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1980 "Cool Reflexion" and the Criticism of Values: Is, Ought, and in Hume's Stephen G. Salkever Bryn Mawr College, [email protected]

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Custom Citation Salkever, Stephen G. "'Cool Reflexion' and the Criticism of Values: Is, Ought, and Objectivity in Hume's Social Science." American Political Science Review 74 (1980): 70-77.

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STEPHENG. SALKEVER Bryn MawrCollege

Is the / distinction incompatiblewith the possibility of a social science which is both objectiveand evaluative(or )?Does support of the latterrequire rejection of the former and vice versa? This article presents an indirect argument against the incompatibilityof the fact/value distinction and an objectively evaluativesocial science. My procedureis to show that , whose is/ought distinction is the locus classicusof the fact/value distinction, is committed both to the view that valuescannot be derivedfrom and to the view that social science is not (and should not be) value-neutral.Furthermore, Hume's position is free from any logical flaws. My conclusion is that it is false to say that the fact/value distinction entails a value-neutralsocial science, and that it is thereforeutterly unnecessaryfor criticsof such a science to waste their time attemptingto "bridgethe gap" betweenfacts and values.

Perhaps the most powerful, and surely the analysis as the most obscure classical text.1 most famous, argument for the exclusion of Although on first inspection "Hume's "Guillo- moral predicates from social scientific discus- tine" seems to bring about a clean separation sion is contained in David Hume's is/ought between facts and values, a closer look reveals distinction, which occurs in A Treatise of ambiguities. The interpretive difficulties arise Human (pp. 469-70). In this much- when Hume says that it "seems altogether disputed passage, Hume appears to claim that inconceivable, how this new relation [the ought ought cannot be deduced from is ] can be a deduction from others [is propositions, and that it is therefore a logical propositions] which are entirely different from error to claim that moral distinctions or judg- it" (Black, 1969, p. 100, emphasis added). ments can be derived from . The question When Hume says that such a deduction "seems is this: does Hume's "celebrated " altogether inconceivable," is he ironically ex- (Hare, 1964, p. 29) that ought cannot be pressing the view that it really is inconceivable, deduced from is require the conclusion that or only stating a difficult problem to be solved ought propositions are not subject to criticism by the rest of book 3 of the Treatise? And and revision on rational grounds (in the way when he says "deduction," does he mean strict that descriptive or explanatory propositions logical entailment (in which case some other may be criticized) and so must be excluded form of from fact to value might be from any objective and rigorous social science? possible) or any inference whatsoever (in which My argument be that Hume does not draw case the gap between fact and value would be this conclusion, and that his rejection of value- absolutely unbridgeable)? Furthermore, how as a goal of social science is not radical is the break with earlier moral and inconsistent with his rejection on logical proposed by the is/ought grounds of the deduction of ought from is, of distinction? In the same paragraph, Hume says value from fact. that he is both exposing a defect in "every One further preliminary distinction is re- system of " and that his distinction quired here: in speaking of Hume's implicit "wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morali- criticism of value-neutrality I am not claiming, ty"; that these expressions are not synonymous for Hume or in general, that objectivity is is suggested by Hume's frequent separation of enhanced insofar as the social scientist holds learned and vulgar judgments.2 certain values at the outset of his or her (Miller, 1979). Rather, my contention is that the conclusion of such inquiry will be the 1The first important demonstration of the difficul- or criticism of values, rather than the ties that emerge from a careful reading of the passage or explanation of moral and cul- was that of McIntyre (1969), to whom my own tural judgments in value-neutral terms (see discussion of Hume owes a great deal. Gibson, 1977). 20ne possible resolution of this difficulty would be The is/ought passage itself has been, in the to suggest that Hume was opposed to all "systems" in last 20 years, the of as much close science, on the grounds that they distorted our view of 70 1980 "Cool Reflexion"and the Criticismof Values 71

