Feminist Empiricism Draws in Various Ways

Catherine E. Hundleby

eminist empiricism draws in various ways developing new accounts of agency in knowl- on the philosophical tradition of empiri- edge emerges as the second theme in feminist F cism, which can be defined as epistemol- empiricism. ogy that gives primary importance to knowledge Most feminist empiricists employ the meth- based on experience. Feminist demands for atten- odology for developing epistemology known as tion to women’s experiences suggest that empiri- naturalized or naturalist epistemology. Naturalism cism can be a promising resource for developing is controversial, but it welcomes disputation, a feminist account of knowledge. Yet feminists takes up new resources for epistemology on an also value empiricism’s purchase on science and ongoing basis, and encourages multiple approaches the empiricist view that knowers’ abilities depend to the evaluation of knowledge. This pluralism on their experiences and their experiential histo- undercuts naturalism’s and empiricism’s conser- ries, including socialization and psychological vative tendencies and imbues current formula- development. tions of empiricism with radical potential. This chapter explores the attractions of empiricism for feminists. Feminist empiricist analysis ranges from broad considerations about Feminist Attraction to Empiricism popular understandings to technical analysis of narrowly defined scientific fields. Whatever the Empiricism traces in the philosophy of the scope, feminist reworkings of empiricism have global North as far back as Aristotle,1 but it is two central themes. The first theme is the inter- classically associated with the 18th-century play among values in knowledge, especially British philosophers, John Locke, George connecting traditionally recognized empirical Berkeley, and David Hume. Most recently the values, such as evidence and objectivity, with noteworthy empiricists include the logical moral and political values. The interplay of these empiricists as well as Willard Van Orman Quine values undermines the traditional association of and his naturalist followers. All empiricists empirical knowledge with individual knowers, emphasize the role of sensory experience in and the separation of individual knowledge from knowledge—evidence, data, and facts—and the politics of communities, by suggesting that downplay the role of innate ideas and inborn the knower is not an isolated person. In this way, mental capacities, which rationalists have his- contesting the nature or locus of the knower and torically championed. Science provides especially 28 Chapter 2 Feminist Empiricism–•–29 good examples of empirical knowledge, and most feminist empiricism is analogous to liberal feminist empiricists focus on the types of knowl- feminism. Both revise traditionally accepted edge produced by science. Although feminists approaches to the problems at hand: empiri- substantially revise empiricism, the traditional cist approaches to scientific knowledge and association remains attractive because of its rhe- liberal approaches to democratic politics, torical power to engage practicing scientists and respectively.2 The political mainstream and the academic philosophers. The naturalist form of culture of science give less currency to more empiricism also insists on attention to the social contested socialist, post-structuralist, and post- and physical embodiment of knowledge that colonial theoretical orientations (Harding, concerns feminists. 1989). Yet traditional rhetoric can convey radi- Empiricism’s concern with identifying and cal ideas, and, when it does, it can be far more making the most of the strengths of science pro- powerful than the more obviously revolution- vides feminists with a useful point of departure ary approaches. Therefore, a radical future can for theorizing about knowledge. Many of the emerge from feminist empiricism just as Zillah early 20th-century logical empiricists aimed to Eisenstein argued it does from liberal feminism develop a science that would serve social pur- (Harding, 1986; Tuana, 1992). poses, including sociopolitical emancipation of The rhetorical advantage can be strategically various sorts; and so the goal of an emancipa- essential because it allows feminists to transform tory science is part of the empiricist heritage the power of science. (Okruhlik, 2003). Attention to the strengths of science supports the development of feminist The point of feminist science criticism must, in the “successor science projects” (Harding, 1986). end, be to change science, and changing science Feminist experiences as scientists and feminist requires changing the practices of scientists. Hence, analyses of scientific problems orient most scientists must be brought into the dialogue. Since feminist empiricist analysis. Yet some feminist scientists are empiricists, that dialogue will have to empiricists consider knowledge in a wider make room, at least in the beginning, for empiri- domain that includes everyday understanding cists and for, at least as a topic of discussion, and that draws on diverse sources of experience empiricism. (Nelson, 1990, pp. 6–7) (Code, 2006a). The experiences from which we gain knowledge do not all arise from scientific Appealing to the traditional empirical valuation methodology and may even include reading fic- of experience and logic provides a strategic tion (Code, 2006b). This broad view of experi- advantage for feminism. Yet, feminists must ence is congruent with Quine’s expansive notion rework empiricism and our understanding of of science that includes the experiential knowl- what constitutes scientific standards in order to edge of people with no special training (Haack, account for the role of sociopolitical values, as 1993; Nelson, 1990). must the not-specifically feminist promoters of Representing progressive concerns and lib- the empiricist tradition. eratory values in empiricist terms is rhetorically Many feminist epistemologists gain inspira- powerful, providing persuasive force and thus tion from a late 20th-century development of strategic advantage that eludes more explicitly empiricism known as “naturalized” or “natural- progressive or revolutionary theories. Scientists ist” epistemology. Naturalists’ attention to the and Anglo-American philosophers of science situation of human physical and cultural embodi- tend to conceive of science in empiricist terms, ment abandons abstract ideals of knowledge that and the public understanding of science follows assume an omniscient god’s-eye view of val- suit. In both these rarefied and commonplace ues or ideals, such as knowledge and justice, contexts, using the terminology of “facts” and provides a concrete account of epistemic (Code, 2006a), “evidence” (Nelson, 1993), and agency—who knows. The same approaches that “objectivity” (Longino, 1990) provides a valu- naturalists reject on empiricist grounds feminists able discursive authority. reject for being implicitly masculine: disassoci- Because of empiricism’s historical centrality ating ideal understanding from the material to the philosophy of science in the global North, realities of human existence excludes or at best 30–•–PART I FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON KNOWLEDGE BUILDING further marginalizes typical or traditional wom- methods operate in specified contexts, from en’s ways of engaging the world in the global broadly cultural to narrowly academic domains. North and conflicts with the dominant ideals of In both academic microbiology and sex edu- femininity. Women’s experience and knowledge cation for children and adolescents, the por- claims gain credibility from their grounding in trayed relationship between egg and sperm in material and empirical resources for understand- the process of fertilization reflects androcen- ing. Naturalism suggests that new ways to trism and other sexist values and is often treated address and redress the traditional Western dis- as a fairy-tale romantic courtship. Images of the counting of these forms of understanding can be egg or ovum range from whoring to dutiful found in scientific and historical accounts of wifehood (The Biology and Gender Study knowledge (Hundleby, 2002). Group, 1988) and even to hunted prey (Martin, Thus, feminist epistemologists, whether or 1991). At the same time, the sperm appears as a not they consider themselves naturalists or even