j
THE COUNCIL OF STATE IN BRAZIL,
1841 - 1899: ITS INFLUENCE DURING THE REIGN OF DOM PEDRO II.
Lydia G<'lrner E\,I.ropc2.n ;;errd.na.!' April 30, 19GL Gilmdn 3.1.5 4:00 p.m. After its independence, Brazil, unlike th~ neighboring Latin American states, established a monarchical :Lorm of government. The monarchy ruled with the assistance of a Council of State, one of the most powerful but least under stood institutions of the government, and one without a parallel in the Americas after 1810. Its members, mostly nobles, were chosen by the Emperor to serve in the Council on a permanent basis, and their tenure, as well as their prox imity to the throne, led to the exercise of great influence and power. A preliminary survey of the functions, jurisdic tion, and socio-economic composition of the Council of State in Brazil during the reign of Dom Pedro II (1840-1889) will illustrate how, in the context of a traditional economic system characterized by an export-import economy based on slave labor, the influence and power of its members became an im pediment of innovation and development. The right to free enterprise without governmental control, and the incentive and promotion of free trade and commerce were some of the issues facing the Brazilian government during the period. In both issues the Council of State was called upon to de liberate. Yet, no attention has been given to the role of this institution in governffiGnt. The purpose of this paper is to place in evidence the importance of the Council of State i~ the decision-making proc'~as during the :;.... eign of f)Dm Pedl.... O II, and demonstrate that neither its existence nor its role can any longer be ignored.
European Background of the Council of State in Brazil The historic roots of the institution of the Council of -2- ; State lie in the medieval C':mncil of the King. This consuJ.ta- tive body consisted of men of knfl),,,,1edge, experience and prudence who advised the monarch on impoli'tant administrative matters. The two European monarchies that are "tlte most relevant for setting th:e sc'ene for t'he Council of State in the Lusc:· Brazilian world are the French and Spanish. In Franqe, the Council of State was formally created 1:>y ijapoleon in 119\9. Its functions consisted of preparing projects of law and regulations. of public administratiQrt, resolving difficulties ofadmin;i;strative nature, and advice on all matters requested. For administrative purposes the Council was. divided into five sections: legislative, interior, finance, administrative, and judi¢iary. This administrative format of the French Council of State was la.ter adopted for
the Council in Srazil. In France~ it b~oame an essential feature of the Na,poleonicstate, and, together with the Code Napoleon, was adopted l:>y many countri.es. l
In Spain, und.e%' Ferdinand and Isal)elld s it was the Council of Castille, -..Ihich had originated in the mediev'al Roya 1 Council of the Kings cf Castille that served as the model for
all subsequent coun.ci13 that formed the c~)re of ~panish colonial administration. Under Charles V, whe!'eas the regional COUncils were SUl1>posed to study, prE":?;:,:;,"e, and recom-
mend legislation for their respective ~eographi·~al i~.t'eas, the Council of State had no regional function, political influence, or administrative s·ignific~nce. 2 It was under Philip II that the Council of State was given the responsibility for the study,
preparation and f~rmulation of policies on domestic matters -3-
with the additional task of overseeing all matters of foreign relations of relevance to the kingdom. 3 Like other Spanish
councils, it combined legal and administrative functions b~t, in counterdistinction to regional councils which could be recognized as genuine regional administrative bodies, the natural tendency of the Council of State in the exercise of its functions was toward centralization. In Portugal, a consultative body to advise the king is mentioned as early as 1385, when Dom Joaa,Master of Avis, was acclaimed king of Portugal. On that occasion, the Cortes of Coimbra, an early version of the general assembly without legislative power, obtained from the King the promise to listen to their advice on all important administrative matters. 4 In the Ordena~oes Affonsinas of 1447, a compila tion of the laws of the kingdom by Affonso V, the basic functions of royal counselors in Portugal were described for the first time. Quoting Solomon, that there was no worse fate than to have an enemy for an advisor, the Ordenacoes stipulated ~ that counselors be men of virtue, sobriety, and loyalty to king and nation. They further stipulated that counselors should study, understand, and examine in depth all matters submitted to their deliberations, and be avlare of their responsibility to offer good counsel. 5 But a consultative body designated as Council of State was only established in Portugal in 1562 by Cardinal Dom Henrique during the minority of Dom Sebasti'ao who, in 1569, after his ascension was to give that -4- body the same functions that it had in Spain under Philip II. No further alterations occurred for two and a half centuries. Only in 1822 did the new constitution stipulate the length of tenure in office and the method of selecting its members. Incumbency was of four years instead of life, and the Cortes nominated a number of candidates from whom the king would choose his advisors. 6 Shortly afterwards, the constitution charter that superseded the 1822 Constitution made appointment to the Council of State in perpetuo, and the choice of counselors the exclusive prerogative of the king. In Brazil, the historical roots of the Council of State lie in the Councils of Portugal and Spain, but its format was similar to that of France. Ostensively designated as an advisory body to the emperor, it became in reality a power ful and influential administrative and legislative organ of govenrment.
Functions, Jurisdiction, and Hierarchy of the Council of State The Brazilian Council of State was created in 1824 by the first constitution of the Empire. During the reign of
Dom Pedro I, 1822-1834, the members of the Cou~cil were mostly Portuguese born, a fact that caused great dissatisfaction among Brazilians who interpreted it as an attempt to perpetuate Portuguese influence in Brazil. After Dom Pedro's abdica tion, in 1834, the Council of State was abolished by the -5-
Regency during the period of his son's minority. In 1841 it was reinstated again by Dom Pt-'dro II shortly. after his ascension to the throne. As was customary, nomination for thq po~ition was a prerogative of the emperor and incumbency 'Hal:) for. life. 7 The constitution stipulated the requirements for the nomination. The candidate had to be at least forty years of age, be a person of knowledge, ability, and virtue. He also had to have an annual income of at least $800.000 mil reis. 98 Upon accepting nomination the new member took an oath of loyalty to the emperor, promised to defend the constitution and the empire, to defend the Roman Catholic Church, and to counsel the emperor according to his conscience and the best interest of the country. The functions and jurisdiction of this body were broader than the oath impl~.ed. The Council was to be consulted on all important matters. In foreign affairs this jurisdiction included declarations· of war, enactm~nts of traaties, and negotiations with foreign powers. Domestic concerns included all areas of publl~ administration, e.g., promulgation of decrees, regulations and instructions; proposals introduced in the House of Representatives by the Cabinet; conflicts of jurisdictions between administrative authorities (including the judiciary); and abuse by ecclesiastical authorities. 9 In the discharge of these functions the counselors could summon any government employee to give an oral or written deposi tion .10 -6-
The Council was composed of t·welve members. For ad ministrative purpo,ses it had four divisions: Foreign affairs and justice; domestic affaiI;'s,; finance; army and navy. Each division was under the supervision of three counselors who were charged with studying; analyzing, and providing opinions on all matters submitted for their consideration by the Emperor or by the Cabinet.ll The Council convened in the imperial palace and was presided over by the Emperor. Under Dom Pedro II it met twice a week.12 In these meetings, the counselors presented their opinions on matters pr~yiously submitted for study, and recommended a course of action. Reconunendations accepted by the Emperor were issued in the form of decrees, or sent to the House of Representatives together with !"lis approval. The Emperor could ctlso accept deliberations from the divisions without conve!l.ing the whole Council.
