US Navy Photo by Journalist 1st Class Jeremy L. Wood, Fleet Combat Camera, Atlantic US Navy Photo by JournalistL. Wood, 1st Class Jeremy MAJ Michael Oeschger, commander of 2nd Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment’s Military Transition Team (MiTT), talks with a local gas station owner about illegal vendors on 15 June 2006. The FA in the Long War A New Mission in COIN America’s overwhelming conventional clearly demonstrates this dichotomy. In military superiority makes it unlikely that By Lieutenant Colonel John A. 1991, we destroyed the world’s fourth future enemies will confront us head on. Nagl, AR, and Lieutenant Colonel largest Army in 100 hours of ground Rather, they will attack us asymmetri- Paul L. Yingling combat. In 2006, we have spent three cally, avoiding our strengths—firepower, years, thousands of lives and billions of maneuver, technology—and come at us capable of providing such fires. However, dollars to stabilize Iraq, yet our insur- and our partners the way the insurgents both the Army and the FA would benefit gent enemies remain a dangerous and do in Iraq and Afghanistan. were the King of Battle to take responsi- capable force. Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus bility for what is, perhaps, the most vital A thinking enemy has a better chance Commander, Combined Arms Center task in counterinsurgency—developing of exhausting our political will through a Fort Leavenworth, Kansas host-nation security forces. protracted insurgency than to defeat our Military Review, Volume LXXXVI The Threats of the Long War. Our military through conventional combat. January-February 2006, No. 1 thinking enemies have studied our Insurgent tactics negate our asymmetric strengths and weaknesses and adapted advantages in intelligence, surveillance vents during the last two decades their tactics to inflict maximum harm on and reconnaissance (ISR) and precision demonstrate that insurgency and ter- our society. Those who have faced the fires by using innocent civilians as cover rorism are the most likely and most US in conventional, interstate combat and concealment and the media as stra- dangerousE threats our country will face (Grenada, Panama, Afghanistan under the tegic “fires.” By hiding “in plain sight” for the foreseeable future. Like the rest Taliban and Iraq under Saddam Hussein) among innocent civilians, insurgents of the Army, the Field Artillery must con- have suffered defeat in days or weeks. maintain their freedom to maneuver. tinue to adapt to become more capable However, those who fight the US using Insurgents rarely mass or defend ter- in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations insurgent tactics (Vietnam, Lebanon, So- rain. Instead, they seek to discredit and that will mark the 21st century. malia and the insurgencies in Afghanistan demoralize free societies and societies Precision fires play an important role and Iraq) have fared far better. who aspire to freedom by terrorizing in countering these threats, and it is The stark contrast between the 1991 innocent civilians.1 essential that the King of Battle remain Gulf War and the current war in Iraq For the foreseeable future, the least

sill-www.army.mil/famag July-August 2006 33 and are essential for America to main- MCO COIN tain her dominance in MCO. In those (Max Force Allowed) (Min Force Necessary) comparatively rare instances when our enemies choose to mass and defend ter- Intel, Comms, EN, Log, PSYOP, MP, Infantry, SOF, Avn rain, precision fires enable US forces to destroy targets with minimal losses to Adaptation friendly forces or innocent civilians. Coupled with our superb maneuver and Fires (FA, ADA, support forces, precision fires enable mortars, airpower) us to destroy our enemies’ capacity to Armored Combat MCO “Spikes” (i.e., defend terrain. Fallujah or Tal Afar) Precision fires also play an important but more limited role in COIN. Time- Capabilities Required sensitive targets in areas where friendly security forces cannot strike are ideal MiTTs, PTTs, BTTs, SPTTs, CA targets for precision fires in COIN. How- ever, effective COIN makes such targets Time rare by denying insurgents sanctuaries outside the reach of friendly security Legend: EN = Engineers PTTs = Police Transition Teams ADA = Air Defense Artillery FA = Field Artillery SOF = Special Operations forces. Precision fires have a more limited Avn = Aviation Log = Logistics Forces role in COIN due to the inherent differ- BTTs = Border Transition MP = Military Police SPPTs = Special Police Transi- Teams PSYOP = Psychological tion Teams ence between COIN and MCO. CA = Civil Affairs Operations In MCO, friendly