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European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2021 EUROPEAN UNION TERRORISM SITUATION and TREND REPORT 2021

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European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2021 EUROPEAN UNION TERRORISM SITUATION and TREND REPORT 2021 European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend report 2021 EUROPEAN UNION TERRORISM SITUATION AND TREND REPORT 2021 PDF | ISBN 978-92-95220-26-3 | ISSN 2363-0876 | DOI: 10.2813/677724 | QL-AJ-21-001-EN-N © European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, 2021 Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. For any use or reproduction of photos or other material that is not under the copyright of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, permission must be sought directly from the copyright holders. Cite this publication: Europol (2021), European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. This publication and more information on Europol are available on the Internet. www.europol.europa.eu Contents 4 Foreword 6 Trends and Executive Summary 10 Introduction 12 Terrorism in Europe in 2020: an overview 42 Jihadist terrorism 78 Right-wing terrorism 92 Left-wing and anarchist terrorism 98 Annexes Foreword TERRORISM Law enforcement authorities in the AND VIOLENT Member States and, together with them, EXTREMISM IN Europol undertakes ardent efforts to ALL FORMS ARE mitigate these threats. SIGNIFICANT I am pleased to present this comprehensive situation report, which details SECURITY the terrorism situation including figures regarding terrorist attacks and arrests in the EU in 2020. The European Union (EU) Terrorism Situation CHALLENGES TO and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2021 is one of Europol’s key reports and highlights the Agency’s role as a crucial information broker and key THE EU. component of the EU’s internal security framework. During 2020, much of the attention of the public, policy-makers and law enforcement has been captivated by the COVID-19 pandemic and our response to this unprecedented crisis. However, a number of tragic attacks served as painful reminders that even during a global public health emergency terrorism remains a threat. While I am encouraged that the number of terrorist attacks recorded in the EU appears to have largely remained stable, I am also concerned that more jihadist terrorist attacks were completed than thwarted during 2020. This is a reflection of the strain that our law enforcement authorities are under during the COVID-19 crisis. Some of the key elements of the terrorism threat in the EU remain unchanged. Jihadist terrorists often strike alone and using unsophisticated methods of attack. The radicalisation of young people in various settings, including in prisons, continues to be a key concern and demands our attention. -4 Foreword TE-SAT 2021 The online domain plays a crucial role in enabling violent extremists to spread their propaganda and sow hatred among potentially vulnerable and receptive audiences. This can be observed across the spectrum of violent extremism from jihadist, to right- and left-wing extremism. We need to further enhance our investigative capabilities online and intensify cooperation with the private sector operators of the online platforms hosting extremist material and providing spaces for violent extremists to engage and radicalise members of the public. — Catherine De Bolle The situation set out in the TE-SAT 2021 compels us and our partners to intensify our collective efforts EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF EUROPOL in fighting this threat. Much has been achieved in enhancing information exchange, reinforcing operational cooperation and streamlining the coordination of complex and challenging investigations over the last years. However, I can see the clear potential to further enhance the way we fight terrorism together by making it easier and even more secure to share information in real-time, by making processes more agile and utilising the latest technological advances embedded in a strong data protection framework. Europol continues to enable and empower cooperation between Member States and with other operational partners. I clearly see Europol’s role in providing a service platform that enables even wider and deeper cooperation between our main stakeholders on key sensitive files and terrorist threats. I look forward to continue working together with Member States and our partners in the EU institutions to realise this and fulfil the promise of making Europe safer every single day. -5 Trends and Executive Summary The EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2021 provides figures on terrorist attacks and terrorism-related arrests in the European Union (EU) in 2020. It is based predominantly on information officially contributed to Europol by EU Member States. In addition, a number of Europol’s cooperation partners were invited to provide information on the terrorism situation in their countries. NUMBERS OF TERRORIST NUMBERS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS APPEAR TO HAVE ARRESTS DROPPED REMAINED LARGELY STABLE. SIGNIFICANTLY. EU Member States reported a total of 57 completed, A total of 449 arrests on suspicion of terrorist failed and foiled terrorist attacks in 2020. The UK offences in EU Member States were reported to reported 62 terrorist incidents and Switzerland Europol in 2020. The UK reported 185 terrorism- reported two probable jihadist terrorist attacks. The related arrests. This number was significantly number of terrorist attacks in EU Member States in lower than in 2019 (1 004, of which 281 in the UK). 