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Ethics for A-Level For AQA and OCR Religious Studies

MARK DIMMOCK AND ANDREW FISHER To access digital resources including: blog posts videos online appendices

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Ethics for A-Level

Mark Dimmock and Andrew Fisher https://www.openbookpublishers.com

© 2017 Mark Dimmock and Andrew Fisher

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Printed in the United Kingdom, United States, and Australia by Lightning Source for Open Book Publishers (Cambridge, UK) Contents

PREFACE 1 1. Exam Specification Details 1 2. Book Structure 1 References 2

INTRODUCTION 3 1. Philosophy, Ethics and Thinking 3 2. Respecting Ethics 3 3. The A-Level Student 4 4. Doing Ethics Well: Legality versus 5 5. Doing Ethics Well: Prudential Reasons versus 5 Moral Reasons 6. Doing Ethics Well: Prescriptive versus Descriptive 6 Claims 7. Doing Ethics Well: Thought-Experiments 6 8. Doing Ethics Well: Understanding Disagreement 7 Summary 7 Questions and Tasks 8 References 8

PART I ETHICS

CHAPTER 1 11 1. Utilitarianism: An Introduction 11 2. 11 3. Nozick’s Machine 12 4. The Foundations of Bentham’s Utilitarianism 13 5. The Structure of Bentham’s Utilitarianism 14 6. Hedonic Calculus 15 7. Problems with Bentham’s Utilitarianism 16 8. Mill’s Utilitarian Proof 20 9. Mill’s Qualitative Utilitarianism 21 10. Mill’s versus Bentham’s Act 22 Utilitarianism 11. Strong versus Weak Rule Utilitarianism 23 12. Comparing the Classical Utilitarians 24 13. Non-Hedonistic Contemporary Utilitarianism: 24 and Preference Utilitarianism Summary 26 Common Student Mistakes 26 Issues to Consider 26 Key Terminology 27 References 28

CHAPTER 2 31 1. An Introduction to Kantian Ethics 31 2. Some Key Ideas 32 3. Acting for the Sake of and Acting in 33 Accordance with Duty 4. Categorical and Hypothetical Imperatives 34 5. The First Formulation of the Categorical 36 Imperative 6. Perfect and Imperfect 37 7. Second Formulation of the 38 8. The Third Formulation of the Categorical 38 Imperative and Summary 9. Kant on Suicide 39 10. Problems and Responses: Conflicting Duties 42 11. Problems and Responses: The Role of Intuitions 43 12. Problem and Responses: Categorical Imperatives 43 and Etiquette 13. Problems and Responses: The Domain of Morality 44 Summary 45 Common Student Mistakes 45 Issues to Consider 45 Key Terminology 46 References 47 CHAPTER 3 ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS 49 1. Aristotelian Introduction 49 2. The Function Argument 49 3. Aristotelian Goodness 50 4. and Virtue 51 5. Developing the 54 6. Practical Wisdom () 55 7. Voluntary Actions, Involuntary Actions and Moral 56 Responsibility 8. Objection: Unclear Guidance 58 9. Objection: Clashing Virtues 59 10. Objection: Circularity 59 11. Objection: Contribution to Eudaimonia 59 12. Moral and Individual Good 61 Summary 62 Common Student Mistakes 62 Issues to Consider 62 Key Terminology 63 References 63

CHAPTER 4 AQUINAS’S 65 1. Introduction to Aquinas 65 2. Motivating Natural Law Theory: The Euthyphro 65 Dilemma and 3. Natural Law Theory 66 4. Summary of Aquinas’s Natural Law Theory 70 5. Putting this into Practice: The Doctrine of Double 70 Effect (DDE) 6. Some Thoughts about Natural Law Theory 73 Summary 75 Common Student Mistakes 75 Issues to Consider 75 Key Terminology 76 References 77 CHAPTER 5 FLETCHER’S SITUATION ETHICS 79 1. Situation Ethics Introduction 79 2. Fletcher’s Overall Framework 80 3. The Four Working of Situationism 81 4. How to Work out What to Do: as a 83 Verb not a Noun 5. The Six of Situation Ethics 83 6. Problems with Fletcher’s Situationism 86 Summary 88 Common Student Mistakes 88 Issues to Consider 88 Key Terminology 89 References 89

PART II METAETHICS

CHAPTER 6 METAETHICAL 93 1. Metaethics: Introduction 93 2. The of Metaethics 94 3. versus Non-Cognitivism 95 4. Realism versus Anti-Realism 98 5. The Metaethical Map 99 6. Cognitivist and Realist Theory One: 100 7. Objections to Naturalism 102 8. Cognitivist and Realist Theory Two: 104 Non-Naturalism 9. Objections to Intuitionism 105 10. Cognitivist and Anti-Realist Theory One: Moral 106 Error Theory 11. Objections to Moral Error Theory 110 12. Non-Cognitivism 111 13. Non-Cognitivist and Anti-Realist Theory One: 112 14. Objections to Emotivism 113 15. Non-Cognitivist and Anti-Realist Theory Two: 115 Prescriptivism 16. Objections to Prescriptivism 115 Summary 116 Common Student Mistakes 117 Issues to Consider 117 Key Terminology 118 References 119

PART III

CHAPTER 7 123 1. Euthanasia Introduction 123 2. Key Terms 123 3. Case One: Persistent Vegetative State 125 4. Case Two: Incurable and Terminal Illness 125 5. Pro-Euthanasia: Argument One 126 6. Pro-Euthanasia: Argument Two 128 7. Pro-Euthanasia: Argument Three 130 8. Anti-Euthanasia: Argument One 132 9. Anti-Euthanasia: Argument Two 132 10. Anti-Euthanasia: Argument Three 133 11. Anti-Euthanasia: Argument Four 135 12. Allowing versus Doing 136 Summary 138 Common Student Mistakes 138 Issues to Consider 139 Key Terminology 139 References 140

CHAPTER 8 143 1. Introduction to Business Ethics 143 2. Employers and Employees 145 3. Businesses and Customers 147 4. A Business and the Environment 149 5. Business and Globalization 151 Summary 152 Common Student Mistakes 153 Issues to Consider 153 Key Terminology 154 References 154 CHAPTER 9 CONSCIENCE 157 1. Introduction 157 2. The History of Conscience 158 3. Aquinas on Conscience 160 4. Freud and the Conscience 161 5. Freud’s Psychosexual Development Theory 163 Summary 165 Common Student Mistakes 165 Issues to Consider 166 Key Terminology 166 References 167

CHAPTER 10 169 1. Introduction 169 2. What Is It to “Have Sex”? 170 3. Natural Law and Sex 171 4. Kant and Sex 173 5. Sex and Utilitarianism 175 6. Sex and the Virtue Theory 176 Summary 178 Common Student Mistakes 178 Issues to Consider 179 Key Terminology 179 References 180

CHAPTER 11 STEALING 183 1. Stealing: Introduction 183 2. Defining Stealing 183 3. Kantian Ethics on Stealing 184 4. Act and Preference Utilitarianism on Stealing 187 5. Rule Utilitarianism on Stealing 190 6. Virtue Ethics on Stealing 191 7. Metaethics and Stealing 193 Summary 195 Common Student Mistakes 195 Issues to Consider 195 Key Terminology 196 References 196

CHAPTER 12 SIMULATED KILLING 199 1. Introduction 199 2. Utilitarianism and Simulated Killing 201 3. The Kantian and the Virtue Ethics Approach 203 4. Films and Plays 203 5. The Paradox of Tragedy (or More Correctly the 204 Paradox of “Negative Emotions”) Summary 205 Common Student Mistakes 206 Issues to Consider 206 Key Terminology 207 References 207

CHAPTER 13 TELLING LIES 209 1. Introduction 209 2. What Is It to Lie? 209 3. Utilitarianism 211 4. The Kantian and Lying 213 5. Some Final Thoughts about the Political Context 214 Summary 214 Common Student Mistakes 215 Issues to Consider 215 Key Terminology 216 References 216

CHAPTER 14 EATING ANIMALS 219 1. Eating Animals Introduction 219 2. Justifying Meat Eating 219 3. 221 4. Challenges to Bentham 223 5. Utilitarian Reasons for Eating Animals 224 6. Kantian Ethics and Eating Animals 226 7. Virtue Ethics and Eating Animals 227 8. 229 Summary 232 Common Student Mistakes 232 Issues to Consider 233 Key Terminology 233 References 234

GLOSSARY 235 Preface

1. Exam Specification Details

This book deals with the Ethics components of AQA Philosophy and OCR Religious Studies. It has been written in line with these specifications, covering the material necessary in a way that, we hope, is engaging for students, teachers and anyone interested in understanding ethical study. Some chapters are, therefore, directly relevant only to one of these two courses. Students studying Ethics as part of OCR Religious Studies do not need to read about the ethics of simulated killing, while students studying AQA Philosophy do not need to consider Natural Law or Situation Ethics. This is not to say that there is not, we hope, some independent value in engaging with these chapters as part of your wider reading. However, the split is not always so clear. Both OCR and AQA require students to engage with the theory of Utilitarianism, for example. However, the specifications differ slightly and so not all of the content is relevant to all students; relevance depend on the course sat. We suggest two options in dealing with this: • Early on in your course — engage with the content in the chapter regardless of your specification. This should give you a full and informed context in which to evaluate the theory. • Later in your course and nearer exams — use your specification to focus on the exact content that may figure in your exam. Your teacher is best placed to advise you on this.

2. Book Structure

In writing this book we followed Andrew Fisher’s approach of focusing on the judgement of the student in evaluating when they are being taught effectively.1 We take the student as authoritative on this matter; we want to create an “engaged” student. To this end we include ways that students can check their judgements on whether the material has taught them anything or not. For example, we include sections on “Common Student Mistakes”, “Issues to Consider” and “Key Terminology” within every chapter.

1 This approach can also be found in: Fisher and Tallant, How to Get Philosophy Students Talking. Following the specification requirements of AQA and OCR, the book deals with , then Metaethics and finally Applied Ethics. What is the ? Consider an analogy put forward by Andrew Fisher (2011).2 Imagine that ethics is like football. • The normative is like a referee interested in the rules governing play. What interests him is the general theories that govern our moral behaviour; how do we work out what is right and what is wrong? • The metaethicist is like a football commentator. What interests her is how the very practice of ethics works. For example, the metaethicist might discuss how people use moral language; or comment on the psychology of immoral people; or ask whether moral properties exist. • The Applied are like the players. They “get their hands [or feet] dirty”. They take the general rules of normative ethics and “play” under them. What interests them is how we should act in specific areas. For example, how should we deal with issues like meat-eating, euthanasia or stealing?

So guided by the AQA and OCR exam specifications, you will find various normative theories explained. You will then find those theories applied to real life examples. Sandwiched between these is the Metaethics chapter which asks: “But what is ethical practice?” With all three types of ethics covered we hope to provide a good grounding in ethics, both in terms of content and a general philosophical approach. Where possible we give as many examples as possible and avoid technical jargon, although sometimes we need to use specific philosophical terms. With this in mind we have included an extensive Glossary at the end of the volume. Our hope is that you will feel able to pick up this book dip into it, or read it from cover to cover. Whatever you choose we hope you’ll gain confidence with the content needed for your exams, that you practice and strengthen your ability to think with clear reasoning and with justification about the topics covered, and get as excited and fascinated by ethics as we are.

References

Fisher, Andrew, Metaethics: An Introduction (Oxford: Routledge, 2011), https:// doi.org/10.1017/upo9781844652594 ―, and Tallant, Jonathan, How to Get Students Talking: An Instructors Toolkit (Oxford: Routledge, 2015), https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315670645

2 Fisher, Metaethics, pp. 1–4. Introduction

1. Philosophy, Ethics and Thinking

Philosophy is hard. Part of the reason it can feel so annoying is because it seems like it should not be hard. After all, philosophy just involves thinking, and we all think — thinking is easy! We do it without…well, thinking. Yet philosophy involves not just thinking, but thinking well. Of course it is true that we all think. But thinking, like football, maths, baking and singing is something we can get better at. Unfortunately, people rarely ask how. If you do not believe us, then just open your eyes. might be a whole lot better off if we thought well, more often. Admittedly, doing A-Level Philosophy will not give you the ability to solve the problems of the world; we are not that naive! But if you engage with philosophy, then you will be developing yourself as a thinker who thinks well. This is why A-Level Philosophy is useful not merely to would-be philosophers, but also to any would be thinkers, perhaps heading off to make decisions in law, medicine, structural engineering — just about anything that requires you to think effectively and clearly. However, if Philosophy is hard, then Ethics is really hard. This might seem unlikely at first glance. After all, Ethics deals with issues of right and wrong, and we have been discussing “what is right” and “what is wrong” since we were children. , on the other hand, deals with topics like the nature of consciousness, while deals with the nature of itself. Indeed, compared to understanding a lecture in the , arguing about the ethics of killing in video games might seem something of a walk in the park. This is misleading, not because other areas of philosophy are easy, but because the complexity of ethics is well camouflaged.

2. Respecting Ethics

When you study A-Level Ethics, and you evaluate what is right and wrong, it can be tempting and comforting to spend time simply defending your initial views; few people would come to a debate about vegetarianism, or , without some pre-existing . If you are open-minded in your ethical approach then you need not reject everything you currently believe, but you Introduction 4 A-Level studentneeds to domore than simplyregurgitateinformationinorder yourself why someone, presumably just as intellectually proficient asyourself, yourself whysomeone,presumablyjustasintellectually you studyphilosophy you areenteringadialoguewiththose that have gone Philosophy, and in particularEthics, is a live and evolving subject. When Philosophy ismore than justfact-learning, ora“historyofideas”. It isdifferent For truesuccess, ethics requires intellectual respect. If youmightthinkthata from chemistry, mathematics, languages, theologyetc. It is unique. Sure, it is for thebeliefsyouhave. Itisthephilosopher’s job,whatever beliefsyouhave, 3. The A-Level Student to ask things have theirplace,we didnotwant thereadertothinkthatthey have to becomecleareraboutwhat to bothmaneuverer pasttheexamhurdlesandtobecomeabetter ethicist. topic see learnt philosophyifthey knowwhatisintheboxes. particular position is obviously false, perhaps take this reactionasaredflag, particular positionisobviouslyfalse,perhapstake cannot findsuchgoodreasons.Invirtueofthis,youareproviding reason. Presumablyitmighttastenicetoeatyourpetcat,orneighbour, reasons foryourviews,andbepreparedtorethinkthoseviewswhereyou it tastes nice it tastes or your dead aunt; but in thesecasesthe“tastejustification”seemstotally or yourdeadaunt;but important to learn some facts, and learn what others believed,to learnsomefacts,andwhat important a successful but unimportant! Thedetailsofthisdebatearenotrelevant here(formoreonthis it maysuggestthatyouhave missed some important stepof an argument —ask is wrong?Ifyouthinkthatgivingtocharitygood,whatdoes“good”mean? might have once acceptedthatposition. boxes”, orstatementsof biographyconcerningthescholars. Although these before you.Learningaboutwhatvariouswill enableyou philosophersthink beliefs anditisthephilosopher’s jobtoreveal andanalysethem. beliefs? enquiry commences. should see these beliefs as 1 You willnoticethatinthisbookwe have notincluded“hintsandtips If youarethinkingwell asanethicist,thenyouarelikelytohave good For example,imaginethereason that youbelieve itis OK toeatmeatis that For example,whydo you thinkthateatinganimals is OK, orthatabortion One aim of this book is to aid you in engaging with alivingdiscipline. One aimofthisbookistoaidyouinengaging For an excellent introduction togood andbadwaysFor anexcellent we ofthinking recommendJohnHospers,‘An Introduction toPhilosophical Analysis’. why Chapter 14 youholdthosebeliefs.What . As philosopherswegood this isnotaparticularly cansaythat

). Thepointisthatthere starting points you thinkandaddtothatevolvingdialogue. , orbasecamps, from which your reasons are goodandbadreasons might youhave forthose 1

justification forour you need to be authentic with yourselfandtoaskwhat you needtobeauthentic Reasons which are 4. DoingEthicsWell: Legalityversus Morality University! IdidUtilitarianismat A-Level, canIhave something differentto Prudential reasonsrelatetoourpersonal fordoingthings. Moral questions are distinct from legal questions, although, of course, moral that to“do”ethicsisrememberinformation.Thatwhyastudentcan the fact that it supported the economy as a reason to keep it. It is true, of It is true, it. economy asareasontokeep it supportedthe that fact the the land. It is quite easy to see why. Imagine a country which has a set of actions 5. DoingEthicsWell: PrudentialReasonsversus Moral does nothelp uswiththemoralquestion ofslavery. We wouldsay“OK,but discussions about ethics do be wary of talking aboutlegalissues. Much more answer whethersomething is morally right or wrong bylookingtothelaws of as aguidetocriticallyanalysetheideaslearnedandleadyourselfyour arguments. But philosophy is not likethis. In order to understand philosophy cannot reduce to a few key facts, or a simplistic noting of what otherpeople course, thatthisisareason; itisaprudentialreason,particularlyforthose who often thannot,suchpointswillbeirrelevant. own justifiableconclusion. Philosophyisalivinganddynamicsubject thatwe one oftheauthorshastaughtethicsatuniversity formanyyears. Philosophy used exampleofNaziGermanybringstomind this distinction.Therefore,in unacceptable mightmeanthatwe have alawagainstit.Butitisunhelpfulto issues might have some implications forthelaw.Thatchild labour ismorally us, nothing hangson the difference between them. In this bookyouwill see us have said. benefited from slavery such as traders or plantation owners. Yet, such a reason switching between theterms, sodonotgethunguponthisdistinction. say theyhave “doneUtilitarianism”.Theyhave learntsomekeyfactsand study, please?” students often say something likethis:“I thought we’d do hard stuff at students tolosesome of their less academically successful habits. Why?Well, so whatifit helps theeconomy!Isit rightorwrong?” Something tokeepseparatearemoralreasons and This statementreveals awholehostofthings.Mostimportantisthe view In ,university Philosophydepartmentsoftenworkwithfirstyear Consider someexamples. Whendefendingslavery, peopleusedtocite Some peopledistinguishbetweenWe “ethics”and“morality”. donot.For legally acceptable, but morally unacceptableorviceversa —the well- you prudential think, using this think, reasons.

Introduction 5 Introduction 6 You willalsobeaware, especiallyinreadingthisbook,ofthephilosophical Another importantdistinctionisbetween 7. DoingEthicsWell: Thought-Experiments What does this tell us about whetheritis right or wrong to eat humans alive? This is sometimes referred toas the “is/ought”gap.We returntothisinlater will tellsuswhetheractingviolentlytowards peoplewearing redtrousersis Nothing. 6. DoingEthicsWell: Prescriptive versus Descriptive Claims fanciful, examplesthataredesignedtoaidourthinking aboutanissue. find iteasytoeatmeat,andmighteven explainwhywe likeeating meat. them morefrequently,and theyareoftenabitmorebizarre. that usesthoughtexperiments. WhenEinsteinaskedwhatwouldhappen ifhe to respond: “yes, but thatcould never happen!”Thoughtexperiments are tracks. Isthisthemorallyrightthingtodo? Youdown atrack. is atramrunning there that imagine trigger? Or, to pullthe that dentistsdiscover thatourteethare“designed” to eatotherhumans alive. looked at hiswatch nearablackhole,thiswas a thoughtexperiment.In fact, leaves itopenastohowpeoplemorally lots ofscienceshowingthegenesandstatisticalproof.Yet, noneofthis general ethicalchatthatwe felttheneedtounderlineit. devices tohelpusthinkaboutcertainissues. Whethertheyarepossiblein device knownasa“thoughtexperiment”.Thesearehypothetical,sometimes does not tellus how we morallyoughttobehave. Itmightexplainwhywe a gunatyourgrandfatherwhenhewas a child. Would it bepossibleforyou acceptable todoso.Butthisisabadargument.Justbecausewe have incisors chapters, especially could stop it, thereby saving five people,bythrowinga fat man under the But thisisnotrelevant tothe real life does not stop us doing that thinking. Indeed, it is not justphilosophy Indeed, it thinking. real lifedoesnotstopus doingthat morally acceptable.The explaining whywe want topunchpeoplewearingtrousers red most other subjects use thought experiments. It is just that philosophy uses experiments. Itisjustthat most othersubjectsuse thought Supporters ofmeat-eatingoftenpointtoourincisorteeth.Thisshowsthatitis natural forustoeatmeat, a factused as a reason for thinking thatitis morally The detailshereareunimportant.Whatisimportant, isthatitinadequate For example, imagine that you could travel back in time. You are pointing Consider a moreserious example, relatingtotheethicsofeatingmeat. Consider some examples.Imaginetheheadline:“ Chapter 6 explanation moral . But it is such a common mistake made in ofwhypeoplefeelandactincertainways question.Don’tyoubelieve us?Imagine ought descriptive toact. and Scientists discover a gene ”. Thearticleincludes prescriptive claims. We cannotmovethere conclusion that people disagreetothe fact that fromthe want youto be aware of the mistake it leads to. Imagine that a group of friends SUMMARY Finally, we want todrawyourattentionacommon bad argumentas we Metaethics. Max saysChina, Alastair says the US, Dinh says the UK.There is general follow intheOlympiccase,anditdoesnotmoraloneeither.So then MoralErrorTheoristsdefendexactlythispositioninthechapteron there is disagreement the questionof“whichcountryhaswonmost Olympic goldmedals?” No! different cultureshave differentviews on euthanasia.Does this fact —that are arguingaboutwhichcountryhaswonthemost Olympicgoldmedals. 8. DoingEthicsWell: UnderstandingDisagreement is noanswer. Nowconsideraparallelargumentthatwe hearfartoooften. ignorance anddisagreement;butdoes this meanthatthereisnotananswer to morally acceptable.Some say yes, the otherssayno. Each of you citehow by itself,thatthereisnomoraltruthandanswer tothequestion. euthanasia is morally acceptable? Again, the answer is no. That answer did not just becausedifferentcultureshave differentmoralviews,thisdoesnotshow, If you are interested in the idea that there is a lack of moral in ethics, is alackofmoraltruth there idea that If youareinterestedinthe Imagine thatyouandyourfriendsarediscussing whether euthanasiais You will notbeassessed, by either AQA or OCR, on the core you. Thiswouldnotbe aweakness! Both the authors,andany when itcomesaboutethics, and to thinking some strategies to to assessment, it isdiscussed in properdetailthefollowing consider instead. It maybeworthoccasionally revisiting the chapters. content of this chapter. If any of the contentis specifically relevant on yourownjourneythrough Ethics. of argumentandevaluate how“thinkingwell” isprogressingfor ideas discussedyour studies,totestownlines hereduring hope you find this textbook usefulandrewardinghope youfindthistextbook inhelping you honest philosopher,can reassureyou —philosophyishard!We Still, we hopethat we have signpostedsomeerrorstoavoid — mean thatthereis no answer to the questionof whether

Introduction 7 Introduction 8 References Hospers, John, QUESTIONS AND TASKS 10. 1. 4. 7. 9. 2. 6. 3. 8. 5. and London:Routledge,1997), “Because there aresomanydifferentviews onmoralissues there cannot What arethoughtexperiments?Whymighttheybeusefulto What role,ifany,doessciencehave inethicalarguments? What ismeantbythe“is/ought”gap?Whyitimportanttoremember What isthedifferencebetween prudentialandmoralreasons? when discussingethicalquestions? Is therealinkbebetween Applied, Normative andMetaethics?Which How wouldyouexplainwhatphilosophyistosomeone? List someethicalquestions. Metaethical? type ofethicsdoyouthinkitwouldbebesttostudyfirst,andwhich last? Can youfigureoutifyourquestionsareNormative, Applied, or philosophers? Do youthinkphilosophyisimportant?Ifyes, why?Ifno, be anymoraltruth”.Whatdoyouthinkofthislineargument? An IntroductiontoPhilosophical Analysis https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203714454 , 4thed.(NewYork PART I NORMATIVE ETHICS

CHAPTER 1

Utilitarianism

Music snobbery is the worst kind of snobbery. It forces people who like something a bit mainstream, a bit of pop like Girls Aloud or Take That! or ABBA to say “It’s my guilty !” I hate that phrase. It is an insult to top quality pop. It is also an insult to guilt. Dara Ó Briain (comedian)

1. Utilitarianism: An Introduction

Some things appear to be straightforwardly good for people. Winning the lottery, marrying your true or securing a desired set of qualifications all seem to be examples of events that improve a person’s life. As a normative ethical theory, Utilitarianism suggests that we can decide what is morally right or morally wrong by weighing up which of our future possible actions promotes such goodness in our lives and the lives of people more generally.

2. Hedonism

Hedonism is a theory of well-being — a theory of how well a life is going for the person living that life. What separates Hedonism from other theories of well-being is that the hedonist that what defines a successful life is directly related to the amount of pleasure in that life; no other factors are relevant at all. Therefore, the more pleasure that a person in their life then the better their life goes, and vice versa. Whereas other theories might focus on fulfilling desires people have, or an objective list of things such as friendship and health. The roots of Hedonism can be traced back at least as far as (341–270 BC) and Ancient Greece. Epicurus held the hedonistic view that the primary intrinsic good for a person is pleasure; meaning that pleasure is always good for a person in and of itself, irrespective of the cause or context of the pleasure. According to this theory pleasure is always intrinsically good for a person and less pleasure is always intrinsically bad. Hedonism is a relatively simple theory of what makes your life better. If you feel that your life would be better if you won the lottery, married your true 12 NORMATIVE ETHICS value ofthisevent thanmerely thepleasureproduced.Manypeopleagree yourself ifyouwouldactuallychoosetoleave behindyourrealfriends,family way, ahedonistmayvalue thepsychologicalpleasureassociatedwiththat with pleasure.Manypleasuresmaybephysical,but Nozick’s challenge toHedonism is based on the thoughtthatmost people who Nozick asks: 3. Nozick’sExperienceMachine that youenjoygaininganewqualification,butthereseems to bemore to the these judgmentsisthatthingsaregoodforyouonlyiftheyprovide that pluggingintotheexperience machine would not bedesirable. However, the onlygoodbytestingourintuitionsviaanowfamousthought-experiment. a meaningfulqualificationimprovessuccess in gaining that yourlifeeven if gains nothingatall;thepsychologicalresponsestomusicdiffer. love orachieved yourdesiredqualifications,thenthehedonisticexplanationof proportional, asthehedonistwouldclaim. psychological pleasurescanthemselves countasintrinsicallygoodforaperson. defender ofatheoryknownas Attitudinal Hedonism. According tothistheory, amount of pleasure that we experience, thenNozickwonders “what else can and lifeinfavourofapre-programmed existence youalso might conclude affected bymorethanjustthetotalpleasureinourlives. Itmaybethecase act ofreadingandthusacceptthatitcanimprove aperson’swell-being. This consider this possible situationwouldopt One important problem for Hedonism is that our well-beingOne importantproblemforHedonismisthat seems tobe one person can gain so much pleasure from a Lady Gaga album while another one personcangainsomuchpleasurefromaLadyGagaalbumwhileanother if Hedonismiscorrect and ourwell-beingthe by is determinedentirely understanding ofhedonisticpleasuremayhelptoexplainwhy,forexample, matter tous,otherthan howourlives feelfromtheinside?” between whatimproves yourlifeandwhatgives pleasureisnotdirectly So, while reading a book would not seem to produce pleasure in a physical So, whilereadingabookwouldnotseemtoproducepleasureinphysical no pleasureisobtainedfromit.Certainly,manybelieve thattherelationship 1 2  Suppose there wasSuppose there machine thatwouldgive anexperience you desired.Super- youanyexperience oet Nozick Robert duper neuropsychologistscouldstimulateyourbrainsothatyouwouldthinkandfeelwere that you’re there;you’ll thinkthatit’sallactuallyhappening for life, pre-programming yourlife experiences? writing agreatnovel,book. ormaking afriend,orreadinganinteresting All thetimeyouwould be floatinginatank,withelectrodesattachedtoyourbrain.Should youplugintothismachine Ibid R. Nozick,‘TheExperience Machine’,p.292. . (1938–2002) attacked the hedonistic idea that pleasure is hedonistic ideathat the (1938–2002)attacked […] Of course, whileinthetank you won’tknow not toplugin.Indeed, if youask […] Fred Feldman would youplugin? 2 Theexperience (1941–) is a isa (1941–) 1

what is meant bythe term“”.Bentham defined it as “[…] thatproperty 4. TheFoundationsofBentham’sUtilitarianism Perhaps thelives ofthosechoosingtobepluggedinthemachine would go justified the machinearemisplaced. After all,once inside the machine we would not took tobeunjustified or arbitrary; forhim Hedonism could be theory basedonthebringingaboutofmorepleasure andlesspain. life where pleasure is far from assured. This may suggest thatour well-being perhaps orfriendships. pleasure producedasaresultofthatevent oraction.Benthamisa utilitarian Bentham moves from this empirical claim about thefactors that guide our of the theory) and say that any reticence to enter the machine is the reticence toenter any of thetheory)andsaythat of thetypehedonisticthinkingdescribedinsectiontwo.ForBentham, or […] toprevent thehappeningofmischief, , ,or amount of life, orthe or action,istheamountofpleasurecontainedinthat only thingthatdeterminesthevalue ofalife,orindeed the value ofanevent is determinedbyotherfactorsinadditiontohowmuchpleasurewe secure, in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage,it tendstoproducebenefit, in anyobject,whereby pleasure, good, in law,politicsandeconomicsasabstractphilosophising. unhappiness”. may feel that the experience machine is desirable just because it guarantees experience machineisdesirablejustbecauseit may feelthatthe machine guaranteesuspleasureyet we finditunappealingcompared to areal behaviour toanormative claimabouthowwe a genuinedesireforsocialreform,Benthamwantedby tobeasmuchinvolved bullet (accepttheapparentlyawkward conclusion as anon-fatalimplication experiences ofpleasure.Or,youmightbelieve thatoursuspicions about extraordinary well! suspect thatthingswere notreal.You mayfeelthatthehedonistcould bite-the- 4  3 When first understanding Utilitarianism, it is also crucial to understand The hedonistsneednotgive way entirelyonthispoint,ofcourse,asthey It isforthemalonetopointoutwhatwe oughttodo,aswell astodeterminewhatwe shalldo. Nature hasplaced mankind under thegovernance of two sovereign masters,pain and pleasure. Bentham developed hismoral theory ofUtilitarianismonthefoundation J. Bentham,‘An IntroductiontothePrinciplesofMoralsandLegislation’, in Ibid Essays ., p.66. byevidenceintheworlditsfavour. According toBentham: , p.65. . ThisbeliefinHedonism, however, was not somethingthatBentham 4 Utility is thuspromotedwhenpleasure andwhen Utility (1748–1832)was thefirstof“classicalutilitarians”.Driven ought tolive. Hecreatesamoral Utilitarianism and Other empirically hedonistic irrational 3

. 13 Utilitarianism 14 NORMATIVE ETHICS “Action B”wouldbemorallywrong. “Action A”“Action ratherthan according tothefundamentalaxiomof B”,then Absolutist moral views hold that certain actionswill alwaysAbsolutist moralviewshold that bemorallywrong wrongly attributedto Utilitarianism “Action A” should be undertakenand is morally right; choosing In additiontobeinghedonistic,Bentham’sUtilitarianismisalso: In effect,thisprinciplesimplysays that promotingutility,defined in terms of the greatestnumberofpeople,inordertoactmorally the measureofrightandwrongisextenttowhichanactionproduces the the centralutilitarianclaim made by Bentham. Based on a phrasethathe goodness isjustanincreaseinpleasure,andevilorunhappiness that that means“end”or“purpose”.Ifmorepleasure followsasaconsequence of groups suggest that tortureis always morally unacceptable whetheritis good, forBentham,ispleasure.We canthenrephrasewhatBentham himself counts as number ofpeople.Ofcourse,what greatest good forthe greatest 5. TheStructureofBentham’sUtilitarianism pleasure, istobeapproved ofandreducingutilityistobedisapproved of. also describedas call his fundamental axiom as a requirement to call hisfundamentalaxiomasarequirement Bentham’s Utilitarianismis or eventevent.consequences ofthat the by is determinedentirely is The theory irrespective ofcontextorconsequences. For example,manycampaigning increase inpainordecrease inpleasure.With thisunderstandingofutilityin unhappiness isavoided.Bentham’scommitmenttoHedonism means forhim mind, Benthamcommitshimselftothe 5  1. 4. 2. 3. The PrincipleofUtility,backedbyacommitmenttoHedonism, underpins By theprincipleofutilityismeantthatwhichapproves ordisapproves ofevery action In addition,Bentham’sUtilitarianismis whatsoever, according to the tendencywhich it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest isinquestion:or,whatthesamethingotherwords,to interest happiness ofthepartywhose promote ortoopposethathappiness. Ibid Impartial Relativist Maximising Consequentialist/Teleological ., p.65. teleological oeh Priestley Joseph consequentialist forthesamereason,basedonGreekword 5 ofUtility (1733–1804),Benthamsuggeststhat becausethemoralvalue ofanaction Relativistic promote the greatest pleasure for pleasure greatest promote the . rather than rather : Absolutist telos . which peoplearesupposedtohavepleasure. total accessto,orsharein,that whether itisauthorisedbydemocraticallyelectedgovernments seeking to Hopefully it is now clear that for Bentham the consequences intermsof for Benthamthe it isnowclearthat Hopefully 6. HedonicCalculus then buying a new book would be morally wrongevena newbookwouldbe buying then it ledtosome though the that pleasure ispromoted,but that takes place. pleasure productionofanyactionarewhatdetermine themoralityofthat pleasure isexperiencedbyroyalty, presidents,siblings,children,friendsor possible inthatcircumstance. pleasure becauseitdid not maximise the totalamountofpleasurethatwas for thehomeless, produced morepleasurehaditbeendonatedtoalocalcharity pleasure from spending moneyonanew book,butthatmoneycould have pleasure inthatsettingwas rejected. Thus, for example,ifyougain some pain involved intorturemayleadtothepromotionofgreaterpleasure(orless act oftortureisabsolutelywronginallcasesandsituations. action, andthatnootherfactorsarerelevant. However, itisnotclearhow action isrightorwrongalways relative tothesituationinwhichaction carried outbyvindictive dictatorsseekingtoinstilfearinapopulationor Bentham’s utilitarian theory is associated with the idea of the is associatedwith theory Bentham’s utilitarian interests On this basis, the Benthamite utilitarian must believeOn thisbasis,theBenthamiteutilitarian thatwhetheracertain obtain informationinordertostopaterroristattack.Forabsolutiststhen,the is secured.Thismeansthatsomeactionsleadtopleasurewillstillnot intense pain)overall, such as inthecase where torturestopsaterroristatrocity. matters is simply securing the maximum amount of pleasure for the maximum be morallygoodacts if anotheractionthat could have produced even more example: weexactly out whattodoinspecificcases.For should go aboutworking enemies. In thetotalcalculationofpleasure,we areallequal regardlessofour status, behaviouroranyothersocialfactor. number of people; the theory does notgivetheory number ofpeople;the specialpreferenceregarding Youis abouttointerceptapassengerairlinerthat jet that a fighter areamilitaryairmanflying Finally, Bentham’s Utilitarianism is also Clearly, Bentham cannot hold this type of viewbecausesometimesthe Clearly, Benthamcannotholdthistype city. You are tasked withdeciding how toact andmust, therefore, choose whether or not to Bentham’s Utilitarianism is that could take iteitherto an airport or, potentially, directly to a major and highly populated seems to have beenhijacked by anasyet unknown figure.The plane appearstobe onapath ; aslongtotalpleasureismaximised then itdoes not matterifthat maximising greatest becauseitdoesnotmerelyrequire impartial pleasureforthe inthesense that what equal considerationof greatest number 15 Utilitarianism 16 NORMATIVE ETHICS 7. ProblemswithBentham’sUtilitarianism The Hedonic Calculus, as suggested byBentham, is based on assessing possible Thus, our fighter-pilotmightconsider the intensityof the pleasureof surviving The Hedonic Calculus isthereforesupposed to provideadecision-procedure versus the durationofpaindeath,whilealso needing tobalancethese (sometimes knownastheFelicificCalculus)inordertohelpanindividual work out how much pleasure would be created by differing possibleactions. work outhowmuchpleasurewouldbecreatedby Utilitarianism morallyrequiresofhim. However, whether or not measuring possible actions in terms of “units of factors againsttherelativeof thepossiblepainsorpleasures.No for autilitarianwhoisconfusedastohowactinmorallytrickysituation. accordingtotheir: pleasurable experiencethat youenjoyed and compareittoahighlypleasurable plausible isverypleasure” associatedwiththemisactually much anopen doubt, the fighter pilot would still face an agonising moral choice but it pilot wouldstillfaceanagonisingmoralchoicebut doubt, thefighter associated with futureactions neededaddressing in orderforUtilitarianismto Bentham recognised that such question andsotheproblem ofcalculationisnotnecessarilysolved simply by theexistence of the Hedonic Calculus. Consider the most recent highly be aworkablemoral theory. BenthamthereforecreatedtheHedonic Calculus experience fromearlierin yourlife.Itmaybethatyoucannotsayconfidently seems that hewould at leasthave some methodology for workingoutwhat 6  1. 4. 7. 2. 6. 3. 5. decision withsomanyvariables. greatest pleasureforthenumberisnotobviouslyhelpfulinmakingsuch a difficult case. Suggesting that the pilot weighthe that case. Suggesting secures the action that options andchoosethe up the fire amissile at theplane.Firingplanewouldkillpassengersbutsave alllives on the ground,yet notfiringmaysave thepassengers,oritmaygive thepassengersonlyafew more minutes before the planeis flown into a city full of innocents and they are killed in any Ibid Purity (i.e.ifanypainwillbefeltalongsidethatpleasure) Intensity Fecundity (i.e.howlikelyitisthatpleasurewillgenerateotherrelated Extent (i.e.howmanypeoplemightbeabletoshareinthatpleasure) Remoteness (i.e.howfarintothefuturepleasureis) Certainty pleasures) Duration ., p.87. Problems ofCalculation relatingtothepleasure 6 “The question(fordecidingmoralrelevance)reason?’, nor isnot‘Canthey ‘Can they talk?’, but ‘Can theysuffer?’”‘Can theytalk?’,but Problem ofRelevant Demandingness your firstholiday.Pleasures thataresofundamentallydifferentinnaturemay would besecured if thedevelopment were permittedtogoahead.However, were extremelyvaried; perhapswinningasportingtrophyversus goingon this assumes that non-human animalsarenotrelevantthis assumesthat tothecalculationof towards thetotalamountofpleasure.However, thefollowingcaseraises that allindividuals who gainpleasureasaresultofcertainactioncount experiences the other,especiallyif one providedmorepleasurethan that the moralstatusofanimalsin the sufferingand pain ofnon-human animals. (There is more on the issue of the calculationprocess. then itisnotclearwhyanimals, that may beabletoexperiencesome form of pleasure to bothyourself and to those who gained economic benefit from your promoted but actually pleasure andcanalmostcertainlyexperiencepain,shouldbeexcludedfrom pleasures andpains.Yet, ifpleasureisallthatmattersforhowwell alifegoes destination? While your actions certainly brought about differingdegreesof brought destination? Whileyour actionscertainly doughnut atsome point thisyear ortreatyourselftoamagazine?Live thelife acting morallyappearstobesetextremelyhigh. Forexample,didyoubuya common standardsuchastheHedonicCalculus. raised above. RememberthatBentham’sUtilitarianismisimpartialin thesense relevant to moral calculations then surelyitis at leastplausiblethat so should On the surface, this case should be obvious for the utilitarian without any On thesurface,thiscaseshouldbeobviousforutilitarian of a high-roller and treat yourself to a taxi ride rather than walkingride rather yourself toataxi of ahigh-rollerandtreat to your is investigated.) special problem of calculation; the greatest good for the greatest number greatest good forthe greatest special problemofcalculation;the simply beincommensurable —theymayincapableofbeingmeasured by a . Bentham, J. 7 You areconsideringwhetherornottoapprove anewhousingdevelopment onapieceof Indeed, Bentham, whenreferringtothemoral value ofanimals,notedthat: In addition,theproblemofcalculationcanbeextendedbeyondissues workers without any pain being experienced by others. Youworkers withoutanypainbeingexperiencedby areaware, however, that currently supportingmanybirds,straycatsandrodentsofvarious types. Being amaximisingethicaltheory,Utilitarianism isalsoopentoa unoccupied land outside the currentboundaryofyourtown.You areclear that, ifapproved, the development willrequirethecullingof several badgersandtheremoval of a habitat the development willcreateagreatdealofpleasureforbothnewresidentsandconstruction Bentham/bnthPML18.html An Introduction tothePrinciplesofMoralsand Legislation An

. If it is not the case that pleasure needstobemerely . Ifitisnotthecasethat maximised at all opportunities : Chapter 14 7 Ifthesufferingandpainofhumansis whenthemoralityofeatinganimals , then thestandard for , http://www.econlib.org/library/ 17 Utilitarianism 18 NORMATIVE ETHICS “natural ” as anonsensicalconceptmasqueradedmeaningfulone. rights” “natural According to theutilitariancalculation, Callum acted in a way thatmaximised (this ishardlyunrealistic).However, suchforcefultheft However, ifwe acceptthatabsoluterightsaresimply“nonsense upon stilts” Remember that as a relativistic moral theory, Utilitarianism doesnotallowfor as arelativistic moraltheory, Remember that them to be used freely and exploited by the peopleofamuchlargercountry them tobeusedfreelyandexploitedby to avoidasitissoutterlydemandingonourbehaviour. the familiar moral dilemma of being stuck on aliferaftwiththreeotherpeople the familiarmoraldilemma ofbeing tragic pain.However, itseems unfair andwrongtosuggest thatCallumacted morally acceptable to maximisingpleasure,suchanactionwouldnotonlybe the factthatagreatermajorityofpeoplewouldgainpleasure —doesnot legal orbasichumanrights.Indeed, Bentham himself dismissed the ideaof pleasure whileDominic acted wronglybecause the consequence of hisactwas decision, itseemsthatyoucouldhavesaving createdmuchmorepleasureby as Benthamputit,thenUtilitarianismseemstobeopencaseswherethe to ,orabsolute any moralabsolutes —suchastheabsoluteright considering thecasesofDominicandCallum. rightly whenhehad just intendedtosave himself, although hehadalucky outcome, while Dominic acted wrongly whenhisintentionwas tosave others open tothe ignores intentionsandfocuses onlyonconsequences. up yourmoneyand ensuring itreached those extremefinancial maximising total pleasure. For example, imagine thattotalpleasure would majority aremorallyrequiredtoexploittheminorityforgreatergoodof maximising moraltheory,Utilitarianismseems to makeimmoralityvery hard hardships orresidinginpoverty aroundtheworld. As aresultofbeing but with only enough supplies for two people. On the raft with you isadoctor with raft supplies fortwo people.Onthe with only enough but but was unlucky inhis outcome. Utilitarianism, as a consequentialist theory, but itwouldbemorallyrequired. be maximised if the resources of a small country were forcibly takenfrom seem tobemorallyjustifiable.Yet, accordingtoUtilitarianism’s commitment As a consequentialist/teleological moral theory Utilitarianism is also moral theory As aconsequentialist/teleological A furtherproblemforUtilitarianismrelatestothe Utilitarianism alsofaces the ducks for cover heaccidentallytripsintothewould-bethief,knockinghim unconscious and leaving therestofcustomers to fend for themselves. Luckily forCallum, when he Now, consider a second case where an intruder bursts in with a gun but Callum, rather but a gun bursts inwith Now, considerasecondcasewhereanintruder thus allowinghispeacefuldetentionuntilpolicearrive. than tryingtointervene, immediately ducks for cover withtheintention of savinghimself the ensuingstruggle,intruder’s gunisaccidentallyfiredandaninnocentpersonkilled. shop. Dominic,withtheintentionofsavinglives, attemptstostoptheintruderbutsadly,in Dominic is seating inacoffee shop whenamasked intruder burstsinthreateningtorobthe Problem of WrongIntentions Problem of Partiality . Thisproblemcanbehighlightedby . This is clearifwe consider TyrannyoftheMajority — only justifiedby . Williams describesthefictionalcaseofJimand the Indians. The pointofthisexampleisnottoestablishwhat therightactionis.You may Integrity Objection your parentorsiblingisnothingspecialincomparison to otherindividuals who isconfidentthathecanpassonacureforcancerifsurvives, aworld 2003). As an agent-neutral theory,no person can give up impartialitywhenit find yourselfinagreementwithutilitarianswho suggestJimmustshoot the utilitarian, perhaps, the status asabelovedutilitarian, perhaps,the the familymembershouldmake to theimpactofanactionupontheirownfeelings,characterandgeneralsense parents orsiblings.Iamafraidtoreportthat,forthepurposesofthisexample, quickly a neutral observer working outwhich action will produce the greatest good allow youtogive comes to judgements about theimpact of a potentialactionupontheirfamily class violinist whobrings pleasure tomillions each year, andoneofyour requires observer wouldandnotgive specialpreference toanyoneirrespective ofyour of maximisingtotalpleasureinsuchascenario.Yet, even ifyoubelievethe that on theraft.Inthiscircumstance,Utilitarianismwouldseemtorequireyou one prisonerinordertosave thelives ofthe rest.Rather,thepurposeof In ordertomakeclearthepotentialworryassociated of integrity.withthis, or loved ones.Inaddition,nopersoncangivewhen itcomes upimpartiality more thanone. morality mightcallforyourownself-sacrifice, it seems extremely unfairnotto example is to show that Utilitarianism forces us to reach this conclusion emotional attachments,becauseeachindividualmustcountforoneandno sibling joins you inthefreezingwater withnohopeofsurvival; thisis the way not onlyover-demanding but also overly cold and calculating.Utilitarianism no specialdifferencetoyourjudgmentregardinghowact.This seems to be not onlytogive upyourownspaceontheraftbutensurethatparentor 8 Finally, Bentham’s Utilitarianism also comes under attack from the related as was planned.Itiskeyto notethatJimdoes not have controlofthesituationinsense Jim caneithershootoneoftheprisonershimselfandthen the restwillbesetfreeasamark Jim isanexplorerwhostumblesuponIndianleaderabouttoexecutetwenty people. Jimknowsnothingoftheirpossiblecrimesoranyotherfactorsinvolved, butheis of celebration,orhecanrefusetheofferinwhichcasealltwenty prisonerswillbeexecuted the Indianchiefwhoiseagertoimpresshisforeigntraveller.offered adifficultchoiceby that heispowerless tobargain ornegotiatewithanyone,andnorcanheuseaweapon to successfully freeanyprisoners.Hehasonlythetwooptions laidout. B. Williams, ‘Jim andtheIndians’, Indians.pdf . Given thecommitment to Jim must treathimselfas Agent-Neutrality, Agent-Neutrality

extra moralweight , framedmostprominentlyby —you mustlookatthesituationas any neutral https://www.unc.edu/courses/2009spring/plcy/240/001/Jim_and_ tothelifeofaloved one.Unfortunately for enr Williams Bernard 8 (1929– too 19 Utilitarianism 20 NORMATIVE ETHICS To putitanotherway, ifindividualhappinessisagoodworthpursuingthen on tat Mill Stuart John Utilitarianism becausehebelieved thattherewas anempiricallybackedproof Hedonistic Utilitarianism. for thegreatestnumber.Morally,heis not entitledtogive more weight tohis facing theutilitariantheoryputforward by Bentham, but asahedonist he If theutilitariancalculationsuggests for prisonerreformandrehabilitation. the Benthamiteutilitariantheoryinorder to createasuccessful version of that hemust shoot one of the prisoners then hemust shoot with no regard to the totalof the happiness of allpersons, then generalhappiness is also good. that might make a life go better) areonlyvaluable goods thatmightmakealifegobetter) persons”. of all person, andthegeneralhappiness,therefore,agoodtoaggregate people desiretheirownhappiness.Thisobservation offactsupportsMill’s did notwishtoseethetheoryrejected.Millsoughtrefineandimprove deepest convictions. acquired, notbecauseit,byitselfandinisolation, makes lifegobetter. about happiness.Knowledge isdesiredonlybecause itprovideshappinesswhen alwaysnumber. greatest secured forthe be availablethe greatesthappiness/pleasureshould tosupporttheprinciplethat a moraltheoryifitfailstorecogniseorrespectperson’s most sincere and Youand self-identity. any compromising ofhisintegrity mayacceptthisasan claim that sincepeopledesiretheirownhappiness,this is evidence that such claim bysuggestingthatknowledge, healthandfreedometc.(asotherplausible 8. Mill’sUtilitarianProof of happiness is the own feelingsthanhewouldgive tothefeelingsofanyotherandtherefore unfortunate consequence of a terriblesituation,butitmaybeproblemfor it does not matterwhetherJim is a pacifist and has been a lifelong advocate maximising total happinessis,however, opentocriticism. For onething, happiness ingeneralmustbeworthpursuing. happiness isdesir empirical defenceofHedonism, relies ontheevidencefrom observation that 10 9

In order to justify Hedonism, Mill sought to justify the claim that the good In ordertojustifyHedonism,Millsought theclaimthatgood Mill’s proof of Utilitarianism in terms of the general desirability of desirability general Mill’s proofofUtilitarianism intermsofthe Mill was so confident abouttheprospects for aversion of Hedonistic This slippage from talk of“pleasure” to talkof“happiness” is explained insection eight of this J. S.Mill,‘Utilitarianism’, in chapter. 10 Sinceourhappinessisgoodforus,andgeneraljust able (1806–1873)wasmany oftheproblems concernedby only . Millsays “…each person’s happiness isagood to that thing that makes our lives go better. Mill defends this Utilitarianism and OtherEssays 9 Mill’s proof, much like Bentham’s Mill’sproof,muchlike , p.308. in sofaras they bring theybring value withtheartsand sciences of music and poetry”. value from knowledge without anyassociated pleasure or happiness? If so, you mayhave acounterexampletoMill’sclaim. with morevalue thanthehappierfool.Mill,onotherhand,believes that 9. Mill’sQualitative Utilitarianism Higher pleasures are those pleasures of the intellect brought about via about intellect brought pleasures arethoseofthe Higher However, Millintroducesaqualitycriterionforpleasure.says that: If playingonaconsole affords youmore pleasurethanreadingShakespeare, In attempting toredraw Bentham’s Utilitarianism, Mill’s most substantial focusses on isthemaximisationofhedonicallycalculatedquantitiestotal the wasthought tomove awaymattered wasall that fromBentham’sideathat that we wouldwant themtodesireit. to killanotherperson.Thisisdesirableinthesense people could and do desire the factthatsomething is desired does not seem to justify theclaim that itis then Bentham would view your life as going better ifyouplaytheconsole. then Benthamwouldviewyourlifeasgoingbetter pleasure. Thus,hesaysthat“Prejudice apart, thegameofpush-pinisequal quality desirable. animalistic and base; pleasures associated with drinkingbeer, havingsex or activities likepoetry,reading orattendingthetheatre.Lower pleasures are also crucialtodecidingwhatismoral. claim thatSocrateshasthebetterlifeeven byhedonisticstandards. Bentham couldnotadmit that theunhappySocrates would be livingalife Bentham isproducingpleasureandtheway thisisachieved isunimportant. it (itispossibletodo so health, areonlyvaluable insofarastheypromotehappiness/pleasure is extremely controversial; canyouimagineasituationinwhichgained should sense thatsomethingisdesirableifitdesired to thenormative sensethatit 12 11 According to Mill, higher pleasures are worth more than lowerpleasures areworthmore than According toMill,higher pleasures. Bentham, J. In addition,theideathatotherapparentgoods,suchasknowledge and It isbettertobeahumanbeingdissatisfiedthanpigsatisfied; better tobeSocratesdissatisfied than afoolsatisfied. And ifthefool, or thepig,isofadifferent opinion,itisonlybecausethey Bentham’s Utilitarianismisquantitativeall Bentham sense that inthe know theirownsideofthequestion. quantity J. S.Mill,‘Utilitarianism’, p.281. , not merely quantity, ofpleasuremattersandcan thereforedefendthe , notmerelyquantity, be desired without anyjustification. Itis possible, for example, todesire G. E. Moore of total pleasure. Instead, Mill thought that oftotalpleasure.Instead,Millthought The RationaleofReward (1873–1958) points out thatMillmoves from the factual — it isanactionthat desire- , p.206, 12 https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=6igN9srLgg8C able quality 11 ), butnotinthesense All that mattersfor ofpleasurewas 21 Utilitarianism 22 NORMATIVE ETHICS “transplant surgeon”. 10. Mill’sRuleUtilitarianismversus Bentham’s Act Utilitarianism While Bentham does suggest that we should have “rules of thumb” against your evaluation andanalysis. your owndetailstosecurethisconclusionforthe actutilitarian). Utilitarianism andalthoughsuchtermsemergedonlyafterMill’sdeath,Mill In addition to a difference in views regarding the importance of the quality of importance ofthequality the In additiontoadifferenceinviewsregarding Mill, wouldanddofavourpleasuresoftheintellectover thebasepleasures the latter. Whether or notMill’sdefenceofhissupposedlynon-prejudiced latter. Whether the to selectwhichpleasuresarehigherandlower. Suchcompetentjudges,says those peoplewhohave experiencedbothtypesofpleasure,arebest placed this distinctionbetween higherandlowerpleasures asnon-arbitrary quality transplant case, killing the healthy man would not seem to be part of the best set best of the part seem tobe man wouldnot healthy the case, killing transplant such akillingisrequiredinordertomaximisetotalpleasure(justadd that the outcomeofindividualactscansometimes lead tooddandobjection- lazing on a sun-lounger.Whatwe should seek to maximise are thehigher decision-procedure. Their viewisthatwe should create aset ofrulesthat, distinction ofhigherandlower pleasuresissuccessful is anopenquestionfor a pleasure,MillandBentham are also separated byreferenceto Act and Rule and notjustanexpressionofhisowntastes,Millsaysthat raising examples. Bentham’s calculus) turns out to bequantitatively lower as a result. Justifying quality pleasures even if the totalpleasure (hedonically calculated via of the body. On this basis, Mill is open to thecriticism that many people have if followed, would produce the greatestamount of total happiness. In the in thecase as simply described the actutilitarian appears powerless to deny individual actions whenmakingmoral judgments. However, thisfocus on is typicallyconsideredaruleutilitarianandBenthamanactutilitarian. both read books and drunk beer and that if givenread booksanddrunkbeerthat both thechoicewouldchoose such actions, for typically they will leadtounforeseen painfulconsequences, they such actions,fortypically 13 An act utilitarian, such asBentham,focuses only ontheconsequences An actutilitarian, of