forces use the maximum force allowable to destroy the enemy. The rapid and overwhelming Figure 1: Adaptation for Full-Spectrum Dominance. From major combat operations (MCO) to application of force hastens the collapse counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, our forces must adapt to maintain dominance through- of enemy forces with minimal loss to out full-spectrum operations. From MCO through COIN, there is a continuing requirement for intelligence (Intel), communications (comms), etc., and a diminishing requirement for fires friendly units. and armored combat. The ascending requirement for elements, such as military transition In COIN, the opposite is true—units teams (MiTTs), helps to develop capable, reliable security forces for the host nation. must rely on the minimum force needed to subdue insurgents. In fact, in COIN, likely form of combat our forces will among nuclear powers is implausible. “the more force you use, the less effective face is conventional interstate combat When the US engages in major com- you are.”3 In a COIN environment, the with a major military power. China, Rus- bat operations (MCO) in the future, our use of fires can affect intelligence col- sia, India and Pakistan all have nuclear most likely adversaries are weak states lection adversely, and intelligence is the weapons, and North Korea and Iran are and non-state actors. Weak states (e.g., lifeblood of COIN. When we capture an determined to acquire them at any cost. Grenada 1982, Panama 1989, Haiti 1994, insurgent, we can exploit his knowledge A small but secure nuclear arsenal is Afghanistan 2001, Iraq 2003) by defini- of the terrorist network; when we kill an capable of deterring an attack by even tion have neither a nuclear deterrent nor insurgent, his knowledge of the terrorist the most capable conventional force. the conventional forces to resist the US for network dies with him. Simply put, nuclear weapons make their any prolonged period of time. In these situ- The use of fires also can affect civilian possessors virtually invulnerable to inva- ations, the conventional might of Ameri- perceptions of security adversely. After sion and regime change.2 can power quickly destroys the enemy’s the use of fires, insurgents often claim Were the US to invade a state with a se- capacity for organized resistance, and US that the strikes were necessary due to cure nuclear capability, we could neither forces quickly transition to stability and the host-nation government’s inability to deter nor prevent that state from turning reconstruction operations (SRO). provide security or that the victims of the its nuclear arsenal on our forces, allies or Another possible scenario for MCO strike were innocent civilians. The truth homeland. A nuclear-armed regime fac- occurs when non-state actors, such as of these claims is beside the point; by ing a conventional invasion literally has terrorists or insurgents, choose to mass employing fires, we create an insurgent nothing more to lose and every incentive forces and defend terrain. This scenario propaganda opportunity. Commanders to go down fighting. has occurred several times in Iraq, includ- must weigh these adverse effects care- The US understands this point. We never ing in battles in Fallujah (2004), Najaf fully when employing fires in COIN. have attacked a nuclear power, and we (2004) and Tal Afar (2004 and 2005). MCO and COIN require different forces spend a great deal of energy attempting When our enemies commit the blunder of with different capabilities. (See Figure 1.) to prevent nuclear proliferation. Our po- massing and defending terrain, our joint Some capabilities are in high demand for tential adversaries understand this point forces seize the opportunity to destroy both MCO and COIN—intelligence, com- and have either acquired or are actively them. Such operations are limited in munications, engineers, logistics, psy- attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. both time and space and quickly return chological operations (PSYOP), military When confronting a nuclear-armed to COIN operations, once we destroy the police (MP), infantry, special operations enemy, the US may opt for diplomacy or enemy’s capacity to hold ground. forces (SOF) and aviation are required covert action. However, unless science The Essential Role of Precision Fires in roughly equal amounts for both COIN or tactics solve the stand-off created in Future Combat. Precision fires will and MCO. Other capabilities in high by nuclear weapons, conventional war play an essential role in future combat demand during MCO are less well suited

