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Home , Carl Gustav Hempel, Empiricism, Hans Reichenbach, Kurt Grelling, Logical positivism, Moritz Schlick

“Logical ”— “Logical ”: What’s in a ?

Thomas Uebel University of Manchester

Do the terms “” and “logical empiricism” mark a philo- sophically real and signiªcant ? There is, of course, no doubt that the ªrst term designates the group of known as the Vi- enna Circle, headed by and including , Her- bert Feigl, Philipp Frank, Hans Hahn, , Friedrich Wais- mann and others. What is debatable, however, is whether the name “logical positivism” correctly distinguishes their doctrines from related ones called “logical empiricism” that emerged from the for Scientiªc around which included , , Kurt Lewin and a young .1 The person who called the co-referentiality of the two terms into ques- tion was Reichenbach himself. He did so in two publications of the second half of the 1930s—in an article in Journal of Philosophy (1936) and in his and Prediction (1938)—in order to alert readers to important dif- ferences between his own philosophy and that of the Circle.2 Reichenbach’s distinction was taken up by his former student Wesley Salmon.3 Not only did Salmon restate it, but he also asserted, categorically and very much in Reichenbach’s spirit, that “our chief inheritance from logical positivism” is “logical empiricism” ([1985] 2005, p. 7). The story of this inheritance is the story of “twentieth-century scientiªc philoso- phy”:

1. In their “Introduction” to the Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism Richardson and Uebel solve the by decree, declaring both terms to be “synonymous” (2007, p. 1 fn.). 2. Reichenbach’s way of drawing the distinction and its context be discussed in de- tail in sect. 6 below. 3. This distinction also appears to be basic to Nicolas Rescher’s account of the “Berlin School of Logical Empiricism” (2006).

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This movement grew chieºy out of the logical positivism of the Vi- enna Circle (with which Carnap was mainly associated) and the log- ical empiricism of the Berlin Group (with which Hans Reichenbach was connected). By midcentury virtually every important ªgure in the movement had relinquished some of the more extreme views of early logical positivism, abandoned the designation of ‘logical posi- tivist’, and adopted ‘logical empiricism’ as the name of their move- ment. After that, logical positivism no longer existed. ([1994] 2005, p. 19) Who then “killed” logical positivism—on this story?4 In print Salmon him- self went no further than to state that Reichenbach regarded his 1938 book as “his refutation of logical positivism” ([1994] 2005, p. 21; cf. [1985] 2005, p. 7) but he also gave no of dissent.5 There is, to be sure, this between the historical constructions of Reichenbach and Salmon: given his longer-term perspective Salmon allowed Carnap to be- come a logical empiricist, whereas Reichenbach was unable to report such redemption. Yet Reichenbach, as logical empiricism personiªed, remained central on his sketch of the development of of science. Now there are, of course, many ways of telling a story of development and it is not my business here to deny the importance of Reichenbach ei- ther as a in his own right or as a moving force of twentieth- century scientiªc philosophy.6 What I do want to call into question, how- ever, is the reliability of this Reichenbachian account as far as the is concerned. There are different ways in which this can be done. One can point out that the development of Vienna Circle philosophers away from what Reichenbach designated as the doctrines and preoccupa- tions of logical positivism was to a very large extent an internal matter prompted by internal opposition.7 One can point out that Carnap’s thought in particular underwent a development far beyond the embrace of 4. Readers will no doubt recall Popper’s self-incrimination (1974) or the frequent claims made on behalf of Quine’s “Two ” (1951) or Kuhn’s Structure (1962). Need- less to say, each such claim requires separate treatment. 5. There are, however, clear indications that Salmon made Reichenbach’s story his own: see his unqualiªed use of locutions like “the Vienna Circle of logical positivism” (1977, pp. 6 and 10), his Reichenbachian claim that was a “doctrine to which a number of early positivists had been committed” (1977, p. 47, without drawing any dis- tinction between logical positivism and its positivist predecessors) and footnote 2 of his ([1990] 2005, p. 244) where these points reoccur. (See also his 2005, pp. 3–4.) 6. Nor, I hasten to add, is it to deny the importance of Wesley Salmon himself or that of the Department of Philosophy which Rescher portrays as the for now terminal point of the Berlin School of Logical Empiricism. 7. For a detailed reconstruction of the Vienna Circle’s so-called protocol- de- bate, see Uebel (2007).

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the probabilistic realism that Reichenbach championed and so effected a radical reorientation of the ofªce even of scientiªc philosophy.8 On either of these the Vienna Circle regains the doctrinal multidimen- sionality that the Reichenbachian account denies it. Here I shall pursue my objective differently, however, by engaging di- rectly with the of the appellations which encapsulate Salmon’s Reichenbachian account.9 I shall review the use that leading members and early onlookers of the movement(s) made of the terms in question (and closely related ones), both in terms of self- and third person-ascriptions, to see whether the usage championed by Reichenbach reºects a distinction recognized by the philosophers involved themselves. It might be won- dered whether this is a proper deployment of scholarly effort. Aren’t but “smoke and mirrors”—or “Schall und Rauch” as a Goethe had Faust replying to the “Gretchenfrage”?10 The quick answer is that even if they carry little signiªcance in and of themselves, nevertheless names so described are indexical and we may inquire what ªre their smoke bears witness to. We may do so especially in the case of a whose name is contested. The of naming, as it were, may indicate fractions and divisions that subsequent developments of the movement tend to obscure. So even if on grounds of doctrines held it can be shown that the Reichenbachian distinction is over-sharp and mislead- ing it might be held that the distinction does after all reveal important so- cial distinctions and that its use can be defended on their account. Whether this holds true is what is investigated below.

1. Anticipations of “Logical Empiricism,” “Logical Positivism” and “Neopositivism” Before turning to the inception proper of the term “logical positivism”, it must be noted that one anticipated more or less all three of the appellations in question—without himself a protagonist of the movement at the .11 , a Finnish philosopher and psy- chologist, coined the phrase “logical empiricism” already in his 1926 monograph on (see von Wright 1979, p. xxvii) and in 8. For reconstructions of Carnap’s explicationist conception, see, e.g., Carus (2007) or Creath (2009). 9. A still further third appellation, “neopositivism,” must also be taken note of, but since it has a similarly controversial as “logical positivism” it does not require extensive discussion on its own. 10. Goethe, Faust, Act 1, Scene 3. The Gretchenfrage to Faust was: “Und wie hälst Du es mit der ?” (And what is your attitude to religion?) 11. Von Wright (1979), Niiniluoto (1992) and Manninen (2009) note that at the time Kaila distanced himself from all extant forms of “positivism” as he understood it.

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1930 published the ªrst in-depth, monograph-length critical study of Carnap’s Aufbau under the title “Logistic Neopositivism” (Der logistische Neupositivismus). Kaila, who had been in correspondence with Reichenbach since 1923 and quoted Schlick’s attribution to Einstein of the “ of observ- ability” as the “supreme principle of all empirical philosophy” (see Manninen 2010, pp. 49–50), employed the phrase “logical empiricism” in order to describe the view that of was constituted by a system of probability statements that are viewed as a logical function of statements about the given. What connected the latter to the higher reaches of empirical knowledge was a probability . Kaila thus op- posed a “reductionist version of positivism” (von Wright 1979, p. xxviii). It has been suggested that Kaila coined the phrase “logical empiricism” with the then very recent psychologism disputes in , for he con- trasted its concern with “logical ” explicitly with a “psychologistic empiricism” (1926, p. 35, orig. emphasis) that attempted a causal expla- nation (see Manninen 2009, p. 50). By contrast (and probably unknown to Kaila), had once called “orthodox logical empiricism” a view that he opposed, namely that “there can be ‘givens,’ sensations, percepts, etc., prior to and independent of thought or , and that thought may be had by some kind of com- pounding or separating of the givens”, as opposed to what he believed, namely that “sensation or ...issointernally fractionized or perplexed as to...require an , a .” (1907, p. 309 fn.).12 What Dewey had the term pick on, then, was precisely the genetic perspective that was jettisoned by Kaila. In as much as both the philosophers of the Vienna Circle and of the Berlin Society abjured psychologistic concerns in their , Kaila’s early use of “logical empiricism” pointed in their direction.13 Whether it was his early use of this term that was picked up by either party years later, however, is not known.14 By contrast, Kaila’s book on Carnap, written after his ªrst visit to Vi- enna in 1929 and his participation in meetings of the Circle and intensive discussions with Carnap, was discussed in the Berlin Society (Manninen

12. Dewey’s use was noted in a posting by Alan Richardson on HOPOS-L, 28 July 2010. 13. A pre-Kaila occurrence of “logical positivism” in ’s Die Philosophie des Als-Ob (1911, Ch. 36) appears to be even less directly pertinent to the genealogy here at issue. Vaihinger used the term to contrast his own view from skeptical “logical ” and dogmatic “logical optimism” about the aptness of our categories for gaining empirical knowledge. For a similar judgement about this occurrence, see Frank (1949, p. 43), for a different one see Fine (1993, pp. 2–3). 14. On Kaila’s later use of “logical empiricism” see sect. 8 below.

