Practical Objectivity: Keeping Natural Science Natural Alan G

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2012 Practical Objectivity: Keeping Natural Science Natural Alan G. Padgett Luther Seminary, [email protected]

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Recommended Citation Padgett, Alan G., "Practical Objectivity: Keeping Natural Science Natural" (2012). Faculty Publications. 309. https://digitalcommons.luthersem.edu/faculty_articles/309 Published Citation Padgett, Alan G. “Practical Objectivity: Keeping Natural Science Natural.” In The Blackwell Companion to Science and Christianity, edited by J. B. Stump, 93–102. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty & Staff choS larship at Digital Commons @ Luther Seminary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Luther Seminary. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. st, NY: Human- 9 sily Press. Press. ress. the Science and Practical Objectivity dbnok of Religion Keeping Natural Science Natural a Feminist Cos · ckwick Publica- ALAN G. PADGETT

dt!dge. A good Should natural science go natural (so to speak) or is there room in a properly natural science ieces by Code, for kinds of explanation other than natural ones? Is there room in a properly natural science for appeal to intelligent agency, for example?' This is the key question of our chapter, . Elmsford, NY: and it will take us some way into the philosophy of science and the relationship between d how biology science and Christian faith. I will argue that the natural sciences should stay natural, but this subordinate. the history and is a contingent and practical conclusion. We are neither putting forwardsome kind of essen ety of fields. tial and necessary definition, nor creating a clear and distinct "line of demarcation" that sepa aicr:. New York: rates science from all other kinds of human knowing. Rather, I will argue that like all science. academic disciplines, the natural sciences embody a human, traditional, and communal form liladclphia, PA: of inquiry. Because of the importance of their traditional values, practices, methods, and lop a feminist explanatory focus - which have pushed back the darkness for centuries and illuminated pow erfully the nature of nature - the natural sciences should keep to their proven methods unless . An important and until a very significant and powerful combination of evidence and reason forces a major change. We might say that by long practice and tradition, the natural sciences have a "nature e University of bias" which has proved highly successful in yielding objective knowledge about natural things. tam works and In this chapter I will introduce the notion of "practical objectivity" and a natural explanatory ded. focus, setting these practical, traditional, and contingent concerns between advocates of methodological naturalism in natural science, and those who press for microdesign theory in biology ("intelligent design"). As we examine this intersection of ideas, other topics will have to be briefly introduced, but the focus of our chapter will remain upon the question we opened with: should natural science stay natural?

Science and Rationality as Human Practices

Philosophy of science in the twenty-first century has been deeply influenced by moves in the mid-twentieth century which connected the logic of science more closely to the actual

Tl,e Blackwell Companion to Scieiicf and Christianity, First Edition. Edited by J. B. Stump and Alan G. Padgett. © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2012 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 94 ALAN G. PADGETT practices of science: to its history, community, and humanity. Pierre Duhem (1954 [1906)) and overturned. l'h the later Wittgenstein (1955) were particularly influential in this move, especially as Wittgen 1986). While th stein's insights were adapted and developed by N. R. Hanson (1958), and most famously by the oft-feared r Thomas Kuhn (1962). A key element of this perspective in the history and philosophy of truth of a cert science is that sciences are seen as practical, human activities with an associated rationality thus engages In or methodology which is grounded in a particular research program (Lakatos) or paradigm priate expectati (Kuhn). Such a philosophy of science moves beyond a purely logical analysis of language, a to the dream 0 la Wittgenstein in the Tractatus (Wittgenstein 1922), to seeing science and its rationality as part of the sci embedded in a human community with a specific, traditional methodology and set of epis geration of �a temic values which guide its quest for objective knowledge (i.e., knowledge of the object it value-laden me studies). For example, in developing his own form of "post-critical philosophy" the scientist their objects of philosopher Michael Polanyi argued that scientific knowledge is "personal knowledge" but nevertheless w with a universal, objective intent (Polanyi 1958, 396). Epistcmolo But since a science is a human practice, with its own epistemological