Paradigm Lost in the Interpretation of The Book of Changes Keyang Dou Jilin University 254 I. Paradigm theory and the Paradigm of Yi Etymologically, philosophical use of the word “paradigm” is not new, but has been in use since classical Greece; for instance, Plato used paradeigma to name the model or the pattern in his philosophy as paradeigma (Timaeus 28A). However, it was Tomas Kuhn who frst delineated the modern concept of the paradigm in a series of publications since the 1950s, among which Te Structure of Scientifc Revolutions (hereafer SSR) is the best known and most ofen quoted. Since then, the impact of the word paradigm, and the extensive debates about it which have prevailed in the feld, went far beyond Kuhn’s own expectations. Today, the Kuhnian paradigm is not only a common concept in the study of the philosophy of science, but has also been more broadly deployed across academia. In China, people are already accustomed to defning a certain academic method or a system of thought as a certain paradigm, and the thorough evolution in methodology would always be called a “revolutionary paradigm”. However, despite extensive discussion, paradigm theory is yet far from a mature concept. One major reason is that Kuhn failed to give a clear and concrete defnition to the concept, and this failure led to hot debate about the meaning and function of the paradigm. Within this debate, one essay, “Te Nature of a Paradigm” (Masterman 1970), identifed 21 possible meanings of “paradigm”. By attempting to interpret Kuhn’s intentions, people have ofered various defnitions and analyses of the concept of the paradigm. In response, Kuhn presented a series of articles and monologues to further clarify the theory, but in vain. Te interpretation of the paradigm seemed to fall into a dilemma: sometimes “paradigm” acquired explanatory defnitions as widely separated as “promise” or “community”, and was in later articles replaced by Canadian Review of Comparative Literature / Revue Canadienne de Littérature Comparée CRCL SEPTEMBER 2014 SEPTEMBRE RCLC 0319–051x/14/41.3/254 © Canadian Comparative Literature Association KEYANG DOU | PARADIGM LOST IN THE INTERPRETATION OF THE BOOK OF CHANGES the new term “disciplinary matrix” (Buchwald & George 1997). However, Kuhn’s perplexity at the nachleben of his concept did not, in any case, impede the broad acceptance of the paradigm as a deployable concept. It seems paradoxical, but it is just this paradox that reveals the key feature of the concept of the paradigm: its meth- odological priority to all rules. Firstly, it is the uncertainty in the defnition of the paradigm which suggests that it is not a defnitive rule, and it is this uncertainty that allowed for such an enormous impact on the history of science. In his SSR, Kuhn described the existence of the concept of the paradigm: “Te determination of shared paradigms is not, however, the determination of shared rules…indeed, the existence of a paradigm need not even imply that any full set of rules exists” (43, 44). In Kuhn’s view, “the existence of the paradigm sets the problem to be solved; ofen the paradigm theory is implicated directly in the design of apparatus able to solve the problem” (27). In this sense, the paradigm can solve problems in the absence of an explicated set of rules, and appar- ently the latter are derived from certain paradigms, which indicates the fact that the 255 paradigm is more like an orientation—which can transcend all specifc rules—and also reversely orient all rules within its own horizon. Tis is what renders “paradigm” a most promising and attractive term, and what has motivated its rapid adoption across various research horizons. Nevertheless, many scholars still make the mistake of equating the paradigm to a rule, even if unconsciously. Attempts to confne the paradigm within a solid concept can only progress into deviations from the particu- lar elasticity of the Kuhnian concept of the paradigm. Secondly, according to Kuhn, the existence of the paradigm is only expressed within an epistemological system: “Te existence of this strong network of commitments—conceptual, theoretical, instrumental, and methodological—is a principal source of the metaphor that relates normal science to puzzle-solving” (Kuhn 42). Apparently, the so-called “existence of this strong network” stressed the integrity of the paradigm. Tis integrity is not simply one quality among others, but a theoretical system hidden amongst objective practices: “Only as experiment and tentative theory are together articulated to a match does the discovery emerge and the theory become a paradigm” (Kuhn 61). Tus, the paradigm should be an inclusive and open system, rather than a closed and fortifed realm, i.e., a rule. Te system of rules operating in any given context is strictly exclu- sive, which bans the interference of anything beyond the criteria authorized by those rules. Terefore, those attempts to make a