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2009, p. 56) and the Circle in December 1930 (Stadler [1997] 2001, pp. 242–244). It is likely that Kaila’s book title, Der logistische Neupositiv- ismus (Logistic Neopositivism), inºuenced the subsequent naming of the movement, for while (who enters the story at the next stage) was already at on a Rockefeller Fellowship by the time of the discussions of Kaila’s book he was present during Kaila’s ªrst visit and took part in the discussions then. As is evident, Kaila’s title partially anticipated both the later common designation “Neopositivism” (the subtitle of Kraft 1950) as well as that of “Logical Positivism.” However, only Reichenbach, in his own review of Carnap’s Aufbau (1933), adopted Kaila’s designation “logistischer Neupositivismus” wholesale, whereas one year after Kaila’s book the Swedish philosopher Ake Petzäll (who also had attended sessions of the Vienna Circle) pub- lished a monograph studying the early publications of the Vienna Circle under the title Logistischer Positivismus (1931).15 (As we shall see, the change from “logistic” or “logistical” to “logical” can also be seen in asso- ciation with the term “empiricism.” In both cases it seems to reºect a con- temporaneous change in the German terminology for formal logic from “Logistik” to “Logik”, hastened by the adoption of the name in its transla- tion into English.) Yet another anticipation of sorts to be noted appears in the report “Phi- losophy of the Exact : Its Present Status in ” in The Mo- nist in 1928. This report had originally been commissioned by its editor from Reichenbach who passed on its execution, along with appropriate in- structions, to Grelling.16 Grelling characterized an incipient movement and even gave yet another name to one part of it (albeit one that did not stick at all): “critical empiricism.” By that he meant “thinkers” working on the “foundations of ”, notably “R. Carnap, M. Born, H. Dingler, A. Einstein, H. Reichenbach, M. Schlick and H. Weyl.” philoso- phers of the mentioned by Grelling were Lewin for his com- parative studies of science and, in the philosophy of , Weyl for his mathematical , and Hilbert and his “collaborators... W. Ackermann, P. Bernays and J. v. Neumann” as well as E. Zermelo, A. Fraenkel, P. Hertz, and W. Dubislav (1928, pp. 106, 98, 102, 104). Among the works he discussed in , Reichenbach (1920) and Carnap (1921) were described in particular detail. As yet, however, no further differentiation within this new movement was drawn. Finally, we must mention the collectively authored small brochure Wis-

15. Petzäll followed this by another critical study four years later (1935); see Uebel (2009). 16. See Peckhaus (1994,p. 62) with .

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senschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis (Carnap, Hahn, Neurath 1929) that presented, manifesto-style, the work of the here ªrstly so- called Vienna Circle to the philosophical public. Produced to celebrate Schlick’s decision to stay in Vienna despite a tempting call to Bonn, its dedicatee actually came to abhor its characterization of the work of the group therein described, albeit not on account of the doctrinal content that was there ascribed to the Circle but on account of the quasi-political and supposedly of the Circle’s efforts at conceptual regen- eration.17 Important for us here is only the negative that neither of the names “logical positivism,” “neopositivism,” or “logical empiricism” made an appearance in its pages.18 The characteristic label used for the philosophy of the Vienna Circle was instead that of the “scientiªc - conception” to which it aspired and its associated slogan of “uniªed sci- ence” which it sought to develop. (While the name “Vienna Circle” was by all accounts invented by Neurath,19 the label “scientiªc world-conception” was due to Schlick and Frank, as Neurath himself once pointed out when it was attributed to him.20 Schlick and Frank used it for their book series “Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung,” inaugurated in 1929.) Characteristically, Neurath spoke of “the representatives of the scientiªc world-conception” when speaking, without differentiation, about the members of the Vienna Circle, the Berlin group and the school of Polish logicians, as e.g. in his “Historical Remarks” prefacing the bibliography of participants and sympathisers of the First Conference of the

17. For an account of the production and early reception of the pamphlet see Uebel (2008). 18. There are, however, two passages that allow the label “logical positivism” to be pinned on it—but only if one were independently so inclined. The ªrst is: “It is the method of logical analysis that essentially distinguishes recent empiricism and positivism from the earlier version that was more biological-psychological in orientation” ([1929] 1973, p. 307, orig. emphasis).The second passage is: “We have characterized the scientiªc world- conception essentially by two features. First it is empiricist and positivist: there is knowledge only from experience which rests on what is immediately given. This sets the limits for the content of legitimate science. Second, the scientiªc world-conception is marked by applica- tion of a certain method, namely of logical analysis. The aim of scientiªc effort is to reach the goal, uniªed science, by applying logical analysis to the empirical material” ([1929] 1973, p. 309, orig. emphasis). 19. Still earlier Neurath experimented with the term “Vienna School,” ªrst in a letter to Carnap (31 December 1927, RC 029-16-06 ASP). In his review of Carnap’s Aufbau Neurath used “Vienna School around Moritz Schlick” and Vienna School of Empirical Ra- tionalism” ([1928] 1981, pp. 296–297) which was commented upon by Carnap (see Uebel 2008, p. 74).—On the origin of “empirical ”, attributed by Neurath to his early mentor Gregor Itelson ([1945] 1983, 234), see Freudenthal and Karachentsev (2011). 20. Neurath to R. v. Mises, 3 November 1930, RC 029-14-02 ASP, p. 1.

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of the Exact Sciences in Prague in the ªrst volume of (1930, p. 313).

2. Blumberg and Feigl’s “Logical Positivism”. It would appear that the name “logical positivism” in precisely this form was ªrst applied to the philosophy of the Vienna Circle (but, notably, not only to it) by Schlick’s former students Feigl and in the article “Logical Positivism. A New Movement in European Philosophy” which led off no. 11 of vol. 28 of the American Journal of Philosophy, dated May 21, 1931. Feigl had come to Harvard for a one-year fellowship in September 1930. He recalled: “At Christmas 1930, Albert Blumberg and I met in New York for a week’s vacation, and for work on [the] article.” Having then mentioned that Schlick had been “appalled and dismayed” by the “slender pamphlet, Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis [which, TU] had been composed by Carnap, Neurath and Hahn aided by Waismann and myself” for its “propagandizing” tone, Feigl continued: “Yet the expansive spirit of Neurath and Reichenbach, and to some extent also of Carnap, had taken hold of us. Blumberg and I felt we had a ‘mis- sion’ in America, and the response to our efforts seemed to support us in this” (1969a, pp. 70–71). Feigl and Blumberg wrote: “The of this new development is its radically novel of the nature, scope and purpose of philosophy—an interpretation gradually achieved through extensive in- quiries into the foundations of logic, mathematics and physics. Its fore- most philosophical exponents are R. Carnap (Vienna), H. Reichenbach (Berlin), M. Schlick (Vienna) and L. Wittgenstein (Cambridge, )” (1931, p. 281). Note the intended wide designation of the term which was belied by later developments: not only did Wittgenstein feel increasingly alienated from all members but Schlick himself (never having felt part of that group to start with) but, as we shall see, Reichenbach soon developed an ambiguous attitude towards the Vienna Circle. In any case, the point of the term chosen was to draw attention to “precisely the union of empiri- cism with a sound theory of logic which differentiates logical positivism from the older positivism, empiricism, and ” and it was noted that it was the “new understanding and use of the analytic character of logic which has made possible the convergence of the empirical and logi- cal ” (1931, p. 282). Starting from Wittgenstein’s conception of logic as tautological, Blum- berg and Feigl’s account proceeded briskly to declare as analytic also arith- metic and the purely mathematical theory of probability and to announce the denial of the synthetic a priori. Starting from (Schlick’s) conception that “it is not the experienced qualitative content as such which is mir-

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rored in any system of knowledge, but the formal structure or of the given” (1931, p. 286), they projected the methodological of Carnap’s Aufbau onto the template of an “isomorphy of the system of lan- guage and the system of ” developed by Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: with atomic interpreted as speaking of elementary they thus arrived at the veriªcationist theory of meaning and a (structural) correspondence theory of (1931, pp. 287–288). The terms of sci- entiªc were to be analyzed in terms of the method of implicit deªnitions and Reichenbach’s distinction between of relation and deªnitions of coordination and the principle of was declared “simply a model for building of nature” obviating once again the need for synthetic judgments a priori (1931, pp. 291–292). The “nature and aim of philosophy,” ªnally, was characterized squarely in the Wittgen- steinian mode adopted by Schlick: the clariªcation of meaning. And while upholding that all “so-called inferred entities” are really “constructs of the given” they stressed that the phenomenalism they were committed to was only methodological and that logical positivism’s conception of meaning- fulness was not conªned to propositions that it was practically or nom- ologically possible to verify, but left the of “theoretical possibility of veriªcation” somewhat vague (1931, pp. 294–296). Feigl’s recollection of its composition made the project of writing the paper sound fairly spontaneous, but the dates he gave are compatible with the plan for this publication having been hatched still in Vienna. There were certainly indications available that the time was right for a paper like this. The work of German-speaking philosophers of science was beginning to be taken note of by Americans. Not only had Schlick himself only re- cently been invited as a visiting professor to Stanford, but there was also Sidney Hook’s report on “contemporary ” in May of 1930 in the Journal of Philosophy parts of which were even translated in the ªrst issue of Erkenntnis (Anon. 1930). In that report, over two pages not translated or mentioned in Erkenntnis, Hook had described the work of Reichenbach, noting his “naturalistic interpretation of the a priori”in (1920) as well as the theses of his (1925) and (1929) and praising his (1929), while only mentioning Schlick and Carnap as his associates in passing (Hook 1930, pp. 159–160). Clearly, some publicity for Schlick’s Wittgenstein-inspired “turning point in philosophy” (Schlick 1930) was in order. Not surprisingly, Blumberg and Feigl’s paper performed a somewhat delicate balancing act therefore. Reichenbach’s work was not annexed wholesale in so far as it was stated that “there are important differences be- tween Reichenbach and the Viennese.” They explained: “For the latter, the of probability, which Reichenbach takes as the fundamental idea,

