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THEORY AND DECISION AND DECISION LIBRARY

AN INTERNATIONAL SERIES IN THE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL

Editors GERALD EBERLEIN, University of Technology, Munich WERNER LEINFELLNER, University of Nebraska

Editorial Advisory Board:

K. BORCH, Norwegian School of and Business Administration

M. BUN G E, McGill University

J. S. COLEMAN, University of Chicago

w. KROEBER-RIEL, University of Saarland

A. RAPOPORT, University of Toronto

A. SEN, Oxford University

W. STEGMULLER, University of Munich

K. SZANIAWSKI, University of Warsaw

L. TONDL, Prague

A. TVERSKY, Stanford University

VOLUME 50 THEORY AND DECISION

Essays in Honor of Werner Leinfellner

Edited by GERALD L. EBERLEIN Institute for Social Sciences, Technical University of Munich, F.R. G. and HAL BERGHEL Department of Computer , University of Arkansas, U.S.A.

D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY

~. A MEMBER OF THE KLUWER " ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS GROUP

DORDRECHT/BOSTON/LANCASTER/TOKYO Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Theory and decision.

(Theory and decision library; v. 50) Bibliography: p. Includes indexes. 1. Social sciences-Philosophy. 2. Social sciences-Methodology. 3. Social history. 4. Leinfellner, Werner. I. Leinfellner, Werner. II. Eberlein, Gerald. III. Berghel, Hal. IV. Series. H61.T466 1987 300'.1 87-28487 ISBN-13:978-90-277-2227-0 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-009-3719-2 DOl: 10.107/978-94-009-3719-2

Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company, P.O. Box 17,3300 AA Dordrecht, Holland.

Sold and distributed in the U.S.A. and Canada by Kluwer Academic Publishers 101 Philip Drive, Norwell, MA 02061, U.S.A.

In all other countries, sold and distributed by Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, P.o. Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, Holland.

All Rights Reserved © 1988 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland Soft cover reprint of the hard cover 1 st edition 1988 No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface vii

Introduction ix

PART I / PHILOSOPHY AND

ROBERT AUDI / On Some Limits and Resources of Common- Sense 3

JOHN POLLOCK / and Proportions 29

PHILIP HUGL Y AND CHARLES SA YW ARD / Why Sub- stitutional Quantification Does Not Express 67

PART II / METHODOLOGY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

MARIO BUNGE / Ideology and Science 79

OLE HAGEN / Some Imperfections in the Scientific Com- munication System and a Possible Remedy 91

GERALD L. EBERLEIN AND O. P. OBERMEIER / Value• Free vs. Value-Conscious Social Sciences 107

PART III/ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL ISSUES

LUCIAN KERN AND HANS-GEORG RADER / Public Bads and Socio-Moral Reasoning: The Case of the New Social Movements in Germany 139

H. L. BERGHEL AND D. L. SALLACH / The Impact of Computers on Job Opportunities: An Analysis of Employ- mentTrends, 1972-1982 169

KARL BORCH IInsurance Without Utility Theory 191 VI TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART IV / GAME AND DECISION THEORY

MAURICE ALLAIS / Three Theorems on the Theory of Cardinal Utility and Random Choice 205

STEVEN J. BRAMS, DAN S. FELSENTHAL, AND ZEEV MAOZ / Chairman Under Approval Voting 223

JOHN C. HARSANYI / Some Recent Developments in Game Theory 235

THOMAS A. COWAN AND PETER C. FISHBURN / Founda- tions of 261

HEINZ J. SKALA / What Does Arrow's Impossibility Theorem Tell Us? 273

HANS W. GOTTINGER / Choice Processes, Computability and Complexity: Computable Choice Functions 287 Curriculum Vitae Werner Leinfellner 301

Werner Leinfellner: Selected Bibliograph 303 Index of 311 Index of Subjects 315 PREFACE

This collection of articles contains contributions from a few of Werner Leinfellner's many friends and colleagues. Some of them are former students of Werner's. Others were colleagues of his at various American and European universities. Further, some have come to know Werner through his research, his long-standing editorship of Theory and Deci• sion and his extensive participation in international conferences and congresses. The following articles are new to this volume. The areas covered are those in which Werner continues to play an active professional role. We offer them as a tribute to the many and multi-faceted contributions to the scientific enterprise for which Werner Leinfellner is so widely known. We believe such a festschrift to be fitting and long overdue. Because of the breadth of Werner's professional associations, it was difficult to select representatives from among his many spheres of influence. We apologize to the many scholars who could not be in• cluded because of time and space considerations. Finally, we wish to express appreciation to Dean John Guilds of the University of Arkansas for providing financial support early on in the evolution of this project, to Jennifer Bauman for her bravura performance in copy-editing the manuscripts, and to our publisher at Reidel for bringing this volume to press.