Rule utilitarians,inwhose campwe canplace Mill,adoptadifferentmoral and one healthy patient undergoing a routine check. In this case, it would seem that total would seemthat a routinecheck.Inthiscase,it undergoing patient and onehealthy Imagine acasewheredoctorhadfive patientsrequiringneworganstostoptheirdeath pleasure is best promoted by killing the one healthy patient, harvestingpatient, one healthy the killing promoted by pleasure isbest his organs and saving theotherfive lives; theirpleasureoutweighs thecosttoformerlyhealthy patient. J. Thomson, ‘TheTrolley Problem’,p.1396. Judith Jarvis Thomson Jarvis Judith 13

(1929–)raisedtheproblemof competent judges , 11. Strongversus Weak RuleUtilitarianism That principleis: Therefore, if arule permitting killingwas allowed then themaximisation of The strongruleutilitarian appearstosufferfromwhat would notbemorallypermitted. would notseemtopromotetotalhappiness;oneoutcome,forexample, Evenan about ifaparticularactof harminganotherpersonmightbring Rule utilitarians may seem to avoid troubling cases likethetransplantsurgeon Rule utilitariansmayseemtoavoidtroubling 2012) described as “Rule Worship”. No longer focussing on the consequences total happinesswouldnotbepromotedoverall. principle”. According toMill,thereis: and beabletosupportupholdindividualhumanlegalrightsbasedon rules thatreflecttheharmprinciple.Thisfactwouldalsohelpruleutilitarians of minoritygroups would, perhaps,failto besupported by thebestutilitarian- overcome objections based on the treatmentof minorities because exploitation of utilitarian-justified rules since a rule allowing the killing of healthy patients of utilitarian-justifiedrulessincearuleallowingthekillinghealthy of the action before them, the strong rule utilitarian appears toignorethe strong ruleutilitarian of theactionbeforethem, the increase intotalpleasureonasingleoccasion, that actmaynotbecondoned by thesetofrulesthatbestpromotes total pleasureoverall. As such, the action be thatpeoplewouldvery likelystopcomingtohospitalsforfear theirlife! justified setofrules.Yet, ruleutilitariansfaceatroublingdilemma: 15 14 1. 2. …one very simpleprinciple,asentitledtogovern absolutelythedealingsofsocietywith  The onlypurposeforwhichpower canberightfullyexercisedover anymember ofacivilized It isthroughRuleUtilitarianismthatwe canmakesenseofMill’s “harm community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is notasufficientwarrant. individual intheway ofcompulsionandcontrol. Ibid J. S.Mill, Weak RuleUtilitarianism Strong RuleUtilitarianism would promotethegreatestamountoftotalhappiness canbeignored followed, wouldpromotethegreatestamountoftotalhappinessmust in circumstanceswheremorehappinesswouldbe producedby always breaking therule. . On befollowed. ,

http://www.econlib.org/library/Mill/mlLbty1.html 15 : Guidancefromthesetofrulesthat,iffollowed, : Guidancefromthesetofrulesthat,if 14

J. J. C. Smart C. J. J. (1920– 23 Utilitarianism 24 NORMATIVE ETHICS “rules of thumb” againstactions that tend not toproduce maximum goodness Act Utilitarianism and Weak RuleUtilitarianismactuallyprovide different 12. ComparingtheClassicalUtilitarians 13. Non-HedonisticContemporaryUtilitarianism: version ofRuleUtilitarianismgainsauniqueidentity.Inwhatcaseswould Peter SingerandPreferenceUtilitarianism Utilitarianism isnota dead theoryanditdidnotendwithMill. Mill Bentham guidelines thatcanbebroken,andgiven thattheactutilitariancanalsooffer Sidgwick and and humanrights,butitisnotclearthattheysurvive theseproblemsholding avoid problems based on treatment of minorities or a lack of absolute legal century. However, fewcontemporaryphilosopherscanclaim asmuch relativeto may beable rule regarding howtoact.Thestrongruleutilitarian own examplesorpreviousinthischapter. patients, itisnotclearwherethis healthy or utilityingeneral,suchaskilling theory. Utilitarianismseemstobe on toateleological,relativisticutilitarian option tomaximise total happinessinfavouroffollowingageneraland non- moral guidance? This is somethingyoushould consider inthelightofyour saved fromtroublingimplicationsonlybydenyingcorefeatures. nature it appearstocollapse into nature Act Utilitarianism.Therulesprovide • • • • • • • • • On the other hand, while Weak Rule Utilitarianism retains a teleological R. M. Hare Act Utilitarian All pleasureequallyvaluable Viewed asrule utilitarian Teleological, impartial,relativistic,maximising Impartial, maximisingtheory If strongruleutilitarian,notclearifteleological or relativistic Hedonist Hedonist Quality ofpleasurematters:intellectualversus animalistic (1838–1900) is consideredto have taken over the baton after Mill, (1919–2002)was perhapschiefadvocate inthemidtwentieth

Henry whether or not some unnerving preferences might form the core of certain weighing ofpreferenceswhendecidingwhichactionbetterpromotesgreater If yousatisfyyourpreferencetoachieve agood qualification yourlifegoes However, thereisaquestionastohow arbitrary thisrequirementisand Peter Singer for example),we might looktotheideasof follow Bentham’scommitmenttoimpartiality,Singeralsosupportsequal theory isteleological,maximising,impartialandrelativisticbuthedoes not to sacrificeourintegrity.Further,theproblemofcalculationalsoseemsbe their preferenceandgainemployment.Individuals, according to Singer,must leaves SingeropentothesameissuesthatplaguedBentham.Namely, preferences ofthemajorityseemtothreatenaminoritygroup,orrequireus preference satisfaction;allpreferencesaretoweigh equally.Thispotentially as a moralachievement (consider the preferencesofanationpaedophiles, animals, iftheyarealsorelevant). a person’s life is entirely determined by thesatisfaction of their preferences. claim that thegreatestgood for the greatestnumbercan be reduced to pleasure rational preferenceswere thosethatmightsurvive cognitive psychotherapy. Brandt, writingabouttherationalityofcertain preferences,suggestedthat relevant, becauseitisnotobvioushowyoucouldworkoutthepreferences regarding circumstanceswherepartialityseemsdesirable,orwhenthe for themiftheysecure rather thancontinueineducation,theirlifegoesbetter On thisbasis,whenmakingmoraldecisionswe shouldconsiderhowbestto of othersinatleastsomedifficultmoralcases (let alone thepreferencesof if ourpreferencesatisfactionfailstoprovidepleasureforus.Continuing in either raw or higher forms. Instead, Singer believes that whatimproves influence inpubliclifeoutsidephilosophyascanthepreferenceutilitarian, individual characterstherefore beingsustainedeven aftersuchtherapy. better bloodthirsty orapparentlyimmoralpreferences,and countingsuchsatisfaction be atthecoreofmoralthinking: ensure themaximisationoftotalpreferencesatisfaction —itdoesnotmatter 17 16 . Brandt, R. There would be something incoherent about living a life where the conclusionsyoucametoin would besomethingincoherentaboutlivingalifewhere There In responsetoaconcernregardingthemoral relevance ofsatisfying ethics didnotmake anydifferencetoyourlife.Itwouldmakeitanacademic exercise. Thewhole my ideasandtheway Ilive. Itwouldbehighlydiscordantifthatwas notthecase point aboutdoingethicsistothinktheway tolive.My lifehasakindofharmonybetween Singer advocatesanon-hedonisticversion ofUtilitarianism.Hisutilitarian K. Toolis, ‘The Most Dangerous Man in theWorld’, nov/06/weekend.kevintoolis in virtueofsatisfyingthatpreference Ethical Theory (1946–). .

. Ifsomeone else desires to getajob https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/1999/ ihr Brandt Richard . 16 (1910–1997). 17

25 Utilitarianism 26 NORMATIVE ETHICS SUMMARY ISSUES TOCONSIDER COMMON STUDENTMISTAKES • • • • • 1. 2. Would youenterNozick’sexperiencemachineif youknew would notcomeout?Wouldyouputsomeone careaboutintothe Utilitarianism simplybecauseyoujudgekillingthefewer numberof Utilitarianism. Imprecise understandingofthehedonic/non-hedonicsplitin Is thereanythingthatwouldimprove yourlifethatcannotbereduced Imprecision inuseofexamplestodefend/challengeUtilitarianism. Not reflectingtheattitudinalaspectofpleasurethatBentham’stheory Minimising thelong-termimpactofactionswhenitcomestopleasure/ to eitherpleasureorpreferencesatisfaction? pain production. people isultimatelythemorallyrightthingtodo. decision? may accountfor. machine whiletheywere asleep,sothattheynever hadtomakethe Suggesting that“JimandtheIndians”isnotacounterexampleto Utilitarianism remainsalivingtheoryandretainshedonistic their objectionsisvery muchuptoyouasacritically-minded gives thetheorysome intuitive supporteven inthelightof philosopher todecide. rule formulations. The core insightthatconsequences matter hypothetical cases that poseserious problems for utilitarians. The extent towhichthedifferentversions of Utilitarianismsurvive non-hedonistic advocates,aswell assupportersofbothactand KEY TERMINOLOGY 12. 11. 10. 4. 7. 9. 6. 3. 8. 5. Are youever toldtostopwatching televisionanddosomethingelse?Is Which isthemostseriousproblemfacingBentham’s Act Why doutilitariansnotgive upontheideaofmaximising pleasureand way? Utilitarianism? Canitbeovercome? If yourpreferenceschangeafterpsychotherapy,didtheoriginal Is Weak RuleUtilitarianismmerely Act Utilitarianismbyanother Look atthequotestartofchapterbyDaraÓBriain —isit theory? the greatergood,shouldyouever beforcedto? this goodforyou?Why? Can pleasurebemeasured?DoesBenthamgoaboutthistaskcorrectly? preferences ever matter? possible thatsomepleasuresareinferiorinvalue toothers? Does Millsuccessfullyimprove Bentham’s Act Utilitarianisminany Does StrongRuleUtilitarianismdeserve tobelabelledasautilitarian Do youhave convictionsorbeliefsyouwouldnotwant tosacrificefor raise problems? just talkintermsofpromotingsufficientpleasure?Wouldthissolve or name? Teleological Principle ofUtility Normative Relativistic Consequentialist Agent-Neutrality Utility Intrinsic Hedonic Calculus 27 Utilitarianism 28 NORMATIVE ETHICS ―, ―, ‘Utilitarianism’, in ―, ―, ‘An IntroductiontothePrinciplesofMoralsandLegislation’,in Williams, Bernard,‘JimandtheIndians’,inhis Toolis, Kevin,‘TheMostDangerousManintheWorld’, Thomson, JudithJarvis,‘TheTrolleyProblem’, References Nozick, Robert,‘TheExperienceMachine’,in Mill, JohnStuart, Brandt, Richard, Bentham, Jeremy, Utilitarianism An IntroductiontothePrinciplesofMoralsandLegislation Utilitarianism andOtherEssays (London: Penguin Books,2004). (Englewood Cliffs,NJ:PrenticeHall,1959). (1985): 1395–415, Jim_and_Indians.pdf November 1999),freelyavailable at 2004). freely available at freely available at freely available at lifeandstyle/1999/nov/06/weekend.kevintoolis http://www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML18.html Shafer-Landau (Oxford:Blackwell Publishing,2007). , freelyavailable at Ethical Theory:TheProblemsofNormative andCriticalEthics The RationaleofReward https://doi.org/10.2307/796133

https://www.unc.edu/courses/2009spring/plcy/240/001/ http://www.econlib.org/library/Mill/mlLbty1.html https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=6igN9srLgg8C Utilitarianism andOtherEssays (London: Longman,Roberts,Green&Co.,1869), , ed.by Alan Ryan (London:Penguin Books, https://www.utilitarianism.com/mill1.htm https://www.theguardian.com/ (London:RobertHeward, 1830), Ethical Theory The Yale LawJournal A CritiqueofUtilitarianism , ed.by Alan Ryan the Guardian , freelyavailable at , ed.byRuss

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CHAPTER 2

Kantian Ethics

In spite of its horrifying title Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals is one of the small books which are truly great; it has exercised on human thought an influence almost ludicrously disproportionate to its size.1

1. An Introduction to Kantian Ethics

Immanuel Kant was born in 1724 in Königsberg in East Prussia, where he died in 1804. Kant is famous for revolutionising how we think about just about every aspect of the world — including science, art, ethics, , the self and reality. He is one of the most important thinkers of all time, which is even more remarkable by the fact that Kant is a truly awful writer. His sentences are full of technical language, are very long, and are incredibly dense. You have been warned! Kant is a rationalist writing during the Enlightenment (1685–1815). He thinks that we can gain knowledge from our senses and through our rational capacities. This means his general philosophical approach starts by asking what we can know a priori. This is key to understanding his work but also makes his writing on ethics seem a bit odd. We think the study of ethics — unlike say maths — ought to direct our eye to what is going on around us in the world. Yet Kant starts by turning his eyes “inward” to thinking about ethical ideas. Kant believes that in doing this people will come to recognise that certain actions are right and wrong irrespective of how we might feel and irrespective of any consequences. For Kant, actions are right if they respect what he calls the Categorical Imperative. For example, because lying fails to respect the Categorical Imperative it is wrong and is wrong irrespective of how we might feel about lying or what might happen if we did lie; it is actions that are right and wrong rather than consequences. This means that Kant’s theory is deontological rather than teleological. It focuses on our duties rather than our ends/goals/consequences.

1 H. J. Paton, ‘Preface’ in I. Kant, Moral Law, p. 7. 32 NORMATIVE ETHICS “stand back”andconsider what we aredoingandwhy.Kantcertainlythought This iswhatKantmeansbyduty. Through thecomingweeks thisjuicybitofgossipisonthetipyourtongue 2. SomeKeyIdeas Good Will Duty Groundwork of the Metaphysicsof Morals Kant gives thefollowingcharacterizationof thegoodwill.Itissomethingthat Kant’s main works in ethics are his He performscertainactionslikescrabblingunderbedcovers, meowingat fashioned term, the idea behind it should sound familiar. Imagine, your friend thinking andactions are driven byhisdesires and inclination.Heeats to establishthesupremeprincipleofmorality. good will”. plays and sleeps when hedesires to do so, there is no reasoning on his part. keep ourpromisedespitethestrongdesiretogossip? Kant’s answer is“the about particularsituations but ratherthrough rationalreflection, Kant seeks certain desires but precisely becausewecertain desiresbut are certain actionslikecaringforhersisterandhelpingthehomeless. right (even reallystrong desires), what does? In ourexample,whyisitthatwe recognise as beingrequiredofus irrespective ofwhatwe (really)desire to do. variousBeth, incontrast,canreflectonthe reasonsshehas,tocarefor on reason rather thanfeelingsorconsequences. Consider mypetcatSpartan. is has told you that she is pregnant but asks youtopromisekeephersecret. has toldyouthatsheispregnantbut her sisterandthehomeless. but you do not tellanyonebecause of your promise. There are thingswe birds andchasinghistail.Nowconsider my daughterBeth,sheperforms so andhetakesthisinsightashisstartingpoint. . Kant, I. 2 good irrespective ofeffects A goodwillisnotbecause ofwhatiteffectsoraccomplishes We mightthinkthenthathumans are moral beings notbecausewe have There is, however, somethingintuitive abouttheideathatmoralityisbased He starts from the notion of “duty” and although thisis a rather old- attaining someproposedend:itis goodthroughitswillingalone —thatis,initself But thisraises the question.If it is not desires that move us to do what is Spartan’s actionsare Moral Law , p.40. : not moral whereasBeth’sactionsare.Spartan’s Metaphysics of Morals (1785). Neithergive practicaladvice rational. — because ofitsfitnessfor We haveto anability (1797) and the . 2 What does Kant mean? Well, pickanythingyoulikewhich you thinkmight will —as hesays“shininglikeajewel”. It isalsogoodwithoutqualification. However,we before dothis,weabout clear onthispoint really needtobe this, whichare acts like any that thinks Kant From whatwe have said above aboutthenatureofdutyandgoodwill we can with 3. Acting thinking foranythingandeverything, exceptonething — to abductchildreninbroaddaylight. Insuchcases the happiness,pleasure those featuresmakesactionsworse? act despite our desires to do otherwise. For Kant this means that acting for the acting this meansthat act despiteourdesirestodootherwise.ForKant are due to thegood will. Considering such actions (can you thinkofany?) and couragemaketheactionsworse.Kantthinkswe canrepeatthislineof a goodwilliswillingalone;nototherattitudes,orconsequences, or ask yourselfifthereareanysituationsyoucanthinkofwhereanactionhaving characteristics of the agent.Even Kantthinksthissounds like aratherstrange But hedid not. InthistypeofactionKantwould claim that we “see” the good of suchawfulviolence we arehumbledandcanrecognize,whatKantcalls, its is acasewheretheremusthave beenanoverwhelming desiretofightback. independence. HestoodpeacefullywhilsttheBritishpolicebeathim.Here idea. Sohowcanhe(andwe) beconfidentthatthegoodwilleven exists? moral worth. means we canrecognizethatthegoodwillexists. moral worth. Obviouslynotallactions are as significant as Gandhi’s! However, make anactiongood below whatwe have todo for ouractions to becarriedout forthesakeofduty. sake ofdutyisthe see why Kantsays that toactfrom good will is acting forthesakeof duty. We someone taking 4  3  The good will unlikeanythingelseisgood good withoutqualification,exceptawill It seems there are.Imagine someone who is It isimpossibletoconceive anythingatallintheworld,oreven outofit,whichcanbetakenas Consider Ibid. Ibid. Duty , p.40. , p.39. for theSakeof aam Gandhi Mahatma pleasure only — for example,happiness, pleasure, courage,andthen way thatan actioncanhave moralworth.We willsee intorture;oraserial killer whose courage allows her Dutyand Acting ’s (1869–1948) non-violentprotestforIndian . 3

4 Seeingsuchresilienceintheface performed despite conflicting desires performed despite unconditionally happy whenkickingacat;or in Accordance the goodwill andwhatmakes . , 33 Kantian Ethics 34 NORMATIVE ETHICS would makeKant’smoralphilosophyanabsurdnon-starter. 4. CategoricalandHypotheticalImperatives If weand want agreewithKant to actforthesakeofdutywhat shouldwe In contrasttoourfriend,thispersonisacting former in their actionismoral.We mustbecarefulthough. there arethreeformulations ofthis. this chapter.However, beforedoingthiswe needtogetasense of whatKant two examplesofhowthisworksinpractice:lying andsuicide.We lookatthe and justhappenedtohavethe sakeofduty, their actionhas thosedesires,then agent the is consistentwith act hasmoralworth.Thisthough the then performed do? Hisanswer isthatwe have toactoutof despite this: accordance with dutyandtheiractionhadnomoralworth.Ifthey actedfor action issomethingthatofvalue althoughitwouldn’tbe correcttocallita duty others. Weto others shouldaskwhetheranactionofgiving on thestreet.Your friendstartstoweep, fumblesin hiswallet andgives the moral worth. robots emotionally barren man thathejusthastohelphim. moral has inmindwhenhetalks aboutactingoutofrespectforthemorallaw. him to give money is ratherthanduty! He is what moved theagenttoact beggar some moneyandtells youthathe beggar having sympathy forthesufferingofothersandnoinclinationtohelpthem.But need to getrid of sympathy, empathy,desires, love, and inclinations. This 5  …he neverthelesstears himself from his deadlyinsensibilityandperformstheaction without any To makethispointclearer,Kantasksustoconsidersomeonewhohasno The moral lawis whathecalls the “Categorical Imperative”. Hethinks Imagine thatyouarewalking withafriend.You pass someone begging For Kant,yourfriend’s action has Let usseewhyKantisnotsayingthis.Consider an actionsuchasgivingto inclination at all, but solelyfromdutythenforthefirsttimehisaction moral has genuineworth . However, Kantdoes think yourfriendshould be applauded as such an Ibid. action. thosedesires. , p.43. Chapter 13 even if the agentlacked the desire to do so. If the answer is “yes” , we willconsiderKant’s exampleofsuicideattheend The questionforKantisnotwhetheranagenthasdesiresbut ! He is not saying that before we! Heisnotsayingthat canactmorallywe . Iftheyacted no moralworthbecausewhatismoving because feels suchanempathywiththepoor respect forthemorallaw ofthosedesires they actedin for thesakeof Kant isnottellingustobecome acting in accordance with dutyandhence would have . Hehas actually been . 5 Youto studyonly ought An imperative isjustacommand.“Cleanyourroom!”animperative I Weare linked.Considerthen, willconsidertheseinturn,showinghowthey you that l will pay you back I will be more likely to get a loan fromyou.In to get more likely you backIwillbe you thatlwillpay you careaboutdoingwell, thatyouwant tosucceedinthetestetc. whether tomake a false promise. Perhaps I think thatbyfalsely promising to followit.Forexample,thecommand “do notpeeltheskinofbabies”is to cleanherroom. Most commands are hypothetical.Forexample,“study!” give mydaughterevery Saturday.“Donotparkinfrontofthesegates!”isa CI-1. permissible. Ifwe actinaccordance with thosethenwe areactingfromduty do it,iscompletelyirrelevant. and is best seenthroughthefollowingexamples. Imagine I’m considering a clean room and about whather dad thinks, thenitis not true thatshe ought ambition, orthatyoureallywant todoit,orthatyourteacherhastoldyou and soul”isacommandfromtheBible. and ouractionshave moralworth.Letuslookatwhatthismeans. command on myneighbour’s gate.“Love yourGodwithallheart,mind categorical. You oughtnottodothisandthefactthat thismightbeyourlife’s room isdependentonconditionsaboutherandme.Ifshedoesnotcare categorical of whatconsequences might follow, or whomaynothave toldthem to followitirrespectiveought following it,irrespectivefeel about ofhowthey her room, this is hypothetical. Thisisbecausewhethersheoughttocleanher her room,thisishypothetical. 7  6  8  What aboutthe“categorical”part?Ifacommand is categoricalthenpeople The next thingwe need is the idea of a “maxim”. This is relatively simple for example, “you ought not lie” —are moral “oughts” —forexample,“youought thinks that Kant Initially itis worth considering what “categorical” and “imperative” mean. Kant’s idea is that we use this “test” to see what maxims are morally Contrast thiswithHypotheticalImperatives. If Itellmydaughtertoclean CI-3: CI-2: CI-1: always atthesametimeasanend,never merely asameans member intheuniversal kingdomofends become auniversal law Ibid Ibid. Ibid. ., p.21. …every rational being must so act as if he were throughhis maxim always a lawmaking …act only according to that maxim through which you can at thesametimewill that it So act that you use humanity, in your own person as wellhumanity, inyourownperson So actthatyouuse of anyother, asintheperson , p.66. , p.15. . Theyapplytopeopleirrespective ofhowtheyfeelaboutthem. . 6

if certain things are true about you; forexample,that about certainthingsaretrue . 8

. 7 35 Kantian Ethics 36 NORMATIVE ETHICS The “test” thatCI-1prescribesis the following.Consider the maxim on which you are thinking about acting,andaskwhetheryoucaneither(i)conceiveyou arethinking watch TV”. what isnotmoral.Presumablywe canthinkoflotsmaxims,whichare will asauniversal law andforthistobetrueitmustatleastpossible is 5ft11.Ithastobepossible will thatyournameisJillorheight For example,“whenever Iam going toexercise I will do it foranabove the Let’s putthesebitstogetherinrelationtoCI-1 thought aboutitintheseterms. to beactingonthemaxim“ that casemymaximissomethinglike“ then itismorallypermissible. that maximanditismorallyimpermissibletodoso.IfpassestheCItest, that itbecome a universal law,or(ii)willthatitbecome a universal law.Ifa get any maxim to pass the CI-1 test by simply adding moreandspecific get anymaximtopassthe CI-1testby 5. TheFirstFormulationoftheCategoricalImperative did we tellyouaboutKant’swork!). Letusconsideranexample. details, suchasnames, heights orlocations, and youare5ft11,canlie”willfailtobeuniversalized becauseyoucannot a universalbecause maxims suchas“ifyournameisJill law.This isimportant averageuniversalized amountof time”.Thismaximcannotbe becausewe cannot conceive thateveryone doessomethingabove “average”. it actuallytocomeabout.Thisshowsthatthecommon concern thatwe can is morally impermissible. Some maxims are justmathematicallyimpossible. is ageneralprincipleorruleuponwhichwe act.We donotdecide on asetof maxim fails on either (i) or (ii) then there is nogoodreasonforyoutoacton there maxim failsoneither(i)or(ii)then maxims, perhapswritingthemdown,andthentrytoliverather a bythembut maxim of anactionwhetherornotweis theprincipleorrule thatcanmakesense have promise Ishoulddoso” non-moral, whichpassthetest,for example, “whenever Iamboredwill 9  …act onlyaccording tothatmaxim throughwhichyoucanatthesametimewillthatitbecomea Imagine Idecidetoexercisebecausefeeldepressed,thenmaybesaid Kant is Finally, itis worth remembering thatthemaxim must be ableto Equally heisnotsayingthatifamaximcannotbeuniversalized thenit universal law Ibid . not . 9 sayingthattheCI-1testisaway ofworkingoutwhatisand . WheneverI willexercise” Ifeeldepressed whenever Icanbenefitfrommaking a false fails . Thisisvery abstract(what . A maxim . A willed as “ would want tobehelpedifyouwere inneed.In which case you arebeing Recall theexampleofmakingafalsepromise to securealoan.Themaximis 6. Perfect andImperfectDuties failing at(i)means we aredealingwithwhatKantcalls a the world would be a horrible place. Rather Kant is asking about whether wewhether about is asking Kant place. Rather a horrible world wouldbe the them” tobecomeauniversal morallaw. process that Again thisisathought the future,namely, thinks thatanyonethinkingaboutthiswillsee that maxim will failat(ii) giving totheneedydoesnotthreaten pass theCI-1test? all peopleincircumstances. Failing at(ii)is what Kantcalls a and henceitismorallyimpermissible.Herewhy. anyone can,inprinciple,gothroughthesamelineofreasoning. cannot universalize themaxim,thenmakingafalsepromisebecomesmorally can make false promises” was to become a universal law then therewould can duty of promisingandlyingwe seethemaximwillfailtestand,becausewe inconsistent ifyouwilledthat“peopleshould not helpthoseinneed”should impermissible. Thisistrueuniversally forallpeopleincircumstances for is whetherIcouldconceive orwillthatthisbecomeauniversal law. anyone money but we decide not tohelpthem.Inthiscase our maxim is “whenever making a promise relies on . Butif “whenever it is of benefit to you, you will become auniversalwant law.Foryoumight people tohelpthoseinneed be notrustandhencepromising.Sobysimplythinkingabouttheidea example we have shownwe have a perfect dutynottomakefalsepromises. everyone didthat?”CI-1is everyone elsecould make afalsepromise if itwouldbenefitthemtodo someone is inneedandasksformoneydonotgive themmoney”.Doesthis so. Kantthinkssuchasituationisnotconceivable becausethevery ideaof not saying that it iswrongtomakefalsepromisesbecause ifpeopledidthen not sayingthat whenever Icanbenefitfromdoing so, Ishouldmake a falsepromise You cannotknowifyouwillbeinneedthefuture andpresumablyyou A maximfailingat(i)iswhatKantcallsa It is absolutely key to recognize that CI-1 is not simply asking “what if “what asking CI-1 isnotsimply to recognize that It isabsolutelykey I couldnot.Ifeveryone followedwe thismaximthen wouldallbelieve No it fails theCI-1test. No it the maximpasses (i) not that is true it Although Consider anotherexample.Imaginethatsomeoneinneedasksusfor So wemaxim “whenever cannotwillthe someoneisinneeddonothelp , andfailingat(ii)meanswe aredealingwithwhatKantcallsan conceive orwill . can gothroughanditmeansthatthismoralclaim istrueuniversally for themaximto becomeauniversal law. you . not aformofUtilitarianism the very idea contradiction inconception ofgivingmoneyaway. Kant (see Chapter 1 Chapter perfect duty ”. Thequestion contradiction in ). Kant is ). Kant imperfect . Inour , and 37 Kantian Ethics 38 NORMATIVE ETHICS “rights”. If someone has a right then they havethen they “rights”. Ifsomeonehasaright thisright irrespective ofgender, After allshedoesnotstopbeingaperson. 7. SecondFormulationoftheCategoricalImperative The secondformulation(CI-2)isthefollowing: The final formulation of theCategoricalImperativeThe finalformulation isacombinationof CI-1 you, Iwas inasense you shouldnotusepeople,becauseifdo,arefailingtotreatthemas your car and point a gun atyourhead and ask to betakentheairportthen who actonCI-1.Theynever actonamaxim whichcannotbecomeauniversal I amnottreatingyouasanendbutrathersolely asameans,whichiswrong. Kant doesnotbelieve thistobemorallywrongbecauseIamrespecting youas Kant thinksthatCI-1andCI-2aretwosides of thesamecoin,thoughprecisely and Summary treated you as a . I wouldhavetreated youasarationalagent. donehadIaskedyouforyour that you havethat driver.decided tobecomeataxi freely IfIuseyouasameans are they purely onthebasisthat people withrespectanddignity treat location, personalcircumstances, relationshipstatus,politicalviewpoint etc. and CI-2. It asks us to imaginea kingdom which consists of only those people a rationalagent;afterall,you an end.Icould treat someone as anend a means.Ishouldalways treatyouasafreerationalagent. a rationalagent.SoaccordingtoKantIshouldalways treatyouasanendnot a rationalagentandthisismorallywrong. rational agents, and not because of their race, ,education,upbringing agents, andnotbecauseoftheir rational 8. TheThirdFormulationoftheCategorical Imperative how they are relatedisamatterofscholarlydebate.Putveryhow they simply CI-2says by askingyoutotakemetheairportIamalso treatingyouasanend.But education, upbringing etc.Forexample, Jill has a righttofreespeech because etc. FromthisyoucanalsoseethatKant’stheoryallowsustospeakabout me havechosen tolet essay andyouhadfreely givenBut it. I didnotask that she isaperson,consequentlythatrightwillnotdisappearifchangesher 10  So act thatyouusehumanity,inyourownpersonaswell as inthepersonof any other,always at Importantly, CI-2does not saythatyou has awaythen Kant’s theory ofrespectingthe For example,ifIuseyouressaywithoutknowledge thenIhave not the sametimeasanend,never merelyasameans Ibid. , p.66. making choicesonyourbehalf chose tobeataxidriver. Ofcourse, if Igetinto by . 10 treating themasameans.Suppose either and thus did not treat you as andthusdidnottreat treatsomeone as ameans dignity ofpeople.We should or

We considersome ofthesebelow.However, aswithallthephilosophical (another is lying see written about Kant’sethics.Hehasaprofoundanddeepinsightintothe written 9. KantonSuicide Jill hasarighttolife“if…”andthenhaveThis isprecisely tofillintheblanks. In summary,we have seenthatKantthinksactshave moralworthonly Kant isnotoriouslystingy withexamples.Onehedoesmentionissuicide to behuman.Kant’smoraltheoryisradically that we oughtnottokillJill,andthisholdstrueinallcircumstances. their dignity. Any theory thatis to have a hope of capturing our notion of to individualpersonalcircumstances, race, genderandethnicity.Everyone is CI-1. ThisiswhyCI-3oftencalledthe“KingdomofEnds”formulation: law. Insuch a kingdompeoplewould treat peopleas ends, because CI-2passes Categorical Imperative inoneofitsformulations. defenders across the world.Before we turnto theseworries, we workthrough disappears ifcircumstances change.Jillhas arighttolife,period;we donotsay an examplethatKantgives regardingsuicide. weall instances.Fromthis,itfollowsthat a setofmoral taught cannotbe rules foreachandevery situationandKantbelieves thatitisuptouswork rights needs to be able to respect the thought that a rightisnotsomethingthat that rights needstobeablerespectthethought questions about mental health andreligion. questions about of Kant’s viewis An attraction ideas we discuss in thisbook,Kant’sworkisstillvery muchalive andhas it outforourselves bythinkingrationally. irrespective ofconsequences and desires. If lyingiswrongthenitin if theyactoutof respect for the moral law, which they do by following the if theyarecarriedoutforthesakeofduty. Agents actforthesakeofduty have exceptionsandCI-2tellsusthatwe should end inthemselves and equal beforethemorallaw! something thatKant’stheorycangive us.CI-1generatesmaximswhichdonot nature of morality and he raises some fundamental questions about what it is what it and heraisessomefundamentalquestionsabout of morality nature 11 …every rational being mustsoact as if he were throughhis maxim always a lawmaking member  There have been,andcontinuetobe,manybooksjournalarticles There are, though, a number of tough questions that Kant’s workraises. questions that a numberoftough There are,though, Related to this, his theory respects the rights of individualsand,relatedly, rights respects the Related tothis,histheory Consequently, Kant thinks that acts are wrong and right universally,acts arewrongandright Consequently, Kantthinksthat in theuniversal kingdomofends Ibid ., p.21. Chapter 13 never . 11 solely asameanstoanend.Ittellsus,forexample,

). This is an emotive topic and linked to Egalitarian always ashistheoryisblind treateveryone asan 39 Kantian Ethics 40 NORMATIVE ETHICS Kant self-loveKant self isa leadingtothedestructionof Imperatives? We willlookatthefirsttwoformulations. Notice afewoddthingshereinrelationtoCI-1.The pointaboutuniversalisation Let’s seehowthismightwork. framework should allow us to “plug in” the issue and “get out” ananswer.framework shouldallowusto“plugin”theissueand“get the abilitytoapplyhis Categorical Imperatives in a dispassionate way. His thinks thatwe have a this maxim? Kant thinksnot.Forhim it isunclearhow we could will itthat asking ustoconsiderthis pointuniversalised. Itdoesnotaddweightto the result of all rationalagentsasthe about mymotives thismeansIwillbeactingonmaxim:“Fromself‐love I continued existencethreatensmoreevilthanitpromises satisfaction. For claim thatitisacontradiction. commit suicide.Todosoismorallywrong.ThishowKantputsit: But whydoes he thinkthis?Howdoes this fitwithKant’sCategorical ourselves andthuswant to“avoidevils”thatmaybefallus. outcomes in one’s life. All suicide attempts areduetothefactthatwe love is “avoid evil”. Bywhich he means avoiding suffering, pain,and other negative more evilthanitpromisessatisfaction”. make asmyprincipletoshortenlifewhenitscontinueddurationthreatens someone whoattemptssuicide self-love thedestructionofoneself. It seems that thereisnothingadded by seems irrelevant.could have Kant justsaiditisacontradictiontowillfrom 13 12 . Kant, I. Kant, I. Kant thinksthatsuicideisalways wrongandhasvery harshwordsfor Imagine then that I decidetocommitsuicide.GivenImagine thenthat we what have justsaid Following CI-1thequestiontheniswhetheritpossibletouniversalise Fundamental torememberisthatforKantthemotive thatdrives He whosobehaves,and makesathingofhimself,becomes whohasnorespectforhumannature One sees at oncea contradiction whose lawwoulddestroylife[suicide]by One sees in asystemofnature of allduty. means ofthevery samefeelingthat actssoastostimulatethefurtheranceoflife[self-love], and for oursportasweor adog,forheisnolongerhumanbeing;hasmadethingof doahorse for everyone anObject of freewill.We arefreetotreathim as abeast,thing,andtousehim humanity inhim. should respect himself, and,havinghimselfdiscardedhishumanity,hecannotexpectthatothers hold as a universal law of nature andis, consequently, wholly opposed to the supreme principle hence therecould be noexistenceasasystemof nature. Therefore,suchamaxim cannot possibly Grounding fortheMetaphysicsofMorals Lectures onEthics 12 perfect , 27;373. (rather thananimperfect)dutytoourselves notto self-love , Ak IV, 422 13 can destroy themselves contradiction whentheir all . Thushe suicide “objects” or“beasts”“things”.So,whatisthedifferencebetween beastsor of Kant’sassumptionregarding a by-product “contradiction” seemsmorelike This ismorallywrong. you arerespectingyourrationality wrong. This amounts to treating them asmerelymeanstoourownend.Givenwrong. Thisamountstotreating wrong. were truethentherewouldbeno“contradiction”.Hence,itseems wrong to It isfinewherepeoplehave given for you totreatthemthatway. In for Kant our is offundamentalvalue.our rationality for Kant Ifanyone’sactionsdonot treating yourself asameremeanstosomeend —namelytheofavoiding treating the firstformulationdoes not give Kanttheconclusion thatsuicide is morally the motivation ofsuicidalpeople.Sowe canavoidthe“contradiction”ifwe that do notlinktotheCategorical Imperatives.that Forexample,hetalksabout to treatourselves asameans to anend.We are, then,treatingourselves asa that case, suicide might belikethetaxidriver case. We have freelydecided that itissometimesfinetotreatpeopleasameans toanend,e.g.ataxidriver. to anend. that we cantreatothersasobjects,beastandthing.Theythusyou pain andsufferingetc. —notanendinitself.Youyourself as aretreating promise example. In this it seems that thevery concept of a promise relies agent. Withagent. regardtoattempting suicideyouractioniswrongbecauseyou you withrespectasarationale and stillbetreating a beast,object,andthing a “beast”“thing”an“object”,notas a human beingwiththegiftofreason. at. Forhimcommittingsuicideis all thisyoucanseewhatKantisgetting suicide. Rememberhecallssuchpeople assessment ofpeopleattempting allow forthepossibilitythatsuicide need notbedriven byself-love. Ifthis call the dutynotto kill oneself recognize someoneelse’s rationality then theyhave donesomethingmorally rational agent and not doing something morally wrong by committing suicide. and notdoingsomethingmorallywrong by rational agent objects or things, and humans? The answer is that we are on trust,whichlyingwoulddestroy.Incontrastinthesuicide case the if youarerationalthenmustthinkthatitisOKtouniversalise themaxim haveYou ignoredyourown rationality. have treatedyourselfasameremeans suicide you are treating yourself asameremeanstoanend.Yousuicide youaretreating might think person There are some other things that Kant says about the wrongnessof suicide says about Kant that There aresomeotherthings Moreover, ifyoudo this, then otherstreatingyouwithrespect This helpsusunderstandKant’sharsh Moving tothesecondformulation. But, likethefirstformulationthisisvery weak. Itisunclearwhyinattempting Second, itisnotreallya“contradiction”atall!Itdifferenttothelying can conclude that you also want others to treatyouin this way. Because — if such a duty exists by consideringsuicide.Recall,Kantsays — a “perfect” duty.So rational . Recall, that as arational 41 Kantian Ethics 42 NORMATIVE ETHICS 10. ProblemsandResponses:ConflictingDuties your doorandasksifyouarehidingJews?WhatmightKant’stheorytell your basementinNaziGermany.ImaginethenthatanSS officer knocks at we areinalawcourtand the SS officer asks us under oath.In that example, we canchoosetoextinguish.However, we neednotdiscussthishere. Jewish people. Kant’s theory but rather that Kant’s theoryisunderspecifiedandfailstogiverather that Kant’s theorybut Kant’s theoryforitdoesseemmorallywrongtoreveal thelocationof Kant’s theorymorallyrepugnant. in If moraldutiesapply Rickman Chapter 13 duties whichconflict?Imaginethatyouhave hiddensome Jewish peoplein apply generic rules whilst paying no attention to whatisbeforeus.So no attention generic ruleswhilstpaying apply a requirement a startingpointformoreconvincingargumentagainstsuicide.Forexample, suicide fails.TherearesomethoughwhouseKant’sideasas against argument can engineer an example that would notallowforthis.Forexample,perhaps can engineeranexamplethat required totelltheSSofficeroursecret?Ifthisisconclusionthenitmakes us todo? Our dutyistorefrainfrom lying so does this mean we aremorally humans beingthepropertyofGodandhenceourlives notbeing something each individual situation intoaccount. He does not justwant us to mindlessly example thereis a way nottolie.Forexample,ifwe simplystayed silent (see silence wouldnotbeanoption.Thiscertainlyseemtocountagainst see So the point is not that these sortsofexamplesare“knock down”criticismsof point isnotthat So the 14 …it should be plain that more than oneimperative/moral principle is relevant to the situation.

There is a consensus between Kantscholars that, as it stands, Kant’s The mainpointthoughisthatKantthinkswe needtotakethefeaturesof greater evilshouldbeapplied. I thinkKantmight say thatalthough lying isnever right,itmight Kant. Onecouldassume,however,from the thathisgeneralapproach of distinguishingthelesser However, Even if we respond in this sort of way inthis example, presumably we Certainly we should tellthetruth;butdowe notalsohave adutytoprotect aninnocentman of valuesis noexplicit Unfortunately, asfarIknow,therediscussionofthisissuein here. from harm? Further, dowe nothave anobligation to fight evil? We areconfronted withaconflict be thelesserevilinsomecases J. DavidVelleman P. Rickman, ‘Having Trouble with Kant?’, With_Kant writesregardingthesetypesofcases: ).

there is no requirement in Kant’stheorytotellthetruth is norequirement there not tolie (1999)and . Lyingisaboutintentionaldeceit,so maybe inthis all . 14 circumstances, then what happens whenwewhat circumstances,then have Michael Cholbi https://philosophynow.org/issues/86/Having_Trouble_ (2000). , there is just , there Peter

“intuitive”. Sohowworriedshould we beifKant’stheoryleads to counter 11. ProblemsandResponses:TheRoleofIntuitions 12. ProblemandResponses:CategoricalImperatives and Etiquette was inmany teams,hisdegreewas insports andexerciseiftherewere ever Kant arguesthatwhatwe aremorallyrequiredtodoisamatterofreason.If thought experimentsthatshowthisisamorallyrepugnantposition. this theory? guidance withthesespecific sorts of cases. In fact,we mightthinkthatthisis Consider an example.Ihadafriendatuniversity whowas asportsman. He probably findsome people atsome point intimethatwouldfind thisview particular, whetheritcanbedoneinaway consistentwith theotheraspects people reason in the right waypeople reasonintheright lying will recognise,forexample, that thenthey do ineachsituation.We willleavedone andin thereadertoseeifthiscanbe a spare minute he would be running, on his bike or in thepool.Unsurprisingly on hisbike a spareminutehewould berunning, as anyform of testforamoraltheory. Intuitions arenotoriouslyfickleand and thegeneralwayhas leftituptous workoutwhatto ofproceedingbut an advantagehas given ofhistheorythat usthesupremeprincipleofmorality counter intuitive.for him,ismorallyimpermissibleinall Forexample,lying, role, ifany,shouldintuitionshave intheformationandtestingofmoral question tokeepattheforefrontofyourmindwhenreadingthisbook.What One of the most commoncriticismslevelledof the One is simply it is that Kant’s theory at of hismoraltheory. is wrong. However, some philosophers, for example intuitive consequences? This thenraisesamoregeneralmethodological unreliable. Even ifyoupick theoddestviewyoucanthinkof,would instances irrespective oftheconsequences.Yet we seemtobeablegenerate have worried about thislinktoreason. The strength ofFoot’s challenge is that he woreatracksuitand trainers allthetime! etiquette seem to beCategoricalImperatives butare she agreesthatmoralityisasystemofCategorical Imperatives butsaysthat 15

However, inKant’sdefencewe mightaskwhywe shoulduseourintuitions Foot usestheexampleof need notbeduetoreason P. Foot,‘Morality asaSystemofHypotheticalImperatives’. . etiquette to motivate herargument. not groundedinreason. (1920–2010), 15 Rulesof 43 Kantian Ethics 44 NORMATIVE ETHICS 13. ProblemsandResponses:TheDomainofMorality what helikedwearing. However, tomymindatleast,thisreason,whichwas Kant thinksthatthedomain of moralityis merely thedomain of reasons and tracksuit and trainers. I asked him about thisand his response was that itwas this upbecause,asfarwenot know,catsarenotrationalagents.Despiteit that toward non-rationalagents.Considersomeone kicking acat.We mightthink than thescopeofreasons.People dothinkthatwe have moralobligations to Kant,treatthemaswe like! to putforward theargumentthatinparticularcaseofmoral“oughts”,we people ought to treat us with dignity.The flip side of this is that non-rational first person,orweperson inthe dinner table our feet onthe not toput ought during amealetc.Itis not simplyamatter ofthinkingintherightway but agents, such asnon-humananimals,donothaveagents, rightsandwe can,according as farwe areagentswhocanreasonthenwe have dutiesandrights a challengetohim.Thatis,we needindependentreasons to thinkthatthe are categorical a tracksuit.Footwouldagreeandthinksthatrulesofetiquette rather torecognisethese“oughts”aspartofasharedculturalpractice. recognise thatwe oughtnottowear tracksuits tofunerals,or(tothinkofsome categorical weother rulesofetiquette) oughtnottoreplyaletterwritteninthethird institutional practices. havethan in reasonrather categorical nature to groundthe agoodargument have. because ifwe did,thenwe wouldbemore likelytotreathumansinthisway. being wrongtotreatanimalsinthisway, Kant because they are not dependenton any particulardesires someone would he reallyoughtnothavebased onhisdesire,didnotchangethefactthat worn formal funeralarranged.Myfrienddecidedtogothisinhis big shared cultural practice. To respond to this challenge, the Kantian would haveKantian shared culturalpractice.Torespondtothischallenge,the not rules of reason. We do not thinkthatif we reasoned correctly we would The challenge to Kant’s theory is that the scope of morality seems bigger the scope ofmorality The challengetoKant’stheoryisthat However, even iftheyarecategorical,Footthinksthatrulesofetiquette During oursecond year atuniversity amutualfrienddied. There was a So althoughthisdoes not show that Kantiswrong,itdoes throw down morally natureofmoral“oughts”arebasedon theyoughtnottodothis.However, Kant’stheorydoesnotback still thinks thatwe shouldnot reason and not just part of a andnotjustpart , SUMMARY ISSUES TOCONSIDER COMMON STUDENTMISTAKES • • • • • 1. 2. Think aboutyourlife.Doyouthinktherearethings you“oughttodo”? Thinking Kantbelieves youcannever treatsomeoneasameanstoan Thinking thattheCategoricalImperative isaformofUtilitarianism. Thinking thatKant’sCategoricalImperative canbesummedupinthe Thinking thatKant’stheoryhasnoroomforemotions. Confusing actingin desires andinclinations? Do youthinkthattherearethingsoughtto do irrespective ofyour question: “howwouldyoulikeitifeveryone didthat”? end. what is morally permissible. Hence Kant can talk aboutabsolute we needtoactoutofrespectforthemorallawandthisamounts good. Ifwewill isunconditionally wantto actforthesakeofduty which heattemptstodevelop acompletemoralsystem. Kant’s moraltheoryisextremelycomplicatedandbadly following theCategoricalImperative, agentswillconverge on to followingtheCategoricalImperative. Kantargues that in and objective moraltruths. us toactforthesakeofdutyisgoodwill,andthat expressed. However, it is hugely influentialand profound. As a system builderKant’sworkstartswithrationalreflectionfrom He startsfrom the notionof duty. Heshows that whatallows accordance with dutyandacting for thesakeof duty. 45 Kantian Ethics 46 NORMATIVE ETHICS KEY TERMINOLOGY 10. 4. 7. 9. 6. 3. 8. 5. What roledoyouthinkintuitionsshouldhave inassessingmoral Why mightKant’stheorybewell placedtorespectpeople’srights? Would capitalpunishmentpasstheCI-2test? What areCategoricalandHypotheticalImperatives? Doyouthinkthat would Kantsay? How mightCI-2relatetoprostitution?DoyouthinkthatKantwould How mightKantrespondtotheSSofficerexample? theories? Can youthinkofsomeexampleswheremightbetreatingsomeone Do youthinkwe have anymoralobligationstowards animals?What rules ofetiquettearecategoricalorhypothetical? say thatitismorallypermissible?(Seealso solely asmeans-to-an-end? A priori Egalitarian Categorical Imperative Duty Deontological Rights Rationalist Maxim Good will Chapter 10 ). ―, ―, Velleman, J.David,‘A RightofSelf-termination?’, References Kant, Immanuel, Foot, Philippa,‘MoralityasaSystemofHypotheticalImperatives’, Rickman, Peter, ‘HavingTroublewithKant?’, Cholbi, MichaelJ.,‘KantandtheIrrationalityofSuicide’, Translated andanalysedbyH.J.Paton (Oxford:Routledge,2013). Beyond Price:EssaysonBirthandDeath Lectures onEthics Philosophical Review Quarterly 2015), at openbookpublishers.com/reader/349 https://doi.org/10.1086/233924 https://philosophynow.org/issues/86/Having_Trouble_With_Kant https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0061 , 17.2(2000):159–76. MoralLaw:TheGroundworkoftheMetaphysicsMorals, (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,1997). , 81.3(1972):305–16, (Cambridge:OpenBookPublishers, https://doi.org/10.2307/2184328 ; freelyavailable at Philosophy Now Ethics , 109.3(1999):606–28, History ofPhilosophy , freelyavailable https://www. The

47 Kantian Ethics

CHAPTER 3

Aristotelian Virtue Ethics

To seek virtue for the sake of reward is to dig for iron with a spade of gold.1

1. Aristotelian Virtue Ethics Introduction

Aristotle (384–322 BC) was a scholar in disciplines such as ethics, metaphysics, biology and botany, amongst others. It is fitting, therefore, that his moral philosophy is based around assessing the broad characters of human beings rather than assessing singular acts in isolation. Indeed, this is what separates Aristotelian Virtue Ethics from both Utilitarianism and Kantian Ethics.

2. The Function Argument

Aristotle was a teleologist, a term related to, but not to be confused with, the label “teleological” as applied to normative ethical theories such as Utilitarianism. Aristotle was a teleologist because he believed that every object has what he referred to as a final cause. The Greek term telos refers to what we might call a purpose, goal, end or true final function of an object. Indeed, those of you studying Aristotle in units related to the may recognise the link between Aristotle’s general teleological worldview and his study of ethics. Aristotle claims that “…for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the ‘well’ is thought to reside in the function”.2 Aristotle’s claim is essentially that in achieving its function, goal or end, an object achieves its own good. Every object has this type of a true function and so every object has a way of achieving goodness. The telos of a chair, for example, may be to provide a seat and a chair is a good chair when it supports the curvature of the human bottom without collapsing under the strain. Equally, says Aristotle, what makes good sculptors, artists and flautists is the successful and appropriate performance of their functions as sculptors, artists and flautists.