values and methods a particular an which are contingently constructed, what about objectivity? Given this view of science as a ing them unles fully human activity, can science be truly objective? There has been a massive debate on this them when in¥ topic by many important philosophers in the last century. Any attempt to summarize this one specific pr· debate would take us far offour current course and purpose. While no consensus has emerged hand: should in the history and philosophy of science concerning these important questions, a few broadly received principles will be all we need for our purposes here (see further Padgett 2003). The notion of a value-free science has largely been replaced by a greater appreciation for the fact that all the academic disciplines or sciences are in fact human practices which take place within established traditions of inquiry (Lakatos and Musgrave 1978; MacIntyre 2006, 1.3-23). To learn a natural or human science is not simply to be trained in pure a priori logical So what is prac reasoning or in universal axiomatic systems of deductive truth, but is closer to being appren What! amcalli ticed into a valuable skill which requires mentoring into a community of experts, a way of of any robust , thinking, an angle of vision, and a specific labor. A student of any specialized science is thus about the wocl, inducted into a community of truth-seeking fellow scientists, whose reasoning is shaped by sources, see Li that tradition of inquiry. No science is without presuppositions and important values that seeks objective shape its methodology, or if you like, its rationality (McMullin 1982). The epistemological discover truth values which are embedded in the contingent, historical, and humanly constructed sciences studies monet· (academic disciplines) are not pure noetic truths - at least, most of them are not - yet with practical objec successful and fruitfulsciences they should be given prima facie epistemic warrant unless there which the sci is some reason to doubt them. So the specific sciences are best understood as using both criticize re eiv. formal and informal logics. reactions. It was in proposing a solution to Hume's famous skeptical argument against induction In his In Oefi that the following principles came to be important in thinking about the rationalityof science, of objectivity. and especially informal reasoning. Following Thomas Reid's response to Hume, I conclude true" (Collier that the principles of informal logic are fallibleand open to revision; based upon a tradition be objective, of reasoning; multiform and diverse, and applied somewhat differently in different sciences making a truth and other academic disciplines (Padgett 2003, 167-194). What counts as a beautiful solution which one is in mathematics is one guide to a good answer to a problem, yet what counts as a beautiful the word. It is solution in chemistry is quite different. In both a kind of rational elegance is seen as a kind into the idea o of guide to a good answer, but what counts as elegant in these disciplines is distinct. The that we are no importance of these broad conclusions about informal reasoning will soon become apparent seeking comm as we continue our discussion of natural science. The first a It turns out, therefore, that the nineteenth-century dream of a pure logical rationality, a practices and v scientific thinking that was value-free and based upon reason and evidence alone, has been structure, pow PRACTICAL OBJECTIVITY 95

1954 [1906)) and overturned. There is no "view from nowhere" for a genuinely human epistemology (Nagel ·ally as Wittgen 1986). While there is thus no perfectly neutral and value-freerationality, the alternativeis not ost famously by the oft-fearedrelativism of "anything goes." Rather, a modest objectivity which sees objective d philosophy of truth of a certain kind as a communal goal and a practice within a tradition of inquiry, and ·aced rationality thus engages in careful and rigorous attention to the object of study, is a reasonable and appro os) or paradigm priate expectation in the natural sciences. Let us call this a "practical objectivity." As opposed , of language, a to the dream of a value-free and purely logical science, this kind of objectivity is a normal 'l's rationality as part of the sciences, and does not fall into the troubles that the earlier Enlightenment exag and set of epis- geration of rationality in science did (and still does). Even though the sciences represent of the object it value-laden methodologies, because of the long history of success in gaining truth about . y" the scientist their objects of study, the values, methods, and practices embedded in scientificcommunities owledge" but nevertheless warrant our epistemological respect. Epistemological respect is a form of rational trust. While the principles of reason used in a particular and mature science are not absolute, a priori truths, we make a mistake in doubt ing them unless there are good reasons to do so. What is more, the smart thing to do is