victorious hero reminiscent of characters in the empir icists, probably demonstrate most thor- Odyssey or the Aeneid (The Biology and oughly the use of empirical data to scrutinize Gender Study Group, 1988). Even using the science, which is the method of philosophical term “fertilization” to name the process that can epistemology that naturalists recommend. be more accurately described as “cellular Feminist naturalists especially—like any natural- fusion” assumes an asymmetry in activity ists—appropriate science to provide accounts of (Longino, 1997). These models attribute to the knowledge; however, as Phyllis Rooney (2003) male sperm cell an active role that invokes argues, feminist naturalism extends to reflexive social norms of masculinity and attribute to the examinations of the underlying motivations and female ovum a passive role. Both genderings worldviews of the social and individual cognitive receive reinforcement from explicitly gendered sciences. Background assumptions—about the imagery and go far beyond the very limited nature of gender as a dimension for investigating “sex” we can attribute to a single cell.3 knowledge, for instance—are not merely noted The feminist empiricist response to sexism in but subject to challenge (Rooney, 2003, p. 226). the content of science is to scrutinize the interplay among metaphors, values, and evidence: “think through a particular field and try to The Spectrum of Feminist understand just what its unstated and fundamen- Empiricist Analysis tal assumptions are and how they influence the course of inquiry” (Longino, 1987, p. 62). It is Scientific knowledge is popularly considered to not to demand that the egg’s activity be con- be the best of human empirical inquiry, the most ceived in aggressive terms, which would only systematic and responsible way to make sense of play into stereotypes of femme fatales and experience. Yet feminist responsibility requires devouring mothers. Even equalitarian metaphors attention to how sexism, racism, and other forms may be problematic insofar as they encourage of oppression manifest in scientific understand- us to anthropomorphize cells, argues Emily ing, in the very context of scientific theories and Martin (1991): claims. Sexism appears, for instance, in cellular biology, as part of accounts of fertilization famil- Although the scientific convention is to call such iar to knowers with no more science knowledge metaphors “dead,” they are not so much dead as than they received in grade-school sex educa- sleeping, hidden within the scientific content of tion. A more technical area shows that sexism texts—and all the more powerful for it. Waking up can deeply undermine a whole field of study: the such metaphors, by becoming aware of when we are evolutionary study of the female orgasm evinces projecting cultural imagery onto what we study, will androcentrism, in Elisabeth Lloyd’s analysis improve our ability to investigate and understand (2005). Resisting sexism that can be identified as nature. Waking up such metaphors, by becoming part of accepted standards of inquiry does not aware of their implications, will rob them of their require abandoning all accepted methods. power to naturalize our social conventions about However, it does require questioning how these gender. (p. 501) Chapter 2 Feminist Empiricism–•–31

For instance, we must beware how anthropo- or “naïve” feminist empiricism. Whereas Lloyd’s morphizing gametes attributes intentionality— study exemplifies spontaneous feminist empiri- purposes and feelings—to the egg and sperm. cism by focusing narrowly on standards of Intervening in defense of such nominal “per- testing, most feminist empiricists—more sons” on the basis of metaphorical understand- “sophisticatedly”—attend to the dynamics between ing might include technological and legal theory generation and theory testing, and so to interventions against the will or interest of the the generation of testing standards and their very real people who produce these cells (Martin, cultural impact.4 1991). A range of social and moral views, and Deferring to existing scientific practices to actions that science informs, can become loaded weed out sexism is a strategy defended by Sharyn with undesirable social assumptions and pro- Clough (2003). She argues that feminists should jected ideals. attend to the local empirical standards of spe- By contrast with the breadth and variability cific sciences and debates and avoid vain in sexist presentations of fertilization, Lloyd attempts to specify the general roles that values (2005) identifies two specific assumptions in have in science. To ask general questions about the evolutionary science of the female orgasm: epistemological justification and to seek a uni- androcentrism and adaptationism. Androcen versal epistemology opens the door to questions trism is being male centered or, more specifi- that lead to global skepticism or universal doubt. cally in the case of sexuality, assuming that We will be unable to claim knowledge of any females are like males (pp. 1–2), and adapta- kind if we demand one theory of knowledge to tionism is “commitment to finding adaptive cover all types of understanding should we fail explanations of a trait” (p. 14). The assumption to develop one that succeeds. that males are standard or ideal is evident in Clough’s rejection of broad conceptions of every available evolutionary account of the knowledge is fairly unique, but many feminist female orgasm, in all of the 21 accounts that empiricists agree with her on the value of local- Lloyd studies, and the assumption that all traits ized strategies. Helen Longino (1987), in her clas- are adaptations is present in 20 of these. Each of sic article “Can There Be a Feminist science?” the 21 theories fails to apply methodological, advises inquirers to refrain from attempting to logical, and evidential standards with which anticipate the ultimate shape of feminist science: their researchers are perfectly familiar and which they otherwise accept (pp. 17–18, 221–222). Accountability [to feminist concerns] does not Adhering to these standards would prevent the demand a radical break with the science one has ubiquitous mismatching of the hypotheses with learned and practiced. The development of a “new” the available evidence, a disconnect that reflects science involves a more dialectical evolution and androcentrism and adaptationism (p. 20). In more continuity with established science than the studies of the female orgasm, bad science has familiar language of scientific revolutions implies. been science as usual. (Longino, 1987, p. 61) Whereas the feminist empiricist analysis of fertilization directly addresses social complex- What remains is to “do science as a feminist”: ity and scrutinizes political implications, Lloyd’s employ the methods and methodologies that analysis is much more constrained, restricted to help to address the feminist concerns relevant to analyzing the methodological inadequacies of that particular area of inquiry. Code (2008) also this particular field. She “leaves undeveloped advises modest goals: some of the most interesting issues, including the social significance of the science of orgasm, Reconsider the value of the small: of small the adequacy and limitation of sexology data projects that speak specifically from a careful in the description of orgasm, and the role of femi- understanding to and about the precise circum- nist approaches to science beyond merely con- stances of a particular species, community, group, trolling for sexist bias” (Meynell, 2007, p. 219). or society, and are understood well enough to The contrast illustrates Sandra Harding’s distinc make such speaking responsibly knowledgeable. tion between “sophisticated” and “spontaneous” (p. 199) 32–•–PART I FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON KNOWLEDGE BUILDING