The of the is/ought passage is of in terms of their . more than simply exegetical concern insofar as Nevertheless, the bulk of Hume's social it squarely raises the issue of whether Hume's science in book 3 of the Treatise is as much distinction can be used as a warrant for concerned with justification and evaluation as it claiming that values or moral propositions is with the explanation of moral phenomena. (unlike factual beliefs) are not subject to Hume does of course spend a deal of time rational defense or criticism. If so, then such explaining how human come to have propositions should be excluded from that those peculiar sensations which we call praise "science of man" (Treatise, p. xxii) whose and blame; this explanation revolves around his foundation on an objective basis forms the goal account of the process of communicated affec- of the Treatise as a whole. Since the disputed tions which he calls sympathy (Treatise, p. passage is not self-explanatory, any attempt to 576). But he also wants to answer the substan- deal with this question must look beyond it to tive moral question of what (and parti- Hume's own practice of social science in book cularly, ) is, as well as the psychological 3. question of how we come to call certain phenomena (or characters) virtuous or vicious. Hume's Practice of Social Science Justice, according to Hume, is defined by the three fundamental laws of stability of Many of Hume's most famous logical and possession, translation by , and the psychological doctrines and aphorisms suggest performance of promises (Treatise, p. 541). His the conclusion that moral judgments are not argument that this conception of justice can be susceptible of rational evaluation. Moral judg- justified by reference to a particular conception ments are constituted by a feeling or sentiment, of the facts which constitute the human condi- and are not conclusions of reason (Treatise, pp. tion and general human interest is too well 471, 457). Reasoning is always subsequent to a known to require extensive summary here (see determination of the passions, and so can never McIntyre, 1969, pp. 39-42). The basic fact or judge them: "Reason is, and ought only to be major premise of the argument is that human the slave of the passions" (Treatise, p. 415). beings, unlike any other animals, are creatures Actions, which are to be construed as reflec- of numberless needs and slender resources, and tions of moral , can be called laudable that it is by the conventions of social organiza- or blameworthy, "but they cannot be reason- tion alone that man is "able to supply his able or unreasonable" (Treatise, pp. 477, 458). defects" (Treatise, pp. 484-85). The gravest of Passionate preferences appear to be similarly these defects is the instability and uncertainty closed to rational critique: " 'Tis not contrary "of such possessions as we have acquir'd by our to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole industry or good fortune," and it is this world to the scratching of my finger" (Treatise, particular defect (rather than, say, our capacity p. 416). All this suggests that it would be for vice, as for ) which provides the plausible to attribute to Humne a sort of problem to which the conventions of society pre-Stevensonian emotivism,3 and to conclude and justice are the solution (Treatise, pp. 487, that while social science may indeed explain 491). and classify moral judgments it should avoid Thus far we are dealing only with Hume's the inappropriate evaluation of such judgments conception of the facts, and with the process of reasoning or drawing from one set of facts to another: from the defining character- istics of the human condition to those conven- the (An Inquiry Conceming the Principles of tions and rules which are best suited to solving Morals, p. 8), a view which was almost a commonplace the problems implicit in these characteristics. in eighteenth-century discussions of science. (For a This inference is sufficient to defend Hume's discussion of a similarly critical response to "system" conception of justice as a more reasonable in Rousseau and Buffon, see Salkever, 1978, pp. solution to the human problem than its com- 216-17.) However, since Hume does refer to his own work as a "system of ." (Treatise, p. 618), this petitors, such as the Aristotelian notion of resolution does not agree precisely with every instance justice as fitness in distribution (Treatise, p. of Hume's use of the term. 502), but it is not sufficient to attach a sense of 3This is proposed by Flew (1969, p. 67). Ardal moral obligation or a sentiment of duty to the (1966, p. 212) argues that while Hume is not strictly rules of Humean justice. One may, without speaking an emotivist (since he was not specifically self-contradiction, accept the argument and still concerned with the nature of moral utterance), emo- not feel any obligation to abstain from the tivism is "in conformity with other aspects of his property of others or to keep one's promises: philosophy." "We have no motive leading us to the perfor- 72 The AmericanPolitical Science Review Vol. 74