Hierarchically, counsp.lors of State tQO~ their places immediately after members of the Cahinet, enjoyed identical privileges and prerogatives, and· w·ere to be addressed as Your Excellency. 13 The Emperor ha,d the pr'erogative of dispensing the Council of State or any of its members for any length of time. But Dom Pedro, shpwing his great re(;'.rd for the
institution, kept it .functioni·ng f0r d.eca.des (1841-1889) and never dismissed any 9fits,members. 14 If the legitimacy of the Council of State was given by the constitution, its power was derived from the Emperor. -7-
According to the law, his person was considered sacred and inviolable. Th~ constitution was not the only repository of legitimacy and sovereignty in the Brazilian Empire. The Crown, which predated all other institutions and gave the country its first constitution, was the ultimate repository of legitimacy, sovereignty, and power. The ModerativePower, invested by the Constitution on the Emperor, made him not only the center of the 1egisla;... tive, executive, and judiciary powers, but also the supreme judge of the whole governmental process. It was his prerogative, among others, to nominate members for the Council of State, Senate, and Cabinet; to approve and suspend provincial govern ments; to appoint and dismiss members of the judiciary; dis- miss Cabinets; to postpone general assemblies; to dissolve the House of Representatives; to sanction decrees. Because it superseded all the other powers, the Moderative power made the Emperor the ultimate judge of every decision of conse- quence in the government. In a sense, he did not govern but judged .15 Under the Emperor there were two other bodies of govern ment that along with the Council of State formed the core of administration: the Senate and the Council of Ministers. The Senate had no active voice in the formulation of policies. It had more of a sanctionary function for the legislation approved by the House of Representatives. Sena tors, as the counselors of State, were nominated for life and -8- selection was made by the Emperor from a list of several candidates previously chosen in provincial elections. Re quirements for nomination were the same as those for the Council of State .16 S.enatorial positions were bougnt after for the prestige they bestowed rather than for the furthering of political ambition. The lack of political character of the Senate caused this body to be nickriamed "Siberiall during the re~gn of Dom Pedro II. Progressive politicians very seldom accepted nominations for the Senate. The Cabinet was also chosen by the Emperor, who selected the President of the Council of Ministers who, in turn, chose the members of his Cabinet and submitted them for imperial approval, The Cabinet was also divided into four areas: foreign affairs and justice; domestic affairs; finance; army and navy. The mir. '.sterof each area reported to the President of the Council of Ministers or to the app~opriatedivision of the Council of State. The Cabinet was the liaison between the Emperor and the House of Representatives, the lower level body of government that could be dissolved by the Emperor. The position.of the Council of State in re1ation to the Emperor and the Cabinet is evident from the following diagram. -9- TABLE I
DIAGRAM: Hierarchical Position of the Council of State and Cabinet
.. ';) ,.. _--_._- - .. - - I -- ...... -- ,-) EMPEROR ' ~L/_\___ ~
r----..::::------__ ...... ___~, ____ ,----.::"'------, COUNCIL OF STATE .______.. _'u .. _.o._ 'r .__ ._---- IIl SECTION OF SECTION OF SECTION OF SECTION OF I I FOREIGN AFFAIRS DOMESTIC FINANCES WAR AND
I 1-1___ J_U_~_~_~_:'_E _. -':~AIR~L_. __'----J.\ ____N_A_V_Y __
,'"'. ______/j I "'.. I I\. l ,---~ 'f " I It '~r-\! . '1~ ~ 1_ .- -- i PRES. OF I" -_',>1 COUNC. OF MIN. ~ 'r\ (------. , /',' I I \'t ._------...-' T1 --/f'- -'~ ---- 'I' \~ ~ , 'oj I I'-S-E-C-T-I-O-N';;::::O~F--'--S-E-C-T-I-O-NL.O-F--"'--S~E·C-T-I-O-N--':O~F--:-I-=S::::::"'C-TI-O~-~-F- FOREIGN AFFAIRS DOMESTIC FINANCES WAR AND I AND AFFAIRS NAVY h JUSTICE ~ ______-'- ______---iL- _____._ ...
CABINET OF MINISTERS -10-
This shows the obvious parallelism of the divisions of the Council of State with those of the Cabinet, and the lines of access between them. Access from the Cabinet to the Council was due to the fact that Cabinet members were required to sub mit to the counselors for consultation all new and contentious matters. If the topic concerned more than one division, the appropriate minister had to consult with each division of the Council separately. Members of the Cabinet were also required to provide the counselors with all information considered essential for the study and deliberation which preceded the reaching of a decision. All the paperwork and documentation of each division of the Council of State was processed by the parallel division of the Cabinet. The hierarchical position of the Council above the Cabinet implied by the bureaucratic process is aleo obvious by the lines of direct access to the Emperor that these two organs of government enjoyed. Whereas counselors had direct access to the Emperor, Cabinet members had to channel their requests through the President of the Council of Ministers, a position created in 1847 to preclude the necessity of the 17 Emperor having to deal with each minister individually. Administrative proposals from the House of Representatives and from the Cabinet were submitted to the Emperor by the President of the Council of Ministers, and from the Council of State by the members of each division. In a comparison between the role of the Council of State -11-
and the Cabinet, it is evident from the bureaucratic process, from the respective ,posi t,ion in the hierarchy, and from the channels of delegated authority, that the Council, of State functioned as an upp~r champer flear the Emperor, placing the Cabinet in a disadvantageous position in the decision- making process of government • .,'
Socio-Economic.! Educati9nal, and" Geog;raphic Background During, his reign of. 49 years Dom Pedro II had 74 ,counselors, of which only 12 served at a time. It is relevant to establish the extent to which this small group was representative of Brazilian society at the time. Their socio-economic and
educational backgro~nd, provinces of origin, and period of inCUmbency .can ser';e as a basis to characterize this gr,oup.
Table II reflects the social status of all the counselors:
TABLE II Social ClaSseS Nobles Civi,l
•• ••• 0 •••• " Princes .. ····o 2 Bishops ..... 1 Dukes ..••...... •• 1 Senators .. o '" •• 21 Mar1uiss ...... 8 Deputies ...... 5
Counts ...•..... ; .. 1 Lawyers ... 0 •••••• 3 Viscounts ...... ~28 Generals .....• t •• 1 Barons ...... ~ ..... 2· Admirals ...... 1 Totals
SOURCE: Publication of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry (1910).' See,'Annex 1.' -12-
T~~ social make-up shown in Table II eives an idea of the control exercised by the nobility and gentry in the Council'of State. lS The Nobility in the Brazilian Empire was not hereditary. Titles were sold most of the time, and under Dom Pedro, the sale of titles was one of the sources o f nat10na. 1 revenue. 19 While only a detailed study will provide specific infor- mation on the economic status of counselors, a general view of their econo~ic background can be attained from the evidence of their social status. In Brazilian society during the nineteenth century, social status and financial position went together. Wealth to qualify for nomination to the Council and for the purchase of titles could only be derived from extensive landed properties, usually worked by 3lave labor.
In fact, titles of ~obility frequently reflected the economic rather than the social background. In an agrarian economy, based OQ export, hiZh economic status was generally found in those areas of the country that provided, or used to provide the major export product.
T~e geographic representation for the members of the Council is shown in Table III. -13-
TABLE III Geographic Representation
Bahia ••••••• i~ •• ~, •• 14 Ceara ...... 1 Rio ...... 18 Maranhao ...... 2 Minas ...... 12 Para ...... 2 Pernambuco ...... • 5 Parayba •...•...... 1 Alagoas .....••....•.• 1 Piaui ...... 1 Rio Grande Dosul ••••. 2 Sao Paulo ....•...•. 3
SOURCE: Avelar, Helio A., Taunay, Alfredo, Hi.sto~i.a Administrativa do. Brasil (1965) The majority of the members were from Bahia, Rio, Minas, and Pernambuco, with only token representation from a few, but by no means all,. of the other provinces. 20 These same· ; four provinces had supplied the sugar and gold that. had sustained Portugal for two centuries. Independence, under the aegis of the Purtuguese Crown had not made much difference to a self-perpetuating oligarchy. The same provinces and families
(if the oligarchi9 system that prevailed in colonial days i~ ". '. considered) that had exercised preponderant political and economic influence in the.c~lonial period, continued to.do so thereafter. Despite the fact that at the time of Dom Pedro's ascension these regions were in economic decline, the power of their ruling class at the center of government had been sustained. This contrasts dramatically with Sao Paulo. At a time when this region was already one of the world's major coffee producers, its families did not enjoy equal in fluence in government. Another factor that usually went along with socio-economic status was education. The legalistic tendency of Brazilian -14-
administration led to the rise of influence of law graduates, to the point where degrees were considered a necessity in order to gain access to bureaucratic positions. 21 This point is made clear in Table IV.