Such localized engagement of feminist concerns carries realist metaphysical assumptions of an raises profound challenges to the way that episte- independent exterior world or at least a repre- mology and empiricism have operated in the past. sentationalist view of mind. To avoid such metaphysical implications, most empiricist philosophers of science follow Quine and Thomas Themes in Feminist Empiricism Kuhn (1977), who speak instead of truth about empirical adequacy, which includes predictive Feminist revisions of empiricism focus on two accuracy and retrodictive accuracy (explaining related themes: epistemic values and epistemic past observations). Likewise, facticity, rationality, agency. First, sociopolitical values have cogni- evidence, and objectivity are values that provide tive or epistemic implications and help to war- standards for scientific testing and evaluation. rant beliefs and theories, argue feminist The operation of these general epistemological empiricists. Defying the traditional distinction values is the central concern for feminist empir- between epistemic and political values raises icists, a project that complements feminist questions for feminist empiricists about the sig- standpoint theorists’ concern with heuristics and nificance of communities for knowledge. For the generation of ideas.5 some feminist empiricists, not the individual Many feminist and not specifically feminist person but instead the community is the locus of empiricists (explicitly Longino and Miriam knowledge. For all, the agent or the knowing Solomon) hope to steer a middle course between subject is no longer the isolated abstract indi- traditional empiricism and the social construc- vidual that was identified in earlier epistemolo- tivism of the Strong Programme in the sociology gies of the global North, a challenge that provides of science that is sometimes read into early Kuhn the second theme in feminist empiricism. (1962). The logical empiricists recognized that political matters and social and subjective inspi- What Do We Want? Epistemic ration affect how theories are generated. Yet they argued that processes of testing or of rational and Political Values theory choice using distinctly epistemic values Feminist empiricist analysis considers the eliminate those influences and distinguish views interplay among various forms of values or theo- with purely epistemological authority. retical virtues: empirical values, such as predic- Contemporary empiricists, whether or not tive accuracy or testability; other epistemic values, they identify as feminist, maintain that general such as simplicity; and non-epistemic values, from epistemic values such as evidence or rationality subjective or personal values to moral or ethical are manifested or articulated in scientific practice values and more broadly political or cultural val- in the form of the following more specific quali- ues. In this section, I will explain the standardly ties of theories or beliefs: ontological simplicity recognized empirical and epistemic values and (Ockham’s razor), modesty, internal coherence, the arguments by feminist empiricists that they external consistency (including theoretical con- are not sufficient to eliminate the political content servatism), predictability, explanatory power of scientific theory. Considering the interplay of (also described as unifying power, generality, or non-epistemic with epistemic values not only breadth of scope), testability (also described as explains observations of sexism in science but refutability or predictive accuracy), and theoreti- also suggests various roles that feminist values cal fruitfulness (or fertility). Thus, following might take in science. There is little agreement Quine and Thomas Kuhn, values receive general regarding how scientists and knowers more gen- acceptance from (mainstream) empiricist philos- erally should integrate feminist values as part of ophy of science. their methods of inquiry. Yet the feminist cri- Whichever of the cognitive values make up the tiques of science have provided ample evidence basis for scientific evaluation, the list is never that feminist practice and values improve scien- exhaustive for contemporary empiricists, nor can tific knowledge. the individual values be applied in a straightfor- The most generally accepted of the cognitive ward algorithmic manner. Rarely do we find con- or epistemological values has been truth, which sensus among theorists about which values are Chapter 2 Feminist Empiricism–•–33

important or how to apply them, or even how to Non-sexist rivals will never even be generated. weigh them against each other. Theoretical fertility Hence the theory which is selected by the canons or productivity, for instance, can be interpreted in of scientific appraisal will simply be the best of different ways by different investigators and in the the sexist rivals; and the very content of science context of different research programs—we may will be sexist, no matter how rigorously we apply ask “fruitful for what?” Also, fruitfulness may be objective standards of assessment in the context of weighted in various ways relative to the other cog- justification. In fact, the best of the sexist theories nitive values (Rooney, 1993), as both Kuhn and will emerge more and more highly confirmed after Quine recognize. For instance, the detailed focus successive tests. (Okruhlik, 1994, pp. 34–35) necessary for an accurate account clearly conflicts with the applicability of that account to a range of Social ideology and sociopolitical values play as phenomena in a range of situations that constitutes substantial a role as “stereotypically scientific breadth of scope (Longino, 1997). issues of evidence and logic” in scientific Feminists differ from other contemporary knowledge (Longino, 1990, p. 3). Both science empiricists in arguing that how we identify, in general or “as usual” and particular cases of interpret, and weigh cognitive values also incompetent or “bad” science involve more than reflects political commitments (whether we real- purely cognitive or logical concerns. ize this or not). “Responsibility and accountabil- A more complicated example of the intermin- ity requirements join verifiability high on the gling of political with epistemic values is epistemic agenda as epistemic and moral-politi- Longino’s feminist defense of a social-cognitive cal issues coalesce and as statements of fact take model over the linear-hormonal, or “biological on a less self-evidently factual demeanour” determinist,” model for gendered differences in (Code, 2006a, p. 128). Scientific method and human physical and cognitive behavior. No rational theory choice—articulated in terms of purely cognitive or epistemic decision between predictive success, observation independence, the two models seems available according to and explanatory power, by Richmond Campbell Longino’s original (1990) analysis, but the values (1997, pp. 25–27)—are not sufficient to elimi- of theoretical unification and simplicity that sup- nate sociopolitical influences. port the linear-hormonal model cannot be viewed only in cognitive terms. Part of the constitutive [T]here are standards of rational acceptability that force of “simplicity” in this model is due to the are independent of particular interests and values operation of gender dimorphism as part of the but . . . satisfaction of these standards by a theory motivation for the very understanding of biologi- or hypothesis does not guarantee that the theory or cal determinism itself, although gender dimor- hypothesis in question is value- or interest-free. phism is biologically contested (Rooney, 1993, (Longino, 1990, p. 12) p. 18). Gender dimorphism, which is assuming that bodies take two distinctly gendered forms, Consider how gender roles influence cellular offers the valued “simplicity” in this case because biology and androcentrism influences evolu- of its resonance with existing social hierarchies; tionary biology, as I described previously, and so it seemed rationally preferable because it was how racism has informed the study of intelli- socially preferred. gence (Gould, 1996). Such non-epistemological Likewise feminist interests support certain values from the context of theory generation cognitive values over others, and empiricism can remain present in those theories that succeed. support the role of feminist politics in good sci- Testing only shows a claim to be epistemically entific practice (Campbell, 1998). Yet, feminist superior among the available contending theories, empiricists do not advocate any specific method- so the process can entrench sociopolitical values ologies, and some refuse to search for definitive in scientific practice, as Kathleen Okruhlik argues: general criteria for evaluating the content of knowledge, even specifically scientific knowl- If [the available] theories have been generated by edge. Instead of viewing science as a product, males operating