mance of promises distinct from a sense of tion of this procedure is Hume's discussion of duty" (Treatise, p. 518).4 If Iremain unmoved various competing principles of political obliga- by the prospect of enhancing the general tion, a problem which is central to all his moral interest of mankind, no amount of careful and political writing, in which he criticizes as inductive inference can cause me to feel a duty mistaken the two extreme views of Tory passive to enhance that interest. However, once the obedience and Whig contractarianism and at- connection between interest and justice is tempts to justify a more reasonable middle established, Hume does believe that the natural ground.6 His argument is that any acceptable operations of sympathy, combined with par- of political obligation, the sort of ental instruction and political education, will in principle which proposes an idea of the extent most cases add a sense of moral obligation to to which a citizen owes allegiance to govern- those rules for which political philosophy and ment, must maximize the satisfaction of the social science (which are one and the same for general interest in peace and and that, in Hume) provide the justification (Treatise, pp. fact, "the obligation to obedience must cease, 533-34).5 But these are two separate pro- whenever the interest ceases. . . ," since cesses: social science can show the causal link "these notions of right and obligation are between a particular conception of justice and deriv'd from nothing but the advantage we reap human interest, but this demonstration cannot from government. . ." (Treatise, pp. 562, 553, by itself compel moral (or action-guiding) 555, emphasis in original). assent to its conclusions. I may well agree that The function of social science is thus not promise-keeping is in the interest of mankind simply to describe and explain the views people and yet feel no moral obligation to keep actually hold concerning the limits of political promises to people I dislike without in any way obligation and the nature of justice, but also to contradicting myself. My deficiency is in discriminate between adequate and mistaken sympathy, not reason. Justice is a means to an conceptions relative to the standard provided end, and will be valued or desired only insofar by the facts about the human condition. Such a as the end is valued (Treatise, p. 619). science is thus legitimately evaluative as well as Thus for Hume social science is limited in explanatory, although it cannot by itself entail that it cannot compel moral assent, a limitation a sense of obligation, or somehow demonstrate which can be established on both logical and to those without concern for general human psychological grounds. But it is not at all welfare that they ought to have such a concern. irrelevant to morality, or limited to describing the development of moral sentiments, since its Moral Judgments and : conclusions provide either criticism or justifica- Hume's Distinctions tion of those principles or values to which a sense of moral obligation may or may not Thus far I have argued that Hume's practice become attached. It does this by showing that of social science rests on the methodological the rules of justice and society are not arbitrary principle that moral and political judgments are conventions, unlike the rules of various games criticizable on objective grounds, even though (Treatise, p. 484; An Inquiry Concerning the these judgments cannot be derived from, nor be Principles of Morals, p. 39). Rather, they can be entailed or required by, any facual proposi- construed and evaluated as proposed solutions tions. Moral sentiments themselves are neither or answers to the problems posed by the rational nor irrational, but the principles to observable and contingent facts about human which they become attached (say, distributive needs, interests, and capacities. A good illustra- justice or the contract theory of obligation) may indeed be criticized in terms of their rationality as solutions to the problem of this to 4Thus from a Humean point of view, any attempt human interest or . Assuming to argue (as does Searle, 1969) that certain institution- be a fair statement of Hume's position, the al facts, like promising, entail obligation, is not only following question remains: does Hume's prac- doomed to failure but utterly beside the point. tice of a critical and evaluative social science 5Hume's position here clearly resembles Aristotle's contradict the separation of is and ought argument, in the Nicomachean Ethics, that a good asserted in the first two sections of book 3 of moral character cannot be produced by reason alone, but can only emerge from a process of habituation. In general, my reading of Hume suggests that his account of the form of practical reasoning (though certainly 6Forbes (1975, pp. 193-223) argues persuasively not of its content) is much closer to Aristotle's than that moderation was the ruling passion of Hume's most (including Hume) have thought. philosophical criticism of British politics. 1980 "Cool Reflexion" and the Criticism of Values 73