TABLE IV Education
Law ...... •...... •... 53
Military ...... fI 6 Engineer ...... •.•.. 4 Medicine ...... 2 Mathematics .....•.•..... 2 Religion ...... 1 No degree ..•.•...••..... 6
SOURCE: Nogueira, Octaciano e Firmo, Joao S. ParZamentares do Imperio (Brasilia, 1973) The overwhelming presence of law graduates in the Council of State emphasizes the socio-economic status of their members, as well as to suggest their conservative mind-set. The absence of any substantial number of members from a different socio-economic and edcuational background implies that at its highest level, the elite surrounding the Emperor represented one group in society that shared the same interests and values. The extent to which this elite perpetuated itself in power can be measured by the long period of service of ap pointees to the Council. Table V illustrates how, with a group of only twelve incumbents at a time, a decade or more could pass without change of membership or input of fresh views. -15-
TABLE V Period in Office
Years 35 1 in 30 Office 2.5
20
15 22 10
5 21 0 5 10 25 Number of Members SOURCE: Publication of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, 1910. See Annex 1. Considering the age requirement for nomination and the length of Dom Pedro's reign, it can be confidently stated that the majority of counselors had been active during the reign of Dom Pedro I (1822-1834) and the Regency (1834-1840), or during the Regency and the first part of his reign. The pos sibility that cliques, "inner groups," and the seniority factor might have developed in such ambience has to be given serious consiqeration. Stale and outmoded leadership, values carried over from colonial times, would be a feasible result of such longevity. -16-
The assumption that the counselors formed a political and administrative elite that infiltrated other areas of government is evident from the control they had over the Cabinet. Early in his reign, Dom Pedro II had adopted the practice of alternating Cabinets between conservatives and liberals, never failing to use his prerogative to appoint the President of the Council of Ministers. During his reign he had a total of thirty-seven Cabinets and thirty-one Presi dents of the Council. Of the thirty-one Presidents chosen by the Emperor, eighte~n had already been members of the
Council of St~te before assuming their new positions. Con sidering those that served twice as President, the number of counselors who served in that capacity rose to twenty-one. In effect, besides the bureaucratic and hierarchic ascendency that the Council t~d over the Cabinet, it also controlled its key positions. Concomitantly with their appointed offices, . 22 counselors and senators also served as members 0 f Cab~nets. The socio-economic background, education, provinces of origin, and perio~ of incumbency, all suggest that the Council of State in its entirety was dominated by an elite that was in position to e>:ert unchallenged influence over the Emperor, and direct the policies of government. A' members appointed for life by the Emperor, and as representatives of socio economic elites from the most traditional and influential areas of the country, they became a self-perpetuating oligarchy. By succeeding themselves, replacing friends in the Cabinets, -17- and by having the monopoly of the post of President of the Council of Ministers, they functioned in a position which promoted conflict of interest and self-interest, by virtue of their being both counselors and legislators at the same time.
Economic Conditions of Brazil, 1850-1889 The self-perpetuating character of the oligarchy that was represented in the Council of State, as well as the values that they represented ,w'ere highly" inappropriate to deal with the problems of economic development facing Brazil during the second half of the nineteenth century.23 In 1850 Brazil had yet to be awakened to industrialization. Although development could be noticed in some pockets of the coastal area, the :iT'lterior was as yet totally undeveloped. 24 The economy, based on slave labor, continued to follow the colonial pattern of~ supplying one or two products to world markets. During the reign of Dom Pedro, a new region in the country began its :!conornic ascendency. The coffee economy in Sao Paulo was to Brazil in the second half of the nineteenth century what sugar had been during the colonial period. The ., . dependency of the Brazilian economy on coffee is best illustrated by figures on Table VI. -18-
TABLE VI Brazil's 8hare in the World Production of Coffee Per cent of· Periods World Production 1820-1829 ...... 18.18 1830-1839 .....•...... •. 29.7 1840-1849 ...... 40.0 1850-1859 •...•..•...... 52.09 1860-1869 ...... 49.07 1870-1879 ...... 49.09 1880-1889 ...... 56.63 1890-1894 •.....•••.••.••. 59.7 1895-1899 ...•...•....•... 66.68 1890-1904 ....••...... 75.64
SOURCE: Hans, Scherrer, Die KaffeevaZorisation und VaZorisationsversuche in anderen WeZthandeZ sartikeZn~ Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, p.338. 1919, Vol. 14. Normano, J. F., Bra3iZ~ a Study of Economic Types~ 1935, p. 40, op. cit. This dependency was similar to the previous dependency on sugar during the colonial period. Now, as then, the trans- port of the export product depended on shi~ping. But neither during the colonial period nor under the Empir~ did Brazil develop a merchant fleet. The great beneficiary of this situation was Gre~t Britain. She had the monopoly on the transportation of Brazilian coffee in particular, and on 25 shipping in gene~al. In 1850, during the month of January, 26 all ships arriving in Rio frcm Great Brit'in were British. That this situation persisted and that at no time during the reign of Dom Pedro attempts were made to start or give in- centive to a merchant fleet, indicates the lack of awareness and limited commercial perspectives of the government. For -19- one reason or another, the government seems to have seen as incompatible being an agricultural country and also owning a merchant fleet. 27 It was self-evident that the latter was in the best interest of the country. The lacK ofa national merchant fleet is also indicative that an independent Brazilian merchant class and a related credit system never developed in Brazil~ as it did in the United States. The Portuguese merchant that had dominated the scene for most of the colonial period, had been replaced after independence by the British merchant, whose capital was provided by the mother country' and "not by the credit structure of Brazil. As an agricultural country, Brazil was highly dependent on imports of manufactured products. The country imported as much manufactur~d products as it exported in raw products. The figures for the first year of each of the four decades of Dom Pedrds reign set the tune for the trend that characterized each period. Table VII illustrates the trend of each decade.
TABLE VII
Fore~gn Trade of Brazil, 1850-1920-1928 Contos de Reis Surplus Surplus Year EX;E0rts Im120rts of EX;E0rts of ImE°:r.ts 1850-51 67,788 76,918 ------9,030 1860-61 123,1'71 123,720 ------549 1870-71 168,000 162,100 5, ': 00 ----- 1880-81 230,963 179,688 51,'295 ------20-