in a deeply sexist culture, then it Longino urges that we treat it as a practice, that is likely that they will all be contaminated by sexism. feminist science is not an abstract ideal but a 34–•–PART I FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON KNOWLEDGE BUILDING matter of “doing science as a feminist” (Longino, The success of multiple feminist critiques of 1990, p. 188). “We can . . . fashion and favor science indicates that feminism has a general research programs that are consistent with the empirical adequacy, at least at this point in the values and commitments we express in the rest progress of science. The empirical advantage is of our lives” (Longino, 1990, p. 191). due, at least in part, to feminist attention to the The feminist critiques of science have revealed role of values, especially political values, in sci- certain patterns in valuation, a constellation of ence; these are not generally recognized compo- theoretical values that Longino has started to nents of epistemology or methodology. “Political catalog (1997). Like the traditional empirical critique of accepted epistemic values helps reveal values, the feminist set begins with empirical ade- existing incoherences in our cognitive practices quacy or accuracy. This accepted epistemic value and suggests remedial options” (Hundleby, 2002, supports a specifically feminist value: “to reveal p. 263). A broader base for criticism becomes both gender in the phenomena and gender bias in available, as does a broader horizon for action, the accounting of them” (Longino, 1997, p. 45). because we consider science to be part of the The value of revealing gender is served by nov- larger community. elty, ontological heterogeneity, and mutuality of A certain number of feminist empiricists, interaction in the content of theories and research notably Lynn Hankinson Nelson, stress that the programs. These values are neither uniquely nor operation of science subjects political values to intrinsically feminist, which holds also for val- ordinary standards of criticism by which people ues of concern to feminists that are not (or are can dismiss them. Naturalists such as Nelson use only distantly) connected to empirical adequacy: scientific understandings of human knowers to applying science to meet current human needs, account for knowledge, but the standards draw such as those traditionally ministered by women, from Quine’s broad notion of science, which incor- and diffusing scientific power by encouraging porates the richness of commonsense reasoning general access and participation in science that can be used as a basis for criticism (Nelson, (Longino, 1997, pp. 50–51). The feminist values 1990). Perhaps the most general value that may complement the more standard set or provide requires attention from naturalists is the value of alternatives. For instance, ontological heteroge- human survival (Code, 1996) because that value neity conflicts with an ontological interpretation underpins human nature according to evolution- of (standardly valued) simplicity. ary biology. The moral and sociopolitical values The necessity for sociopolitical values in sci- dismissed by Quine for being the result of natu- ence implies that nastier—sexist, racist, and so ral selection are vindicated by those origins, forth—sociopolitical values could be justified according to Nelson. She argues that their evolu- and are part of not just bad science but science as tionary success provides scientific reason to usual. Criticizing the role of such values makes it consider the values cognitively good: they meet difficult to support a positive role for feminist the common practical needs of societies and of values in knowledge, a problem described by humanity (Nelson, 1990, p. 133). We may use Louise Antony as the “bias paradox.”6 Yet some these same standards to evaluate which moral political values, such as feminism, can be and sociopolitical values have empirical value. revealed to better support empirical adequacy Because it reconfigures the role of bias in sci- than others. “Doing science as a feminist” has ence, there is no need to distinguish between produced any number of novel and empirically good and bad bias in Miriam Solomon’s “social successful theories. Early feminist critiques of empiricism” (2001). She replaces the traditional science led, for instance, to recognizing the activ- epistemological distinction between epistemic or ity of the ovum and to developing the “woman- rational (“cold”) and non-epistemic or biasing the-gatherer” hypothesis in anthropology that has (“hot”) factors in how scientists decide among proved more successful than the previous “man- theories with an account of empirical and non- the-hunter” alternative (Longino & Doell, 1983). empirical decision vectors. Empirical decision This pattern provides evidence of the empirical vectors include salience of data, availability of adequacy of at least some feminist values in one data, egocentric bias toward one’s own data (non- field at a particular point in its development. cognitive—but driven by data!), and preference Chapter 2 Feminist Empiricism–•–35

for a theory that generates novel predictions. “Doing science as a feminist” is thus an open- Non-empirical decision vectors include ideology, ended practice. pride, conservativeness, radicalism, elegance, competitiveness, and peer pressure; the list goes Who Knows? Epistemic Agency on and so includes much more than the sociopolitical values addressed by other feminist empiri- Traditional empiricists viewed the agent of cists. Solomon argues that all sorts of personal knowledge as an individual person who has the and social values can be part of the motivation same sorts of rational capabilities as other per- behind states of science that are justified. It is the sons, a laudably equalitarian account but one appropriate social distribution of decision vec- that masks real differences among knowers. tors that makes a scientific decision rational, not Individual people have different resources for whether any particular vectors are present. The understanding in accordance with their social only relevant distinction among values is whether location, their socialization, and their develop- they are empirical. mental history. Addressing these variables Solomon bucks intuition and argues that requires a more social account of the epistemic dissent—and not consensus—is the scientific agent, and feminist empiricists disagree about norm, in the sense of being the more common what that account should be; they even consider and general state of science. Rational dissent that different models of epistemic agency pro- occurs under the following circumstances: vide the desired purchase on different projects of inquiry (Code, 2006a). 1. All theories under consideration have some Feminists have transformed the empiricist empirical success (explain some observations). concept of the knowing subject through various forms of attention to how individuals depend on 2. All empirical vectors are distributed propor- communities for knowledge. I will present their tionately to the empirical success of each theory accounts beginning with the most individualistic (productive scientific methods fall under theo- and proceeding through degrees of sociality ries proportional to their empirical success). toward the most communal account, and then to . 3 The nonempirical vectors are equally distributed. one that disrupts feminist dependence on the notion of community. To start, the traditional view Dissent occurs more frequently than consensus of individuals as agents of knowledge as revised partly because only a very specific configuration by Heidi Grasswick (2004) becomes individuals- of the decision vectors can justify consensus.7 in-communities. More radically, granting central Forming consensus is only appropriate when all roles to the community in which individuals are the empirical success supports one theory, mak- only secondary participants and not direct agents, ing it a limiting case of dissent. Longino and Nelson argue that the practices of Thus Solomon, like Nelson, maintains that people coordinated in their communal relation- we can assess the scientific significance of moral ships allow individual experiences to become and sociopolitical values. Such an assessment significant. Communal processes qualify individ- will only proceed in the long term, however. ual beliefs as objective according to Longino (1990), and coherence with communal standards Epistemic practices at their best proceed according qualifies individual observations as evidence to (interim) standards derived from collaborative according to Nelson (1990). In Solomon’s “social efforts to produce the best possible investigations, empiricism” (2001), individuals fall completely descriptions, and understandings, where “best” out of the picture of scientific knowledge, because includes an ongoing self-reflexive and negotiative scientific rationality only occurs in relationships commitment to determining and trying out norms among competing theories, and so only at the and standards, and evaluating their effectiveness level of communities. The strength and role of and failures. (Code, 2008, p. 194) communities in knowledge remains highly contested, leading Lorraine Code (1996, 2006a) While we wait for more evidence to come in, we instead to adopt a more flexible concept of society have some reason to favor feminist values. to account for the social nature of knowledge. 36–•–PART I FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON KNOWLEDGE BUILDING