34 July-August 2006 Field Artillery for COIN—armored combat and fires, Assigning the Fires Center at Fort Sill, (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. such as FA, air defense artillery (ADA), Oklahoma, responsibility for developing FORSCOM is centralizing all advisory mortars and airpower. This decreasing the host-nation security forces would team training at Fort Riley, Kansas, with use of firepower is consistent with the benefit the Army as a whole. Innovation primary responsibility for the mission principle of employing the minimum force occurs best when one branch or service being assigned to the First Infantry Divi- necessary to defeat insurgents. takes a holistic approach to developing sion upon its re-stationing at Fort Riley However, even in COIN, it is necessary a new capability. This holistic approach in the late summer of 2006. to preserve the capability to transition includes not only doctrine and training While developing host-nation security to MCO. As operations in Fallujah, Tal development, but also manning cohesive forces is vital to the war on terrorism, no Afar and elsewhere have demonstrated, units dedicated to the mission with pro- branch has the responsibility for holisti- there are rare opportunities in COIN in motions tied to performance in the new cally developing this capability. Perhaps which the enemy chooses to mass and mission field. The development of armor, more importantly, the current method of defend terrain. When these opportunities amphibious operations, submarines, forming advisory teams to develop host- occur, we must rapidly transition to MCO bombers and SOF in the 20th century nation security forces offers no promotion for periods limited in space and time to confirms this observation. pathway to reward the best leaders for defeat insurgent forces. Furthermore, scholarly research shows mastering this vital skill. We must send Other forces are in demand less dur- that innovation flourishes when innova- our best personnel as advisors and give ing MCO but become critical in COIN. tive practices are linked to professional them the training required for success in Providing security and other services to advancement. According to Stephen this most demanding mission.7 civilian populations is essential to COIN. Peter Rosen, “innovation may thus re- Developing host-nation security forces Military transition teams (MiTTs), po- quire the creation of a new promotion is a new way of war. A branch that sees lice transition teams (PTTs) and border pathway to the senior ranks, so that this work as a mission-essential task transition teams (BTTs) develop the young officers practicing the new way should lead the mission and reward the host-nation security forces needed to pro- of war can rise to the top, as part of a leaders and the Soldiers who master it. vide security for the civilian population. generational change.”6 The steps necessary to implement such Civil affairs (CA) units build host-nation Forces Command (FORSCOM) cur- a significant change are too complex to governance capacity to redress popular rently has responsibility for the host- cover in this space. However, Figure 2 grievances, including the need for sewer, nation security force mission with sup- briefly outlines 10 steps that the Artillery water, electricity, academics, trash, medi- port from the Combined Arms Center Branch could take were it to embrace cal and security (SWEAT-MS).4 During the transition from MCO to COIN, forces organized, trained and 1. Revise “DA Pamphlet 600-3 Commissioned Officer Development and Career equipped for MCO tasks must transition Management” to recognize service as a host-nation security force advisor as a to tasks that are in high demand. By doing key developmental assignment for Field Artillery officers. so, friendly forces maintain continuous 2. Create a leader’s course for developing host-nation security forces at Fort pressure on the enemy and deny him the Sill, Oklahoma, in cooperation with the COIN Academy at Fort Leavenworth, ability to hide in plain sight among the Kansas. civilian population. 3. Develop a plan for transitioning fires brigades and their subordinate battalions If forces are so specialized that they into advisory units. are unable to make the transition from MCO to COIN, then the population will 4. Propose to Forces Command (FORSCOM) that future MiTT/BTT/PTT/SPTT be without security and other essential requirements be filled by fires brigade units. services in the post-conflict environment. 