G. EBERLEIN H.BERGHEL

vii INTRODUCTION

In the late sixties the controversy between and subjec• tivism in the English-speaking countries subsided, as did the so-called Positivismusstreit in the German-speaking Western democracies. The latter term refers on the one hand to the dispute between critical , frequently designated as "" in Germany, and the of the on the other. The objectivism/ controversy had shown that there was only an apparent dualistic alternative between the objective methodol• ogy of "hard" empirical sciences and the subjectivistic methodology of "soft" action sciences and . In fact, the issue was, and still is, one of a gradual based on the decision as to whether to recognize the qualitative characteristics of the human subject matter as well.

Today we find, not grand dualism, but rather detailed disagreements over theory and method, disagreements which cannot be reduced to anyone pattern and which cannot be easily resolved .... The two opposing turn out to be supplementary, each important in its own way and each equally scientific. I And Diesing concludes:

What remains of the philosophical argument are two types of theory (for example, game theory and learning theory) which are both useful, both scientific, and frequently equivalent. Choice between them by scientists can be made on empirical grounds rather than on the grounds developed in the philosophical controversy.2 The positivism controversy, however, maintained that there was a fundamental, even dogmatic difference between Popperian rationalism as strict deductivism on the one hand and the highly sophisticated neomarxian theory of Habermas on the other - a difference which could not be eliminated by a relation of complementarity between "hard" quantitative and "soft" clinical methods - as in the objectivism/ subjectivism controversy. Rather, the opponents parted just as funda• mentally intransigent as they were at the beginning of the dispute over terminology and arguments. And no one would have been able to say at that time whether the social sciences or at least the philosophy of the

lX

Gerald Eberlein and Hal Berghel (Eds.): Theory and Decision, ix-xix. © 1988 by D. Reidel Publishing Company. x INTRODUCTION social sciences had gained in any way from the controversy. Adherents of "hard" and "soft" social sciences confronted each other as uncom• promisingly as those of a classical and a "trans• classical" philosophy of the social sciences.3 The question of whether it made any concrete difference that the social sciences pursued their research as critical rationalists or critical theorists was not satisfactorily answered. Social scientists and , at that time, lacked an approach which integrated the legacies of logical ,4 ,s hermeneutics and phenomenology - the continental - with the legacies of North American 6 and pragmaticism, and with the of science, arising from the impact of European immigrants on between the W orId Wars. This enumeration of philosophical approaches reflects a range of different methods in the social sciences, and precisely this indicates the fact that contemporary philosophies are not to be interpreted as dogmatic systems, but rather as alternative or complementary meth• odologies. In this unsatisfactory situation Werner Leinfellner, who had chosen the USA as his academic home, together with Werner Kroeber-Riel and Gerald Eberlein, his European colleagues and friends, decided to propose a fresh conception for the social sciences and social phi• losophy. Their approach was methodological and topical in character - as opposed to the objectivism/subjectivism controversy and even more so with respect to the positivism controversy. Thus, in October 1970, THEORY AND DECISION: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES had as the theme of its first issue a 'Symposium on Decision Theory'.1 The title of the journal and the topic of this special issue both emphasized the intended integration of philosophy and the social sciences. Quite con• trary to classical philosophies of the past, the new journal conceived of philosophy, not as a closed system based on metaphysical premisses, but as a philosophy of the social sciences in three basic respects: First, on a fundamental level, the problems in the formation of categories and , the foundations of logic and mathematics and epistemological issues constitute the "critical aspect" - in Kantian terms - of this applied philosophy. Secondly, the development of dnd theories as well as INTRODUCTION Xl problems of methods and research techniques form its methodological level in the narrow sense of the term. Finally, on the highest level, a synoptical phase functions predomi• nantly in the construction of theories and in the synthesis of systems of propositions or theories of different range.8 Following their methodological pluralism, editors and consulting editors agreed that empirical and formal methods as well as the context of discovery and the context of justification should be represented. Thus, philosophical contributions employ logical and linguistic analyses, i.e. deductive and semiotic methods, while contributions of the social sciences use empirical and historical research techniques following the logic of inductive or reductive methods. As the first special issue with its 'Symposium on Decision Theory' already had demonstrated, formal logical systems as well as of belonged to the subject matter of the new journal. Naturally, since a micro• economist and a sociologist functioned as European editors, these disciplines received particular consideration but other social sciences such as psychology, political science, law or were in• cluded as well. Most of these disciplines were represented on the Consulting Board. All participants agreed from the start, moreover, that descriptive and prescriptive theories had to be considered and, thus, that the real or presumed gulf between "value-neutral" and "normative" science was not to be increased by way of exclusion of one of these poles. The same openness for contributions ranging from fundamental research to applied research characterized the journal THEORY AND DECISION and the THEORY AND DECISION LIBRARY, and still does. Only a few years after the foundation of the journal, Werner Leinfellner insisted that the social sciences have to be conceived of not only in an epistemological, but also in a thematic perspective, not only as a cognitive, but also as a practical actualization. Thus, they gain their relevance not only as applied, but also as technological disciplines.9 The subsequent volumes made it clear that the unity of theory and decision as expressed in the journal's title was intended to encompass traditional theories or conceptions as well as decision and game theoretic criteria, generally interpreted as restricted to statistical or natural science methods. The editors' goal was to create "a link between advanced work in logic, philosophy and methodology of the natural Xll INTRODUCTION

