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The Failure of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq

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The Failure of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq BUILDING STATES, FAILING NATIONS: THE FAILURE OF POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN IRAQ Hawzhin Azeez B.A., M.A. A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy January 2013 Newcastle Business School, Faculty of Business and Law The University of Newcastle, Australia. The thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text. I give consent to the final version of my thesis being made available worldwide when deposited in the University’s Digital Repository**, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968. **Unless an Embargo has been approved for a determined period. Acknowledgements The completion of this thesis would not have been possible without the support of my supervisors Dr. Robert Imre and Dr. Tod Moore. Dr. Imre came on board at an exceptionally crucial time and rescued my confidence and desire to proceed with my research. Since then, his constant guidance and support, particularly in the form of emotional support and motivation has been profound in encouraging me to continue with the research. Dr. Imre has also been crucial in encouraging my confidence in teaching, one of my life's greatest passions, in addition to supporting my efforts at publications. Dr. Tod Moore likewise inherited a haphazard thesis and provided valuable feedback and support which was crucial to the completion of the thesis. He was kind enough not to be too critical of my efforts despite the copious amounts of work he read. Much debt is owed to both for the profound help, motivation and support they have provided. Thanks are also owed to Dr. Inta Allegritti and Dr. John Tate who were my initial supervisors in the beginning of the project. I have learned much because of my interactions with them and appreciate their contributions. Much thanks also to Dr. Jim Jose who inherited me as a Ph.D. student in the awkward middle stages of my candidature and provided a revived sense of purpose to continue with the research. Many thanks also to Vicki Tonkin and her staff for their professional service and proofreading of my final thesis draft. It is not difficult to pinpoint the seeds of my interest in the field of state reconstruction; suffice it to say that being a western educated, young Kurdish woman whose earlier life experiences as a Kurdish refugee as a result of the first Gulf War (1980-1988); and my family's subsequent exile to Iran, where limited politco- economic opportunities prevented a humane existence other than at the level of second class citizens, played a profound role. My interest in nation-building also results from my identity as a Kurd from northern Iraq, and my earlier memories of Kurdish resistance against the brutality and oppression of the Ba’athist regime. My father's decision to escape the brutality of the regime in 1988, the memory of war and conflict and the profound sense of fear and insecurity have enabled me to gain a deep level of empathy and awareness of the trials that conflict-ridden societies experience. I will forever remember the memory, sense and smells of war and bombs falling on terrified villagers. It is therefore my profound privilege to have selected an area of study, which I feel so essentially and irrevocably connected to, and feel an intense desire to dedicate my life to. Having said this, it was also profoundly difficult to focus my thesis on religion and the role of religious actors, particularly as a secular, educated young woman; because of my experience in the deeply religious society in the short years after the 1979 revolutionary Iran, which instilled in me both a deep sense of awe and aversion to institutionalised religion. Nevertheless, the role of the political theorist is fraught with difficulties that challenge us as humans first and foremost, and second as scientists responsible with the onerous task of addressing political challenges. Last but not least, I would like to thank my family and my friends. I dedicate this thesis to the most incredible people: my father Khalid Azeez and mother Naema Azeez. Without your courage and strength we would not have survived the abject poverty, hopelessness and violence of the situation we were confined in. Thank you. To my incredible older brother, Govand Azeez, you showed me the strength of the human spirit, and that irrespective of your beginnings, we have the power to choose our destines and be the 'masters of our fate, the captains of our souls'! Ale Gaitan, my beautiful sister in law, thank you for your unconditional love. Reband Azeez, Heleen (lele) and Zaggie you are the loves of my life. Finally, I would like to note that I alone am responsible for any errors or oversights within the thesis. Hawzhin Azeez. Abbreviations ARC