Grasswick (2004) rejects the traditional view involves four criteria for critical interpersonal of the atomistic, self-sufficient individual but engagement. An objective community has the argues that recognizing the (relational, depen- following: (1) avenues for the expression and dent) individual as the agent of knowledge diffusion of criticism; (2) uptake of, and response remains necessary to make sense of the possibil- to, criticism; (3) public standards by reference to ity of dissent and of how epistemic standards which theories and so forth are assessed; and, (4) become challenged (p. 97). A dynamic model of equality of intellectual authority (Longino, 1990, epistemic agency becomes possible when we 1993). Communities that meet these criteria, to identify agents as individuals-in-communities. the extent that they meet the criteria, produce Although Grasswick’s location of epistemic objective views that individuals may hold. agency in individual persons is traditional, her As inquirers, we choose, at least to a certain notion of the individual as socially dependent is extent, the cultures in which we participate, so, transformative. Gone are assumptions that the as feminists, we can choose to whom we are knower has a given set of capacities for rea- accountable, which community will guide our soning because, with Code (1991), Grasswick beliefs; we can even choose combinations of insists that cognitive capacities are shaped by communities. “The feminist scientist is respon- psychological development and socialization. sive to the ideals of a political community as “Individual knowers become epistemically dif- well as to some subset of the standards endorsed ferentiated along the lines of their communal in her or his scientific community” (Longino, histories and memberships” (Grasswick, 2004, 1990, p. 192). Longino’s advice to choose a p. 102). With Code again, Grasswick emphasizes feminist community does not entail adopting the need for trust between people and our depen- any particular methodology. Nevertheless “doing dence on systems of authority. Yet Grassw ick’s science as a feminist” requires interpreting focus on communities goes beyond Code’s con- empirical adequacy in terms of the concerns of cern with interdependence by giving communi- one’s chosen community, as described in the ties a critical role in the development and previous section on epistemic values. support of individual understanding. Similarly, for Nelson, individuals acquire their Grasswick (2004) insists that communities scientific values from communities, but, for her, provide “standards of evidence and bodies of the community plays a more comprehensive role. evidence” (p. 96) and that they prioritize some The communal quality of the standards necessary epistemic values over others (p. 104), as Longino for a person to be said to know any particular (1990, 2004) and Nelson (1990) have also thing entails that some community to which that argued. However, Grasswick addresses how person belongs must be the first and foremost individuals are each involved in multiple com- agent of knowledge. Individual people do not munities that are conflicting, overlapping, and have knowledge or evidence at all except insofar vague, a complication that Longino and Nelson as each participates in knowing communities. barely acknowledge. They set aside the com- Background beliefs and standards—for example, plexities of communities to focus on how a com- regarding the techniques for collecting evidence munity can operate to provide objectivity and and how to make inferences from data—that we evidence for beliefs. share with other people provide support in vary- Longino (1990) argues that critical discursive ing degrees for our theories. communities grant objectivity to the beliefs of Nelson’s communal view of knowledge fol- individuals by constraining individual values. lows from her argument that sociopolitical crite- “Individual values are held in check not by a ria are among our tools for justifying knowledge methodology but by social values” (p. 102). claims, again as outlined in the previous section. Scientific practice is independent of individual The importance of sociopolitical values sug- aims, except that individuals may work toward gests that community is the primary epistemic building the appropriate communities, which are agent, which also is borne out by some com- those that engage a maximal number of different monsense observations. If any one member of a points of view. Longino’s social standard for community knows something, then some other assessing the objectivity of scientific discourse member could also know it—in this limited Chapter 2 Feminist Empiricism–•–37 sense we may be interchangeable. “Acceptable Among feminist empiricists, Code stands out answers to the question ‘Who knows?’ include for resisting commitment to any particular formu- ‘Everyone,’ ‘All of us,’ ‘Lots of people,’ ‘Many lation of the epistemic agent and for recognizing of us,’ but only very problematically ‘Only me’” sources of agency aside from individuals-in- (Nelson, 1990, p. 255). Yet, “we know” doesn’t communities and human communities that mean “I and you and . . . you,” the “we” formed include our relationship with the biological and from people that each of us knows. Especially in ecological environment. Although Code treats as “big science,” which brings together people fundamental the mutual dependence among indi- with vastly different skills who complete sepa- viduals by suggesting that knowers are “second rate portions of calculation and experimenta- persons,” a concept borrowed from Annette Baier tion, no one participant understands it all. So it (2002), Code’s account resists any reference to seems that “we” must know before any “I” can communities. She recognizes that knowledge begin to understand. also develops in smaller and more fluid social Methodologically, for Solomon, as individu- contexts—in a “society” that remains less clearly als we cannot expect nor should we desire to be defined and correspondingly more flexible than a free from bias, even to a degree, though we community. Code suggests that we engage in should aim to pursue theories that have empiri- “imaginaries” (a notion borrowed from Cornelius cal success. We can address the role of nonem- Castoriadis). Instituted imaginaries provide pirical decision vectors only in social terms. For coherence among individual understandings, and individuals to recognize, assess, and redistribute instituting imaginaries question the social struc- the nonempirical vectors in order to justify the ture and make new meanings possible (Code, state of science requires a range of techniques. 