1 I. Panin, Thoughts, p. 92, https://ia601405.us.archive.org/8/items/thoughts00panigoog/thoughts00 panigoog.pdf 2 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, http://sacred-texts.com/cla/ari/nico/index.htm 50 NORMATIVE ETHICS Aristotle wrotethat“…aseye, hand,footandingeneraleachoftheparts Function Argument In workingoutourtruefunction, Aristotle looks to thatfeature function thatdetermineswhetherornotitisagood car. wefar fromunreasonablethat have afunctionaswhole.Indeed,thismay not onlytoreasonbut from therestofworldisourability 3. Aristotelian Goodness the functionofahumanbeingis,asperhisFunction Argument. point, Aristotle directshisthinkingtowards humanbeingsspecifically. Given theabove, hopefullythesestepsoftheargumentareclearsofar. At this know whatmakesagoodkidneyforexample —so too Aristotle thinksit do nothave areligiousworldviewofyourown.However, toyouespecially achieved whenwe act inaccordance with our apart fromallthese?” function orend,so a true reasons differentiating characteristic On thebasis of the previous argument, thegood life for ahuman being is in accordancewiththistruefunctionor uniquely differentiatingcharacteristicandwe achieve thegood when we act identifies whatthegoodforahumanbeingisinvirtueofworkingout man fromotherlivinganimals be plausible if weplausible be considerotherobjects.Thecomponentpartsofacar, for backdrop tounderstanding Aristotle’s ethical reasoning. For,justasachairhas example, have individual functions but a car itself, as a whole, has its own evidently hasafunction,mayonelayitdownthatmansimilarlyfunction 3  1. 4. 2. 3. This teleological (function and purpose) based worldview is the necessary This teleological(functionandpurpose)basedworldviewisthe The notionthatmanhasatruefunctionmaysound odd, particularly ifyou On thebasisthatwe wouldascribeafunctiontoourconstituentparts —we Ibid An objectisgoodwhenitproperlysecuresits All objectshave a The goodforahumanbeingis,therefore,actinginaccordancewith The reason. . Thus, just as the function of a chair can be derived from its . telos ofahumanbeingisto 3 telos , so the function of a human being is relatedtoour , sothefunctionofahumanbeing Aristotle believeshavehuman beings a . . According to Aristotle, whatseparatesmankind reason telos . . telos telos . However, ratherthan .

telos . Aristotle separates uniquely act on Aristotle meansby The quotation provided at theendofsection three was the firstdirect reference yet beenidentified.Whilealltranslationshave theirownissues, when describingthestateofactinginaccordancewithourtruefunction. well alignedwithactinginaccordance with our 4. Flourishing inlifemay make us happy buthappiness itself is not necessarily term to virtue in the explanatory sections ofthischapter.Withexplanatory in the to virtue Aristotle’s theoretical term happinessasatranslationfor leaving theconcept of goodness as generalandabstractwe can saymore good life. According to Aristotle, life. According good presuppositions now laid out, we can begin to properly explainand evaluate aim for as it is the aim andendofhumanexistence.Toreachthisstate,weis the aim forasit understood asflourishing clearer. rational andcognitive aspects. or animalisticqualitiesbutastheresultofexercise ofourdistinctlyhuman or virtue”. involves “…the active exerciseofthemind in conformity withperfectgoodness upon asimpletranslationofhappiness.Thefollowingexamplemaymakethis moral position. must ourselves actinaccordance with reason.Properlyunderstandingwhat his conceptionofthevirtues andtheirlinktomoralthinking. but it may be easier to stay with the understanding of the with easier tostay may be it but specifically what the good for ahumaninvolves.specifically whatthe Aristotle usestheGreek 4  Aristotle concludes that a life is Eudaimonia Eudaimonia Naomi is an extremely talented pianist. Some days, she plays music that simply makes of “Twinkle, Twinkle LittleStar”.Onotherdays,sheplayscomplexmusic such asthe the worksofgreatercomplexity. than theformer.Ifweperformances makeNaomihappy of function,both usethelanguage supremely difficult Chopin-GodowskyÉ happy, but she seems to be flourishing as a pianist only with the latter performances rather she seemstobeflourishing asapianistonlywiththelatter but happy, her happy,perhapsthetunefrom the televisionsoapopera“Neighbours”orarendition but shefulfilsherfunctionasapianist(and Ibid eudaimonia . 4

Eudaimonia hasbeenvariously translatedandnoperfecttranslation has to capture the state that we tocapturethestatethat experienceifwe fully andVirtue eudaimonia issecured not astheresultexercisingofourphysical is perhaps themost helpful translationand improves iscrucialtounderstandinghisVirtue Ethical eudaimonia eudaimon eudaimonia tudes is agoodpianist)onlywhensheflourisheswith . These performances may also make Naomi isthestatethatallhumansshould (adjective of we meanreallyor telos . Perhaps, ifwe preferthe eudaimonia eudaimonia asflourishing truly eudaimonia ) whenit achieve happy, a 51 Aristotelian Virtue Ethics 52 NORMATIVE ETHICS “Anyone canbecome angry —that iseasy.Buttobewiththeright “what should I Agent-Centred MoralTheories Act-Centred MoralTheories Aristotle identifiesvirtuesinpractice. Aristotelian Virtuein virtueofaprimary theory Ethicsisanagent-centred Virtuesrelated to arethoseparticulardispositions that areappropriately This focus on our dispositions and our character, rather than our actionsin than This focusonourdispositionsandcharacter,rather wrong. Utilitarianism andKantianEthics are twodifferentexamplesofact-centred I may become angry whenmy step-son thoughtlessly eats through the father is juggling twenty-sixfather isjuggling different tasksand momentarilylosestrackof focus onpeopleandtheircharactersratherthansingularactions.For Aristotle, time (how totally unfairofhim…). Anyway, as I was saying,backto Aristotle, the situationand, to linkbackourfunction, encourageactions that arein person, totherightdegree,attime,for therightpurpose,andin disposition in response to thatfeeling; theproperresponse.Thecorrect accordance with reason. Again, amoreconcreteexamplewillmakeclearhow and evaluating Aristotelian VirtueEthics youmustkeepinmindthisfocuson assessments and judgments. Act-centred moral theories maybeteleological character ratherthanspecificcommentsonthemoralityofactions. chapter, thesecond question maybegintotakecareofitself.Whenexplaining remaining crisps without saving any for others, or he may feel anger when he right way —that isnoteasy”. or deontological, absolutist or relativist, but they share acommon worldview they or deontological,absolutistrelativist,but centred in thatparticularactions are bearersofmoral value —either beingrightor isolation, iswhatearns Aristotelian Virtuean Ethicsthelabelofbeing morality hasmoretodowiththequestion“howshouldI moral theoriesduetotheirfocusonactionswhenitcomes to makingmoral has towaitpicked upatworkbecause hisstep- minute ortwotobe an extra 5  According to Aristotle, According All ofus,atonetimeoranother,experiencefeelings ofanger.Forexample, Aristotle referstovirtuesascharactertraitsorpsychologicaldispositions. For Aristotle, Ibid moraltheoryratherthanan . do ?” If we answer the first question then, as we see later in this virtue isnot a feeling virtues arecharacter dispositions orpersonalitytraits 5 act-centred itselfbutanappropriate psychological moraltheory. be ?” ratherthan agent- . Anger isafeelingandthereforeneithervirtuenorvice.However, the Wenature of mustkeepinmind theagent-centred Aristotelian VirtueEthics vices of excess and deficiency;suchactionmaywell involve when consideringthese examples. A persondoesnotceasetohave awitty However, ifarmed with a heavy, blunt instrumenttheirlife-riskingaction terrorist attack,thentheiractionmayberash rather thancourageous. puts theirlifeontheline,whenunarmed, in anattempttostopa would-be patience, ratherthanalackof spirit or irascibility. Virtues are not feelings, but disposition isalwaysgives onethat risetoa“middling”action.Ifsomeone disposition in virtue of a single joke that might err on the side ofbuffoonery, err on the might joke that of asingle disposition invirtue characteristic dispositional responses that, when viewedcharacteristic dispositionalresponsesthat, holistically,define correct response to anger — response thatisneitherexcessive nordeficient.Thetablebelowmakesthis response toafeelingisdescribedasactingonthebasisof respond tosituations.Hesuggeststhefollowing examples. Our psychologicaldispositions, virtuousornot,areonlytobe assessed by our charactersandwhowe are. or ceasetobegenerousbecause theyfailtodonatecharityononeoccasion. or inaction andbreathless exuberance, butas suggesting thatwe actbetween the understood as suggesting thatwe always actsomewhere between complete more apparent. may becourageouslyvirtuousratherthanrash.TheGoldenMeanisnotto Conversation Giving money Situation Anger Social conduct Indignation Fear Feeling/Emotion Shame exceptional The Golden Mean ought not tobeviewedThe GoldenMeanought a virtuous that assuggesting In additiontofeelings, Aristotle also suggests thatwe mayvirtuously patience. Vice ofDeficiency Cantankerousness Boorishness Stinginess Vice of Lack ofspirit Deficiency Cowardice Spitefulness Shyness the Golden Mean between two extremes Virtuous Disposition (Golden Mean) Wittiness Friendliness Generosity Virtuous Disposition (Golden Mean) Patience Righteousness Courage Modesty Vice ofExcess Profligacy Buffoonery Self-serving flattery Vice ofExcess Envy Irascibility Rashness Shamefulness extreme Golden Mean courage — , a is 53 Aristotelian Virtue Ethics 54 NORMATIVE ETHICS Aristotle compares thedevelopment oftheskillvirtuetodevelopment virtuous charactertraitsinattempttolive thegoodlife.You mayfeelyourself we become just bydoing just acts”. when facedwithasituationinwhichfriendliness andgenerosityare wall properly, andnorwillaskilledcyclistneedabstractreflectiononhowto will notneedabstractreflectionwhenitcomes to knowinghowbuilda In a quote widely attributed to In aquotewidelyattributed Aristotle, Excellence, then, is not an act buta habit”. therefore bemoved tobecomewittier,morecourageousandgenerous traits anddispositions. to feelings/situationsvirtuouslyjustasthegood builderbecomescomfortable traits. Ethicalcharactersaredeveloped bypracticallearningandhabitual to placethatbrickproperly.Buildingrequirespracticalskillandnotmerely these traitsinordertodevelop them. 5. Developing theVirtues possibilities; theywillsimplyknowonamore intuitive level howtoact.This is action andnotmerelybyintellectualteaching. as humanbeings,ourbehaviourwillgenerallyreflectvirtuouspersonality coming to an Aristotelian Virtue Ethicalviewafterreadingthischapter and responding to the sight of varioussight responding tothe toolsandasetofplans. A skilledbuilder of otherskills.Hesaysthat“…menbecomebuildersbybuilding”and“… intellectual knowledge and the same applies to developing virtuous character into aparticularplacebutwe aregoodbuildersonlywhenwe know is always ajourneythatrequiresbotheffortandpracticeover time. Aristotle up the Aristotelian viewbysayingthat“…we arewhatwe repeatedlydo. holds that thesame is trueforhumanbeingsattemptingtodevelop their balance hisspeedcorrectlyashegoesaroundacorner. you cannotsimplyacquirethesetraitsbydecision; rather,you must but become excellent atsomething overnight. Makingprogress in anyendeavour single-act situations.Ifwe actinaccordance with reasonandfulfilour function judgment of a person’s general character and observation over more than not tosaythatbuilders, cyclists and virtuous peoplewillnotsometimes need Aristotle, 7 . Durant, W. 6 Analogously, apersonskilledinthevirtueswill not needabstractreflection In theend,virtuousindividualwillbecome comfortable inresponding Cultivating a virtuous character is something that happensbypractice. The NicomacheanEthics The StoryofPhilosophy , http://sacred-texts.com/cla/ari/nico/index.htm , p.76. 7 We mightknowthata brick must go 6 It is fairly obvious that we cannot il Durrant Will (1885–1981)sums

how live

Aristotle suggests that theaim of anactionwillbemade clear bytherelevant Aristotle doesoffersomespecificsregardinghowexactlywe might,touse Virtue EthicsBootcamp. virtuous byfollowingexamplesofothers.Ifwe areunsureinourownability virtuous. A child,forexample,willmostcertainlyneedtolearnhowbe virtuously tovarious feelings,emotionsandsituations. into practice.Forthe virtuous charactertraits practical wisdom Aristotelian, virtuous characteristicas revealed by theGoldenMean; for example,ouraim in virtuous charactersrequiresalifetimeofworkratherthansingleweek ata work. Putting upasinglebookshelf does work. Putting not makeyouaskilledbuilderany It is the repetitionof skill thatdetermines your statusand the development of 6. PracticalWisdom ( from those more skilledthantheyinpractisingvirtue.Hopefully, such virtue that leads that virtuouswillrequirealifetimeof Aristotle tosuggestthat to reflectspecificallyonwhatdoinabnormalordifficultsituations(e.g. to discern what acourageous response in agiven situationis,thenwe may practical wisdomsupportsourinstinctive knowledge ofhowtorespond practice actions that arewittyratherthan boorish, or courageous rather than develop aswithouttheskill ofpracticalwisdom it maybedifficulttoactually at ascertaining what exactly courage or generosity amounts toinaspecific courage orgenerosity exactly what at ascertaining developingto respondcourageouslyorgenerously.Itisby be a situationmay a depressinglymodernphrase,“upskill”inordertobecomemorevirtuous. cowardly. Imagine tryingtobeaphilosopherwithoutanacutesense of logical responses willbenaturalforthosewhoareproperlyskilled. reasoning; youwouldstrugglebecausethisseems to beafoundationalgood our skillofpracticalwisdom (translation of “ of practical wisdom by looking attheactionsofotherswhoweof practicalwisdomby to be dotake on whichotherphilosophical skills rely. So too itmaybewiththevirtues, more thanasingleactofcouragemakesyoucourageousandvirtuousperson. moral dilemmas, in thecaseofethics)butnormalsituationsappropriate may actually bethemost important virtuous disposition or character trait to building apprenticelearns fromamastersotoovirtueapprenticescan learn be guidedbythebehaviour ofSocrates,Jesus, examples. Ifwe learnfromthewisdom and virtueofothers, then justasa situation andhowexactlywe mightachieve it. If thisstillseemstobesomewhatopaque,then we maydevelop oursense It istheneedtobecomeskilledwhendeveloping virtuouscharactertraits By developing theskillof practicalwisdom, we canproperlyputour Phronesis ) phronesis Gandhi ”) thatwe become better , MandelaorKing,as 55 Aristotelian Virtue Ethics 56 NORMATIVE ETHICS Aristotle’s ideas. These distinctions matter in ethics because a person might Very broadly, anactionisvoluntarywhenitfreelychosenandinvoluntary 7. Voluntary Actions, Involuntary Actions andMoral Think ofDavid,workingatabankwhengroup ofthieves breakinarmed Responsibility when itisnot —thesetermsaremorepreciselydefinednext,inlinewith with guns. David is told that if he does not open the safe then he willbe if hedoesnotopenthesafethen guns. Davidistoldthat with would not have turned the wheel and he very much regrets thedamage that is Psychological Force Psychological Force Physical Force Imagine that Reuben isdrivinghiscaronwayImagine that homefromwork.Outofthe to contribute when it comes todiscussions when itofpotential to contribute two feet,withtheirpersonallydeveloped senseofpracticalwisdom. killed. Underthisextremepsychologicalpressure, Aristotle wouldacceptthat apprentices willeventually reach a pointwheretheycan stand on theirown affected by associated with particularactions.We canseparateactionsintotwoobvious Despite thefocusonagentsandnotactions, Aristotle doeshave something David isnotmorallyresponsibleinanyway forthetheft. havebecause Davidwouldnot safe isinvoluntary, of the David’s opening categories: caused. According to Aristotle, Reuben’sactionisinvoluntarybecauseofthis opened the safe otherwise and he very much regrets doing so. On this basis, involuntary actions. According to Aristotle, anactionisvoluntaryunlessit being labelledasinvoluntary. wheel, steering the his handandforceshimtoturn grabs his passenger blue, not fortheir be heldtomorallyresponsiblefortheirvoluntaryactionsbut external physicalforceandsoheisnotmorallyresponsible forthecrash. sending thecarintooncomingtraffic.Without thisphysicalforce,Reuben 1. 2. In addition to force, ignorance of a certain type can alsosupportanaction to force,ignoranceofacertaintype In addition Voluntary actions Involuntary actions force or ignorance , asunderstoodinthefollowingways. as Action from Ignorance with No Regret Action fromIgnorancewithNoRegret Action inIgnorance Action fromIgnorance (or knowledge-based) barrier.Laurencedoes not, therefore,escapemoral However, in thedays before thesurprise concert his friend, unbeknown to Rhys, Rhys, a talented musician, wishes toperformasurpriseconcertforfriendand Rhys, atalented Return tothecase of Rhys and his Manilow performance but remove any Laurence has had too much to drink and chooses to climb a traffic light with Laurence hashadtoomuchtodrinkandchoosesclimbatrafficlight that Rhysacted involuntarily whencausing offence because he was unaware “Copacabana” classic tune stage andblasts out hisrenditionofthe takes tothe the epistemicgapisbridgedandRhyslearnsof hisfriend’s newly acquired his actionwasthis wouldnotmeanthat because Laurence involuntary distress caused. For thesereasons, Rhys bearsnomoral responsibility forthe develops an intenseandvery personaldislikeforManilow. Thus, when Rhys as Rhysactedfromignorance, butitisnotobviouslyinvoluntaryas,without a a non-voluntaryratherthaninvoluntaryaction.The actioncannotbevoluntary action —that isalsorelatedtoignorantaction. acts inignoranceratherthanfromduetoanexternalepistemic a trafficconeonhishead.Laurence’s alcohol consumptionhasmadehim can be classed as involuntary, therebyblockingassociated claims of moral responsibility. responsibility asaresultofhisself-createdignorance. of thechangedcircumstances;heactedfromignorancewhenperforming ignorant, atleast temporarily, of the consequences of this action in terms of upset resultingfromhissongchoice. musical views, he feelsnoregretforhisaction,then Aristotle wouldclass it as his friendstormsoffinmuchdistress.Inthissituation, Aristotle wouldaccept has beenpracticingsongsfromtheBarryManilowbackcatalogueforweeks. barrier, Rhyswould not have actedashedid and he very much regrets the even ifheknewwhatwas goingtohappen. sense of regret on Rhys’ part for the distress caused. If, at the moment that the distress caused.If,at for the on Rhys’part sense ofregret social relationships,employmentandpoliceaction.However, for Aristotle song ratherthanfrommalice.Without thisepistemic (orknowledge-related) sense of regret, itmay have been thatRhys would have performed the action Finally, Aristotle alsoidentifiesathirdform ofaction —non-voluntary Crucially, Aristotle does not allowthat allactionthatinvolves ignorance 57 Aristotelian Virtue Ethics 58 NORMATIVE ETHICS “what wouldJesusdo”,ifwevirtuous rolemodel, deemJesustobeamorally Virtueyou act Ethics, youmay findcoldcomfortfromsuggestionsthat vote foranincreaseinsubsidiesrenewabletechnologies athuge energy what todoyoumayconsulttheguidanceofferedbyUtilitarianismorKantian whether ornottochangecareersworkinthe charitysector —is“lookto Ethics anddiscovervarious that specificactionsyoucouldundertakeare then theactor is notmorally responsibleastheyact on thebasisof force or from from considering how truly virtuous people might respond inthissituation, virtuous peoplemight how truly from considering the moralexemplars of and guidance]?” guidance whatsoever. Who arethevirtuousagents[thatwe should look tofor generously, patientlyand modestly whilst avoiding self-serving flattery and Consider yourselfcaughtinthemiddleofamoraldilemma.Wantingto know does not, becauseitcannot,telluswhat we shoulddo…Itgives usno act —perhaps wonderingwhetherornottoreporta friend tothepolice,or ignorance. 8. Objection:UnclearGuidance our moral dilemmas are new situations, not merelyold ones repeated. Asking objection, putting forward the worry directly bysayingthat“‘Virtue Ethics of Virtue Ethics, novelor applytheiractionstoapotentially situation? Although adefender and non- of unhelpful of beingatheory,nothelpfulmoralguidance,but do inthiscase.Virtueof whattoactually Ethics maythereforebeaccused understanding andexplanations.Thesummary, however, isrefreshingly morally rightorwrong.Moving to seektheadvice of Aristotelian and we canhold theactor morally responsible.However, if the action is involuntary might notseemveryto determinewhetherornot helpfulforanMPtrying but this responseraisesitsownworry —howcanwebut who isvirtuous, identify envy. Ratherthanknowinghow to live in general,you may seek knowledge situation”, thenwe mightwell sympathisewiththeobjectorsince very often specific moralplatitudes. simple. 8 The detailabove isimportantandyourownexampleswillhelp In response,thevirtueethicistmayremindusthatwe canlearnhowtoact R. Hursthouse,‘Normative Virtue Ethics’,pp.701–03. If anactionisvoluntary,thenitcompletedfreefromforceandignorance 8 Ifallthevirtueethicistcan offer toaperson wondering how to Rosalind Gandhi (1943–)gives avoicetothiscommon and how they would act in this An entirelydifferentobjectionto Aristotelian Virtue Ethicsis basedona 10. Objection:Circularity will appropriatelyrespondtocomplexmoralsituations. A FormulaOnecar, whether thisisastrengthorweakness isforyoutodecideanddefend. 9. Objection:ClashingVirtues Ethics provides guidance in the form of “v-rules”. These are guiding rules of form of“v-rules”.Theseareguiding Ethics providesguidanceinthe Related to the general objection fromlackofguidance,adevelopedRelated tothegeneral objection for example, will begood when it has both rawspeed and delicate handling for anormative moraltheoryisajudgmentthatyoushouldmakeyourself and then defend. the form“dowhatishonest”or“avoidenvious”. the onusonskillofvirtuouspersonwhendecidinghowtoact. Again, and itisuptotheskilledengineersteerapathbetween thesetwovirtues. concept ofpracticalwisdom and suggestthattheskilledvirtuous person concern regarding logicalcircularity. According to Aristotle, thefollowing coveringcreation ofacodifiedmoralrulebook all situationsandinsteadput clashing virtuesinanygiven situation.Virtue ethicistshave nointerestinthe of friendliness;generositymaythreatenmodesty.Inthesesituations,the unfair characterisationofVirtueVirtue Ethics.Hursthousesuggeststhat may questionhow we aresupposed to cope with situationsinwhich virtues expense, and potential financial risk,tothetax-payerexpense, andpotential a deliberately (totake statements seemtobecorrect: suggestion to“bevirtuous”mayagainseembeunhelpfullyvague. seem toclash.Courageousbehaviourmay,incertaincases,meanalack situations. Whether or not you believe that this level of guidance is suitable specific example). So tooapersonwithpracticalwisdomcansteerpathbetween apparently not bespecific,buttheydostandasguidanceacross lots ofdifferentmoral 9  1. 2. To thisparticularobjection,the Aristotelian virtueethicistcaninvokethe Despite her statement of the objection, Hursthouse thinks that this isan Despite herstatementoftheobjection,Hursthousethinksthat Ibid A personisvirtuouswhen theyactinvirtuousways. An actisvirtuousifitanthataperson wouldcommitin that circumstance. . 9 Theserulesmay 59 Aristotelian Virtue Ethics 60 NORMATIVE ETHICS 11. Objection:Contributionto This, however,circular reasoning.Ifvirtuousactionsareunderstood lookstobe The finaldistinctobjectionto Aristotelian Virtue Ethicsconsidered inthis virtuous characterdispositions. virtuous isdeterminedbytheactionsofaspecificallyindividual.The virtuous actions,thenwe have unhelpfullycircularreasoning. would actuallycarrythatactionout.Virtuous peoplearelivingandbreathing It is not the case that whateverIt isnotthecasethat rather but pianist playswillbegreat, agreat In thiscase, there does not seem to beanytroublingcircularityin reasoning. for virtuouspeoplearenotjustbecauseoftheiractualactions but that greatpianistshave theskills to makegreatmusic. So too itis with virtues, is simply because it dangerously circularinthisreasoning is nothing there to ourabilitysecurea to decidewhetherornotanactisvirtuouswe canassess what avirtuous given hergenerous personality.However, byworkingherselfso hard for guide as to which actions are properlyalignedwithvirtues.Thus, if we wish person would do inthatcircumstance, but thisdoes not meanthatwhatis amounts of her time to helping others tosolveamounts ofhertimetohelping considerable cost, problemsat actually seemtocontributeourflourishingor securingthegoodlife. a reflectionofhowwe learntodevelop ourvirtuousdispositions. concrete guides,helpingustounderstandtheactionsassociated with abstract chapter stemsfromthe living virtuouslywillcontribute Aristotelian claimthat reasonably beexpected of her,we maywishtodescribe Shelley asvirtuous others, we may wonder if Shelley is unduly limiting on thefactthatcertaindispositions may seem to bevirtuousbutmaynot in terms of both time and effort, toherself. Working beyondthelimits that can issue iswhetherornotaperson,withvirtuouscharacteristicsintheabstract, virtuous peopleareunderstoodintermsof in termsofvirtuouspeople,but because ofwhotheyareandhowtheiractionsmotivated. Itistheir skills andcharactertraitsthatmeanthat,inpractice,theyprovide a clear suggests theanalogyofpiano-playing: Shelley isoftendescribed as generoustoafaultandregularlydedicates large 10 1. 2. As an example of this possible objection in practice, consider the following. As anexampleofthispossibleobjectioninpractice, considerthe . Annas, J. Julia Annas Julia A pianistisgreatwhenhe“does”pianoplaying. Great pianoplayingiswhatgreatpianistsdo. Intelligent Virtue (1946 – ) responds to this apparent problem by arguing that arguing ) respondstothisapparentproblemby . eudaimon life. A challengetothisviewmay bebased Eudaimonia her own ability to flourish. 10 Annas 12. MoralGoodandIndividual We maysaythatShelleyhas either succumbed to avice of excess and is (which claims thatpleasureistheonlysource ofwell-being who has the better life from their own individualperspectiveslife fromtheir better who hasthe happy —the with reason,sohedonists do nottherefore live according totheir Hedonist orthe Aristotelian virtuousperson —you shouldagainformyour For Aristotle, moralgoodnessandindividualmayseemtobe for aperson.Externalfactorssuchaspoverty,disease oruntimelydeath function. generous ratherthanprofligateandaccepttheuncomfortableconclusion and profligate withhertimeratherthangenerous,orwe mayaccept that sheis psychology — development ofvirtuesitis impossible for apersontoflourish even ifthey avoid poverty, disease,lonelinessetc. as a rival theoryattemptingtooutlinewhatisrequiredforwell-being, might advanceand asaresultofthesecharacteristicsdispositionswillboth their cases ifyouseektosupportthisgeneralobjection. own flourishing.Youto their contributing shouldconsideryourownpossible claim may seem more plausible ifwe ruledoutadescription ofShelleywasting own journeytowards or wasteful ratherthangenerousand,becauseofthesetraits,actuallybe own reasonedjudgment. one voice. On the contrary, the non-virtuous person will have a psychology in conflictbetween theirrational andnon-rationalelements.Inconsidering intimately linked. After all,avirtuous personwillbecharitableandfriendlyetc. may scupperaperson’sadvance towards her time. being virtuous is necessary fortheachievement of be thoughttofailbecause it downplays the importance of acting inaccordance suggest thatlivingavirtuous life is sufficient to guaranteea state of someone could be properlydescribed as rash rather thancourageous say thatthisvirtuouscharactertraitishelpinghertoflourish.Thissecond Aristotle saysofhisideallyvirtuouspersonthattheywillhave aunified It is important to note, as weto note, It isimportant that concludethischapter, Aristotle doesnot Responses tothisinitialstatementoftheobjectionarenothardimagine. Still, thisobjectionmaystand up ifyoucanenvisageasituationinwhich that theirrationaland non-rational psychologies will speakwith eudaimonia and make life better forothers.Hedonism andmakelifebetter eudaimonia . However, for Aristotle, eudaimonia — see ; withoutthe telos Chapter 1 eudaimonia ortrue ),

61 Aristotelian Virtue Ethics 62 NORMATIVE ETHICS SUMMARY ISSUES TOCONSIDER COMMON STUDENTMISTAKES • • • • • • 1. 4. 2. 3. “middling” actions. “knowing how”? Are thevirtuesfixedand absolute?Orcanvirtuesberelative toculture Who hasthebetterlife —happyhedonistorvirtuous Thinking thattheGoldenMeanalways suggests“neutral”or voluntary actions. Aristotelian Virtue Ethics is very differentinnature to theother Aristotelian Virtue Ethics offers adistinctnormative moral picture Understanding virtuesasfeelings. Is becomingmoralaskill? Ismoralitybasedon“knowingthat”or Incorrect differentiationbetween voluntary,involuntary andnon- Misunderstanding thefunctionofahumanbeing( Can Virtue Ethicsofferuseful guidance? Claiming thatVirtue Ethics isuninterestedinactions. Claiming thatVirtue Ethicsoffersnoguidancewhatsoever inmoral and time? individual? situations. Whether this,initself,isavirtueorviceanissue for your with Aristotle’s teleological claims, differing from those who possible for human beings. Regardless, there is little doubtthat act-centred normative moraltheoriesconsidered in thisbook. and thatitisatheoryworthyofyourreflections. are happytoacceptthatthereisanobjectively goodlifethatis own judgment.Thelackofacodifiedandfixedmoralrulebookis strength ofthetheory.Some,meanwhile,willfeeluncomfortable something manyviewasaflaw,whileothersperceive itasthekey eudaimonia ). Aristotle, Annas, Julia, References KEY TERMINOLOGY Panin, Ivan, Hursthouse, Rosalind,‘Normative Virtue Ethics’,in 12. 11. 10. 7. 9. 6. 8. 5. Russ Shafer-Landau(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing,2007),pp.701–09. Clarendon Press,1908),freelyavailable at nico/index.htm 01405.us.archive.org/8/items/thoughts00panigoog/thoughts00panigoog.pdf Are somevirtuesmoreimportantthanothers?Why? Aristotelian Virtue Ethics? Who mightcountasvirtuousrolemodelsandwhy? What shouldyoudoifvirtuesseemtoclashwhenfacedwithdifferent virtue? If thereisnopurposetolife,anypointinsubscribing Is theGoldenMeanausefulway ofworkingoutvirtuous Can youthinkofsomethingthatcontributesto Can youthinkofavirtuethatdoesnotcontributeto possible actions? Do humanbeingshave a characteristics? The NicomacheanEthics Thoughts Agent-centred Act-centred Eudaimonia Dispositions Intelligent Virtue

(Grafton:Ivan Panin, 1887),freelyavailable at (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,2011). telos , translatedbyWilliam DavidRoss(Oxford: orproperfunction? http://sacred-texts.com/cla/ari/ Virtue Telos Phronesis Golden mean Ethical Theory eudaimonia eudaimonia thatisnota , ed.by https://ia6 ?

63 Aristotelian Virtue Ethics

CHAPTER 4

Aquinas’s Natural Law Theory

Grace does not destroy nature but perfects it.1

They show that the requirements of the law are written on their hearts, their also bearing witness, and their thoughts sometimes accusing them and at other times even defending them.2

1. Introduction to Aquinas

Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) was an intellectual and religious revolutionary, living at a time of great philosophical, theological and scientific development. He was a member of the Dominican Friars, which at that time was considered to be a cult, and was taught by one of the greatest intellects of the age, Albert the Great (1208–1280). In a nutshell Aquinas wanted to move away from ’s thinking, which was hugely influential at the time, and instead introduce Aristotelian ideas to science, nature and theology. Aquinas wrote an incredible amount — in fact one of the miracles accredited to him was the amount he wrote! His most famous work is Summa Theologica and this runs to some three and half thousand pages and contains many fascinating and profound insights, such as proofs for God’s existence. The book remained a fundamental basis for Catholic thinking right up to the 1960s! But do not worry we will only be focusing on a few key ideas! Specifically books I–II, questions 93–95.

2. Motivating Natural Law Theory: The and Divine Command Theory

The likely answer from a religious person as to why we should not steal, or commit adultery is: “because God forbids us”; or if we ask why we should love our neighbour or give money to charity then the answer is likely to be “because God commands it”. Drawing this link between what is right and wrong and

1 T. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, I:8, http://www.summatheologica.info/summa/parts/?p=1 2 T. Aquinas, Romans, 2:15. 66 NORMATIVE ETHICS Aristotle Law Theorycontainsfourdifferenttypesoflaw: Aquinas’s Natural The dilemmarunsasfollows: (DCT). wrong. That is, Aquinas opts for the first option inthe Euthyphro dilemma what Godcommands and forbidsiswhatcalledthe Law, NaturalHumanLawandDivine four lawsandhowtheyrelatetooneanotheris viatheEternalLaw,sowe’d 3. NaturalLawTheory theory iswrong. the things. it hasalways,of God’smindthen Eternal Lawispart And becausethe problem thatitmakemoralityhaphazard.This“ God’s commands God’s commandsdonotmakeitright,Hisonlytelluswhatis God commandsit.Ifsomethingbecauseitisright,then God just fall out of the picture? This is where his Natural Law Theory comes in. decided atsomepointto write. a purpose,goal,end/or thetruefinalfunctionofanobject)(see and willalways, exist.TheEternalLawisnotsimplysomethingthatGod as statedabove. Butthenthisraisestheobviousquestion:ifitisnotGod’s as amatteroffact,isrightandwrongratherthandeterminewhat Divine CommandTheory. commands that make something right and wrong, then what does? Does not commands thatmakesomethingrightandwrong,thenwhatdoes?Doesnot right. ThismeansGodsimplydropsoutofthepictureinterms morality? Forhim,God’scommandsaretheretohelpus anything why better startthere… be morallyacceptable.Butifamoraltheorysaysthisthenthatlooksasthe sometimes called,isthereasonthatmany,including Aquinas, give uponthe Aquinas thinks that Either There isapowerful andinfluentialchallengetosuchanaccount called If ontheotherhandsomethingisright Most theistsrejectthefirstoptionandoptforthissecond —that By “EternalLaw’” Aquinas means God’s rational purposeand plan for So for Aquinas whatrole,ifanyatall,doesGodhave whenitcomesto Euthyphro dilemma somethingisright. , is a teleologist (the Greek term “ , isateleologist(theGreek atallcouldberight;killingchildrenorsettingfiretochurches Godcommandssomethingisrightbecauseitis, make afterthechallengewas firstraisedinPlato’s everything something right.Buttheythenhave tofacethe hasapurposeandfollows a plan.He,like telos because . Theway tounderstandthese ” referstowhatwe mightcall arbitrariness problem Godcommandsitthen Divine Command Theory or itisrightbecause come tosee Chapter 3 Euthyphro explaining ” asitis Eternal what, what, all ; .

When Aquinas talksofNaturalLaws,hemeansinternalrulesandnotexternal This fitswithcommon sense. A “ who is the murderer. Theseare who isthe Natural Law Plumit that true cannot be it whoisthemurdererthen He thinksthatthisistheguidingprincipleforallourdecisionmaking. for Aquinas itisnotasifwe needtocheckwhether we shouldpursue good then itisfollowingtheEternalLaw. that a claimmadeinthegamecannotbothbetrueandfalse;ifit that the board,howtodealoutcards, how to reveal themurdereretc.Theserules general rules(what Aquinas calls grow thenagoodhumanisto…?Istowhat?Howareweto finishthis going links tohisviewonsex,see gives somemore examplesofprimaryprecepts: down for us to consult but ratheritgeneratesgeneral rules that anyrational distinct from rats and rocks. What is right for me and you as humans is to act and avoid evil, as it is just part of how we already thinkaboutthings. Aquinas agent cancome to recognizesimplyinvirtueofbeingrational. For example, are allwrittendownandcanbeconsulted. according toreason.Ifwe actaccordingtoreasonthenwein the arepartaking a goodifitgrowsintostrongoaktree. come to recognizebysimplythinkingandarenotexternalliketheother rules oak; theeye a ones identity ofthemurderer.Therearecertainrulesabouthowtomove around means. Imagine that wemeans. Imaginethat Cluedo andwe areplaying to workoutthe aretrying binding onallrationalagentsandbecauseofthis Aquinas rejects believes that so obviousthattheyareneitherwrittendownnorspoken.Onesuchruleis ? Whatdoyouthink? not tobeconfusedwithatelelogicalethical Aquinas thinks that the answerAquinas thinksthat is Aquinas thinksthatsomethingis The firstprimarypreceptisthat However, inplayingthegamethereareotherrulesthatoperatewhich are If we allactaccordingtoreason,thenwe willallagreetosome overarching Natural Law does not generate an external set of rules that are written set ofrulesthat an external Natural Lawdoesnotgenerate Before unpackingthis,itisworthclarifyingsomethingaboutwhat“law” But whatabouthumans?Justasagoodeye istosee,andagoodacorn . — such as you can only have one guess as to theidentityof the murderer. . every telos object hasa of seeing; a rat of eating and reproducing etc. (notice this Chapter 10 Chapter telos internal rules good good is to be pursued and doneevilavoided. good istobepursued ; theacornhas primary precepts good ” eye isonewhich seeswell, anacornis reason ). Ifsomethingfulfilsitspurpose/plan inasfaritfulfilsitspurpose/plan. and that it is this that makes us it isthisthat andthat theory which suchasUtilitarianism)and ). These are any telos is not rationalpersoncan ofgrowingintoan Professor Plum absolute is Professor and .

67 Aquinas’s Natural Law Theory 68 NORMATIVE ETHICS Aquinas’s thinking tohave alawtodrive ontherightinUS and on theleft These precepts are Saudi Arabia thenyouarenotallowed todrive wear a helmet whenridinga bike, do not hackinto someone’s bank account. with thosesecondarypreceptswhich with NaturalLaw,itiswhat Aquinas callsan men can,andwomencannot,drive.says that wrong tofollowalawthat So For example,we mightthinkthat“treatChristians as secondary citizens” is a then we oughttofollowthem,iftheyarenot,thenwe oughtnot.Toseewhy to whathecalls “ talk andinteractwithpeople. Todiscover ourrealgoods — our secondary that that thislawismorallywrong.This in turn meansthat Aquinas wouldthink think throughanexample. power inSaudiactuallyreallythoughthardthentheytoowouldrecognize precepts whichaccord with NaturalLaw —we needtobepartofasociety. precepts andconsequently Aquinas thinks thatwhatwe ought todo is do notdrive above 70mphonamotorway, donotkidnappeople,always and whichhecallsthe it ispresentedasasecondaryprecept,because although and areconsistentwithNaturalLaw. of theroadonwhichtodrive. in the UK as there is no to think that there is one correct side morally acceptable based on an arbitrary difference (gender). Hewouldreasonthatifthemenin based onanarbitrarydifference(gender). by , groups,clubs,societiesetc. set ofsecondary precepts forallpeopleinsituations.Itis consistent with secondary preceptispractically Secondary precepts are 1. 4. 2. 3. Aquinas alsointroduceswhathecallsthe Unlike primaryprecepts, Aquinas is It is clear that on ourownweIt isclearthat arenotvery good atdiscovering primary It is Consider thesecondarypreceptthat“ this Know andworshipGod. Reproduce andeducateone’soffspring. Protect andpreserve humanlife. Live inasociety not humanlaw alwaysto followsecondaryprecepts.Itisonly morallyacceptable Secondary Precepts primary if . does not they areconsistentwiththeNaturalLaw.Ifare, real goods not generatedbyourreason because they aretruefor fitwiththeNaturalLaw.Hence,itismorally . irrational

”. These might include such things as are not inaccordance with the NaturalLaw

because ittreatspeopledifferently if youareawomanandlive in committed to there being only one committed totherebeing ”. Aquinas wouldarguethatthis apparent good Human Law butrathertheyareimposed all people in all instances is not . Thisisincontrast whichgives rise inaccordance

“live insociety”isitselfaprimaryprecept. Following theHuman Laws Eternal Law(God’s plans/purpose forallthings),NaturalLaws (our partaking Law whichtellsusthat we shouldforgive others —includingourenemies. to know this than God Himself. This then is precisely what is revealedis preciselywhat God Himself.Thisthen to knowthisthan inthe to finishanaffairhewaswentThe man’sreasoning having. as follows —“I Case closed. The pointofthisstoryissimple. We canbeconfused and mistaken good secondary preceptuntilwe talkandlive withChristians.Themorewe purposes andplans betrulyhappy. pointed outthe commandment that itsays that itis wrong tocommit adultery. God whichwe findinscripture;forexample,thetencommandments. But why and secondary precepts,we mightthinkthatthereis no need for God. If we about whatwe think we have most reason to do and because of this we need are sohappy?” and surelyGodwouldwant whatisbestforme! How coulditbewrongifwe weam havinganaffairwhichjustfeelssoright, arebothvery much inlove about an instance where a married man came to ask his advice about whether . can learntheseprimarypreceptsbyrationalreflectionthenGodsimplydrops is forthisreasonthat and it better others insocietythe with and talk can think rational reflectionandcreatedbypeople).DivinelawsarethosethatGodhas, ourselves we have the right to beangry,beargrudges, etc. Isn’t this just alwaysour friendsandnearly impossibletoforgive ourenemies.We tell of astheDivineequivalent oftheHumanLaw(those discovered through out ofthestory(recallEuthyphrodilemmaabove). is astorytoillustrate Aquinas’s answer. introduce the Divine Law at all? It certainly feels we have enough Laws. Here in Hisgrace,seenfittogive usandarethose“mysteries”,rulesgiven by in theEternalLawwhichleadstoprimaryprecepts),HumanLaws(humans making specificlawstocapturethetruthsofNaturalLawswhichlead human? However, these human reasons are someone who actually knowsthemind of Godtoguideus, and who better secondary precepts)andnowfinally Aquinas introducesthe need some guidance when it comes to forgiveness and it is where theDivine A number of years ago I was talking toa minister of a church. He told me The DivineLaw,whichisdiscovered through Just torecapastherealotsofmovingpartsthestory.We nowhave In response, the ministeropenedBibletoTen Commandments and But lookingatwhatwe have said already aboutNaturalLaws and primary Or consider another example. Weconsider another Or we recognizethat hard toforgive findit and theDivine Laws will helpus to fulfil our distortions revelation of the EternalLaw. We , should be thought DivineLaw . 69 Aquinas’s Natural Law Theory 70 NORMATIVE ETHICS “internal” NaturalLaw. By followingtheNaturalLawwe participateinGod’s Aquinas rejectstheDivineCommandTheory. (DDE) When theyarerightreflectourrealgoods. wrong. 4. Summaryof Aquinas’s NaturalLaw Theory For Aquinas everythinghas afunction(a Let’s consider someexamplestoshowthatwhatwe have saidsofarmight fallible so sometimeswefallible these secondarypreceptswrong,sometimeswe get the rightpath.Thatpathisfoundthrough those actsthatfulfilfunction.Some things such as acorns, and eyes, just life. Clearlysuicide is notpreservingandprotectinghumanlife.Ittherefore get sofarwithrationalreflection.We needsome goods. only reflectourapparent get themright.Whentheyarewrong such as, general, 5. PuttingthisintoPractice:TheDoctrineofDoubleEffect preserve and protect human life and hence an abortioninthiscase is morally Wedue torape. Thesamereasoningisgoingtoapply. pregnant to ought precepts whichcanactuallyguideourday-to-daybehaviour.Butwe are purpose forusintheEternalLaw. God’s commands through theDivineLawareways of do that naturally.However, humans are freeand hence need guidance tofind answerfor istounderstand that Aquinas, actually work.Imagine someone considering suicide. Is this morally acceptable comes in theformofDivineLaw.SotoreturnEuthyphro dilemma. correct? Willpreserving life?The about primary precept thisnotviolate the occasions when itismorallyacceptabletokill afoetus.Buthowcanthisbe or not?Recall,itispartoftheNaturalLawtopreserve andprotecthuman it is morallyunacceptable. of God’splanforourlife;henceit part irrational tokilloneselfandcannotbe in factmorallyacceptableand externally butisalso about what we dointernally is However,derive theprimarypreceptsthat Law arequite fromtheNatural However, as we will see, Aquinas thinks thatthereare Imagine thatsomeone is consideringhavinganabortionafterbecoming Finally, howeverFinally, goodwe arebecausewe arefiniteandsinful,we canonly morallyacceptabletokillaninnocentpersonand thereforetheremaybe pursue good and shun evil good andshun pursue not whatdetermines telos an actionisnotjustabout whatwedo . Sowe needtocreatesecondary ) and the good thing(s) to do are good thing(s) ) andthe (i.e.ourmotivations). With this reasoning whatis morally acceptable. revealed guidance some illuminating andgeneratesthe instances where andthis whatis “ This isabstractsolet’sgobacktoourexample.The actofthesonwas performed Summa Theologica Many peoplewouldsaythathedid nothing morallywrongandinfact,some father inorder to save his own life. That would be doingevil to bring about to good andthatisnever morallyacceptable.Theintentionoftheson was to primary precept? Aquinas asksustoconsider the differencebetween the preserve andprotecthis life,sotheintentionwas good —tick(3).Finally,the distinction he can show that, for example, killing an innocent distinction hecanshowthat,forexample,killing acceptable. Thisdistinctionandconclusion is possiblebecauseof Aquinas’s action andbecauseofthis, is morally Aquinas wouldthinkthekilling actions. Whatabout Aquinas? Whatwouldhesay? acceptable. Doctrine ofDoubleEffectwhichstatesthatifanactfulfilsfourconditions then reasons were seriousasitwas hislifeorfather’s life —tick(4). it ismorallyacceptable.Ifnot,thennot. motive. might evenfor his a patontheback he shouldget goasfartosaythat his lifecameaboutfirst —we cantick(2).The sondidnotfirstacttokillhis this actionismorallywrong.But,infact,hewouldsaythe he wouldsaythat the fact that the father wasact —the factthatfather external act —the killed,andtheinternal son’s action was not morallywrong(Aquinas discusses self-defence in the Doctrine ofDoubleEffect 1. 4. 2. 3. save hisownlife Wegiventhink that might Law to“preserve theNatural andprotectlife” To make this clear, Aquinas introduces one of his most famous ideas: the In our example, theaction is one of Imagine a child brought up inaphysically,sexuallyandemotionallyabusiveImagine achildbrought family.Heis father isdrunkandreadytoabusehimagainhequicklygrabsakitchenknifeslashes scared forhislifeandislockedinthehousedaysatatime.Onedaywhen frequently son didanythingwrong? his father’s artery. His father bleeds out and dies in amatterof minutes. Do you thinkthe So whyisthesonkillingfathernotindirectcontradictionwith The fourth,itmustbeforseriousreasons. The thirdisthattheintentionmustbegood. The secondprincipleisthattheactmustcomeabout beforethe The firstprincipleisthattheactmustbea consequences. (II–II,Qu.64)). so that isgood ”. Let’sseehowthisworks. — we cantick(1).Moreover, theacttosave self-defence good because of the son’s internal one. can be morally 71 Aquinas’s Natural Law Theory 72 NORMATIVE ETHICS An The reasonisserious,itconcernspeople’slives (4). Knowing thatshe does not have time todefuse it or throw itaway, she throws Law Theory, asisshownviatheDDE. to his death. Does this actionmeetthefourcriteriaofDDE? Well, no, the foetus(4). the lifeand deathofthewomanand the reasonsareseriousas theyareabout the foetus(2).Theintentiontosave thewoman’s life isalsogood(3).Finally, the foetus dying butthatis not whatis intended. The action the womanwilldie.Whatwould Aquinas sayinthisinstance?Well usingthe good willhappen(2).Theintentionisgood,ittosave herfellowsoldiers (3). good, to save herfellowsoldiers (1). The order is right, sheisnotdoingevilso death ofthefoetusitwould beacceptablefor Aquinas throughhisNatural death is morally wrong? No. Because even thoughtheexternalactof your day and then sets up atripwirecausing his father tofallfrom his flat window action. DDE. Ifwe judgethisact DDE hewouldsaythatitismorally could is good (1). The act of removing the cancer comes before the death of cancer comesbeforethe cancer —is good(1).Theactofremovingthe cancer. Thedoctorshave twochoices;totakeout theuterusandsave themother, own deathisthesame, the internalact — the —mightbedifferent. in self-defence, the son up. TheintentionisnotgoodandhencetheDDEdoes must putacrossat(3). herself on the grenade.Itblows up, killingherbutsavingothersoldiers in her hence seemscontrarytotheprimarypreceptofpreservinglife. hence theactionis barracks. Isthiswrongorright? Aquinas saysthisismorallyacceptablegiven because the son’s but the foetus willdie;or leave the foetustodevelop and be born healthy, but so doesthatmean

We candrawacontrastingcase. Imagine thatinsteadofslashinghisfather We have alreadyseenthatsuicideismorallyimpermissiblefor Aquinas, The action is to remove thecancer; it has the foreseeableconsequences of The intention —theinternalactwas Imagine a case where a soldier sees a grenade thrown into her barracks. Finally, imagine that a woman is pregnant and also has inoperable uterine Finally, imaginethatawomanispregnantandalso hasinoperableuterine Contrast this with a soldier who decides to killherselfbyblowing So given thattheactmeetsallfourprinciples,itisinlinewithDDEand So even thoughthisis acase where thedoctor’s actions bringaboutthe action isjudgedviatheNaturalLawbothexternallyandinternally foresee thatthiswas certainlywhatwas goingtohappen.Theactitselfis intention is to kill the father ratherthan save his own life — morally acceptable any plans both actionyoutakethatleadsknowinglytoyourown the killing.Heworks out thebesttime, internally andexternallywe’ll seewhy. , even thoughitcausedsomeonetodieand acceptable not toremove thecancer. to killherselfeven thoughshe not permitthissuicidal — to remove the . we we There are many things wethings There aremany through consider whenthinking might Aquinas’s (and which are not.Forexample,wearing clothes, taking medication and body would meanawholehostofthingssuchashomosexuality andcontraception Natural Law Theory.TherearesomeobviousproblemsweNatural couldraise, such Now, withsomethingsthismightbeplausible. Thingssuchastheeye oran Eternal Lawdoesnotexistandthereforethewholetheorycomestumbling 6. SomeThoughtsaboutNaturalLawTheory for example framework (we discuss these apparentproblemsinmoredetail things thatwe canpickupon. that God exists. How plausible is Aquinas’s theory? There are anumberof to ethicsseems flawed. if thereis the timingisnotright.Hisclaimratherthat lead topregnancythenitiswrong.However, even withthisqualification not piercing certainlyarenotnatural,butwe would not want tosaysuch things argument. So,let’sassume of their possible interpretation down. However, asgoodphilosopherswe oughtalways tooperatewitha acorn have a clearfunction —togrow,see are morallywrong.We mighttakethisasareasontorethink Aquinas’s moral and hencereproductionismorallyacceptable.Thismeansthatsex an unfaithfulpartner,butalsothinkthatsuchviolenceismorallyunacceptable. are morallywrong. as theproblemaboutwhetherornotGodexists.Ifdoesexistthen But ifwe areunconvinced that humans have agoal,thenthiswholeapproach unanswered questionsrelatingto if itfulfilsitsfunction,thenismorallyacceptable,butthereareanumberof have a by discovering whatisnatural andwhatisnot. seems a bit less obvious!Dohumans(ratherthanour individualparts)really seems abit saying thatifsexdoes not lead to pregnancyitis wrong. After all,sometimes such thingashumannature andnosuchthingasahumanfunctionor goal. principle ofcharity So itisnottruethatwe candiscover whatismorallyacceptableornotsimply not “natural” but which are perfectly acceptable, and things which and things acceptable, which areperfectly but not “natural” Aquinas’s theory worksontheideathat ifsomethingis“natural”,thatis, Wematter? Weask, whydoes“natural” might are that of things canthink There is,though,amorefundamentalworryat theheartofthisapproach Put this worry aside. Recall, Aquinas thinks thatreproduction is natural On theotherhand we mightconsider that violence lead to reproduction is morally unacceptable. Notice that leadtoreproductionismorallyunacceptable. Aquinas isnot Aristotle telos ? Therearecertainlysome philosophers —suchastheexistentialists, de Simone ’s) toethics.Namely,theythinkthat andgrantouropponentisrationalgive thestrongest natural (1908–1986) —who think thatthereis no . — but whatabouthumans? This everything is anaturalresponse to for thesakeofargument no potential hasagoal( Chapter 10 are for sexto natural telos does ). ). 73 Aquinas’s Natural Law Theory 74 NORMATIVE ETHICS when we consideritinmoredetailisfarfromclear. If thefirstdoctor says “Idid not intendtokillthefoetus”canwe makesense However, istherereallyamoral difference? To put pressure on theanswer the foetusdied,didnotsheintend(insomesense)tokillfoetus?Sothis the foetuswoulddie?”shesay“yes, ofcourse”.Butifshedidthisand that thereis,askyourselfwhatyouthinkitmeans to intenddo something. the foetus.ForDDEtoworkinway that Aquinas understandsit,this to makes sense; we have anintuitive feel forwhatDDE is getting at.However, there willbe.We’ll allstartto have similar views on whatisrightandwrong. that themore we think,themore rational we become, the more convergence living our lives. That, we mightthink,is precisely the role of a moral theory. proceeding. If this is in line with the Natural Law and the Divine Lawthen Law andthe Natural the proceeding. Ifthisisinlinewith know that in doing so the foetus will die. What is not morally acceptable is to is notmorallyacceptable foetus willdie.What in doingsothe know that disagree withthemonmoralissues. And even inobviouslyrationalareas such deliberation withfriendsandcolleagues,itisnot obvioustouswhatwe as makes themoraldifferencebetweendifference inintention thetwodoctors. and DivineLaws. as mathematics,thebestmathematiciansarenot abletoagree.We mightthen abortion. For Aquinas it rational agentsshoulddo.We allknowpeoplewewerational, but taketobe But isthistoooptimistic?Very often,even afterextensive reflectionandcool But howmightitworkinthiscase? of this? After all,ifyouasked her “did you knowthatintaking outtheuterus it is morally acceptable. If it is out of line, then it is not.Theassumption it ismorallyacceptable.Ifoutofline,then using theNaturalLaw.We wouldhopeourmoraltheorygives usdirectionin the natureofmind,andhowweissue raisessomecomplexquestionabout uterus —in fullknowledge thatthefoetuswilldie —otherintendstokill uterus. Onfirstreadingthisseems removing the foetus by the intend tokill might understandintentions. be scepticalthatasrationalagentswe willcome to beinlinewiththeNatural both remove theuterusandfoetusdies.Theoneintendstotakeout Imagine two doctors who (apparently) do exactly thesame thing, they Next we mightraise questions about DDE. Go backtoourexampleabout For Aquinas, ifwe rationally reflectthenwe arrive attherightway of weFinally, wonder howeasyitistoworkoutwhatactuallydo might is morallyacceptabletoremove theuteruseven ifwe SUMMARY ISSUES TOCONSIDER COMMON STUDENTMISTAKES • • • • • • 1. 2. Why mightthisanswer beproblematic? We mightanswer the“arbitrariness”dilemmabycitingGod’s nature. Thinking that Aquinas iscommittedtotherebeingonlyone setof Thinking thatitisalways morallyrequiredofustofollowsecondary Thinking thatallthe“laws”areabsolute. Thinking thatNaturalLawsarelawsofscience —e.g.law Thinking thatEternalLawissomethingGoddecidedtowrite. Thinking that Aquinas isaDivineCommandTheorist. with whatisrightandwrong? If Godexiststhenwhat —ifanythingdoyouthinkthathasto thermodynamics. precepts. Aquinas is an intellectual giant. He wrote an incredible amount He wroteanincredible giant. Aquinas isanintellectual secondary preceptsforallpeopleinsituations. we actuallymeanby“actions”,“”and“consequences”. His workremainsmuch discussed and researched and typically His central idea is that humans are created by God to reason Command Theory. accordance withreason,andthemorallywrongthingifwe don’t. covering avast arrayof topics. His influence has been immense. is our function. Humans do the morally right thing if wething morally right is ourfunction.Humansdothe actin example, hisDoctrineofDoubleEffectmakesustoreflectonwhat still playsacentralroleinChristianEthicsthatrejectsDivine Aquinas is anincrediblysubtleandcomplex thinker. For — that 75 Aquinas’s Natural Law Theory 76 NORMATIVE ETHICS KEY TERMINOLOGY 12. 11. 10. 4. 7. 9. 6. 3. 8. 5. What isthedifference —ifanythingbetween intendingtobring What istheDoctrineofDoubleEffect? What areDivineLaws? What areHumanLawsandsecondaryprecepts? What areNaturalLawsandprimaryprecepts? What istheEternalLaw? Think ofadescriptive claim.Thinkofaprescriptive claim.Whymight Just asagoodeye istosee,andagoodacorngrowthen If peoplethoughtlongenough,doyouthinktherewouldbe People oftentalkaboutwhatis“natural”?Whatdoyouthinkthey about thatend? about someendandactingwhereyouknowyouractionwillbring convergence onwhatismorallyrightandwrong? it beproblematicmovingfromonetotheother? mean bythis?Howusefulisthenotionof“natural”inamoraltheory? human isto…?Istowhat?Howarewe goingtofinishthissentence? A posteriori A priori Apparent goods Natural Law External acts Eternal Law Internal acts Primary precepts Real goods Doctrine ofDoubleEffect Secondary precepts ―, Aquinas, Thomas, References Plato, Romans (CommentaryontheLetterofSaintPaul totheRomans) classics.mit.edu/Plato/euthyfro.html summatheologica.info/summa/parts/?p=1 Euthyphro , translatedbyBenjaminJowett, freelyavailable at Summa Theologica , freely

available at

http://www.

http:// 77 Aquinas’s Natural Law Theory

CHAPTER 5

Fletcher’s Situation Ethics

Every man must decide for himself according to his own estimate of conditions and consequences…1

People like to wallow or cower in the security of the law.2

1. Situation Ethics Introduction

In the introduction to The Situation Ethics: The New Morality Joseph Fletcher (1905–1991) develops what he calls an ethical non-system. His book caused a “fire storm” amongst the public because it legitimised the general post-war dissatisfaction with authority. At the time it was written it seemed to make some radical claims such as that it is not wrong to have extramarital sex, to be homosexual, or to have an abortion. All that said, Fletcher’s work is not widely discussed nor respected in philosophical circles. It is badly argued, idiosyncratic and rehashes old ideas. Although there is the clothing of religion in the book — Fletcher uses religious terms such as “agápe” and cites famous theologians such as (1884–1976) — the central ideas do not rely on the truth of any particular religion. As he says his argument has “…nothing special to do with theological…faith”3 Fletcher calls this ethical “non-system” Situationism and a Bible story will illustrate the general point of the book. In Mark 3:1–6 we are told that Jesus healed a man with a withered hand in the Jewish Temple; an act which we would consider to demonstrate Jesus’s love for all. However, the Pharisees tell him off because he has performed this healing on the Sabbath day and the Jewish law says that no one can work on the Sabbath. Fletcher’s work is an attempt to show how acts can be morally acceptable even if they go against so-called moral laws (if you’ve read Chapter 3 on Aristotle you might already have an answer to this). Fletcher says that Jesus’ act is morally acceptable — despite going against the Jewish law — because he acted to bring about the most love.