5. Assign Iraqi and Afghan exchange officers to Fort Sill. This failure to adapt provides the enemy 6. Develop cooperative programs with the Defense Language Institute, Monterey, an opportunity to create chaos immedi- California, and colleges and universities for Arab area and language studies; ately after the end of MCO and fuels the endow one or more chairs in these institutions to support culture and language growth of the insurgency.5 training for Field Artillerymen. A New Role for the FA in COIN. The 7. Assign a liaison officer (LNO) to Fort Riley, Kansas, to coordinate host-nation Army and the FA would benefit greatly security force development doctrine with the 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), if the King of Battle would take primary 1st Infantry Division (1/1ID). responsibility for developing host-na- tion security forces. The Army would 8. Assign Field Artillerymen with experience in developing security forces to the combat training centers (CTCs) to serve as observer/controllers (O/C) during fires benefit by ensuring that an important brigade mission readiness exercises (MRXs). new mission is led by a branch that can take a holistic approach to innovation. 9. Assign LNOs to the MultiNational Security Transition Command, Iraq (MNSTC- The FA would benefit because its newly I) and the Phoenix Academy, also in Iraq, to provide feedback on training Iraqi formed fires brigades are ideal for this security forces. vital mission. (While fires battalions 10. Offer FORSCOM a fires brigade to reinforce and, eventually, replace 1/1ID with a within brigade combat teams, or BCTs, fires brigade as the lead unit for training units deploying as security force trainers. have many of the same attributes as fires brigades, the fires battalions usually are fully committed as maneuver formations Figure 2: Ten Steps for the Field Artillery Branch to Embrace the Counterinsurgency (COIN) in a COIN environment.) Mission of Advising Host-Nation Security Forces

sill-www.army.mil/famag July-August 2006 35 full-spectrum capabilities. Rank MCO COIN The Field Artillery is a powerful instru- ment for destroying America’s enemies. Colonel Brigade Commander Division Senior Advisor The branch must become an equally Lieutenant Colonel Battalion Commander Brigade Senior Advisor powerful instrument for strengthening Major/Captain Brigade Primary Staff Division Staff Advisors America’s friends. Developing host-na- tion security forces is vital to victory in Captain Battery Commander Battalion Senior Advisor the long war and is a mission worthy of Captain/1st Lieutenant Battalion Primary Staff Battalion Senior Advisors the King of Battle. 1st Lieutenant/2nd Lieutenant Platoon Leader Company Senior Advisors Staff Sergeant Section Chief Platoon Senior Advisor Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl, Armor (AR), is the Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in Washington, DC. Figure 3: Fires Brigade Structure in MCO and COIN. The fires brigade would make a superb Previously, he served as the S3 of 1st Bat- division MiTT. talion, 34th Armor (1-34 AR), 1st Infantry Division, during Operation Iraqi Freedom the mission of developing host-nation population they secure. However, this (OIF) II and as the Deputy G3 of the 24th security forces. dispersion places them at risk for insur- Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas. He Taking responsibility for developing gent attacks. Redlegs with the ability to taught International Relations and National host-nation security forces would ben- call for fire reduce this risk and increase Security Studies at the US Military Acad- efit the FA by providing fires brigades the confidence and the effectiveness of emy at West Point; commanded A Troop, a high-priority mission during COIN. host-nation security forces. 1-1 Cav, part of the 1st Armored Division, Fires brigades have many attributes that FA forces already train host-nation se- in Germany; and led a tank platoon in the make them ideal to be advisory units. curity forces as well as superbly perform 1st Cavalry Division in the Gulf during They are cohesive units that are read- many other tasks, including serving as Operation Desert Storm (ODS). He holds a ily available during the transition from maneuver forces, MPs, truck drivers, CA PhD in International Relations from Oxford University, England, where he studied as MCO to COIN. Upon conclusion of and PSYOP Soldiers, and area support a Rhodes Scholar. He is the author of the MCO, fires brigades could transition to group staff members. However, Field book Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: developing host-nation security forces, Artillerymen should not be content to Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya thereby denying insurgents freedom of fill in gaps for high-demand capabilities and Vietnam (University of Chicago Press, action in the immediate post-conflict in COIN operations. 