2006a, pp. 30–31). Imaginaries are “habitats” that provide [T]he identification of decision vectors and “places to know,” Code (2006a) argues, in two improvement of their distribution . . . typically senses: as places from which we can begin require expertise, and, often, multidisciplinary inquiry and as places that we must come to knowledge and skills. The critical training required understand if we are to be responsible knowers. to identify presuppositions about gender, for exam- Learning about the contexts in which we know is ple, is quite different from the psychological train- central to the methodology of most feminist ing and methods required to detect cognitive bias. empiricism, and it is integral to naturalized or And the statistical techniques needed to assess the naturalist epistemology. Naturalism treats know- role of birth order are quite different from scientific ers as part of nature, as subject to empirical and philosophical knowledge of theoretical con- investigation, and thus seeks to use empirical straints such as simplicity. (Solomon, 2001, p. 140) evidence especially from science to enrich and strengthen epistemological theorizing. Thus, for Solomon, methodological considerations must be both socially dispersed (as in Nelson’s account) and multidisciplinary in order Feminist Naturalism to reveal imbalances in political values and other nonempirical decision vectors. Naturalized epistemologists begin with the Solomon’s naturalist demand for empirical assumption that people actually have knowl- evidence to support epistemological evaluations edge and hence with an implicit rejection of restrains her endorsement of Longino’s recom- global skepticism, the worry that knowledge is mendation (her fourth criterion for critical not at all possible. The means for rejecting skep- engagement) that we should join or develop egali- ticism, according to Quine, is to use our science tarian communities for the sake of improving our itself to provide the explanation of how some investigations. Solomon admits that such social beliefs are justified, or warranted, over others. democratization may benefit the identification of Final answers regarding standards for inquiry political decision vectors. Yet, at best, only politi- are not the goal, however, for thoroughgoing cal decision vectors might receive improved atten- naturalists. Such concerns risk begging the tion, and we remain without evidence of even that. question about the assumptions underpinning 38–•–PART I FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON KNOWLEDGE BUILDING the sciences of cognition and ignoring the ways and distinctive in feminist epistemology, and in that scientific investigation continues to develop. feminist naturalism especially, is ongoing infor- Instead, jumping straight in to work with scien- mation by feminism and by science, even as these tific findings provides a constructive “looping change over time (Rooney, 2003). effect” as systems of epistemic valuation are continuously informed by empirical develop- ments (Fellows, 2010). Controversies About The relevant sciences for Quine are the sci- Feminist Empiricism ences of individual cognition, behaviorism, and neuroscience that some feminist naturalists also Feminist empiricism rarely receives complimen- take up (Antony, 2003; Duran, 1993). Even for tary treatment in overviews of feminist episte- Quine, further forms of science may shed light mologies and science studies, in large part because on how people’s experiences can justify their it has been misunderstood. The theoretical con- beliefs, and thus his reformed empiricism com- servativeness of empiricism does not entail a plements Kuhn’s historicism (Hundleby, 2002). political conservativeness. The most potentially Making use of all of our available resources to regressive approach to feminist empiricism may scrutinize our understandings reflects natural- be naturalism because it defers to scientific input, ism’s inspiration by the 18th-century empiri- which inevitably reflects the status quo. Yet the cism of David Hume, which Baier (2002) reflexive revolutionary spirit of naturalism chal- argues has a distinctly social cast that suits it for lenges even its own empiricist precepts. feminism (pp. 46–50). As part of the process of naturalizing episte- The Conservative Quality mology, feminists critically analyze the method- of Empiricism ologies and basic concepts of the contemporary cognitive sciences that inform their naturalism— Naturalism may seem to resist progress in whether the sciences of individual psychology several different ways. Some concerns involve favored by Quine or the Kuhnian and post- the critical weakness of naturalism and the patri- Kuhnian social studies of knowledge. Feminist archal content of the science it relies on. Another naturalists recognize that the scientific resources concern is that empirical understanding, natural- for epistemology themselves are subject to ized or not, can never be sufficient for political improvement. After all, science is open-ended in analysis. Feminist naturalists account for the fact several different ways due to the open-endedness that there are always prior epistemologies and of the future, natural human ingenuity and cre- other existing influences on the ways that we ativity, and even the concepts we create (Rooney, evaluate beliefs, and they demand continuous 2003, pp. 218–219). The feminist treatment of scrutiny of these value systems as concrete con- the scientific resources for theorizing about stitutive circumstances for all our inquiries. knowledge as dynamic produces “a verb-sense Relying on science, as naturalists do, seems of epistemology, . . . a sense of doing epistemol- to at least limit and perhaps exclude the possi- ogy, of reflecting in a systematic way on knowl- bility of establishing new ideals for human rea- edge and knowing while drawing ongoing soning, not only because science may employ critical attention to particular kinds of motivat- regressive politics but also because formulating ing concerns, questions, and methods in the ideals is not the job of science—it’s the job of way one does epistemology” (p. 207, emphasis philosophy. At best, science describes only original). This reflexive development of empiri- people’s success with respect to accepted ideals, cal standards contrasts with the usual epistemo- without interrogating those standards, deferring logical pursuit of a “final” view, epistemology as to existing standards in a way that discourages a noun: for example, coherentism, positivism, some feminist empiricists, including Longino empiricism. Such static treatments of knowledge (1993), from naturalism. Further, naturalism’s become dynamic and defeasible in feminist tendency toward scientism—deference to scien- hands, subject to challenge and change over time. tific evaluations—may be inherently quietist, In the context of transforming claims about what suppressing dispute. In practice, many of the counts as knowledge, what remains continuous central tenets of science are beyond scrutiny, Chapter 2 Feminist Empiricism–•–39 even though in some ideal forms science may be impact on the normative correction of many self-revising (Linker, 2003). forms of human knowledge, such as those The patriarchal social system produces almost assessed in terms of logical, linguistic, and moral all of the science available that might provide truths. empirical standards for evaluating knowledge Yet, feminist empiricism involves accounting claims. As a practical political resource, science for the relationship between values traditionally has a history of resisting social explanations for considered to be noncognitive—including social gendered differences and seeking instead liberation and morality—and their cognitive accounts based on biology that portray the dif- counterparts, such as empirical adequacy. ferences as relatively immutable. The tendency “Experience,” the key concept in empiricism, is in the scientific study of knowledge to accept a very broad and complex notion for feminist gender as given and ahistorical seems to be espe- empiricists that extends beyond and complicates cially strong when women’s capacities have simple sensory experience. Cultural resources, been judged to be inferior. Consider that some including some rudimentary prior epistemology, significant gendered differences have been found inform any empirical knowledge. Our studies in with spatial ability, but the differences are so psychology and the history of science, for small as to be easily explained by differences in instance, cannot move ahead without some socialization. Yet researchers persist in looking notion of what needs examination, without a for biological reasons for gendered differences functional ontology, an account of the nature of in understanding (Fausto-Sterling, 1985, 1992), the world that shows how meaningful inquiry such that cognitive science seems bent on justi- can be possible. Cognitive scientists generally