TABLE VII SOURCE: 1850-1920: Homero Baptista. Rel,atol'io apresentadas Presidents de Republ,ica dos Estad08 UnidoB Do Braail,~ p. 79. Rio de Janeiro~ 1922, 1921-1928: Ministry of Finance, Economical, Data about Bl'aail,~ l,9l,9-l,928~ pp. 36-37. -Rio de Janeiro, 1929. Normano, J. F., Braai~~ a Study of Economic Types~ 1935, p. 194, op. cit. The meager surpluses are even greater indicators of the dependence of Brazil on imports during the reign of Dom Pedro. They coincided with the two decades in which coffee production reached its peak. Virtually all import~ were manufactured products frOm Britain. As had been the case in shipping, Britain had th~ monopoly of imports to Brazil. Between 1845 and 1849 the tota.l value of British imports to Brazil was $27.540 contos: imports from the United States lagged far behind with $6.061 contos. 28 A great part of these imports were destined for Rio. What this high rate of imports could do for-embryonic domestic industries is easy to perceive. Any attempt by local industries to compare with the rate of influx and quality of these imports would necessarily end in failure. The stranglehold of the British on imports to Brazil and in the carrying trade was further underlined by British dominance of the retail trade. A ship manifest for Rio shows -21- that from imports going to sixty-three merchants, forty-one 29 were British. Only government measures ~ould attempt to redress the situation. To the Brazilian government, the high rate of imports far from being considered an impediment to the development of domestic. industries, was considered the cornerstone of fiscal policy. 30 The ad valoZ'em tax on imports was the major . source of national revenue. Dependence on the import tax to meet annual expenditures necessarily eliminated all attempts to restrict imports and thereby stimulate the development of domestic industries. This factor should be seen as one, among many, that prevented a serious drive for industrializa- tion during the period. Initiation, promotion, or stimulation of industries were not among the priorities of the Brazilian government. This point is obviously clear from data on the percentage of capital invested in industrial establishments during 1848-1889. TABLE VIII Industrial Establishments According to the Period " of Their Foundation Per cent of Period of Foundation Capita~ Invested Before 1849 ...... l.lf From 18 5 0 -18 54 • • . .•..•,' .• '. . • • . . • ..••·0 . 2 1855-1859 •..••..•.••.•..•...•. 0.2 1 a 6 0 -18. 6 4 . • . . • . • • . '. • . • . •.• • • • •'( .. .0 • 4 1865-1869 •••••.••.••.••..•.•.. 0.6 1870-1874 ...... • it •••••••••• e"L.3 -21- <-1.,., TABLE V!II (Con!inued) Per cent of r~riod of Foundation Capital Invested From 1875-1879 .....•.•..•.•••.•... 1.3 1880-1884 .....•...... •...... • 3.2 1885-1889 ...... 11.2. 1890-1894 ...... •. 11.8 1895-1899 ...... •...... 5.0 1900-1904 .••...... •.••••.. 6.0 1905-1909 ...... •....•.•• 12.4 SOURCE: Normano, J. F., Brazil, a study of Eaonomia Types, 1935, p. 99, Ope cit. Only during the last nine years of the reign of Dom Pedro is there a noticeable increase in the amount of capital invested in ~ndu~t~ia1ization. The .1ack of progress toward industrialization during the period :of monarchy can largely be attributed to lack of capital. lepenuence on Eng1.:.' nd, and on an export economy. One aspect still to be considered is the amount of control exercised by the. -government over the economy. That Brazil was an absolutp. monarchy, with a socio-economic elite controlling government decisions. and whOti~ economic tr~ditions belonged to the p~st and to a system that was rapidly reaching the end, should not be lost when ,Jne evaluates the economic development durirlp; the period. The traditiona1 economic system to wr-ich this elite was accustomed was the. colonial type. This had been charc;lcteri<:.ad by one or two export products and slave labor. The slow accumulation of wealth represented by the plantation systp.m, -22- where fortunes and prestigious family names took decades to be built and to gain legitimacy, was the hallmark of this system. In this traditional background there was no place for the highly dynamic and individualist personality of the entrepreneur who quickly could accumulate a fortune. But it was the entrepreneur who was best qualified to bring in- novation to the Brazilian economic scene. The Brazilian government looked with a degree of distrust on any attempts to introduce innovation into the economy or into any other area. It held absolute control over the private business sector to a degree that has yet to be fully appreciated by economic historians. The commercial laws of the Empire testify to this fact. The most ostensive of these laws regulated the creation of new companies, associA- t~ons,. an d b ank s. ~'~- Among provisions regulating the creation of "associations"--the designation given to limited-liability companies in Brazil at ·~he time--and banKs, wa3 one that required prior authorization by the government before such associations could be legally l;:03tablished. Another provision stipulated that the government had the right to dissolve ouch associations without prior conaultation with shareholders. So critical for the Brazilian economy wel'e the implementa- tion of this law and the power of the Council of State in making decisions at the highest administrative level, that these two aspects may be further illustrated by an'analysis of three cases in which the counselors were called upon to deliberate. -23- Opinions by the Council of State The full extent to which this law prevented the free as sociation of capital for commercial enterprises has yet to be determined, but even at the time of its conception and implementation, the law was already seen as a barrier to the "free movement on the road of progress.,,32 Attempts to remove some of its restrictions met with continual refusal by the Council of State. An early challenge came from no less a personage than Viscount Maua, the best known Brazilian entrepreneur of the nineteenth century. An admirer of the development and in dustrialization taking'place in England, Maua was, in his own words, "overcome by the desire to put at the service of (our) progress a new instrument free of government interference.,,33 In other words, he wanted the right of free association without restrictions. In 1850 he tried to avoid the requirement of previous government authcri":"itio.1 fo:.., the creation of business associa tions. Maua orgal.,ized a joint stock company with "silent partners" and divided the capital in shares. 34 The Council of State, aware of Mau~' s attempt to circum'lent the law, handed down an opinion against the creu.tion of s·.:,ch companies n In addition to recommending that companies already created on such bases be discontinued, the counselors explained that merely because the law did not expressly prohibit such companies, it should not be assumed that they were therefore permissible. -24- A decree went into effect in 1852 declaring such companies "void.,,3S Attempts to remove or diminish government, control over business continued. Such attempts were unsuccessful and served only to tighten control even more. A law published in 1860 regulated even more strictly the stipulations of the decree published in 1852. The law of 1860, drawn up at the insistence of the Emperor, specified in detail penalties for violations and reaffirmed the authority of the Council of State to grant permission for the creation of any enterprise that involved association of capital and partnership.36 It also specified that before such authorizations would be granted prerequisites had to be met. The Council of State was to decide on the following: would the proposed company serve the public ir.terest? Would it be "contrary to good customs"? Would it tend toward monopoly? Was the capital, investment sufficient a;~.1 :i.ts worth correctly evaluated? Did the promoters offer "moral guaranties indispensable to the creation of t:",e enterprise"? Finally, would it probably succeed?37 Some of these prerequisites, for instance, soundness of the capital base and the tendency to monopoly, can be seen as having enough social value to merit a close examina·· tion. But there are others which were dependent on subjectLe jUdgment. Obviously they were in the area of "good customs," "moral guaranties," and "probability of success," \ standards were to be defined by the counselors. The standards for these prerequisites meant one thing in a traditional plantation society and economy, but they meant quite another in the highly dynamic world of an innovator and entrepreneur . / l1ke Haua. In the word~ of one liberal, the law of 1860 was a "fearful law." designed to "undermine public liber-ties." 37a Discouragement of business initiative caused by this law should be taken into consideration in the final analysis of those dismal figures showing the percentage of capital invested in industrial enterprises during the reign of Dom Pedro II. The degree to which the government itself contributed to those figures has to be measured by the degree of control .exercised by the State over the economy,an'd by the actions of the Council of State as the advisory body to the Emperor. One speaker pointe,~ to the "really unforgivable" lack of progress in Brazil during the period; 38 anc:i:her complained that "if anyone thinks of creating or carrying out any large enterprise, he immediately must contend with the Council of State, and with t:e ill humor of the ministers.,,3S After 1860, attempts continued to be made to release private enterprise from governmental control. In'1865, the Minister of Justice, Nabuco the Araujo, taking for his model British legislation on the subject, ~rafted a bill with this objective. He took the precaution of collecting several favorable opinions before submitting it to the Council of State for approval. 