adopt them when investigating their area of expertise, unless significant reasons cause us to doubt summarize this one specific principle or its proper application. This general principle applies to the case at has emerged hand: should we doubt the nature-bias of the natural sciences today? s, a few broadly gett 2003). ppreciation for Practical Objectivity and Explanatory Focus ices which take . aclnryre 2006, e a priorilogical So what is practical about objectivity, and what does that have to do with scientific reasoning? o being appren What I am calling practical objectivity is one of those contingent values found in the tradition erts, a way of of any robust natural science. The sciences arose historically as ways of seeking knowledge science is thus about the world, and specialized as their range of interest grew more focused (among many g is shaped by sources, see Lindberg 1992; Butterfield 1953). Objectivity in science is "practical" in that it nmc values that seeks objective knowledge of the things being studied. One of the goals of a science is to epistemological discover truth about some object, some element of the world. For example, economics ucted sciences studies monetary systems, while chemistry studies molecules (among other things). The not - yet with practical objectivity of chemistry, therefore, just is the set of values, practices, and beliefs nt unlessthere which the scientists learn in order to be good chemists, and thus to discover new things or as using both criticize received theories about the structure and makeup of physical elements and their reactions. In his In Defense of Objectivity, the philosopher Andrew Collier sets forththree definitions of objectivity. The first sense is "what is true independently of any subject judging it to be me, I conclude true" (Collier 2003, 134). The second sense is that in which human judgments are said to pon a tradition be objective, that is, the knowing subject is causally open to the influence of the object in 'lferenr sciences making a truth claim or judgment (135). But the third sense is that of a "human attitude," in auti.ful solution which one is trying to make one's beliefs and values objectively true in the second sense of ts as a beautiful the word. It is this third sense, objectivity as a human attitude or goal, which we can expand s seen as a kind into the idea of a practical objectivity (137). And for the sciences, what we need to notice is is distinct. The that we are not talking about the practical objectivity of a single knower, but of a truth come apparent seeking community and tradition. The first aspect of keeping natural sciences natural, then, is not very controversial. In its al rationality, a practices and values, a natural science seeks objective knowledge about natural objects, their lone, has been structure, powers, and interactions. While economics is a science, therefore, it is not a natural 96 ALAN G. PADGETT science, because financialsystems are human creations and involve the study of human socie and problems ties - thus economics is a social or human science. Geology, on the other hand, is a natural the term, while science which studies the earth. including the Somewhat more controversial is the claim that a natural science should explain things and light of new e events using natural explanations. Let us call the type of explanations used in any academic design" propo discipline its "explanatory focus." Mature and successful sciences (and similar academic, What we h explanatory disciplines) explain things and events using standard, accepted models and pat the traditions o terns of explanation which have proved successful in the past. In mathematics, for example, What is more, the truth of a formula can be proved using the explanatory focus of that discipline, namely, in going about mathematical proof. If I want to know not only if but why a right triangle can never be equi these points lateral, a geometrical proof of this can be given. This truth about the right triangle can be Despite the explained using the explanatory focus of geometry, as this has developed in the history of informal reaso mathematics. When we turn to natural sciences, there exists a long tradition in which the find the best w explanatory focus of a natural science like astronomy limits itself to natural explanations. In based upon de other words, the explanatory focus of the natural sciences upon natural explanations is also informal Lhin part of their practical objectivity. Human purposeful activity, of course, can and does affect in defending th the outcome of an experiment in astronomy or any natural science - but this invalidates the logic are ·fullib results. The data are then considered "corrupt." The idea in the natural sciences seems to be diverse, and ap to understand how things work in the natural world by themselves, so to speak, without set of diverse human interference. This second part of keeping natural science natural is a bit more con symbolic logic troversial. To see why we need to briefly discuss "methodological naturalism" and "intelligent make clear su design." clusion of an · conclusion is I involves pcrso Methodological Naturalism and Informal Reasoning dence. Thus r to shape and I ticular expertis What we have been calling the nature-bias and practical objectivity of the natural sciences is question, whe generally called today "methodological naturalism." The ideas are somewhat similar, but the as a whole wil terminology is quite different.I find that both defenders and critics of so-called "methodologi worldview of cal naturalism" are often led astray by their terminology. The debate all too easily switches used in the se from philosophy of science to full-blown philosophical naturalism. The term itself is objec our personal p tionable. The nature-bias of the natural sciences is best left completely separate from any ingfor the h11li1 notion of "naturalism." It seems that the first published use of this phrase in the sense we ality" of theol are discussing was by the philosopher Paul deVries, in an article entitled "Naturalism in the truths are boll Natural Sciences" (deVries 1986). Even though deVries does distinguish between two types scientific purs of naturalism (methodological and full-blown philosophical), the main problem is with like theory ch calling the nature-bias of natural science an "ism" as if it were some version of naturalism hand, that is). - which it is not. The practical nature-bias of the natural sciences which we have been discuss This does 1 ing in this chapter has nothing in fact to do with a full-blown ontology as a philosophical basic and ceat worldview. The discussion of this term since then shows that it is all too easy to turn "meth rule such back odological naturalism" into some kind of worldview, or to think that it is a strict and delimit to be had - b ing methodology of some kind (Plantinga 1996). Both of these misunderstand what is no truth is usuall more than a contingent tradition and rational bias, rather than a "methodology" in any proper in that area ju sense of the word. It is just too easy to think of methodological naturalism as simply acting situations, pc. in the practice of science as if naturalism (full-blown) were true: a highly dubious way of for new disco describing the practical objectivity of the natural sciences. Because of the serious confusions may win out PRACTICAL OBJECTIVITY 97 f human socie and problems with this proposed terminology from deVries in 1986, I suggest we eliminate nd, is a natural the term, while keeping the practical observation of how natural sciences are in factpracticed, including the tradition of nature-bias. Like any tradition, it is in fact open to revision in the lain things and light of new evidence. And this point leads to a consideration of the so-called "intelligent any academic design" proposal. ilar academic, What we have called an explanatory focus and a practical objectivity are key elements in odcls and pat the traditions of inquiry that we call "scientific," or indeed in any of the academic disciplines. s, for example, What is more, as we argued previously the natural sciences use a great deal of informal logic ipline, namely, in going about the testing of theories and models, and in coming up with new ones. Both of never be equi- these points will be important in considering the recent debate about intelligent design. tri-ar1gle can be Despite the attempt of Karl Popper to develop a logic of scientific discovery that avoided the history of informal reasoning (he accepted Hume's skepticism regarding the problem of induction), I n in which the find the best way forward is simply to reject Hume's rejection. Popper's philosophy of science, il)lanations. In based upon deductive logic, is not so much false as it is limited or incomplete, just because nations is also informal thinking is so much a part of scientific reasoning fromthe evidence. As noted above, nd does affect in defending the rationality of informalreasoning, I concluded that the principles of informal invalidates the logic are fallible and open to revision, based upon a tradition of reasoning, multiform and es seems to be diverse, and applied differently in different sciences and other academic disciplines. Thus this p ·ak, without set of diverse principles must be rigorously distinguished from the system of formal and bit more con symbolic logic which has been so brilliantly developed since the nineteenth century. Once we nd "intelligent make clear such a distinction, the so-called "problem" of induction dissipates, since the con clusion of an informal argument simply cannot be logically certain or necessary (and this conclusion is logically necessary!). Informal reasoning is more open than formal logic, and involves personal judgment, as well as commonly accepted principles, procedures, and evi dence. Thus room exists for the deepest values and commitments of an individual researcher g to shape and be shaped by the more focused and narrow discoveries and values of her par ticular expertise. This finalpoint cannot be