sciences and the social sciences",10 and thus to do to the revolution in the social sciences. It was essentially Werner Leinfellner's accomplishment that the ideal of logical empiricism in the 1930s and 1940s, to create a "unified science", was replaced by that of a "methodological ".ll Accordingly, twenty years after Diesing, the THEORY AND DECISION school of the philosophy of the social sciences can substantiate his claim: "... There are no longer any methodological differences at issue"P Certainly the term "methodological" has to be interpreted in a broad sense, implicating the unity of science due to common standards of theory formation and to the fact that theories are the methodological basic units of the disciplines. Furthermore, "methodo• logical unity", in the context of this journal and library, refers to the continuously differentiated and integrated unity of an undogmatic, pluralistic philosophy of the social sciences. The convergence of objectivistic and subjectivistic methods was demonstrated in recent years by the development of empirical decision theories gradually bridging the gap between empirical behavioristic or behavioral theories on the one hand and statistical decision theory on the other. This is paralleled by differing emphases in editorial state• ments in THEORY AND DECISION after twenty years of publication. While the first issue refers to the 'Comparison of Formal Structure', today, the 'Discussion of Empirical Models in Terms of Formal Struc• tures' is stressed,u The new approach of THEORY AND DECISION owed its fruitfulness, as I see it, to the goal of journal and library "to support such research on a front unrestricted by disciplinary, national or ideological boun• daries".14 This goal was realized in that journal and library succeeded not only in attracting contributions from a wide range of disciplines and philosophies, but also in gaining the cooperation of editors and authors from both the major social systems in East and West. That this approach has produced the only intercontinental school of the philosophy of the social sciences to appear after the Second W orId War is essentially to the credit of Werner Leinfellner, who for decades worked on building a bridge between Europe and North America through his research and teaching. In this final volume of the general TDL series, the far-reaching differentiation of topics in the journal and the library ISis documented for the last time prior to the series' division into four subseries. All the INTRODUCTION xiii authors represented in this volume are authors, editors and members of the Advisory Board of the journal and the THEORY AND DECISION LIBRARY respectively. The central topics of journal and library form the parts of the present volume.