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is deªnable either (a) purely logically, for the mathematical theory of prob- ability or (b) as statistical frequency. For them, therefore, applied probabil- ity is deªnable ultimately in terms of the truth or falsity of the proposi- tions describing individual cases of the in question (e.g., the tossing of a coin).” Conceding that “the intricate is far from solved” (1931, p. 291) Blumberg and Feigl correctly referred reader to papers by Reichenbach, Feigl, Waismann and Mises in Erkenntnis vol. 1, nos. 2–4. These papers originated at the First Conference on the Epistemology of the Exact Science in Prague in 1929 which had been jointly organized by the Vienna Circle and the Berlin Society. (The bro- chure Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung was publicly presented there.) What was not noted, however, was that these papers were followed by a “Discus- sion over Probability” in which the difference between what one may call Carnap’s truth-functional “positivism” and Reichenbach’s inductive “real- ism” found a much starker expression than was hinted at by Blumberg and Feigl (see Erkenntnis 1, pp. 269–270 and Kamlah 1985). Even so, dif- ferences between Berlin and Vienna had been noted. What leads me to suspect that Blumberg and Feigl’s paper was not quite as spontaneous as suggested—besides the apparent need to balance the publicity which the Berlin group had gained in the —is that in it a certain person and that person’s philosophical proclivities were very discretely “disappeared.” This aspect of Blumberg and Feigl’s paper suggests that it was conceived at least in part also to compete with the pamphlet Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung that Schlick had come to abhor. Just as Schlick’s own opening essay in Erkenntnis, “The Turning Point in Philosophy” (1930), may be understood as an alternative formulation of the philosophical program of the Vienna Circle for the German-speaking academic public,21 so Blumberg and Feigl’s paper may be regarded as an effort to forestall what Schlick would have regarded as detrimental effects of the pamphlet in the English-speaking world. (He could not know that the pamphlet was to remain untranslated until 1973.) There are three striking omissions in Blumberg and Feigl’s paper that speak of this devel- oping intra-Vienna Circle dynamic. Absent from the list of representative publications is any mention of the pamphlet Wissenschaftliche Weltauf- fassung, Der Wiener Kreis itself, absent is the name of one of its authors, Otto Neurath, and absent from the of the Circle’s philosophy is the aim of uniªed science that the pamphlet had stressed. (Needless to say, absent also is any mention of the socio-cultural and political context of the Circle’s philosophy that had been invoked in the pamphlet.) In

21. It also served as an alternative to Reichenbach’s introductory remarks (1930) but that’s another involved story; see my concluding remarks in sect.11.

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other words, Blumberg and Feigl presented the philosophical program of the Schlick wing—more or less to the exclusion of that of the so-called left wing of the Circle whose members already at the time grew increasingly critical of Wittgenstein’s views (see Carnap 1963, pp. 57–58)

3. The Swift International Reception of “Logical Positivism”. Whatever the intra-Austro-German and intra-Viennese points that were scored by Blumberg and Feigl’s paper, it certainly was successful in ren- dering the name “logical positivism” an international currency. It appears in the title of ’s British Academic lecture in March 1933 in which she said of “the group of philosophers sometimes referred to as ‘der Wiener Kreis’” that “notwithstanding divergences in detail” their theory “has come to be known as ‘Logical Positivism’” (1933, p. 55). Stebbing did not mention Blumberg and Feigl’s paper as such but mentioned the name given by Petzäll’s ªrst book as a slight alternative and also noted that Schlick seemed to prefer the designation “consistent empiricism” (“konsequenter Empirizismus,” in Schlick 1932). Max Black, in his “Intro- duction” to the English translation of Carnap’s “Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft” also spoke of the Vienna Circle as “the Logical Positivists, as they have sometimes been called” and refers to both Blumberg and Feigl’s and Stebbing’s papers (1934, pp. 12 and 19 fn.).22 Likewise, the ªrst monograph-length critical study in English of Vi- enna Circle philosophies (mainly Carnap’s from the Aufbau to his Logical ) and of the philosophy associated by Blumberg and Feigl with the Vienna Circle (Wittgenstein’s Tractatus) by the American philosopher Jul- ius Weinberg carried the name Blumberg and Feigl had bestowed on the movement in its own title (1936). Weinberg’s critique focused on the sup- posedly real solipsism that follows from the claimed-to-be only “method- ological” solipsism of Carnap’s Aufbau and the reconstructions of scientiªc knowledge it allowed for until late 1932. Unlike Stebbing, Weinberg al- ready had the advantage of a longer view, but it is notable that even though he was fully apprised of the break that “radical ” af- forded its protagonists, he still treated Carnap and Neurath of the mid- 1930s as “Logical Positivists” (1936, p. 294). In the same year also published a report of the Vienna Circle’s views, alongside that of other contemporary groupings, in the Journal of Philosophy. That Nagel did not employ the term “logical positiv- ism” but simply subsumed the Circle’s efforts (he too concentrated on Carnap) under the heading of “analytical philosophy in Europe” (he cov- ered Germany, Poland and Austria) may have sprung from the unusual 22. For Carnap’s take on the name, see sect. 5 below.

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close familiarity with its history and recent developments which he had gained from then very recent discussions with members (especially with Carnap, then in Prague). For instance, by noting that “following the tradi- tion of most radical movements, the threat of a split into a ‘left’ and a ‘right’ wing is on the horizon” (1936, p. 29). Nagel in fact made public a façon de parler that Schlick strongly objected to and had persuaded Carnap to drop as “Neurathian jargon” in letters of November 1934 and January 1935.23 Nagel, in short, had an inside view which precluded the more or less uncritical use of “logical positivism.” A. J. Ayer, on the other hand, another visitor to the Circle, much less versed than Nagel either in its or its internal tensions and inter- national connections, was happy to employ “logical positivism,” both in the text of his own Language, Truth and Logic (1936) and, more than twenty years later, in the title of his anthology of previously untranslated Vienna Circle texts, taken mostly from the early 1930s (preceded by a Russell essay on logical ).24 In Language, Truth and Logic Ayer de- clared: “The philosophers with whom I am in the closest agreement are those who compose the ‘Viennese circle’, under the leadership of Moritz Schlick, and are commonly known as logical positivists” ([1936] 1946, p. 32). Even more than twenty years later Ayer still claimed that his book “popularize[d] what may be called the classical position of the Vienna Cir- cle” (1959b, p. 8). It is notable, however, that the logical positivism en- dorsed in his own book espoused, as the Preface proudly told the reader, a “thoroughgoing phenomenalism” ([1936] 1946, p. 32) and that Ayer adopted this particular position at a point in time when Carnap had long given up on methodological solipsism for the practical purpose of recon- structing scientiªc theories. It is perhaps not insigniªcant therefore that in Ayer’s anthology the last three contributions, essays by Ramsey, Ryle and a late piece by Waismann, come under the subheading of “analytic philosophy” (1959a, p. viii). The term “logical positivism” had become linked, due to Ayer’s own work and its congruence with the still earlier use of the term by others, to the earliest phase of Vienna Circle theorizing. Unfortunately, Ayer’s book widely popularized the idea of logical posi- tivism in the English-speaking world but gave no indication that Vienna Circle philosophies themselves had since moved on. This is explainable in that Ayer in that book saw himself as presenting his own philosophy and not as giving an exposition or critique of that of the Vienna Circle. Even

23. The quote is from Schlick’s letter to Carnap, 20 January 1935, RC 029-27-07 ASP, p. 2. 24. According to Ayer (1987, pp. 23–25), he began his 1936 book “in the Christmas vacation of 1933–34 and ªnished writing it in July 1935,” having attended meetings of the Vienna Circle “from December 1932 until April 1933.”

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so, his book had the effect of attributing to the logical positivists a con- stant point of view—unlike Weinberg—moreover one they either had by then abandoned or never held. Not untypically, who out to re- fute logical positivism after II, both outside and inside acade- mia like Joad (1950) and Barnes (1950), drew no distinction between Ayer’s views and those of the Vienna Circle.

4. “Logical Positivism” Rejected in the Vienna Circle. As Nagel’s abstention indicates, the name “logical positivism” was not universally applauded. It is notable that the name “logical positivism” was challenged already at the time of its inception as an inappropriate and misleading term by members of the group of philosophers to whom it was meant to apply. To start with, already in 1932 Schlick himself (as Stebbing noted) ex- pressed reservations about “the term ‘logical’ or else ‘logistic positivism’” (with to Blumberg and Feigl, Kaila and Petzäll) and indicated that “consistent empiricism” appeared more “appropriate” to him ([1932] 1959, p. 106). This label found no uptake but it is unlikely that Schlick lost much sleep over it. According to many reports, Schlick opposed col- lective names and designations that suggested anything like the formation of a school—thus the embarrassment occasioned for him by Wissenschaft- liche Weltauffassung—Der Wiener Kreis. Carnap, for his part, occasionally spoke of “our ‘Vienna Circle’” ([1934a] 2003, p. xiii; 1936–37, p. 422) and preferred to use expressions like “the views of the Vienna Circle” (1935, p. 22) or “the works of the Vi- enna Circle and related groups” ([1934b] 1987, p. 46; 1936, p. 142) when designating the doctrines espoused by this group. Confronted with an in- ternational audience he typically remarked, as in his London lectures of 1934, that “the Vienna Circle is sometimes designated as Positivistic. It is doubtful whether this designation is quite suitable for us...Thename Logical Positivism seems more suitable, but this also can be misunder- stood.” (1935, p. 20)25 And in “ and Meaning” Carnap wrote about the designation “Vienna Circle”: 25. In the Preface to the English translation of his “Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft” Carnap wrote similarly but more expansively: “Thus our position is related to that of Positivism which, like ourselves, rejects and re- quires that every scientiªc should be based on and reducible to statements of empirical . On this account many (and we ourselves at ) have given our position the name of Positivism (or New Positivism or Logical Positivism). The term may be employed, provided it is understood that we agree with Positivism only in its logical components, but make no assertions as to whether the Given is real and the Physical World appearance, or vice versa; for Logical Analysis shows that such assertions belong to