1 K. E. Kirk, Conscience and its Problems, p. 331. 2 J. F. Fletcher, Situation Ethics. 3 Ibid., p. 15. 80 NORMATIVE ETHICS “ “ A MiddleEthics:Situationism Antinomianism WeLegalism and that think might possibilities. the Antinomianism exhaust The otherextremeis Antinomianism (“anti” meaningagainst;“” were wearing “inappropriate”clothing, which was against thewillof Allah. 2. Fletcher’s Overall Framework Legalism If wewe rejectmorallawsthenarenot forcedintolawless moralanarchy? Islamic Legalism (obviously, just as in theChristiansect,thesearenotwholly Fletcher says there are two unattractive views in ethics: “ Fletcher thinksnot. from leaving the school because they wereschool becausethey the from leaving notwearingthe that sayspeopleare laws andruleslimitingtheactionsofpeopleare simplyaway oftryingto girls died. decisions taken are decisions taken and theirconsciencetheinstitutionsinwhich theyfindthemselves. comfort thembecausetheyarescared of absolutefreedom. If Antinomianism is right andifanagentbelieves thatsomethingisright,thenitis. Antinomianism refused to letagroupofgirlsescape from a burningbuildingbecausethey representative ofeitherreligion).In2002thereligiouspoliceSaudi Arabia One witness said he saw three policemen “beating young girlstopreventOne witnesssaidhesawthreepolicemen“beating them observessensitive moralruleswithoutbeing Fletcher hasin tothesituation. irrespective oftheconsequences. For example,we oughttotellthetruthinall means themoralagentiserraticandrandom, isunpredictable,andany meaning law).Thisistheviewthatsaysanagentcandowhatever heor mind asimplemindeddeontologistwhoholdsthatactionsarerightandwrong help —such asbloodtransfusionswhensomeone intheircommunityisill because theythinkitisagainstGod’s commands. Or consider an exampleof she wants inasituation.Fletchercallsthisan“ situations, even ifthismeansthat,say,millionsofpeopledie. Someone who is following the system ofLegalismissomeonewho“blindly” Someone whoisfollowingthe Situationism Antinomianism 4 Various Christiansectsarelegalistic;forinstance,somemightrefusemedical ‘Saudi Police “Stopped”FireRescue’, BBC News, 1874471.stm ”. ”,

and one ad hoc . Therearenolawsnorguidingprinciples,justagents always free

attractive viewwhichsitsinbetween them: tochoose what theywant. Any supposed http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/ existential ” viewbecauseitisone abaya Legalism ”. 4 Fifteen ” and

Well itdoes The situationalist follows a strategywhich is (1842–1910). Fletcherdoes notwant histheoryassociated with theseviews we mightthinkinthat on Dewey John Principle 1. Utilitarianism in Utilitarianism. So,Fletcher’s viewisnotunique.Whatmakeshis different It isdirectedattheconsequences that willdeterminewhetheranactionisright Fletcher would say that here isasituationwherewewould saythat Fletcher not tofollowthe ought 3. TheFourWorkingPrinciplesofSituationism the situation;consider there arefourworkingprinciplesofSituationism. Tenthe to break in Commandments.Infact,hesayssomethingstronger,that turns outtobemurder. From theuniversal lawwe canonlyderive principles, principle donotmurderbutratherthemostlovingthing,whichinthiscase people (“ derive from the one law regarding maximizing love. For example, we might and rejectsalltheimplications ofthistype“Pragmatism”. a universal”. about themostlove. However, itisnota But thereisonly laws or wrong. is notwrongin is thecentralityof“love”, orashecallsit is thatwe oughttoalways actsoastobringaboutthemostlove forthemost have tobemurderedinordergetinformationstopanuclearattack. have amoral principle thatwe oughtnottomurder. This is a specific andwell worked-outphilosophical positionadoptedbythelikesof some situations itis our not otheruniversal laws. As Fletcher putsit:“we cannotmilkauniversal from 5 This mean that for Fletcher it might,on occasions, be morally acceptable For example, a situation might arise where the child of a terrorist would child ofaterrorist arise wherethe might For example,asituation there Fletcher thinksthat Fletcher saysthatthere Of course, . Principlesaregeneralizationswhichcontext-sensitive andwhich J. F.Fletcher, Agápē 5 not (1859

SituationEthics any Calculus”).Fletcher’s Situationism isthena meanthatFletcherisapragmatist.“Pragmatism” isavery one all Chapter 1 teleologicaltheorywillaskustolookatthedetailsof situations.Thisthenissimilartothediscussion of Rule- – morallaw,soherejectsLegalism.Fletcher’s onemorallaw 1952), Chapter 1 in general , p.27. duty is . hre Peirce Charles amorallaw,andhenceherejects Antinomianism. can to breakthesecommandments. He thinksthat be moral murder is wrongbecause it does not bring wherewe talkaboutBenthamandMill’s agápē principles (1839–1914)and law pragmatic . becauseforFletcher,murder but that these differfrom that but . Whatdoes that mean? teleological principle ila James William because theory.

81 Fletcher’s Situation Ethics 82 NORMATIVE ETHICS “who” ofasituation.SummingupthisFletcher says: This doesnotmeanheisarelativistinthesensethatwe cansimply choose These then are his “four working principles”: pragmatism,relativism, are his“fourworking These then views mightplayoutineach what is right and wrong rather it is just an appeal for people to stop trying Principle 4: Principle 3: Principle 2:Relativism His use of “positivism” is not thephilosophical idea with thesame name but Kant’s CategoricalImperative (see Fletcher justmeansthatwhatisrightorwrongrelatedtothesituationwe Even withhisrejectionof Antinomianism andhisacceptanceofonesupreme Loveis experiencedby is somethingthat to “laydownthelaw”forallpeopleincontexts.Ifsituationsvary then love, Fletcherwillsaythathecannot.Itisnotaresultoflogicorreasoning, principle ofmorality,Fletcher,surprisingly,stillcallshimselfarelativist. positivism andpersonalism. are in. consequences vary andwhatwe oughttodowillchangeaccordingly.This rather itisadecisionwe take, itislikethe“theologian’sfaith”. rather iswhere: if we are to maximize love we need to consider the person in a situation — is avery simple,unsophisticatedidea,likehisideasonpragmatism,and moral views which do not trytoworkoutwhatdo in theabstract(e.g. So whenchallengedasto 7  6  Any moralorvalue judgmentinethics,likeatheologian’s faith propositions, isadecision —not What makeshisviewpragmaticisvery simple.Itisjusthisattractionto Love isof people, byandforpeople.Thingsaretobeused; people aretobeloved… Loving actions aretheonlyconductpermissible a conclusion.Itischoice,notresultreachedbyforceoflogic… Ibid Ibid. ., p.51. , p.47. how real lifesituations he can justify that the onlylawistomaximize hecanjustifythat . 7 Chapter 2 people )), butratherexploreshowmoral . . SoPersonalism istheviewthat 6 the “moral compass”. This is how people typicallythinkof conscience and it “conscience” isaverbis really it and notanoun.Thissoundscomplicatedbut 1: Onlyone‘thing’isintrinsicallygood;namely, love, nothingelseatall There isonethingwhichintrinsicallygood, thatisgoodirrespective of when we live intheworldandnotthrough armchairreflection. we are to trying decide whether or not tocheck his phone to delete the texts 4. HowtoWorkoutWhatDo:ConscienceasaVerb not Notice that here he talks about “ about here hetalks Notice that Fletcher gives sixpropositions(features)ofhistheory. out whattodo.Hesays “conscience” plays aroleinworking For Fletcher a Noun feelings anddesires.We discussthis below. this in the abstract, perhaps reason about it, oraskforguidancefromtheHoly this intheabstract,perhapsreasonabout Calculus (see Conscience is notthenameofaninternalfacultynoritasort 5. TheSixPropositionsofSituationEthics phone, maybe we will not but whatever happens the outcome as faritbringsaboutthemostamountoflove. EchoingBentham’sHedonic and experiencethesituation,we needtobedoing(hence“verb”) the context, namelylove. Ifloveor wrong in iswhatgood,then anactionisright is oftenportrayed incartoonswithadevilandangelsittingonsomeone’s before hedoes.Theold“noun”viewofconscience would getustothinkabout havebullies laughingbecausethey sentourfriendsomeoffensive textsand because ofhowheunderstands love which,importantly,isnotabout having experiencing. Maybe,we mightconclude that itis right togointoour friend’s shoulder whisperingintoherears. been known beforehand been Spirit, aguardianangeletc. not (forcomplexandsophisticateddiscussionsofconsciencesee 8  According to Fletcherthisiswrong.Instead,we needtobeinthesituation, First consider what he meanswhensaysconscience“isnotanoun”. consider what First Rather forFletcherconscience isaverb. Imaginewe have heardsome agapeic calculus possible. Ibid ., p.95. 8 Chapter 1 , thegreatestamountof neighbor welfare forthelargest numberof neighbors . Whatourconsciencewouldhave usdoisrevealed ) Fletcherdefendswhathecallsthe: welfare ” rather than “love”.than ” rather does this Fletcher could not have Chapter 9 ). 83 Fletcher’s Situation Ethics 84 NORMATIVE ETHICS Agápē As we havefirst ,the seeninthe ( was shot in the head by 16-year-old Oshea Israel after an argument ata party we mighthave towards friends or familymemberwhichisbetterdescribed as 2: TherulingnormofChristiandecisionislove, nothingelse 3: Love andjusticearethesame,forislove distributed,nothingelse For Fletcher,practicallyallmoralproblemsweboiled down encountercanbe feeling. Incartoonswhenacharacterisinlove theirheartsjumpoutof to do(therulingnorm)isbringaboutlove. We needtobecareful though to anapparenttensionbetween “”ontheonehandand“love” onthe the horrorofthose actions, butshedoes love herson’s killer. Thatlove is type of love which is manifest in how God relates to us. Consider Christ’s love things becausethey“cannotstopthinking”aboutsomeone. lover. Givenand howpeopletypicallytalkof“love” ourmoderncontext itis probably unhelpfultoeven callit“love”. particular meaning.Initiallyitiseasiertoseewhat and after he hadservedand after a17year sentenceforthecrime,askedhim tomove in anything inreturnanddoes not give anyspecial considerations to anyone. chest, orpeople“inlove” areportrayed as not beingabletoconcentrateon other. Considerarecentstory: in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Mrs Johnson subsequently forgave her son’s killer in sayingthathe forgave those carrying outhis execution or consider a more modern example. InFebruary1993,Mrs Johnson’s son, Laramiun Byrd, 20, brotherly love ( because forFletcher“love” hasatechnicalmeaning. next door to her.Shewas not condoning his actions, nor will she ever forget érōs A policesearchoftheircold case filesrevealed thecaseofJohn Henkel —shot andkilled Yet Trevell, who was brought upa Catholic and always retained his faith, had a terrible This isnotwhatlove meansforFletcher.IntheChristiancontext loveabout and think Typically peoplewrite asexperiencing anintense Trevellknown astherapperGDep,was Coleman,better arisingstarontheNewYork Rather police —a stepalmostunimaginablefor someonefromtheHipHopworld. Crystal, andtwinboys. By love Fletchermeans“ to hisvictim,yet 17yearsand went later,in2010,hecouldnolongerbeartheguilt tothe secret, asan18-year-old, hehadmuggedandshota man. Henever knewwhathappened in 1993 at exactly the same street corner inHarlemwhereTrevellsame street the exactly in 1993at sayshecommitted his hip-hop sceneandhadbeensignedtoPDiddy’s Bad Boyrecord label. Healsohadawife, ). regardstheenemyinsamewayspouse, asthefriend,brother, agápē isan philēo attitude ). Nor is it theerotic desire we might feel towards others andnotafeelingatall, agápē ” —from ancientGreek. only waywe todecidewhat ought

one is not

which doesnotexpect . Itisnotthefeeling Agápē hasavery agápē agápē. is the “meaningless and pointless”. An action, such as telling thetruth,only acquires We want todistributefairly,buthowshouldwe dothis? 4: Love willstheneighbor’s goodwhenwe likehimornot This isself-explanatory. As we notedabove, This couldbeexpressedasasupposedtensionbetween “love” offamily were “brave andresponsible right”becauseshewas acting inlightofthe we take,asconsidered as anactionindependentofitsconsequences is literally, 6: Love’s decisionsaremadesituationally,notprescriptively In directrejectionofthedeontologicalapproachesFletchersaysthatanyaction Even if the embryo had not beendefective according to Fletcherheractions Ethical decisions are notcutanddriedmostofthetimetheyexistin a the unlovable. Sorelatedtoourenemies: 5: Only the ends justify the means, nothing else 5: Onlytheendsjustifymeans,nothingelse loving decision was not onegiven bythelawwhichstatedthat allabortions gives the exampleof a women in Arizona who learned that she might “beara grey area.Nodecision can betakenbeforeconsideringthesituation.Fletcher particulars ofthesituation soastobringaboutthemostlove. of inthisway.thought problems canbe Imagine we to decidewhat aretrying defectivethalidomide”. Whatshouldshedo?The because shehadtaken baby are wrong. However, she travelled to Sweden where she had an abortion. and doing the rightthing — in love. “Love isjustice,justicelove”. is thebestway todistributefood given to acharity,orhowtriagenurse its statusasameansbyvirtueofanendbeyonditself. might workinawar zone.Inthesecasesweproblem likethis. mightputthe 10 9   Trevell’s choice was perhaps hardest to bearfor his wife Crystal, who now has to bringup Fletcher saystheanswer issimple.Toactjustlyorfairlypreciselyto Christian loveof goodandevil,orevento loseorabandonoursense doesnotaskus of superior crime. Heisnowservingajailsentenceof15years tolifeforHenkel’smurder.Yet hehasno are ourneighborsandtobeloved. and inferior;itsimplyinsiststhathowever wewe ratethem,andwhether likethemnornot,they regrets; “Iwanted togetrightwithGod”,hesays. their teenageboysonherown. Ibid. Ibid ., p.89. , p.107. “justice”. Fletcher thinksthat most other moral 10 9 agápē isinthebusinessofloving 85 Fletcher’s Situation Ethics 86 NORMATIVE ETHICS “situation”. “situation”. “attitude” invirtueofwhichwe act?Orisitaboutbringingcertain This is simplythemistakeofthinkingthatanargumentstrengthenedby you needmoreinformation,justmakesomeupand thenreframethequestion. Unfortunately simplyappealingtoothersisnotanargument.Toseehow Fletcher’s workhastheannoyingtendencytopresenttriviallytrue claims asif Fletcher’s Situationismisahopelesslyconfused and confusingmoraltheory. Fletcher hasthedevildonerightthing?Itisnot clear. 6. famous philosophers,suchas they areprofoundphilosophicalinsights. the situation!”Becausewe have justgiven youthedetailsofsituation.If some featureofconsequences.Thisreading but rather of asanattitude, thought of the attitude about horrendously dire consequences. According to Fletcher have we done and inaccurate,especiallywhendealingwiththetwocentralideas:“love” and consequences? right orwrong?Itisnotclear. out ofhatredandmalice but —due tohislackofknowledge —happens to in his key textand this is an important omission. To see how thorny theissue is ofcourseinlinewithhis useless this approachisconsider the following: “Walker’s crisps arehealthy morally rightway? Ifthe“ bring about a vastabout bring amountoflove intheworld.Hasdevil actedinthe because GaryLinekersaysso”. extended discussion of theseconcepts. However, thereisnodiscussion of it says itiswhatwe oughtto saying thatsomeoneelse —normallyin“authority”,holdsit. So whatFletchermeansby“love” isnotclear.Norwhathemeans by Suppose weour actbrings actingood“conscience”asFletchercallsitbut At themost general level, Fletchercommits the To see why this might beproblematic, consider a case where we act out of The other concern throughout Fletcher’s work is that he is simply unclear Problems If youwere writingabookonSituationism youwouldexpectaclearand If hedoessaythatwhatwe didis“wrong”thenfine, In someplaceshetalksaboutlovean “attitude”. Inotherplaceshe being Notice itisnogoodsaying“well we cannotdecidebecauseitdependson Fletcher uses many quotations from famous theologians and mentions agápē withFletcher’s Situationism but the consequence is one of great death anddestruction. the consequenceisoneofgreat but agápē bring about agápē calculus” calculus. Ok,sothenimaginethedevilacting Aristotle asan

is usedthen“yes”. So,accordingto , as a substitute for argument. , asasubstitute end point fallacy of appealing to authority . Whichisit?Isitaloving agápē should notbe . (Relativism). which depend on him? What about the type of illness, the type of death,who of illness,thetype the type which dependonhim?Whatabout what agendaswe have. whole hostofproblemsforFletcher. Utilitarianism. Have alookat think thisisOK,onFletcher’s account.Butrecallherejects Antinomianism the medicalprofessionetc. to be“whatsituation?”Thepoint,simplyput,isthattherenoobviousway that saving fivethat more “love”about strangerswouldbring thansavingyour prescription thatwe should“askwhatwillbringaboutthemostlove inthe dad. Inwhichcaseweto save ought thestrangersover yourdad.Butis notit admirable andunderstandabletosave aloved oneover strangers? and simplyreplace“happiness”with account. This is because his theory is based on a very crude form of any situationwilldependonwhatismotivatingus, whatourdispositionsare, actually isconsider the following. A politicianstandsupandsays“given the considered in “thesituation”, willbedependentonwhatwe current situationwe need to raise taxes”. Ourfirst response is probably going regarding Utilitarianism, e.g. it being “too demanding” and hence generate a “too demanding” andhencegenerate regarding Utilitarianism,e.g.itbeing of knowing what is meant by “situation”. What we“situation”. What what ismeantby of knowing willchoosetoconsiderin our dadorfive strangersfrom drowning, theutilitarianwould argue we in theGuardian,regarding Fletcher’s book: is notitadmirableandunderstandabletosave aloved oneover strangers? important. Dowe considerhisreligiousviews,thefactthathehasthreecats might seethesituationinoneway andsomeone else see it inanother, and hence we gettwodifferentclaims about whatwe ought todo. You might he leaves behind,theeffectitmighthave onthejudicialsystem,effect should save thestrangersbecause fiveone. But than lotsofhappinessisbetter one person plausible that seems perfectly It unhelpful. is singularly situation” situation whatoughtwe todo? The pointiswhatdoes, and does not, get You can simply repeatthissubstitutionformost of theproblems we cited We leave youwith thefollowingquotationfromGrahamDunstanwriting The situationalistwillhave exactlythesame problem. We mightimagine generous andlovable man.Itisharder toforgive theSCMPressforpublishingit Utilitarianism isaccused of beingcounter intuitive. Ifwe couldonly save It isinfactquiteeasytogeneratelotsandofworriesaboutFletcher’s It ispossible,thoughnoteasy, to forgive Professor Fletcher for writinghisbook, for he isa Consider amoralexample. wantsill patient A terminally todie;given the So then, as a way ofactuallyworkingoutwhatwe oughttodo, Fletcher’s Chapter 1 agápē. wherewe suggestsome problems Hereisoneexample. already think . is 87 Fletcher’s Situation Ethics 88 NORMATIVE ETHICS SUMMARY ISSUES TOCONSIDER COMMON STUDENTMISTAKES • • • • • 1. 2. “positivism”. Why doyouthinkFletcher’s book was sopopular atthetimeof Think thatby“conscience”Fletchermeansa“moral compass”. Think thatlove isaboutfeelings. Think thatsituationethicsallowsyoudotoanything youwant. Thinking thatFletcher’s isa“pragmatist”. If analienvisitedearthand asked“Whatislove?” howwouldyou Mixing upFletcher’s useof“Positivism”with Ayer’s useof publication? answer them? 1960s. Fletcher's position has a centralcommitment to God’s . Fletcher’s Situational Ethicsgainedapopularfollowingasit for behaviour that allows Fletcher to claim that an action might be an actionmight allows Fletchertoclaimthat for behaviourthat the diverse situationswe findourselves in. love — allowed thereligiousbeliever tofittheirviewsintotherapidly conceptual possibilitythatacommittedChristian/Jew/Muslim changing andnuancedmoralpoliticallandscapeofthe right inonecontext,butwrongadifferentcontext —depending on thelevel of understand it. Hisposition is worth studyingthough(not etc. mayconsidertheanswers tomoralquestionsdependon sophisticated, and we soonrunintoproblemsintryingto sometimes what mightbemorallyrequiredofusistobreakthe just because it is on thecurriculum!) because itopens up the Despite how popular thetheorywas it is not philosophically agápē . Itisthiscentralfocuson agápē brought about. In fact,Fletcherthinksthat broughtabout. agápē asthemoralguide ‘Saudi Police“Stopped” FireRescue’, References KEY TERMINOLOGY Kirk, KennethE., Fletcher, JosephF., 11. 10. 4. 7. 9. 6. 3. 8. 5. Westminster John KnoxPress,1966). (Louisville: Westminster JohnKnoxPress,1999). available at What doesitmeantosaythatconscienceisaverb ratherthananoun? What isthe“fallacyofappealingtoauthority”?Canyougive yourown What doesFletchermeanby“positivism”? What doyouthink“situation”means? What doyouthinkaChristianwouldmakeofFletcher’s theory? Why doesFletchersaythathistheoryis:“fact-based,empirical-based, Pick onechallengetoUtilitarianism,andreformtheas If we actfromlove, doesthatmeanwe candoanything? How doesSituationismdifferfrom“Utilitarianism”ifatall? towards Situationism. data-conscious andinquiring”? a verb oranoun? Do youthinkwe have aconscience?Ifyoudo,should we thinkofitas example? Agápē Agápē Eros Legalism http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1874471.stm calculus Conscience andItsProblems: An IntroductiontoCasuistry Situation Ethics:TheNewMorality BBC News Pragmatic Conscience (15March2002),freely (LouisvilleandLondon:

89 Fletcher’s Situation Ethics

PART II METAETHICS

CHAPTER 6

Metaethical Theories

But in every case in which one would commonly be said to be making an ethical judgment, the function of the relevant ethical word is purely ‘emotive’. It is used to express feeling about certain objects, but not to make any assertion about them.1

*WARNING*

In purely length terms, this is a longer chapter than any other in this textbook. In addition, it contains lots of key terminology that will be unique to this chapter. Thus, we don’t advise that this chapter should be read/considered/ crammed in merely one sitting. Rather, we suggest that you choose specific sections of the chapter, perhaps informed by your course specifications or our suggested tasks at the end of the chapter, and engage with those sections in any one sitting. In addition, the first “Issue to Consider” at the conclusion of this chapter should be especially useful in guiding your journey through Metaethics. The ideas herein are no more complex, fundamentally, than elsewhere in the book; the breadth should not be daunting if properly managed.

1. Metaethics: Introduction

The prefix “meta” is derived from the Greek for “beyond”. Metaethics is therefore a form of study that is beyond the topics considered in normative or applied ethics. Recall as we stated in the introduction, the differences between these forms of ethical study are helpfully captured in an analogy put forward by Fisher (2011) involving different participants in a game of football. • Applied Ethics is the study of how we should act in specific areas of our lives; how we should deal with issues like meat-eating, euthanasia or stealing (to use examples familiar to this textbook). To use the football analogy, the applied ethicist kicks the philosophical football around just as a footballer kicks the ball on the field. A good applied ethicist

1 A. J. Ayer, ‘A Critique of Ethics’, p. 21. 94 METAETHICS You should not expectametaethicalargumenttoprovide specific guidance A formercolleagueonce suggestedthatMetaethicswas entirelyand 2. TheValue ofMetaethics Nobody isperfect,anditthereforepossiblethatsome of youarenot frustratingly pointless —academia foracademia’s frustratingly sake, shethought.There the foundationsofnormative orappliedaction-guidingmoraltheories. any one particularcircumstance.any Instead,Metaethicsisfocussedonquestions based here isanon-football fans. Torespectthispossibility, avid football regarding howethicalstudy —atbothnormative andappliedlevels —works. regarding howtoact,butyoushouldexpectametaethical argumenttocritique us howwe shouldmorallyactorwhichtypeofdecision is morallycorrectin explanation ofwhatMetaethicsamounts to. Metaethicalconclusions do not tell Some typicalmetaethicalquestionsare: • • • • • When we saysomethingis“morallygood”,whatdowe Metaethics Normative Ethics If moralclaimsaresometimestrue,whatmethods dowe usetoaccess If theclaimthat“euthanasiaismorallywrong” true,whatmakesit Preference Utilitarianism(discussedin true than toarefereeorplayer. Themetaethicistjudgesandcommentson the gameisplayed. these moraltruths? general moralrulesgoverning ourbehaviour,suchasUtilitarianism lives. player, ismore likearefereewhosetsuptherulesgoverning how appropriateness ofparticulartacticsorset-pieceroutines. arguments, orkickingthefootball,themselves. Forexample,the applied ethicalargumentswithinthenormative frameworkofhis convince ustochangeourmoralviewsinaparticularcornerof or KantianEthics.Thenormative ethicist,ratherthanbeingafootball metaethicist mightcommentonthemeaningandappropriatenessof metaethicist hasarolemoresimilartofootballcommentatorrather might scoregoalsandbesuccessfulbyofferingspecificargumentsthat how theethicalgameisbeingplayed ratherthanadvancing practical ethical language,justasthefootballcommentatormightremarkon ? isthestudyofhowwe engageinethics.Thus,the isfocussedonthecreationoftheoriesthatprovide Peter Singer , forexample,focusesonadvancing Chapter 1 ). mean ? version ofCognitivism,concernedwithmeaning,iscapturedinthediscussion whether or not they accurately pick out, orreferto,specificallymoralaspectsof pick accurately they or not whether with psychology,iscapturedinthediscussion of without firstunderstandingwhatwas meantbyfundamental conceptslike Understanding goodness —whatitisandhowweaccess it might Key to the successful study of Metaethics is understanding the variousto thesuccessfulstudyofMetaethicsisunderstanding Key key Semantic Cognitivism fall in the debates between Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism, and Realism 3. Cognitivismversus Non-Cognitivism theories canbecategorised,atleastforourpurposes,inrespectofwherethey make upthe“metaethicalmap”.Metaethical terminological distinctionsthat the world. Thus,thesemanticcognitivistviewsour the to thesemantic cognitivist, whatmakes our moral statements true or false is these twopositions. then you have aparticularviewaboutthe Cognitivism, asdiscussed in theremainderofthischapter,is a combinationof like afundamentalpresuppositionofsuccessful ethical study,rather thana Chapter 3 particular view about the particular viewabout person withoutbeingsureofthemeaningstermslikeblood,heartorliver. deal withthedebatebetween cognitivistsandnon-cognitivists. are, however, good reasons for thinking thatmetaethical arguments can be and Anti-Realism. Thus,itisaprerequisiteforunderstandingandevaluating addition orsubtraction.Norwouldwe consider attempting surgeryona concerned with good behaviour or, as per descriptive our claims can be trueor false (what philosophers call of understand whatexactly“good”amountsto. make moral claims of the form “murder is wrong” or“helpingothers is right” metaethical theoriesthatyouunderstandthesetwodebates.Inthissection,we merely abstracttopicofphilosophicaldebate. just asworthyandvaluable astheirnormative andappliedcounterparts. Semantic Cognitivism( Analogously, weapplied mathematics wouldnotconsider attempting If youareaMoralCognitivist(the“moral”prefixisassumed from hereon) One suchfactorinfavourofMetaethicsisasfollows.Ifethicsfundamentally Semantic Cognitivism ), goodcharacters,thenitwouldseemtobedesirableproperly in nature; wein nature; world moral featuresofthe trytodescribe genuinely not tobeconfusedwithRealism whilethelatterversion of Cognitivism, concerned psychology behindmoralutterances.Theformer Aristotle meaning moral languageasessentially (his theory is detailed in Psychological Cognitivism ) suggeststhatwhenwe of moral terms and a truth-apt ). According — seems . 95 Metaethical Theories 96 METAETHICS According to thepsychological cognitivist,Ialsoexpressabeliefwhenmake when theyareinaccurate. we assume that a belief is the kind of thing thatcan be trueor false and refers won the Premier Leaguein2015–2016”, I express my belief thatthis happened. when we utteramoralstatementwe give voicetoabelief,ratherthanany Psychological Cognitivism Psychological Cognitivism(nottobeconfusedwithRealism)istheviewthat fiction historybooks. the accuracyofthisstatementasadescriptionfeaturesworld;if this statementwillbe the cognitivist, are not especially different to the language and psychology the cognitivist,arenot especially differenttothelanguage beliefs thataremadetrueorfalseaccording tohowaccuratelythey truth-apt to theworld. In ethics then, cognitivistsclaim that moral statements express to formthecognitivistposition.Thisisreasonablebecauseitmost together describe theworld.Morallanguageandmoral psychology,according to described as true or false. Whether itis true or false will be determined by and ourmoral claims are truewhenourdescriptions are accurateandfalse and falseotherwise. common to manyotherdisciplines such as science, news journalism or non- claims suchas“murderiswrong”or“helpingothers isright”. other typeof non-belief attitude. So, when I utter thestatement“Leicester City of wrongnessassociatedwithmurderthenitwillbetrue, out amoralproperty of statementsinanewsreport.Whenthereportersaysthat“thedefendant means uncontroversial. Considerasemanticcognitivistaboutthemeaning with what actually exists in the world in the with whatactuallyexists below). Instead, it is purely a theory explaining the meaningofmoral below). Instead,itispurelyatheoryexplaining be true,ifitdoesnotthenwillfalse.Thesituationisthesamefor everwayin another it To put true. being actually statements. suggesting thatmoral claims are truth-apt —capableof being trueor false. “murder iswrong”reallydoespick utterance semantic moralcognitivist,ifthe will it features oftheworldidentifiedthen correctly referstothe statement stepped intothecourthouseandgave hisnameanddateofbirth”,then Semantic Cognitivism,byitself,doesnotsuggestanythingaboutmoralclaims natural tothinkofatruth-aptutteranceasbeing theexpressionofabelief,for This position reallyis as simple as itsounds, even thoughitis by no From here, Semantic and Psychological Cognitivism will be assumed to go assumed to From here,SemanticandPsychologicalCognitivism willbe Crucially, keepinmindthatSemanticCognitivismonlygoesasfar truth-apt —it willbethekindof statement thatcan be (that is Realismversus (that Anti-Realism —see Cognitivism hasnothingtodo (1966–) is of this view when it comes to Cognitivism and our moral utterances, we bedoingwhenwe engageinnormative orappliedethics? world. Consider what happens when you get frustrated withyourwork,for world. Considerwhathappenswhenyouget when we uttersentencessuchas“murderiswrong”we arenot attempting work isannoying —even thoughpeoplemighttakeyoutobeannoyed Psychological Non-Cognitivism Psychological Non-Cognitivismisaviewthat isdescribedby(though Semantic Non-Cognitivism to saythatCognitivismisthecommon sense positionwhenitcomes to moral they arelike“thedefendant entered thecourthouse”; they arenon-descriptive, the typesofthingsthatcanbetrueor false because theyarenottruth-apt; weany moralfeaturesoftheworldbut to describe aresimplyexpressingan language and our associated psychology. Of course, you might think, ethical and ourassociated psychology.Ofcourse,youmightthink, language psychological non-cognitivists hold that the psychology behindournon-truth- psychological non-cognitivistsholdthat do notaimattruthandattempttodescribeorreferanyfeatureofthe are fairlycommon and unremarkable; itis just thattheyaredifferenttobelief apt moral expressions is not tobeunderstood as based on “belief”, but rather or feeling attitude claims are truth-apt and that we express ethical beliefs,for what else could cognitivist thus argues that our moral utterances are more like “Ahhhhh!”are morelike our moralutterances cognitivist thusarguesthat than most likely,adesireorpreferenceforyourwork to beover. Suchmentalstates based on“…desires,preferences,emotions,intentions orthelike”. belief- assertions it’shighly likelythatitisabunchof[truth-apt, belief-state] example, andexclaim“Ahhhhh!”it isnot Thisisanexpressionofattitude, states. state] assertions”. that “…ifsomething walkssuggesting andtalkslikeabunch of[truth-apt, something which describes the world and it is not truth apt. The semanticnon- apt. is nottruth world andit something whichdescribesthe seem tobeanundesirableposition. According tothesemanticnon-cognitivist Semantic Non-Cognitivismmight,givenof itscognitivistrival, theplausibility not defendedby) non-truth-apt expressions. . Joyce, R. 2 . Wedgwood, R. 3 Youfair is probably so far;it fuss isabout all the be wonderingwhat might Your cryof“Ahhhhh!”your that in frustrationdoesnotexpressabelief The MythofMorality The NatureofNormativity 2 perhaps disgust, or anger, in thiscase. — perhaps disgust,oranger, Attitudesare not ap Wedgwood Ralph , p.14. , p.37. (1964–). According toWedgwood, Richard Joyce Richard 3

— but,

97 Metaethical Theories 98 METAETHICS “Ahhhhh!” by saying“false”. The non-cognitivist thussuggestsafairlyradical “Moral” prefixisassumed from hereon). As before,understanding thesebroad According tothenon-cognitivistourmoralutterancesarenotcapableofbeing When ageographerspeaks of thewater inLake Ontario, the“Geography The second key fork in the road that separates metaethical theories is the choice Realism (temperature, depthetc.)thatexistindependently and objectively; thewater would have aparticulartemperatureirrespective ofanyhumanbeliefabout 4. Realismversus Anti-Realism Realism Railton, believe this).Importantly,realists thusbelieve inthepossibilityof far lesscontroversial andmightbeahelpfulguidetotherealistviewinethics. true orfalseandareexpressionsofattitudes/preferences/desires/emotions that temperature. Analogously, that theories outlinedlaterinthischapter. positions is crucial to understanding and critiquing the specific metaethical the positions iscrucialtounderstandingandcritiquing a “morally wrong action”. a “morally action”, ora“depressing action” so too it mightpossess the propertyofbeing an action can possess properties such as being “Salika’s action”, “a violent and howmoraldiscourse works. Later,specificnon-cognitivistviewswillbe as apositioncombiningboththesemanticandpsychologicalelements. realist” believes that such water exists and has various propertiesand qualities of apositionthatmightbecalled“stark,raving MoralRealism”invirtueof our normalunderstandingforyourself. a mistaketorespondcryof would be just asit of thatmoralstatement independently ofhumanbeingsandcanbelocatedintheworld.Justas understanding of our common views regarding whatmoral utterances mean believing thatmind-independentmoraltruthexists intheworld. between MoralRealismand Cognitivism, the Anti-Realism (aswith explained andevaluatedof thisrevision desirability andyoucanjudgethe etc. ratherthanexpressionsofbelief.Respondingtoamoralutteranceby saying “true”or“false”wouldbetofailproperlycomprehendthemeaning of individualpeople or factsexistandthatthey existobjectivelyof theminds orbeliefs andindependently 4 When discussing Non-Cognitivism from this point,itshould be understood Realism in ethics is somewhat controversial, but Realism in geographyis P. Railton,‘’,p.165. is aviewaboutwhat (oratleast,realistsrelevant forourdiscussion, such as Peter Railton exists inethics, realists hold that certain moral properties . Itistheviewthatmoralpropertiesexists (1950–)describeshimselfasinfavour 4

Anti-Realism Anti-Realism issimplythedenialofRealism. Anti-realists denytheexistence Theories bothnon-cognitivistandanti-realist Theories bothnon-cognitivistandrealist Theories bothcognitivistandanti-realist The broadexplanationsofCognitivism,Non-Cognitivism,Realismand Anti- The naturalbedfellows betweenbroad positions outlined arethus the would makemurderwrongbethepresenceofanactualmoralproperty Realism have been crucial because they allow the followingcategorisation of Realism and Anti-Realism might becombined to form specific metaethical Example theorieswhicharebothcognitivistandrealist theories. simply they dragons orleprechaunsinthat about thus akintotheanti-realist terms meanifanyofthefollowingisgoingtomakesense.Drawingout Cognitivism andRealism, and Non-Cognitivism Anti-Realism. If we 5. TheMetaethicalMap deny theirexistence. of wrongness(objectivethe actof andmind-independent)associatedwith of anymind-independent,objective, moralproperties.Theanti-realistis metaethical mapmightbevery helpful,tothisend. map morespecificallyinrespectofhowCognitivism,Non-Cognitivism, However,moral utterancesaimoftruth. metaethical section paintsthe next the murder. error specific metaethical views to makesense. You really need to learnwhatthese should notbesurprisinggivennon-cognitivists donotbelieve that our that 5 Anti-realists tend to be (thoughneed not be)non-cognitivists, a fact that We onlyknowof one personholdingthisview:Kahane. Emotivism Prescriptivism Moral ErrorTheory Moral Non-Naturalism(e.g.intuitionistrealistaccounts) Moral Naturalism G. Kahane,‘Must MetaethicalRealismMakeaSemantic Claim?’ — believing that“murder is wrong” does not make murder wrong. What 5 99 Metaethical Theories 100 METAETHICS “The problemisoneoffindingroom for ethics, orplacingethicswithinthe view thatthereare beliefs withthe our moralutterances areexpressionsoftruth-apt view that we nottrytodescribethem?). Platonic Forms and the like.The naturalist seeks to fitmoral properties into Naturalists hold that therearemoral properties intheworld that maketrue 6. CognitivistandRealistTheoryOne:Naturalism the non-mysticalworldofordinaryscience. truth inethics, without resortingtonon-naturaljustifications based on Gods, the placeofvalue andobligation[morality]intheworldoffactsasrevealed property isnaturalifitfitsintotheworldoffacts asrevealed byscience. properties discussed and examined in the sciences, for example. So, the property philosophical andethicalnaturalistactuallymeansbytheterm“natural”. properties existingthatwe aretryingtoreferandaccuratelydescribe. desirability and purpose of this commitment to Naturalism when he says that: aim fortruthinourmoralutterances,itmakessensetothinkthatthereare at leastsomeofourordinarymoralbeliefs.Unsurprisingly,naturalistsalso circumstance, false.Thisisacontroversial viewandisexploredinmoredepth disenchanted of “beingmagnetic”.Thesepropertiescanbeinvestigated byscientists and are of being“wet” isaperfectlynaturalpropertyasthemorecomplex in sectionstenandeleven. moral errortheoristsbelieve thatourmoralutterancesarealways, inevery metaethical Naturalism. hold thatthesemoralpropertiesareperfectlynaturalratherthan by science”. being non-natural.To understand thisclaim, we need abettergripofwhatthe sit withtheviewthatnosuchmoralpropertiesexist(otherwise,whywould not supernaturalorbeyondthestudyofnaturalsciences. . Blackburn, S. 7 . Harman, G. 6 The outlyingtheoryisMoralErrorTheory,whichcombines thecognitivist Gilbert Harman Gilbert Utilitarianism isanormativea is underpinnedby ethicaltheorythat However, if our moral utterances do not aim for truth then thismay neatly Naturalists inethicsholdthatmoralpropertiesareasnaturalthose Moral Naturalismthusspeakstothosewhowish todefendRealismand io Blackburn Simon , non-ethicalorderwhichwe inhabit,andofwhichwe areapart”. 6 Ifmurderhasthepropertyofbeingmorallywrong,thenthis Explaining Value andOtherEssaysinMoralPhilosophy Ruling Passions (1938–)suggeststhat“…we mustconcentrateonfinding no (1944–) (though not a realist himself) outlinesthe (1944–)(thoughnotarealisthimself) realistobjective moralpropertiesintheworld.Thus, Jeremy Bentham , p.49. and John StuartMill , p.79. , ifyourecall 7 Australian coasthaveand climatechange coralreefs”,sincehumanactivity Virtuea normative Ethics,thusdefined,wouldthereforebe based theory 1 we candeterminethecharacter traits and dispositions thatcan help us to meet Naturalism (thesetheoriesaremorespecificallydiscussed in from these aimsandsuchcharactertraitsdispositionswillthenbevirtuous. the changeablepresence ofthosenaturalproperties. true. However, ifmoralpropertiesarenaturalproperties,thenRelativism possession of anappropriatefunctionalrole within agroup. As rational beings, particular ends —survival, reproduction, enjoyment/freedomfrompain,and place Virtue Ethics (as discussed in its Aristotelian form in wellperfectly understandpleasureintermsofneuralfiringsorpsychological promoted thegreatestamountofpleasure/happinessfornumber presence fromcasetocase. determined by naturalfactors to do with ourpsychology,behaviour,biology actions might not be absolutely wrong but might instead bewrongrelativeactions mightnotbeabsolutely wrongbut to at some point continentalplateswillshiftand these cities could move in and socialdynamics. As withUtilitarianism,nomysticalorsupernatural stuff contingent lifestyles; murder, for example,wouldbewrong irrespective ofany relative locationtoeachother.Norisitabsolutelytruethat “sectionsofthe on Naturalismbecausewhatmakessomethinggood or virtuousisentirely of people.Utilitariansthusviewgoodasanentirelynaturalpropertiesforthere other is, in and of itself, irrelevant tothedebatebetween moral relativists and is requiredtoexplainthevirtuesandassociatedmoralgoodness. is nothing mystical,enchantedorsupernaturalaboutpleasure;scientists can makes truetheclaimthat“murderiswrong”then thisnaturalpropertymight might changethisnaturalfact.Equallythen,if anaturalpropertyiswhat may makemoresenseinvirtueofthefactthatnatural propertiescanvary in explanations. seem to dependupontheamountofpleasureproduced, or elseonsome specific situational factors if theclaim that “murderiswrong”were naturalist metaethicalframework. nature then they would need to apply irrespectivethey wouldneedtoapply then nature situations or ofcontingent ). Harman suggests that if ethicalguidelinesandruleswere). Harmansuggeststhat absolutein According to Hursthouse, human beings functionwell if they meet four Michael Smith In addition,both For example,itisnot Does Naturalism lead to Relativism? Harman claimed that, if correct, Does NaturalismleadtoRelativism?Harmanclaimedthat, Chapter 1 changeable would , definedmoralgoodnessintermsoftheact(orsetrules)that naturalfactor.Ifmoralproperties arenaturalproperties,then (1954–) rejects Harman’s claim and suggests that Naturalism (1954–)rejectsHarman’s claimandsuggeststhat naturally leadustoMoralRelativismandawayfrom Philippa Foot absolutely true that “London isnorthofParis” truethat because and Rosalind Hursthouse Chapter 3 have soughtto ) within a absolutely Chapter

101 Metaethical Theories 102 METAETHICS According toMoore: 7. ObjectionstoNaturalism Thus, testingtheworldinordertodeterminenaturalornon-naturalstatus yellow isasimpleconceptthatcannotbebrokendownintosimpler component was not a naturalist — Question Argument Non-Naturalism inethics. that moral propertieswerethat naturalproperties.Moore’s objectiontoidentifying that thesequestionscannotbesettledbytakingastanceonNaturalismor the conceptofahorsecanbebrokendowntosimpler components. to someonewhohasnever comeintocontactwiththeanimalbecause parts. Yellow isjustyellow, andwewill it that else about cansaynothing G. E.Moore debate are absolutists. cannot be explained in terms of any other concept or property. Consider, asan concept orproperty. other in termsofany explained cannot be concept of the colour yellow is a fundamentally simple concept in so far as it concept ofahorsecanbereducedtosimplerpart. As amammal ofatypically questions regardingtherationalityorreasonablenessofhumanbehaviourand of moral propertiescannotsettlethe identification ofthemoralwithnaturalfailedwhathetermed moral propertieswerethe fundamentallysimpleandsecondlyhethought moral propertiesasnaturalwas two-fold.Firstly,hethoughtthat moral absolutists. Smith argues thatabsolutistsandrelativistswilldifferon be explainedtosomeonewhohasnotcomeinto visual contactwithit,because brown colour,withcertainorgansanddimensions. In anobviousway, between moralpropertiesandcolourproperties. According toMoore,the be analysed and investigated bymethods that do not involve testingtheworld. explain itinsimpler terms. Thesame, says Moore, is trueformoral properties. example ofacomplex property, theidea ofahorse. A horse can beexplained 8  For Smith,importantquestionsrelevant totheabsolutistandrelativist If I am asked, ‘What is good?’ my answer isthat Moore denies that the sameistrueforconceptofyellow.Moore deniesthat Yellow cannot Moore’s first objectiontoNaturalism, matter that isallIhave tosayaboutit. G. E.Moore . OrifIamasked‘Howisgoodto bedefined?’myanswer isthatitcannotbedefined,and a priori was asupporterofCognitivismandRealism.However, Moore , ‘TheOpen-Question Argument: TheSubjectMatterofEthics’, p.35. . rather than he was a non-naturalist — 8 a posteriori a priori from simplicity

good is good, andthatis the endof the — differences between relativistsand meaning that these debates must and objected to theidea , isbasedonananalogy Open All such attempted reductions will fail because it willalways be possible to Tanner referstothe whether ornotabacheloris an unmarried man as the concept of a bachelor whether Action A isgood,even ifIamtoldthat Action A ispleasurable. fundamentally simple.Theutilitarian,forexample,definesgoodness in terms that “giving tocharityispleasurable”.Thisidentificationbetweenthat goodness terms ofothernaturalproperties. to naturalpropertiesasthiswouldimplythatmoralarenot this question is open then goodness doesnotequal thesuggestednatural this questionisopenthen property. natural to the moral property to reducethe of attempting mistake the provides amodernexampleoftheOpenQuestion Argument inaction: possesses the naturalpropertysuggested”but“is it agood act”? a pleasurableactismorallygoodact.Yet, itseemstoremainopenas actually reducibletopleasure. After all,itisnotpossibletomeaningfullyask goodness might about of identificationanaturalist type and pleasureisthe and insertsome naturalpropertysuchas “pleasure”.Now,we have theclaim argumentative pullbutlackssufficientrobustness.However, Moore’s Open can be reduced to the concept ofanunmarriedman.Thus,ifthisutilitarian- the reduced to can be is good”.Forgoodness,Mooresuggestswecharity naturalist’s lead followthe On thisbasis,Moorecannotacceptthatmoralpropertiescanbereduced Question Argument moreformallydrives homehispoint. or notsomethingcreatingpleasureisactuallygood.Thequestionremains of pleasure and so reduces goodness to pleasure. Moore suggests thatmoral meaningful ask whether the suggested natural property is actually good; if is actually property meaningful askwhether thesuggestednatural meaningful inawayit shouldnotremainmeaningfulifgoodnessis that have inmind. should not be a meaningful question —an opentoaskwhether a meaningful should notbe style naturalistiscorrectabouttheidentificationofgoodness and pleasure,it naturalists makeamistakeintryingtogroundsimple moral properties in natural propertywillleave ameaningfulopenquestionoftheform“thisact 9 As it stands, Moore’s analogy betweenAs itstands,Moore’s analogy goodnessandyellow hassome Some peopletalkasiftheythinkthatwhichhasevolvedsame thingasbeinggood.Thus, isthe Moore, tocommit the because good has beendefinedassomethingotherthan However, accordingtoMooreitremains an Moore suggests that any attempted reduction of a moral property to a any attemptedreductionofamoralproperty Moore suggeststhat Moore suggests thatwe takesome putative moralclaimsuchas“givingto itself, as‘thesurvival of thefittest’ of the fittest’and ‘the survival of the [fittest]’ is good. To make such an argument is, according to for instance,capitalismof ‘thesurvival maybejustifiedonthebasisthatitismerelyanexpression J. Tanner, ‘TheNaturalistic Fallacy’, Naturalistic Fallacy . 9 http://www.richmond-philosophy.net/rjp/rjp13_tanner.php , whichisMoore’sownterminologyfor open question as to whether Julia Tanner

103 Metaethical Theories 104 METAETHICS According to Moore, moral propertiesdo exist buttheyarefundamentally what God wills, but is itgood?” appearstoremainopen.Self-evidently,this what Godwills,but who are living withdeafness in Bangladesh. While watching thereportand Having beenso helped, the news report pointsoutthatthisperson has made a Moore’s critique of Naturalism sets the scene forhisownmetaethicalview. Moore’s critiqueofNaturalismsetsthe for example,“whatGodwills’” willalsofailbecausethequestionof“thisis the associatedinterview,Beckyintuitsfactthat thedoctorshave actedina to hearforthefirsttimeinherlifeviause ofnewmedicaltechnology. properties arelike,typicallynon-naturalistsalsointuitionists. presence ofthesesimplenon-naturalpropertiesviaa is discoverablethat property throughthekindof Question Open Think ofthe property. searchlight seeking Argument asthe deafness and that she tooisactingmorallywelldeafness andthat others tohear.The inhelping documentary which involves her passing on thistechnologytopoor children are acquired“withoutmakinganyuseofprocessreasoning”. consideration. However, typicallynon-naturaliststhinkthatwe come to knownon-naturalpropertiesdepend ontheparticulartheoryunder contemporarily, reductions ofgoodness. Any attempttoreduce the conceptofgoodness to, 8. CognitivistandRealistTheoryTwo: Non-Naturalism out thosewhocommitthenaturalisticfallacy. intuitions areabout us to identifynaturalproperties,such as in thesciences. How we might much clearer. moral “withoutany need of proof, or of evidence beyond itself”. means is as follows. If Goodness is non-natural thenitis not thekindof morally goodway inresearchingand implementingthecureforthiswoman’s example should make this method of intuiting non-natural moralproperties example shouldmakethismethodofintuiting simple simple concept. no more acceptable if, likeMoore, youbelieveno moreacceptable thatgoodisafundamentally non-natural reduction is not anexampleof a naturalistic fallacy, butitcan be naturalistic reductionsofgoodness,arejustaspowerful against 11 10

