Bryn Mawr College Scholarship, Research, and Creative Work at Bryn Mawr College Political Science Faculty Research and Scholarship Political Science 1980 "Cool Reflexion" and the Criticism of Values: Is, Ought, and Objectivity in Hume's Social Science Stephen G. Salkever Bryn Mawr College, [email protected] Let us know how access to this document benefits ouy . Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.brynmawr.edu/polisci_pubs Part of the Political Science Commons Custom Citation Salkever, Stephen G. "'Cool Reflexion' and the Criticism of Values: Is, Ought, and Objectivity in Hume's Social Science." American Political Science Review 74 (1980): 70-77. This paper is posted at Scholarship, Research, and Creative Work at Bryn Mawr College. http://repository.brynmawr.edu/polisci_pubs/17 For more information, please contact [email protected]. "Cool Reflexion"and the Criticismof Values: Is, Ought,and Objectivityin Hume's SocialScience STEPHENG. SALKEVER Bryn MawrCollege Is the fact/value distinction incompatiblewith the possibility of a social science which is both objectiveand evaluative(or normative)?Does support of the latterrequire rejection of the former and vice versa? This article presents an indirect argument against the incompatibilityof the fact/value distinction and an objectively evaluativesocial science. My procedureis to show that David Hume, whose is/ought distinction is the locus classicusof the fact/value distinction, is committed both to the view that valuescannot be derivedfrom facts and to the view that social science is not (and should not be) value-neutral.Furthermore, Hume's position is free from any logical flaws. My conclusion is that it is false to say that the fact/value distinction entails a value-neutralsocial science, and that it is thereforeutterly unnecessaryfor criticsof such a science to waste their time attemptingto "bridgethe gap" betweenfacts and values. Perhaps the most powerful, and surely the analysis as the most obscure classical text.1 most famous, argument for the exclusion of Although on first inspection "Hume's "Guillo- moral predicates from social scientific discus- tine" seems to bring about a clean separation sion is contained in David Hume's is/ought between facts and values, a closer look reveals distinction, which occurs in A Treatise of ambiguities. The interpretive difficulties arise Human Nature (pp. 469-70). In this much- when Hume says that it "seems altogether disputed passage, Hume appears to claim that inconceivable, how this new relation [the ought ought propositions cannot be deduced from is proposition] can be a deduction from others [is propositions, and that it is therefore a logical propositions] which are entirely different from error to claim that moral distinctions or judg- it" (Black, 1969, p. 100, emphasis added). ments can be derived from reason. The question When Hume says that such a deduction "seems is this: does Hume's "celebrated observation" altogether inconceivable," is he ironically ex- (Hare, 1964, p. 29) that ought cannot be pressing the view that it really is inconceivable, deduced from is require the conclusion that or only stating a difficult problem to be solved ought propositions are not subject to criticism by the rest of book 3 of the Treatise? And and revision on rational grounds (in the way when he says "deduction," does he mean strict that descriptive or explanatory propositions logical entailment (in which case some other may be criticized) and so must be excluded form of inference from fact to value might be from any objective and rigorous social science? possible) or any inference whatsoever (in which My argument will be that Hume does not draw case the gap between fact and value would be this conclusion, and that his rejection of value- absolutely unbridgeable)? Furthermore, how neutrality as a goal of social science is not radical is the break with earlier moral and inconsistent with his rejection on logical political philosophy proposed by the is/ought grounds of the deduction of ought from is, of distinction? In the same paragraph, Hume says value from fact. that he is both exposing a defect in "every One further preliminary distinction is re- system of morality" and that his distinction quired here: in speaking of Hume's implicit "wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morali- criticism of value-neutrality I am not claiming, ty"; that these expressions are not synonymous for Hume or in general, that objectivity is is suggested by Hume's frequent separation of enhanced insofar as the social scientist holds learned and vulgar judgments.2 certain values at the outset of his or her inquiry (Miller, 1979). Rather, my contention is that the conclusion of such inquiry will be the 1The first important demonstration of the difficul- evaluation or criticism of values, rather than the ties that emerge from a careful reading of the passage description or explanation of moral and cul- was that of McIntyre (1969), to whom my own tural judgments in value-neutral terms (see discussion of Hume owes a great deal. Gibson, 1977). 