40 The 'Council, ho,~ever, vetoed any change -26- in the law, arguing that the proposed legislation was designed for a country like England were the "people, with its self government, sober character •.. who respects his own dignity and knows how to maintain -untouched his political liberty ... will not abuse his commercial freedom." But the case of Brazil was different, argued the counselors. It was their "painful but necessary duty," they explained, "to note the truly deplorable condition of Brazil" where a population "without the independence that characterized the British could not be considered in identical circumstances" and enjoy the same commercial 'freedom. -The Council decided to postpone any changes in the law until "'better times ," and rejected l Araujo's proposal .... The law continued to stand for another seventeen years. An example of how the law continued to be enforced during those years is given in the following aCCOuilt by the Count of Prados, a member of the Council of State from 1870 to 1882. In a compila~ion of all the opinions handed down by him in the Counc:':L, he lists the request submitted to him by two merchants from-Rio, Carlos Teixeira de Magalhaes Leite and Lucas da Costa Faria, asking for permission to create a commercial association to provide needed capital for small farmers. The association was to be named, appropriately enough, Bank of Agriculture. In the opinion of Count of Prados the request met all the requirements of the law of 1860, except the one that specified a r: ;2;ood probability of -27- suc:cess." In his view, the probability was more ,"intuitive" than real. In ~reparing his opinion, he acknowledges that in Europe, especially in Scotland, such associations did exist with a great deal of success for the purpose of advancing capital to small farmers. The part of the proposal that seemed to him to impair the "good probability of success" was the plan to offer capital at "low interest rates over a long period of time." In his view, an association based on these terms could not possibly succeed. Maintaining that regardless of how the proposal was examined it had failed to show the "probability of success," he recommended that the request be denied. 42 A comparison cannot be avoideti between the similar purposes of the attemp'ted Bank of Agriculture and those of commercial banks in the United States during the nineteenth century; mainly, to make available needed capital funds in the form of long-period loans. The need for capital on long terms was felt in Brazil as much as e~~ewhere.42a The majority of requests for authorization appear' to have been handlc<.! inth~ ElCi.!ne I.1anner. The proposal was studie,d and then recommended by the appropriate division of the Council. While the commercial plans of a Ii;an of Maua's," stature would involve a great deal of deLdte a~d even ~ clarification of the law, the modest innovator was left with no recourse other than to' turn to other kinda of business or abandon his commercial aspirations entirely. The risk of-submitting a request only'to see it !'eject~d seems to hav~ -28- been great. Not only did the candidate have to comply with material aspects of the law, namely capital and assets, but he also was judged on the basis of his character and morals. Even if he happened to pass the examination, as was the case of the two merchants, he still had the burden of predicting the future to such an extent that no doubt would' be left in the minds of the members of the Council of State that his proposal had a sure probability of success in Brazil, re gardless of how succesJiul similar enterprises had been elsewhere. While in many growing societies the government actually helped and favored the innovator and the, entrepreneur in their attempts to move the economy, the government of Dom Pedro II was neither sympathetic nor favorable to businessmen. In fact, it did a~ much as possible to restrain them, as the. law of 1860 proves. New proposals to change this law were introduced in 18'11., and again in 1879. Finally, in 1882, seven Y2ars before the end of the monarchy, and thirty-two years after the issue of free association without governmental control had first been debated, the Council of State gave a favorable opinion and the law of 1860 was at last amended. 43 In the same manner that the law of 1660 served to il lustrate the power of the Council of State in controlling the Brazilian economy and the flux of innovation to be allowed in the count:t:"y,so the issue' cf the Amazon region -29- during the same period serves to illustrate the range and degree of control exercised by tllat body over the government. At the time that the Amazon region first began to be mentioned, in 1850, the area was closed to foreign naviga tion as it had been since colonial days. In 1808, when the ports of Brazil had been open to all· nGl:tions by, Prince Regent Dom Joao, the ports of the Amazon region h.ad not .been included in the decree. In 1850, Matthew Fontaine Maury, head of thelJnited., States Naval Observatory and Hydrographic Office, began a campal.gn. to f orce t h e openl.ng . o·f'h t e reg.l.on.. 44 The focal' point of his contention was that, except.for selfishness, there was no reason in 1850 for such a lar';;e region of the globe to remain closed to trade and commerce wh~n its economic potential was thought to be fabulous. Maury begant.o publish a series of pamphlets and newspaper articles characterizing' Dom. Pedro II as the uRosas of the Amazon.,,45 The Brazilian newspapers responded in kind by characterizing the United States as a "nation of pirates. ,,46 In 1852, concerned by repercussions then coming also from Europe, the Brazilian government gave Viscount Maua authQrization to incorporate the Amazon Navigation and Trade Company, for the purpose of exploiting the region. The con cession of this monopoly, rather than the outright opening of the region to foreign nations, led Maury to submit a memorial to the Congress of the United States in 1854. he -30- stated that the opening of the Amazon region and navigation of the Amazon River to all nations was ltessential to the well being and prosperity of the United States.,,47 At thi's point the Council of State prepared a written opinion, signed by its three senior members, Viscount of Uruguay, Marquis of Abrantes,artd Viscount of Maranguape, stating that "Lieutenant Maury carries his campaign with the knowledge and protection of 'iheGovernmentof the United States, which eagerly welcomes his 'doctrines. It is his publications, which have contributed most to develop and 48 stir up this propaganda." This opinion became the official position of the Brazilian government, which refused to open u!' the region. In 1853, the new United States representa~ive to Rio, arrived with instructions from his government, "to secure for thp. citizens of the United States free use of the Amazon 1/ River. 