emphasized enough in the context of our present u ral sciences is question, where issues of faith, reason, values, and rationality loom large. Sure, no discipline imilar, but the as a whole will share all the values of a particular scholar, but there is room for the larger "methodologi worldview of a particular scholar to influence the way those methods and rationalities are easily switches used in the service of science. There is room in the open practice of scientific reasoningfor l itself is objec our personal perspectives and presuppositions to rationally influence informal scientific think ·ace from any ingfor the individual scientist. This is what Robert J. Russell and I mean, in part, by the "mutu · 1 the sense we ality" of theology and science (Padgett 2003; Russell 2008). Larger commitments and accepted turalism in the truths are bound to influence the rational investigator at the boundaries and edges of their cer1- two types scientific pursuits, just because a rational person will allow other truths to influence things oblem is with like theory choice among otherwise equally good theories (equally good on the evidence at of naturalism hand, that is). e been discuss- This does not mean that our worldviews should overwhelm the evidence. Of course more philosophical basic and central epistemological values (like fitwith data or coherence) can and should over to turn "meth rule such background commitments when there is a clearly demonstrable truth or best theory ct and delimit to be had - but at the growing edges of a science (among other places) such demonstrable nd what is no truth is usually not available. Indeed, the very fact that the scientific discipline is "growing" " in any proper in that area just means that new theories are open forconsideration. The scientist is, in such simply acting situations, perfectly rational in allowing her worldview to influence areas where one looks ubiou way of for new discoveries, or one's best hunch as to which theory among currently disputed ones 0u.s confusions may win out over the long run. 98 ALAN G. PADGETT

To see this clearly it is important to make two distinctions. First we have to distinguish is not whether between the rational commitments and methods of a whole tradition and community, and the action was ac necessarily larger set of beliefs, values, and knowledge of individual expertsin that science. This in natural phflo is simply the difference between a science and a scientist. In other words, we have to distin The new in guish between the individual scientist and the larger community of scholars, classic texts, to what its pw accepted paradigms, and practices which make up the specific science as a whole. Second, nations. In effi we have to distinguish between two ways in which larger truths and values from the indi versities beti.y vidual's worldview may influence their scientific activity: implicitly as a background to the "intelligent de. informal logic of their specific science; or explicitly, when researchers add their own personal cal phenomcn commitments to the content of their scientific arguments, explanations, and publications. from the tradi The importance of keeping these distinctions clear will soon become apparent in our discus Could an c..-x-pl sion of intelligent design. The being in would fit the scientific expla Microdesign and Macrodesign in Science In answeriq acting upon t

In the light of the perspective on natural scientific reasoning we have been tracing in brief compass, we are now ready to consider the case of the intelligent design debates. Since the early 1990s a small band of scholars has been seeking to insert the hypothesis of "intelligent design" into the natural sciences, especially biology (Forrest and Gross 2004). Now there is nothing unscientific in principle about appeal to the action of intelligent agents as an explana scientific issue tion of phenomena. Perfectly scientific disciplines like economics and linguistics do so all the course in the time, and what counts as good evidence for design or purpose can be rationally delineated accepted tan within specific sciences (Dembski 1998). Yet these are human or social sciences where appeal influence ques to intelligent agency is at the center of their tradition of inquiry and practical objectivity. The science. To ta same could be said for the search for extra-terrestrial intelligence like the SETI project: the shown that no activities of intelligent beings are a core part of the explanatory focus and tradition of inquiry. likely to be in What has been controversial is the insertion of intelligent design explanations in the natural to the empiric sciences, and especially biology. Here proponents of intelligent design have run up against of scientific di the tradition of nature-bias in what we label natural science, a tradition with a long history beyond scienc of success. in both the i;a It is important at this point to distinguish between two notions of "design" when it comes interpretation to the universe. I have called these "macrodesign" and "microdesign" (Padgett 2008). For Put another w millennia in Western culture, going back to Plato and Aristotle, natural philosophers and science. Jnfori scientists have simply assumed as obvious the notion that the whole universe was designed does the proc by an intelligent God. The scientific assumption that nature has an order or structure which thinking hard is rational, mathematical, and can be discovered by empirical inquiry was a key element in of scientists is the development of natural philosophy and early modern science. I call this scientific presup any specific s position "macrodesign." Yet the natural philosophers did not appeal to God's action in Individuals m explaining events and things within the created world - such an appeal would have been in effect to move from natural philosophy to theology. Instead, natural philosophers like Roger Bacon studied what was called "secondary causes" within the created world, while activity or set accepting all the time the theological presupposition that God created and sustained all things, science. The s and acts in the world. Thus macrodesign was an assumption which stimulated scientific things (indu research without prejudice as to which events were caused by God: all things and events owed Second, the W their ultimate existence and powers to God, yet this theological fact was not accepted as a gious or non-1 natural philosophical explanation of specific things and events within creation. The point here can proceed \ PRACTICAL OBJECTIVITY 99

to distinguish is not whether God does in fact act in new and surprising ways in history and nature: God's 1111t1ity, and the action was accepted. The point was whether appeal to God's intelligent agency was proper Jill science. This in natural philosophy. have to distin The new innovation of intelligent design arose in the late 1980s and 1990s as a response s, classic texts, to what its proposers thought was the inherent philosophical naturalism of Darwinian expla :vvbole. Second, nations. In effect, they were calling into question the late medieval division of labor in uni from the indi versities between natural philosophy and theology. They wanted to appeal to an unnamed ground to the "intelligent designer" to explain withinthe natural sciences the design-like character of biologi town personal cal phenomena, especially cellular biology. This move I label "microdesign" to distinguish it d publications. from the traditional macrodesign assumption in the history of natural science in the West. t in our discus- Could an explanation be natural-scientific if it appealed to the actions of an intelligent being? The being in question would not have to be God (but it is hard to imagine just who else would fit the bill here), the question was simply one of what "counts" as genuine natural scientific explanation. In answering this question, we should first recall the difference between an assumption acting upon the individual scientist, and an assumption, method, or epistemic values being common to a community of inquiry that makes up a specific scientific tradition. Second, recall the difference between an idea being part of the implicit background of the thinking ates. Since the of an individualand that idea being cited explicitly in the proposed scientific explanation itself. of "intelligent On the basis of scientificpractice and reasoning, there should be no objection to the individual . Now there is scientist making use of her larger worldview (Christian or otherwise) in thinking hard about s as an explana scientific issues, or in explaining the meaning of scientificdiscoveries to a larger audience. Of : cs do so all the course in the end new theories and discoveries will have to be justified according to the aUy delineated accepted standards of the mature science concerned, but the point remains that worldviews where appeal influence questions, hunches, areas of research, scientific practice, and informal reasoning in bjectivity. The science. To take one of many examples from the history of science, Geoffrey Cantor has Tl project: the shown that not onlywere Quakers, because of their distinctive theology and spirituality, more rioi, of inquiry. likely to be involved in science than other religious groups, they were attracted particularly , s in the natural to the empirical, observational sciences (Cantor 2005). Turning to matters of interpretation run up against of scientific discoveries, it is quite obvious that larger values, assumptions, and insights well a long history beyond science are used to illustrate and explain science to a larger intellectual audience. So in both the rational assumptions used by the sciences and in the principles of meaning and when it comes interpretation used in hermeneutics, reason must go beyond the natural sciences themselves. gett 2008). For Put another way,this is the simple point that thinking about science requires us to go beyond ilosophers and science. Informal reasoning draws upon more than rational principles and evidence alone, as · was