20ne possible resolution of this difficulty would be The is/ought passage itself has been, in the to suggest that Hume was opposed to all "systems" in last 20 years, the object of as much close science, on the grounds that they distorted our view of 70 1980 "Cool Reflexion"and the Criticismof Values 71 The meaning of the is/ought passage is of in terms of their rationality. more than simply exegetical concern insofar as Nevertheless, the bulk of Hume's social it squarely raises the issue of whether Hume's science in book 3 of the Treatise is as much distinction can be used as a warrant for concerned with justification and evaluation as it claiming that values or moral propositions is with the explanation of moral phenomena. (unlike factual beliefs) are not subject to Hume does of course spend a good deal of time rational defense or criticism. If so, then such explaining how human beings come to have propositions should be excluded from that those peculiar sensations which we call praise "science of man" (Treatise, p. xxii) whose and blame; this explanation revolves around his foundation on an objective basis forms the goal account of the process of communicated affec- of the Treatise as a whole. Since the disputed tions which he calls sympathy (Treatise, p. passage is not self-explanatory, any attempt to 576). But he also wants to answer the substan- deal with this question must look beyond it to tive moral question of what virtue (and parti- Hume's own practice of social science in book cularly, justice) is, as well as the psychological 3. question of how we come to call certain phenomena (or characters) virtuous or vicious. Hume's Practice of Social Science Justice, according to Hume, is defined by the three fundamental laws of stability of Many of Hume's most famous logical and possession, translation by consent, and the psychological doctrines and aphorisms suggest performance of promises (Treatise, p. 541). His the conclusion that moral judgments are not argument that this conception of justice can be susceptible of rational evaluation. Moral judg- justified by reference to a particular conception ments are constituted by a feeling or sentiment, of the facts which constitute the human condi- and are not conclusions of reason (Treatise, pp. tion and general human interest is too well 471, 457). Reasoning is always subsequent to a known to require extensive summary here (see determination of the passions, and so can never McIntyre, 1969, pp. 39-42). The basic fact or judge them: "Reason is, and ought only to be major premise of the argument is that human the slave of the passions" (Treatise, p. 415). beings, unlike any other animals, are creatures Actions, which are to be construed as reflec- of numberless needs and slender resources, and tions of moral principles, can be called laudable that it is by the conventions of social organiza- or blameworthy, "but they cannot be reason- tion alone that man is "able to supply his able or unreasonable" (Treatise, pp. 477, 458). defects" (Treatise, pp. 484-85). The gravest of Passionate preferences appear to be similarly these defects is the instability and uncertainty closed to rational critique: " 'Tis not contrary "of such possessions as we have acquir'd by our to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole industry or good fortune," and it is this world to the scratching of my finger" (Treatise, particular defect (rather than, say, our capacity p. 416). All this suggests that it would be for vice, as for Aristotle) which provides the plausible to attribute to Humne a sort of problem to which the conventions of society pre-Stevensonian emotivism,3 and to conclude and justice are the solution (Treatise, pp. 487, that while social science may indeed explain 491). and classify moral judgments it should avoid Thus far we are dealing only with Hume's the inappropriate evaluation of such judgments conception of the facts, and with the process of reasoning or drawing inferences from one set of facts to another: from the defining character- istics of the human condition to those conven- the evidence (An Inquiry Conceming the Principles of tions and rules which are best suited to solving Morals, p. 8), a view which was almost a commonplace the problems implicit in these characteristics. in eighteenth-century discussions of science. (For a This inference is sufficient to defend Hume's discussion of a similarly critical response to "system" conception of justice as a more reasonable in Rousseau and Buffon, see Salkever, 1978, pp. solution to the human problem than its com- 216-17.) However, since Hume does refer to his own work as a "system of .ethics" (Treatise, p.