fying women’s low social status. Psychologists assume (1) that knowledge takes the form of resolutely search for differences, even when discrete propositional beliefs regarding isolated empirical results consistently reveal gender par- statements of fact (e.g., “the breadbox is larger ity in verbal ability. than the teacup”), (2) that individuals are the For such reasons, taking up scientific accounts agents of knowledge, and (3) that science is the of gender can be regressive and epistemologi- best example of knowledge. However, “stipula- cally dubious, especially when it comes to cog- tion . . . simply begs the question against more nition. For instance, scientific accounts of robust forms of naturalizing epistemology where cognition support claims made by Jane Duran questions about the cognitive demarcation and (2001) that women benefit from an especially delineation of beliefs are open to question” “relational” view of themselves and the world.8 (Rooney, 2003, p. 216). No scientific authority Duran seems to be among the most thoroughgo- absolves the need to scrutinize background con- ing of feminist naturalisms because she engages cepts and values, whether they include the sex- deeply in empirical research in both cognitive ism of cognitive science or the empirical science (1993) and contemporary cultural stud- adequacy of psychoanalysis. ies (2001). However, that depth is at the expense Background epistemologies belong to the of considering other empirical factors, including communal resources that Nelson argues are nec- socialization, that reveal how gender dichoto- essary for individual knowledge of any kind. mies in cognition can be symptoms of oppres- Yet her picture of communities as prior to indi- sion. It ignores a competing account that has vidual knowledge seems to entail that what can more thorough empirical support, the evidence be known is static and that individual knowl- that women are socialized to participate in and edge is passive. So Edrie Sobstyl (2004) argues even facilitate their oppression. that science and common sense are in constant Adherence to the empiricist tradition also can flux, and in dynamic interaction with individual be used to rule out the relevance of social libera- experience. tion movements to fostering advances in science (Harding, 1986, pp. 25–26). Thus, empiricism’s This creates opportunities for knowledge to grow future can seem to be radical only insofar as its and change. . . . The fact that women alter their internal conflicts spark a move away from the behavior in order to avoid being targets of sexual empiricism itself. As Maureen Linker argues assault shows that they recognize the prevailing (2003), empirical evidence seems to have little beliefs of a patriarchal community. But the fact 40–•–PART I FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON KNOWLEDGE BUILDING

that women resist such constraints on their respond to new questions that we have about behavior and demand freedom from sexual pre- knowledge, including feminist questions. dation shows that our common sense and gendered social and political experiences have a Naturalism Supporting Rationalism concrete impact on what we know. It is not helpful to say that this resistance is entirely derived The self-critical impulse in naturalist episte- from the community, because our community mology takes the general form of requiring has not been particularly willing to warrant such empiricism to be based itself on empirical inves- ideals. (p. 131) tigation. The scientific evidence concerning human inquiry thus could turn out to support a Thus Sobstyl argues that we can revise and nonempiricist view of knowledge, to make avail- complete Nelson’s holism by allowing for a able “genuinely novel and transformative philo- symmetrical relationship between embodied sophical strategies” that explain how bias can individuals and communities rather than by giv- play a positive role in reasoning (Antony, 2003, ing absolute priority to communities. Individual p. 142). Indeed, some evidence supports the knowledge may be derived from communal rationalist view of mind, harking back to René knowledge, as Nelson argues, or it may be situ- Descartes, that people have native intellectual ated in or interdependent with communal capacities, such as for language, and that, in this knowledge in the way that Grasswick and way, one’s ability to know is independent of Sobstyl suggest. one’s past experience (Antony, 2003). There are many reasons to believe that the On the basis of her rationalist (but naturalisti- program of naturalizing epistemology will change cally supported) view that knowers rely on innate substantially in the future. To begin with, natu- mental capacities, Antony adopts the further ralizing epistemology is a project currently in its rationalist view that knowers are interchange- very early stages. Even those who are sympa- able, which most feminists find objectionable thetic to naturalism or describe themselves as because it denies the impact on knowledge of naturalists are “slow to renounce the old modes developmental history, social situation, and dif- of legitimation” (Roth, 2003, p. 296), and what ferent forms of embodiment. Moreover, the the new scientific modes are, exactly, remains bodies that do play a role in Antony’s work and unclear. In addition, the development of natural- that provide one’s perspective on the world do ism has been slow because naturalists have had not have “bias” in the usual sense that differenti- to spend a good deal of their time defending the ates individuals. The forms of prejudgment that importance and viability of naturalist techniques are properly called biases at best are merely (Rooney, 2003). analogous to the shared cognitive dispositions Naturalism is a continuous process, and new that can make our bodies seem interchangeable. ways of viewing knowledge constantly emerge Yet, Antony’s argument demonstrates that from the open texture of science, as Rooney changes in scientific accounts of cognition could, (2003) argues. in principle, undermine the traditional empiricist view of the mind and the entailed epistemology At the very least, I maintain, naturalists must have (Campbell, 1998, p. 33). Such a turnabout is pos- a . . . verb-sense of science—that is, [of] science as sible because developing scientific perspectives on a diversity of dynamic disciplines, the concepts, knowledge is an ongoing activity, and this is a questions, and findings of which are continually further reason to view naturalism in a “verb-sense” being modified in relation to changing conditions, (Rooney, 2003). One may practice epistemologi- including the changing conditions of empirical cal naturalism continuously, and ongoing natural- investigation and the changing social and political ist revision entails that feminist empiricists may worlds within which such investigation is situated. find themselves engaging in quite different forms (pp. 218–219) of theorizing than that with which they started. Naturalizing is never complete because epistemol- New scientific tools may emerge merely because ogy is never finally, ultimately naturalized. science progresses in addressing people’s Empiricism remains, at the moment and for changing concerns and because science may the foreseeable future, a viable starting place or Chapter 2 Feminist Empiricism–•–41 background epistemology for naturalist methods. to find in it potential support for rationalism, Antony’s argument does not succeed in its attempt showing that, not only in principle but also in to turn naturalism toward rationalism. Admittedly, practice, naturalism has revolutionary potential. a rationalist view of the mind—for example, the Naturalism’s open-endedness suggests further view of Descartes or Noam Chomsky—might that feminist empiricism may be mutually com- reflect some evidence better than the behaviorism plementary with other feminist epistemologies, that Quine favored. Even Quine considers behav- and encourages treating epistemological choices iorist psychology useful only for individuating as provisional, according to the problem at hand, belief states. Behaviorism is not sufficient support rather than as definitive. Looking to “small” for epistemology because behaviors are neither the places in Code’s ecological manner requires a same as beliefs nor sufficient to explain them—a dynamic sensitivity, strategizing as activists: task