the Treatise? While recognizing the dangers of ideas, or to real and matter of inherent in what Anthony Flew calls the fact" (Treatise, p. 458, emphasis in original). Infallibility Assumption,7 I will attempt to The next step in the argument, however, is the show that Hume's argument that moral distinc- psychological claim that "passions, volitions, tions are not derived from reason is consistent and actions," which are the components and in general, though not always in detail, with his the objects of moral judgments, are "original implicit assumption that such distinctions are facts and , compleat in themselves," and criticizable and corrigible on rational and objec- thus "not susceptible of any such agreement or tive grounds. disagreement" (Treatise, p. 458). The inference Hume offers two major arguments for the drawn from these premises is that virtue is conclusion that moral judgments are indepen- neither discovered nor derived by the under- dent of reason. First, morality results in action standing or by reason (Treatise, p. 463). Does while reason does not; second, the terms this conclusion mean that moral judgments are "'reasonable" and "unreasonable" cannot be absolutely incorrigible and independent of rea- applied to actions or morals, but only to son, as is our preference for one flavor of ice beliefs.8 The first argument seems to rest on a cream rather than another? descriptive psychological claim, the assertion Everything here seems to depend on under- that as a matter of fact "morals excite passions; standing what Hume means by saying that our ... reason of itself is utterly impotent in this passions and actions are "original facts and particular" (Treatise, p. 457). Hume concludes realities, compleat in themselves." It is clear from this that "the rules of morality . . . are not that he does not mean that such phenomena are conclusions of our reason." There is nothing in self-generating: our feelings or impressions of this argument, however, to deny the view that moral good and arise as a result of the moral rules, however they are arrived at in the interaction between the internal actions of our first instance, may be subject to correction and mind and external objects (Treatise, pp revision in the light of subsequent reflection 464-65). When this interaction results in a and . It simply says that reason by feeling of pleasure or of a particular sort itself cannot constitute moral rules. This point ("without reference to our particular interest" is very similar to Aristotle's claim in book 6 of [Treatise, p. 472] ), we Call the feeling one of the Nicomachean Ethics (1 139a35-b4), in virtue or vice. So while it is clearly wrong to say which it is argued that since "thought by itself that virtue can be derived from consideration of moves nothing," a person cannot become vir- external objects and their relations only, it is tuous simply by engaging in a certain course of equally misleading to say that virtue is a feeling reasoning.9 Reason may be both perfectly spontaneously and independently produced by incapable of spontaneously generating morals the passions alone. and yet perfectly able to evaluate morals. My pleasure in viewing a charitable or a Hume's second argument for the categorical courageous character derives from the complex separation of reason and morality is much more interaction of my impressions of that character ambiguous. His basic premise here appears to be and its effects on others and the sympathetic the logical or analytic claim that reason is pleasure which these impressions produce in concerned only with the agreement (or dis- me. The difficulty that Hume encounters in agreement) of a to either "real relations describing this interaction appears when at the end of section 1 of book 3, just prior to the is/ought passage, he attempts to clarify his conception of our feelings of virtue and vice by 7This is the fallacy of "insisting that where two saying that they are like secondary qualities in in appear to be inconsistent, one of passages an author modem (Lockean) philosophy and physics, these passages has to be so interpreted that the apparent inconsistency is resolved" (Flew, 1969, p. in the mind rather than qualities in 65). Of course, one must also be careful to avoid the objects (Treatise, p. 469). The problem with practice of Hubristic Restraint, which makes one's this analogy is that Hume has already, in book own good sense the measure of an author's con- 1 (Treatise, pp. 226-31), presented very strong sistency. arguments against the intelligibility of the 8What follows is greatly indebted to the presenta- distinction between primary and secondary tion of Harrison (1976). Both arguments are de- qualities. This inconsistency suggests a very veloped in concise form on pp. 457-58 of the serious difficulty in Hume's account of the Treatise. nature of our moral judgments. Is there any 9This similarity is noted and exploited to a very Humean way around it? different end (that of showing that Aristotle is really a I believe that there is; it lies in noting that Humean subjectivist malgre lui) by Irwin (1975). moral judgments are not, for Hume, the only 74 The AmericanPolitical Science Review Vol. 74 judgments which are internal, not derived from those probabilistic judgments to which causal reason, and yet corrigible and subject to criti- beliefs become attached, providing a set of cism by experience and reflection. These char- general rules of inductive method (Treatise, pp. acteristics also apply to our judgments of 173-75) by which we can "learn to distinguish efficient causal necessity, whose critique forms the accidental circumstances from the effica- the subject of book 1 of the Treatise. 