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I use this geographical designation because of lack of a suitable name for the movement represented by this Circle. It has some- times been called Logical Positivism, but I am afraid this name suggests too close a dependence upon the older Positivists, espe- cially Comte and Mach. We have indeed been inºuenced to a con- siderable extent by the historical positivism, especially in the ear- lier stage of our development. But today we would like a more general name for our movement, comprehending the groups in other countries which have developed related views (see [Paris Con- gress proceedings, TU]). The term ‘Scientiªc Empiricism’ (pro- posed by Morris [1935, p. 285, TU]) is perhaps suitable. In some historical remarks in the following, concerned chieºy with our original group I shall however use the term ‘Vienna Circle’. (1936– 37, p. 422)26

Carnap stuck to the terminological resolve announced here throughout the 40s. Later, in his “Intellectual Autobiography” (1963) Carnap simply spoke, when relevant, of the Vienna Circle as such and mostly avoided “isms” when speaking of their philosophy. In his contributions to the 1942 Dictionary of Philosophy edited by D. Runes, Carnap wrote directly under the heading “Scientiªc Empiri- cism; movement”: “A philosophical movement origi- nated by the movement of Logical Positivism but including many other groups and persons.” (1942, p. 285) The entry was structured in two parts. Carnap speciªed under “I. The Vienna Circle; Logical Positivism; Logical Empiricism” as its founder Schlick and its members Bergmann, Carnap, Feigl, Frank, Gödel, Hahn, Neurath, and Waisman, and went on to remark a little later that “the views developed in the V. C. have been called Logical Positivism (A. E. Blumberg and H. Feigl, J. Phil. 28, 1931); many members now prefer the term ‘Logical Empiricism’” (1942, p. 285). Notably, Carnap’s references on the historical development include not only the pamphlet of 1929 and Neurath’s historical monograph of 1935, but also Nagel’s and Reichenbach’s papers in Journal of Philosophy of 1936. Under “II. Scientiªc Empiricism” Carnap speciªed “A wider movement, comprising besides Logical Empiricism other groups and with related views in various countries” (1942, p. 286). Among these he named “the Berlin Society for Scientiªc Philosophy” and as its members Dubi-

the of unveriªable pseudo-statements.” ([1932] 1934, p. 27) Similar remarks were is- sued with regard to the applicability of the term “”. 26. See also Carnap’s lecture manuscript “Philosophy and Logical Analysis”, ca. 1936, RC 081-03-01 ASP, p. 1.

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slav, Grelling, Helmer, Hempel, Herzberg, Korsch, Reichenbach, Strauss. Clearly, Carnap was concerned to characterize the independence of the Berlin Group. As it unfortunately happened, however, this dictionary en- try (like some others) was corrupted when typeset and Carnap’s corrections were not incorporated into the ªnal version. As a result, Carnap’s even- handedness remained largely unrecognized.27 Carnap’s remarks and misgivings about the term “logical positivism” reºect his conversations and correspondence with Neurath. “Please don’t say ‘positivism’. I just reread Comte’s work. And even though I have to guard it against too much abuse, it’s pretty gruesome,” Neurath wrote in May 1934.28 Eleven years later, in his debate with Horace Kallen over the supposedly authoritarian tendencies of the unity of science movement, he returned to the matter. “I think from a pedagogical and Kallenian point of view we should solemnly cut the strings which connect us with the posi- tivism of the past. Comte and some of his followers, in their arguing and in their social approach tried to create a deªnite system of moral- ity not based on the consensus of mankind, but on the deductions brought forward by the positivists Their praise of medieval Catholicism is con- nected with what Kallen would call an imperialist attitude, which led them to create a kind of positivist church . . . Their anti-pluralist attitude induced me to drop, wherever possible, the term ‘positivism’.” ([1946] 1983, p. 235) Clearly Neurath, of whom Carnap once hoped that “as a creator of slogans he would one day ªnd a good name” for their movement, was highly sensitive to the politics of naming a controversial philosophy.29

5. Neurath on “Logical Empiricism”. Prior to the Paris Congress for the Unity of Science, during the summer of 1935, Neurath and Carnap continued debating the respective advantages and disadvantages of the terms “logicising empiricism,” “logistic empiri- cism” and “logical empiricism.”30 Here it is to be noted that already in the November 1931 issue of the internationally oriented Italian journal Scientia Neurath employed the term “logical empiricism” for the philoso- 27. See the note in Benson’s bibliography of Carnap in Schilpp (1963, p. 1033) which indicates the corrections that should have been made. In the paragraph in the text I em- ployed the text as it should have appeared after Carnap’s corrections. In its published form the reference to Reichenbach (1936) was virtually unidentiªable and the list of members of the Berlin group unidentiªable as such. 28. Neurath to Carnap, trans. TU, 9 May 1934, RC 029-10-67 ASP, p. 1. 29. Quoted from Carnap to Neurath, 4 July 1935, RC 029-09-37 ASP, p. 2. 30. Neurath to Carnap, 6 July 1935, RC 029-09-36, pp. 1–2; Carnap to Neurath, 31 July 1935, RC 029-09-15, p. 2; Neurath to Carnap, 3 August 1935, RC 029-09-14, p. 3.

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phy being “work[ed] out” by the Vienna Circle ([1931] 1983, p. 52).31 We may wonder whether this constituted his ªrst thinly veiled public reaction to the name bestowed on the movement by Blumberg and Feigl. I do think this is likely but I have not found anything to establish this more securely. There is also the question whether Neurath then or later knew of Kaila’s use of the term “logical empiricism” in 1926. I think this is un- likely, but again cannot prove it. Already in 1931 however, and increas- ingly so during the years of the protocol sentence debate Neurath often re- ferred to his own version of Vienna Circle philosophy as “physicalism,” even “radical physicalism” (as in the title of [1934] 1983), but Carnap ob- jected to “physicalism” as a name for their “comprehensive viewpoint”.32 Neurath’s initial proposal to use the appellation “logical empiricism” was not taken up and it was only when he was faced with ªnding a proper name amidst the increasing internationalization of Vienna Circle philoso- phy that he returned to it. In his contributions to and in his report of the First International Congress of the Unity of Science in Paris in September 1935, he used “logical empiricism” throughout to cover both the philoso- phers of the Vienna Circle and the Berlin Society and he reserved the term “scientiªc empiricism” to designate the nascent wider international move- ment (see his 1936a, 1936b, 1936c and 1935).33 (“Scientiªc empiricism” had been proposed by Morris as name for the movement arising from the convergence of pragmatism and Viennese empiricism; see his 1935a, 1936b.)34 An even broader use of “logical empiricism” as encompassing also its internationalization is indicated in the title and text of his French monograph “The Development of the Vienna Circle and the Future of Logical Empiricism” (1936d) and a related Swedish paper (1936e). With “scientiªc empiricism” soon dropping out of his again, “logical empiricism” continued to be used in the wide by Neurath through- out the later 1930s and 1940s (e.g. 1936f, 1936g, 1936h, 1937, 1941, 1946). When late in his life Neurath wrote that he “suggested the expression ‘Logical Empiricism’ for stressing the combination of empiricism and highly evolved deduction” ([1946] 1983, p. 235) it is perhaps not wholly clear whether he referred to his use in 1931 or 1936. That he went on to

31. On Neurath’s still earlier naming efforts see fn. 19 above. 32. Carnap to Neurath, 4 July 1935, RC 029-09-37 ASP, p. 2. 33. In publications of the period Neurath used “logical positivism” only once, with quotation marks, in relation to Feigl’s contribution ([1935] 1981, p. 659); in the same re- port he once used “logicising empiricism” in relation to Frank’s lecture ([1935] 1981, p. 653) and once “logistic empiricism” in reporting a talk by Reichenbach ([1935] 1981, p. 657). 34. Frank once reported (1941, pp. 12–13) that Morris proposed “logical empiricism”

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note that he had “been less successful in promoting ‘Logical Empiricism’ instead of ‘Logical Positivism’” (1983, 235) suggests what his correspon- dence conªrms, namely that it was his ªrst use of it in 1931 that he had in mind.35 It also does not seem to be the case that Neurath’s re-adoption of the term “logical empiricism” was due to Reichenbach’s use of the term “logistic empiricism” at the Paris Congress (reported by Neurath at [1935] 1981, p. 657). There is not only this difference in their usages of “logistic/logical empiricism” that for Neurath it comprised both the Vien- nese and Berliner versions, whereas Reichenbach was not so ecumenical, but there were also, as noted, the discussions with Carnap prior to the Paris Congress during which, as we saw, Neurath began to re-employ the name he had proposed in 1931.