1 ;.3 He made a presentation to the Brazilian government pointing out the advantages of opening' the region to other nations, and gave by way of illustration the example of the Mississippi River. The Brazilian government issued a reply stating that, after careful consineration, it h~d concluded that the case of the Mississippi could not be compared to the Amazon: "only savages (lived) in the Amazon Va:;.ley, a:.1d they had no use for trade with the outside world. uS () -31- The success of the Amazon Navigation and Trade Company contradicted this opinion. It showed that the region already had the potential for commercial development. The receipts for the first years were impressive. From 1852-1857 the receipts amounted to $250.000 contos; from 1857-62 to $400.000; from 1862-67 to more than $1.000.000 contos. For several years the company paid dividends of an average of 12 per cent a year. 51 According to Viscount Mau~, it "was one of the great enterprises"that he had undertaken. 52 The success of the company was not lost among those who favored the opening of the region. One provincial representa tive spoke in the House of Represen.tatives against the "policy of chinese exclusion" to which his native province was sub jected. 53 Such sentiments made themselves felt in high places. In 1.36 1.:., tl-.e Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his annual report submitted to the General Assembly, stated that ·the governmeni: "was cOlllTinced that it was desirable, as soon as possible, to permit grec:,ter d':Ne10pment of .tr.e commerc~ in the Am3.zon region: it had, therefore, resolved to extend freedom of navigation to. flags of all nations." 54 In an example that well illustrates the degree of power and contrcl exercised by the Council of State over the C~binet, the counselo~s overruled the Minister and t:.anded down a differf!nt opinion. Signed by Pimenta Buerlo, later Mar~uis of Sao Vicente, and expressing an ultra conservative and obstructionist attitude~ the opinion stated that the opening of the Amazon "would be -32- a bad policy for Brazil to isolate herself from the·Andean Republics and sacrifice their morlal support. The issue should be deferred.,,55 And so it was for another two years. On February of 1866, the Minister o·f the Navy wrote a letter to the Marquis of Olinda, the senior member of the Council of State, stating that it "was neither consistent nor decorous on the part of Brazil to maintain and defend in the River de La Plata principles of liberty and progress [free nagivation] which were refused in the case of our own North (AmazonJ.,,56 In August of the same year, the liberal Goes e Vasconcellos became President of the Council of Ministers, and immediately submitted to the Emperor a proposal for the opening of the Amazon region. Dom Pedro II, in a move that shows, how. much he r~lied on 'L.:1e Council of State for his decisions even on issues, as was the case with the Amazon, that had been extensi','ely debated for sixteen years, once more placed the matter before the Cowlcil for their deliberation and opinion. Despite a final objection by Pimenta Bueno that no warship was to be allowed to enter the region, this time the Council relented and came to an agreement on the terms of a decr~e. The' decree opening the navigation of the Amazon River to ships 57 of all nations went into effect in 1867. ':'hiE continuous lack of rGsponse to :.nnovation and change that characterized the opinions handed down by the ~ounselors -32,,- carmot be iA1:~ted indepe1'l4eBtly fl'"Otn the. peraoft. of 1:ae Emperor. Tbe exbmt Empez'Or B&C ~vrie4t'"C~ over the wbol~ admiRi1t'tret:i ve Md polltical proeease- .in tbe· 'CO\l&tl'Y.. an4 public officiala sar-\"~c at ki. pleasure. Of the ~J ••b~li~ ,«. «4ministrator very little ia lcA9wn. ~ t-ht h. ~ a 4t.~,i.k. for practioal,dfaira. Of' ~ .f.airll i~ ie ~~4 teat he WKte;;."trt004 only enough 'to Iraaf the fc:tf,).'t tb~t the l'f;alf~uadat".i4A of hie throne was 4epen4ent Upon .1\ ~;'CNlt\.lNl .o~i.e·ty. 58 The- only two cl.e&l' iJa.:.ps ppejec:'te.d by Ihlm: htir'Q durin, his reign are thoe~ t)f a pa.tewnelistic Mld tQlel'.nt $QverflRD't, and of an intel lectual. Of his wlet'ance ~' FV"'I'ft8.ll't. we. know that he took with grea~ 8~Qi~lsm$ witho~ ever ,re~aliating, the atta~~8 . . N4e alcU.nat him a1'\4 hie f4Jllily 'by the l:ibel"al..s.' We'. know more of his intelllctc;tu~l prefeGeneee. He intensel.y cul·tiva't~J the arts as a form of moral uplift. ~o the point of becomina very interested in the New i:ngun4 traru;~~mder,~alists. ~il-::t of hi"s time was spen"t ~:.n s'cudying S.~Tlskr5.t, 'lU-pj., And Arabic, '!'he nature of his personality ~'i;l.S appclrentl:1 reflecte .1 tM,)fa phere . ./ -33- This conservati-/e il.tmosphert::, combinE::d with the Emperor'E inclination for surrounding himself with f~liar faces and scenes, reached the pointwbere he was re.luctant even to authorize studies for the improvement of the water supply for the city of ]lio de Janeiro. In la78, for instance, he held the opinion that it was better to give the poor free water at the p\lblic fountains, than to bring water in a more hygienic fOl'nl tc their hO:.l5eS for a small fee. 59 To which extent this mentality was shared or adopted by his advisors is not in the. scope of this paper to inquire. But the possibility exists t~1.at the cons.rvatism of the counselo:t:'f. was not totally out of p~dce with the atmosphere at the Court. Conc lus 5. on The influence of the Council of StAte in the deciRion making process of government durinl the r~ign of Dom Pedro II has been compared 'to a "fifth power" not mentioned in the constitution. 60 With appointees representing the personal choice of the Emperor and ranking second only to him in th; command structure, the counselor8 w~re in a position of directing and controllin& all major shifts .f foreign and domestic affairs. The majority of its members belonged to a socio-economic oligarchy whose natural tendency was to uphold traditionalism. The conservative and stagnated mentality of this group is reflected in its opinions and -34- decisions, which became an impediment to development and innovation. It is our contention that the role of the Council of State during the reign of Dom Pedro II is a factor that deserves to be taken into consideration in the analysis of Brazilian economic history. It has as much legitimacy as other factors that have been considered so far. Studies 1n economic history have, for the most part, given emphasis to factors such as slave labo~, lack of capital, and an export economy. Combined, these three factors offer a per suasive argument to explain the backwardness of Brazil during the second part of the nineteenth century, but the role of the government also has to be taken into consideration. In the administrative area, it can be argued that the centralized power of the Council of State lent stability to the government during the fall of so many cabinets. Their actual involvement in the decision-making process provided opportunity to legislate without opposition, or in a vacuum, if necessary. But if the stabilizing factor has its merits, it also should be considered that at a certain point in history, innovation and change are needed, a factor that the counselors were unwilling to admit. We suggest that an examination of the influence exercised by the Council of State will add to our understanding of these two areas. One of the reasons why the understanding of the influence of the Council of State is lacking at present, is because -35- its existence has been almost forgotten. With the exception of a few publications in the area of constitutional history, no comprehensive study of the Council of State in Brazil exists. In addition, its role has been ignored by the majority of historians. The opportunity, then, has been missed to establish substantial linkages between the actions of this advisory body and many critical