PART I: PHILOSOPHY AND LOGIC

In the first contribution to Part I, 'On Some Limits and Resources of Common-Sense Philosophy', R. Audi tries to overcome the polarity between the common-sense framework of intentionalistic concepts (, desire, intention etc.) and scientific empirical psychology. The chances and possible applications of common-sense psychology are explored in three respects: the explanatory resources of common-sense psychology; script theory conceived of as a scientific advance over that psychology; and the potential of both approaches for understanding human behavior. The paper is a typical example for the interdependent relationships between philosophy and psychology, the latter understood not only as a social science but also as everyday . The fact that the paper takes up the uses of common-sense-psycho• logical concepts for a normative assessment of human action demon• strates again the importance of the connection between descriptive and prescriptive aspects. The second contribution, by John L. Pollock, 'Probability and Pro• portions', is concerned with the fundamental level in terms of the three levels introduced above and, in a way, tries to establish more basic fundamentals for a systematic philosophy of the social sciences. Con• sidering the essentially probabilistic character of empirical research in general and the still controversial in particular, a theory of nomic probability, the kind of probability involved in statistical laws of nature, attains special relevance. The theory has been developed by the author in a number of articles, some of which were published in THEORY AND DECISION. The purpose of the present paper is to investigate the logical and mathematical structure of nomic probability and to generate a calculus of nomic probability. In the third contribution, 'Why Substitutional Quantification Does Not Express Existence', Hugly and Sayward analyze the thesis that substitutional quantification does not express existence. This analysis leads them to such topics as "deviant" substitutional of truth, " extensions" of and "feature placing sentences". By XlV INTRODUCTION means of an intricate chain of arguments, Hugly and Sayward show that the existential impact of quantification cannot be shown in either syntactic or semantic terms. Thus, the distinction between the existen• tial and non-existential quantificational assertions must be due to some aspect of the use of . Finally, they conjecture that the relevant feature of use might be "epistemic closure".

PART II: METHODOLOGY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Mario Bunge intends his paper to be a methodological preliminary to a scientific study of some of the most influential ideologies, distinguishing between total, religious and sociopolitical ideologies. In his critical assessment he outlines the concepts of a fundamentalist and a scientific ideology, and discusses some of their methodological and epistemo• logical problems: (a) What are the differences between ideology and science? (b) Is all ideology incompatible with science?, and (c) Are scientific ideologies possible? His contribution provides another example for the interdependence of philosophy and the social sciences, and especially points out the importance of methodological inquiries into the difference between ideology and science for the application of scientific analysis to social and political problems. O. Hagen notes 'Some Imperfections in the Scientific Communica• tion System and a Possible Remedy' in his contribution to Part II. He discusses non pUblication and ignored publication as cases of failure in the present c0mmunication system of scientific research and proposes possible ways to counteract them. Some of his proposals are: the full responsibility of the editor also for what is rejected should be stressed; published articles should include a note on possible earlier rejections; all journals should inform the authors about the for rejection; possible conflicts of interest between author and referee should be considered; finally, unpublished as well as published papers should be registered in a universally available databank arranged according to the principles of library catalogs. Such registration could give the ideas contained in the papers a kind of "patent-pending" status. This paper demonstrates convincingly how a problem of scientific practice can be provided with a possible solution by means of formal methods and innovative ideas. In 'Value-Free VS. Value-Conscious Social Sciences', Gerald Eberlein and O. P. Obermeier outline the paradigm of a value-conscious social INTRODUCTION xv science which clearly states and explicates its premisses as opposed to the received view of a value-neutral science. The cognitive function of science is extended by a function of realization, and an alternative to the prevailing theories on the non-responsibility of science for its social consequences is put forward. This contribution, too, represents in mmly respects the program of the THEORY AND DECISION journal and library: again, a deeper understanding of both fundamental and applied research and a complementarity of cognitive and practical realizations is at issue - demonstrated by way of a new paradigm of science.