6. Reichenbach on “Logistic Empiricism”. Reichenbach’s employment of the term “logistic positivism” and, later on, “logical positivism” was no less antithetical to the Carnap-Neurath wing of the Vienna Circle than the Feigl-Blumberg paper had been, even though its target was essentially wider. By 1936 and 1938 Reichenbach employed the term “logistic empiricism”—by 1951 he too employed “logical empiricism” (1951, p. 255)—to distinguish the philosophy emerging from the Berlin Society for Scientiªc Philosophy, principally his own and that of his collaborators, from that of the Vienna Circle.36 Once more competition played its part.37 Reichenbach was prompted

on the occasion of a conference in Prague in 1934 (see Morris 1936a), but Morris himself clearly laid emphasis in the term “scientiªc empiricism”; see also Morris (1935b). 35. Neurath claimed it explicitly as his “expression-baby” in a letter to Morris of 18 November 1944, quoted in Pietarinen (2011, pp. 78–79). 36. It may be noted that while Reichenbach often contrasted the work of the Berlin So- ciety for Scientiªc Philosophy with that of the Vienna Circle in general terms, he focused for present purposes on “the ‘Berlin group’...among whose members were Dubislav, Herzberg, Grelling, and the author” who “met in the seminars of the University of Berlin and the ‘Gesellschaft für wissenschaftliche Philosophie’” (1936, p. 143) One referee suggested that Reichenbach’s use of “empiricism” in the name for his philosophy may reºect the fact that before the Berlin Society changed its name at Hilbert’s suggestion in 1931, it had been called the “Society for Empirical Philosophy.” (Its short-lived pre-World War One predecessor was the “Society for Positivistic Philosophy”, founded by the Machian Joseph Petzold who also founded the Society for Empirical Philosophy in 1927 and led it until his death in 1929 after which Reichenbach became more actively involved; see Hoffmann (1993) and Danneberg and Scherrnus (1994).) 37. Previously, Reichenbach spoke of what “has already been accurately termed ‘logistic neo-positivism’” in his review ([1933] 1979, p. 406, trans. amended) of Carnap’s Aufbau and following some critical remarks noted that “the scientiªc atmosphere of which Carnap’s book is a part” “fortunately . . . exists in various centers, of which the Vienna Cir- cle is only one”, adding that “the discussions among these in some ways very different cen-

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to write “Logistic Empiricism in Germany and the Present State of its Problems” for the Journal of Philosophy by Nagel’s article in its pages just two months earlier. In a footnote Nagel had written of “groups of students, like the one centered around Hans Reichenbach before he found it necessary to leave Berlin, which are in large sympathy and active cooperation with the Vienna Circle even though they have never given ex- plicit assents to its doctrines” (Nagel 1936, p. 30 fn.). Just as Reichenbach one year earlier had been moved to write to correct his former teacher, the German philosopher Ernst von Aster whose survey of contemporary phi- losophy (Aster 1935) had privileged the Vienna Circle at the expense of the Berlin Society38—and two years later would again be moved to write for the same to Max Black prompted by his review of contemporary positivism (1938) in the ªrst issue of The Modern Review39—so here Reichenbach wrote to Nagel: Especially our Berlin group added certain types of considerations to the discussions that other groups neglected too much. I mean pre- dominantly the close contact with physical research. According to your report it looks as if logic and abstract discussion of meaning were the main topics of our thought circle (Gedankenkreis). But just in our German circle we stressed over and over that such dis- cussion remained suspended in air if they are not based on closest cooperation with physical research.40 Given for his own account in the pages of Journal of Philosophy, Reichenbach then tried set the record straight concerning “the origin, in- tent, and drift of the recent movement among German-speaking thinkers seeking to propagate a scientiªc philosophy” (1936, p. 142).41

ters have already advanced to a high level” ([1933] 1979, p. 407). Not very long after- wards, in his remarks on Popper’s Logic of Scientiªc Discovery (1934) Reichenbach noted Popper’s debt to “logistical positivism” and, following his critical diagnosis that Popper’s replacement of the principle of induction as essential to scientiªc method by guidance through an “unscientiªc, metaphysical (evolutionarily explainable) ” (Popper’s terms), he advised that it would be “in the interest of the representatives of the scientiªc world conception” to support his own probabilistic theory of induction instead (Reichen- bach 1935, p. 283). 38. See Hoffmann ([1993] 2007, pp. 41–42) and Gerner (1997, pp. 151–153). 39. See Danneberg (1993, p. 340 fn.) and Schernus (1994, p. 35). 40. Reichenbach to Nagel, 15 February 1936, HR 013–51–01 ASP, quoted in Gerner (1997, p. 99) 41. That the work and especially the independence of Reichenbach’s Berlin group has been insufªciently appreciated has claimed more recently in Danneberg (1993, pp. 320– 321); Danneberg and Schernus (1994, p. 391); Hoffmann ([1993] 2007, p. 42), (1994, p. 21) and Milkov (2011).

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“The historical development of empiricism has taken a sudden change in our day,” Reichenbach claimed (vaguely echoing Schlick), “a change which opens new perspectives upon old problems as well as perspectives upon new problems—thus inaugurating a new phase of .” (1936, p. 142) Given this diagnosis, Reichenbach set himself the task (differently from Schlick) “to determine the origin, intent, the drift of the recent movement among German-speaking thinkers seeking to propagate a scientiªc philosophy.” (1936, p. 142) Accordingly he asserted, with reference to Chapter 7 of his 1920 monograph: “The program for a philosophical method in the form of an analysis of science was ªrst pub- lished, within the context of the movement under discussion, by the author in 1920.” (1936, p. 142) Similar priority claims for the Berlin group were repeated throughout the article.42 It may seem that Reichenbach avoided charges of infelicity by stating what his program consisted in: “‘Reason’ was to be grasped only in the concrete form of scientiªc statements—an idea which later on found a more precise formulation in Carnap’s theory that philosophy must be an analysis of scientiªc language.” (1936, p. 142) Here Reichenbach conveniently forgot that in 1920 he had acknowledged Schlick’s writings—presumably his “Space and Time in Relativistic Phys- ics” (1917) and General Theory of Knowledge (1918)—as “belonging to the few from which scientiªc philosophy will emerge anew.”43 Apart from putting himself and his Berlin group into the driving seat of the perceived philosophical development, Reichenbach was concerned to segregate Vienna Circle philosophy as “logistic positivism” apart from his own “logistic empiricism.” The strategy employed was two-pronged. While Carnap’s “fundamental ideas on logical positivism” were described as a combination of “the epistemological ideas of Mach and other positiv- ists with the of Russell” and Vienna Circle philosophy generally as centered on the idea that “every has a veriªable meaning” leading to “their war on pseudo-problems” (1936, p. 143), the Berlin group was said, by contrast, to have “avoided all theoretical maxims like those set up by the Viennese school and embarked upon detailed work in logistics, physics, , and .” (1936, p. 144) In delineating the contrast between “the system of logistic positivism”—elsewhere he spoke of Carnap’s “premature” systematizing44—and the “concentrate[]

42. For instance, after mentioning the Vienna Circle’s veriªcationism, Reichenbach wrote: “During these years, the idea of scientiªc philosophy was making headway in Berlin.” (1936, p. 143). 43. Reichenbach to Schlick, 17 October 1920, no sig. ASP, quoted in Gerner (1997, p. 53). 44. See the letter Reichenbach to von Aster, 3 June 1935, HR 013–39–34 ASP, quoted in Gerner (1997, p. 152).

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on minute work” of the Berlin group (1936, pp. 149–150), Reichenbach did not shy away from misrepresentation. Thus Reichenbach characterized logical positivism as “the consistent realization of a program which accepts nothing but absolute as contents of science” and the Aufbau “as a modern fulªllment of Descartes’ quest for an absolutely certain basis of science” (1936, p. 149). (Already his considerably delayed review of the Aufbau spoke of “a foundation for knowledge of the greatest security” that Carnap would have established had he been correct ([1933] 1979, p. 407).) To be sure, Reichenbach went on to acknowledge brieºy that, in Vienna, Neurath challenged Carnap’s position—and Schlick’s—so that “logistic positivism became logistic ma- terialism” which, however, better was called, he added, by his name of “lo- gistic empiricism” (1936, p. 151). But Reichenbach left readers in no doubt whose challenge to logistic positivism was the deeper and more consequential one: his own which proposed a probability logic to account for the meaningfulness of empirical propositions and solve the problem of induction. Reichenbach noted pointedly that “the members of the Vien- nese Circle, especially, still refuse to accept” his solution. (1936, p. 159) This was not far from suggesting that they would disagree with his sum- mary claim a page earlier: “A scientiªc system is not maintained as true but only as our best wager for the future. To discover what is our best wager in any situation of is the aim of all scientiªc toil; never can we arrive at predictions which are certain” (1936, p. 158). Needless to say, not even Schlick who still in 1934 demanded certainty of his so-called “constatations”—contrary to Carnap and Neurath—extended this demand to the propositions of science proper. By 1934, no one in the Vienna Circle demanded certainty of the for scientiªc statements. It is difªcult not to conclude that Reichenbach here attacked a strawman version of Vi- enna Circle philosophy. In his Experience and Prediction Reichenbach expanded on and even radi- calized the same strategy of differentiation. He began by speaking of a “philosophic movement which, though conªned to small groups, is spread all over the world. American pragmatists and behaviorists, English logis- tic epistemologists, Austrian positivists, German representatives of the analysis of science, and Polish logisticians are the main groups to which is due the origin of that philosophic movement which we now call ‘logistic empiricism’.” ([1938] 2006, p. xli) Yet as the book unfolds it becomes clear that logistic empiricism was far from a broad church: the Preface quite correctly stressed the centrality of the conviction that “the key to an understanding of scientiªc method is contained within the probability problem” and that in unlocking precisely this lay what Reichenbach