aspects in several areas of Brazilian history. In the area of economic and administrative history, additional bibliography is essential to lead into further avenues of investigation and establish linkages well beyond the immediacy of a single study. A comprehensive study would certainly offer a new insight into the nature of Dom Pedro's admininistration, as well as to offer a dif ferent perspective of the Emperor himself. The study of the national period in Brazil has been quite extensive, but in some areas it lacks in depth analysis. In the current historiography there is a tendency to approach Brazil, either as a "new World" nation that should be like the United States, or as the offspring ·of a decadent European monarchy. Neither approach is satisfactory, since they tend to ignore either historical or geographical realities. The economic and administrative institutions of Brazil may serve as an index of how a country in the New World tends to organize its government after more than three centuries of colonization and absolute rule. The act of becoming inde pendent is itself anticlimactic, since the social mentality -36- of the ruling elite suffers no change. The Council of State is one of the institutions whose records have the key to some of these issues. -37- FOOTNOTES 1. Le ConseiZ d'Etat~ Z799-Z9?4~ Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (Paris, 1974). Hanson, C. J., E~eoutive Disoretion and JudioiaZ Custom~ an Aspect of the Frenoh ConseiZ d'Etat, Stevens & Sons (London, 1954). 2. Lynch, John, Spain under the Habsburgs~ Oxford University Press (New York, 1965), pp. 47,48. 3. Koenigsberger, Helmut, The Government of SiciZy undel' Phi Zip II of Spain~ Staples Press (London, New York, 1951), p. 13, 15, 16. 4. Souza, Joaquim Rodrigues de, AnaZize e Commental'io da Constituicao PoZitica do Impel'io do BrasiZ (Sao Luiz do Maranhao, l8S7), p. 280. 5. Ordenacoes do senhor Rey Dom Affonso V (Coimbra, 1792). Na Real Imprensa da Universidade. Livro I, pp. 1, 3, 5, 8. 5a. Almeida, Fortunato de., Historia de POl'tugaZ~ Vol. 3 (Coimbra, 1925), pp. 21, 22. 6. Constituiaao poZitica da Monarchia Portugueza. Imprensa Nacional (Lisboa, i822), pp. 164, 165. 7. Pinheiro-Ferreira, Silvestre, Ob8el'Va~Oes 80bre a Constituicao do Bl'a8iZ~ e sobre a Carta Con8ti~uaionaZ do Reino de PortugaZ~ Typographia de Casimir (Paris, 1833), p. 38. 8. The Mi1reis was the Brazilian currency at the time. It could be theoretically divided into one thousand reis. One conto was worth one thousand mi1reis. Rate of Exchange in Rio de Janeiro or London Pence per Milreis Year Min. Max. Ave. 1823 48 53-1/2 50-3/4 Normano, J. F., BraziZ~ a study of Eaonomic Types~ University of North Carolina Press (Chapel Hill, 1935), p. 198. 9. Souza, op. cit., p. 287. Chapter I, Art. 7 of the Constitution. -38- 10. Souza, Ope cit., Chapter II, Art. 22 of the Constitu tion. 11. Souza, Ope cit., Chapter I, Art. 1 of the Constitu tion. 12. Fia1ho~ Anfriso, "Biographical sketch of Dam Pedro II, Emperor of Brazil." In the Smithsonian Institute AnnuaZ Report of the Board of Regents (Washington, 1877), p. 27. 13. Souza, Ope cit., Chapter IV, Art. 57 of the Constitu tion. 14. Assuf, Mauricio, 0 ConaeZho de Eatado. Guavira Editores (Rio, 1965), p. 77. 15. Torres, Jose Cami10 de Oliveira, 0 ConaeZho de Eatado. Edicoes GRD (Rio, 1965), p. 52. ~ 16. Souza, Ope cit., Chapter IV, Art. 40, 43, 45 of the Constitution. 17. Haring, C. H., Empire in BraziZ: a New WorZd Experiment with Monarahy. Harvard University Press (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), p. 62. 18. The list of all members of the Counoi1 of State is given in Annex I. Miniatroa e AZtos Funaionarios da Antiga Reparti~ao doa Negoaioa Estrangeiroa depois Repartiaao daa ReZaqae~ Exteriores do BraaiZ e Membroa do Extinto tonseZho de Estado. Rio de Janeiro. Imprensa Naciona1 (1910). Arahivo NobiZiarahiao BrasiZeiro. Organizado pe10 Bar~o de Vasconcellos e 0 Barao Smith de Vasconcellos. Lausane (Suisse, 1918). 19. Revenue from sale of titles was included in the item "Interior" under Revenue Collected in Annex 11. Normano, Ope cit., pp. 132, 133. 20. For provinces of or~g~n consult: Nogueira, Octaciano and Firmo, Joao Sereno, ParZamentares do Imperio. Centro Grafico do Senado Federal (Brasilia, 1973); Arahivo NobiZiarahiao BrasiZeiro~ Ope cit. 21. For professions consult: Nogueira, Firmo, Ope cit.; Avelar, Helio de Alcantara and 'Taunay, Alfredo d'Escragnole, Historia Administrativa do BraaiZ~ V. 1, Servico de Documentacao (1965); For the influence of law graduates in the administra tion consult: Barman, Barman, "The Role of the Law Graduate -39- in the Political Elite of Imperial Brazil." Journat of Inter ameriaan Studies and WorZd, Affc:irs /J Vol. 18, N. 4, Nov., 1976. 22. For complete list of Cabinets and its members consult: Fleiuss, Max., Historia Administrativa do Brasit/J 2 ed., Companhia Melhoramentos de Sao Paulo (S.P., 1922); Nogueira, Firmo, op. cit.; Avelar, op. cit. 23. Pang, Eul-Soon, "The Mandarins of Imperial Brazil," Comparative Studies in Society and HistorY/J 14:2, March (1972), pp. 215-244. 24. Graham, Richard, Britain and the Onset of Moderniza tion in Brazit/J Cambridge University Press (1968), p. 10. 25. Ibid., p. 88. 26. Ibid., p. 88. In selected years during the 19th century, almost half of the ships entering Brazilian ports were also British. This situation contrasts with the American colonies' where even before independence, three-quarters of all North American trade was carried in their own ships. See F. A. Shannon, Ameriaa's Economia Growth (New York, 1951), p. 9. 27. Graham, op. cit., p. 88. 28. Ibid., p. 83. One conto was worth one thousand milr2is. See footnote 8. 29. Graham, op. cit., p. 83 (footnote 2). 30. Annex II, item "Importation" under Revenue Collected . ..., 31. Art. 295, Law n. 556 of June 25, 1850. Cotterrao das Leis do Imperio do Brasit/J Rio de Janeiro. Imprensa Nacional (1909). 32. Rebou~as, Andr~, Agricuttura Nationat/J Estudos Eaonomicos. Lamoureaux (Rio, 1883), pp. 3, 9, 11, 69. , 33 .. Maua, Irineo Evangelista de Souza, Visconde de, AutobiografiaJ 2 ed., Claudio Ganns (Rio, Valverde, 1942), p. 235. 34. Ibid., p. 235. 35. Decree of December 13, 1852. Cotteaao das Leis do Imperio do BrasitJ op. cit. :, -40- 36. Ibid., Art. 1, Law n. 1.083 of August 22, 1860, p. 31. 37. Ibid., Decree n. 2.711 of December 19, 1860, pp. 1128, 1133. 37a. Tavares Bastos, Aureliano Candido, Cartaa do Sotitario, 3 ed., Brasiliana, 115 (Sao Paulo, Editora Nacional, 1938), p. 46. 38. Reboucas, Ope cit., p. 322. :> 39. Pinto Jr.} Joaquim Antonio, Liberdade e Commercio~ Typografia Imperial, Instituto Artistico (Rio, 1869), pp. 4, 14, 16. 40. Graham, Ope cit., p. 225. 41. Ibid., p. 226. Quote from the Parecer das Secoes de Justica e Fazenda do Conselho de Estado, July 9, 1866. AIHGB, Lata 381, Doc. 4. 42. Conde de Prados, Pareceres e VOtOB do E~mo. Conde de PradoB no Consetho d'Estado do Brasit (Ouro Preto, 1893), p. 144. 42a. Taylor, George Rogers, The Transportation Revotution J tBt5-tB60. Rinehart & Cooper, Inc. (New York, Toronto, 1957), p. 319. 43. Art. 1, Law n. 3.150 of November 4, 1882. Cottecao daB Leis do Imperio do Brasit, Ope cit., p. 139. 44. Harchant, Anyda, ViBcount Maua and the Empire of BraBit. University of California Press (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1965), p. 104. 45. Ibid., p. 105. Juan Manuel de Rosas was the Argentinian dictator until 1852, when he was defeated in the Battle of Monte Caseros and fled to England. 46. Ibid., p. 106. Quote from the Brazilian newspaper, Observador, May, 1852. 47. Martin, Percy Alvim, "Opening of the Amazon" in HAHR, Vol. 1. 48. Ibid., p. 157. Quotes Nabuco. de Araujo, Um EBtadista do Impe~io (Paris, 1897), Vol. 2, p. 382. -41- 49. Marchant, Ope cit. , p. 107. 50. Marchant, Ope cit. , p. liJ8. 5l. Ibid., p. 114. 52. Ibid., p. 106. 