OBJECTIVITY IN THE FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requisites for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Karen Cordrick Haely, M.A. ***** The Ohio State University 2003 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor Louise M. Antony, Adviser Professor Donald C. Hubin _______________________ Professor George Pappas Adviser Philosophy Graduate Program ABSTRACT According to a familiar though naïve conception, science is a rigorously neutral enterprise, free from social and cultural influence, but more sophisticated philosophical views about science have revealed that cultural and personal interests and values are ubiquitous in scientific practice, and thus ought not be ignored when attempting to understand, describe and prescribe proper behavior for the practice of science. Indeed, many theorists have argued that cultural and personal interests and values must be present in science (and knowledge gathering in general) in order to make sense of the world. The concept of objectivity has been utilized in the philosophy of science (as well as in epistemology) as a way to discuss and explore the various types of social and cultural influence that operate in science. The concept has also served as the focus of debates about just how much neutrality we can or should expect in science. This thesis examines feminist ideas regarding how to revise and enrich the concept of objectivity, and how these suggestions help achieve both feminist and scientific goals. Feminists offer us warnings about “idealized” concepts of objectivity, and suggest that power can play a crucial role in determining which research programs get labeled “objective”. In addition, the views examined in this thesis offer conceptions of objectivity that are intended to allow us to increase the extent to which our scientific theories are objective, but at the same time allow us to appreciate (and not eliminate) the role of cultural and social interests as they play a role in science. ii Dedicated to R.M.H. iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to thank my adviser, Louise M. Antony, for sharing her philosophical insight, encouragement and helpful critique that made this thesis possible, as well as for her patience in correcting both my stylistic and philosophical errors. I also wish to thank Don Hubin and George Pappas for their suggestions and guidance, especially in the earliest stages of this project when it was at its worst. I am also grateful to Hank Kreuzman who has given me philosophical guidance and critique for over a dozen years. Finally, I wish to thank my husband, friends and family who have encouraged and supported my efforts to complete this thesis. iv VITA September 7, 1970.….Born – Fayetteville, North Carolina 1995…………………M.A. Philosophy, The Ohio State University 1992…………………B.A. Philosophy, The College of Wooster, Dept. Honors 2002 – present……… Adjunct Instructor The College of Wooster, Wooster, OH Ursuline College, Pepper Pike, OH 2000…………………Adjunct Instructor University of St. Francis, Joliet, IL (in Atlanta, GA) 1997 – 2000…………Adjunct Instructor Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 1992 – 1997…………Graduate Teaching and Research Associate The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH PUBLICATIONS 1. Karen C. Haely and Donald C. Hubin, “Rape and the Reasonable Man”, Law and Philosophy 18: 113-139, 1999. FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Philosophy v LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1.1 Epicycle illustration………………………………………………………….16 vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract…………………………………………………………………………….. ii Dedication…………………………………………………………………………. iii Acknowledgments…………………………………………………………….…….iv Vita…………………………………………………………………………………..v List of Figures………………………………………………………………………..vi Chapters: 1. Background for the Feminist Studies of Objectivity in Science………………….1 1.1 Influences on Feminist Views of Objectivity…………………………….8 1.2 Objectivity in the Feminist Philosophy of Science………………………26 2. Power and Objectivity: A Warning from Catherine MacKinnon………………..28 2.1 Power and Facts………………………………………………………….29 2.2 Should We Keep Objectivity?…………………………………………...38 3. Evelyn Fox Keller’s Dynamic Objectivity……………………………………….44 3.1 Dynamic Objectivity…………………………………………………….45 3.2 Understanding Dynamic Objectivity – The McClintock Case………….53 3.3 Warnings About Domination……………………………………………65 3.4 Keller’s Contributions...…………………………………………………68 4. Sandra Harding’s Strong Objectivity…………………………………………….73 4.1 Weak Objectivity………………………………………………………..73 4.2 Strong Objectivity……………………………………………….……....76 4.3 Summary………………………………………………………….