10 This cious causes," and so avoid erroneous judg- analogy has been traced in detail by Lewis ments like those expressed in the prejudices White Beck (1974), who argues that the gap that "an Irishman cannot have wit, and a between is and ought is, for Hume, the same as Frenchman cannot have solidity" (Treatise, pp. the gap between was and must be. Hume's 149, 146, emphasis in original).12 Although critique of consists of showing that all causal judgments are not themselves derived causal judgments arise from two interacting from or by reasoning, accurate and careful elements: our probabilistic reasoning concern- reasoning concerning those probabilistic in- ing the connections among events (Treatise, pp. ferences on which causal beliefs depend can 180-8 1), and the supervenient belief that improve the of those beliefs and enable future events will (or "must be") connected in us to reject mistaken causal systems and claims. the same way that similar events have been in Moral judgments guide conduct and are not our past experience. Much of book 1 is devoted derived from abstract reason; moral obligations to an account of the conditions under which we are not entailed by "the discovery of certain come to experience causal judgments (showing connexions and relations of ideas, which are that they are derived from custom and habit, eternal, immutable, and universally obligatory" rather than reason), just as much of book 3 is (Treatise, p. 496). But all moral judgments devoted to an account of the conditions under (whether "artificial" or "natural") contain or which we experience moral judgments 1 (show- are supervenient on causal probabilistic claims ing that they are derived from sympathy, rather that certain dispositions or characters tend to than reason). A good way of summarizing the promote the interests of society or mankind, similarities between causal and moral judgments just as causal scientific claims are supervenient is to note that, for Hume, both can be on probabilistic judgments that some events understood on the model of aesthetic apprecia- regularly precede other events (Treatise, p. 579; tion, as matters of taste (Treatise, pp. 103, 462, Beck, 1974, p. 221). Thus it makes perfect 547n., 577, 581-82);Morals, p. 6). Humean sense to say that there can be "fatal But to say that they are matters of taste is errors in our conduct" and in the desires and not at all to say that they are strictly subjective moral judgments which produce that conduct and incorrigible; there is a real (not only a (Treatise, p. 538). Furthermore, while reason conventional) between good and bad alone has no power to direct our action, taste (Treatise, p. 472), and similarly a dif- "reason -and judgment may, indeed, be the ference between good and bad causal judg- mediate cause of an action, by prompting, or ments, or between good and bad science. Book by directing a passion" (Treatise, p. 462). 1 of the Treatise is by no means a blanket This position is expressed with even greater indictment of all inductive causal inference as clarity in the first section of the second unreasonable. It also contains a lengthy analysis Inquiry, where Hume says that even though of the ways in which we can correct errors in reason cannot be the proximate cause of any action, and thus cannot take the place of moral sentiments, "in order to pave the way for such 10Compare the language of the is/ought passage a sentiment and give a proper discernment of its with the following statement on p. 134 of the object, it is often necessary, we find, that much Treatise: ". . . let men be once fully convinced of reasoning should precede, that nice distinctions these two principles [that 'cause' is not in any object, conclusions drawn, distant com- and that there is no reason for inferring causality from be made, just constant conjunction, and this will throw them so parisons formed, complicated relations ex- loose from all common systems, that they will make amined, and general facts fixed and ascer- no difficulty of receiving any, which may appear the tained" (Morals, p. 6).1 3 To say that reason is a most extraordinary." III think, however, that it is misleading to say, with Ardal (1966, p. 195), that this is Hume's "chief 12 objective" in book 3. Harrison's conclusion that Hume I am guided here by Cassidy (1977). was asking a moral question, rather than a psycho- 13See also Morals, p. 105: "Reason, when fully logical or sociological one (at least, given twentieth- assisted and improved, is sufficient to instruct us in century definitions of these ), seems nearer the the pernicious or useful tendency of qualities and mark (1976, pp. 122-23). actions, but it is not alone sufficient to produce any 1980 "Cool Reflexion"and the Criticismof Values 75