PART III: ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL ISSUES

In the first contribution to this part L. Kern and H.-G. Rider investi• gate 'Public Bads and Socio-Moral Reasoning: The Case of the New Social Movements (NSM) in Germany'. The authors argue that public choice theory explains the continued existence of social movements already established, but not why they have arisen. Therefore, they propose to analyze the rise of social movements in analogy to the crea• tion of public goods as a prisoner's dilemma problem. They measure the force of the individual's arguments with to his moral reasoning and pro-social behavior. Then they introduce the utility difference between the cooperative and the noncooperative solution to the prisoner's dilemma as a variable. The authors argue that the NSM in Germany can be analyzed in terms of a shift from the economic growth option to a paradigm of the ecology option. Finally, an opera• tionalization of cooperative and free-riding behavior is given and their hypotheses are tested against the data of their 1983 survey. The con• clusion of the authors: moral and pro-social behavior, pessimism about the future, and the awareness of newly arising problems in society are important factors in the emergence of the NSM. New methods like those of decision theory are applied to generate hypotheses and to solve a current problem of political science. The theory drawn from formal models seem to have sufficient empirical content to allow for empirical testing with social research techniques. H. L. Berghel and D. L. Sallach in their contribution, 'The Impact of Computers on Job Opportunities: An Analysis of Employment Trends, 1972-1982', investigate the widely discussed question of the relation• ship between the growth of the computer industry and employment. Their present study tries to bring new to bear upon the growth xvi INTRODUCTION and/or decline of computer-related jobs compared to three cat~ories of traditional employment: administrative, clerical and blue-collar. The results show there is no direct and immediate causal connection between the two phenomena. Their contribution exemplifies the critical function of social science which may, even as applied science, clarify problems of relevance to the . K. Borch assumes in his paper, 'Insurance without Utility Theory', that insurance companies are essentially risk-neutral, and seek to maximize the expected present value of profits. It is then shown that the companies still make their decisions as if they were risk-averse. Thus, Borch combines the search for scientific truth with the search for practical decision criteria: utility theory and decision theory are employed methodologically to gain insight into the factual decision criteria of important economic organizations.

PART IV: DECISION AND GAME THEORY

Already some years ago Werner Leinfellner convincingly argued that, on the one hand, decision theory belongs to practical philosophy, but, on the other hand, according to Harsanyi it is a self-contained theory of human action or behavior:

It is a new interdiscipline and a fundamental discipline of the social sciences and consists of a number of subtheories such as or utility theory, bargaining theory, welfare theory, etc. [He goes on to emphasize that formerly inl decision theory there was made a strict difference between normative theories (economics, statistical decision theory, moral philosophy, political theory) and descriptive theories (experimental learn• ing theory, theory of voting behavior). But today decision theories which deal with public social decisions are considered as a sole rational and normative theory of individual, dual, plural and collective decisions and/or conflict resolutions, respectively.16

We may add that the earlier distinction between normative and descrip• tive decision theory conformed in many ways with the difference between "soft" and "hard" sciences. The new conception of a single theory encompassing both poles amply supports P. Diesing's on the convergence or complementarity of both paradigms. 17 A variety of the subtheories referred to above are represented in the articles in Part IV. To begin, in his paper 'Three Theorems on the Theory of Cardinal Utility and Random Choice' Maurice Allais com• ments on three essential theorems. First, he argues that the invariance of cardinal utility implies a particular form of the preference function. INTRODUCTION xvii

Second, he shows that the invariance of cardinal utility implies his "postulate of cardinal isovariation". Third, he shows that if a neo• Bernoullian index exists, it must be a function of a cardinal utility index. The latter proof being a different form of an earlier proof but one which is independent of the aforementioned postulate. Each of these proofs are offered to further clarify and justify his firm belief in the use of cardinal utility as a meaningful measure of preference. In 'Chairman Paradoxes under Approval Voting', Brams, Felsenthal and Maoz discuss three chairman paradoxes under approval voting. Earlier work by these authors and Farquharson demonstrated thaJ: a chairman with both regular and tie-breaking votes could actually do worse in a plurality vote context than if he had only a regular vote. Brams et al. show that this is not simply an anomalous feature of plurality voting: these paradoxes hold under approval voting as well. As a result, there seems to be no easy way to determine under which conditions the voting context will favor the chairman. They conclude with a suggestion for further investigation into the issue of the extent to which certain properties of voting systems affect the relative frequency of these paradoxes. As the title implies, Harsanyi's contribution, 'Some Recent Develop• ments in Game Theory', surveys recent advances. Specifically, these developments deal with such issues as cooperative solution concepts, theories of games with incomplete information, the use of noncoopera• tive bargaining models in cooperative games, perfect and imperfect equilibrium points, and equilibrium selection. He shows how recent research has shed light on the inadequacy of the original definitions for (non)cooperative games proposed by Nash; that weak equilibrium points are more stable than one might think; and that equilibrium points need not reflect rational behavior, to mention but a few. This paper concludes with a discussion of Harsanyi's own solution theory based upon a tracing procedure and selection determined by domi• nance relationships. Cowan and Fishburn's 'Foundations of Preference' accentuates the independence of preference and transitivity. As the authors point out, the traditional account of preference regards it as a primitive notion for which such properties as asymmetry and transitivity are expected to hold. Cowan and Fishburn argue that not only is transitivity not an inherent of preference, but that preference, itself, is not a primitive notion. Since preference is derived from other considerations, XVlll INTRODUCTION