……..89 5. Helen Longino: Science as Social………………………………………………94 5.1 Science as a Social Practice…………………………………………….95 5.2 The Social Aspect of Science and Increasing Objectivity……………..105 5.3 Diversity……………………………………………………………….113 5.4 Response to Criticism………………………………………………….116 5.5 Criticism from Outside Science………………………………………..123 vii 5.6 Summary……………………….………………………………………125 6. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….126 Bibliography………………………………………………………………….…….142 viii Chapter 1 Background for the Feminist Studies of Objectivity in Science There is a story with which we are all familiar about how science proceeds, and this story emphasizes the objectivity of science. Objectivity is commonly taken to be the extent to which we allow our scientific beliefs to be driven by “some impartial and nonarbitrary criteria rather than by our wishes as to how things ought to be”.1 When we assert that research programs are objectively done, or that our scientific knowledge is objective, we are indicating that what supports the conclusions of these research programs is not merely a reflection of social values, politics, religious convictions or simply our desires about how we would like things to be. Rather, we are asserting that “the facts” support the conclusions drawn. Given that science is supposed to be objective – or at least more objective than what is characteristic of fields such as art or literary criticism – many scientists and some philosophers have held that what counts as real science is (or should be) unmarred by what goes on in our social and political lives, and this view is part of the familiar story we’ve all been told about science. Indeed, the very separation between what we call science and everything else (non-science) rests on the extent to which our scientific practice adheres to certain norms and rules that are supposed to be the great equalizers of 1 Helen Longino, Science as Social Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 62. 1 all biases, prejudices, guesses, emotions, social and political beliefs, and the like. These norms and rules – embodied in what we call the scientific method – are supposed to wash out all the non-empirical and non-scientific bits and pieces that are so characteristic of religion, art, music, politics and culture. The assumed distinction between the context of discovery – how hypotheses and theories become formulated – and the context of justification – where those theories are tested against evidence – has led many to claim that the relationship between science and social and political ideals is either non-existent or unimportant. Indeed, if what we call scientific knowledge is cleansed of social and political values, if it is truly objective, what could an investigation of the interaction between them possibly yield? The objectivity of science2 is supposed to be explained by the separation of the contexts of discovery and confirmation. In discovery, the scientists and researchers working out scientific problems don’t follow any set of rules, and they are not required to set aside personal views or beliefs in this context. This is where personal interests, political or religious beliefs, gut feelings and hunches are allowed to guide and direct the researcher, in effect leading him or her to a hypothesis or theory about some phenomena or other. But in confirming or justifying our theories – the context of justification – the scientific process becomes, well, scientific: the process of confirming theories requires that evidence be weighed against those theories, resulting in either the confirmation of the 2 In this paper, the most common use of the term ‘science’ is for any structured, systematic inquiry, which most commonly includes mathematics, physics, chemistry and biology (as well as more specific fields such as geology, astronomy and the like). See Elizabeth Anderson, “Knowledge, Human Interests, and Objectivity in Feminist Epistemology”, Philosophical Topics, vol. 23, Fall 1995, fn 2, in which she explains that using ‘science’ rather than ‘inquiry’ signifies that the latter is a disciplined, systematic inquiry subject to peer review. However, I am reluctant to apply the term ‘science’ as widely as Anderson, who includes the humanities, social sciences and economics in her vision of what constitutes science. 2 theory or the theory’s demise. In confirming theories, the social and political preferences and desires of the research community are not allowed to have an effect on the confirmation of the theory. Indeed, if such things did have an effect on the outcome of a scientific study, then the study would cease to be, on this view, truly scientific. Again, the scientific quality of research is supposed to be based in part on its objectivity, or the extent to which subjective values are carefully guarded against, and are precluded from influencing the conclusions of the research. This basic sense of objectivity is what has elevated scientific