53. Martin, Ope cit., p. 158. Quotes Representative Tito Franco from the Province of Para, addressing the House of Representatitves. The allusion to "chinese exclusion" refers to the immigration laws of certain countries that in the 19th century would not admit Chinese immigrants. 54. Ibid., p. 159. Quote from Relatorio do Minist~rio de Rela90es Exteriores, 1867. -' 55. Ibid., p. 159. Quote refers to a treaty signed in 1851 between Brazil and Peru excluding citizens of the United States from the right to navigate the Amazon. It stated that the Amazon should belong exclusively to the States owning its banks. 56. Ibid., p. 159. 57. Decree of December 7, 1866. Co t te a'ao das Leis do Imperio do Brasit. ~ 58. Marchant, Ope cit., p. 87. For a very complimentary biography of Dam Pedro II see Mary Wilhelmine Williams, Dom Pedro the Magnanimous~ Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press (1937). 59. Ibid., p. 170. 60. Rodrigues, Jose Honoria, 0 Consetho de Estado. o Quinto Poder? Centro Grafico do Senado Federal (Brasilia, 1978). -42- ADDED BIBLIDGRAPHY 1. On the Conseil du Roi France: Mousnier, Roland, Le ConseiZ du Roi~ de Louis XII a Za RevoZution. Presses Universitaires de France (1970). 2. For the organization of Spanish administration under Charles V: Kenistan, Hayward, Froan(Jes(Jo de Los Cobos., Se(Jro~'i;aroy of the Empr.l'or CharoZes V. University of Pittsburg Preus (1908), 3, On the Council of State in Brazil: a. Tavares de Lyra, Augusto, "0 Conselho de Estado." Revist:.:. do I.E.G.B q April 1931, Vol. l~ 413. Th:;'i;;; essay is an attempt to list all counselors and their place of birth. It is incomplete. b. , "A Presidencia los Presiue.ntes do Conselho de Ministros no Segundo Rpinado." RIHCR., 94v, 148 (1923), 1927, p. 566-609. c. ) "Os mini tros de Estado CIa Independenc~.a 3~·:R-(~11iSlica." RIBGE., V. 193, 1948, Rio, 3-48. d. Atos do Conselho de E6tado. Centro Grafico do Senado Federal (Brasilia, D.F., 1978). Published by the Brazilian Senate. Opinions offered by counselors Juring meetings with tt.e Emperor aX-'1::! given. in chrono logical sequence. Several years are missing. -~:.~ ='.,~.:;}~ I :;(Y0i{C~ : ;'.:inistrcs e ,:,.1 tos Y1.~ncior.i.arici:: -:.ta .>.l'.tiga H.eparticao 0,2..S , . ~ ;{elac()E ~: ~x ter' i (1 !' t; 2' dr"! ~-Ct: '2.1.1. . e :::[,oras de ..::xt':'~1tc '.-~ .. -'"'_~ (J': 1;.. j ...... '..-.. -t··· .-.~~. 1 0 ,",1:1 ....1!..... ;:;()~'~se Iii. G 58 ~L CS ~.c' l:L ~)l"'(:: -:S.s. .~~1·-'lO_J..o...... L\.J..O ... /.l...;) ~'.)':J .J,;J~u,~y ...]L AU qua•• !U ~ua4t 1 ....&~1aa fllll,dlllfah lon~t!fl'l 'all,.lm,." ... III'Jir_ 'f"flir•• 13. lIru.QtU [)B s. .Tolo DA PAUlA (Oom Fr:lo lQ. ~1.\I<'>I"E7. de AllRA,.-rES pli~uel Calm on OU Pinl cjS·;~ ,1e .\ssis !liascarenb:lS). Ell'ectivo • • 1827 IS34 "Almeida. Vis..:onJe, J~pois )1J.rquez), se', lau nador. • • • • • . ., IB43 l&>s r~s (Succcdeu ao o. 5). I 30· PAULA SoUZA (Fmncisco de Paula SOUZ3 et 14' !"'h'l<1!Z DE BARBACJr.OA (Felisberlo Caldeira !llellol, senador. • • • • • . • • lats I~ IIIsJ D' a.1' "Jnles). geiltral. Effectivo • • • 1830 Itl.p .,1. GALVlo (,)l:lnQeI Antonio), scnador 18.j8 Itlse IS50 'Succedeu aO) n. 11) ,1. VISCOSDE DE AHAEli! (Antonio Paulino Limpo Conselhdros ~ EsWc "cnorarlos: , de Ai>reu/. : J ....,:'"" I.. " ...... : , .. u.. : ••• &. . Hnir•• AU •• ' ••eat" urrir...ud..I,aueci.,.", ' 52. VllICAJ"DE DO RIO·BRANCO (Jose Maria da Silva ParantlOs). senador • • • . . • . • ItlIO ISIlo .8&1 75. CO~RJlIA fJl\an(lcl Fr!lnci~co), scnador. 100] 1Bat) IgJS 53. /'It,eR'It:EZ DE .\kRITIBA (Manoel Yieira Tosla), 70. C~~RCA nJ! OLI~"INA (j01\0 Alfredo), sen.dor.1 188;' 1!:187 senadof • • . • • • • . • . . Iat;, 1000 .880 ;;-. YI~-('I~nE nt:: DL'rRF.PAlf\E-Roll.-\~ {lIcnriquc- 54. DUQ'fC DE C.'XIAS (Luiz Alves de Lima e Silva), Ill' Be::tlrcr.3irc-Rllh:rn; CID Fr.j,nc;::t, Conde. 'len .. dor. marecbal. • • . • . • • . dluo [8&:J 1000 IIcurhjuc uC llcnurer~ireJ. general. . ,I I' fl; .<1t; >8?4 55. t,., ,!\BE'~. Princeza 1m per,al . I BOb 1889 ;8. :\hlmsllo C'~l/")S (!lfartinho Al\,:J,rc~ da $il.a Campus). sClI:1.dor . IS&; 188g 1887 50. PRINW'E GASTi.O DE ORLt:ASS. C~"nE D'El'. mao, rect...u. . • • ...... 1&.<'J 1:';:.19 I :-9. :\"nRAIlE Fll;t·F./RA (Domingos de), ent~o de rUI '11. ;i)>OOKDB Da SIlI1JI80' (joio Lins Vieira Can ! I sando de Sinimb6). senador. • . • .' 18!b 18a) Itp! '/2. VISiCOIIDB VWIJU, Da SO-VA (Luiz Antonio Vieira da Silva). senador ,1882 188Q Is&) 73. VISCONDa OIl Box CoJoo'SllLHO (jose Bento da I CUl\ba e F'igu~iredo;. len:e de direito. se- n ..dor. • • . • • • • • 18CA 189 1891 74. "~'~'!'TJt ?UB:IlA (L&. ...y,;w;; RLJri t'~:':lla). senador. • • • • IIIII:a 1&9 ii8!1 - Rio de j~neiro - Imprensa National - 1910 i;orrr:ar10. u' F.. ';;razilL _8. :)tud.v of i!:conomic r.Y'r~. Univerrd.ty of dorth Caroli.~\a i)reBs. Ch8.pel hill. (1935) P'l)" lJ2,lJJ 1831-3:.) 1889 1999 IteulS Amount Per Amount Per J'aprr ~;old Gold Total PapeT Per (:l'l\l cent Con- an;\ G()ld cent verted Convertrr! to P<\pert to "art( -, .. _. __ .. __ ...--_. __ ...... I /Ij portatio.1 ...... •.....•....•.... 3,cJIl 29·,:, go,Iu6 48.:1 I I El.'Jf.t 185.(}13 849,065 967. 2 79 44·6 I.,terl"r ...... !pOr. 42·7 3~~,~G!) III." 1,o77.oBI 3-456 15,783 l,o<'J'l,fl64 3:}·6 E~,·' .. 'lition ...... •. , ..•.•....•... 7-40 6.0 l7,g8g !J·3 • ()rdinllry f! "VI"m",· ...... •....•.••• , . I f ,~54 - - :l.o&>,- ...... ,. I.~M'1I ...... 1,195,::95 1'1!),:J01 Illi4.8.: '3 143 •• , •.••. To h~ d"". ,I'd for i I'e gUI\I'l\nl'~e (1l1Id I,Jfth,. N'P<'l' n1.1IV::y •••••••••••••••••• "" .t •••••••••• ...... 01 57r. 3,),166 39.166 ...... '·otal ••...... •...... • 11,5:14 70.~ 147.:;74 7~)'O 1,1 D5.:!!)'j ,8ooi03 8'l5.68~ 12,Ogo.977 14·2 !',xlflwrdinary 1'.'VCI'UCS • , ••.•.• I,U7" 15. 1 Ig,nO lill 'l'jlt,:\!)1J 1,IlII) 4,61 3 !:55,OII 10.6 Pc. dpls for 'pr,.jal "ppJicatioll .,,, ...... , ...... 1l1.'po !1~:jlj3 3!h l !JB 123,614- 5.1 ( ",llf.·r ... , ...... , I • , ••• I I ••••••• G,7 .. • ..... IF! ...... ',!',,!.: I, , • , ••••••••• , ••• , ..... ' • •• 12,:1"jC) I!~O," IIl(i, 73!~ too.O '.~,3",\O'I 1(l.. ,~06 Of;~,4(l3 ~.399.Go:.l 100.0 • Tt"/lSIi:~rrr'd !o the '!utr~ ill 11:<: HeJlublil'. t CnnVCI.;illl, rilte taken: 4S:"li7 H~ of,\rl'rcc No. 111.~57 'lrlhe 23 of t-by 1:)~(1 (Lka1.;I) • .~i)urc(r: 111;1 I 1f1'1) Hi.) ..I" Janeiro, I!JI,t. I!r!~): MenJIICI',1 (I.hrt!::I:"('~ .. f) Co) .. gr~;: g .. ,;jMItU !'~!IJ /Jresid~ .. II dll Rt/luhlica, WarhingloPl !.Lis P. d, ,S()ILIO, ltio d,· J:lih~jro, "I:l". 1911 9 !\filli'lrks AIIIOlHH l'H AIII('.;.11 I'a Paper Gold Gold Con- Total Paper Per ell"! ,· ... 1lI VeTted to aoJ Gold cent Papcrt Converted to Papcr ~ .-- ~,,------'-"--'---~--'--' ---.----.. -----~ -_ .. _- loteri"r ...... , ...•...... •.. ~ ';/)~I 0 2~I'468} 17. 17·?' li04·H2 i22 557 205,~!)9 JlIstice ...... , ..... , ...... 1l1,/ 7,215 9·Q Foreigll Aff;.'r •...... •.. , . , ...... I' 3 1.4 938 4·5 0.706 Ii, '(,;j 28.146 34,8E.~ 1.6 Nlwy •••••.••.. , ....••...•.•.. "'" I. ~,j')} 12,t:37' 161.47" 1.554 7.097 1 6 41.0 15·~ 17 .5 7 7.7}10.0 ""ar ..••• ' ...... , ...... ,.[,:() 19,~I:lJ "13,~54. ~()o 9 1:1 274, 167 t2·3' :\~li<:"I" .. c. lr.ltt:ilry and Comm(:rcl' .. 6",90:: 68 .. .. } 1 10 24.6 7 3.5°11 68.4 10 ;':,,,,,,nuuienli"1) :t·,,1 Puhlk WOlks •••• 5 , 9 6 6 ~J.I} 26 ..... 4 9. 11S 13,3~4 Bo,fJ;,1 53°,53(; 23·8 '9 .i. 'u, Ir.e ••••••••. I ..... ~ • " •• • ••••••• 5,197 40.6 r',57C 31.9 4G :':,46B lO·l,~92 6 0 47 ,3 2 873,770 39·~ ,'~~)lJlkul;(,;'ll (.r tlpt:t ial }{ev!~u'J(' .1 .... 6r.927 2.8 Dq>o~i! •...... , ..•...... , .....• (;.6 ..... '.' ...... "-- ."'--_.. - '-._------r"':ti ...... , ... " 100.0 2oi\J"'; 126,223- 577,374 100.0 Il6,4'l3 • ~,:i,!.\kc if~ a''''-H~;,)u !!. '.H·i~inal fi~Ur('A. . 't Cnnvl'"io" rUle taken: 4":;0'/ a' of "ecl't~e No. 'tl.~57 of Mny ~3, 1!J~Il. 10 ,\U/JT':,:'i; 31-.39. ;tJld 18ll!I: !>jr..-tQda do StrulfO til F"ali.tlj(a. Fjnan;as. Qpa,ITos .I)'rJOpti(OS da rulila I d,sp,(a do Bradl (periodo de ISlIlI a 1 19 3). RIO d.,' Janeiw, '914. 19::9: M,nsa!~tn aprUlnlailfi QO CongusSli Na.;ionaip·,o Pm;dmu tla P.,puhlka, W4I'-\i"llullluiJ P. tI. Sowa. RIO de Jancu'o, 1930.