it is not reasonable to expect that all occurrences of use have the same properties. This, in , accounts for the alleged intransitivity of preference noted by behavioral decision theorists. In 'What does Arrow's Impossibility Theorem Tell Us?', Skala dis• cusses several aspects of the famous theorem. Arrow observed that intuitive properties of aggregates of individual preferences are incon• sistent for finite societies. Arrow's original result has been extended in many ways. Some others have shown the joint inconsistency of subsets of the original six properties. Others have shown the consistency of the properties for infinite societies. Still others have investigated the result of weakening and altering the properties. In this paper, Skala interprets these extensions, and suggests a non-standard model of the Arrow which does allow possibility for large, finite societies. Gottinger's paper, entitled 'Choice Processes, Computability and Complexity', attempts to base the of limited upon computability theory. Gottinger uses the computer as a model for simulating individual preference structures. Each computer is then associated with individual strategies. The fully networked system be• comes, in effect, a social choice machine. Gottinger's main result is that the effective realization of choice functions is bound by the complexity of the computers.

NOTES

I P. Diesing: 'Objectivism vs. Subjectivism in the Social Sciences', Philosophy of Science 33 (1966), pp. 124-133, see p. 131. 2 Ibid., p. 124. 3 Cf Th. W. Adorno e.a. eds.: Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie, Neuwied 1969 and later editions .

.j Cf for example P. Achinstein, S. Barker eds.: The Legacy of , Baltimore 1969. 5 P. A. Schilpp ed.: The Philosophy of , LaSalle 1974, 2 vols. n A. Kaplan: The Conduct of Inquiry, San Francisco 1964. 7 Up to the present (1970-1986) 21 volumes of THEORY AND DECISION have been published. B The terms "critical aspects", "methodological side", "synoptical phase" are to be found already in H. Cairns, ' and the Social Sciences' in G. Gurvitch, W. Moore eds., Twentieth Century Sociology, New York 1945, pp. 14-16. 9 W. Leinfellner: 'Wissenschaftstheorie und Begriindung der Wissenschaften', in H. Albert, R. Carnap et al. eds., Forschungslogik der Sozialwissenschajten, Diisseldorf 1972, pp. 11-27. IU Cf THEORY AND DECISION LIBRARY, back cover. INTRODUCTION XIX

II Thus the title of Vol. 3 of THEORY AND DECISION LIBRARY, 1973, edited by M. Bunge. 12 Diesing,op. cit., p. 126. 1J See 'Editorial', THEORY AND DECISION, Vol. 1, No.1, October 1970, p. 1; Vol. 20, No.3, May 1986, reverse side of title page. 14 See Note 9. 15 In the years 1973-1986 50 volumes of the THEORY AND DECISION LIBRARY have appeared. In 1986/7 the general library will be divided into four subseries: Series A: Philosophy and Methodology of the Social Sciences; Series B: Mathematical, Statistical Methods and Linear Programming; Series C: Utility, Game and Decision Theory; and Series D: Systems and Information Theory. In addition, the continuing increase in the division of labor in the sciences has led to the differentiation and development of.. the "behavioral sciences" from a component in the subtitle of the general library to a new journal, and Philosophy (published by D. Reidel, beginning in 1986). 16 W. Leinfellner: 'Entscheidungstheorie' in Handbuch wissenschaftstheoretischer Begriffe, 1. Speck et al. eds., Gottingen 1980, Vol. 1, pp. 161-161 (transl. by G. L. E.). 17 See Note 1.