mediate cause of conduct is surely to say much tions from the perspective of the interests of more than that reason is simply instrumental, mankind. A necessary condition for adequate nothing more than a calculation of the best reflection of this kind is the intercourse of means to an end independently and irrationally sentiments in society, which is made possible established by passion. Reasoning can ascertain by sympathy, and which enables us to say that general facts concerning human need or in- "X is good" instead of "X pleases me" (Trea- terest, and draw inferences concerning the tise, pp. 574-91; Beck, 1974, p. 226). Genuine dispositions and customs which tend to pro- moral judgments are not produced indepen- mote this interest. Hume's social science is itself dently or spontaneously by asocial individuals, a critique of those practical reasonings which but emerge only in the process of expressing are implicit in various customs and moral and comparing views about how best to solve systems, and not simply an account of the common human problems, and to satisfy shared conditions under which such systems arise. human needs (Morals, pp. 94-9 5). This is the There are two general classes of errors which function of language and reason, and is not can result in unsatisfactory moral judgments: merely instrumental or subsequent to moral errors concerning the basic human needs judgment, but is in an important sense at least (which, according to Hume, are the needs for partially constitutive of such judgments. peace and liberty in general, and the stability of But sociality is not a sufficient condition for possessions in particular), and errors concerning the production of praiseworthy moral senti- the rules and dispositions which best satisfy ments. Hume does not claim that all misplaced those needs. The two great sources of both moral judgments can be attributed to inade- types of error are a priori moral systems which quate socialization. He would not, I think, distort our view of the observable facts con- reject the Aristotelian observation that it is cerning human needs (Morals, p. 8) and our possible to be both a good citizen and a not so natural tendency to mistake judgments about good human , and he is surely neither a our own interests for genuine moral judgments: conventionalist nor a cultural relativist.14 The "There is no quality in human nature, which most striking evidence for this is his consistent causes more fatal errors in our conduct, than criticism of the praise generally given to hero- that which leads us to prefer whatever is ism, military glory, and courage in general: present to the distant and remote, and makes us "Heroism, or military glory, is much admir'd by desire objects more according to their situation the generality of mankind. They consider it as than their intrinsic value" (Treatise, p. 538). the most sublime kind of merit. Men of cool These sources of error are precisely analo- reflexion are not so sanguine in their praises of gous to the two sources of mistakes concerning it. The infinite confusions and disorder, which inductive inferences. The first error can be it has caus'd in the world, diminish much of its corrected by insisting on the importance of fact merit in their eyes" (Treatise, pp. 600-01). and observation in practical reasoning, as in Similarly, those societies and cultures which science. The second involves the question of the seem to equate courage and virtue, like the proper perspective from which moral judgments Roman Republic and Homeric Greece (Morals, can be made, and is the same as the problem pp. 79-80), are subject to criticism on the relative to "our judgments concerning external grounds that their judgments of value are bodies" in natural science (Treatise, p. 603). informed by a mistaken conception of real Our moral judgments will be free from implicit human needs and interests. At something like errors to the extent that they are informed by a the other extreme, the "monkish ," such process of reflection which enables us to celibacy, self-denial, humility, and solitude, consider the value of characters and disposi- are contrary to reason and will everywhere be rejected by "men of sense" (Morals, p. 91). The moral blame or approbation." There are important doubts about the propriety of using the to 14Nor is he guilty of the ethnocentrist view that all solve interpretive difficulties in the Treatise (see Ardal, societies are fundamentally like England and France, 1966, pp. 2-3), since in many respects the Inquiries in spite of some well-known passages such as the are intended by Hume to smooth over perplexities following from section 8 of the first Inquiry (Under- that are squarely faced in the Treatise. The elimination standing, p. 93): "Mankind are so much the same, in of the doctrine of sympathy from the second Inquiry all times and places, that informs us of nothing is but one instance of this. I have tried to deal with new or strange in this particular." See also Morals, p. these problems by citing the Inquiries only when there 33. The position that Hume was very sensitive to is, to my mind, clear agreement between them and the cultural differences as well as uniformities has been Treatise. effectively set forth by Forbes (1975, pp. 102-21). 76 The AmericanPolitical Science Review Vol. 74