It isworthnotingthatMoore’s arguments, althoughdirectedagainst ihr Price Richard Becky iswatching aBBCnewsreportonwomanwhohasbeenhelped W. D.Ross, R. Price,‘A ReviewofthePrincipleQuestionsinMorals’,p. 159. non-natural The Rightandthe Good W. D. Ross W.D. (1723–1791) suggested that truths are intuited when they are intuited (1723–1791)suggestedthattruths properties.Thebestway tounderstandwhatnon-natural how we discover moralpropertiesratherthan whatmoral (1877–1971)suggestedthatwe intuitself-evident , p.29. empirical moral sense means thathelp . Soalthough non-natural intuit 10 More 11 the An

Principle via hermoralsense. (e.g. RalphWedgewood). However, objectionstoabasic Intuitionism arenot werefer tothepresenceofthesenon-natural and appropriately willcorrectly were lessdaft,ourintuitive moralsense mightbemorereliable! 9. ObjectionstoIntuitionism Kantian moraltruths). Intuitionism offers a way aroundtheOpenQuestion Argument andthe Naturalistic Fallacy,consequentlyithasanumberofmodern proponents then you believeReligious Language —then cannot be statements that that first glance);dutiesthatshouldguideourbehaviourbutsometimes can to apprehensionviaourmoralsense.Whenwe uttermoralsentenceswe terms ofhowtoactinspecificsituations. going astrayandthismayexplaincontinuingmoral disagreement.Ifonlywe properties intheworld.Whenwe soappropriatelyrefer,we maketruemoral properly pick up on features of the world. Indeed, pick uponfeaturesofthe properly particularly difficulttoconceive of. different ethicalviews(Mooreisateleologist, whereasRoss intuits proto- do even self-professed intuitionists suchasMooreandRoss have radically claim thatmoralpropertiesarefundamentallysimpleandnon-natural,open disagreement facie our intuitive sense, just as our other faculties require maturityand tuning to use herfacultiesofreasontoidentifyit;thepropertygoodness is pickedup moral goodness is self-evidentinthesituationanddoes not requireBeckyto moral judgments might be properly verified.be properly moral judgmentsmight the Ifyou support harming others,notlying,andkeepingpromises.Rosssuggeststhatnoformal both the Open Question Open the both Intuitionists Fallacy. Naturalistic Argument and the overriddenbe competing duties.Rossoutlinesdutiessuchasnot other by empirical or logical defence of these duties is appropriate because they are because they empirical orlogicaldefenceofthesedutiesisappropriate suggested that,amongstotherthings,stupidity mayleadtoourintuitions statements. seek todescribethepresenceofsuchpropertiesaccuratelyand,sometimes, self-evident. We cannotargue W. D. Ross specifically suggeststhattherearevarious self-evident In addition,onarelated note,we may wonderhowsuchintuitive In response, Ross has suggested that we need a certain moral maturity to If youareanintuitionistandarealistthismightofferroutetosurviving Firstly, Intuitionismmightbethoughttostrugglewhenexplainingmoral dutiesthatwe canintuit( which you may be lucky enough to come across in a unit on to comeacrossinaunit enough lucky —which youmaybe . If moral truths areself-evidentand can be intuited, thenwhy prima facie to theclaimwe shouldnotlie,only meaning,inthissense,apparenton Samuel Clarke (1675–1729) Verification from prima itin 105 Metaethical Theories 106 METAETHICS Theory 10. Cognitivistand Anti-Realist TheoryOne:MoralError Thus far, we have seen that Cognitivism tends to be associated with Realism. verify suchstatements. In sodoing,Mackiedenies thatpossibilityourtruth-aptbeliefsare ever Intuitionism is correct Mackie breakswiththistrend withhisMoralErrorTheory.Mackieaccepts that Moral Error Theory. It is, as ever, for you to judge whether theintuitionisthas favour savingfive over oneinthefirstcase, but favoursavingoneover five falsity) oraretruebydefinitionmeaningless. that our intuitions are so unreliable that they are better understoodasirrational are better they that our intuitionsaresounreliable that to usetwoexamples,whointuitsgoodnesscorrectly.Certainly,we could truths? gentleman tohisdeathinfrontofthetrainstopitsprogress.Mostresponders properties, thenitisnotclear divergent intuitionsabout such cases rather thandisagreement across a group In asecond redirected train. of the path one persontiedinthe doing sowillkill any plausibledefenceoftheirtheoryagainstthe criticismssuggestedthusfar. are expressionsoffeelingsorinitialbeliefs,ratherthanareflectionobjective case, youcansave fiveportly pushing onerather track by peopletiedtothe our moral utterances are expressions of truth-apt beliefs, but denies Realism. beliefs, but our moralutterancesare expressionsoftruth-apt of differentpeople. one version, youcanredirectatraintosave five peopletiedtothetrack,but in thesecondcase.Ifourintuitionspointsodivergentlywhen we makemoral in theworld.Thus, verificationists maysuggestthatmoral statements —if moral judgmentsexpressingourownfeelingsorpersonalbeliefs,ratherthan but thismaybehardertoholdwhenexplainingoneperson’sownpersonal explored in thenextsection as they feed into explanation of Mackie’s own empirically verified (testedagainsttheworldtodeterminetheir truthor judgments, mightwe bebettertoassumeourpre-rationalintuitive responses judgments givingvoicetotheexistenceofmind-independent,objective, non- natural moralproperties. not useempiricalmeans to testforthepresence of non-naturalproperties J. L. Mackie If moraljudgmentsareintuitively supportedjudgmentsaboutnon-natural Perhaps responses based onmoralmaturityorstupiditywillapplyherealso, Finally, returningtothetheme of disagreement, we mightpositevidence Consider responses to thestandard ethical dilemma of a trolleycase. In (1917–1981) also offers criticisms of Intuitionism, but these are — would be meaningless in virtue of our inability to how we couldverify whetheritisMooreorRoss, “when canpromises be broken”.Ifmoraltruths reallydidexistandRealism Argument fromRelativity Thus, Mackieviewsdisagreementinethics —deepthatseems was correct, should we nothave expected tofind some of these truthsbynow? world withoutanymoralpropertiesinit. Naturalistic andNon-NaturalisticRealism Mackie’s first objection to Realism is built out ofhisappreciationthedepth Mackie’s firstobjectiontoRealismisbuilt Mackian argument. for thischapter.Instead,we mustexplainandevaluate Mackie’stheoryasit true, because a moral of the world can never accurately describe a those debateswouldhavethat now! Ofcourse,ifyouthink settled by been their own,beblindtothefacts.However, sometimes the factsbecomeclear to coalescearoundthetruthover timeanddisagreementis,atleastinpart, to Intuitionismofferedintheprevioussection.Mackiesuggeststhatother live ifmoralityisentirelyfalse. Although interesting,thesediscussions are not plausible realistdisciplines,suchasthesciences or historyviewsbegin prone tosuchmistakenthinking). properties, inourterms)actuallyexist. prescriptive, theseclaims areallfalse”. knowledge and scientists and historians will sometimes, through no fault of arguing over 2000+years ago,questionssuch as “whenis war acceptable”and and disagreementtherebyreduces. action-guiding andMackiedenies that anyobjective guidestoaction(moral conquered. of moraldisagreement,andsosharessomethingwithonetheobjections to theory anymoreorlesslikely implications doesnotmakethat or liberating is incorrect;therearenomoralfactstosettlethe debatesoratleastsomeof impervious tosolutionthroughrationalmeans —as evidencethatRealism implicitly claim, among other things, to be pointing to somethingobjectivelypointing to be implicitly claim,amongotherthings, be accurate (though itis surprising how often even thebestphilosophers are should bemadeclearthatMackie’s arguments aredirectedagainst consider itsimplicationsiftrue. than stands rather depressing having A theory some moraldebateshave beensettled,then youcouldusethistocriticise 12 Yet, inethics,philosophersstilldisagreeover thesameissuesthattheywere

In Mackie’sownwords,“Althoughmoral judgments mostpeopleinmaking Mackie’s two arguments.It following the Anti-Realism issupportedby Mackie’s view isstartlingandraises loads of questionsabouthowwe should Disagreement occurs in these disciplines because there is a barrier to true Disagreement occursinthesedisciplinesbecausethereisabarrier J. L.Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right andWrong , p.35. . 12 Byprescriptive, Mackiemeans both 107 Metaethical Theories 108 METAETHICS “is” and“ought”inareasotherthanmorality —thefactthatahorseisrunning Argument Queerness Argument Queerness would be betteroff. The simpler explanationis not tograntexistenceweird Hume wonderswhyandhowwe move fromstatementsaboutwhat Mackie’s secondanti-realistargumentishismostfamous.Moralproperties —be Mackie suggests that that aliens or ghosts exist on the basis offirst-handtestimony(competing aliens orghostsexistonthe that to positingtheexistenceofsuch queer andutterlyuniqueentitiesthenwe to Hume: that we cannot simply ignore even if we like murderingor hate charitable they naturalornon-natural —aresupposed to be then they would be entities orqualitiesrelationsofaverythey wouldbe then strange sort, twelve. Mackie, however, takesthisHumeanworryinhisowndirection. to statements about how we give rise to such an of moralitywhenhespokethe“is-ought”gap. guiding quality According giving. Thisaspectofmorality,however, raisesissuesatthemetaethicallevel. properties, butjusttosuggestthattherearenoproperties andthatourmoral properties. He says that “[if] there were there objective values“[if] properties. Hesaysthat [moralproperties], at Goodwood does not,ofitself,give youan“ought”regardinghowtoactin response. The factthatamoral property quality, thatofferan“ought”justbecausetheyare, wouldbeextremely utterly differentfromanythingelseintheuniverse”. if it is true that givingto charity is right, thenwe should give to charity, murder iswrong,thenwe shouldnotmurder, we mightnotwant to beliefs reflect cultural and personalbeliefs.Justaswereflect cultural beliefs tend tosuggest donot explanations basedon drunkenness ortiredness,forexample,seem more 14 13 Hume, D. Hume has his own suggestion for explanation, and this is outlined in section In every systemofmorality,whichIhave hithertomet,Ihave always Mackie suggests that if weMackie suggeststhat resorting without moral thinking canexplain instead of the usual copulationsofpropositions, of the instead the lastconsequence. not connectedwithan makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden Iam proceeds for some time in the ordinaryways of reasoning, and establishes thebeing of a God, or J. L.Mackie, A TreatiseonHumanNature Ethics (1711–1776)recognisedthepotentialproblemwithaction- , p.38. 13

At itscore,moralityissupposedtoofferreasonsforaction “ought” regardingbehaviour.How can this beexplained? ought properties themselves , oran ought ought not , http://www.davidhume.org/texts/thn.html to act. We do not make such a link between . Thischangeisimperceptible,buthowever, of is , and is that carry such an action-guiding , on the otherhand, does seem to is not even if we mightwant , I meet with nopropositionthatis , Imeet action-guiding 14 [remarked],

[surprised] . If it is true that thattheauthor

to find, that to. Equally, is thecase, even if queer

Although Mackieadmires the honestyofintuitionistinadmitting the wearing ablueshirttoday”areestablishedinthelatterway. would needaspecialmoralfacultyinordertoaccess queermoralproperties. Hume favoured Mackie, thusrequiresan unnecessarilyqueermetaphysics(whatexists) and testing theworldthroughoursenses). the existenceof queer properties,thenwhyadmit to theexistenceof a to come into contact with queermoral properties. Mackie suggests that we Cognitivism and Anti-Realism. Cognitivism gap referredtoabove ( geometric ormathematicaltruthandcannotbededuced like “2+2=4”,orvarious geometric claims like “triangleshave threesides”, plausible) sowe perhapsoughtnottograntthatmoralproperties existjust knowledgeof knowledge isacompletelyuniquetype accessed in acompletely an unnecessarily queerepistemology(howwe knowwhatexists).Forthese are establishedintheformerway whereasknowledge claimslike“Alastair is reasons, Mackieisananti-realist. referring tothequeermethodofunderstanding thatwe wouldneedinorder realists. queer methodforgrasping queerproperties?MoralRealism,according to relations ofideas observations reveal whatis,not whatoughttobe).Ifmoralknowledge does of moralpropertiesisfurthersupportedviaconsideration unique way or,more plausibly perhaps,moral knowledge does not actually is notderivable simply from relations ofideas (it isnotsupposed to belike moral knowledge donotseemtofiteithersideofthefork.Moralknowledge moral propertiesintheworld. believefor accessing realist existence ofsucharadicallydifferentfaculty inthe because we happentotalkaboutthem. existence ofsuchaqueermoralsense,hedoesnot thinkthatitiscredibleto existed basedontheapplicationofhisfamousfork.Remember,however, that exist. Butifwe cannotknowthatmoral properties existthenwe should not be not fitintoeitherside of Hume’s fork, then itwillbethecase that eithermoral As before,ifwe can explainourmoralbeliefswithoutneedingtoadmit This split of types of knowledge is referred to as Hume’s fork, yet claims to Hume, certainly, would have rejected the idea that moral properties Hume dividedknowledge intotwocamps —knowledge gainedfrom Indeed, support for Anti-Realism through acomplaintaboutthequeerness Nor, however, is it derivable simply from matters of fact, given the“is-ought” On asimilartheme,Mackiestrengthenstheargumentfromqueernessby andknowledge gainedfrom Non-Cognitivism a posteriori , sense-based,worldlyandscientificempirical and than (likeMackie) Anti-Realism rather matters offact a priori . Knowledge claims Hume’s fork withoutany . 109 Metaethical Theories 110 METAETHICS 11. ObjectionstoMoralErrorTheory would no longerpersist.Thus, Ayer would have feltthatmoral disagreement different tootherthingsshouldbeseenasaproblem;is why somethingbeing wrong (but it is not morally right either!) and that giving to charity is not to charity giving either!) andthat it isnot morally right wrong (but Realists have various responsestoMackie.Firstly,realistsmightjustagree Max and Ethan disagreeover themoralityofmeat-eatingonlybecausethey found in ethics, it might be thought that wethat thought be might found inethics,it moral shouldabandonourfaulty for slaughter.Ifallthenon-moralfactswere clear,thentheirdisagreement to disagreewithMoralErrorTheory. the badness of slavery, sexism and racism etc. MoralError Theory denies the language andpsychology,butfindithardto grantthatobjective, mind- language entirely —aratherextrememetaethicalconclusion! perhaps in the form of human rights being identified, thenyouhaveperhaps intheformofhumanrightsbeing areason progress moral truth; any of denying of moralprogressinvirtue possibility progress. Itmaybetemptingtoarguethatmoral disagreement has actually problem. Indeed,intuitionistsmaybevery happytoaccepttheuniqueness disagree over the and accepttheconclusion that moralpropertieswouldbequeerinvirtueof requires correctanswers. If youbelieve thatprogresshasbeenmade in ethics, reduced over timebecausewe have come into contact with truthsregarding only wheretherewere disagreementsover thenon-moralfacts.On thisview, of moralpropertiesinvirtuetheirfundamentalsimplicityand independent moral facts orpropertiesactuallyexistintheworld, then Moral is notasdeepandpervasive asMackiesuggests. it notthecase that everything is different toeverything else, in atleastsome irreducibility tootherproperties.Naturalists,meanwhile, may simply wonder morally right (but it is notmorallywrongeither!).Givenmorally right(but to be is notruth there making propertiesexistintheworld. It suggests that murder is not morally moral beliefsarefalseandthattheycould moral disagreementcanbecriticised. may beworththeseseeming costs. bridging the “is-ought” gap; they may simply deny that such queernessisa may simplydenythat they “is-ought” gap; the bridging sense? In addition, Mackie’s views regarding theimportanceand depth of A differentresponsetomoraldisagreementisdefendtheideaof A. J. Ayer J. A. However, ifyou Moral ErrorTheoryisalsohighlycounterintuitive. Itsaysthatallofyour (1910–1989),forexample,feltthatmoraldisagreementsexisted non-moral fact do accept Cognitivismasanaccurateexplanationof moral of how much pain is endured by animals sent ofhowmuchpainisenduredby never betruebecausenomoraltruth 12. Non-Cognitivism Thus, non-cognitivists will be unconcerned by the lack ofmoralpropertiesin the unconcerned by Thus, non-cognitivistswillbe well tiedtoeachother.Now,ifmoralutterances were expressions of moral Prior to anexplanationand evaluation of the specific theoretical options for Non-Cognitivism moregenerally. Liz lacksanydesiretocaterforherfriendsandsodoesnotact.Liz’sbelief, friends, thenLizwouldcometobemotivated toactandprepareadelightfully feelings oremotions.ThispictureiscertainlywhatHumehadinmindgiven following Mackie.Indeed,thisiswhatthemajorityofanti-realiststendtodo. the world because they deny that our moralutterancesareattemptstopick deny that the worldbecausethey the non-cognitivist,itis worthwhile just providing a few words in favour of the situationandaddtoLiz’spsychologya gap mightbetakenashelpfulevidence for Non-Cognitivism. If moral person uttersamoralphrase,ifthephraseissincerely uttered,thenthey’ll be can afford to do so, is morally required”,thenyouwould expect me to be claim clearer. of theworld;beliefssaywhatwe believe “is”anddonot of ouractions. in thatcircumstanceyoumightquestionthesincerity ofmymoralutterance. us to action.Tobemotivated toactuallyact,according toHume,abelief must utterances arenotdescriptive beliefsbutareinsteadexpressionsofattitudes, utterances carrywiththemanaction-guidingforce, this maybebecausemoral up anerrortheorist,thenitmaybeworthdenyingCognitivismratherthan motivate behaviourbecausebeliefsaremotivationally inert.Thefunctionof a motivated togive charityifIwere abletodoso;if Ichosenottogive tocharity motivated. Forexample,ifIutterthewords “givingtocharity,forthosewho his be belief asapsychologicalstateistooffermotivationally neutraldescription by itself,does not and cannot motivate action on her part. Now, if we change such propertiesout. sumptuous feast. Thus, Hume argues, desires are required intheexplanation beliefs As well assupporting Anti-Realism, Hume’sidentificationofthe“is-ought” If youareimpressed by anti-realist argumentsbutdo not wish to end Moral utterances,andrelevant moralmotivations, seem toberemarkably Liz coupled withadesire So whyisthisrelevant toadefenceofNon-Cognitivism?Well, whena Humean TheoryofMotivation we wouldneedto,inadditiontothemoral belief,granttheexistence believes thatherfriendswillsoonbearrivingforabarbecue.However, inourheads.ThefollowingcaseshouldmakeHume’s . Humeclaimed that beliefsalonecannot desire to feedandcaterforher by themselves leadto 111 Metaethical Theories 112 METAETHICS “good” and “bad” thattheyhave onlyemotive meanings inthesense of Ayer, speakingofthe claimthat“stealingmoneyiswrong”saysthissimply A. J. Ayer and 13. Non-Cognitivistand Anti-Realist TheoryOne:Emotivism verifiable or open toreal-world testing in order to determine their truthvalue (moral utterances, on this view, are not truth-apt beliefs attempting to describe beliefs attempting (moral utterances,onthisview,arenottruth-apt we claimthatsomethingismorallyrightwe hurrahthataction.This explains when we claimthatsomethingis morally wrongwe boo that actionand when Indeed, Emotivism isreferredtoasthe “boo/hurrah”metaethicaltheory; false, for it is not truth-aptso too we cannot say that a linguistic boo of the twentieth century. According toEmotivism, the moral statementthatmurder tend totrackeach other sowell —our moral utterances are just expressions that we shouldstopusingmorallanguage. therefore, straightforwardly leadto the world).Thus, Ayer suggestedthatmoralutterances had an that moralutteranceshadameaningeven though,asanon-cognitivistand the connectionbetween moralityandmotivation; we expressmotivationally- gives formallinguisticvoicetowhatisessentiallyanegative “boo”tomurder. approval anddisapproval. Therefore, just as we cannotsaythat a“boo”is and moral judgments is preserved. On thisbasis, there is no pull totheidea an actof “…evincing mymoral disapproval of it. Itis as if I had said, ‘You anti-realist, heplainlycouldnotsuggestthatmoralutteranceswere empirically an expression of mydesire that everyone should give tocharity,thenitis reveals an emotion, even if not a description of the world. Emotivism does rather thanexpressingmotivationally inertmoral beliefs. relevant emotional distaste or emotional approval whenwe use moral words of some special exclamation marks”. of ourmoraldesires! But theclaimthatourmoraljudgementsaresimplyan of acontinuousdesiretodowhatwe believe ismoral.However, ifmoral is wrong is simply an expression of emotion against the act ofmurdering.It is wrongsimplyanexpressionofemotionagainstthe is simply is morallyright” to charity phrase “giving If the into ourpsychology. utterances were themselves moraldesires then we neednotadd the extrabelief metaethical viewthatheldconsiderable sway foratimeintheearlypartsof expression ofourdesiresjustisNon-Cognitivism. exceedingly simpletoexplainwhyourmoralutterancesandmotivations stole thatmoney’inapeculiartoneofhorror,or writtenitwiththeaddition 15 Although averificationist aboutlanguagehimself, Ayer

Stevenson, inaddition,suggestedofmoral terms like“right”,“wrong”, A. J. Ayer, ‘The Emotive TheoryofEthics’,p.106. C. L. Stevenson L. C. (1908–1979) were defenders of Emotivism, a 15 Thus, the moral judgment meaningfully as somemeaningformoralvalues did not emotive wish to deny

meaning not . , 14. ObjectionstoEmotivism (Charlotte is sad that she feelsnegativelyis sadthat (Charlotte towards avoiding), orperhaps tax (reflecting amoralbeliefinmyhead).Idonotconsidermyselftobebooing what Imeantwhensaid that “terrorism ismorallywrong”?Cantheyknow widely considered to beanundulyand unhelpfully simplistic form of Non- I suggest that a certain action is right or wrong,Itakemyselftobemakinga I suggestthatacertainactionisright Emotivism captured the “magnetism” of morality — form “stealing is wrong” is either trueor false. Stevenson thus arguedthat track ourmotivations because our moral utterances are expressions of the that euthanasia ismorallywronginallcircumstances. Williamthat andWendy them. these responsesrequirecarefulstatementanddefence ifyouseektopursue herself. Perhapstax we canhave second-orderemotions tax” butbequitedepressed aboutthisjudgment. If we were cognitivists, this Charlotte feels that others shouldnotavoidtax —boothemwhilesheis Charlotte feelsthat Cognitivism. We considerthreeobjectionshere. disagreement between William andWendy over theissueofeuthanasia.Wendy depresses her. However, itisnotimmediatelyobvioushowEmotivism might answer that isindependentoftheir ownminds. a moral fact thatisindependentofher mind and herdesires and thisfact abstract philosophising about themeaningof words should ever trump our an actioninaratheracademic and indirect way. We mightquestionwhether Despite earlypopularity,Emotivism is not apopularpositiontodayand it is claim that istrueandmakingaclaim that reflectshowItaketheworld to be own psychological reflections when itcomes to whatwe mean when we utter or economists, orcomputertechnicians,disagree over asubstantively correct moral judgments? moral sentences.Canitbethecasethat Ayer orStevensonthan I knewbetter may seem to be disagreeing via utilising and reasonjustasscientists, disagreeing viautilising may seemtobe happy act inthiswayhappy avoidance. However,for herowntax —hurrah of both better than you, if you take yourself to be making truth-apt and descriptivetruth-apt making yourself tobe than you, ifyoutake better explain Charlotte’s“bootoavoidingtax”whenshe harboursadesiretoavoid believesemotional divorcecouldbeeasilyexplained;Charlotte theretobe emotional. For example,Charlottemay feel that“itis wrong toavoid paying emotions thatunderpinourmotivations. says thateuthanasiaismorally rightinatleastsome cases, whilst William says Finally, we can return tomoral disagreement. Consider a sincere moral Firstly, onapsychologicallevel, Emotivism is unlikely tofeelcorrect.When Secondly, some of our moral utterances do not seem to be in the least part in the Secondly, some ofourmoralutterancesdo notseemtobe our moral utterances about ouremotions

113 Metaethical Theories 114 METAETHICS “Ethical statements do not look like thekindof thing the emotive theorysays (boo forchocolate,hurrahvanilla) thanwithtruth-based disagreements in I am, therefore, mistaken if I claim that “murder is acceptable”, at least within I am,therefore,mistakenifclaimthat“murder isacceptable”,atleastwithin Relativism andEmotivismhave thesamesetofgroundingbeliefs —no they are”. moral arguments seems tosuggest of moraldebate emotivist explanation the that moral debates arealways emotive ratherthanfactual,andso are swayed the boundaries of my society even if not in the of others. This truth is is determinedorfixedin that property define goodnessasagenuine they that absolute moral truths exist.Whilsttheculturalrelativistmayadmit that to believe inaform of realistmoral truth, even ifsuchrelativists do not hold Chapter 1 are suchattempteddescriptions ofrealist,albeitrelativistic,moraltruths. backed exist andmoralexpressionsreflecttheculturally absolute moraltruths are thingsweof those contra theemotivistinterpretation to betruth-apt, take cultural relativist may suggest that the claim“murderiswrong”canbetruein cultural relativistmaysuggestthat reduce thisdisagreementtoaseriesofemotionalboo’sandhurrah’sregarding other hand, the emotivist, obviously, does not accept that our moral statements other hand,theemotivist, obviously,doesnotacceptthatourmoralstatements other academic disciplines. If thisisnothowwe believe moraldebatesshould only byemotionalratherthanrationalmeans,isacontroversial claimgiven that is ever absolutelytrueinallcircumstances. As a specific type of relativist, the mind-independently true. moral utterances. moral reasonsseem to bedeployed very carefullyinjustsuchdebates.Indeed, havearguments over moreincommonwith whichice-creamflavourisbest between Emotivismandmoralrelativism.Butdonotbe deceived. Recallfrom be described, then Emotivism has a problem. As exists and that our moral statements attempt to describe such truths. On the exists andthatourmoral statementsattempttodescribesuchtruths.On the ethical judgments often reflect personal and culturally supported emotions, and more absolutely anything than speakers, rather emotions ofparticular is nevereuthanasia, wheretruth theaimofmoralutterances.Suggesting standards for behaviour.Thus,theremaybesome suggestion thatCultural some cultural settingsand false in others depending on the differentcultural non-absolute andrelative toculture,buttheculturalrelativistacceptsthatit nature bytheculturalstandardsofagiven society. 16 . Brandt, R. The previousobjectiontoEmotivism may Thus, if “murder is wrong” is a true relative to my culture, However, oncethefactsofmatterareagreeduponemotivistmust However, thisisamistake.ContraEmotivism,culturalrelativists dotend thatrelativists,asopposedtoabsolutists,holdnomoralclaim 16 Brandt,aspertheabove discussion, feels thatmoralutterances Ethical Theory:The ProblemsofNormative and CriticalEthics seem to highlight possible links highlight , p.226. then it is still true suggests . According totheprescriptivist,thisisnotadescriptive beliefbutisareflection 15. Non-Cognitivistand Anti-Realist TheoryTwo: 16. ObjectionstoPrescriptivism Prescriptivism we cannotcry“false!” againstCristina,butwe cancry“inconsistent”.This,at Prescriptivism is,onthisbasis,oftenviewed asastep-uponEmotivismwhen R. M.Hare Many ofthechallenges toPrescriptivism carry over from the challenges following example. to invoke claims of realist moral truth or realistmoralfalsehood.Considerthe to invokeclaimsofrealistmoraltruth to legitimatelycriticiseanotherpersonfortheirmoralviewswithoutneeding to capturetheaction-guidingnatureofmoralutteranceswithoutresorting they know better the meaning of our moral statements than wethe meaningofour moralstatementsthan know better they do,atleastif least, may give some genuine meaning back to moral disagreement and provide does Emotivism, because Prescriptivism suggests thattheaction-guiding a method for legitimately and rationally criticising the moral claims of others. a methodforlegitimatelyandrationallycriticising themoralclaimsofothers. acceptable”, thenwe cancriticiseCristina’sinconsistency.Ontheonehand, a moralstatement.Inaddition,perhapscrucially,Prescriptivismalsoallowsus a defenderofsimpleemotivistposition.Instead,Harewas ametaethical claims ofmoraltruth. claim that justifies criticism of her, according to the prescriptivist, but it is her inconsistency of Cristina’snon-cognitive attitude that no one should ever murder. However, it comestonon-cognitivistandanti-realistmetaethical theories. if Cristinalateruttersthewords“murderingthisterribledictatorismorally morally wrong”thenthisutterancemeansthatWilliam wants otherstocease moral judgments. So, for example, if William claimed that “euthanasiais murder of a terrible dictator. It is not that Cristina had made a false moral murder ofaterribledictator.ItisnotthatCristina hadmadeafalsemoral express asubjectiveour prescriptionforotherstoactinaccordance with she wants noonetoever murder whilstontheotherhandalsowanting the supporting ordecidinginfavourofeuthanasia.Prescriptivism thus attempts suggested regardingEmotivism. The prescriptivist must also explain why prescriptivist. just emotionalapproval anddisapproval. Instead,ourmoralutterances normativemeaning of into the edgeofmoralutterancesisfundamentallybuilt As a prescriptivist, Hare felt that our moralutterancesexpressmorethan As aprescriptivist,Harefeltthat Prescriptivism also seems to betteraccount formoraldisagreementthan Cristina claimsthat“murderisuniversally andabsolutelymorallywrong”. was a committed non-cognitivist andanti-realistbuthewas not in the actions she prescribes for others that justifies criticism. Thus, intheactionssheprescribesforothersthatjustifies criticism.Thus, 115 Metaethical Theories 116 METAETHICS whom we disagreemorally?Prescriptivismdoesnotallowus to suggest we takeourselvesand descriptive tobemakingtruth-apt claims about moral SUMMARY the meaningofourmoral judgments. Again, thisis a judgment youshould that we cannotclaim that Realism is correct just because we wish it tobeso that aracistwhobelieves “itismorallyacceptabletokillthoseofadifferent properties intheworld. does notofferthetoolsthatwe need.Ofcourse,theprescriptivistmayreply and that Prescriptivism, like it or not, is actually theproper understanding of and realistjustification —isimportantwhenconfrontingthemoralviewsof all. Ifweto cry“false!” —withproper,rational feelthatretainingtheability racists, sexistsandothermorallydeplorableindividuals,thenPrescriptivism racial background” utters somethingfalse. Indeed, so longas the racist holds of moraldisagreementbetter is inconsistency the most serious objection we can make to someone with make foryourself. morally consistent views then we have nogrounds to criticise his position at prescriptivist isgoodenough. the moral disagreementofferedby After all, 17 . Wilson, C. In addition,we mightacceptthatPrescriptivism captures thequalities There ismuchmorethatcould be said in thischapter.Metaethical where you sit in the debate betweenwhere yousitinthedebate CognitivismandNon- Metaethics that reflects thechallengeofcoming toyourown, Metaethics that far as possible on this whistle-stop tourtooutline thesetheories first-person, viewontheseissues. to decide how much importance Metaethics has relative tothe theories areasvaried andnuancedastheirnormative rivals, Cognitivism, Realismand Anti-Realism, and,moregenerally, and itisimpossibletogive afairhearingtoallofthemin clearly andtogive themsuchafairhearing.Itisforyoutodecide single chapter.CatherineWilson has authored anenquiryinto normative andappliedcampsofethicalstudy. Metaethics fromaFirstPerson Standpoint

than Emotivism, but denythatthepictureof , 17 https://www.openbookpublishers.com/reader/417 However, we have triedas ISSUES TOCONSIDER COMMON STUDENTMISTAKES • • • • • • • • 18 1. 4. 2. 6. 3. 5. o an For weaknesses andstrengths toyourmap. with obviouslynormative orappliedissues. Ignoring theexplanationsofdisagreementofferedbyintuitionists. Not usingexamplestoaidexplanationbecausenotdirectlydealing Not linkingcriticismsofonepositiontosupportforanotherposition; Not usinganalogiesappropriately —thinkofotherrealist/naturalist/ Not breakingdownthechaptersoastobefirmlyingraspof Forgetting theimportanceofaskingameaningfulquestionwhen Mackie’s attackonRealismjustifieshisanti-realistposition. Misunderstanding thequeernesscomplaint. followed bytheassociatedtheories.Iffeelingconfident,thentrytoadd trying toengageinevaluation. these toethics. Confusing Cognitivism,Non-Cognitivism,Realismand Anti-Realism. Can aphilosopherever knowwhatyoumeanbetterthanknow? less likelythatitexists? Can youcreateyourownMetaethicalMap?Trydrawingoutaflow- Does moraldisagreementlendsupportto Anti-Realism? Does somethingbeingqueer(inMackie’ssense of theterm)makeit Does Naturalismlendsupportto Absolutism? Does EmotivismlendsupporttoRelativism? chart style diagramthatseparatesCognitivismandNon-Cognitivism, cognitivist/non-cognitivist disciplinesandexamples,thencompare meanings ofkeyterms,andthenthenaturetheories,before e.g. Moore’sattackonNaturalismexplainshisintuitionistviewsand explaining themechanismofOpenQuestion Argument. study aide! excellent Metaethical mapsee A. Miller, 18 An IntroductiontoContemporaryMetaethics, We recommendthisasanexcellent p. 8. 117 Metaethical Theories 118 METAETHICS KEY TERMINOLOGY 13. 12. 11. 10. 7. 9. 8. Are moraljudgmentsmeaninglessiftheyareaboutnon-natural What istheHumeanaccountofmotivation? Whydoesitsupport Is theresuchathingasmoralprogress?Whatdoesthissuggestin Is Metaethicsasimportantnormative orappliedethics? Non-Cognitivism? terms ofMetaethics? this supportIntuitionism? Can anon-cognitivistproperlyexplainmoraldisagreement? Can yougive anotherexampleofanOpenQuestion Argument, witha properties? Iftheyarenon-cognitive? different candidatenaturalmoralproperty? Do we justknowwhatisrightorwrongbasedoncommonsense?Does A posteriori A priori Anti-Realism Normative Non-Cognitivism Naturalistic Fallacy Empirical Cognitivism Truth-apt Prima facie Prescriptivism Relativism Realism Queer Semantic ―, ‘The Emotive TheoryofEthics’,in Ayer, A. J.,‘A CritiqueofEthics’,in References Joyce, Richard, Price, Richard,‘A ReviewofthePrincipleQuestionsinMorals’, Kahane, G.,‘MustMetaethicalRealismMakeaSemanticClaim?’, Hume, David, Harman, Gilbert, Fisher, Andrew, Ross, W. D., Railton, Peter, ‘MoralRealism’, Moore, G.E.,‘TheOpen-Question Argument: TheSubjectMatterofEthics’, Miller, A., Mackie, J.L., Brandt, Richard, Blackburn, Simon, Moralists 1650–1800 Journal ofMoralPhilosophy (London: Routledge,2006),pp.31–47. (Oxford: ClarendonPress,2000). (Englewood Cliffs:PrenticeHall,1959). (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007). 2001), 2003). pp. 131–98. doi.org/10.1017/upo9781844652594 available at org/10.1163/174552412x628869 in https://doi.org/10.1093/0199252653.001.0001 https://doi.org/10.2307/2185589 ed. byGeorgeSher(London:Routledge,2012),pp.103–10. Arguing About Metaethics Arguing About https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511487101 An IntroductiontoContemporaryMetaethics The RightandtheGood Ethics: Inventing RightandWrong A TreatiseonHumanNature http://www.davidhume.org/texts/thn.html The Myth ofMorality The Metaethics: An Introduction Metaethics: An Ethical Theory:TheProblemsofNormative andCriticalEthics Explaining Value andOtherEssaysinMoralPhilosophy Ruling Passions , ed.byD.Raphael(Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1969), , 10.2 , ed.by Andrew FisherandSimonKirchin The PhilosophicalReview

(Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,1998). (2013): 148–78, (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press,1930), Ethical Theory (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, Ethics: EssentialReadingsinMoralTheory (London: JohnNoon,1739),freely (Oxford:Routledge,2011), (NewYork: Penguin, 1977). , ed.byRussShafer-Landau https://doi. (Cambridge:Polity, , 95.2(1986):163–207, The British

https://

, 119 Metaethical Theories 120 METAETHICS Wilson, Catherine, Wedgwood, Ralph, Tanner, Julia, ‘TheNaturalisticFallacy’, 13 (2006),freelyavailable at Press, 2007), at Book Publishers,2016), rjp13_tanner.php https://www.openbookpublishers.com/reader/417 https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251315.001.0001 Metaethics fromaFirstPerson Standpoint The NatureofNormativity

https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0087 http://www.richmond-philosophy.net/rjp/ The RichmondJournalofPhilosophy (Oxford:OxfordUniversity (Cambridge:Open ; freelyavailable , PART III APPLIED ETHICS

CHAPTER 7

Euthanasia

His enemies put it bluntly. Singer says it’s OK to kill disabled babies. Singer says seriously damaged human beings are on a par with apes. Singer says it would have been OK to kill his own mother. These charges are spat out of the sides of their mouths. One theologian I spoke to said contemptuously, ‘Peter Singer takes the most basic human instincts and tries to reason them out of existence. What does he expect us to do, hug him?’1

1. Euthanasia Introduction

There is an old adage that only two things in life are certain — death and taxes. While the morality of the latter would be an interesting topic itself (and you may look to issues discussed in Chapter 8 for some inspiration), it is the morality of an issue connected to the former that draws the focus of this chapter. Specifically, we consider the ethical issues surrounding euthanasia (sometimes labelled as “mercy killing”).

2. Key Terms

The etymology of euthanasia helps to reveal the meaning of the term. Like most upstanding and respectable philosophical terms, euthanasia has its roots in Ancient Greek language; it is based on a combination of the terms eu meaning “well” and thanatos meaning “death”. Euthanasia is thus the act of seeking to provide a good death for a person who otherwise might be faced with a much more unpleasant death — hence the term “mercy killing”. There are different ways to categorise the various types of euthanasia and it is critical to be confident and familiar with these categorisations.

Voluntary Euthanasia

Voluntary euthanasia occurs when a person makes their own choice to have their life terminated in order to avoid future suffering.

1 J. Hari, ‘Peter Singer: Some People are More Equal than Others’, http://www.independent.co.uk/ news/people/profiles/peter-singer-some-people-are-more-equal-than-others-551696.html 124 APPLIED ETHICS Active Euthanasia A person is in aPersistent Vegetative State(hereafterPVS)when theyare and passivevoluntary is both Although euthanasiathat isnotparticularly Non-Voluntary Euthanasia withdrawal oftreatmentthatmightkeepthemalive. Thus,apersonwhois Passive Euthanasia Passive euthanasiaoccurswhenapersonisallowed todieduethedeliberate If apersonisactivelydeath wastheir euthaniseditmeansthat causedby Non-voluntary euthanasiaoccurswhenadecisionregardingpremature forms of euthanasia. As an appliedethicalissue, itisimportanttomakeethical 3. CaseOne:Persistent Vegetative State themselves. that willgrounddiscussion ofargumentsinfavourandagainstthevarying to keepthemalive mightbeavailable. A personwhohas alife-supportmachine passively euthanisedisallowed todievianaturalcauseseven thoughmethods person making thedecision. Inaddition, we can differentiate between typesof decision toallownaturalcausestakeeffect. and merciful death is made by another person,becausetheindividualtobe and mercifuldeathismadeby cannot, duetothenatureoftheirageorcondition,makeanydecision for claims inthelightofpracticalandreal-worldfactors. common, euthanasia could come in anycombination of methods and decision- in aPVS,accordingtothe NationalHealthServiceintheUnitedKingdom, can injection orthevoluntaryswallowing ofadeadlycocktaildrugs. is mostcommonly associated withyounginfantsorpatientsinacomawho makers as laid out. Legalityof the forms of euthanasia varies from nation to meaningful psychological interactionwiththeworldaroundthem. A patient biologically able to support their own continued existence, but they havethey own continuedexistence,but able tosupporttheir biologically no external intervention ratherthannaturalcauses, most likelythroughalethal euthanasia basedonthe euthanised is unable tomakea decision for themselves. This form of euthanasia switched off, for example, dies via natural causes but onlyas a resultof a neither follow anobjectwiththeireyes norrespond tothesoundsofvoices nation; Belgiumallowsforvoluntaryandactive euthanasia,theUKdoesnot. The above offers a differentiationof types of euthanasia interms of the In thenexttwosections, we outlinetwodifferentformsofmedical afflictions method involved inendingalife. view noprospectofrecovery asplausible.ThePVSlabelmayseemcrudeor 4. CaseTwo: IncurableandTerminal Illness Imagine a patient who has been diagnosed with anincurabledisease that will Hillsborough footballdisasterin1989 —madeasimilardecisionregarding for therelatives insuchcases and itisworthmentioningthatTerri Schiavo’s for theirsontobeallowed to“diewithdignity”ratherthancontinueexisting the factthatsuchpatientsareclearlyunabletomakeanykindofvoluntary the lifeoftheirsonafterhefellintoaPVS.TonyBland’sparentscampaigned to herbrainasaresultofheartattack. Although she survived the heart-attack, to beeuthanised,although thisisalsoanissuethatwouldreward further to askforeuthanasiathemselves andsothesecasesmoralissues can highlight that morallyoughttoberespectedeven whenthepatientisinaPVS? they shouldlosetheirfaculties,describingdesires should they fallinto psychological states when it comes to an ability to makeavoluntary decision psychological stateswhen itcomestoanability physical sufferingwillincrease. You can imagine foryourselves the rangeof patient knowsthattheirabilitytolive anormal lifewilldecrease and thattheir parents ultimatelyfoughtalegalbattleagainsttheirson-in-law in attempt to psychological stateofthepatientisstark. do not consider wherethelinecanbedrawnregardingpatients infitorunfit diseases and conditions that may have such unfortunate effects upon a person. decision regarding theirfutureinterests. Forthesakeofsimplicity,we will desirable andthatshewouldbebetteroffbeingallowed todie. as persistent when the condition isinplaceforuptoayearwhen the as persistent anddoctors and willshownodiscerniblesignofemotion.Thevegetative stateisdefined assume therearenorelevantfrom suchpatients,writtenincase letterofintent clear thatwe shouldbeconsideringonlynon-voluntaryeuthanasia,dueto in his emaciated state. Onecan only attempt toimaginetheemotional turmoil upsetting, butthemessageaboutdifference between thephysical and the ultimately bringabouttheirdeath. As the condition progresses over time,the decision provide avoluntary letter Would the implications ofsuchaletter. moral thought. her husbandultimatelycametotheviewthatcontinuedexistencewas not ensure thatTerri was notallowed todie. surrounding voluntaryeuthanasia. Again, forsimplicityinour discussion, we such acondition.However, youmayfinditrewardingmoral toconsiderthe When considering themoralityof euthanasia for patients inaPVS,itis Unlike thepatientinaPVS, the patientinthisexampleretainsability In the United Kingdom, the parentsof Tony Bland In the US, Terri Schiavo fell intoaPVSwhenshe suffered oxygen deprivation — a victim of the 125 Euthanasia 126 APPLIED ETHICS virtue of their extreme psychological limitations. Suggesting that some form that extreme psychologicallimitations.Suggesting virtue oftheir Glover In thissection,we consider thefirstofargumentsinfavourmoral the sectiononwell-being from that apersonwould be “betteroff”dead, then euthanasia would be morally life, perhapsdependingonanyexperienceofphysical pain.Patients inaPVS goods apersonpossesses 5. Pro-Euthanasia: Argument One person’s life. A hedonist,forexample,wouldsuggestthatthequalityofalife of a positions thatmightseektoprovideacriterionmeasurethequality preferable than death. Onsuch occasions, when qualityof life is so dreadful psychological qualities of typical human beings.This maygosomewaypsychological qualities of typical to doubt that a person in a PVS has, at best, a non-existent quality of lifein quality a personinPVShas,atbest,non-existent doubt that depends onhowmuchhappiness/pleasureapersonexperiences;supporter are notmerelybed-riddenlikesome who mighthave suffered severe strokes and love, forexample. argument, ifsound,wouldalsoseemtosuggestthatactive euthanasia ismore non-voluntary andvoluntaryformsofeuthanasia.However,to both apply the acceptability ofeuthanasia.This argument isageneralandwould Deprived ofhappiness andothercapabilities,thelifeofapatientinPVS life or other such afflictions; they arebiological entitieslackingthedistinguishing of consciousness of life, is necessary tohavinganykindofquality other factors as beingdeterminantsof the qualityofalife,therecanlittle of alifedependson of adesire-satisfaction theorywouldsuggest thequality of thissection. morally acceptablethanpassive euthanasiaforreasonsdiscussed at theend how manyofaperson’s desires are satisfied;anobjective-list theoristwould suggest thatthequalityofalifedepends on howmanyobjectively valuable seems to beatbestutterly neutralandatworstnegative inrespectofquality justifiable. Evidently,much turns onwhatcounts as a worthwhilelife.Recalling . Glover, J. 2 Whichever one of these views a person supports, or even iftheyunderstand . According to this relatively simple idea, sometimes life is actually less This initialargumentcanbelabelledasthe I have nowaysomeone whoholdsthatbeingalive, ofrefuting even thoughunconscious,is intrinsically valuable [valuable irrespective oftheformbeingalive]. Butitisaviewthatwill seem unattractive to those of us who, in ourown case, see a life of permanent coma as in no way preferable todeath.From the subjective pointofview,thereisnothingtochoosebetween thetwo. (1941–)says: Causing Deathand Saving Lives goods including, but not limited to,knowledgenot — goods including,but Chapter 1 , p.45. , therearevarious philosophical argument fromqualityof Jonathan 2 The best possible way, if we remain interested in quality of life, might seem we suggestthatalifewithno discernible quality of life is not worthwhile,then PVS’s arewillingtofavouranendthepatient’slife. they wouldnotwant toseeonemoresunriseorlive onemoreday —these to beallowed todieandwonderinghowanyonecouldreachapointwhere in timewheretheir terminal illnesseswillreachapoint worsening those with to beallowedundue suffering. and without todiequickly point the Although thought isthatifdeath isdeemed morally desirable, thenwhynotsimply to takeitscourse,whenthecourse of naturemaybedirectedbystarvation, to bealethalinjectiondesignedsendpatient painlesslytosleepbefore activethat passive euthanasiaisfarmoremorallydefensiblethan euthanasia; load-bearing judgment,withthechoiceofmethodmoreapracticalthan goods. I recall,asayoungteenager,listeningtoDianePrettyexpressher desire life ofapersonwithterminalillnesswhoisnearingtheendtheirlife. provide deathactively ratherthanpassively? dehydration orsecondaryinfections. Although thesepassively viewed death- after all the judgment that euthanasia is morally acceptable may seem to be the may seemtobe euthanasia ismorallyacceptable judgment that all the after a timewhenqualityof life eitherbecomes negative or ceases to berelevant. If to enjoylife,satisfydesiresoracquireobjectivelyand theirinability valuable Diane Prettysuffered from motor-neurone disease and althoughsheremained causing effectsmaybemanaged withpainkillers,Singer’s relatively simple course of action]we should ensure thatitcomes in thebest possibleway”. questions, I suggest, reflected more of my inability to empathisewithher daily questions, Isuggest,reflectedmoreofmyinability quality oflifeisnon-existentornegative invirtueof their physicalsuffering in time cannot be sharply labelled, it seems extremely plausible that many of plausible that in timecannotbesharplylabelled,itseemsextremely moral issue. Indeed, in thiscontext,passive euthanasiamightseem to bethe mentally proficient,theworseningofherconditionover timeledhertorequest worst euthanasia mayappearmorallyjustifiable. existence thantheydidwithunduedepressiononherpart. no meansall)partnersandparentsofpeoplein by why some(but explain support machine or withdrawing proactivesupport machineorwithdrawing treatment inordertoallownature same effect. Thebestpossibleway mightnotseem to involve turningoffalife shutting down their organs, or a selection of drinkable liquids that have the nearing thefinalstagesofaterminalillness, we maywell grantthatthereis . Singer, P. 3 According to Thus, if we focusonthequalityoflifeforpatientsinaPVS,orthose The case of Diane Prettyis informative whenconsideringthequalityof If youfindtheargumentfromqualityoflifeconvincing,thenmayjudge of allworlds. Peter Singer , p.186. , “Havingchosendeath[asamorallyacceptable 3

127 Euthanasia 128 APPLIED ETHICS Whereas the former argument attempted to defend the moral acceptability to defendthe attempted former argument Whereas the The secondargumentwe canofferinsupportofeuthanasia —bothvoluntary (as outlinedin 6. Pro-Euthanasia: Argument Two theory, SituationEthicsprovides no absoluteguidanceregardingthemoral their stead because the latter, and not the former, can secure greater preference their steadbecausethelatter,andnotformer, cansecuregreater later section).Fornow,however, letus take Singer’s claim at facevalue. Being life as an absolutemoral wrong thenyoumay view his claim as immediately loving thanactively bringingdeathabout. As a relativisticnormative ethical patient isactuallyourambition. disabled and suffering young infant child (whocannotexpressanywishes infant disabled andsufferingyoung death ismorallydesirable)passively allowingdeathtooccurisactuallyless a preference utilitarian (further detailonthistheory isavailablea preferenceutilitarian in labelled the forms —can be and non-voluntary and pragmatic judgments will need to form the basis of moral judgments acceptability ofeuthanasiainany its forms; situation-specific, practical regarding theirfuture)maybejustifiableonthefollowinggrounds: quality of life of the individuals involved. So, on his view, thedisabled infant more detachedandyoumayor of life,thisargumentmayseemalittle quality of aterminalcondition, haveof lifethenwe alowquality that mightthink utilising theperspectiveof euthanasiaby ofthepatientandtheirassociated in individualcases.However, itisimportanttoconsiderhow may have alower qualityoflifethanahealthychildwhomightbebornin morally outofbounds(thiskindobjectionto euthanasia isconsidered in a may notviewthisasastrengthorweakness. healthy childisborn. euthanasia mightactuallybeinthecircumstance where thedeathof spending ourlimitedmedical resources on maintaining theirexistence,rather satisfaction. Thus,we morallyoughttobringaboutthesituationinwhich Singer makeshisjudgmentregardinghowtoact insuchacasebasedonthe Singer’s suggestion maysound callous, and ifyouviewkillinganinnocent 4  According to When thedeath of a disabled infant will lead to the birth of another infant with better prospectsof In addition, if we recalltheideas of SituationEthicist If wenear theend those whoareina PVS,orthosesuffering assume that a happylife,thetotalamountofhappinesswillbegreaterifdisabledinfantiskilled Ibid ., p.163. Chapter 5 Peter Singer ) thenwe maywonder whether ornot(assuming , thenon-voluntaryeuthanisingofaseverely argument from resource use from resource argument Joseph Fletcher loving Chapter 1 . 4 active ), . According to theMadison CountyRecord, Christina McCray (a patientina with associatedexpensive care,voluntarilyrequestseuthanasiathenitmaybe PVS) hadmedicalbillsthataverage outto$250,000peryear. funding medicalresearchtobenefitfuturegenerations. that decisions intheNationalHealthService are alreadybeingmade in the who directed tootherpatients death willallowresourcestobebetter their that then it may become clear why non-voluntaryeuthanasiaof such patients the years oflifethatapatientinPVSmayhave, alongwiththenumber than spending those same resources on effectively treatingotherdiseases or the consequencesofspendingresourcesonPVSpatientsmaybelesspositive than spendingthoseresources elsewhere, is notmorallydesirable.This kind of the treatment.Thus, allocating spendingtodifferent forms of treatment for to consider the benefitsofdifferenttreatmentcostsinrespect their pay- light ofteleologicalandquality-of-lifebasedreasoning.TheNHSutilises different patientscanbeobjectively calculatedagainstacommon standard a higher quality of life are greater thanspending money tokeeppeople alive a QALY toinformmedical decision-making.Ifthepositive consequencesof allocation planningwhenitcomes ill, sufferingandfrailpatients to treating addition, if apatientwithpoor quality of life, who is facing futuresuffering than adeontologist,foritascribes argument willappealtoateleologistrather consequences mightbesecured. rough definition, but enoughfor our purposes) then theyear in which this QALY is shorthand for Quality Adjusted Life Year, a measurement designed QALYs when making financial planning and treatment costing decisions. of PVS patientsthatexist, then thecost of keeping such individuals alive outcome isexpectedcanbegiven avalue of1.Each followingyear canthen offs tothepatientsinvolved. Ifapotentialtreatmentwillleadtopatient in ordertoinformthosespendingdecisions in termsofwherethebetter might have theirsufferingreducedmoresignificantly. family). In support ofthe the least with considered desirable(at be might moral values toactionsbasedon be given avalue between 0and1according totheexpectedlastingimpactsof being freefrompainandabletoperformdailyactivities(thisisasomewhat becomes clearer. Ifmedicine issometimes about makingdifficultdecisions, spending moneyon treating patientswho might becured or helped tohave 5  The argumentfrom resource use is,therefore,anextensionoftheuse of It isworthnoting,forthoseuncomfortablewiththiskindofresource Some financialfiguresmayputthispossibleargumentintocontext. Madison-St. Clair Record plaintiff-s-bills-could-be-8-4-million , http://madisonrecord.com/stories/510564252-nursing-expert-testifies-that- consequences ratherthanduties 5 Ifwe consider . Inthissetting, 129 Euthanasia 130 APPLIED ETHICS 1 7. Pro-Euthanasia: Argument Three The finalargumentwe willofferinfavourofeuthanasiaisanargument (because many normal things that wethat (because manynormalthings cause emotionalharmto do seemto where resourcesarefinite. who eitherwishtodieandhave adiminishingqualityoflifeorwho areina PVS, thenspendingontheformerismorallydefensibleratherthan treatments thatcouldimprove thequalityoflifeforotherpatientsinaworld that voluntaryeuthanasiaismorallyjustifiable. Singer sumsuptheposition: the power andmoral rightoftheindividualtoactinway thattheydeem to thisprinciple,thenyouseeminglymustbelieve thatapersonvoluntarily interferenceinaperson’s life istostopthatpersonfrom keeping apatientinPVSalive versus investing inresearchforcuresand death that causes physical harm to another person. Therefore, if we believe in dying wouldcauseharmtoanotherperson.Ifwe discountemotionalharm a mercifuldeathbeforetheirsufferingbecomes too extreme,would have a and decision-making was and shouldbeabletodecidethepathsoftheirownlives. Iftherighttochoose people shouldhaveassumption that own decisions to maketheir theright choice ofhowandwhentodie? correct, unless physically harminganother,thenwe must seemingly allow requesting euthanasiashould not bedenied the righttodie, unless their from personal autonomy other people —gettingajobover anothercandidate, for example)thenitisnot our ownpathappliesinlife,thenwhywould this notapplyinrespect ofour often viewed asthemostpowerful in thisappliedethicalarea,the latter. on the is tospendmoney consider howlovingit Again, youmight harming others;allotherinterferenceisnottobejustified.Ifyousubscribe easy toenvisageacircumstance inwhichaterminallyillpatient,requesting , Mill elucidated the harm principle, which suggested that theonlylegitimate . Singer, P. 6 …the principleofrespectforautonomytellsustoallowrational agentstolive theirownlives Perhaps themostfamous philosophical proponentofarighttopersonal to doastheychoose. agents should autonomously choose to die, then respect for autonomy will lead us to assistthem for autonomywillleadus respect should autonomously choosetodie,then agents according to their ownautonomous decisions, free from coercion or interference;butif rational Practical Ethics 6 , p.195. . Thisargumentproceeds from the fairlyplausible . As discussed in argument Chapter We have spokenabovein a euthanasia specifically,forthepatient ofvoluntary Thus far we have onlyoutlinedpro-euthanasia arguments.Infact,we have voluntary euthanasia.However, moreoften,theviewissupportedbyBiblical value andworthofalife. value tolife,ofatypethatmeansitisworthwhileinallcircumstances; in Glover’s Life PVS obviouslycannot choose how to die. If we returntotheearliermentioned Holy Spirit:“Don’tyouknowthatyourselves areGod’s temple andthat familial autonomyinsuchaway. time togive anti-euthanasia,and anti-active euthanasia, arguments theirfair this section, problems with the quality of alife quality the this section,problemswith Christian, thinking.Essentially, a belief thatlife is sacred suggests an absolute properly respectingthechoices made by one relative on behalf of another. It possibility of a preserving, irrespective ofquality. A non-religiouspersonmayprefer to speak God’s Spirit dwells in your midst? destroy that person; for God’s temple is sacred, and you together are that decisions for usifwe were incapacitated,thenperhapsthesameshouldapply really onlyprovided pro- reference. In theBible,we aretold that God said: “Let us make mankind in our qualitative aspect.ForSanctityofLifetheoristsandsupporters asdescribed in 8. Anti-Euthanasia: Argument One of anabsoluterighttolifethatcannotbetaken away throughnon-voluntary image, inourlikeness”. of personalautonomycanbeextendedto is foryoutoconsiderifatheory euthanasia mightbejustifiableinvirtueof in thiscontextandnon-voluntary justified onthis euthanasia mayalsobe instances non-voluntary in certain hearing. basis euthanasia, and cannot be revoked by personal decree in the context of context personal decreeinthe euthanasia, andcannotberevokedby earlier words it is the view that lifehas an intrinsicvalue thatsupersedes any suggestions regardingtheundesirabilityofpassive euthanasia.Itisnow eei 1:26, Genesis 7 The first objection to euthanasia may be termed the The firstobjectiontoeuthanasiamaybe In addition, our bodies are described as sacred and as containing God’s It isnotnecessarytobereligiousholdtheview thatalllives areworth However, if we would trust loved ones to make other importantmedical . TheSanctityofLifeethicisusuallyfounded on religious,andspecifically — though of course, such cases seem to aspecies of voluntary euthanasia. https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Genesis+1%3A26-28&version=NIV letter of intent letter 7

active , written prior to the condition taking hold, then condition taking the prior to , written euthanasia argumentsinvirtueof Singer’s

If anyone destroys God’s temple, God will never undermine the ultimate objection fromSanctityof

131 Euthanasia 132 APPLIED ETHICS A relatedobjectiontoeuthanasia,premised on acommitmenttoChristianity, All humanlife,whetherinthewomboraPVS,isofsacred and God-given The language is somewhat complex but thekeypointsaregiven inour worth such that killing (including euthanising, as a form of killing) is morally as aformofkilling) (including euthanising, killing worth suchthat whether voluntarily requested ornon-voluntarilyencouragedforsomeone whether voluntarily 9. Anti-Euthanasia: Argument Two temple”. Catholic DeclarationofFaith. Thedocumentstatesthat: life; mightthisrelatetodoctorswhoadministereuthanasia? previous discussions in this chapter —life is sacred and so euthanasia, any stretch, would defend an objection of this type). Let usreturntothe1980 any stretch,woulddefendanobjectionofthistype). avowedly teleologicalinnature,consideringthepainfulandpotentially costly consequences of continued life, theargumentfrom Sanctity ofLife is deontological of that sanctity —our creationintheimageofGodandpresenceGod’s of that is the impermissible. morally recommend this type of killing, whether motivatedwhether of killing, morally recommendthistype a mistaken by else, ismorallyimpermissible. No legislator,guidedbymoral ideals, can ever euthanasia. A 1980CatholicDeclarationofFaithisclearandabsoluteinnature: sense ofmercyornot. statement oftheappealthisethicalstance: spirit withinus Sanctity ofLifeviewtobothabortionandeuthanasia,MotherTeresa gave a 10 9 8 …no one is permitted to ask for this act of killing, either for himself or herself for another person

Whilst theargumentsfrom The notion of a sacred life lays behind Catholic teaching ontheissue of For me,lifeisthemostbeautifulgiftofGodtomankind,thereforepeopleandnationswhodestroy can anyauthoritylegitimatelyrecommendorpermitsuchanaction.Foritisaquestionofthe entrusted to hisorhercare,norcanhesheconsentit,either explicitly or implicitly, entrusted nor life by abortion and euthanasiaarethepoorest.Ido not saylegal or illegal, but Ithink that no life, andanattackonhumanity. violation a crimeagainst of thedivinelaw,anoffenceagainstdignityhumanperson, human handshouldberaisedtokilllife,sincelifeisGod’susin 1 Corinthians3:16–18, J. ChalihaandE.LeJoly, Sacred Congregation for theDoctrineofFaith,‘Declaration on Euthanasia’, va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19800505_euthanasia_en.html NIV objection from valuable suffering

8 Thesequotesnotonlyreveal thesanctityofourbodiesandcause innaturesinceitrelatestoadutyavoidkilling.Linkingthe — they also reveal the punishmentfor those who might take https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=1 Corinthians+3&version= The JoyinLoving 10 quality of , p.174. (keepinmind that notallChristians,by lifeanduseofresourceswere . 9 http://www.vatican.