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called “my contribution to the discussion of logistic empiricism” ([1938] 2006, pp. xliii–xliv). Notably, representatives of the Vienna Circle now no longer were classed and refuted as logistic positivists but mostly as “positivists” simpliciter, yet the old criticism was reiterated: “It was the of modern positivism to restore knowledge to absolute certainty” ([1938] 2006, p. 344). Having criticized positivism’s phenomenalism at length (without always noting its merely methodological nature in the hands of Circle members), Reichenbach now also omitted his previous acknowl- edgement of Neurath’s opposition to it from the main text and relegated one sole mention of Carnap’s and Neurath’s “behaviorist turn” alongside Watson’s and Tolman’s and Dewey’s pragmatism to a foot- note ([1938] 2006, p. 163 fn.). In short, the presentation was designed to show Reichenbach as the sole opponent of the Viennese aberrations casti- gated as more or less unqualiªedly phenomenalistic. Likewise with regard to the Vienna Circle’s veriªcationism: when he ªnally acknowledged that some representatives of the Vienna Circle had given up on “absolute,” i.e. complete, veriªcation as well, Reichenbach dubbed them “the more toler- ant representatives of positivism” ([1938] 2006, p. 76). His subsequent criticism of Carnap’s concept of degrees of conªrmation of a proposition— which, he acknowledged corresponded to his own concept of the weight of a proposition—turned on Carnap’s failure to operationalize it by means of his own (Reichenbach’s) conception of probability ([1938] 2006, p. 77).45 “Logistic empiricism,” in short, was not a broad church but rather meant Reichenbach’s own reconstruction of scientiªc method as frequentist probabilistic reasoning about real objects hiding behind superªcial ap- pearances. In sum, Reichenbach’s “logistic empiricism” was by no means the same animal as Neurath’s far more generic “logical empiricism”—nor even, as we shall see next, the same as what Feigl came to adopt as “logical empiricism.”

7. “Logical Positivism” in the Historical Mode (I): Its Use by Apostates. With the exception of Ayer (and two writers discussed in sect. 9 who re- mained indifferent to the naming issue), the term “logical positivism” fell out of favor in the middle of the 1930s in one important respect. It fell out of favor in so far as it was no longer used by philosophers to denote a type of philosophy they themselves admitted to confessing. Needless to 45. Dating Carnap’s inauguration of degrees of conªrmation correctly to his 1935 Paris Congress paper (Carnap 1936), Reichenbach made sure to have previously noted that his own earlier investigations related to what he called “the probabilistic theory of meaning”; see Reichenbach ([1938] 2006, pp. 76 fn. and 72 fn.).

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say, those philosophers who, like Reichenbach, objected to the doctrines they associated with it were quite happy to continue using the term “logi- cal positivism” to characterize competitors. Both types of reactions can be found among philosophers who all along or at one time or another be- longed to the movement designated by it, the Vienna Circle. Carnap and Neurath can be seen to represent the ªrst group, as we saw. So we turn to two younger ex-student members of the Circle: Feigl post-1935 and post-1950, represent the second group, albeit in dia- metrically opposed ways. In retrospect Feigl once wrote about the name “logical positivism” that “as early as 1935...Iabandoned the label (at least as far as I was con- cerned) and availed myself of the alias ‘logical empiricism’. This was trig- gered by a remark of a French philosopher at the International Congress for the Unity of Science in Paris (1935). He burst out at me ‘Les positivists, çe sont des idiots.’”([1963] 1981, 38) Accordingly, Feigl’s sur- vey article (1943) appealed only to “logical empiricism,” as did his address to the plenary session of the Second International Congress of the Interna- tional Union for the (1955). The latter, however, also contains the phrase “logical empiricism after twenty-ªve years of de- velopment compares favorably with the earlier logical positivism” (1955, p. 114). For Feigl, the terms “logical positivism” and “logical empiricism” were not coextensive. This is conªrmed by his well-known papers from the late sixties. Speaking of the “Origin and Spirit of Logical Positivism” Feigl again used the term “logical positivism” to designate the “early phases” of the movement originating from Vienna ([1969a] 1981, p. 35), and in “The Vienna Circle in America” he again noted that “most of us preferred the label ‘logical empiricism’ or ‘scientiªc empiricism’ ever since about 1936” ([1969b] 1981, p. 57). The reason for this change now was said to be the tendency of opponents to misinterpret them as adherents of “subjective ” despite their disclaimers of “metaphysical .” This much was much in line with Carnap’s and Neurath’s reasoning. But Feigl also added: “perhaps the most important and constructive aspect in this transition to logical empiricism was the element of empirical or scientiªc realism that became increasingly prominent in our views. Reichenbach and I had already opposed the phenomenalistic reduction in the twenties” ([1969b] 1981, p. 80). Here Feigl joined a delimitation of that was not originally his—and one that is not ultimately sustainable. While it may be conceded that, with the exception of Neurath, ca. 1929– 30 the Vienna Circle brieºy presented a “methodologically positivistic” epistemological program to the public (their logical analysis of science proceeded by reduction of its statements to the given), it abstained from

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any ontological claims. Moreover, as noted, Neurath early on and Carnap from the mid-1930s onwards themselves employed the term “logical em- piricism” without any more “realistic” in their . Another philosopher who continued to employ the term “logical posi- tivism” to denote a philosophy he had come to to was Gustav Berg- mann. A student member of the Circle in the early years, Bergmann pub- lished a collection of his critical essays under the provocative title The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism in the mid-1950s.46 Seeing the beginning of logical positivism to be marked by the appearance of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, its peak by Carnap’s Aufbau, and its end by Carnap’s Logical Syn- tax and Schlick’s Gesammelte Aufsätze 1926–1938, Bergmann characterized the movement as “the contemporary form of British empiricism” distin- guished by its “” with “the analysis of language as its basic tool” ([1950] 1966, pp. 2, 7, 6). Like Feigl, then, Bergmann used “logical positivism” primarily to designate the (methodologically) phenomenalist phase of Vienna Circle philosophy. What is also notable here—beyond the ªrst use of another since famous designation: “linguistic turn”—is Bergmann’s concurrence with the char- acterization of Vienna Circle philosophy that was suggested repeatedly in the works of A. J. Ayer. Thus speaking of “Carnapian positivism” ([1954] 1966, p. vi), Bergmann also called the Aufbau “the work in which the au- thor comes closest to the classical empiricist ” ([1950] 1966, p. 2 fn.). Also like Reichenbach, Bergmann then painted precisely the picture of the Aufbau that Quine’s “” painted—and which has been argued against vigorously in recent years as a deep misun- derstanding of the very point of Carnap’s ªrst major work.47 As it hap- pened, Bergmann himself defended an alternative sense-data base for a re- construction of the concept of in his own debate with Quine ([1953b] 1966, p. 88).48 Unlike Feigl, then, Bergmann’s opposition did not spring from the

46. In a letter of 1938 summarizing his recollections of the Vienna Circle as a student member from 1927 to 1931, however, Bergmann did not use this appellation (perhaps unsurprisingly so, since the letter was written for Otto Neurath). Instead Bergmann spoke of “the views of a school for which it was so difªcult to ªnd a name. This was so difªcult because against each available name that was approximately correct—such as ‘Positivism’, ‘Empiricism’ and the like—objections were raised because of their historical associations; thus ªnally the factually neutral name ‘Vienna Circle’—which you proposed—was the only one that could be agreed upon, and this name indeed prevailed in the literature” ([1988] 1993, p. 201). 47. See, e.g. Friedman (1987), (1992) and Richardson (1998). 48. It is surely not insigniªcant that Bergmann (1954)—like Weinberg (1936)—were reprinted still in the 1960s. It seems fair enough to conclude that, together with Ayer’s an- thology entitled Logical Positivism (1959), their continued availability helped to re-afªx the

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scientiªc realism that Feigl shared with Reichenbach. Rather, for Berg- mann the early Vienna Circle had not taken their positivism seriously enough: thus in the early 1950s he was concerned to reconstruct phenom- enalism ([1953a] 1966, pp. 43–45). Later on Bergmann embraced a “two- level” realism “of and of bodies” and characterized the logical pos- itivists, “whether they knew it or not,” as “either metaphysical material- ists or phenomenalists. The former hold that there is nothing mental; the latter, that everything is mental” (1966, p. ix). Here, clearly, historical ac- curacy was wholly abandoned for rhetorical effect.

8. “Logical Positivism” in the Historical Mode (II): Its Use Rejected by Sympathisers. As we saw, Neurath did not use the term “logical positivism” even in his- torical perspectives and Carnap only did so qualiªed by phrases like “was called by some” and disclaiming its descriptive or historical accuracy. They are not the only ones who adopted such an attitude. Not only did the continued use of “logical positivism” unite opponents who sported con- ºicting metaphysical tendencies, but objections to the continued use of the term also united philosophers who did not agree on their metaphysical stances. As we learnt early on, the term “logical empiricism” had ªrst been used by Kaila in the mid-1920s, albeit without reference to any existing move- ment. (As we saw, when he did use a label to refer to an existent move- ment before the mid-1930s he used “logistical neopositivism”.) Yet Kaila himself returned to the use of the term he had invented in the title and text of two of his publications that discussed different and scientiªc of reality as “Contributions to Logical Empiricism” in 1936 and 1941. In 1936, he discussed the “principle of empiricism or the thesis of testability” which says that “a statement or a system of state- ments concerning ‘reality’ which is such that the derivation of empirical statements . . . from it is logically precluded—e.g. because of the indeter- minacy of the concepts used—has no truth criterion; an afªrmation or ne- gation of such a statement is arbitrary”, and he acknowledged “the impos- sibility of strict decidability” ([1936] 1979, pp. 62–63). In 1941, the “method of logical empiricism” was summarized as the conjunction of the denial of the synthetic a priori and the afªrmation of the “thesis of test- ability.” (The latter thesis was subsequently analyzed with the unavailabil- ity of “indubitable” empirical statements being dubbed a “triviality” ([1941] 1979, pp. 129 and 135).) Since in both monographs Kaila now

name “logical positivism” and, even more importantly, together with Quine’s “Two Dogmas” (1951), the Hume-plus-Russell interpretation to the Vienna Circle as a whole.