language of a culture is a necessary condition preestablished harmony between our moral for the emergence of impartial moral judg- judgments and their objects similar to that ments, but that language may reflect mistaken between our causal judgments and the course of perceptions of human needs and the qualities nature (An Inquiry Concerning Human Under- which serve them and so issue in defective standing, p. 67; Beck, 1974, p. 225). But moral judgments or cultural values. whatever the merit of these sketchy attempts at Nor does Hume hold that moral controver- reconciling genuine interest and general opin- sies can be resolved by determining what moral ion,15 they should not be allowed to obscure views are held by most humans most of the the fact that, for Hume, a great part of the task time. Thus I think Harrison is mistaken in of the social scientist is to criticize ill-founded arguing that Hume believed that moral ques- moral or political judgments and to suggest tions can be settled by carefully observing what revisions in them wherever possible.1 6 things people actually approve of (1976, p. 123). Nonetheless, it is true that Hume often suggests that common moral opinion is the authoritative standard for resolving moral and Conclusion political disputes: "The general opinion of mankind has some authority in all cases; but in A genuinely Humean social science would this of morals 'tis perfectly infallible" (Treatise, indeed be concerned with the analysis of p. 552; see also Treatise, p. 547n.). Similarly, in certain kinds of facts, and not with exhorting "Of The Original Contract" he says that "in all its audience to be virtuous after one fashion or questions with regard to morals . . . there is another: the social scientist is not a poet or a really no other standard [other than an appeal painter (Understanding, p. 15). Nor is it his to general opinion] by which any controversy function to deduce obligatory duties from can ever be decided" (Aiken, 1948, p . 371 ). At supposedly eternal factual verities. But it would the same time, he states with equal clarity, be a one-sided and thus a misleading account of frequency, and force that the basic standard or Hume's social science to say that it simply fact in terms of which values may be criticized treats values as phenomena to be described and is the substantive one of true human interest, explained by reference to the conditions which rather than the procedural (and indeterminate) produce them. Rather, the work of the best standard of what most people take that interest social science will be to ascertain as clearly as to be: "In all determinations of morality ... possible those fundamental though contingent the question cannot, by any means, be decided facts which define human needs and interests, with greater than by ascertaining, on and to examine, methodically and reflectively, any side, the true interests of mankind" (Mor- the inferences from these facts which are als, pp. 12-13, see also Treatise, p. 562). implicit in judgments of value, and upon which As his discussion of courage and glory such judgments are superimposed by our pas- suggests, Hume is clearly aware that there may sionate and sympathetic concern with the be disputes between the generality of mankind interests of mankind. Hume's social science is on the one hand and persons of sense and cool thus both factual and critical; its subject matter reflection on the other concerning which quali- is composed of facts and inferences, but its ties should be called virtuous; and Hume leaves conclusions are anything but value-neutral. no doubt as to whose opinion should be Thus social science must be objectively critical favored in such controversies. His ambivalence in a way that is perfectly consistent with the about affirming that there is an objective moral is/ought distinction, and, ironically enough, standard whose existence does not depend critical in a way that a rigid and only super- upon consent or may well be caused ficially Humean separation of fact and value by the fact that the human interest or the would exclude from the practice of social human good is a sort of final cause, and Hume's science. rejection of the intelligibility of teleological analysis is a central tenet of his empiricist (Treatise, p. 171). He sometimes 1 5They seem to be more aprioristic than the attempts to resolve possible discrepancies be- teleology whose rejection occasions them. tween real human interest and opinions con- 16A brief set of such criticisms and proposals for cerning that interest by suggesting that the revision is presented in Morals, pp. 12-14, where moral judgments of societies have progressively Hume argues that from the perspective of the true improved from uncultivated times to the pre- human interest, alms-giving, tyrannicide, and the sent (Morals, p. 79; Forbes, 1975, pp. 87-89), liberality of princes are not virtues, and that luxury is and even, perhaps, by hinting that there is a no vice. 1980 "Cool Reflexion"and the Criticismof Values 77

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