2005). He is slated to take command of 1-34 environment. The FA’s future is served better by AR at Fort Riley in November. Fires brigades contain a high ratio of taking responsibility for a vital COIN leaders, including centrally selected requirement: advising host-nation se- Lieutenant Colonel Paul L. Yingling is the senior commanders and command curity forces. FA doctrine must teach Deputy Commanding Officer for the 3rd sergeants major. This ratio of leaders leaders how to perform this task, and FA Armored Cavalry Regiment, the same unit in which he served as the Effects enables embedding security force advi- institutional and unit training must hone Coordinator (ECOORD) during OIF III. sors down to the platoon level. Advisory this difficult but essential craft. Among other assignments, he was the teams currently do not extend to the The FA’s “staking out” this skill Executive Officer (XO) for the 212th Field company and platoon levels. would ensure that fires brigades are in Artillery Brigade at Fort Sill, Oklahoma; Fires brigades have the staff exper- high demand for both MCO and COIN. XO of 2-18 FA, 212th FA Brigade, during tise needed to develop the host-nation Combatant commanders fighting active OIF I; and Chief of Plans, G3, 2nd Infantry security forces’ ability to perform vital insurgencies would seek fires brigades Division in Korea. He commanded A/25 administrative, logistical, and command to build the combat power needed to FA (Target Acquisition) during Operation and control tasks.8 The organizational defeat insurgents. Likewise, combatant Joint Endeavor in Bosnia and served as structure of a fires brigade would make commanders who seek to deter conflict a Platoon Fire Direction Officer in the 1st Infantry Division during ODS. He taught a superb division-level MiTT. (See would seek fires brigades to build host- International Relations at West Point. He Figure 3.) nation deterrent capabilities. holds an MA in International Relations Finally, fires brigades can coordinate The struggle to defend free societies from the University of Chicago and is a for fires in the event insurgents try to and societies seeking to be free from the graduate of the Command and General overwhelm and destroy a host-nation’s perils of insurgency and terrorism will Staff College and School of Advanced security forces. To be effective, security be the work of a generation of Army Military Studies (SAMS), both at Fort forces must disperse among the civilian leaders. Defeating these threats requires Leavenworth, Kansas.

1. T. X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone (St. Paul, Minnesota: would be quite sufficient.” (November-December 2005), 2-15. Zenith Press, 2004.) Hammes provides a superb description 3. Eliot Cohen, Conrad Crane, Jan Horvath and John Nagl, 6. Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War (Ithaca and of the difficulties encountered by conventional military forces “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency,” London: Cornell University Press, 1991), 20. For more on in- when confronting insurgencies. Military Review LXXXVI, 2 (March-April 2006), 52. See FM novation in wartime, see John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with 2. See Kenneth Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” 3.24 Counterinsurgency for more on the limited role of force a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam in Robert Art and Ken Waltz, eds., The Use of Force, Military in counterinsurgency. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). Power and International Politics, 4th Edition (Lanham, Maryland: 4. See Major General Peter W. Chiarelli and Major Patrick 7.For an excellent case study on the advisory efforts in Iraq, University Press of American, 1993) 333-349. Waltz argues, R. Michaelis, “Winning the Peace: The Requirement of Full- see Greg Jaffe, “A Camp Divided,” The Wall Street Journal “Nuclear weapons strip conventional forces of most of their Spectrum Operations,” Military Review LXXXV, 4 (July-August (June 17, 2006), 1. functions...The probability of major war among states having 2005), 4-17. 8. See Brigadier General Daniel P. Bolger, “So You Want to be an nuclear weapons approaches zero...We do not need ever larger 5. Nigel R. F. Alwyn-Foster, “Changing the Army for Advisor?” Military Review LXXXVI, 2 (March-April 2006), 2-7. forces to deter. Smaller forces, so long as they are invulnerable, Counterinsurgency Operations,” Military Review LXXXV, 6

36 July-August 2006 Field Artillery