designed does the process of interpretation. There is nothing wrong with a religiously serious scientist U'llcture which thinking hard about her science in ways that draw upon her religious faith. The community ·ey element in of scientists is another thing. The principles, texts, discoveries, evidence, and procedures of ien.tificp resup any specific science (say, geology) do not draw upon any particular religious perspective. _od's action in Individuals may, and groups within geology may - but not the whole community. So now uld have been we have to say two things that are in tension with each other, and both sides of this tension ilosophers like are equally important. First, fromthe perspective of the individual person of faith, no human d world, while activity or set of ideas is religiously neutral. This includes the practice and discoveries of ined all things, science. The serious spiritual intellectual will want to see all of life, all human and created lated scientific things (including science!), from the point of view of faith. This is of course as it should be. cl events owed Second, the whole community of geologists (for example) is not committed to any one reli t accepted as a gious or non-religious worldview. The practical objectivity and explanatory focus of geology The point here can proceed with quality scientific reasoning and results without necessarily embracing any 100 ALAN G. PADGETT larger religious or non-religious perspective. One way of making this second point would be to say that the assumptions, evidence, procedures, and epistemological values of geology ( or any specific science) are too small to count as "religious." Of course the rational person will want to "follow the evidence wherever it leads" and this raises an important question: can My thanks to the discoveries of science raise questions which science cannot answer? On the face of it, the and sugge.� answer would seem to be "yes." Much larger questions of truth, beauty, meaning, logic, and The term,, language can be raise by scientific discoveries without any science being able to find the social. answer. The question of why the universe or even the multiverse (if there be such) exists at all is one such question. But if this is so, could the evidence of geology itself not point to a designer of some type? Certainly that is possible, but the argument would no longer be strictly geological - it would move into an interdisciplinary conversation, where theology and philoso phy would have an important place at the table. Thus questions of intelligent design go beyond geology, even if the evidence is discovered by geology. We might discover a particu larly interesting layer of black rock on a geological dig, only to later discover that it is the ancient remains of a burned city, not a naturally occurring geological feature. Questions London: about this city and its inhabitants would necessarily take us outside geology, but not com Dembski, Will" pletely - geological evidence is an important part of archeology. The discussion would go Cambrid interdisciplinary in a quite natural way. deVries, Paul. But why would such an argument no longer be natural science itself? Could not a natural Duhem, Pier science like biology eventually come to embrace microdesign arguments as a normal part of the paradigm of biological science? What is wrong with making appeal to an intelligent designer as an explicit part of a scientific explanation? The philosophy of science we have been tracing in this chapter would suggest that no strict, logically necessary reason can be given to exclude microdesign arguments from natural-scientific explanations. This is just because the nature-bias of the natural sciences is a tradition rather than an essence, and as such is open to revision. At the same time, a very powerful burden of proof lies on those who would buck the strong currents of scientific practice and history. The practical objectivity Lakatos, Imre and natural explanatory focus of biology would demand solid and convincing evidence before bridge U we set them aside, and a careful exploration of alternative natural explanations would first Lindberg, Davj be called for. So far the intelligent design proponents have failed this test (see among many cal, Religi sources Miller 1999;Johnson, Lamoureux et al. 1999). In the world of scholarship and science, MacIntyre, .AJ in the groves of academe, intelligent design has failed to be a fruitful paradigm. The promis McMullin, Er sory notes made in the 1990s of new breakthroughs in biology have simply not been paid. It would seem that microdesign is not a fruitful mode of explanation in biology. Miller, Kenne Does such a conclusion undermine the rationality of Christian faith, or any religious faith? Evolulio,i Of course not. The sciences as they developed over time have a specific domain of study and Nagel, Thom Padgett, Alan a narrow focus on the particular objects they seek to know, and a standard explanatory focus Rapids, that excludes many things which would otherwise be