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US Navy Photo by Journalist 1st Class Jeremy L. Wood, Fleet Combat Camera, Atlantic US Navy Photo by JournalistL. Wood, 1st Class Jeremy MAJ Michael Oeschger, commander of 2nd Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment’s Military Transition Team (MiTT), talks with a local gas station owner about illegal vendors on 15 June 2006. The FA in the Long War A New Mission in COIN America’s overwhelming conventional clearly demonstrates this dichotomy. In military superiority makes it unlikely that By Lieutenant Colonel John A. 1991, we destroyed the world’s fourth future enemies will confront us head on. Nagl, AR, and Lieutenant Colonel largest Army in 100 hours of ground Rather, they will attack us asymmetri- Paul L. Yingling combat. In 2006, we have spent three cally, avoiding our strengths—firepower, years, thousands of lives and billions of maneuver, technology—and come at us capable of providing such fires. However, dollars to stabilize Iraq, yet our insur- and our partners the way the insurgents both the Army and the FA would benefit gent enemies remain a dangerous and do in Iraq and Afghanistan. were the King of Battle to take responsi- capable force. Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus bility for what is, perhaps, the most vital A thinking enemy has a better chance Commander, Combined Arms Center task in counterinsurgency—developing of exhausting our political will through a Fort Leavenworth, Kansas host-nation security forces. protracted insurgency than to defeat our Military Review, Volume LXXXVI The Threats of the Long War. Our military through conventional combat. January-February 2006, No. 1 thinking enemies have studied our Insurgent tactics negate our asymmetric strengths and weaknesses and adapted advantages in intelligence, surveillance vents during the last two decades their tactics to inflict maximum harm on and reconnaissance (ISR) and precision demonstrate that insurgency and ter- our society. Those who have faced the fires by using innocent civilians as cover rorism are the most likely and most US in conventional, interstate combat and concealment and the media as stra- dangerousE threats our country will face (Grenada, Panama, Afghanistan under the tegic “fires.” By hiding “in plain sight” for the foreseeable future. Like the rest Taliban and Iraq under Saddam Hussein) among innocent civilians, insurgents of the Army, the Field Artillery must con- have suffered defeat in days or weeks. maintain their freedom to maneuver. tinue to adapt to become more capable However, those who fight the US using Insurgents rarely mass or defend ter- in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations insurgent tactics (Vietnam, Lebanon, So- rain. Instead, they seek to discredit and that will mark the 21st century. malia and the insurgencies in Afghanistan demoralize free societies and societies Precision fires play an important role and Iraq) have fared far better. who aspire to freedom by terrorizing in countering these threats, and it is The stark contrast between the 1991 innocent civilians.1 essential that the King of Battle remain Gulf War and the current war in Iraq For the foreseeable future, the least sill-www.army.mil/famag July-August 2006 33 and are essential for America to main- MCO COIN tain her dominance in MCO. In those (Max Force Allowed) (Min Force Necessary) comparatively rare instances when our enemies choose to mass and defend ter- Intel, Comms, EN, Log, PSYOP, MP, Infantry, SOF, Avn rain, precision fires enable US forces to destroy targets with minimal losses to Adaptation friendly forces or innocent civilians. Coupled with our superb maneuver and Required support forces, precision fires enable Fires (FA, ADA, mortars, airpower) us to destroy our enemies’ capacity to Armored Combat MCO “Spikes” (i.e., defend terrain. Fallujah or Tal Afar) Precision fires also play an important but more limited role in COIN. Time- Capabilities sensitive targets in areas where friendly security forces cannot strike are ideal MiTTs, PTTs, BTTs, SPTTs, CA targets for precision fires in COIN. How- ever, effective COIN makes such targets Time rare by denying insurgents sanctuaries outside the reach of friendly security Legend: EN = Engineers PTTs = Police Transition Teams ADA = Air Defense Artillery FA = Field Artillery SOF = Special Operations forces. Precision fires have a more limited Avn = Aviation Log = Logistics Forces role in COIN due to the inherent differ- BTTs = Border Transition MP = Military Police SPPTs = Special Police Transi- Teams PSYOP = Psychological tion Teams ence between COIN and MCO. CA = Civil Affairs Operations In MCO, friendly forces use the maximum force allowable to destroy the enemy. The rapid and overwhelming Figure 1: Adaptation for Full-Spectrum Dominance. From major combat operations (MCO) to application of force hastens the collapse counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, our forces must adapt to maintain dominance through- of enemy forces with minimal loss to out full-spectrum operations. From MCO through COIN, there is a continuing requirement for intelligence (Intel), communications (comms), etc., and a diminishing requirement for fires friendly units. and armored combat. The ascending requirement for elements, such as military transition In COIN, the opposite is true—units teams (MiTTs), helps to develop capable, reliable security forces for the host nation. must rely on the minimum force needed to subdue insurgents. In fact, in COIN, likely form of combat our forces will among nuclear powers is implausible. “the more force you use, the less effective face is conventional interstate combat When the US engages in major com- you are.”3 In a COIN environment, the with a major military power. China, Rus- bat operations (MCO) in the future, our use of fires can affect intelligence col- sia, India and Pakistan all have nuclear most likely adversaries are weak states lection adversely, and intelligence is the weapons, and North Korea and Iran are and non-state actors. Weak states (e.g., lifeblood of COIN. When we capture an determined to acquire them at any cost. Grenada 1982, Panama 1989, Haiti 1994, insurgent, we can exploit his knowledge A small but secure nuclear arsenal is Afghanistan 2001, Iraq 2003) by defini- of the terrorist network; when we kill an capable of deterring an attack by even tion have neither a nuclear deterrent nor insurgent, his knowledge of the terrorist the most capable conventional force. the conventional forces to resist the US for network dies with him. Simply put, nuclear weapons make their any prolonged period of time. In these situ- The use of fires also can affect civilian possessors virtually invulnerable to inva- ations, the conventional might of Ameri- perceptions of security adversely. After sion and regime change.2 can power quickly destroys the enemy’s the use of fires, insurgents often claim Were the US to invade a state with a se- capacity for organized resistance, and US that the strikes were necessary due to cure nuclear capability, we could neither forces quickly transition to stability and the host-nation government’s inability to deter nor prevent that state from turning reconstruction operations (SRO). provide security or that the victims of the its nuclear arsenal on our forces, allies or Another possible scenario for MCO strike were innocent civilians. The truth homeland. A nuclear-armed regime fac- occurs when non-state actors, such as of these claims is beside the point; by ing a conventional invasion literally has terrorists or insurgents, choose to mass employing fires, we create an insurgent nothing more to lose and every incentive forces and defend terrain. This scenario propaganda opportunity. Commanders to go down fighting. has occurred several times in Iraq, includ- must weigh these adverse effects care- The US understands this point. We never ing in battles in Fallujah (2004), Najaf fully when employing fires in COIN. have attacked a nuclear power, and we (2004) and Tal Afar (2004 and 2005). MCO and COIN require different forces spend a great deal of energy attempting When our enemies commit the blunder of with different capabilities. (See Figure 1.) to prevent nuclear proliferation. Our po- massing and defending terrain, our joint Some capabilities are in high demand for tential adversaries understand this point forces seize the opportunity to destroy both MCO and COIN—intelligence, com- and have either acquired or are actively them. Such operations are limited in munications, engineers, logistics, psy- attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. both time and space and quickly return chological operations (PSYOP), military When confronting a nuclear-armed to COIN operations, once we destroy the police (MP), infantry, special operations enemy, the US may opt for diplomacy or enemy’s capacity to hold ground. forces (SOF) and aviation are required covert action. However, unless science The Essential Role of Precision Fires in roughly equal amounts for both COIN or tactics solve the stand-off created in Future Combat. Precision fires will and MCO. Other capabilities in high by nuclear weapons, conventional war play an essential role in future combat demand during MCO are less well suited 34 July-August 2006 Field Artillery for COIN—armored combat and fires, Assigning the Fires Center at Fort Sill, (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. such as FA, air defense artillery (ADA), Oklahoma, responsibility for developing FORSCOM is centralizing all advisory mortars and airpower. This decreasing the host-nation security forces would team training at Fort Riley, Kansas, with use of firepower is consistent with the benefit the Army as a whole. Innovation primary responsibility for the mission principle of employing the minimum force occurs best when one branch or service being assigned to the First Infantry Divi- necessary to defeat insurgents. takes a holistic approach to developing sion upon its re-stationing at Fort Riley However, even in COIN, it is necessary a new capability. This holistic approach in the late summer of 2006. to preserve the capability to transition includes not only doctrine and training While developing host-nation security to MCO.

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