2020 is comparable to 2019 (119, 64 of which in the The decrease is probably linked to the COVID-19 UK) but decreased compared to 2018 (129, 60 of pandemic. However, it remains unclear whether this which in the UK). A total of 21 people were killed in indicates reduced terrorist activity or it is a result terrorist attacks in the EU in 2020. Three people died of changes in the operational capacities of public in the UK and one in Switzerland. With the exception authorities during the pandemic. of the targeted murder of a school teacher in France, the fatal victims appear to have been chosen at random as representatives of populations identified as enemies on ideological grounds. -6 Trends and Executive Summary TE-SAT 2021 ALL COMPLETED JIHADIST TERRORIST MORE JIHADIST ATTACKS WERE JIHADIST TERRORIST CARRIED OUT BY ATTACKERS ATTACKS WERE LONE ACTORS. CONTINUED TO COMPLETED THAN HAVE A DIVERSE Disrupted plots mainly involved THWARTED. multiple suspects. The self- BACKGROUND. proclaimed Islamic State (IS) Ten completed jihadist terrorist terrorist group and the al-Qaeda The family background or place attacks occurred in the EU network continued to incite of birth of perpetrators varied in 2020. In addition, the UK lone-actor attacks in Western significantly. Four of the ten reported three jihadist attacks countries, sometimes by completed jihadist attacks were and Switzerland two probable exploiting the renewed carried out by EU citizens. The jihadist attacks. The number controversy over satirical perpetrators of five attacks had of completed jihadist attacks depictions of the Prophet entered the EU as asylum in Europe (EU, Switzerland and Muhammad. seekers or irregular migrants; in the UK) more than doubled in four cases they had been in the comparison with the number EU several years before carrying in the EU (including the UK) in out their attack. One perpetrator 2019. In 2020, unlike 2018 and entered the EU from Tunisia via 2019, the number of completed Italy approximately a month MOST JIHADIST attacks exceeded that of foiled prior to his attack in Nice plots (four in the EU, two in the TERRORIST (France). UK). Whether this was linked ATTACKERS USED to the effects of the COVID-19 UNSOPHISTICATED pandemic cannot be ascertained ATTACK METHODS. on the basis of the information available. Except for the attack in Vienna, in which firearms were used, modi operandi involved rudimentary methods (stabbing, vehicle ramming, and arson). -7 TE-SAT 2021 Trends and Executive Summary HUNDREDS OF EUROPEANS REMAIN IN EUROPE CONTINUED DETENTION CAMPS JIHADISTS TO SUFFER THE IN NORTHEAST OPERATING ONLINE EFFECTS OF SYRIA. CONTINUED TO JIHADIST STRUGGLE TO RADICALISATION While a small number of REBUILD THEIR AND RECRUITMENT returnees from the conflict area in Syria and Iraq were NETWORKS AFTER IN PRISONS AND reported by EU Member THE 2019 THE THREAT FROM States and other European TELEGRAM RELEASED countries in 2020, hundreds of TAKEDOWN. PRISONERS. Europeans remain in detention camps in northeast Syria. In 2020, at least five jihadist Jihadist propaganda has COVID-19 restrictions on travel attacks in Europe (Austria, become more dispersed across affected the return of foreign Germany and the UK) involved a variety of platforms and terrorist fighters to Europe in perpetrators who were either there has been a clear attempt 2020. Those that did return released convicts or prisoners at by IS supporters to ensure included two IS members the time they committed the IS messaging reaches target entering Spain using an attack. audiences. irregular migration route from North Africa. -8 Trends and Executive Summary TE-SAT 2021 SUSPECTS ARRESTED FOR PLANNING RIGHT- WING TERRORIST OR EXTREMIST ATTACKS ARE INCREASINGLY YOUNG IN AGE, AND ONE COMPLETED COVID-19 DID NOT SOME ARE MINORS. RIGHT-WING FUNDAMENTALLY TERRORIST MODIFY CORE Most have links to transnational ATTACK WAS violent online communities and TERRORIST MODI CARRIED OUT BY A espouse accelerationist ideas. OPERANDI. LONE ACTOR IN There was an observed trend for right-wing extremists to GERMANY. Terrorist groups and individuals use video games and gaming tried to integrate the pandemic platforms to propagate ideology. Three other right-wing terrorist into
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