important. Chemistry does not explain Padgett, Alan molecular attraction on the basis of love - does that mean love is unimportant or does not losophy, exist? Arguments for or against the existence of God are part of philosophy and theology. Plantinga, Al Such arguments can be rigorous, rational, and logical; they may draw upon the discoveries vol. 1, H" of science and history; but that does not make the arguments themselves scientific or histori Polanyi, M icb cal. Such arguments are about the findings of history, or science, or religious studies - they Chicago do not take place within those disciplines. The natural sciences should stay natural not because Russell, Robe they have to, but because it is wise given their purpose and the lessons to be learned from Sdence. the history of science. Only someone naive enough to believe that natural science can answer Wittgenstein, all our questions would assume that the nature-bias of natural science undermines religion. Wittgenstein, Such an assumption is not science, but scientism. PRACTICAL OBJECTIVITY 101

int would be Notes f geology ( or al person will question: can My thanks to Alan Love, Philip Rolnick, and of course my excellent co-editor,Jim Stump, forcomments face of it, the and suggestions on earlier versions on this chapter. ng, logic, and The term "natural" has many meanings. In this chapter it will be contrasted with the human and e to find the social. uch) exists at not point to a ngcr be strictly References and philoso nt design go ve.r a particu- Butterfield, Herbert. 1953. The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800. New York: Macmillan. . that it is the Cantor, Geoffrey. 2005. Quakers,Jews and Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press . Collier, Andrew. 2003. In Defence of Objectivity and Other Essays: On Realism, Existentialism and Politics. ·e. Questions London: Routledge. but not com Dembski, William A. 1998. The Design Inference: Eliminating Chance through Small Probabilities. Cambridge: ion would go Cambridge University Press. deVries, Paul. 1986. Naturalism in the Natural Sciences. Christian Scholar's Review, 15, pp. 388-396. not a natural Duhem, Pierre Maurice Marie. 1954 (1906]. The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Princeton: Princ ormal part of eton University Press. an intelligent Forrest, Barbara and Gross, Paul R. 2004. Creationism's Trojan Horse: The Wedge of Intelligent Design. 'en ewe have Oxford: Oxford University Press. reason can be Hanson, Norwood Russell. 1958. Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of s. This is just Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. e.nce, and as Johnson, Phillip E., Lamoureux, Denis 0. et al. 1999. DarwinismDefeated? The Johnson-Lamoureux Debate Vancouver: Regent College Publishing. · lies on those on Biological Origins. Kuhn, Thomas S. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. :cal objectivity Lakatos, lmre and Musgrave, Alan, eds. 1978. Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cam idence before bridge University Press. , ns would first Lindberg, David C. 1992. The Beginnings of Western Science: The European Scientific Tradition in Philosophi among many cal, Religious, and Institutional Context, 600 B.C. to A.D. 1450. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ,.P and science, MacIntyre, Alasdair C. 2006. Selected Essays, 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. . . The promis McMullin, Ernan. 1982. Values in Science. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of r been paid. It Science Association, 2, pp. 3-28. Miller, Kenneth R. 1999. Finding Darwin's God: A Scientist's Search for Common Ground between God and religious faith? Evolution. New York: Cliff Street Books. n of study and Nagel, Thomas. 1986. The View from Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Padgett, Alan G. 2003. Grand lanatory focus Science and the Study of God: A Mutuality Model for Theology and Science. Rapids, MI: Eerdmans. es not explain Padgett, Alan G. 2008. Religion and the Physical Sciences. In D. Borchert, ed. The Encyclopedia of Phi nt or does not losophy, vol. 8. New York: Macmillan-Gale, pp. 397-401. and theology. Plantinga, Alvin. 1996. Methodological Naturalism. In]. M. Van der Meer, ed. Facetsof Faith and Science, rhe discoveries vol. 1, Historiography and Modes of Interaction. Lanham: University Press of America, pp. 177-221. tific or histori Polanyi, Michael. 1958. Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. Chicago: University of studies - they Chicago Press. ra I not because Russell, Robert J. 2008. Cosmologyfrom Alpha to Omega: The Creative Mutual Interaction of Theology and . learned from Science. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. lee can answer Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1922. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London: Kegan Paul. lines religion. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1955. Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell. 102 ALAN G. PADGETT