for which he suggests biology, especially neurophysiology (Nelson, 1990, pp. 126–128). Choos[e] . . . points of concentration, of focus; Naturalist explanation must also account for discern . . . the gaps where intervention and con- the impact of different social situations and dif- testation have the best hopes of entering, and ferent bodies with various levels and forms of work . . . to ensure that their effects will cognitive development (Code, 2006a), something spread . . . [A]ctivists, both singly and collectively, only promised by Anthony’s rationalism and not have to know a lot just to see what might be pos- delivered. These nonbehavioral factors affect sible and may have to develop strategic compro- neurophysiology, including language develop- mises to be able to work toward sometimes distant ment (Nelson, 1990, pp. 286–287), and so have and often unstable goals. (Code, 2008, p. 201) implications not only for Quinean empiricism but also for any rationalism that is accountable to Methodologies may be taken up as guerrilla empirical evidence. The need to address how the strategies based on shared oppositional con- social world impacts evidence inspired Quine’s sciousness that “operates like the clutch of an argument for naturalism (Nelson, 1990, p. 288; automobile: the mechanism that permits the Quine, 1960). Therefore, to ignore social influ- driver to select, engage, and disengage gears in ences, as Antony’s rationalist move does, is to a system for the transmission of power” depart from the basic spirit of naturalism rather (Sandoval, 1991, p. 14). This U.S. third world than to defeat it on its own terms. feminist strategy identified by Chela Sandoval encourages flexibility in taking up the competing political tactics of liberal, Marxist, radical, Conclusion and socialist feminism, and it denies the need to commit to a final strategy. Likewise, shifting Employing empiricism provides feminists with among empiricist and other methodologies valuable purchase in the dominant culture and keeps inquirers free from the stagnation of any access to the power of scientific resources. These static epistemology. So feminist empiricism advantages imbue empiricism with a radical continues its radical progression by transform- potential that both critics of feminist empiricism ing from a hegemonic strategy into a “proces- (Harding, 1986) and defenders of it (Campbell, sual relationship” (Sandoval, 1991, p. 24) with 1998; Nelson, 1990) recognize to include strate- only tentative “places to know” (Code, 2006a). gic rhetoric and to go far beyond rhetorical sig- Although Code’s account most clearly sup- nificance. Further, supporters argue that feminist ports recognizing as provisional the naturalist naturalism demonstrates the radical future of employment of empiricism or of any other epis- feminist empiricism because it holds all the temology, her view resonates with other forms strengths of the early alternative approaches of feminist empiricism. Consider that because known as feminist standpoint theory and femi- different methodologies and epistemologies, nist postmodernism. Feminist naturalism, spe- including rationalism, have some empirical sup- cifically, provides clear grounds for evaluating port, Solomon would advise methodological not only beliefs but also values and practices dissent. Keeping different options at hand also that include political views (Tuana, 1992). The serves Rooney’s “verb-sense” of epistemology broad scope of naturalist critique allows Antony that recognizes the open-endedness of human 42–•–PART I FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON KNOWLEDGE BUILDING inquiry. Finally, this pluralism can be expressed 4. Might the different epistemologies work better without assuming naturalism: Longino’s (1990, in addressing different forms of research? 2004) requirement of ongoing critical engage- Different methodologies? Different disciplines? ment among divergent perspectives can apply to Different research topics? feminist epistemologies and methodologies as much as it does to science itself: Online Resources The feminist interventions I imagine will be local The Thinking Meat Project—Explaining Female (i.e., specific to a particular area of research), they Orgasm: An Interview With Elisabeth Lloyd may not be exclusive (i.e., different feminist per- http://thinkingmeat.com/newsblog/?page_id=1201 spectives may be represented in theorizing), and they will be in some way continuous with existing The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy scientific work. (Longino, 1987, p. 62) http://plato.stanford.edu/ There is no one feminist empiricism, but many This open-source encyclopedia features articles by feminist empiricisms, an epistemological plu- experts in specific fields that are periodically updated. rality that can be justified—both politically and • Anderson, E., Feminist epistemology and epistemologically and from an individual and a philosophy of science, March 16, 2011, community level—according to the various http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism- views of feminist empiricists. epistemology/ • Fehr, C., Feminist philosophy of biology, Discussion Questions June 22, 2011, forthcoming, Fall 2011 edi- 1. How might a feminist empiricist view of evi- tion, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/femi- dence or objectivity apply beyond the domain nist-philosophy-biology/ of science to everyday knowledge? Consider Many feminist empiricists, especially how a feminist empiricist would shop for gro- Fausto-Sterling, Lloyd, and Longino, have ceries or plant a garden. made important contributions to the philos- 2. How might scientists apply Code’s view of ophy of biology. ecological thinking? • Garry, A., Analytic feminism, April 29, 2004, . a Grasswick’s notion of knowers as individuals- http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/femap in-communities may be a helpful starting proach-analytic/ point. How might a scientist present herself Feminist empiricism can be viewed as the as an individual-in-communities? How epistemological wing of analytic feminism, might social scientists view their subjects as given that empiricism has been the central individuals-in-communities? Will this vary epistemology and essential to the prevalence with the level at which we recognize socie of the “analytic” approach in 20th-century ties or communities? Anglo-American philosophy. b. What other aspects of scientists and subjects • Stanford, K., Underdetermination of scientific of study must we address to achieve eco- theory, August 12, 2009, http://plato.stanford. logical thinking? Is this different for differ- edu/entries/scientific-underdetermination/ ent fields of inquiry? index.html 3. What do you think are the particular strengths and weaknesses of feminist empiricism? Why This theory associated with Quine’s natural- might it be useful to distinguish feminist ism explains the interrelation of epistemic empiricism from other feminist epistemolo- and non-epistemic values for many feminist gies in some contexts but not in others? Social empiricists. contexts? Historical contexts? Geographical • Whipps, J., Pragmatist feminism, July 9, contexts? Regarding some knowers but not 2010, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/femap others? Different bodies? proach-pragmatism/ Chapter 2 Feminist Empiricism–•–43

Feminist empiricists engage with pragma- 7. When there is consensus, dissent approaches zero, tist philosophy primarily through the works and the conditions (1) through (3) are met as follows: of Quine, but other feminists engage differ- 1. One theory has all the empirical successes ent elements and authors in the pragmatist (explains all the different observations); tradition. 2. All the empirical vectors support that theory (productive scientific methods all fall Relevant Journals under the theory). 3. With maintained consensus, nonempirical Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy decision vectors all begin to support the Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society one theory. Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge, 8. Duran bases her view of the feminine self on Culture, and Policy object-relations theory, which generally falls under feminist standpoint theory (Harding, 1986), but she aims to develop a naturalist version. Notes

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