Accreditation Review Committees CAVR The Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in East Timor CPA Coalition Provisional Authority CSIS Centre for Strategic and International Studies HNDC The Higher National De-Ba’athification Commission ICG International Crisis Group ICP Iraqi Communist Party ICTJ International Centre for Transitional Justice IDC Iraqi de-Ba’athification Council IDP Internally Displaced People IST Iraqi Special Tribunal JAM Mehdi Army or Jaysh al-Mehdi JHU National Heritage Party NATO Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development RCLO Regime Crimes Liaison Office SCIRI Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq. Reformed to SIIC after 2007. SICT Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal SPSC Serious Crimes of the Dili District Court TJDB Transitional Justice Data Base UNTAET The United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor TABLE OF CONTENT Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations Table of Content Abstract 1- Chapter One: Introduction: 1.1 Overview: 1 2-Chapter Two: The Literature review: 2.1 Introduction: 21 2.2 The State-centric Nature of Reconstructions: 33 2.3 Weak and Failed States Literature: 41 2.4 Sovereignty: 52 2.5 Religious Actors: 67 2.6 Identity Politics: 91 2.7 Regional Implications: 103 2.8 Conclusion: 106 3- Chapter Three- The American Model of Reconstruction 3.1 Introduction: 108 3.2 Wilsonian Internationalism: 111 3.3 Neo-Imperialism: 125 3.4 The Ideal U.S. Model for Reconstructions: 131 3.5 Conclusion: 141 4-Chapter Four- Post-Colonial Iraq and nation-building 4.1 Introduction: 145 4.2 Identity Matters: 148 4.3 Iraq's State-Building Experience: 157 4.4 Iraq and Identity: 167 4.5 The Kurdish Experience: 169 4.6 The Kirkuk Issue: 178 4.7 The Shia Experience: 182 4.8 Overview of Iraq Nation-Building: 189 4.9 Nation-building through Transitional Justice Practices: 202 4.10 Iraq’s Transitional Justice: 206 5-Chapter Five: Ayatollahs, Grand Marjas and 'Upstart' Clerics: 5.1 Introduction: 214 5.2 Insider Actors and Outsider Actors: 216 5.3 Utility of Religion within Reconstruction: 224 5.4 Islamic Religious Hierarchy: 230 5.5 Top level Religious Actors: 236 5.6 Muqtada al-Sadr: 247 5.7 Shi’ite Political Activism: 253 5.8 Conclusion: 264 6-Chapter Six- Exogenous Actors and Iraq’s Reconstructions 6.1 Introduction: 272 6.2 Theories on Influence of Neighbours: 275 6.3 The Middle East and Regionalism: 284 6.4 Refugees and Internally Displaced People: 295 6.5 Turkey: 298 6.6 Iran: 303 6.7 Saudi Arabia: 312 6.8 Syria and Jordan: 318 6.9 Conclusion: 320 7- Chapter Seven- Conclusion: 325 8-References: 344 ABSTRACT The fundamental objective of this thesis centres on identifying the most prominent contemporary lacuna in reconstruction of conflict ridden, weak and failing societies, particularly with an interest in deeply religious societies. The case study utilised focuses on the U.S. led reconstruction, as well as the policies and failures within the post-Saddam Iraq. It is argued that the U.S. led coalition forces imposed a linear liberal democratic peace model on Iraq, which immediately faced significant resistance from the long suffering recipient society. The thesis posits that the model of reconstruction imposed on recipient societies, such as Iraq, is inadequate and quixotic and requires a fundamental shift in approach, norms and the attitude of the international donor community. An analysis of Iraq demonstrates that polyethnoreligious societies face substantial identity insecurities, often perpetuated and reinforced by previous colonial practices and repressive regimes. Thus, the international community is faced with significant socio-political engineering, which in deeply religious societies requires a fundamental shift in inter-societal attitudes. Iraq demonstrated that the liberation of long oppressed societies from the clutches of dictators does not necessarily produce inherently liberal, though perhaps tentatively democratic, societies because of the unique nature of the social structures of such societies. This was evident through the rise of top-level religious actors such as Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and the lesser educated Muqtada al-Sadr. The resultant dialogues produced from the political activism of such actors not only shaped the state- society and inter-societal discourse on the ideal Iraqi identity; but also provided a powerful example of the return of the role of religion into the political sphere. It is this gap, the role of religion and its influential representatives, and their relationship towards, and impact on reconstructions and social engineering, which is at the centre of this thesis. The significance of this study relates to the crucial and evolving state-society relations within the Middle East and the violent internal dialogue currently in evidence through the Arab Spring.
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