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expressly rejected his earlier critique of Vienna Circle philosophy as no longer apposite,49 one might be tempted to take his reference to logical empiricism as denoting only its post-methodologically phenomenalist pe- riod. However, we also read:

When the science-theoretical method of logical empiricism was taking its present shape in the twenties, the decisive stimulus came from the so-called ‘Vienna Circle’ (Wittgenstein, Carnap, Schlick, and others). The positivist and phenomenalist tradition of was still alive in many ways in this circle, and it may have looked as though the novelty of the theory of science in question consisted merely in a shift of Mach’s psychologizing positivism in a more ‘logicizing’ direction, brought about by complementing it with symbolic logic, which meanwhile had matured, and with the anti-psychologistic attitude that derived from Frege. Accordingly, the new ‘scientiªc philosophy’ was often referred to as ‘logical posi- tivism’ or, more precisely, ‘logistic neopositivism’; such christenings are still being used. In our opinion they should be avoided if what is meant is ‘logical empiricism’ as it is understood in this treatise. For this science-theoretical method, at its core, is not an ideological continuation and revival of the positivist and phenomenological tradition; it is at least just as closely related to certain forms of crit- ical epistemological realism as it is to positivist phenomenalism. . . . Once a decisive developmental step has occurred, it can only cause confusion when the novel product of differentiation is pressed into some old box into which it no longer ªts...Foranobjective appreciation of the decisive philosophical , science-theoretical prog- ress that has been accomplished here, it is important to disentangle logical empiricism from certain ideological relationships which are external to it and not substantial. ([1941] 1979, pp. 154–155)

Kaila left readers in no doubt who he opposed: Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic “where logical empiricism is presented as a new form of the psychol- ogizing British empiricism and phenomenalism” and, “even more disas- trous . . . certain other tendencies, especially those of Otto Neurath and Philip Frank, whose writings belong rather to the literature of the Marxist sphere of ideas than to general philosophy” ([1941] 1979, p. 252 n.38). Kaila, then, did not see “logical empiricism” as denoting only the later physicalist phase of Vienna Circle philosophy, nor did he draw by its 49. In the former, Kaila says about his (1930) that he “can no longer concur with all the ideas put forward” in ([1936] 1979, p. 121 fn.1), in the latter he called his earlier criticism “now obsolete” ([1941] 1979, p. 252 fn.37).

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means a distinction between that and Reichenbach’s—to whose work on relativity theory (1924 and 1928) he nevertheless again accorded pride of place ([1941] 1979, pp. 189 and 201; compare [1930] 1979, p. 48). Hav- ing joined Feigl’s and Reichenbach’s realist wing of logical empiricism, Kaila nevertheless refused to segregate the earlier a-realist Circle as logical positivism. Another may also be mentioned in this context, namely the au- thor of the International Encyclopedia of Uniªed Science’s very own historical monograph: Joergen Joergensen. Here the title clearly reºected the editor- in-chief’s : “The Development of Logical Empiricism” (1951). Consistent with the usage exempliªed by Neurath and Carnap, it con- tained two parts: the ªrst dealt with “The Vienna Circle: Its Program and ” and the second with “Logical Empiricism: Its Expansion and Elaboration.” Interestingly enough, the ªrst part ended with a discus- sion of Carnap’s Aufbau, while Carnap’s Logical Syntax was treated in the second part. While term “logical positivism” was only employed twice (1951, pp. 11 and 28) Joergensen followed in outline the division of labor for the terms “logical positivism” and “logical empiricism” that Feigl sug- gested, albeit with the big difference that he placed the transition to “log- ical empiricism” soon after 1930 (1951, p. 40).50 Notable too is that the second part begins with a description of the co- operative publication and conference activities of the Circle and descrip- tions of the “Berlin Group,” the “Lwow-Warsaw Group”, the “Pragmatists and Operationalists,” the “Uppsala Group,” the “Munster Group,” and of several “Individuals.” This was easily the most comprehensive treatment of the internationalization of the movement to date. Nevertheless, writers speaking for the Berlin group might allege, with apparent justiªcation, that it did not get quite the foundational billing that it deserved along- side the Vienna Circle.51 This overlooks that the section in question begins with the sentence: “Simultaneously with the gathering by Schlick of the Circle at Vienna, a similar group was formed in Berlin, which in 1928 was organized as the ‘Gesellschaft für empirische (later...‘wissenschaftliche’) Philosophie’” (1951, p. 48). To be sure, this is about as sloppy about the de- velopment of the Berlin group as Reichenbach’s 1936 paper was about the development of the Vienna Circle.52 Yet the very varied work of the Berlin

50. Note the rough agreement of this dating with that by Carnap of the ªrst steps in what he called “the liberalisation of empiricism” in (1963, pp. 56–58). 51. See speciªcally Danneberg and Schernus (1994, p. 391), more obliquely Hoffmann ([1993] 2007, pp. 41–42), (1994, p. 22). 52. See the claim that Hahn and Neurath were attracted to Schlick’s circle by Schlick’s cooperation with Carnap in Reichenbach (1936, p. 143). Whether or not Reichenbach’s 1936 paper was meant as a counter-manifesto or not—a claim by Stadler (2010) chal-

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group was given good coverage and Reichenbach’s ªrst book on relativity theory (1920) was mentioned alongside Schlick’s on the theory of knowl- edge (1918). Since the original manuscript of Joergensen’s monograph ended with a discussion of the 1939 Unity of Science Conference at Harvard, a Post- script by N. M. Martin was added in 1949, listing mainly the expansion of publication activity in the United States, followed by another postscript updating the lively developments up to and including 1950, among them the incorporation of the Unity of Science Institute under Frank at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Notably, in this appendix no monikers were used for the movement in question at all. In short, like Kaila, neither Joergensen nor Martin gave comfort to those who wanted to use the terms “logical positivism” and “logical empiricism” to distinguish sharply and along principled ways the Vienna Circle from the Berlin group.

9. The Not-Bothered Brigade: , Philipp Frank and C. G. Hempel. Last but not least we may consider the terminological of two writ- ers who always expressed their admiration for the work of Mach as they understood it and of a former student of Reichenbach who became closely associated with the Vienna Circle. To begin with, let us note the iconoclastic that Richard von Mises made in calling his book a Kleines Lehrbuch des Positivism, appearing in translation as Positivism. A Study in Human Understanding. Especially in light of Neurath’s concerns and Feigl’s experience, Mises’s declaration of allegiance to positivism is quite striking and reveals his intellectual inde- pendence: he belonged neither to the Vienna Circle nor to the Berlin Soci- ety for Scientiªc Philosophy. What is surprising is that, despite his choice of book title, Mises used the term “logical empiricism” to refer to the phi- losophy of the Vienna Circle ([1939] 1951, p. 91). However, in the Eng- lish translation an Introduction was added in which the term “so-called ‘logical positivism’” was appended to the Vienna Circle whose members were then referred to as “logical positivists” ([1939] 1951, pp. 8–9). This is interesting insofar as the original choice may well have reºected the preference of the editor of the series in which the book originally appeared (Neurath’s Library of Uniªed Science), whereas the usage adopted in the later Introduction apparently reºects one the author still found common in the 1940s in the United States. Importantly, however, no differentiation be-

lenged by Milkov (2011)—the claim that Reichenbach gave a “precise” report of the his- tory of the Viennese movement (Milkov 2011, p. xxxvii) is not tenable.

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tween different phases of Vienna Circle philosophy was reºected in either of the names given to its philosophies. Like Mises, Philipp Frank was not afraid of using the term “positivism” but instead repeatedly defended Mach against misinterpretation as a sub- jective idealist (e.g. 1949, p. 35). Indeed, a crucial role in his 1949 ac- count of the history of logical empiricism was played by what he called the “new positivism” (1949, pp. 9, 10, 13, 18, 20–21, 24 and 40). New positivism consisted in the integration of the seemingly contradictory conceptions of scientiªc theories by Mach and Poincaré such that - atized theories could be viewed either as free creations of the human mind or as economical of the facts. The only condition was that the statements of the theory were suitably related to observations. This early synthesis Frank attributed to what he called “our group,” namely the dis- cussion group with Hahn and Neurath from 1907 onwards that Rudolf Haller called the “ªrst Vienna Circle.”53 Their view was considerably im- proved towards the end of the following decade, according to Frank, by Schlick’s clariªcation that all that this suitable relation of theory to obser- vation required was that some statements specifying observational conse- quences were deducible from the and by Reichenbach’s speciªcation that in order to do so some terms of the axiomatic system re- quired so-called coordinating or operational deªnitions (1949, pp. 25–31) In these anti-reductionist moves Frank saw no sharp break with what had come before, but only a reªnement that allowed “a new philosophy” to be built “on the basis of [the then] new science” of (1949, p. 25), a process he also called the “integration of the new positivism with the ideas that have grown out of Einstein’s new science” (1949, p. 26). Quite consistently then Frank employed “logical positivism” and “logi- cal empiricism” interchangeably in his 1949 Introduction (1949, pp. 38, 42, 43, 45, 48 and 49; cf. 1947, p. 164). Eight years earlier he told readers of his ªrst English-language collection of papers that he did not like either of the terms (1941, p. 5) and, indeed, happily used “positivism” to denote the views of his pre- discussion group with Hahn and Neurath (1941, p. 7), but designated as “logical empiricism” the then most recent version of the philosophy of the movement he had been part of (1941, p. 15). Even though by about 1950 Frank settled into use of the term “logical empiricism” as the ofªcial designation of the philosophy which he himself professed (see the title of 1950/51) and even of the entire movement from its very start (1948/49, p. 458), Frank also reiterated, implicitly, the interchangeability of the names “logical positivism” and “logical empiricism” (1950/51, p. 43)—as he had already in is short obit-

53. See Haller (1985), Stadler ([1997] 2001, pp. 168–188) and Uebel (2000), (2003).

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uary for Schlick (1936, p. 292). Clearly, Frank attached no signiªcance to this choice. Turning to Hempel we ªnd a similar terminological tolerance. While his ªrst contribution to the Vienna Circle’s protocol sentence debate car- ried “logical positivist” in its title (1935a), its follow-up only used the designation “Vienna Circle” (1935b). In one of his retrospective papers from the 1970s and 1980s he recalled that and why Carnap did not like the name “logical positivism” (the association with older positivisms oc- cluded their own principled anti-metaphysical stance) and himself used “logical empiricism” instead (1973). In another, Hempel spoke of “logical positivism or, as it used to be called, logical empiricism” ([1981] 2000, p. 268). Quite clearly, this former student of Reichenbach did not place or hold a stake in the distinction drawn by his former teacher.