closed defnition and to draw an objective conclusion can only lead to a lost paradigm. Tirdly, while stressing the integrity of the concept of the paradigm, Kuhn also introduced concepts such as “scientifc com- munity”, “disciplinary matrix” and so forth, which suggested another unique quality of the paradigm: its acceptability. In his SSR, Kuhn said: “Paradigms gain their status because they are more successful than their competitors in solving a few problems that the group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute” (61). Te paradigm will not function as a paradigm unless it is widely accepted by the academic commu- nity. And it is at this point that the paradigm difers most signifcantly from the rule. CRCL SEPTEMBER 2014 SEPTEMBRE RCLC Rules are always pragmatic, regardless of reception; rules are not easily amended according to the will of any receivers, and are thus rendered static and lifeless, while the paradigm is more like a “commonwealth”, of which the subjective interpretation and reception is of crucial importance to the existence of the paradigm. It is in this fexible dialogic existence prior to rules that one can fnd deep connec- tions between the Kuhnian paradigm and the hermeneutical structures of yixue ( ), the branch of traditional Chinese scholarship devoted to interpretation of the Yijing (), or Classic of Changes (ofen still known in the West as the I Ching). Te paradigm is not a defnite concept but a metaphysical orientation and totality, all laws and practices of which are guided by this orientation, whereas all oriented interpreta- tions could also verify themselves and actively participate into the logical existence of the paradigm: it is this orientation which is deeply similar to the place of yixue in the traditional culture of China. As one of the Six Classics () and one of the Tree Obscure Classics (), the Yijing was one of the oldest and most broadly accepted 256 classics in China, dating in its standard form to the mid-frst millennium BCE, but with roots in divinatory systems of the second millennium. It established a keynote for the traditional culture of China and helped orient the minds of Chinese schol- ars for most of the imperial period. Te Yijing also possesses an orientation within itself—the life experience of the ancient people of China—which is vividly displayed by an integral system of hexagrams, lines and written judgments. Each hexagram and line has its original meaning, but conclusive judgments about them would always be guided toward the ultimate understanding of the Dao of Yi (or Way of Change, ). Te system is also an Appellstruktur, which is forever open to interpretation by later receptors, as is stressed in the Yizhuan (): “Te benevolent see it and call it benevolence and the wise see it and name it wisdom.” Te Yi (, the abbreviation of Yijing) is so inclusive that the Siku Quanshu (, one of the largest and most important imperial collections of classical books in 18th-century China) gave it a preeminent, cosmologically signifcant place: “Te Dao of Yi is so omnipotent that it includes everything.” Of course, the correlations mentioned above might still be exterior and mechanical but the paradigm of Yi is evidently a very curious topic; the results of such studies might ofer a new approach to a major facet of Chinese intellectual history, but might also potentially enlarge the scope of paradigm theory. Te curious study of Cheng Chungying (1935- ) in onto-hermeneutics could be a most typical and vivid example. In his Paradigm of Change in Classical Philosophy of China and On Harmony As Transformation: Paradigms From the Yijing (2009), Cheng ofered a systematic narration of the overall paradigm of Yijing interpretation. However, Cheng’s onto-hermeneutical delineation of the paradigm of Yi is so subjec- tive and, even more importantly, his theory overlooked the comparison between the paradigm theory and the yixue, which appealed the necessity of the following discus- sion in this thesis. Kuhn’s perplexity in defning the paradigm was partly caused by his conceptual mindset; i.e., though he realized the priority of the paradigm over- rules, he was still trying to confne it as a solid concept. In this respect, the study of KEYANG DOU | PARADIGM LOST IN THE INTERPRETATION OF THE BOOK OF CHANGES the Yijing could provide an ideal model for the paradigm theory, and the analysis of the phenomenon of the lost paradigm of Yi might provide solutions to similar mis- takes made by Kuhn. II. The Self-Consciousness of the Paradigm of Yi In the traditional scholarship of China, Yixue is one of the preeminent forms of clas- sical hermeneutics. Te Yijing is comprised of two books: the frst being the basic classics (also called the Yijing), which is believed to have been written in the 9th cen- tury BCE, and the other, the commentaries of Yi, also called the Yizhuan, believed to have been compiled at least 600 years afer the basic classics.