10. Anti-Euthanasia: Argument Three The thirdanti-euthanasiaargumenttoconsider can belabelledthe Thus, even ifsomeonerequestseuthanasiainordertoavoidpain, that voluntary and non-voluntary euthanasia, but involuntary euthanasiaalso? voluntary andnon-voluntaryeuthanasia,but wrong toshortenit. If euthanasiais justified on thebasis of money andtimebeingbetterspent from thepatientorpatient’sfamily? face theendoftheirlife).However, it does explainwhyalifeshouldbeseen through toitsnaturalendandwhyitmightthereforebeviewed asmorally that Christiansopposepalliative care(atypeofthatdoesnotattemptto that personclosertosharingintheexperienceofChrist.Thisdoesnotmean to kill;indeed,theslipperyslopeobjectionisbothteleologicalinnatureand people withouttheirconsent. After all,ifyouareateleologist(perhaps,anact does noteven requireadenialthateuthanasiamightbedesirableincertain an objection,considerearlierpro-euthanasiaargumentscouchedintermsof certain actions.Ittherefore maybeobjectedthateitherlifeissacred,or itis request should not be granted because it deprives a person of an element resource allocationandpersonalautonomy. of Lifeoradeontologicaldutynot require anyviewregardingtheSanctity of God’splanforthem;theexperiencesufferingatendlifebrings on some patients ratherthanothers, then whywouldpermission be required utilitarian) you have already given up ideas concerning absolute rules against instances whenviewed in theabstractorinisolation. indefensible even ifwe startfromapparentlymoralmotivations. be better deployedbe better what istostopusjustifyingnotmerely elsewhere,then euthanasia, thenwedown adangerousslopetoeuthanising slipping seemtobe extend life,somuchasmakeanindividualcomfortablepossiblethey slope objection situations whereitis actually morallyundesirable. Tosee the strengthofsuch situations, thenitwouldleadtoeuthanasiabecominglegalandacceptablein not, andifitisnotthen we mayendupina situationwe findutterly morally 11 According toChristianteaching,however,the lastmoments during suffering, especiallysuffering  The slipperyslopeobjectionisthat If morality is determined by consequences, and consequencesjustify If moralityisdeterminedby If euthanasiacanbejustifiedonteleologicalgroundswhenresources would union withtheredeemingsacrificewhichHeofferedinobediencetoFather’s will of life, has aspecial place in God’ssavingplan;itisfact a sharinginChrist’spassionand Ibid . (sometimes called the Wedge argument if euthanasiawere tobecomelegalinsome ). Thisobjectiondoesnot . 11 slippery 133 Euthanasia 134 APPLIED ETHICS Why think of negativeWhy think consequences fromachangeinthelaw,whenthese wayit iseasytoargueagainst). The slipperyslopeobjectionsuggests that then itisobvioustheycannever come to adifferentviewonthevalue oftheir the lawregardingeuthanasia isperhapsthemost liberal intheworld, should that thenegative outcomes might beprobable,ratherthancertain.Thus, that a change in one fact must lead to a suggested negative change elsewhere. to thenon-morallydefensibleeuthanisingofmanyothertypespatientswho, line in the sand is thereby crossed, may not elderly patients feel pressured to crossed, maynot elderlypatients sand isthereby line inthe life atalaterstage,astheymighthavestill beenalive. hadthey On thisissue, pressure toallowtheirchildreninheritanyaccumulated ratherthan people areeuthanised,others may begin tofeelpressure to takeupthatsame person’s preferences and whether theyare onlymorallyrelevant iftheystand person who is otherwise physicallyhealthyfrom opting for voluntary due to a response should deal with theissue of probable negative consequences, a possiblenegativeare logicalfallaciesiftheypremisedonthe idea that as thingsstand,arequitecontenttoremainalive sincetheyhave noreasonto autonomy mattersor it does not. If we enableaperson to have theirlifeended, choose death, butnotothers? Again, itmaybeobjectedthateitherpersonal can wedraw astrongenoughlinesoastoallowsomepeople justifiably can choose when toend their life,thenwhatis to stopaseriously depressed consequences mightnothappen?Indeed,some slipperyslopearguments consider otheroptions. rather thancheapening a plausibly reasonableobjectionthrough wilful outcome must,ofnecessity,followfromsomechange inpolicy.However, we option. Ifnon-voluntaryeuthanasiais granted, andalegal,moral and cultural or the terminallyill,butifpersonal autonomy justifies euthanasia thenhow in even a small number of cases may, over time,send us down a slippery slope up tosome sort of psychological testing and counselling; the relevant idea is it maybeworthwhilerevisitingthediscussion from mental health needs as being verymental healthneedsasbeing different fromeuthanasiaforPVSpatients misrepresentation ofitsstructure. ResearchingthesituationinBelgium,where euthanasia? Most people might view such enabling of suicideforpatientswith view suchenabling euthanasia? Mostpeoplemight should not “straw-man”theobjection in thisway (i.e. phraseitinsuch a weak see that wealth spent on their own care? Granting non-voluntaryeuthanasia not beaburdentotheirfamilies?Maythefinanciallywell-off elderlyfeel In addition,ifpersonalautonomyisrespectedtothedegreethatsomeone In addition, opponents of euthanasia oftensuggestthatifone group of Of course, an easyresponsetoanyslippery slopeobjectionissimplytodeny Richard Brandt . Chapter 1 regardinga A fourth anti-euthanasiaobjectionis the 11. Anti-Euthanasia: Argument Four worsening disease who is not euthanisedcould have theircondition and pain would consideringtheapplicationofRuleUtilitarianism. Firstly, itmightbesuggestedthattoeuthanisethosewho are terminallyill, their suffering. to theircondition. At thevery least,ifnotacure,euthanisedpeopleare thereby toartificiallyeliminatetheirchances of living toexperiencea cure to reduce suffering to the extent suggested by the objection issomethingyou the suggested by to reducesufferingtheextent legalised thensome deaths mayoccur for peoplewhocould have beentreated provide a good grounding to either support or oppose this line of thought, as provide agoodgroundingtoeithersupportoropposethislineofthought, pleasure missed by those who die early. Whether or not palliative care is able any suffering. step-forwardfrom any around tobenefit alleviate might that intreatment carefully managed by skilled healthcare professionals so as to greatly diminish skilled healthcareprofessionals soastogreatly carefully managedby claim requiringcontemporaryevidencetofurther thediscussion. On balance, Singer suggests, euthanasia would cause more pain tocease than of life grounds. It mightbethoughtplausiblethataperson with asevere and or thoseinaPVS,istokillpeopleearlierthanwouldotherwisehappenand relevantlytwo distinct,but objection bringstogether similar, linesofthought. may wish to consider and further , as it would seem to beanempirical had theybeenkeptalive. However, heurgesthat: be arguedthatend of life care is now so advanced that euthanasiais not necessary in order to avoid suffering and so cannot be justified even on quality 13 12 Against averydeaths thatmightoccurifeuthanasiaislegalisedwe smallnumberofunnecessary . Singer, P. In response to these types of objections, Singer grantsthatwere euthanasia In addition,given themodernadvances in palliative careitmight also must place the very large amount of pain and distressthat will be sufferedif euthanasia isnot legalised, bypatientswhoreallyareterminallyill. “Incurable” PsychiatricCondition GrantedRighttoDie’, The following article highlights the use of the law in Belgium: ‘Belgian Convicted Killer with law inBelgium:‘Belgian ConvictedKiller use ofthe The followingarticlehighlights the sep/16/belgium-convict-granted-right-to-die Practical Ethics , p.197. 13

objection from modern treatment https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/ 12 . This 135 Euthanasia 136 APPLIED ETHICS Aquinas 12. Allowing versus Doing Thus, according to Rachels, most doctors at the time ofhispaper the to Rachels,mostdoctorsat Thus, according James theory discussed in this willhaveas patient the unintended effectofkilling theforeseeable but the DoctrineofDoubleEffectinchapteronNatural Law. this actionmaybemoral so long as the badeffectwas not aimed at, does not this primaryprecept,would certainly seem to denythemoral acceptability of the contextofSanctityLifeethic. A secondary precept, derived from one oftheprimarypreceptsforhumanbeingsispreservationthat of good, yet hasaforeseeablebutunintendedconsequenceof badeffect,then life. Nomoral prescription, we mightthink,could speak more strongly and permissible to allow a patient to die(passivepermissible toallowapatient euthanasia,onourdefinitions) doctor may prescribea multitude of painkillers totreatthepain,even though deemed tobeintheirinterests(active euthanasia). distinction between allowinganddoingintheeuthanasiadebate: a resultoftheside-effects ofthedrugs.Indeed,adoctormaysimplyrefrain action asmoraleven ifitresultsinanoutcomethatmightnotbeconsidered a nuancedstanceintheeuthanasiadebate. artificial shorteningoflife.However, NaturalLawtheoristsareable tohave absolutely againsteuthanasia —especiallygiven theCatholicbackgroundof Doctrine of Double Effect, as drawn from the normative Natural Law moral outweighbad itself.Ifthis cause ofthe directly the good effectandisnot the morally permissible in theabstract.Ifanact is directed by adesire to do moral may beaware thatapatienthasnotlongtolive andissufferingimmensely. The brief commentisunclear,itcriticaltolookback totherelevant discussion of eventhink itimpermissibletokillapatient but iftheyrequestitoris not muchseemstohaveit changedintheUKcontextsince —wouldthink 14 A NaturalLawtheorist,viatheDoctrineofDoubleEffect,candescribean

The idea isthatitpermissible,atleastinsomecases,towithholdtreatmentandallowapatient The distinction betweenThe active andpassive euthanasiaisthoughttobecrucialformedicalethics. The plausibility of this distinction is supported by consideration of the of thisdistinctionissupportedby The plausibility Now, letusapplythisdoctrinedirectlytothecontext ofeuthanasia. A doctor to die, butit is never permissibleto take any direct action designed to kill the patient.Thisdoctrine seems tobeacceptedbymostdoctors. J. Rachels,‘Active andPassive Euthanasia’,p.511. ’s Natural LawstanceandtheearlierreferencetoCatholicviewsin (1941–2003)sums up thesupposedmoralimportanceof Chapter 4 . RecallfromthechapteronNaturalLawethics 14 — and wrong (for the good of “suffering reduction” is directly achievedreduction” isdirectly wrong (forthegoodof“suffering bad the by who engagesinactive euthanasiabyprovisionofalethalcocktail of drugsin with theunintendedbutforeseeableconsequence that thepatientwilldieas Meanwhile, Singercomments that“We cannotavoidresponsibilitysimplyby foreseeable consequence, says Singer,thenwe donotreallybelieve we escape from offering painfultreatmentmethods in order to avoid causing suffering, the morally good end of pain reduction is intended directly. Thus, the doctor Thus, the morally goodendofpain reductionisintendeddirectly. the the NaturalLaw theorist, becausedeathis not intendeddirectlybutrather light oftheearlierchapteroutliningnormative theoryitself.Despiteboth painful treatment,deathisjustaproportionatelyacceptableside-effect). preference utilitarianlikeSingermightgrantit; this isforyoutojudge. polluting alocalriver. Ifwe wouldnot excusethecompanyforignoringa directing ourintentiontoone effect rather thananother.Ifwe foresee both and doing,theDoctrineofDoubleEffect,inthisdebate.Rachelssaysthat: of thenon-intervention.a result says morally wrong, These actionsarenot consequences alone, then this approachmayseemtohaveconsequences alone,then a moremeritthan retain manyproponents.Ifoneviewsmoraloutcomes asbasedonmorethan responsibility forallowingdeathintheeuthanasiacontext. of killing),whilethedoctorwhowithdraws treatment inorder to relieve order to artificiallykillapatientso that theirsufferingis reduced is morally on theirrecyclingbill,withtheforeseeablebutunintendedconsequenceof in general,totheeuthanasiadebateshouldbeconsidered carefully andinthe more workers.Thisoutcomeisgoodandmotivates bossestoactsave money effects, we must take responsibilityfortheforeseen effects of what we do”. suffering, withtheunintendedbutforeseeableoutcomeofdeath,actsmorally justly (forthegood of “sufferingreduction” is achieved by notadministering Singer’s and Rachel’s attack, NaturalLawandtheDoctrine ofDoubleEffect Singer gives theexampleofabusinessseekingtosave moneyinorder to hire 16 15 . Singer, P. The application oftheDoctrineDoubleEffect,andNaturalLaw ethics If a doctor lets a patient die, for humane reasons,heisinthesame position as if he had given intervene onthepatient’sdeath)one,methodusedisnotitselfimportant. the patienta lethal injection for humane reasons…ifthedoctor’s decision was theright(to not Both Rachels and Singer have littletimeforthedistinction between allowing Ibid .. Practical Ethics , p.183. 15 16

137 Euthanasia 138 APPLIED ETHICS SUMMARY COMMON STUDENTMISTAKES • • • • • 17

J. D.Velleman, reader/349 Thinking thatpro-euthanasiaviewsmustbesecular andthatanti- without properengagement —theideathatalifeshouldbeprolonged Misrepresenting theDoctrineofDoubleEffectin applicationto Making theslipperyslopeobjectionsimplerthanitis —focuseson the chapteronNaturalLawethics. likelihood offutureconsequences,notcertaintyconsequences. Dismissing thequalityoflifeargumentjustbecause ofareligiousfaith Dismissively suggestingthatnotbeingreligiousisenoughtooppose euthanasia viewsmustbereligious. All optionsremainopen. euthanasia —keep inmindthemoredetailedknowledge gainedfrom even inthefaceofsuffering needssuitabledefence. Sanctity ofLifeclaimsouthand.mighthave absolutevalue for non-religious reasonsandthisisanideaoneshouldengagewith. various methodsofeuthanasiaandthevarious contextsinwhich Euthanasia isanappliedmoraltopicthathasprofound for treatment or for death; the best wayor fordeath;thebest for treatment ofallocatingmedical those methodsmaybeemployed. texts. lip-service discussed by in workssuchasthat and evaluatein favourandagainstthe arguments both thekey are ahost of subtleties inthedebatetowhichwe can only pay changes thatquiteliterallyshortenorextendlifespans.There resources; thepowers ofpeopleoverbodies andthe their both of depressedpatients,theimportancepre-injuryrequests implications; successful moral argumentsmayleadtolegislative bodies of incapacitated family members. Further issues are bodies ofincapacitatedfamilymembers.Further suggest thereferences below asaguideto usefulandenquiring 17 However, we hopethatyounowfeelconfident to explain Beyond Price: Essays onBirth and Death — such as the acceptabilityof active euthanasia J. DavidVelleman , https://www.openbookpublishers.com/ , andwe ISSUES TOCONSIDER KEY TERMINOLOGY 12. 11. 10. 1. 4. 7. 9. 2. 6. 3. 8. 5. What makesalifeworthliving?Isever withoutvalue? What isassistedsuicide?IsitdifferentfromEuthanasia? viewed asanacceptablemethod? with referencetothedevelopment ofeuthanasialawsinBelgium. Is themoralityofeuthanasiadeterminedbyempiricalfactorssuchas If youwere designingeuthanasialaws,whatwouldtheylooklike? Is theresomethingmorallyuncomfortableabouttheargumentfrom Is RuleUtilitarianismtheonlyteleologicaltheorythatsurvives the If euthanasiaismorallyacceptable,shouldpassive euthanasiaever be levels ofpalliative careavailable? Can theslipperyslopeobjectionbeblockedinthiscontext? Answer Could involuntaryeuthanasia(euthanasiaagainstaperson’swishes) autonomy somethingwe mustalways respect?Ifnot,whenshouldit resource allocation?Ifso,what? medicine? moral differencebetween allowinganddoing? ever bejustifiedinanycircumstance? slippery slopeobjection? Should adepressedpatientever beallowed euthanasia?Ispersonal Should aSanctityofLifeethichave anyroleintwenty-first century Should theDoctrineofDoubleEffectbeethicallyrelevant? Istherea not berespected? Persistent Vegetative State Palliative care Doctrine ofdoubleeffect

Well-being Straw-man Sanctity ofLife 139 Euthanasia 140 APPLIED ETHICS ‘Belgian ConvictedKillerwith“Incurable”PsychiatricConditionGranted Velleman, J.David, Madison-St. ClairRecord Bible References Hari, J.,‘Peter Singer:SomePeople areMoreEqualthanOthers’,freely Rachels, James,‘Active andPassive Euthanasia’, Chaliha, Jaya, andLeJoly, Glover, Jonathan, Singer, Peter, Sacred CongregationfortheDoctrineofFaith,‘Declarationon Teresa 4-million (1979): 511–16, www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/16/belgium-convict-granted-right- Euthanasia’, freelyavailable at Right toDie’, to-die at available at congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19800505_euthanasia_ Book Publishers,2015), https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511975950 biblegateway.com/ en.html singer-some-people-are-more-equal-than-others-551696.html stories/510564252-nursing-expert-testifies-that-plaintiff-s-bills-could-be-8- , NewInternationalVersion, freelyavailable at https://www.openbookpublishers.com/reader/349

(London: Penguin, 1996). Practical Ethics http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/peter- the Guardian https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-6561-1_33 Causing DeathandSavingLives Beyond Price:EssaysonBirthandDeath

, freelyavailable at https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0061 The JoyinLoving: A GuidetoDailyLifewithMother (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press,2011), (16September2014), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/ http://madisonrecord.com/ Biomedical EthicsandtheLaw (London: Penguin, 1990). freely available at https://www. (Cambridge,Open ; freelyavailable https:// , 5 , 5

CHAPTER 8

Business Ethics

There is no such thing as business ethics. John Maxwell

A business that makes nothing but money is a poor kind of business. Henry Ford

1. Introduction to Business Ethics

What is a business? Is Christian Aid a business? Is McDonalds? What about a university? This is a difficult and complicated question to answer but let us start from the claim that a business is an organization that buys and sells goods or services for profit. If I buy some books from a shop, they are goods and the business makes a profit. If I pay the taxi driver to take me to the airport then that is a service and I increase the taxi company’s profit. Maybe then Christian Aid is not a business? Arguably there is no “customer” purchasing a good or a service, whereas McDonalds clearly is a business. But what about a university? Well that is a much harder and more controversial question, and one that we have posed below for you to consider. For any business, whatever its size, the key feature will be that it sells goods or services for profit. Ethics arises because relationships exist. That is, if there is a relationship then there is a legitimate question of how ought we to behave in that relationship? In a business there are many different relationships and hence we can ask ethical questions regarding each of these relationships. Here are a few examples. (a) A business has a relationship with its shareholders — the people who own a share of the company. However, if the shareholders want to reduce the wages of the workers so they can get a larger dividend, would they be doing something morally wrong? After all, they might arguably be said in some sense to “own” the business and can do what they want with it. (b) A business has a relationship with its customers — the people who are buying the goods and services. For instance, if a business knowingly reduces 144 APPLIED ETHICS ‘The World’sMostEthicalCompanies’). Trading Initiative. (CSR). Wecontributes CSR tomean:“[…] abusinessapproachthat cantake wrong, even ifthiswas notrecognisedatthetime. wrong? wrong todoso? Conversely, ifanemployee isprivytosome questionable the amountof health advice it provides on its labels in order to increase profits, this basicargument. to sustainabledevelopmentdelivering by economic, socialandenvironmental is abusiness’s“ that isoftenusedinthiscontext talking interms of “values and ethics” is very badbusiness practice. The phrase practices andbecomesa“whistle-blower”morally has shedoneanything then conditions infactoriesbeforethe1847Factory Act were certainlymorally relationship with is arguably is The Body Shop, who in 1988 became the founding member of the Ethical if a mobile phone company constructs a new phone mast which causes a low leavescrapping paternity it canincreaseproductivityby woulditbemorally morally wrong? much needed boost tothelocal economy, but canonlydo so by building ona hum tobeheardbythelocalcommunity,hascompanydonesomething has itdonesomethingmorallywrong? businesses are bestinterms of CSR, and which is the most ethical (e.g.Forbes, benefits forallstakeholders”. statements infullviewonthepromotionalmaterialofanybusiness. nature reserve, hasitdonesomethingmorallywrong? ‘FT.com/Lexicon’, 1 2 3 1. 2. Although itis now the for a business to have “ethics” statements, it This isinstarkcontrasttonowadays, whenyoufind“value andethic” There isnowaplethoraofethicalrankingsthat tellthecustomerwhich (e) Also there are business’s arise regardingthe (d) Therearealsoethicalquestionsthat (c) A business has a relationship with its Of course,businesseshave always madeethicaldecisions.Theworking See K.Strauss,‘TheWorld’s Most EthicalCompanies 2016’,  To seedetails oftheEthicalTradingInitiative see (CSR) strauss/2016/03/09/the-worlds-most-ethical-companies-2016 A businesswillmakeaprofitifitcanattractcustomers. A business’saimistomakeaprofit.

irrational the environment 2 Financial Time

others who are affected for companies 1 , example ofacompanywithclearCSR A great http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=corporate-social-responsibility-- . If a business opens a new factory, giving a . Ifabusinessopensnewfactory,giving to be 3 by thebusiness’s activity. For example, ethical.Whymightthisbe?Consider http://www.ethicaltrade.org employees Corporate Social Responsibility http://www.forbes.com/sites/karsten . If a business realises that Not tobe ”

After all,theemployees were notpress-gangedintoworkingforthecompany. Therefore, given (1)–(4)itseems more reasonable forabusiness simply to They wereEmployeesdesks nordeniedaccess toexits. chained totheir not were notprisoners or slaves butwere rationalhumanbeingswhochose to whether businesses 2. Employers andEmployees For instance,wefound out(i.e. costs ofbeing the potential mightthinkthat they did process to becomeethical.Itisofcourse thenanopenempiricalquestion deontology. do so through thelens of the normative theories of Utilitarianism and Kantian attraction only to appear ethical and not go through a long,oftenexpensiveonly toappearethicalandnotgothrough attraction appearing but Did Sports Direct do something morally wrong? Tomakethisalittlemore cynical marketingdevice in thefirstplace manageable, let us put aside the illegality of their behaviour. Let’sassumethat of their aside theillegality let usput manageable, appear 4 5  4. 3. In this chapter we aregoingtolookatafewareas of business ethics and were docked fifteen minutes’ pay for being oneminutelate.“Sometimes on my zero-hours went tothetoiletmorethanonceevery fourhourswe were calledintothemanager’s office was liftedonwhatseemedtobedraconianworkingpracticesforitsemployees anditwas and questioned”. “I lasted six days before I quit”. I wouldgetgiven onlyone three-hourshiftthewholeweek. Therewas noroutine”. In 1992 Mike Ashley started thecompany Sports Direct; it grewrapidlytobecome the contract, Iwouldendupworkingfortendaysinarow, tenhoursaday.Onotherweeks Given thiswe mightthinkthattheydidnotdoanythingmorally wrong. leaving thestoreafterwork —sometimeshavingtostriptheirunderwear. Employees Of course,therearemanyquestionsthatarisefromtheabove argument. revealedworkers were that minimum wage. notpaidthe employee One “if we claimedthat, biggest sports retailer in the UK and one of the biggest in Europe.However,biggest sportsretailerintheUKandoneof in2016thelid D. Avis, ‘SportsDirect:FormerEmployees SpeakOut’, Ibid. It willmake In thepresentcontext(atleastinWest) abusinesswillattractmost customers ifit appearing ethical becauseitactuallycostsmoreto to beethical,ratherthanactuallybeingethical. nothing illegal not ethical. — beingethical) far outweigh thecosts of more hence (4) mightberejected. However, thereremains a great are appears intheirpractice. . ethicalorwhetheritis window dressing and simplya profitifit tobeethical. appears ethicalratherthanactually http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-36864345 4 Employees were often searched when be ethicalratherthansimply actually beingethical being 5 145 Business Ethics 146 APPLIED ETHICS “employee’s rights” inparticular.However, we suspectmostpeoplewould “hedonic” calculus. If we introducehigherandlower pleasures,thenwe can “lower” pleasures.Onlyhumans can experiencehigherpleasure,non-human A preference or welfare consequentialist might thenconclude that whatSports work forthiscompany.Itisplausiblethattheemployees simplyfailed toread would claimthattheactionsofSportsDirect the “small print” in their contracts. In this case why think that thebusinessdid the “smallprint”intheircontracts.Inthiscasewhythink terms of happiness or pleasure but inotherterms such as then we mightthinkthatthelower pleasuresof,say,amillionpeople having thought thathigherandlower pleasures were people wouldjudgethatthecompanyoughtnottohave actedintheway that people will dissatisfied than apigsatisfied. He thoughtthattherewere “higher”and a utilitarian as arguablySportsDirect didnottreatitsemployees fairly. and/or preferences. Investigating thisclaim, though, would take uswell trainers, isoutweighedor owningthelatesttrendy a newtennisracket the by animals cannot. act utilitarians. This is because Mill said it would be bettertoahuman acceptable forSportsDirecttotreatitsemployees inthe way thatitdid. anything wrong? Direct did was morallywrongbecauseitsactions did notmaximize welfare respect theintuitionthatwhatSportsDirectdidwas morallywrong.Mill right if,andonlyitbringsaboutmore happiness thananyotheract,so rule-utilitarian mightconclude thatwhatSportsDirectdidwas morallywrong rule “treatyouremployees fairly”isjustifiableonutilitariangrounds.Thatis, it did. unhappiness ofapproximately27,000employees. Inwhichcaseitwas morally maybe thenSportsDirect higher pleasureofthethreequarteramillionemployees beingtreatedfairly. happiness fromowningthecheapsportsproductsoutweighed themiseryand beyond thescopeofthischapter. believe thatwhatSports Direct did What is important then is to realize that itis not as clear-cut as saying that That saidperhapswe donotneedtodrawthisconclusion In thecaseofSportsDirect,itmightbethat Furthermore, Consequentialist Theories also spell out the “utility” not in Furthermore, ConsequentialistTheoriesalsospell outthe“utility” Remember thatforan“actutilitarian”(see Mill arguesthatpleasureshouldnotjustbeweighed onthequalitative Moreover, theactutilitarianhasnotimefor“rights”ingeneralandan Moving away from typically would believe thatacertainbusiness practiceismorally right be happierifthisruleis followed thanifitisnot.Hence,a Act Utilitarianism, we might thinkthatthe did not do anythingmorallywrong. was morally wrong qualitatively was Chapter 1 millions morally wrongbecausethe and even ifitwere ofpeoplewhogained welfare distinct.Ifthisistrue ) anactismorally and rule even if utilitarian preferences we are legal . , very oftenfromthepoorestgroupofsociety.This means they donothave lots could into thismeans-endrelationship.Thesamethen entering voluntarily whether thebusinessistreatingpeople It isclearthatbusinessescandirectlyaffecthow acustomerthinksabout Ford, or Body Shop are using their employeesFord, orBodyShopareusingtheir this is asameanstoanendbut 3. BusinessesandCustomers the contractofworkfreely. that businesses cannot usepeopleasameans to anendbutthatthekeyis the Kantiantalksinterms of dutyandCategoricalImperatives; for theKantian then theywouldnotspend millionsofpoundsonadvertising eachyear! But the Kantianswouldsaythatwhatwasis morallywrong.We’ll happening look to workforSportsDirect.Iftheyarenot,then SportsDirect givenoccupy apositionof they thisthen goods or services, the worldaround them,andthemselves. If they could not preferences etc. driver forourownend.This is becausewe paythetaxidriver andtheyare according to theposition, we should maximize pleasure, happiness, wellbeing, at otherfeaturesof the Kantianposition when we consider other issues below. another. Moreover, we mightsupposethatinleavingthejobtheyend pay theiremployeesacceptable becausethey andtheiremployees areentering or wrong.Ratheritwilldependonthespecifics of thesituationandhow, of jobstopickfromsoitisnotasiftheycouldleave thejobandquicklyfind in treatingitsemployees asameanstoanend(profit).Butitcannot bethat it isalways morallywrongtotreatsomeoneas up in a situation which is far worse, perhaps not being able to pay their rent, able topaytheir up inasituationwhichisfarworse,perhapsnotbeing it practisedaformof morally wrongbecauseallbusinessesusetheiremployees tomakeaprofit. being onthestreet,havingrelationshipsbreakdown. said fortheemployeesbe McDonalds, or that is true inabusiness.Sure,it employees asmeans-to-an-end even thoughitispayingthem.Inwhichcase simple. For ifthiswere truethen We needtothinkabitharderaboutwhatKantissaying.not saying Using a taxi is not morally wrong even though we are using the taxi In thiscase, we mightwonderiftheemployees reallyare Perhaps though theKantianwould say that Sports Direct is On firstlook,we mightthinkthatthisis precisely what Sports Direct did So muchfortheutilitarians,whataboutKantians?(See exploitation . ThepeopleworkingforSportsDirectare all businesses would be doing something as rationalandfree trust . Withcomes aquestion this trust solely ameanstoanend. . Chapter 2 different freely is treatingits choosing because .) Well, 147 Business Ethics 148 APPLIED ETHICS “horsemeat” scandal and other “food fraud”caseshave“horsemeat” scandalandother beensocontroversial. “honest” viewpoint. An advert foracomputerthatsays:“thisisvery expensive; We mightthinkthathereisacasewherebusiness’s actions towards the you’llof word forgames,abit useapproximately5%ofitscapacity,probably Youlabel. just buyingthe you areprobably the statisticssay dorealizethat were still amazed to discover the scale of it. Itappears that salespeople are way ofexplainingitisvia when theyaredeceived intoeatingit.These were caseswherefood companies It maybethatpeople lying? processing and surfing theweb” willprobablynotgetthecompany very far deliberately lied,ordeceived thecustomerfor profit. always be wrong to do so. Presumably, for the act utilitarian, itis not always and inwhatform. chasing their commissions, theirbosses are chasingprofits — wecustomer ismorallywrong.Buthowmight this? Well, explain oneobvious rather itinvolves regarding howmuch information acompanyshouldprovidetothecustomer in termsofsales.Soitseems unfair to compel businessestobehonestand interest —that ofmakingaprofittogive thecustomerabalancedand morally wrongforabusinesstolieandexploit thetrustofcustomer. balanced in stated: “We’ve alwayspeople were knownthat mis-sold we beingPPI,but of responsibilitytothecustomer 7 6 Looking at hard tosaywhyitwould Act Utilitarianism accountitisquite and inefficient”. Itis beyond doubtthatbanksknewPPI was a con, yet itwas not intheir In 2011 a court decision meant that banks had to compensate millions of people after they had tocompensatemillionsofpeopleafter banks In 2011acourtdecisionmeantthat But whatislying?Well, it But ontheotherhandacompanycannotlie.Thisofcourseiswhy But howfardoesthis“responsibility”reach?Itisofcourse not inabusiness’s into the insecurity of customers by promising a “safety net”. PPI promised to repay people’s PPI promisedtorepay promising a“safetynet”. insecurity ofcustomersby into the interest tostopsellingPPIbecauseitwas “acash cow”. InordertosellPPIbankstapped had been mis-sold Payment ProtectionInsurance (PPI) whichwas judged to be“ineffective borrowings iftheirincomefellduetoillnessorjobloss. ‘Horsemeat Scandal:WhereDid the29%HorseinyourTesco BurgerCome From?’, G. Wearden, ‘HowthePPIScandalUnfolded’,  public-secrecy https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/22/horsemeat-scandal-guardian-investigation- how-ppi-scandal-unfolded this way. intentional deception would

trust choose to eathorsemeat but thetroublearises ?” is not 6

. As DougTaylor, whoworksfor“Which?”, whensomeone fails totellthetruthbut . Butwhyoughtcompanies refrain from https://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/may/05/ where’s thesense the Guardian 7 ,

A plausible rulemightbe“do not lieinapositionoftrustwherethereare As we discussed above itiscommon parlance amongstbusinesses to talk Typically, thoughnotexhaustively,ethically thisamountstothebusinessbeing was morallywrong. 4. A BusinessandtheEnvironment If, by lying,a business produces more happiness than bynotlying,thenitis Kant uses the CategoricalImperative toshow this. Letusreconsider the PPI the grandscheme of things,matter.Butthe increaseinglobalization,the the otherethicalissues, is onlyarelatively newphenomenon.Inthepast, testing itscosmetics on animals or reducing the amount of non-recyclable goal notjustofprofitbuttobeinstepwiththeissuessocietyasawhole. plastic bagsthatthecompanyuses. advancement ofscience,andthefactwe live inconnectedcommunitieshas a business polluting apond, or mining on agreenspace did not really,in many of criticized. This,like are heavily and isoftenanareawherethey a business use apotentiallymore expensive product,thusreducingitsprofits, about grounds thewayon Kantian and irrational.Soitseemsthat PPI was that sold customer if itmeansmakingaprofit”tobecome auniversal law.Itisirrational case. Itwouldbeirrationalfortheheadofabanktowant themaxim“lieto customer. Yet, even on the ruleutilitarianaccount it is true thatitis cement intheconstructionofitsfactories,whydoes this matter?Whyshould reasonable groundsthatyou’ll befoundout”.Ifthiswere justifiablethrough responsible towards the utilitarian grounds, then itwould be unacceptableforbusinesses to liethe in thenameofprofit,businesses could do whattheywanted regardingthe morally acceptableforthebusinesstolie. all always morally acceptableforabusinesstolie. business is working within the law but using, say, environmentally unfriendly the lawbut within business isworking because if this is a universal law then therewould be environment. Therewas aviewthat theworldissuchamassive placethat simply becauseitismoreenvironmentallyfriendly? andthereforetherecould be noprofitandbusinesses. It isself-defeating We mightnotthinkthatwe wouldgetthesameresultforruleutilitarian. This contrasts with the Kantian approach. If you recall, for the Kantian it is This contrastswiththeKantianapproach.Ifyourecall,for It istruethattheenvironmentoneofbiggest concernsforbusinesses But whyshould a business have anyobligationtotheenvironment? If a morallywrongtolie.Itis true inallinstances that oneoughtnottolie. Corporate Social Responsibility environment ; inotherwords,abusinessworkswiththe ; thismightincludethingssuchasnot no trust in businesses at sometimes

149 Business Ethics 150 APPLIED ETHICS we intentionallykillbillionsoffishandaquaticlifefor we spelloutthedetailsofcasebutUtilitarianismdoes not appeartobeas Kantian, itlegitimisesand henceincreasesthepossibilityofexploitation of they are that thegoldproduced might causealotofhappiness,notleastbecause it to showwhythiswas morallywrongifweWe areutilitarians. think might lead to businessestreatinghumansasa means to an end, whichiswrong.So plants, andotheraquaticlifedonothavelevel acomparablyhigh of pleasure although theexploitationofenvironmentis notmorallywrongforthe towardsas abusiness’smoralobligation and thusthereisnosuchthing the Did the companydo something morallywrong?Itmighthave done something climate changeandtheholeinozonelayer areprimeexamplesofthisslow clear-cut aswe perhapsmight have hoped. But canwe give anysubstancetothisthought?Whatreallyiswrong? After all, realization. or happinesscomparedtohumanssoallthingsbeingequalitmight is usedinjewellery, computers, electronics,dentistry,medicineetc.Thefish, it forgedsafetydocumentation.Buteven ifitdid nothing illegal,did it do illegal; perhapsitomittedtoperformtheappropriateload tests, orperhaps mean thatKantbelieves abusinesscandowhatever itwants towards the morally wrong. Ofcourse, as with theothercases this will depend on how made peoplerealizethatbusinessescan,anddo,affecttheenvironment; environment. environment, astheenvironmentisnotarational environmental something morallywrong? people What wouldwe sayifwe areutilitarians? Well we cannottalkabout We canbringsomeoftheissuesintofocusthroughanexample: 100,000 cubicmetersofcyanide-contaminated water. Thewater spilledover somefarmland If a business treats the environment as a means to an end (profit) then I suspectinthetwenty-first centuryouranswer“obviously yes!” willbe For theKantian,we only have moral obligations towards rational agents disaster inEuropesinceChernobyl. Thecyanide water was aby-productofthemining gold bythe Aurul miningcompany. and In 2000 heavy snow caused the collapse ofadaminRomania.Thewassnow causedthe In 2000heavy holdingback of ahugeamountaquaticlifeandtheaccident has beencalled the biggestenvironmental , whichis. then modelling into the rights Someș acertaintypeofbehaviourandthis couldthen , for there are river. Although no no rights and again we might find it hard humans were killed agent food the . Nowthisdoesnot every year. spill caused the not death be “[child labour] isconsidered aspartofthehouseholdchoreschildrendoto “[child labour] The world is getting smaller anditisincreasinglyeasytocontactwork The worldisgetting would have adirectlynegativelivelihoods effectonthe ofalargenumber with peopleacross the world.WhereasinpastaUKbusiness might set Now consider businesses in “developing” countries. Theyareoftentryingto friendly” wayto survive.famer mightstruggle thenthat then do Whatright there beacompletebanorisitthecasethat: there has been a move to make businesses more environmentally friendly. got to produce crops, but has todosoinamoreexpensiveto producecrops,but got “environmentally 5. BusinessandGlobalization people. Buthowmuchthenare“westernidiosyncratic? Should ideals”simply developingcollapse. IfafarmerinKenya andmayleadtotheir hasnotonly dependent on the use of child labour and therefore ablanketbanon child labour During theindustrial inthe UK there was no such requirement. country where the children were used, people think it is very wrong.But is reader. Theaiminthissectionistostartyouthinkingaboutsome of theissues. rather thanapplyour moral theories to these issues, we will leave this tothe Or consider another issue. consider another Or As wewas said,it that recently quite notuntil of theenvironmentalimpacttheirwork.In fact, theWest imposingtheir it? ConsiderthisquotationfromaCameroonianfatherwhoisalsofarmer: a wholehostofnewethicalissuesbut opportunities. Thisbrings international its sightsonreachingafewcitiesintheUK,businessesnowhave greater money thatisusedtopaytheirschoolfees”. help theirparents.Ido not consider this child abuse becausewe aremaking been exposedasusingchildlabour. Although this maynotbeillegalinthe environmental standardsonbusinesseswouldeffectively stopsuchbusinesses start fromscratchwithvery poorinfrastructure andapoorunderstanding 9  8 A global ban We canunderstandthenthatalocalruraleconomymaywell bewholly Nike, Gap, M&S, H&M,Walmart,Gap, Nike, Nestléandmanymorecompanieshave actual outcomesofimplementedmeasures economic role ofchildren. of humane policy would betoapplysomebasicrules A moresensible working conditions in conjunction with a targeted, evolving approachthatdulyconsidersthe working conditions inconjunctionwithatargeted, Ibid F. Wijen, ‘BanningChildLabour Imposes Naive Western Ideals on ComplexProblems’, www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/aug/26/ban-child-labour-developing-countries- imposes-naive-western-ideals-complex-problems . Hereandhereaftertheemphasis isoursunlessotherwisestated. […] showsdisrespectfor other culturesby imposing a . 9

8

western mindset asto the https://

151 Business Ethics 152 APPLIED ETHICS SUMMARY the business treat their femaleemployeesthe businesstreat andsuccessfullyoperate? The general questionthenishowfarcanwe impose —ifatallWestern business located in aculturewhichtreatswomen as second class citizens; howshould cultures. Forexample,someculturesoperatebyusingbribes;whatthenshould increase inglobalization.Ingeneral,thesearisewhenthereisaclashof businesses do withinthatculture?WhataboutwhenaWestern business is businesses inotherlessaffluentcountries? businesses intheWest have toimposetheseenvironmentalstandards on ethics innon-Western contexts? 10 . Parenti, M. There aremanyotherexamplesoftheethicalissues that come with the The label“businessethics”isrelatively new.Thecustomeris Perhaps thenthemostethicalresponsetobusinessisrefuse to playthecapitalistgame of business in thefirstplace and leads ustoseekaftermoremoney a systemthat that thought to rethinkwhat“business” mightmeanandhowa“business” and more material goods will crush and stunt the environment neededforbusinessesto capitalism —the of capitalismcouldbeseenasnotallowingusto fulfilthisrole. incentive tobe —ratherthansimplyappearingethical. in profits.This leads to ageneralquestion whetherthereis any healthy, beingwithfriends and family, developing hobbiesand exist —is itself immoral? Marx,andmanyothers,certainly should act. skills, educatingourselves etc.,thenthe“forprofit”mentality a businesswillleadtoslump signs ofmoralwrongdoingby now very sensitive tohow“ethical”abusinessisandthusany The essence of capitalism The essence is toturnnatureinto commodities and commodities If ourfunctionashumansinvolves devotingtimetobeing demoralized humanity iskeptinlinewithdrugs,television,andarmedforce. into capital. The liveinto capital. The earth istransformedintodeadgoldbricks,with green mansion overlooks avast sprawl of shanty towns,whereinadesperate, One questionthatwe have notyet addressed is whether luxury itemsfor the fewand toxic slag heaps for the many. The glittering Against Empire . human flourishing 10

. ISSUES TOCONSIDER COMMON STUDENTMISTAKES • • • • 11. 10. 1. 12. 4. 7. 9. 2. 6. 3. 8. 5. Assuming thatequalopportunitymeanstreatingeveryone thesame. Assuming thatsomefromaculturecanspeakonbehalfofall What doyouthinkabout thefinalquotationfromParenti? What Why shouldbusinesscareabouttheworldthey leave forfuture Western business practice? What doyouthinkoftheargumentthatitisirrationalforabusinessto Write anethics/value statementforyourschool. What aretheysaying?doyouthinkofthem? What doyouthinkthedifferenceisbetween abusinessand Thinking thatKantsayswe can violence. Others,perhapsconcerningdresscode, donot.Howthenare we goingtodecide between thosevalues thatshouldbepartofethical If youdothinkthatcapitalism isimmoralthenwhatalternative is How fardoyouthinkcapitalismisimmoral? Imagine thatasanemployee youareofferedabribe.Howwouldthe Find afewexamplesofadverts. Explaininyourownwordswhatthey Find someexamplesofabusiness’sethicsand/orvalues statement. there? Whyistheproposed alternative more take bribesinbusiness? Confusing thelegalquestionsandmoralquestions. generations? After all,futuregenerations donotexist. do youthinktheutilitarian andtheKantianwouldsayaboutthis are tellingthecustomer.Isthisintentionaldeception?itlying? Do youthinkthatauniversity isabusiness? company? culture. quotation? utilitarian tellustoact?WhatabouttheKantian?Isitalways wrongto business practiceandthosethataremerelyidiosyncratic featuresof be ethical? Some workplacerulesseemtrueinevery culture —e.g.donotuse never usepeopleasmeans. morally acceptable? 153 Business Ethics 154 APPLIED ETHICS ‘Horsemeat Scandal:WhereDidthe29%HorseinyourTesco BurgerCome ‘FT.com/Lexicon’, Avis, D.,‘Sports Direct:FormerEmployees SpeakOut’, Wijen, F.,‘BanningChildLabourImposesNaive Western IdealsonComplex Wearden, G.,‘HowthePPIScandalUnfolded’, References KEY TERMINOLOGY Parenti, Michael, Strauss, K.,‘TheWorld’sMostEthicalCompanies2016’,Forbes,freely Term?term=corporate-social-responsibility--(CSR) worlds-most-ethical-companies-2016 Problems’, From?’, freelyavailable at 2016), freelyavailable at freely available at theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/aug/26/ban-child-labour- developing-countries-imposes-naive-western-ideals-complex-problems available at oct/22/horsemeat-scandal-guardian-investigation-public-secrecy how-ppi-scandal-unfolded Goods Stakeholders Services the Guardian http://www.forbes.com/sites/karstenstrauss/2016/03/09/the- Against Empire Financial Time https://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/may/05/ (26 August 2015),freelyavailable at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-36864345 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/ , freelyavailable at (Saint Francisco:CityLightsBooks,1995). Whistleblowing Capitalism Corporate SocialResponsibility the Guardian http://lexicon.ft.com/

BBC News (5May2011), https://www. (22 July

CHAPTER 9

Conscience

The bite of conscience, like the bite of a dog into stone, is a stupidity.

1. Introduction

Each of us has, at one time or another, talked about our conscience. We might have been “pricked by our conscience” or our conscience might have “butted in” when it was not wanted. We might be going on quite happily telling a lie to a friend, or might have accidentally walked out of a shop without paying for something and it is our conscience that makes us confess or stops us in our tracks spins us on our heels and takes us back into the shop. People from different walks of life talk of the “conscience”, from the religious believer, the politician, the celebrity, to every day folk; we might hear someone berate their conscience for nagging them to do something they do not want to. People might be labelled “conscientious objectors” because they feel their conscience is telling them to object to certain political actions, e.g. war. A protester might lament the erosion of their “freedom of conscience”. And we can find concepts very similar to “conscience” in many non-Christian religious traditions both Eastern and Western throughout history and from around the globe.1 However, the nature of conscience is obscure and consequently the philosophical discussion of conscience is complex and has a long history. It draws on issues in philosophical psychology, philosophy of religion, , philosophy of mind, applied ethics, normative ethics and Metaethics. In this chapter we’ll give a general overview of two theories of conscience. One draws on Aquinas’s account; the other Sigmund Freud’s (1856–1939). Although Freud is not typically seen as a philosopher (he’s a psychologist) his account will provide us with some insights which allows us to think philosophically about this thing we call “the conscience”.