10. Conclusion. The conclusion is that there is no systematic unity of usage of the terms “logical positivism” and “logical empiricism” even among the participants and early critics of the tradition in question. While nobody objected to the term “logical empiricism,” opinions were decidedly divided over the term “logical positivism.” Since the dispute concerns precisely the ade- quacy of this term for naming the philosophies of the Vienna Circle in a contrastive way, there is, accordingly, no agreement precisely where it matters. It might be thought that a proper division may be drawn between self- ascriptions and third-party attributions. Accordingly, it might be thought that “logical positivism” was a term used for third-party attribution (as it was by Reichenbach) but as a term of self-ascription was disliked by the people so described (Neurath, Carnap). Since “logical positivism” started out as a self-ascription (Blumberg and Feigl), however, this division could at best hold from the mid-1930s onwards (Feigl again). But this does not hold true either, for some veterans of the movement were quite indifferent as to whether the term “logical positivism” or “logical empiricism” was to be preferred (Frank, v. Mises). No systematic usage is thus discernible among members of the Vienna Circle: some never liked the term “logical positivism,” some only later on did not like it and some never cared one way or another. So one might think that the proper division is between types or phases of Vienna Circle thought, such that “logical positivism” denoted the early, methodologically phenomenalist period and “logical empiricism” denoted the later phases. (This would seem to be how Salmon understood the dis- tinction.) While one can ªnd examples for such a usage within the Vienna

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Circle (Feigl, Bergmann) one also can ªnd prominent examples of mem- bers who were against this (Neurath, Carnap, Frank). Nor can a proper division be drawn between the early local phase of the movement as “logical positivism” and the later international phase of “logical empiricism”: neither Reichenbach, nor Frank and v. Mises, nor Carnap and Neurath subscribed to this interpretation. Along a different track it might be thought that a proper division may be drawn between those who supported the party in question and those who did not. Accordingly, those who opposed the Vienna Circle’s philoso- phies called it “logical positivism” (like Reichenbach) and those who sup- ported it objected to it (Neurath and Carnap). But this division is also not tenable. Clearly, some of those who coined the name also supported it (Blumberg and Feigl). It also is evident that it makes no difference whether, when those using the term “logical positivism” were visitors, they were critical of it or not. To be sure, the philosophers who anticipated the term more or less pre- cisely were visitors to the Circle (Kaila, Petzäll) and, like outside observers who picked up the term (Stebbing, Weinberg), they were critical of it. But Ayer too was a visitor but became a strident advocate of a certain vari- ant of Viennese “logical positivism.” Most strikingly, however, Kaila rec- ognised the continuity between early and later versions of Vienna Circle philosophy and so rejected the continued use of “logical positivism” for its earlier version. As for the term “neopositivism,” it may be noted that it also was picked up not only by critically-minded outsiders but also both by a former member in his history of the Vienna Circle (Kraft 1950) and used many years later by Rudolf Haller for the title of his own concise overview of the Vienna Circle (1993). In sum, there is no systematic agreement of any sort about the usage of the term “logical positivism” insofar as it is meant to isolate the Vienna Circle philosophy or even only part of it from the larger movement of “logical empiricism.” Readers may agree but wonder why this is worth stating with such precision: aren’t names but Schall und Rauch anyway? More pertinently, what does this uneven usage have to do with Wesley Salmon’s claim that “logical empiricism” should be separated sharply from the Vienna Circle’s “logical positivism”? Does it matter that Reichenbach’s drawing this separation was not more widely accepted? We may, of course, periodize and name philosophi- cal movements to our heart’s content in whatever way suits our purposes in categorizing them. If the purpose is a historiographical one, however, we are constrained by conduciveness to historical truth as our condition of adequacy. Since Reichenbach’s way of drawing a distinction between logi-

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cal positivism and logical empiricism is not only doctrinally over-sharp and misleading but also does not map onto discernible sociological dis- tinctions, it seems that we must conclude that it has no authority over and above that of Reichenbach’s own purposes. Reichenbach was no innocent bystander. As we noted, there was an on- going competition for attention and resources between, as I would put it, the Viennese and the Berlin wings of early logical empiricism. So picking up and defending Reichenbach’s usage is taking sides. But to what end— is the competition still ongoing? Now there is no denying that the philos- ophy of science that was being developed in Berlin was different from that being developed in Vienna. Prominent here is, as Salmon always stressed, the scientiªc realism that characterizes Reichenbach’s philosophy as well as the central role that his frequentist interpretation of probability occu- pied in his understanding of empiricism. While is no longer an issue, scientiªc realism is. Might we then ªnd in this an objective ground for the distinction between “logical positivism” and “logical empiricism” such that logical positivists deny and logical empiricists afªrm scientiªc realism? While Reichenbach and Feigl would agree, both being scientiªc realists, again Kaila, being another, would disagree—as would, no doubt, Carnap, Frank and Neurath who saw themselves as logical empiricists but not as scientiªc realists. Again we ªnd no agreement in usage among the protagonists and sympathisers of the movement. So while individual authors did associate doctrinal or personel-related meanings with the differential use of the terms “logical positivism” and “logical empiricism,” there was no uniform use of these terms either among members, opponents or sympathizers of the Vienna and Berlin groups. The conclusion this suggests is that it would be better simply to acknowledge that within the broad movement of logical empiricism a pretty wide variety of conceptions were developed. This plurality ranges from different conceptions of the nature of through different conceptions of probability to different conceptions of the stand- ing of theoretical terms—and even to different conceptions of the objec- tives of the post-metaphysical theory of science under development. So are these names “logical positivism” and “logical empiricism” but Schall und Rauch after all? Insofar as such an answer gives them the status of indexical terms it does point to the competition between principally Reichenbach and the Vienna Circle as the ªre from which the smoke emerged. And here we touch on a matter that requires an intensive inves- tigation in its own right. That is the dispute between Reichenbach and the Vienna Circle not over speciªc philosophical theses but over precisely the nature of the philosophical enterprise itself. In fact, we should speak in the plural here since Reichenbach on this account was involved in two dis-

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putes explicitly and in one more implicitly: in one with Schlick as repre- sentative of the Wittgensteinian wing of the Circle, in one with Neurath as representative of the socio-politically activist left wing of the Circle and, later and not explicitly so, in one with Carnap over scientiªc realism. Moreover, there is one respect in which in the earlier meta-philosophical disputes both wings of the Circle were united. Both objected that the new philosophies they were developing were not just one more addition to the long line of philosophies that graced the history of the — both thought and claimed in so many words that a decisive “turning point” had been reached. Later, Carnap’s explicationism carried the same message once more. It is a curious fact that the disputes just mentioned also focused at least partly on a name, indeed, a name that Reichenbach attached to his philosophy—“Naturphilosophie” (philosophy of nature)—and that the members of the Vienna Circle strongly objected to it. (Passions ran high on various uses, indeed the very use, of the term “philosophy” between 1929 and 1931.) These disputes erupted in the course of planning the First Conference on the Philosophy of the Exact Sciences in Prague in 1929 and in the course of the negotiations for the takeover of Annalen der Philosophie and its relaunch as Erkenntnis in 1929–30. (And they found a repetition in Reichenbach’s apparently ultimately aborted attempt to start a letter campaign to secure chairs at German universities for young philos- ophers of nature in 1931.)54 It would appear that in these discussions metaphilosophical concerns and broadly ideological ones mixed freely and explosively. The “Gretchenfrage” here was: “Und wie hälst Du es mit der Pol- itik?” (And what is your attitude to politics?) But of these very real conºicts between Reichenbach and the Vienna Circle the terminological separation between “logical positivism” and “logical empiricism” that Reichenbach tried to introduce was but the faintest echo.55

References Anon. 1930. “Deutsche Philosophie im Urteil eines Amerikaners.” Erkenntnis 1:83–87. Ayer, A. J. [1936] 1946. Language, Truth and Logic 2nd ed. London: Gollanc. 54. Some or all of these disputes are mentioned in Röseberg (1993), Danneberg and Schernus (1994), Gerner (1997) and Stadler (2010). They deserve a closer analysis in their own right. 55. An early and highly compressed version of this paper was presented at the confer- ence “Philosophy of Science in Europe” celebrating the 20th anniversary of the Institute Vienna Circle in December 2011 in Vienna. I wish to thank the members of audience there for stimulating questions and two anonymous referees for suggestions.

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