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Experimental Philosophy and Feminist Epistemology: Conflicts and Complements City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 9-2018 Experimental Philosophy and Feminist Epistemology: Conflicts and Complements Amanda Huminski The Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/2826 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY: CONFLICTS AND COMPLEMENTS by AMANDA HUMINSKI A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York 2018 © 2018 AMANDA HUMINSKI All Rights Reserved ii Experimental Philosophy and Feminist Epistemology: Conflicts and Complements By Amanda Huminski This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. _______________________________ ________________________________________________ Date Linda Martín Alcoff Chair of Examining Committee _______________________________ ________________________________________________ Date Nickolas Pappas Executive Officer Supervisory Committee: Jesse Prinz Miranda Fricker THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK iii ABSTRACT Experimental Philosophy and Feminist Epistemology: Conflicts and Complements by Amanda Huminski Advisor: Jesse Prinz The recent turn toward experimental philosophy, particularly in ethics and epistemology, might appear to be supported by feminist epistemology, insofar as experimental philosophy signifies a break from the tradition of primarily white, middle-class men attempting to draw universal claims from within the limits of their own experience and research. However, the relationship between the two is not so straightforward, and an analysis of their connection bears on broader questions concerning intuitions, philosophical methodology, and epistemic standards more generally. This dissertation project aims to 1) examine the conception of intuitions that appears to underpin many projects in experimental philosophy, 2) levy a charge of scientism against certain experimental philosophy practices, 3) explore how these two features contribute to a unique variety of epistemic objectification, and 4) draw on feminist epistemology to propose a revised view of intuitions and corresponding qualitative methodology for experimental philosophy. Ultimately, this dissertation accepts one broad premise of experimental philosophy – that the intuitions and insights of non-philosophers may be uniquely useful in addressing philosophical issues – and incorporates considerations from feminist epistemology to explore how to best integrate these viewpoints into theorizing in such a way that both resolves some tensions between these two methodologies, and in doing so, highlights cooperative benefits that may improve the methods of experimental philosophy. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Jesse Prinz, Miranda Fricker, and Linda Martín Alcoff for their ongoing guidance and support. Michael Devitt and Massimo Pigliucci provided incredibly useful feedback at various stages in this process, and attendees as the 2016 Society for Analytical Feminism conference, the 2016 Feminist Epistemologies, Methodologies, Metaphysics and Science Studies conference, and the 2017 Cognitive Science Speaker Series also provided indispensable comments on previous iterations of many chapters contained herein. I would also like to thank Nancy Bauer, Gail Weiss, and Tatiana Romanovskaya for their encouragement and advice early in my academic career. And thank you to my friends, family, and colleagues who have provided support, encouragement, and sounding boards. Finally, thanks to Alyssa, for everything. v CONTENTS Chapter 1: An Introduction and Some Prima Facie Concerns .................................................. 1 1: Philosophy and Experiment ....................................................................................... 1 2: Experimental Philosophy and Its Critics ......................................................................... 5 3: Experimental Philosophy and Feminist Epistemology ........................................................ 9 4: Additional Feminist Considerations in Brief .................................................................. 13 4.1: A Diversity Façade ........................................................................................... 14 4.2: The Threat of Essentialism................................................................................. 14 4.3: Experimental Philosophy and Scientism ................................................................. 15 4.4: Native Informants and Epistemic Objectification...................................................... 16 5: Looking Ahead ..................................................................................................... 17 Chapter 2: Philosophical Intuitions ................................................................................. 19 1: A Taxonomy of Views on Intuitions ............................................................................ 20 2: Intuitions as Evidence ............................................................................................ 25 3: A Dangerous Dualism ............................................................................................. 28 Chapter 3: Experimental Philosophy and Scientism ............................................................ 36 1: A Proposed Definition of Scientism ............................................................................ 36 2: Historical Context ................................................................................................. 41 3: An Example of Scientism ......................................................................................... 47 4: Scientism and Experimental Philosophy ...................................................................... 50 4.1: Epistemology: Direct & Indirect Effects ................................................................. 51 4.2: Ethics: Ought Implies Can .................................................................................. 52 4.3: Philosophy of Mind: Mechanisms and Concepts of Belief ............................................. 52 4.4: Action Theory: Representation of Thought Experiments ............................................. 53 4.5: Philosophy of Language: Assertion ....................................................................... 53 4.6: Methodology: Philosophical Judgements, Decision Making, and Behavior......................... 53 5: Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 60 Chapter 4: Experimental Philosophy and Epistemic Objectification ....................................... 61 1: Epistemic Objectification and its Harms ...................................................................... 61 2: Dualism and Scientism ........................................................................................... 68 3: Experimental Philosophy and Epistemic Objectification ................................................... 72 4: Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 81 Chapter 5: Intuitional Holism ........................................................................................ 82 1: Against Dualism .................................................................................................... 82 vi 2: Chalmers and Devitt on Intuitional Holism ................................................................... 87 3: Etiology and Justification of Intuitional Holism ............................................................. 90 4: Conclusion and Relevance for Experimental Philosophy ................................................... 92 Chapter 6: Recommendations for the Experimental Philosopher ........................................... 94 1: The Upside of Intuitional Holism ............................................................................... 94 2: A Qualitative Approach .......................................................................................... 96 3: Experimental Philosophy and Standpoint Theory............................................................ 99 4: Experimental Philosophy and Feminist Empiricism ........................................................ 101 5: Conclusion and Areas for Future Consideration ............................................................ 105 Bibliography ............................................................................................................ 108 vii Chapter 1: An Introduction and Some Prima Facie Concerns The recent turn toward experimental philosophy, particularly in ethics and epistemology, might appear to be supported by feminist epistemology, insofar as experimental philosophy signifies a break from the tradition of primarily white, middle-class men attempting to draw universal claims from within the limits of their own experience and research. However, the relationship between the two is not so straightforward, and an analysis of their connection bears on broader questions
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