1 See P. Strohm, Conscience, p. 18, for a good overview of this. 158 APPLIED ETHICS “speak”, anddoes not have alanguageofchoice. All oftheseobservations then Murderer we’ll lookhow“conscience” is, andhasbeen,usedinordertodrawoutsome within’ aperson,whichEichmannalsotermed‘the voiceoftheblood’”. 2. TheHistoryofConscience King Jr., whowasKing and constantpressuretochangehisviewssaid: underthreat since I stand,candonoother”and“Icannotnorwillretractanything, In thetwenty-first centuryconscience is notthoughtofassolelyareligious themselvescounted”, toactcontrary inmortaldanger, to“standupandbe leave anumberofobservations andquestions. Conscience is, then, powerful. Itseems that itcan move apersontoput general features. protestant reformation. particular age and dissipates at any age. It does not “speak”, and it does age. Itdoesnot“speak”,andit any age anddissipatesat particular due to itsadoptionbybothProtestantand Catholic traditions. In thissection and being forced to recantbyCharles V, stands his grounds and says “Here considerable pressurebythepowerful peoplebeforehim.Orconsider a more recent example. or many,itcanechoreligiousideas,social racistideas,loftyideasor officers: “Conscience was simply the ‘morality of the Fatherland thatdwells ideas found in the filth of humancorruption.Consciencecandevelopideas foundinthefilth atany it isnever safenorvirtuoustogoagainstconscience”. Luther believed that idea. However talkof“conscience” was popularised,atleastin“theWest”, his God-given consciencewas notallowinghimtorecant,even under the been citedbythemost repugnant andmorally abhorrentpeoplewhohave ever lived, racists, murderers, tyrants, dictators. For example as Bettina self-interest. Stangneth’s statesin 2 3 “Conscience” playedmost famousspeechesinthe aroleinoneofthe But, conscience asks thequestion,isit right? And therecomes a time whenwe musttake a In themidstofpoliticalturmoilcivilrightsmovement MartinLuther Conscience can be male or female or both or neither, it can beonevoice or neither, it Conscience canbemaleorfemaleboth But it is not just saints and heroes that talkof conscience, conscience has position thatisneithersafe,norpolitic,popular,butonemusttakeitbecauseright S. Benhabib, ‘Who’s on Trial, Eichmann or Arendt?’,  M. L. King Jr., ‘AM. L.King ProperSenseofPriorities’, whos-on-trial-eichmann-or-anrendt king04.html , 3 adiscussion of theinnerlifeoneNazi’smostnotorious Eichmann Before Jerusalem: The Unexamined LifeofaMass Eichmann BeforeJerusalem:The http://www.aavw.org/special_features/speeches_speech_ (1483–1546), being charged with heresy http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/09/21/ . 2 “invention”. With allthese points in mind let’s consider one of the keythinkers (Hamlet 3.1.78–82). wrong throughourconscience. was tellinguswhattodo. Of course, although conscience is “inward looking”, wrong yet failtobeguideddoit.ThispredicamentiswhatShakespeare wewho saysforexample:“myconsciencetellsmeIhave thinkofatyrant to the conscience differently than wethe consciencedifferently wouldifafriend,priest,politicianorImam true thattheconsciencegives usguidancebutnotknowledge. to actincertainways, even whenthingsaredifficultoreven lifethreatening. that is not the same as saying that wethat is notthesameassaying that the conscience justmakeupwhat plays. First, killing thementallyillis morally wrong, we do not want tosay that inthis case country”. Clearlythisisacasewhereher kill allmentallyillpeopletohelpthe different things,andtheyengendereddisagreement withinthescientific does notmeanthattheideasthemselves arenew. a source of moral about what“conscience” means doesnotmean thatconscience is allegedly tellsus. For instance, we mightthinkthatwhatis right and wrong captured inthisfamous quotation: “conscience doth makecowards of usall” conscience is tellingherhowshe community. This in itself does not lead us to theconclusion that thereare no reflecting inwards on oneself,howonemight“feel”aboutcertainthings. It is not about looking is notabout is wrong because my conscience told me”. Third it mightbethoughtof as a in relationtoconscience, inventions, andthat intheirdevelopment they mightbeusedtotalkabout in itsmodernmoralmeaningthemid eighteenth century(e.g.neitherPlato is dependentonGodbutalso think thatwe come to knowwhatisrightand molecules and noatoms. Sothelackofterm“conscience”, and disagreement modern, or justbecausethereis disagreement with howaterm is used, that motivation her consciencegives her nor There seemtobe(atleast)threerelatedfunctionsthatwe thinktheconscience Just toclarify,we canseethedifferenceinfirsttwoofthesefunctions if Finally itisworthnotingthattheterm“conscience” was onlyformalized Equally theoppositeseemstrue,thatwe mightknowwhatisrightand Consider thepointthatterms“molecules” and “atoms”were recent Consider another point.Conscience is Aristotle . Thatis,itmightbethethingthatactuallygetsusupoutofourseat it tellsuswhatwe oughtto do talk of conscience).However, talk notethatjustbecausea knowledge out intotheworld,atasetofrulesorlaws.We experience knowledge Aquinas . Thatis, we mightsay “I ought to . ofwhatisrightandwrong.Soitmightbe behave. But,given thatwe thinkthat as a subjective guide forourlives. Second, it is inthatitisaboutone know thatstealinga pen merely term an is 159 Conscience 160 APPLIED ETHICS Aquinas’s account. Aquinas, unlike conscience, (the Eternal/Divinelaw)toactualreallifesituations. If you recall from Notice thenthatforPaul —and Aquinas —the “conscience” following ourconscienceasitcanmove usinthewrongdirection/mislead 3. Aquinas onConscience thinking andreflectionisrevealed intheBible: thinks Aquinas, when thinks Aquinas, the mind this knowledge? This is where anotherkeytechnicaltermisintroduced. The the applicationof to activity”( be took conscienceto thinkers, they willseethatitisthestraightline.This “coming torecognizethrough laws. Theroleofconsciencetheprimarypreceptsdiscovered istoapply asthe after all signposts do not opinions on things (see all signpostsdonotopinionsonthings after Aquinas, certain preceptsthatwe oughttolive by. Aquinas thinksthatthisrelianceon content ofsynderesis. reflection” iswhat synderesis. For Aquinas hasinmindwhenhetalksabout Question 79, Article 13). conscience ismorallyneutral out thequickestway togetbetween twopoints.Throughrational reflection means that a but as aguide.Thismeansthat but Aquinas, unlikeLutherandpost-reformation basic ideaisthatthroughreason(whathecalls synderesis sometimes accusing the person, sometimes defending them.For Aquinas . Aquinas, T. 4 Aquinas explicitlydefines“conscience” as the“applicationofknowledge They showthat the requirementsof the law are writtenontheirhearts,consciences also To get abetterunderstanding ofsynderesis consider someone trying towork To beclearthen Aquinas For Aquinas theconscience istheactofapplyinguniversal principles them bearing witness,andtheirthoughtssometimesaccusingthematothertimeseven defending . 4

. Synderesis is not thesame as conscience but is the innateabilityof — what he calls a Summa Theologica Romans failure of conscience Chapter 4 , 2:15. knowledge conscience , itsimply“bearswitness”,isa“sign-post”and habit of the mind did nottakeconsciencetobeasourceof moral knowledge , toactivity,thisraisesthequestionhowwe get Aquinas synderesis is never mistaken , I–II,I).So,ifconscience for Aquinas isabout (and notsynderesis)makesamistake.This fallible needs to beclearly thoughtthroughon developed a NaturalLaw theology. The . For Aquinas wein wrong maybe

— to apprehend the eternal/divine ratio ) we cancometorecognize . Humans do wrong, Summa bears witness , Part1,

This person buys a gun and goes on a killing rampage. The owner of the shop, rampage. Theownerof the This personbuysagunandgoesonkilling wrong throughsynderesis. However, even thoughwe areinfallible about 4. FreudandtheConscience In thiscase, the ownerofgunshop followingherconscience has done Freud’s manyideashisconceptualization ofthestructuremindiskey to Freud is best knownas a psychologist and the architectof psychoanalysis. He from ignorancewe couldnothave avoided (invincible)meansouractionis this, we can,anddo, make mistakes in applyingthis knowledge. Itisour the eternal/divinelaws,ofwhichthereare likely outcome. presents. However, hisideashaveand indeedhis influential, incredibly been and explainhowhereconceptualisesitasapsychological andnottheological criminal recordwhichwouldhave shownuponabasicbackgroundcheck. concept, andindoingsoargueswegood shouldnotacceptitasaninherently conscience ( record, hasnever beenintroublewiththepolicenoratschoolandtheyhave overcome by usingone’s reason ( ignorance isdoingwrongwhenone is doing something wrongwhenone could not have knownbetter;vincible is controversial andmostphilosopherspsychologists rejecttheideashe us to act. It can go wrong throughignorance. Ignorance which could have morally wrong. might thisrelatetoconscience? his viewsonconscience. He thinksthemindcanbe thoughtofascontaining her been avoided(vincible)meansouractionismorallywrong.Mistakesderiving by followingherconscience, hasnotdonesomethingmorallywrongbecause something morallywrongbecauseinthiscaseherignoranceisvincible. be no record of mentalillness.Heis,forallintents andpurposes,amodel citizen. name hasenteredoureverydayin theformofa“Freudianslip”. talk Among notion. overcome by usingone’s reason ( To conclude, Aquinas thinksallofuscanknowinfalliblywhatis rightand person whoissoldagunevenThis contraststothe thoughhehasaviolent In the next section, we will consider what Freud has to say about conscience, Imagine twopeoplegoingintoagunshop.Thefirstpersonhasnocriminal For Aquinas, conscience errs becauseof ignorance is invincible conscientia) which tellsushowtoapplythisknowledge andmoves ; therewas no indication thatthiswould have beena vincible ignorance invincible ignorance ought to haveBut how knownbetter. two types ignorance ), andignorancethat . Ignorancethat ). Invincible ignorance abouthowtoapply cannot can be not

161 Conscience 162 APPLIED ETHICS To successfully operateintheworld, we need to consciously reflect and reason very littleaboutthecontentof we inhabit!We have tounderstandboundaries,sanctions and consequences. Imagine thatyourmumhasalways toldyounottositwithyourelbowson However, aswe develop we soon realize thatwe cannotsimplyactonthe Freud structure of the mind.Our ego balances the primal drives of the the super-ego takes in addressing the ego super-ego takesinaddressingthe the that monitors from parental(social/religious) rulesandregulationscontrolstheegois itis for food, sex, drinkand is the oldest part ofthemind. The three parts:the the voiceofauthorityfrom thesuper-ego. then youinternalizethisrule.Sowhenaremucholderandnot the table living withyourmum any longerthevoice of your“super-ego”speakswith grow older we internalizethesethingsand “hear them”as a voice of authority. primal instinctsofthe principle; theycrawlto put single-mindedly afterthechocolatebuttons principle”. This is the claim that whatidentifies and unifies the drives of the principle tohelpus understand the drives in the properly formalized or understood and Freudlikensittochaos. It isinstinctive, authority —“take yourelbowsoffthetable!”Theseare very basicsof acceptable insocietyandfindthemselves physically,socially and emotionally and ultimately,we have todelayinstinctive behaviourand“weigh-up” the are inaccessibletous.Freudhasaniceway ofdescribingthe cauldron full of seething excitations…”.(SE, XXII.73). Although we can say understood astherelationbetween these. reflects, it needs something to weigh-upneeds somethingto reflects, it the against us whatwerules, andaswe canand cannotdoandchastiseusforbreaking isolated. ItiswhatFreudcallsthe“ego”whichplaysthispolicingrole. in theirmouth,theycrave theirmother’s milk irrespective ofanythingelse. is theavoidanceofpainandpursuitpleasure. emotional andillogical.We cannotlistallthedrives thatmakeup the super-ego situation. Putbluntlysomeone whose not simplyfollowthepleasureprinciple.Thatis,althoughegorationally Where doestheconscience come in?ForFreudthe Now, asavery youngchilditmaybeOKtodriven bythe pleasure For Freudthe Early inourlifeparents(aswell associety,religiousleadersetc.)tell But ifwe onlyhave the . whattheegoisdoing.ThisauthorityFreud calls the id id , theegoandsuper-ego. is thecollectionofourprimaldrives,basic desires e.g.the id as we haveourselves tonavigate social spaces inthe id and the id , Freuddidthinkthattherewas ageneral . When the internalized authority derivedauthority internalized . Whenthe ego id thenitisunclearwhywe would is unchecked would cease to be Freud’s accountofconscienceis id , whathecalls the “pleasure id . We needsome conscience istheformthat id ;

he calls it: “…a id cannot be id authority id asthey with id violent, abusive etc.Inthesesortsofcases the consciencewouldbestifling, we failtoachieve andthisgives riseto world through putting things in their mouth. Notice that during thisphase things intheirmouth.Noticethat world throughputting If we failtomoveto astage,then throughastagecompletely,orreturn Psychosexual Developmentof sexualdevelopment Theoryisatheory from First, theobviouspointisthatforFreudconscience is the with super-ego failstodealproperly Freud saysthatwhenthe force forgood. the product of our often non- upbringing rather thanadivinely-inspired the productofouroftennon-idealupbringing is ourego’spunishmentforfallingshortofthesuper-ego;conscience that wethink we can,orshould,getridoftheconscience he doesthink shouldtreat the authorityof the super-ego.But super-ego isarrived at throughthe the pleasureprincipleisrepressed —thisformswhathecalls the formofsuper-egoweguilt by through callconscience.Furthermore, conscience”.of assynonymouswith the“guilty Ouregoispunished thought tells ustoremove ourelbowsfromthetable. that stage.This can be aserious problem forourrelationshipsandcould be an growing up where parents are stifling, overlyup whereparentsarestifling, growing authoritarian, distant,cold,hard, 5. Freud’sPsychosexualDevelopment Theory problems ariseandwe mightbecomefixatedwiththeareaassociated with God. Second,unlike Aquinas, Freudthinksthattheconscience could bebad, destructive andunhelpful.Theconscience is theway theegoexperiences are breastfeeding and as the baby developsbaby and asthe are breastfeeding and explore the navigate they overlyFreud doesnot although authoritarian,distant,etc.Thismeansthat only dowe getinformationabouttheworld, butwe alsofulfil the of development.that aswe Freudthought develop we movedifferent through understood as “theconscience”. Inourlastexampleitis“conscience” that in biting,chewingandsucking.Forexample,babies soon after theyareborn things intheirmouth,pleasure is wherebabiesgetpleasurethroughputting underlying causeofmentalillness. it withahealthydose of scepticismandhence notbekowtowed bythe“guilt” babies arevery dependentonothers. According to Freud atthisstagenot to death.Freudwasbirth to lookattheentirelifespaninterms thefirstthinker experiences we have. And, of course, we might have hadreally stages. Atour libido(sexdrive)each stage isfocusedtowardsthings. different You canalsohopefullyseethedifferencesbetween Aquinas andFreud. The firststageistheoralfrombirthtoabout oneandahalf.Thisstage Notice thenthatourconscience often requirescertainthingsfromuswhich guilt . ForFreud,theconscience can be not neurosis bad the voiceof experiences id id —when . . Babies 163 Conscience 164 APPLIED ETHICS “anally retentive”. Thatis,someonewhoisoverly controllingoroutofcontrol At thisstagegirlsplaywithinordertolearntheroleofagirlandboys waste, ordonotcarewherewhentheyletgooftheirwaste. who failtoproperlymove throughthisstagearewhatsometimes called chew andsuch asmuchtheywantwho canbite, arebeingguidedbythe which Freudcallsthe Here pleasure is gained through failure tomove properlythroughthisstagewhichprevented thesuccessful the OedipusandElectracomplex. A problematicphallicstagewillcause the stagewherewe acquireafullydeveloped conscience. gaining controlofone’s body, anditstartswithcontrollingthebladder play withboysinordertolearnabouttheroleofboys..Thechildlearnshow problems withintimacyinlaterlife. different inmenandwomen.This stage iswhereFreudthinkswe develop development ofthe and understandingone’sgender. and messy,because —accordingtoFreudtheydonotwant toletgooftheir control oftheirbodiesisasourceprideandpleasureforchildren. Agents recognises thedifferencebetween menandwomenbutalsoshowsadesireto id is thestagewheresexualdesirerepressedandnonewdesires emerge. happiness. People becomesexuallyactive, fall inlove andgetmarried.Thisis bowelstrained). Itisaroundthistimethattheegodevelops.potty (being This engage inasexualrelationshipand,moregenerally, apursuitofpleasureand stage stage is not about pleasure in the body as the libido is “latent” or hidden —this libido is“latent” body asthe pleasure inthe stage isnotabout navigate thesocial world. A difficult latencystageleads to relational problems . Freudexplainsbehaviourslikesmoking,chewinggum,overeating, with The nextstage, The next phase of development, from about threetosix years, is stage, fromabout one andahalftothreeyears,The next isthe The libidothenreappearsinthefinalstagewhichlaststoourdeathand inwhichachilddiscovers one’s genitals, andimportantlythattheyare the latencystage id mature genital stage mature . controlling going to the toilet , isfromsixyearsThis totheonsetofpuberty. . This is where the individual notonly . Thisiswherethe . This stage is about the phallic anal stage . SUMMARY COMMON STUDENTMISTAKES • • • • • • “conscience”. Modern Christian orthodoxypopularised it and “on high”,theyderivewe from theupbringing have had.Soifwe Writing consciouswhenmeaningconscience. Thinking thatbecausethe Thinking thatfor Aquinas conscienceisway ofknowingwhat isright Confusing conscienceasguidancewith asthesourceof Confuse synderesis knowledge. and wrong. Believe Freudthinkstheconscienceisalways bad. modern invention. The notionof“conscience” has appearedforthousandsofyears we canbeeitherculpable —throughvincibleignoranceornot what we know.In Aquinas’s view, our conscience is fallible and Freud istheformsuper-egotakeswhenittryingtokeep fixated andrepressive, formaneurosisandultimately become features ofthemindisthroughwhatFreudcallsPsychosexual thought thatconscience is theway we understandhowtoapply treated throughpsychosexualcounselling. through thePsychosexual Stages inthenormal way, and can be as havingthreeparts,the Development; ifwe do not develop correctlythenwe become conscience canbeeitheragood culpable —through invincibleignorance. characterised itinrelationtoGod’svoice,andguidance. Aquinas of conscience in differentcultures,even thoughithas not always beencalled might guideuswrongly.Whenourconscience “gets itwrong” mentally ill.Freud thought thatthiscould be avoided by working he is certain thatithas not gotanythingto do with God. For Freud have hadarepressivevoice super-ego —the the then upbringing ego is about following rules but those rulesdonotcomefrom following rulesbut ego isabout ego inline.Itisinternalizedas the voice of authority.Thesuper- Freud is less convinced that conscience isaforceforgood,and Freud islessconvincedthat — will berepressive. Howwe develop thesethree

and conscience. id term , egoandsuper-ego.Theconsciencefor conscience isnew, itselfisa or bad.Weof ourmind canthink 165 Conscience 166 APPLIED ETHICS ISSUES TOCONSIDER KEY TERMINOLOGY 12. 11. 10. 1. 4. 7. 9. 2. 6. 3. 8. 5. What doyouthinkaboutFreud’sPsychosexualDevelopment Theory? Why doesFreudthinkwe needtobecautiousaboutlisteningour What arethepossibledifferentrolesforconscience? What isthedifferencebetween vincibleandinvincible?Isnotmostof What isthedifferencebetween synderesisandconscience? years? How doesFreud’saccountofconsciencerelatetohisPsychosexual Freud’s PsychosexualDevelopment Theory. try harder? the supposedlyinvincibleknowledge, reallyvincible?We justneedto Could itever makesensetotalkaboutanimals/robotshavinga Could theconsciencebeamorallybadthing? Do youthinkthateveryone ultimatelyknows —iftheyreason Do youthinkhave aconscience?Whatdoesittellyou? Do youthinkconsciencewillstillshapeourlives inonethousand Draw upatableofthekeystagesandaccompanyingcharacteristics Development Theory? conscience? correctly —what isrightandwrong? conscience? Ifnot,whynot? Id Pleasure principle Ego Synderesis Super-ego Vincible ignorance Theory (oral, anal, phallic, Theory (oral,anal,phallic, Psychosexual Development Invincible ignorance latency and mature genital latency andmaturegenital phases) ―, Aquinas, Thomas, References King, MartinLuther,‘A ProperSenseofPriorities’,6February1968, Freud S.and A., Giubilini, Alberto, ‘Conscience’, Giubilini, Alberto, Benhabib, Seyla, ‘Who’sonTrial,Eichmannor Arendt?’, Strohm, Paul, York: RandomHouse,2001). Washington, D.C.,freelyavailable at Winter 2016ed.,editedbyEdward N.Zalta,freelyavailable at Romans (CommentaryontheLetterofSaintPaul totheRomans) (21 September2014),freelyavailable at University Press,2011),vol. 273, features/speeches_speech_king04.html plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/conscience/ actrade/9780199569694.001.0001 com/2014/09/21/whos-on-trial-eichmann-or-anrendt newadvent.org/summa/ Conscience: A Very ShortIntroduction Summa Theologica Complete PsychologicalWorksofSigmundFreud

The StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy https://doi.org/10.1093/ , freely http://www.aavw.org/special_ http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.

available at (Oxford:Oxford http://www. The NewYork Times . https:// (New ,

167 Conscience

CHAPTER 10

Sexual Ethics

Only when you [have sex] […] are you most cleanly alive and most cleanly yourself. […] Sex isn’t just friction and shallow fun. Sex is also the revenge on death. Don’t forget death. Don’t ever forget it. Yes, sex too is limited in its power. […] But tell me, what power is greater?1

There is no morality intrinsic to sex, although general moral rules apply to the treatment of others in sex acts as they apply to all human relationships.2

1. Philosophy of Sex Introduction

While we write this chapter, a court in the United Arab Emirates have detained a foreign couple in their twenties for having sex outside marriage and if found guilty they will both face a lengthy jail sentence.3 Shortly after the 2017 General Synod vote in the UK on whether same sex couples could be “blessed” in church, the eminent theologian and academic Professor John Milbank tweeted: “There is no need to demand “” in gay relationships. That wrongly equates same sex physical affection with full (heterosexual) sex”.4 Now there might have been a subtle and sophisticated theological point here. Or there might not. Whatever the right response to Milbank is, what it makes clear, and what probably does not need pointing out, is that “sex” is, has been, and always will be an issue of great importance to people. Moreover, it makes clear that the very notion of “sex” is a philosophically interesting one. What, after all, is “sex”? What does it mean to talk about heterosexual sex as “full” sex in such a context? Was Monica Lewinsky correct to say that she did not have sex with Bill Clinton, the then president of the US, because it was “only” oral sex? What is the role of sexual pleasure in defining sex? What is consent? Is pornography wrong? What is sexual perversion? Of course, we can only deal here with a very small fraction of some of these issues (for an excellent survey

1 P. Roth, The Dying Animal, p. 69. 2 Alan H. Goldman, ‘Plain Sex’, p. 49. 3 ‘Couple “Detained in UAE for Sex Outside Marriage”’, BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-africa-39208946 4 https://twitter.com/johnmilbank3/status/831996919400513536 170 APPLIED ETHICS “did you have sex with her?” and receiving theanswer: “well itdepends…” It This question is not thesame as what is “sexual orientation”, or, what is one’s when faced with the question “what is it to haveis it question “what the when facedwith sex?” Typical(frustrated) we suggest,alotoftheethicaldiscussions sex alreadypresupposewhat about whether theyhave actuallyhadsex.We canimaginesomeone being asked: 2. WhatIsItto“Have Sex”? Imagine awomenasked her partnerifhewas a virginandgotthefollowing first thought. These points are worth keeping in mindwhenwefirst thought.Thesepoints areworthkeeping about the talk the differentways tounderstandsexandthiswillenable us toexploremore get even moreconfusing…. penetrative intercourse”. The women might beperplexed(tosay the least). people areinvolvedstimulation toorgasm,isthissex?What inmanual genital people engageincoitus but thereisno orgasm: is this“havingsex”? What philosophers! Istheanswer notobvious?Sexispenis-in-vagina penetrative definition homosexualsexisconceptuallyimpossible.Thismightseemfalse do withsex. and simplyoffensive. Sex as coitus also gives risetosome odd situations. about peopleengagedinoral sex, can this count as “having sex”? What about about ifonepersonhasanorgasmwheretheotherdoesnot?Orimaginethat response: “yes Iam…I’veinvolved onlybeen inhomosexualpenis-in-anus havecorrect tosaythey ? Ifsomeoneisrapedit “hadsex”? And things questions. Howessentialisorgasminthedefinitionofsex?Imaginethattwo is of articles see Sobel 2008) and our focus will be on someofthe of articlesseeSobel2008)andourfocuswillbe involved in sexual activitysometimes themselves report uncertaintyabout intercourse ( usefully thevarious moralissuesassociatedwithsex. might say about sex. Hopefully you can see why this is the right order. For, sex. Hopefully youcanseewhythisistheright might sayabout move ontodiscussing some of thethingsthatdifferentmoralphilosophers ethical questionsthatare involved in“havingsex”. Inparticular,thereader sex —as opposedtoone’sgender.Theremightbesome thatwouldbebemused sex is,butthatpresuppositioniscontroversial. Thus we needtobeclearabout seems then that “having sex” is a more complex notion that wesex” isamorecomplexnotionthat that “having seems then have might She might sensibly think he isdeludedincallinghimselfa“virgin”. think sensibly She might Anal sex sex, andconsequentlyourinitialdefinitionof“sex” as We startthischapterbydiscussing the very definitionof“sex”;we then Notice thatthingsarealso complicated by thefactthatpeoplewhoare Givenby thedefinitionofsexascoitus,thenthisobviouslymeansthat coitus ) —end of story. Well maybe…butconsider some other coitus isincomplete. ethical issues to (NLT) itissimplyan If yourecallwhenwe discussed Law Theory(NLT)Natural in faculties have onetrueend — 3. NaturalLawandSex the NLTthe are objective there how weregarding moraltruths and ought ought, that end. It is important tounderstand that theoutcome is independentof there arelotsofthings that we agree the Bonobomonkeysengagein“rape”,“masturbation” and“homosexual” tendency towards procreationatall;contraceptionfrustratesprocreative the worldoutsidesafeconfines of marriage.Homosexual acts have no not usingitatall pleasurable desires, wants, reasons, hopes, fears etc. and that for the NaturalLaw Theorist and importantlywhatifthatdefinitionwere changed. acts doesnotmeanthattheyaredoingsomething morallywrong. all wrong.Premaritalsexis wrong because childrenwould be broughtinto acceptable sexualactivity. answering thisquestion,we shouldthenbeabletoworkoutwhat ismorally cuts well, agoodguitarisonethatplayswell, etc.Therefore,inordertowork clarifications aspeopleoftenmisunderstandNLT. out what“good”sexiswe needtoaskwhatsexis oneself, frustrating procreativeoneself, frustrating ends.However, itisvitaltomakeanumberof if, andonlyitisconsistentwithprocreationbadinsofaras morally acceptable but ratheronly contraception, homosexualacts,pornographyandadulteryare bestiality, ends; masturbation and pornography focus the sexual acts something whichisnotaffectedbyculture,religion,etc.This means that for fulfils itsfunction. thing something isgoodifthat A goodknifeisonethat should askthemselvesused ifaparticularaccountof“havingsex”isbeing not, tobehave sexually. not byleavingitintheknifedrawer. So,notusing sexualfaculties( We cansaythenthat,forthetraditionalNLT, premaritalsex,masturbation, The NLT is However, onthefaceofitNLT doesseemtohave alotofcounter examples; Furthermore there is adifferencebetweenthere Furthermore and wrongly usingsomething St. Aquinas in order not andotherNaturalLawtheoristswouldsaythatoursexual human . We useaknifewronglyifwe trytouseitasaviolinbowbut fortheNLT. claimingthat tofulfilthisend.Ifiscorrectthensexualactivitygood acts objective fact . So, according to theNLT, thefactthat,for instance, anything procreation whetherasexualactiswrongorright, are not thatfrustratesnaturalendsiswrong . True,sexispleasurablebutit wrongbut for . Whatisitsfunction?In do seemtofrustrate inwards Chapter 4 Chapter celibacy frustrates towards ) is , 171 Sexual Ethics 172 APPLIED ETHICS “function” ofoursexualfaculties. whether something is right or wrong is not thesame as asking whether function ofsexualfaculties toreproduce,thatthisishowthings for procreation). frustrated. So,forexample,sexbetween amanandwomen whenthewoman faculty to that itwillbefrustratedtheniswrong;ifyou the mouth,orifsomeone used to“ the facultybeing rather thanusing myperfectlygoodmouth,boththeseseemto a tube through the funoutofsexbutthisisnotcase. Just asonecaneatadish in many though theyareunnatural. the use of sex toys, or various medications such as Viagra is not wrong even medication wouldbewrongandtheNLTtaking isnotcommittedtothis.So perfectly good legs, then this might be different. good legs,thenthis mightbe perfectly different ways whilstalwaysone can fulfillingthenaturalfunctionofeating, approach to the ethics ofsex.However,approach tothe main questiontoaskturnson the same asusingthat the is fornot it what for somethingotherthan a faculty are not could give an of contraceptionbecausehavingsexwhilstusing contraceptionistousethe of the on theotherhandwe wiredsomeone’s jaw shutsotheycouldnoteatthrough is pregnantnotwrongfortheNLT. why be involved indifferentformsofsexualact,fantasy,etc.aslongitispart thenaturalends of myhandsandmouth,butsurelysuchthings be frustrating sexual facultieswhilst something is “man-made or not”. If this was the case, wearing glasses and necessarily ruledoutaslongitis,overall, partofasexactthatisintended natural ends.Forexample,imagineIregularlywalk onmy hands,orIamfed 5 As noted,theNLT does,though,ruleouthomosexualsexandallforms if somethingis“unnatural”itwrong.Deciding Also, theclaimisnotthat We might thinkthatlinkingsex to procreation in this way would take all There aremanythingswhichwe couldaskregardingthisoverall NLT The plausibilityofthistheoryneednotturnon how religiousyouare.We Furthermore, the claim is not that if youuseafaculty claim isnotthat Furthermore, the But, anNLT would agree becausethese sorts of examplesare These examples are cited by Edward Feser here: gqAcU&t=5773s wejust becausesomething think that might long termfunction morally frustrate atheistic evolutionary biological wrong?

itsend. intending tofrustrate of the sexual organs(so,forexample,oralsexisnot ofthe always frustrate walked ontheirhandseven thoughtheyhad ” thenaturalendofhandsormouth.If theirend. account that also talks aboutthe https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rynlfg 5 Butasitstandssimplyusing is the case; namely,itisthe the intend with theknowledge to useitbe not ought cases of to be.

This “is/‘ought” gap plagues many moral theories but seems particularly gap plagues manymoraltheoriesbut This “is/‘ought” (1947 4. KantandSex Kant thinksthatsex is morally permissible within thecontextof a that oursexualdesires and impulses,actinguponthose are Categorical Imperativethe (see these contexts — pressing here.Putsimply,itdoesnotseemproblematicforsomeone using another human as the contraception tosay:“true,Iamintendingfrustratethenaturalfunctionof undignified. The sexual part of our nature is unbefitting to howhumans is unbefitting of ournature undignified. Thesexual part my sexualfacultiesbut a means,butalways atthesametimeasan end morally wrong his writing on the subject, like just about all of his writing, is incrediblydense, all ofhiswriting, his writingonthesubject,likejustabout heterosexual, lifelong,and monogamous marriage. Any sexual act outside be countedassexual but broadlyspeaking,his views on sex are based on his Second Formulation of humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of anyother,neveror intheperson in yourownperson humanity, whether simply as should behave andthreatens ourpropermorallife. Anal sex Adultery Viagra Pornography Premarital sex Homosexual sex Contraception Celibacy Masturbation Sexual Act/Activity Oral sex Sadomasochism Sex toys Kant, like For Kant,sexualdesire is theonlyimpulseinusthattakesbody of – ) calls a sexual St. Augustine . His reasons for thinking this arevery. Hisreasonsforthinking least because complex, not Summary ofNaturalLawTheory’sviewonsex , masturbation,adultery,premaritalsex pessimist object optimists why (354–430)and sometimes Acceptable of indulgence. Kant says regarding does thatmeanI Morally (Plato and many modern philosophers would ). Thebroadfeelingamongstthepessimists is Chapter 2 Chapter X X ): act insuchaway thatyoualways treat . Unacceptable ought Morally X X X X X X X X notdoit?” Freud , is what It Depends… sexual Alan Soble X X X appetite: — is

173 Sexual Ethics 174 APPLIED ETHICS wrong. Well, forKant,theonlyreason itisnotwrongtheroleofmarriage. wrong, butifthatisthecase,thenmeansforKantcontinued work? ThisishowSoblestartstoapproachthisquestion: Kant’s sexualpessimism: If yourecallfrom treating people desires. That is,insexwe aretreatingothersas as ameanstoanend as whole persons and hence we are acting immorally.In the languageof is key tobeingmoral, but for him, this is precisely what is missing in sexual ethics his second formulation of the CategoricalImperative: in havingsex we are whole person and thus there is reciprocity there and thus whole person end. Butwhy? existence ofthehumanraceisevidenceimmoralbehaviour!Thatsurely sexual desire is more than simply treating another merelyasameans toan simply treating sexual desireismorethan person So we canavoidthe chargeofobjectifyingandusingasexualpartnermerely So ifthisishisgeneralpessimisticviewofsexhowdoesthatrelatetoaon ie in Cited 7 . Kant, I. 6 8  Because sexuality is not an inclination which one human being has for another assuch, but is an But becausetheacquisition In the context of First we mustunderstandwhatKantmeansbymarriage: Far fromtherebeinganyconcernforthehappinessofloved one,thelover, inordertosatisfy it gives rise to the preferenceof one sexto the other,andtodishonouringof that sex through inclination for thesexof another, itisa principle of the the satisfactionofdesire of misery reciprocal rights regains his or her personhood (and hence does not lose it, after all). When I “surrender” myself to personhood (andhencedoesnotloseit,afterall).WhenI“surrender” his orher regains you, and you thereby acquire me, but you also yourself to me, “surrender” and I thereby acquire [Marriage] with acompleterightofdisposalover it his [sexual] desireand still his [sexual] appetite, may even plungetheloved oneinto the depths been suckeddry Ibid. ? As itstandslookslike and not simply the genitals, sexual desireandpleasure.Howdoesthis genitals, simply the andnot , p.

[…] 202. Lectures onEthics ibid is an agreementbetween twopersonsby which [and after having sex] the person is castasideasonecastsaway [andafterhavingsex]theperson alemonwhichhas ., p.260. . 6

merely , each of them undertaking to surrender thewholeoftheirpersontoother , eachof them undertakingtosurrender Chapter 2 Chapter marriage . because insexwithinmarriageyouaretreatingeach other asa 7

, as a means to an end. Consider this full expression of

cited in A. Soble, [ofanotherthroughsex] , Kant believes, Kant others as treating that , and only in marriage, Kant thinksthatsex and any . 8

sexualdesireoractisgoingtobemorally The PhilosophyofSex:Contemporary Readings . Sex within marriage isaboutthe . Sexwithin degradation ofhumannature in marriageisreciprocal, each person objects they granteach other equal and nottreatingthem whole persons , p.200. , inthat whole

As youwillrecallfrom This reciprocity thoughis not presentinnon-maritalsexualrelationships.This with perfunctorysex,wherealmost any otheractivitywould bring aboutmore weany particularsexactis cannotsaythat wrong. Within marriage itisacceptable. Utilitarianism is committed to the claim that weUtilitarianism iscommittedtotheclaimthat have adutytohave asmuch the actofhavingsexisalwaysUtilitarianism iscommittedtotheclaimthat from their act,itdoes not takemuch to see that the that needtobemade. the basis of it being too caughtuponthis. Categorical Imperative Kantthinksthatsexoutside heterosexual marriageis good. Utilitarianism 5. SexandUtilitarianism pleasure detrimental effectsonrelationshipsandone’smental andphysicalhealth. are morallywrong.Foreven thoughtherapistorpaedophilemightgetpleasure on sex.Thethingtorememberthoughisthatviathesecond formulation ofthe ones etc.ismuchgreaterbecausetheacthastakenplace. is very hard to understand on many levels and we urgethereader not toget acceptable matter is decided by whether or not performing that act brings about more whether ornotperformingthatactbringsabout matter isdecidedby morally mental andphysicalsufferingofthevictim, the distress of relatives and loved happiness. (NoticethenthecontrastwithKantian andtheNLT accounts). happiness. Orwe might supposethathavingsexallthetimehave homosexual sex, ormasturbation,oral sexcanbemorally sex as possible. For thereare things we can do that bringaboutmore overall simple. ThegreatestKantscholarsarestillnotsurehowtounderstandhisideas 9  We wanted toshow you thatKantiscomplex and thattheanswers arenot Third, for Utilitarianism,heterosexualsexwithinamarriagemightbe Fourth, adultery or having multiple sexual partners can be morally multiple sexualpartnerscanbe or having adultery Fourth, First, althoughsex will typicallylead to pleasurethatdoes not mean that ourselves. you, which “you” includes the “me” thatyouhaveyou, which“you”includesthe acquired, we reacquire but then each surrender Second, just becausesexistypicallypleasurableitdoes not mean Ibid ., p.278. wrong overall . We canimagineacasewhere,forexample, theoverall happinessis 9

if there has been coercion or threats, or just a generalunhappiness than notdoingso.This leaves afewquestionsandqualifications a particular act does Chapter 1 Chapter leave space for us to show that rapeandpaedophilia . This means that if Utilitarianism is correct Utilitarianismdoesnotruleoutanacton always wrong. Premaritalsex,or overall unhappiness, the acceptable . The 175 Sexual Ethics 176 APPLIED ETHICS Aristotle Although virtuetheorists do write aboutmany applied ethical issues, they We cannotaskavirtue theorist:“howshouldwe virtuously. Ifwe keepdoingthisthenwe willdevelopor disposition ahabit (1919–2001), we oughttodowhenconsidering various sexactsbecauseofhisdistinction Halwani 6. SexandtheVirtue Theory for thissortofaction,and weis required “seeing” what at better willjustget than others?We’ll leaveimplications some ofthe through thereadertothink took thepleasures that arose from it tobefleetingand of lower value. This to be virtuous? Well, thegeneralidea is that tobevirtuous is to develop certain that situation”?Whenfacedwiththissortofquestion, thevirtuetheoristwill theory. do notwriteaboutsex.Thosethat(e.g. typically generally notinterestedin,ordoes not have timefor,along-termrelationship at therighttime,withreasons,to extent. answer thatyoushould do whatever avirtuous consequently, itisunhelpfultotryandworkout“the”virtuetheoryviewon dispositions orhabits of this. others and thus outweigh other,lower, pleasures. Bentham however would own marriage fun and interesting. Orwe might thinkthatsomeone who is issues that arise when you think about sexual ethics through the lensofvirtue sexual ethicsthrough about arise whenyouthink issues that some pleasuresarequalitativelythat is becauseMillthought distinct from is happierwithmutuallyconsentingmultiplesexualpartners(orprostitutes). increased if amarried couple agreetohave sexwithotherpeopletokeeptheir excess anddeficiency between between sexual conduct.Sowe willgivethrough some thereaderaframeworktothink support amoreconservative sexualethic.However,are afew(e.g. there not makethisdistinction(see To get asense of this,recallthe “DoctrineoftheGoldenMean”from If yourecall,virtuetheory Fifth, Millgives adifferentanswer toBenthamquestionsregardingwhat So if we keepthisdistinctioninmind we mightbeabletodistinguish (see (1967–))whodonotdefendtraditionalaccountsofsexualethicsand types higher andlowerpleasures ee Geach Peter ofsexacts.Perhaps some sex actsarelower andsome higher Chapter 3 sothatwe respond tothingsintheworldrightway, regardingcertainfeelings we areactingrationally, thatis, section4).Theideahereisthatbyacting (1916–2013)and is not Chapter 1 . In general Mill didnotvalue. Ingeneral sexandhe a theorydevised to helpusmakedecisions. section9). oe Scruton Roger agent calculate would do. But whatisit lzbt Anscombe Elizabeth whattodointhisor (1944–))often between Raja

The person who has the virtueof temperance will not eitherbea drunk or a violates theotherperson’s within theGoldenMean. with ourothergoalsandvirtues.Oneexampleishealth.Someonewho would bethemeanbetween stinginessandwastefulness. temperance take “fear”. glutton or be someone who is teetotal or who starves himself. In relation to agent would do that act, and that would depend on whether the activity fitted activity the would dependonwhether act, andthat would dothat agent a certainsexualactivityisrightorwrongwilldepend onwhetheravirtuous about sex. a friendship would be wrecked or made impossible with constant unwanted courageous. We canrepeatthisforothervirtues,e.g.thevirtueof“generosity” courage andthuswillneedlesshelpfromothersinordertoseewhatis reasons. relevant. Intermsofan Aristotelian approachthevirtuethatisrelevant is rash or of of usandrespondingintherightway inanyparticularsituations.Forinstance, intemperance mightmaketheseendshardtoachieve —e.g. justconsider how unhealthy —perhaps physicallyand emotionally. Orconsider other thingswe intemperate withregardtosex(e.g.promiscuous) would unchecked sexualdesires nor willhedenynaturalsexualdesires completely might value suchasfriendshiporeducation:inthesetoowe canimaginehow how to have sexand with whom. Second, break themarriagevows but ratherhewillhave sexattherighttime,withpeoplefor similar reasons sexual advances. There aresomeotherthingsthatthevirtuetheoristmightsay sex, theagentwhohasvirtueoftemperancewillnotsimplybedriven by sex. “moderation”. of thisvirtuewouldbe A roughmoderninterpretation courage When discussing sexual ethics a number of different virtues mightbe When discussingsexualethicsanumberofdifferent To have an excess of fear is to be appetites First, thevirtuetheoristwouldsaythat One way of seeing if our action is So, likeUtilitarianism,theanswer towhetheravirtuetheoristwouldthink or headstrong. To act rationally withregardto fear is to have the virtue . Themorewewebetter actcourageouslythenthe at having willbe this includes the desire for food, drink, and importantly for us, —this includesthedesireforfood,drink,andimportantly (the vicebeing . Adultery might because oftheirsexualdesire intemperance sexual be wrong because an intemperate person would wrong becauseanintemperate be autonomy whichisthechoiceofwhenand cowardly ) . This virtue istodowithour intemperate paedophilia is also always wrongfor whereas the lack of fear is to be rape isalways wrong . is if our actions conflict potentially becauseit become desires

177 Sexual Ethics 178 APPLIED ETHICS SUMMARY COMMON STUDENTMISTAKES • • • • • Thinking thattheUtilitarianmustthinkwe should bepromiscuous. wrong. Not realizingthathowonedefines“sex”willchange howoneanswers Not realizingthatitisn’tclearwhat“sex”means. Believing thatfor Aquinas sexhastobeperfunctory andboring. Believing that Aquinas thinksthatifsexdoesn’tleadtopregnancyitis moral questions. very differentviews.TheNaturalLawTheorist uses theideaof Kantian also uses the idea of autonomyand respect for a person Philosophers since atleastPlato have discussed sex asitraises function andgoaltogrounda“conservative” viewofsex.The theory guideoursexualpractice? this chapter,whatdo you thinksexis? And how shouldmoral to grounda conservative view of sex, with asplash of pessimism paedophilia ismorallywrong.However, whenwe move past and, aswiththeirviewsontheotherissues we have lookedat of sexualdesirethrowninforgood nature unbefitting the about a moralissue should ask themselves whethertheythinkrapeor a numberofinterestingphilosophicalquestions.Sexisabout relationships and interactions between peopleand consequently in thisbook,moreopentoseewhatarisesdifferentsituations. a moralissue. it seemstobe believesAnyone that thatsexisnot measure. Utilitarianism andVirtue Theoryareless pessimistic such clear-cutcases,theissuesbecomemoresubtleandcomplex. We considered a numberof philosophical theories which give The twoquestionswe leave youwith are these.Havingread ISSUES TOCONSIDER KEY TERMINOLOGY 12. 11. 10. 1. 4. 7. 9. 2. 6. 3. 8. 5. After all,theyseemtofrustratethenaturalfacultiesofearsand What virtuesandvicesmightbeassociatedwithsex? What mightRuleUtilitarianism( Would youcountMillasasexualoptimistorpessimist? Why doesKantthinkhavingmultiplewives orhusbandsismorally Would theNLT thinkthatusingearplugsorridingabikewere wrong? you respond? wrong? Use theDoctrineofGoldenMeantothinkthroughmoralitya How mightMill’sdistinctionbetween higherandlower pleasures be In somecountriessamesexmarriageispermissible.Doyouthinkthat Imagine youwere visitedbyanalien.Thealiensays“I’ve heardlot For Utilitarianismcouldbestialitybemorallyacceptable? Could youbeanatheistandaNLT? legs. acceptable? about ‘havingsex’.Whatdoyouhumansmeanbythis?”Howwould Do youthinkthatsexisamoralissue?Ifso,whatsortsofquestions relevant inthiscontext? issues, e.g.whetheradulteryismorallyrightorwrong? in thesecountriesKantwouldsaythathomosexualsexismorally should moralphilosophersconsiderinthisarea? sexual activity. Natural LawTheory Doctrine oftheGoldenMean Sex Chapter 1 Autonomy Means andEnd ) sayaboutsomeofthese 179 Sexual Ethics 180 APPLIED ETHICS ―, ―, ‘Couple “DetainedinUAEforSexOutsideMarriage”’, Aristotle, References Halwani, R., Roth, Philip, Milbank, John[@johnmilbank3], Mill, J.S.,‘Utilitarianism’,in Goldman, A. H.,‘Plain Sex’, Bentham, Jeremy,‘An IntroductiontothePrinciplesofMoralsand Soble, Alan, & Littlefield,2002). The PhilosophyofSexandLove: An Introduction An IntroductiontothePrinciplesofMoralsandLegislation (London: Penguin Books,2004). with Full(Heterosexual)Sex Penguin Books,2004). Routledge, 2010), Legislation’, in Gay Relationships.ThatWronglyEquatesSameSexPhysical Affection available at available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML18.html status/831996919400513536 The NicomacheanEthics The PhilosophyofSex:ContemporaryReadings The PhilosophyofLove, SexandMarriage: An Introduction The Dying Animal The http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-39208946 http://sacred-texts.com/cla/ari/nico/index.htm Utilitarianism andOtherEssays https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203856369 Philosophy &Public Affairs Utilitarianism andOtherEssays (London:RandomHouse,2010). ’ , (Oxford:ClarendonPress,1908),freely ‘ https://twitter.com/johnmilbank3/ There isnoNeedtoDemand , ed.by Alan Ryan (London: (Paragon House,1998). , 6.3(1977):267–87. BBC News (Plymouth: Rowman , freelyavailable at , ed.by Alan Ryan

“ Celibacy , freely (Oxford: ” in

CHAPTER 11

Stealing

You shall not steal.1

1. Stealing: Introduction

The Bible reference above is absolutist in nature. It does not say that you should not steal so long as you have enough resources available to you, or that you should not steal if your neighbour has been good to you. Rather, it simply says that you should not steal full stop. Partly as a result of this particular commandment and the impact of Christianity upon social custom in many parts of the world, the message that stealing is a moral wrong is pervasive and fairly uncontroversial, at least prima facie. For example, if you hear that someone has been sent to prison for stealing, it would likely take something atypical for you to question whether or not the person deserved punishment for his or her crime. In this chapter, we apply the key normative theories of Kantian Ethics, Utilitarianism and Virtue Ethics to the issue of stealing.

2. Defining Stealing

Beginning a chapter on the ethics of stealing, it is important to make clear exactly what “stealing” amounts to. At first, this may seem like a fairly simple task; stealing is just the taking of another person’s property without their consent. Indeed, if reality television programmes following British Traffic Police are anything to go by, this definition is of use not merely for philosophy classes, but for the real world also; theft of vehicles is often categorised as an example of TWOC — “taking without owners’ consent”. Yet, it is not always clear that stealing comfortably fits this definition. For example, we might wonder if it is possible to steal an item even though the owner has given you consent to take it. The original definition would rule this out as a conceptual impossibility, but consider someone who, whilst inebriated (perhaps even drugged against their will), gives you permission

1 Exodus 20:15, https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Exodus+20 184 APPLIED ETHICS “stolen” money just by refusing tohandover“stolen” moneyjustby If so,our theirfinancialproperty. In them inhandafter If youplayagameforrealmoney,andbeat follows. 3. KantianEthicsonStealing the idea of property. For example, if a person is being paid by thehour, but they freelyenteredintothegame? to takeanitemofvalue fromtheirhouse.Even thoughyouhave theirexplicit to thefirstformulation, ifwegeneral maxim behindan action (the consider the taking theconceptfarbeyondphysical. portion of tax to the government.to the portion oftax Again, wewonder ifthispersonhas might permission, actingonthisverbal instructionandstealingtheirtelevisionstill defensible as a mechanism for capturing such instances of stealing. However, a broadandliberalinterpretationofboth“property” and“consent”. are better atcards than someone else, although you hide this fact from them. cast doubt on the definition by focussing not on the issue of consent, but on issue ofconsent,but focussing notonthe definition by on the cast doubt can utilisetwoformulations oftheKantianCategoricalImperative. According considering the application of Kantian thinkingto the issue of stealing in this creator rough understandingofstealingprovidedatthe startofthissection,butwith reading oftheoriginaldefinition stealing would again need to berather or may not be labelled as stealing. We will proceed in this chapterwiththe if itisdefensible,onlybecauseofabroadreadingtheideaproperty, in thefieldofcomedy,forexample. Again, theoriginaldefinitionmightbe might seemtobeanactoftheft. have theystolenmoneyortimefromtheiremployer? Or,asasecond possible hand, mightitbesuggestedthatyouhave stolentheirmoneyeven though broad. example, ifImakeupajokethatisthenretoldbysomeone else, have they proper consentwasor denythat is anactofstealing, either ever given —this stolen “property” without my consent? This is a genuinely important issue without myconsent?Thisisagenuinely stolen “property” spends an undueamountoftimeonsocial media or checkingsports scores, seems particularly compellinginthefirstexample.However, we can also section. Backgroundknowledgeis thereforeassumed inwhat ofthistheory As a second counterexample totheoriginaldefinition,imaginethatyou All of this has hopefully opened your minds to thevariety of acts that may There areresponsestothesetwoexamples,ofcourse.We mightdenythat To determinewhetheran actismorallypermissible(acceptable)ornot, we Finally, consider the example of someone who fails to pay their legally due consider theexampleofsomeonewhofailstopaytheirlegally Finally, Chapter 2 Chapter , weits Ethics, namedafter outlinedthestructure ofKantian . Itwould be bestto engagewith Chapter 2 before “take the property of othersonlywhenitisnecessary forsurvival”the property “take (putting your ownendofsecuringpropertythatyoudesire. (without moralcondemnation) takethepenoutofyourhandon the basis wider responseofKantianEthicstostealing. which youmighthave beenholdingthepenwithoutever owningthepen. want,For example,ifIcould thennoonecantrulybesaidtoownanything. would breakdown.Thus, such a maxim could not beuniversalised without when their parent’s back is turned. The thief, in this case, seems to act on the whether ornottheactioninvolves treating anotherperson merely as a means we should consider whether or not thatmaxim could be willed to become form that we can). Can thismaxim be willed to be auniversal law? Well, even informativethis casewillbe view regarding family. TheKantian astothe formulation. Ifyoustealfromthechild, then youarequiteclearlynot treating formulation ofKant’sCategoricalImperative, italsofailsagainstthesecond the breakdown of the concept of “property” in thiscaseisclearifweconcept of“property” breakdown ofthe the think of otherswheneverthe property whole conceptofproperty pleased, then they to anend,ratherthanendinthemselves. this exampleintothemost extremeandthereforeplausiblymorallydefensible wethat cases. Taketo other canapply is plausibly that anexampleofstealing the Kantianresponse to this case is what reallymatters,for it is a structure did notspeak that theory no surprise —any toys fromchildrenshouldbe their owndignity;on the contraryyouare using them merely as a means to the child(orpersoncaringforchild)asafreeandrationalagentwith let usfirsttakeanexampleofstealingwherethequestionwhetheritseems possible thatitmightbemorallyacceptablecanapparentlyanswered principle thatsupports the actioninmind of the person acting), then a universal law. According to thesecond formulation, we should consider as it stands, there are reasons for thinking that suchamaxim couldnotbe as itstands, therearereasonsforthinking against such actions would likely bein trouble. However, the structureof about theideaof“ownership”.If anyone can take anyobjectwhenever they contradiction (much like the example of breaking promises). Thereasonfor example ofbreaking the contradiction (muchlike could notwillthismaximtobecomeauniversal law,becauseifeveryone took of theuniversalised maxim asdescribedabove, thenthereisaclearsensein uncontroversially witha“no”.Consider a person who steals a toyfrom a child internationally influential supermarket chaininordertofeedyourhungry influential internationally moral defensible,perhapsinvolvingstealingfrom afinanciallypowerful and the propertyofotherswhenevermaxim “take we youplease”.Itseemsthat To consider whatguidanceKantianEthics would provideregardingstealing, That KantianEthicsspeaksagainstthemoral permissibilityofstealing In this new example, the maxim behind the action might be thought to be be thought In thisnewexample,the maximbehindtheactionmight Indeed, not onlydoes the act of theft as described fail againstthefirst 185 Stealing 186 APPLIED ETHICS Thus, on this view, I apparently could universaliseThus, onthisview,Iapparently bread maxim “take the you oryourimmediatefamilymembers are atthepointofstarvation” (asper would behappy. with water, medical treatment and, in themodern age, some financial resource. was explainedinmoredetail —astowhetherornotamaximofthistype Indeed, even someone who burglesahousetostealtelevisionmightacton from afinanciallypowerful supermarketonlywhenyouorimmediate family the propertyof others only when it is necessary for survival”, it mightbe previous maxim,andthe afflicted the issue that to the thus bringsusback to it,thiswillstillcovera very only smallnumberofinstancespossible tries tocoverthe maxim“stealfoodwhen hungry”,but thismaximupwith the MacIntyreapproach),thiswould not helpsomeone who actually acts on to theMacIntyre-style worry. people. This, therefore, forms the basis of a response that the Kantiancan offer down ifonlyIcouldstealthingsdesired.However, thereisaquestion —as a potentiallyviolentindividual.Thebreadthofsuchuniversalised maxim could universalise themaxim“Peoplecan stealfroma withmyfingerprint comes to applyingthetestofuniversalisation thesystemcanbemanipulated concept ofpropertymaynotsurvive universalisation ofsuchamaxim. case ofthefirstmaximthisparagraph,toa limited numberofdesperate clearly notbeuniversal in thesense that itwould apply onlytome or, in the understood asauniversalcould be law.Thisisbecauseitsapplicationwould referred to in of the form “take bread fromafinanciallypowerfulof theform“take supermarketonlywhen in thisbecomingauniversal law;theconceptofpropertywouldnotbreak universalised. For one, food is always strictly necessaryfor our survival, along members are atthepointof starvation”. Indeed, less desirably, I seemingly more dramatic language. Thus, evenmore dramaticlanguage. iftheMacIntyrecriticismhassome bite by beingoverly specificwiththemaxim.Hesays: shop whenever theyfeelhungry”,since there would be nothingcontradictory suggested thatwe areventuring away from the approach with which Kant such amaximiftheyplanonsellingthattelevisioninordertopaydebt just because it might bethecase that we could attempt to universalise a maxim . MacIntyre, A. 2 All Ineedtodoischaracterisetheproposedaction in suchaway thatthemaxim will permit Indeed, themaximuniversalised must alsobethemaximactedupon,so, universalised. me todowhatIwant whileprohibitingothersfromdoingwhatwouldnullify theaction if Still, even inreferringtothemaxim in themore specific form of “take 2 Chapter 2 A ShortHistoryof Ethics lsar MacIntyre Alasdair whenthisformulation of the CategoricalImperative , p.126. (1929–)hassuggestedthatwhenit views onhowthiscentralclaimshouldbeinterpretedinpractice.Rule when itcomes tostealingisnot“canever bejustified” (thiswas the 4. Act andPreferenceUtilitarianismonStealing Utilitarianism respectively. Utilitarianism andtheideasof In thiscaseofstealingfromasupermarket —anactsometimes referred toas for anexampleofstealingtobemorallyrightis for thegoodconsequencesto five ofthischapter;fornowourattentionisfocused upon theideas of theory of Utilitarianism. Utilitarian theories — of Utilitarianism.Utilitarian theory the Categorical Imperative, would be useful for you to consider for yourselves. through specificinstancesofstealing,perhapswithrealcasestudies,and denying themtheir fundamentalhumandignityasarationalagent. thereby of actualmaximsmotivatingmoral assessmentmustbe theft; not behaviour, the example of aperson stealing bread from a multinationalsupermarketchain the moralityof actions, although thethree theories have slightlydifferent linked by their commitment to the view that it is consequence that determines is consequencethat it view that their commitmenttothe linked by 1 Chapter key question facing Kantian Ethics) but rather “doesUtilitarianismjustify Ethics) but question facingKantian key it is not immediately clear who might be being used a “victimlesscrime” —itisnotimmediatelyclearwhomightbebeing reinterpreted maximsdescribedasfavourablypossible. Bentham or notitinvolves theuseofanotherpersonmerelyasameanstoanend, owned andfinanciallypowerful supermarketisthequestionasto whether outweigh thebadconsequences. Indeed, this very much seems to bethe case in on site?Ifstealingfromasoletrader,thisissuewouldnotarise.However, it is farmorecomplexinthemoderncontextoflargesupermarkets.Working Isitthesecuritypersonnel it theshareholders? Is it theshelf-stackingstaff? in order to survive. Thus, the keyissue for Act and Preference Utilitarianism may seem to make it more open to the idea that examples ofstealingwill may seemtomakeitmoreopentheideathat merely as a means to an end. Is it themanagementof the supermarket? Is stealing intoomanycases”. sometimes be morallyacceptable.Thisisbecause allthatneedstobethecase seeing ifthoseexamples could escape falling foulofthesecond formulation of 1. What ismorecomplexinthisexampleofstealingfromtheinternationally The Consider thefollowingsituations: James hastwochildren whoaredesperateforaparticularChristmas present. Ifhestealsthe present, whichhecannotaffordtobuy,froma teleological and isthelocationoffulldiscussion of thebroadnormative moral Peter Singer , consequentialistandrelativisticnatureofUtilitarianism asdefendersof Act UtilitarianismandPreference John StuartMill Act, Rule,andPreference —are willbediscussed in section Jeremy 187 Stealing 188 APPLIED ETHICS wrong inallofthesecases because notstealingwouldfailtocreatethegreatest In allfive cases as described (and we should not cheatandchangetheexamples!) that stealingwouldbemorallyright;indeed,not stealingmaywell bemorally the Benthamite,hedonistic act utilitarianwould seem to be forced to suggest pleasure forthegreatestnumber.Ifwe replace“pleasure”with“preference key respects, and so the preferenceutilitarianwould seem to face the same against stealing.Wedisposed not to steal,forexample, off being arebetter utilitarians wouldhave “rulesofthumb” thatprovidegeneralguidance issue. because we cannotbesureoftheconsequences. satisfaction” in thefive cases, the situationsdo not seem to bedifferentinany 4. 2. 3. 5. In response, we should pay attentionto Bentham’s suggestion thatact A footballclubrequiresalargedonationinordertokeeprunningits A gangofthieves hastheabilitytosteal1pfromevery bankaccountin youth teams andprovidingpleasureforhundredsofchildreninthelocal youth If theystealthecar,attendconcert,refillitwithpetrolandpark Matthew can illegally download a music album that he wouldgreatly download amusicalbumthat can illegally Matthew forward toforavery longtimebecausetheircarhasbroken down.By favour thetheft. funds to save theyouthprogramme. If the goods stolen were oftrivial thieves rich beyond theirwildest dreams, filling theirlives with extreme the world. The pain of losing 1p, even whenmultiplied an extremely large numberoftimes,isminimal.However, thetheftwouldmake pleasure. at alltotheactualownerofcar. deal ofpleasureandnopain action appearstoprovidethemwithagreat necessary to sellinorderraisethe of property and steals£10,000worth area. Imogen,afanoftheclub,breaksintomansionmillionaire case, more pleasurewouldseem to beproduced by anillegaldownload chance, theynoticeanunlockedcarparkedonadriveway nearthem. rather thanapaid-fordownload. Bryony andRobertaregoingtomiss a concertthattheyhave beenlooking importance to the millionaire, the balanceof pleasure versus pain may music andallowhismoneytolinethepocketsofaninternationalpop more pleasureforhischildrenthanpainthecompany. major international retailerthenthisactionwould very likelylead tofar back onthedriveway —all withouttheowner’s knowledge —then their enjoy, saving himself money in doing so. Or, hecan pay fullprice for the star, herrecordlabelandafinanciallypowerful musicretailer.In this you canimaginemanysuchsituationsyourselves whereconsequences are we should be wary of over-confidence in our analysis, and not downplay the wefear of from the psychological painoften resulting mustrecognise the factor inthepainofaneight-year-old boylosingphotosofhimself with his that Utilitarianism doesnotofferenoughinrespectofcautioningagainst that thief who stole an iPad in Colorado Springs, for example, probably did not to stealinginasecond,orthirdfourthsituation wheremorallegitimacyis in anactofstealing theft. Inaddition,itmightbethecasethatengaging less than absolutistaboutthewrongness ofstealing,andbeingso liberal that painful consequencesassociatedwiththatpossibleaction. action thanpleasuremighthave beengeneratedifsuccessful.Indeed, inthe associated with stealing. The pain of a victim will not be fully accounted for fully The painofavictimwillnotbe stealing. associated with are enoughtosaveoverlyfrom being theutilitarian promiscuous in terms recently deceased father. recognise in theabstract(thisseems most relevant tocases four and five). The real world,thieves oftenhave noideawhatpaintheirvictimssufferasstolen relatively easy to predict. There may be adifference between wanting tobe or preferencesatisfactionisallthatdeterminesmorality.We are surethat of theprevioussituations(andsimilar such cases) for thereasonalluded to of allowingmorallyjustifiedstealing.Thereisgoodreasonforthinking of stealingwillproducethemaximum amount ofpleasureinagiven situation, one potentiallymorallyjustifiablesituationwould makesomeone more prone items canoftenhave hiddensentimentalvaluea thiefcould beyondanythat if weIn addition, finance andanger. of immediate painstodowith think only of are plenty there to rulesofthumb, in thepreviousparagraphpertaining having propertystolenorahouse burgled. This psychological distress may be so severe thatitoutweighs even large-scale pleasures resulting from the either morequestionableorobviouslynotpresent. empathetic asaresult,then thelong-termcosts of stealing —astheypertain suggesting thatgreaterattentionshould be paidtothepsychologicalcosts situations. enormous numberof stealing turnsouttobemorallyrequiredinapotentially situations wheretheconsequences obviously pointtostealingiftotalpleasure stealing in general. Although stealingmay be viewed as undesirable in some 3 Act andpreferenceutilitariansmaymaketheirfinalstandonthisissue by or notsuch“rulesofthumb” As anobjection,itcanbeaskedwhether Perhapsand thereforeless ifonebecomescomfortablewithstealing If James,forexample,was caughtthenfarmorepainwould resultfromhis K. Leon,‘FamilySeeksStoleniPad withPhotosofDeceased Father’, family-seeks-stolen-ipad-with-photos-of-deceased-father/ 3 Thus, even when we might thinkan individual act

http://fox21news.com/2014/10/03/ 189 Stealing 190 APPLIED ETHICS “good” stealing and “bad” stealinginaway thatsatisfies the non-absolutist. viewing, it might seem that a rule banning stealing would be a goodcandidate would be stealing a rulebanning viewing, itmightseemthat you againshould find itusefultoconsider. Here, itwillbeworth revisitingthe with stealingasdescribedabove. with reasonforoptimism. As a reminder,theruleutilitariansuggeststhat would morallycriticiseorsupportstealing. with individualinstances of stealingand their moral status, is something that would allowforstealing“whennecessary”and thusdiscriminatebetween How easy it would be to write such a rule that is consistentwithpromoting to writesucharulethat How easyitwouldbe If youfindyourselfwishingtodefendUtilitarianism,butareleftuninspired free, ofcourse,butthebestset rules would very likelyinclude provision for followed, wouldpromote the greatestgoodfornumber.Oninitial that you understand, and can defend, the scope of cases in which utilitarians the issue of stealing, itwill be well worthyourwhile coming up withyourown than originallythought.Thisideahasmuchincommon withKant’sindirect to thecharacter and future actions of the perpetrator — the greatesthappinessfornumber, yet doesnot “getitwrong” to beincluded in thesetofrulesthatwould produce the greatestgood for the greatest number, especiallygivengreatest psychological costsassociated potential the 5. RuleUtilitarianismonStealing provision of medical treatment and housingetc.Suchprovisionwouldnotbe provision ofmedicaltreatment distinction between StrongRule UtilitarianismandWeak RuseUtilitarianism as discussedin concern foranimals,asdiscussedin collecting adequate taxation, givencollecting adequatetaxation, a poundspentonsomeoneindistress that of food for those hungry or lackingresources,andasimilarruleregarding of foodforthosehungry is likelytofacilitategreaterfuturehappinessthan apoundspentbysomeone more depth,perhapswithyourownexamples). might seem likely thattherewould be arulerequiringadequate provision moral action is action that would be recommended by theset of rules that, if by theextenttowhich Act Utilitarianismand Preference Utilitarianism can economically comfortable (thoughwe encourageyoutoconsider this ideain examples andthenapplyingthetheoriestothosecasesinordermakeclear speak againstinstances of stealing, thenRuleUtilitarianism may provide you Whatever your viewson Act andPreferenceUtilitarianismastheyimpact Indeed, if we thinkmorebroadlyaboutthe“bestsetofrules”,thenit Despite thepreviousideas,itmaybesuggested thatthebestsetofrules Chapter 1 . Chapter 14 . may be far higher As a normative moral theory, Aristotelian Virtue Ethics was explored in would need a particularly interesting interpretation of thenotionpreventingwould needaparticularlyinterestinginterpretation If the harm principle informs rules in the set that promotes thegreatest If theharmprincipleinformsrulesinsetthat Recall from 6. Virtue EthicsonStealing the purposeofpromotinghappiness. A usefulexampletohave inmindwould to takeassetsfromprivate individuals in ordertoredistributeresources for the actandpreferenceutilitarians? to returncases 1–5 asoutlinedinsection four and ask yourselfwhatthe performing thoseactions.Usingreasontoworkout thevirtuousGoldenMean privatestylegood inthe individuals forthegreater ofRobinHood —would 3 difficulty of practically applyingthetheorytostealing.Itmight be useful and non-virtuous(vice) character traits. and thisalsoraisesanotherproblemfortheruleutilitarianinrespectof and sold. Such action could beusedinways thatwouldpromotegreaterlevels of happinessifstolen read everything hereinthelightofissuesraisedthere. rule utilitarian would suggest in those cases objection as it pertains toapplyingRule Utilitarianism in the contextof stealing. in thedifferentspheresoflife, utilitarian puttheminamoreorlessattractive position thantheanswers of harm toothers. would benoruleallowingpeople number, thenthere happiness forthegreatest but rather is interested in the by whichtheruleutilitarianwants ustojudgespecificactions in ourminds, of jewelsbe when thosejewelsin perpetuity, deposit box storedinasafety not appear to sit neatly with Mill’s ownharmprinciple. with not appeartositneatly At thevery least,in and, as withallofthetheories discussed in thischapter,itisimportant to 4 The onlypurposeforwhichpower canberightfullyexercisedover anymemberofacivilized This entire issue in itself highlights the difficulty of actually fixing the rules the fixing difficulty ofactually the issue initselfhighlights This entire The virtueethicistisnotinterestedinthemoral status ofindividual actions, Finally, it is worth considering the impact ofastyleit isworthconsideringthe Finally, of“demandingness” community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is notasufficientwarrant J. S.Mill, On Liberty Chapter 1 , http://www.econlib.org/library/Mill/mlLbty1.html — which seems to have theappearanceof stealing from , Mill’sharmprinciple: . 4 character traits Aristotle suggestedthefollowingasvirtuous and dispositions of the person — does the answer of the rule

Chapter 191 Stealing 192 APPLIED ETHICS Augustine that: Augustine After all,howarewea loafofbreadwouldbe todetermineifourstealing Thus, thosewhoengageintheactofstealingonbasisrighteousness, virtuous way. This example is over-simplified, but thepointis hopefully clear. who engageintheactofstealingonbasisrashness,shamefulness and from amoralperspective. the very sameact,performedbytwodifferentpeople,canbeviewed differently that loaftoahungryandhomeless woman onthestreetnearby.Ifaperson guidance, andthisworrywouldseemtobeatitsmostacutewhenitcomes to action wouldbeinaspecificsituation? and self-servingflattery?Howcanwe ascertainwhatthevirtuouscourseof a vice of excess. Yet, if someone else commits the very same act of stealing, application ofVirtuethe about Ethics tostealing. According toVirtueEthics, commits this act out of self-serving flattery, thenthey act in accordance with courage andvirtuouspatiencemaybeconsidered moral, whereas those representative oftheGoldenMean. irascibility willnotbeconsidered moral. Thisreveals somethinginteresting but this raises the troublingissue of subjectivity. Forexample,ifI view based onrighteousandgenerouscharacterdispositions, or reflectrashness but does so on the basis of righteousness and generosity, thentheyactina Anger seeking advice from Virtue Ethics over an applied ethical issue such as stealing. Indignation Fear Conversation Giving money Feeling/Emotion Situation Social conduct Shame Takeand thenpassing theactofstealingaloafbreadfromsupermarket, It appearsthat,withsomecompanions ofhisownage,hedespoiled aneighbour’s peartree, although he was not hungry, andhisparentshad better pearsat home. He continuedthroughout One possibilityistolooktheactionsofvirtuous peopleforguidance, One ofthebiggerworriesregardingVirtue Ethics is itslackofspecific his lifetoconsiderthisanactofalmost incrediblewickedness.Itwould nothave beensobadifhe asvirtuous,thenImayviewhiscompleteaversion tostealingas Vice ofDeficiency Lack ofspirit Cantankerousness Cowardice Boorishness Stinginess Spitefulness Shyness Virtuous Disposition (Golden Mean) Wittiness Patience Friendliness Righteousness Courage Modesty Generosity etad Russell Bertrand (1872–1970)saysof Vice ofExcess Envy Profligacy Irascibility Rashness Buffoonery Self-serving flattery Shamefulness St. AQA require youtounderstand how the various metaethical theories as 7. MetaethicsandStealing The combinationofCognitivismandRealismin thisareawouldentailthat virtuous charactertraitofgenerositywould give riseto.Or,more extremely, virtuous personbecauseofhiswillingnesstostealfromtherichinorder However, ifIviewthefictionalcharacterRobinHoodasparadigmofa Cognitivism andRealism three chapters flourishing, butthismaybeaseriousweakness. to clash,aswell aswhentheadviceofpossiblevirtuouspeoplealsoseemsto that willbemadetruebygenuinelyexisting moralpropertiesatleast the specification,ofwhichstealingisfirstwe have considered. Below, give tothepoor, then Imayhave adifferentview as to which actions the discussed in acceptability ofindividualactionswillbemade truebynaturalproperties assuming somegraspofthetheoriesfrom as itisstillbeingunhelpfullyvague. again thislanguagemightbethoughtunhelpfulbythecriticofVirtue Ethics clash. An actofstealingmightseem to bebothcourageous and self-serving, or comes to stealing? Aristotle can refer topractical reason ( is easily applicable to the otherapplied ethical issues also discussed in the remaining of these people are the right people toseekvirtuousguidancefromwhenit right of thesepeoplearethe individual, myviewswouldoncemorebedifferent;howdowe decide which if Iviewafamousfictionalpirateofthehighseasasrepresentingvirtuous moral claimsaboutstealingare how metaethicaltheoriesmightrelatetothisissue. both brave andrash.Resolvinghowtoactrequiresuseofpracticalreason,but such aspleasure,happiness orpreferencesatisfaction.Fortheintuitionist, some ofthetime.Forutilitarian,moralclaims regardingtheethical Stealing forpettyreasons looks to betheheightofnon-virtuousbehaviour. . Russell, B. 5 In addition,we mightwonder how toactwhenvirtues themselves seem mischief, inspiredbythelove ofwickednessforitsownsake. had been hungry,or had no other meansof getting pears;but,as it was, the act was one of pure 5502mbp#page/n3/mode/2up . History ofWestern Philosophy Chapter 7 mightbeappliedtotheethicalissueson truth-apt , p.364, Chapter 7 propositions,expressingbeliefs https://archive.org/stream/westernphilosoph03 5 Much oftheguidancebelow , we offerguidanceasto phronesis ) and human

193 Stealing 194 APPLIED ETHICS According tothesimplenon-cognitivistconsidered in thisbook,ourmoral The moralerrortheoristbelieves thatourmoralclaims regarding theethicsof Non-Cognitivism and Anti-Realism wisdom of theft.Moralerrortheoristswhocareaboutthepropertyrights Cognitivism and Anti-Realism Moral reasonsarenottheonlytoengageinstealing,aslegaland for thoseinterestedinadoptingaviewlikeEmotivism orPrescriptivismis for inconsistency if she speaks ofthe general wrongness of stealingwhilst their part.Themoralerrortheoristmayhave anon-moralreasonforopposing the non-naturalpropertyofgoodnesswillmakesomeourmoralclaims that it cheapens and eliminates the value of moral debate over the moral genuinely trueorfalsein theway that realistseekstodoandintheway that properties existas truth-makers for those moral claims. Importantly, just defending therightnessofstealinginhercase. Despitethis,onebigworry argument (somethingakintotheclaimofmoral errortheorist).However, and Prescriptivism, a phrase such as “stealing is wrong” expresses a negative as approval ordisapproval. Thus,accordingtotheoriessuchasEmotivism reveal somethingtrue abouttheworldanddonoteven trytodescribefeatures regarding stealingtrue. rightness ofstealing,since we cannotdefend ourethicalclaimsasbeing of theworld. of belief; they are expressions of emotion or other non-truth-aptattitudessuch others, forexample,maywell stronglyopposestealing. if we adoptPrescriptivism, we mightatleastbeabletocriticisethethief is definedbythecommitment to theideathatmoral utterances do not utterances regardingstealingarenottruth-aptbecausetheyexpressions morally wrongatleastsometimes”, thisdoes not entailalove ofstealingon most peoplewouldwish to. because the moral error theorist cannot endorse the claim that “stealing canbe claim that moral errortheorist cannotendorsethe because the emotional attitude towards stealing (Emotivism) or makes it clearthatwe do social/personal reasons will also be afactor astheyoftenspeakagainstthe stealing on many occasions, or indeed supporting stealingon other occasions. can neverbut true, are intendedtobe stealing achievebecause nomoral truth not want peopletosteal(Prescriptivism). Whichever non-cognitivisttheoryyouprefer,theposition Therefore, we cannot criticiseathiefasmorallywrongwhenusingthis SUMMARY ISSUES TOCONSIDER COMMON STUDENTMISTAKES • • • 1. 4. 7. 2. 6. 3. 5. Assuming toomuchwhenexplaininghowatheorymightbeappliedto Is itpossibletomeasurethepsychologicalpains associatedwith How doesthedefinitionyouarrived atin(2)fitwiththeideaof Is keepingduetaxfromthegovernment anexampleofstealing? Having toonarrowanunderstandingofstealing.Itisadvisableto Is anabsoluteprohibition againststealingdefensible?Whyorwhynot? Not applyingthestrengthsandweaknesses ofthevarious moral theories asdiscussedintheory-specificchapters. Can youcreateyourownsatisfactorydefinition of stealing? discuss arangeofcases(realandfictional). and usingkeyterms. an issueofstealing —give afullexplanation,showingunderstanding, Do peopleyouconsider virtuous have anyhistoryofstealing? Does stealingoncemakeyoumorelikelytosteal again? stealing? stealing ideas? Many willwant toavoidanabsolutemoralviewregarding the the various nuancedissuesafflictingeachtheory. own problems.Intermsofshowingyourunderstandingthese each hastheir stealing, but offer anabsoluteprohibitionagainst is atacticthatmaybestenableyoutowritewithconfidenceabout issues, applying normative theoriestoyourownvariety ofcases unacceptability ofstealing,thekindviewthatKantmight be thought to defend. Neither Utilitarianism norVirtueto defend.Neither thought be Ethics 195 Stealing 196 APPLIED ETHICS Bible KEY TERMINOLOGY References Russell, Bertrand, Mill, J.S., MacIntyre, Alasdair, Leon, K.,‘FamilySeeksStoleniPad withPhotosofDeceasedFather’, 10. 9. 8. Fox21 News westernphilosoph035502mbp#page/n3/mode/2up available at freelyavailable at com/2014/10/03/family-seeks-stolen-ipad-with-photos-of-deceased-father/ Brothers, 1947),freelyavailable at mlLbty1.html https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203131121 biblegateway.com/ , NewInternationalVersion, freelyavailable at What wouldtheerror-theoristsayaboutmoralityofstealing? Would thebestsetofrulesforpromotinggreatestgood Is itworthdebatingtheethicsofstealingifyouareanemotivistora greatest numbercontainaruleabsolutelyprohibitingstealing? prescriptivist? On Liberty Universalisation Categorical Imperative (3October2014),freelyavailable at

History ofWestern Philosophy (London: Longman,Roberts,Green&Co.,1869), freely A ShortHistoryofEthics

http://www.econlib.org/library/Mill/ https://archive.org/stream/ (London:Routledge,2002), (Woking:Unwin http://fox21news. Truth-apt https://www.

CHAPTER 12

Simulated Killing

Can you avoid knowledge? You cannot! Can you avoid technology? You cannot! Things are going to go ahead in spite of ethics, in spite of your personal beliefs, in spite of everything.1

Technology: the knack of so arranging the world that we don’t have to experience it.2

1. Introduction

Ethics is about how we live in the world and how we interact with one another. Given that “simulated” killing is, well, “simulated”, we might think that it falls outside ethical consideration. However, this chapter will challenge this claim. Simply granting that a scenario is not “real” does not mean that it should not be thought of as ethical. We think through how the various ethical theories we have looked at in this book might have something to say about simulated killing. The chapter relies on the work of Michael Lacewing (1971–) and Garry Young.3 Simulated killing can mean a number of things and at first it is perhaps easier to say what it is not. Obviously simulated killing is not actual killing, nor is it a description or representation of killing. So J. K. Rowling’s description of the death of Voldemort will not count as simulated killing nor would Caravaggio’s painting depicting John the Baptist’s decapitation. However, acting in a film involving killing — Schindler’s List for example, or acting Romeo killing Tybalt on stage, would. Furthermore, with the advent of computer games and virtual reality there are interesting, and arguably morally different, dimensions to simulated killing. Specifically, modern technology helps us all be part of the simulation. Of course, one reaction to supposed ethical worries surrounding this topic might be simply — “grow up”! There are many horrific things — real things — going on in the world, poverty, torture, crippling debt. They are the

1 J. Delgado, quoted in John Horgan, ‘The Forgotten Era of Brain Chips’. 2 M. Frisch. Homo Faber: A Report. 3 M. Lacewing, ‘Simulated Killing’, http://documents.routledge-interactive.s3.amazonaws.com/ 9781138793934/A22014/ethical_theories/Simulated killing.pdf. See in particular Garry Young’s Ethics in the Virtual World: The Morality and Psychology of Gaming. 200 APPLIED ETHICS What is interesting is that weWhat isinterestingthat many ofyoureadingthischapter suspectthat The thing tokeepinmind when readingthemis whether this“who cares, it’s would find some or all of (1)–(4) objectionable. Even,would findsomeorall of(1)–(4)objectionable. perhaps,morally these simulatedthingsarejustentertainment. After akillingscene in afilm the things thatas ethicists we ought tobeconcerning ourselves with. In contrast they mightcapturethisintuition. Weof cases,one’s will then consider thetype and reformedduetoelectricalcharges.Nooneisactuallyhurt! computer monitor altered onthe and gooutforadrink,thepixelswillbe will dustthemselvesactors inRomeoandJuliet actors willgohome;the off objectionable. not real!”attitudeseemsright? And ifitisnot,why? 1. 4. 2. 3. In thischapterwe willstartbylookingatdifferent moral theories andhow However, tocounterthismoredismissiveconsider afewexamples. attitude, As partofonelevel ofthevideogame A localhighsecurityprisonhasalargenumberofchildkillers.They Super ColumbineMassacreRPG! 2 In June2015avideogamecalled“Hatred”was released.Theaimofthe It is common for armies to use very realistic computer gaming to train Moscow airport inordertopassyourselfoffasaRussianterrorist.Ifyou for sale.Isthereanythingwrongwiththis? their Syriantrainingsimulator their soldiers. Imagine thatsoldiers are currentlyfightinginSyriaand valvea safety this seemstoactlike and andprisonersbecome quiet the characterthroughatown,shooting,burning, runningover, blowing game issimple,tokillasmanycivilianspossible. Thegamercontrols programs. Shouldtheybegiven theheadsets? prison warden proposesaway ofstoppingtherioting. At littlecost, each play thislevel areyoudoingsomethingmorallywrong? killing fantasy.Experimentshave shownthattheimmersive natureof DylanSchool Massacre).Isit Columbine High the Kleboldandre-enact often riotwhichcauses massive destructionandsuffering.However, the up, and executing random innocentpeople.(Equally controversialup, andexecuting is inmate canbegivengivesheadset that hisorherownvirtualreality morally wrongtoplaysuchgames? helpful andarewillingtogetinvolved ineducationalandcommunity each prisoner the abilitytoengagevirtuallyinhis or her favourite child soldiers, realistic maps,civiliansitessuch asmosquesetc. —isreleased you are expected to participate in amassshootingofciviliansat youareexpectedtoparticipate Whereplayers can play Eric Harris and — along withrealisticRussian and US Call of Duty

— Modern Warfare “risk increasingacts” violence, playing thekillerwill lead her toviolence and harm. So the utilitarian wrong. would sayitismorallywrongforthispersonto playsuchgames.Whereasin wrong. But 2. UtilitarianismandSimulatedKilling Perhaps itmakestheplayer For Utilitarianism no act, lead to theplayer being some people game issomethingthat life miserableforthosearoundthemorslumpintodepression. In fact,then, playing ismorallywrong. Buttheevidencedoesnotsupportthisclaim. There players toviolenceinwaysthemselves whichmightbeharmfultoboth and their videogamesmightturntomaking people whoarestoppedfromplaying players of at killingothersiswrong.Whatweplaying have tofocusonishowmuch philosophical problemthatmightrelatetotheseissues,the killing leadstomore and playingthekillerin games a videogamemayhave nonegative effects;inwhichcase,itisnotmorally answered according to Utilitarianismitmightbe that playingakillerincomputer conclude that thereisnothingwrongwith(1)–(4). After all,theinmates, the other cases,wheretheplayera killerin hasa“normal”disposition,playing other? in which we are is though,afurtherconsideration to bemade when thinking aboutplayingthe mixed. In might even betheirdutytoplaysuchgames. might bemoreunhappinessifsomeone happiness iscreatedinparticularexamplesofsimulatedkilling. no oneishurt,andthereunhappiness.Infact,we canimaginethatthere 4 As Youngevidence relevant(2014) reportsthe to thesesortsofclaimsis This said,noticethatthequestionisanempiricalone(i.e.ita Perhaps playingakillermakespeople In askingthisquestionregardingtheamountofhappinesswe might So, forUtilitarianism M. McCormick,‘Is itWrongtoPlay Violent Video Games?’, p.279. some Call of Duty a posteriori why cases, where agamerperhapsalreadyhaspredispositionto mightsuchsimulatedkillingbringaboutunhappiness? observing thesimulated killing 4 rather than ). Orperhapsplayingsimulatedkillingdesensitises the unhappiness or Hatred if more likely qua there is a clear link betweenis aclearlink there risk-increasingacts less abletoempathise act, is right or wrong. So we cannot say that get enjoyment and there is a lot of happiness, then thannotdoingso,thenplayingthekilleris a priori toharm others (whatMcCormick calls we mightbeabletosaythatsuchgame morally oughttodo ). stops If . We end by highlightinga famous more inclinedto violent behaviour playing thekillerin simulated playingthesegames.Perhaps andtrust,eachofwhichmight . Insomesituations,it Paradox ofTragedy ? . 201 Simulated Killing 202 APPLIED ETHICS virtue kill fantasies is not just of less quantity, but isof virtue killfantasiesisnotjustoflessquantity, value asthepleasurewe getfrom otheractivitiessuchaspoetry. will notnecessarilyleadtotheconclusion that playingthekiller invideo which is highly sexualized is much more likely to bring about harm inthe about to bring sexualized ismuchmorelikely which ishighly to “happiness”.Benthamfamouslyclaims: the killingissimulated:age,raceandgender ofthepersonkilledand the gamer. Orincontrastmaybethesimulatedkilling ofuniformedsoldiers in games ismorallywrong.Wesuch games mightargue(canyou?)thatplaying lower? Weis a it that this isdebatable) mightreasonableconclude(though point isthattheutilitarianquestionsabout“simulated killing”canonlybe killer inavideo game inthesame way asanyotherpleasure.However, you’ll If yourecallfrom killer. disposition? answered ifwe firstpindowntheprecisedetailsofsituation. a videogamedoes not changepeople’soutlookandbehaviour.Thesimple account ineachcase.Forinstance,whatisgoingtobeimportantnotonly as a drawingclassor,say,visitingan Art Gallery. this wasalso recallthatMillthought push-pin (or, and that right, notquite correct to thinkof such activities as a lower pleasure but Because “push pinisasgood as poetry”Benthamwould treat playingthe questions highlighted above,questions highlighted also whethersuchpleasureishigheror but lower involvedat killingwe inplaying empirical needtoconsider —notjustthe the killerin in ourcase,playing method of deathareimportant.Perhaps, for example, asimulated killing some instancesitwouldberighttoplaythekillerinthesegames. . Bentham, J. 5 Young isagoodplacetoend thissection: There are further things that Utilitarianism wouldhavethings that There arefurther into totake Call of Duty We have averyeconomic impact isquantifiable asis good ideaofthebenefits ofvideogames.Their Prejudice apart, the game ofpush-pinisequalvaluePrejudice apart,the science ofmusicand and arts withthe Maybe then when doing a utilitarian calculation regardingthepleasure Maybe thenwhendoingautilitarian the numberof theybringtogamers. GTAhours of entertainment to gratifythoseindividualswhoaremostdifficultbepleased. and musicdeservebefore agameofpush-pin,itmustbebecausetheyarecalculated tobepreferred Of course, introducing the distinction between higher and lower pleasure poetry. Ifthegameofpush-pinfurnishmorepleasure,itisvaluable thaneither…Ifpoetry type org/library/Bentham/bnthPML18.html pleasure. Mill might argue that the inmate gainingpleasurefromenacting the argue that pleasure.Millmight of person playing thesimulated killing —do they have aviolent — but the An Introduction tothe PrinciplesofMoralsandLegislation An can in fact lead to Chapter 1 Chapter type of killing thatis simulated. Maybe the Call ofDuty Bentham and Mill differ in their approaches BenthamandMilldifferintheir higher pleasure / Hatred . Or we might agreethatitis 5 etc.)isperhaps

[Grand Theft Auto][Grand , pp.206–07, less quality still maintain thatin http://www.econlib. thanjoining not alonesold ofequal way that We have placedthesetwotheoriestogetherbecauseintheend whatthey we dohave amoral duty towards other.Putsimplyitmakesusworseatbeing we cantreatanimalscruelly.Thisisbecauseifwe didtreatthemcruellywe 4. FilmsandPlays Recall, weout thatsimulatedkilling takes startedthischapterbypointing 3. TheKantianandtheVirtue Ethics Approach to depend directly ontheempirical data abouthowdoingso will changethe the question“would it iswrongtoplay the Aristotelian orKantian think then Kantwouldsaythatwe shouldavoidthem.But,asstatedabove, thisis same way.in the dealt with in videogameswillbe killer the less courageous, empathetic, sensitive etc. — then thevirtuetheoristwill person playingthegame. place in films and plays. Noticethat thismightinclude killer invideogames?” the answer is: “Not directly, itjust depends on the link killer makesuslessabletoreasonandhencediscernourdutytowards others, animals because theyarenon-rational.But,heargues,thatthisdoes not mean an openquestionastheempiricalevidenceisinconclusive. claim this will make us less able to do the right thing at the right time tothe right the thing at right do the to claim thiswillmakeuslessable compassion (see right proportion.Thismeansthatplayingthe killer istobeavoided.So it doesnothelp is notwrongtoharmanimalsbecauseof“rights”,it moral beings. An Aristotelian would say asimilar thing. Namely, althoughit might becomelessabletoactrationallyanddischargeourdutiesinareaswhere haveto besimilar. playing thekillerinvideogamesisgoing tosayabout between doingsoandits Specifically, whether they think playing the killer is right or wrongisgoing the killerisright playing Specifically, whethertheythink . Young, G. 6 There are also a number of educational benefits. The improvementsare alsoanumberofeducational benefits. The There in visualperception,hand-eye The pointofthisdiversionthe moralityofplaying intoanimalethicsisthat game violence.Otherheavilycriticized violent gamesarelikewiseusuallyamongthetopsellers. Recall from coordination, and othermotorskillsfromgamingarealsowell documented.Thedifficulty only over 66million games by2008,evidencethatatleastthismanypeoplederivefrom entertainment a problemintrinsictoutilitariantheoryandshouldnotbecountedagainstviolentgames. lies indecidinghowmuchthesebenefitsshouldweigh againstanyharmthatgamesdo,butthisis Shifting tovirtuetheory, Ethics intheVirtual World:TheMorality andPsychologyofGaming Chapter 2 Chapter 14 us develop therighttypesofvirtues thatKantsaidwe have nomoral dutytowards effects foradiscussionofthis). if playing thekillermakesuslessvirtuous —e.g. onus as moralagents”. , e.g.sensitivity,empathy, watching , p.131 . If playing the playing simulated 6

203 Simulated Killing 204 APPLIED ETHICS Watching films (ofcourseitdoesnothave tobeafilm —thesamereasoning wall andin theshower. We feeldisgusted,anxiousandscared.We quickly Imagine thatwe go intoahotelroomandwe seebloodyhandmarksonthe flock inourdroves tosuch films.Infact,themorescary/disgusting/disturbing the film is, the more attractive itseem to audiences. Consider Hitchcock’s as possible.Suchemotionsare as quickly out ofthere around andget turn haveand characterwhichmight authenticity fore issues todowith the adirect think thatwatching killingiswrong?Well itdependsontheconsequences. to rehearse again thegeneralapproaches discussed above. Does the utilitarian groundbreaking link tootherissueswe have discussed. games andactinginfilms/playsmightbeclosing.) games. Ofcourse,theremightbefurthercomplications whenaskinghow less direct relevance toourreaders. Anyway, we suggestthatwe could treat 5. TheParadox ofTragedy(orMoreCorrectlytheParadox likely to makes usmore —orlesslikely or gun knife holding a(fake) physically one a killeronstageorinfilmdifferspsychologicallyfromplaying playing playing thekillerinfilms and plays ina similar way as we have invideo knife-wielding killerinavideogameaffectsus.Butagain,thisisanempirical killing, or of “Negative Emotions”) applies toplays or video games) generate inus disgust, anxiety and fear butwe as the and not aphilosophical question. (It is interesting to note thatbecause of the and death. And perhaps thisis fundamentally differenttohow playing a and (virtually)bleedingmakesusless —ormoresensitive torealblood Does theKantianor Aristotelian? Well itdependsonhowaffectsusas questions we needtoask —whichwillbedifferent.Forexample,perhaps unwelcome andmake usuncomfortable.However, considerallthetimeand increase in the sophistication of virtual reality,thegapbetween playingvideo in a video game. However, we suggest theissues are still fundamentallythe moral agents. And theanswer tothesequestionsis,again,anempiricalmatter. money spentonwatchingfilms whichhaveand making scenarios. upsetting hand negative emotionsarenotdesired, whereasinothercontexttheyare. hold arealknifeorgun.Orperhapswatchingshot (virtually) peoplebeing same, it is just how we extract theempirical data What thenaboutsimply We endwithanancientphilosophicalproblemwhichhascometo beknown Paradox of Tragedy acting outthekilling. Psycho forexample.Herethen isthe“paradox”.Onone . Although itisnotdirectlyaboutethics, itbringsto watching Playing simulated killing? Well, we do not need such characters is — what sort of empirical — we guess — of SUMMARY Again, we donotneedtogointothedetailsofthis.Itisthoughjustanother them *fear*,*horror*,*disgust*. needs tobeexplained. Wethat thing willnotgointothepossibleexplanations perhaps these emotions particularly horrificifwe witnessedreallifekilling,butifitis“simulated” when wepertinent refertosimulatedkilling.Presumablywe wouldfindit dimension to simulated killing which mayhavedimension tosimulatedkilling moralsignificanceand are todo with *fear*notfear,*horror*horror, *disgust* notdisgust etc. consequently deserve consideration. in ourcharacterthatmightcome about throughsimulatedkillingbecausethey here. What is interesting to us is that this paradox seems to be particularly this paradoxseemstobe to usisthat is interesting here. What Although itisnotagenuineparadoxcertainlytension —anodd This in turnmightmeanthatwe needtobeless worried aboutthechanges “Simulated killing”covers anumberofdifferentareas;itcould Virtue Ethicallenses we have shown that thisis not thecase. For will beadvanced viaexperimentation. we can say isthat“yes simulated killingis a moral issue”, butthe Utilitarianism whether itis simulated or not is not important,the the question is how being involvedthe questionishowbeing insimulatedkillingchanges topic isoutsideethics.ButusingUtilitarianism,Kantianand the firstcategory it could be an actor on film or stage, or it could less rationalorvirtuous —thenwe oughtnot to beinvolved in decision of whetheraparticularactivityismorally rightorwrong do them,ifnot,we ought not.FortheKantianandvirtueethicist compared to doingsomethingelse.Ifitismore, then we ought to question is how much happiness each of these activities generates us asaperson.Ifitmakesless able tobeamoralagent —e.g. involve playing thekiller,or watching someone play thekiller.In be someoneplayingavideogame. surrounding simulated killing aregoingtobeaddressed via simulated killing. psychology However, themain lessonfrom this chapteristhis. Issues Initially we mightthinkthatbecauseitis“simulated”this . Whichisthusfarinconclusive. Soitseems the best — horror, fear, etc. are qualitatively different. Call 205 Simulated Killing 206 APPLIED ETHICS ISSUES TOCONSIDER COMMON STUDENTMISTAKES • • • • 1. 4. 7. 9. 2. 6. 3. 8. 5. “killed” theycanberesetand“killedagain”.Should we treatthiscase Assuming thatbadtastejustmeansmorallywrong. Watch the2015film What wouldtheKantian/virtueethicistsayabout (1)? What is“simulatedkilling”? Thinking thatwe cananswer theParadox ofTragedybysimply Thinking thattheUtilitarianwouldsaythereisnothingwrongwith Thompson. How do you think the film deals with the ethical issues? Do Thompson. Howdoyouthinkthefilmdealswithethicalissues?Do Hatred young childrenplayinggamesthatinvolve killing,e.g.aplayground you thinkthataparticularethicaltheorycomesoutasmorefavourable? How mightyouconsider(a)thesimulatedkillingofanimals?Should Imagine acaseinthefuturewhereonecanbuyultra-life like AI Reading (1)–(4)doyouthinkthatsimulatedkillinggeneratesagenuine Missing howimportantthepsychologicaldataistoethicalquestion. looks atthecourtcasebetween thecreatorsof longer knowthedifference between themandrealhumans?Doesthat game ofsoldiers. pointing outthatsometimeswe likebadthings. programmed tobegformercy,whimper,etc. Once theyhave been pleasure? Governments have censoredvideogames, suchas differently? Whathappensiftherobotsaresolifelike thatpeopleno actions, suchasstealingorrape? Do youthinkthatthepleasuregainedbyinmates in(1)isa“lower” change things? robots. Theserobotscanbe“killed”.Theywill“bleed”, theyhave been it betreatedanydifferentlyfromthesimulatedkillingofhumans?(b) moral issue? how mightthis relatetolawsgoverning “simulated killing”? simulated killing. Should we treat“simulatedkilling”differentlyfromother “simulated” . Are they righttodoso?Thatis,even ifwe findthem immoral, Gamechangers starring Daniel Radcliffe. This film starringDanielRadcliffe.Thisfilm Grand Theft AutoGrand Call ofDuty and Jack andJack , and Young, Garry, References KEY TERMINOLOGY Horgan, John,‘TheForgottenEraofBrainChips’, Frisch, Max, McCormick, Matt,‘IsItWrongtoPlay Violent Video Games?’, Lacewing, Michael,‘SimulatedKilling’,freelyavailable at Bentham, Jeremy, 11. 10. Ethics andInformationTechnology (October 2005):66–73, freely available at theories/Simulated killing.pdf choice.51-1780 routledge-interactive.s3.amazonaws.com/9781138793934/A22014/ethical_ org/10.1023/a:1013802119431 html of Gaming What isthe“Paradox ofTragedy”?Doyouthinkithasanyrelevance What doesthecurrentpsychologicalresearchtellusaboutethical when discussingthemoralityofsimulatedkilling? Use GoogleScholartofindthemostup-to-dateresearchon psychological effectsof“simulatedkilling”(anyversion youwant). issues raisedinthischapter? Paradox ofTragedy Simulated killing (Abington:Routledge,2014), Homo Faber: A Report Ethics intheVirtual World:TheMoralityand Psychology An IntroductiontothePrinciplesofMoralsandLegislation http://www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML18. https://doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican1005-66 (HoughtonMifflinHarcourt,1959). , 3.4(2001):277–87, Higher andlower pleasures Risk-increasing Acts https://doi.org/10.5860/ Scientific American https://doi. http://documents. , 293.4 , 207 Simulated Killing

CHAPTER 13

Telling Lies

I’m not upset that you lied to me; I’m upset that from now on I can’t believe you. Friedrich Nietzsche

1. Introduction

What is it to tell a lie? Is it always wrong to tell lies? Is it sometimes acceptable to lie, and if so, what are the conditions that make it OK? Humans have dealt with these types of questions, regarding lies and truth, ever since they began to interact with one another. Truth and trust are key to the working of our society, in fact people who are caught in a lie are sanctioned, blamed and punished. We have many examples of politicians being brought down by lies; Nixon and the ensuing Watergate is a good one (although see the final section regarding Politicians). Children are told “not to lie”, religious leaders and religious texts condemn lying, relationship guidance talks about the importance of not lying to your partner etc. We will start to consider some of these questions and apply some of the thinking thus far discussed in the book to lying.

2. What Is It to Lie?

Let’s consider some examples; when you read them you should ask yourself whether there is a lie involved. 1. A friend asks you where you went on holiday last year. You say “Cambridge”, which they understand to be Cambridge, UK, but you really mean Cambridge, Massachusetts. 2. You are teaching chemistry to primary school children and you hold up a football and say “Atoms are just like this…” 3. You are having a really bad day: your partner has split up with you, you have lost your house keys, and your friend just shouted at you. You meet an acquaintance in the corridor; they say, “how are you?” You say, “fine thanks, and you?”. 210 APPLIED ETHICS your parttomisleadfriend. wrong issomethingwe consider below; itwould seem that itis precisely for this maynotbethecase. Butasitstands(7)isnotacaseoflying. then wearing awedding ringwhenyouarenotmarriedseems like acaseof this isrightorwrongsomethingthatwe’ll returntobelow. answerthe is“yes”involves andinfactallteaching course, whether Of lying. truth, thewholetruthandnothingbutisnoteacher’s maxim”.This lying. generally considered to beastandard answer toastandard question; the certainly falsebutthereisnolieinvolved. cases suchasthisthatwe have the phrase“littlewhitelie”. question byyourgran,youlookherintheeye andlie.Nowwhetherthisis questioner wouldbeexpectingthisreplyinmostcircumstances. or chemistryetc.Butdoesthismeanthatyouarelyingtotheclass? We think in your reply tothe guard.However, iftherewas an intentionto deceive then understand thatwearing aweddingsomeone ismarried, ringindicatesthat is because it is simply impossible to gointoallthedetailsofscience or history, example, mostlyspace. And asKirstenWalsh and Adrian Currie So whatdoyouthink? Are thesecasesoflyingornot?Let’staketheminturn. 1 4. 7. 6. 5. (7) Thisdoes not seem like acase of lyingasyouwere completelyhonest (6) Thiscouldbeacase of lying.Ifthesocial context isoneinwhichwe (5) This does not seem to be a case of lying, rather just bad maths. It is asked adirect Having been is aclearcaseoflying. (4) Thisdoesseemasifit (3) Arguably thiswouldnotbecategorisedaslyingthereplygiven is (2) Isharder.Strictlyspeakingatomsarenothinglikefootballs;theyare,for (1) This does not fallintothecategoryoflyingas there was no intenton K. Walsh and A. Currie,‘Caricatures,Myths, andWhiteLies’,p.424. Your gran has saved up herpension, bought some wool, and knitted You are smugglingBibles into China. At theborder,guards ask you You are takingamaths test and one questionasks the solutiontosinx A recentdivorceekeepswearing hiswedding ring. you a jumper. You hate it.She is visiting youand you putiton. She asks, wave youthrough. what youhave inyourtruck. As ithappens,youhave hundredsofBibles, cosx much forthinkingaboutme”. so you say “oh, hundreds of Bibles”. The guards think thisis a joke and smiling, “so, do you reallylikeit?”You reply,“ofcourse Gran, thanks so 2 You write“10”[theanswer is“1”]. 1 state“the 2 + I intendthatyouadopt abeliefwhichIbelieve tobefalsebutinsodoingI If yourecall( then form thefalsebeliefthattherewere noBiblesinthetruck,thenthismight 3. Utilitarianism telling thetruth —“yes there areBibles in the truck” —thentheguards would generate more goodthanifIhadnot, thenIhave donesomethingright. lying tooneself”isacommon phraseused by psychologists, self-help books, particular, anactionisrightif,andonlyitbrings aboutthegreatestamount Gran adoptthefalsebeliefthatyoudolikejumper. definition of“ discussed inthisbook. and symbols;thatiswhat(6) —thewedding ring —showsus. acceptable tointendforsomeone to adopt abeliefwhichyouknowtobefalse? count aslying.So for somethingtobealie, whatisimportantthe consideration atsomepoint —justnothere. counsellors etc. Itisthenagenuinelyinterestingquestionwhichdeserves question whetherwe can deceive of lyingwillonlybewrong ifitbringsaboutlessgoodthannotdoing so.If of happiness,pleasure,well-being, preferencesatisfactionetc. is, irrespective ofcontext.Sowe cannotsaythatlyingiswrongbecause theaction maths case,showsus. else’s good. starting pointsforthinkingaboutthemoralquestion. necessarily thoughttobealieasthe Wethis. When,ifever, cannowframethemoralquestionlike morally isit What thencanwe takefromthesequickexamples? That iswhy“yes IlikethejumperGran”in(4)isalie.Youyour intendthat The secondfeatureisthateveryone countsasequal inthecalculations.That It followsfromthesetwo claims that In cases such as (3), even ifwe saysomethingwe knowtobefalse, it is not Notice finallythatintheBiblesmugglingcaseifpersonknewby Finally, as anaside,itisacontroversialFinally, andphilosophically interesting Lying can involve things otherthanspeaking;itcan involve writing, signs Lying does not simply involve sayingsomethingfalse.Thatis what (5),the Let’s consider thisquestionthroughthelens of some of thetheoriesalready Of course, all these claims are controversial but they at leastgive us some your the consideration of right and wrong actions in relation to good. In —but itneednotbethecasethatwhatisbeingsaidfalse. goodisasimportant good Chapter 1 ”

(happiness, pleasure,well-being, preferencesetc.)and ) Consequentialism has twofeatures.Firstisthe lie toourselves my good,whichisasimportantanyone intention . We donotdiscuss this herebut“not no action to deceive ismissing. ismorallyrightorwrong intention to 211 Telling Lies 212 APPLIED ETHICS “does the utilitarian think that lying is wrong?” the answeris wrong?”the lying that think utilitarian “does the just depends”. is“it Sheriff Let’s consideramundanecase.Iflyingtoyourgranbringsaboutthebest follows that than ifshehadoriginallybeentoldthetruthabout thejumper. then we canimagine thatthismightmeanshewouldnotbeableever totrust the outset.Now, not onlywill there beriots but therewill knit whichmakesherhappyetc.,thenitismorallyacceptabletolie.Notice, arising. Consider the sheriff example; it could be that the realcriminal arising. Considerthesheriffexample;itcould bethat are caseswherewe thinkthatsometimesitismorallycounterintuitive tobe a soldiercapturedandtorturedbutwhostillcontinuestoliesaythat consequences confesses resulting in worse consequences than if the truth had been told at consequences and outcomes in order to tryandprevent some new problems required tolie. right tohave lied;given thehorrificconsequencesoftellingtruthsheis law enforcement it isacceptabletoliebutthatwe have amoralobligationtolie. means itwouldbewrongtolie. morally requiredtolie.However, theintuitionsworkbothways andthere her grandchildrenagain,maygiveand thusmakeherunhappier upknitting, however, thattheconsequentialistwouldsaywe hundreds ofthousandslives. Inthiscasepeoplebelieve thatshewas she doesnotknowhowtobreaktheallies’codes,andinsodoingsaves 2 The consequentialist will judge in this case that it is morally required that the Sheriff lies Utilitarianism seemstobeintuitive insomecases.Imagine,forexample, However, Consider a famous example from H. J. McCloskey known as “ and framing an innocent man.Noone will miss the man and he is hated in the town. If heframesandjailsthisinnocentman,convincingpeopletobelieve thatitwas this Imagine ascenariowheretherehasbeenseriouscrimeintownandtheSheriffistrying conclusions. consequentialist saysitissometimesmorallyrequiredtoliecanleadcounterintuitive Or consider the granexample.Ifyourbrothertellshisthatyoulied, Of course, the utilitarian should try and think harder about the possible harder about and think should try Of course,theutilitarian even ifthismeansthataninnocentmanisjailed.Thisthenshowsthefact to prevent seriousrioting.Heknowsthatthisriotingislikelytobringaboutdestruction, idea whocommittedthecrime.However, hecanprevent theseriotsbylyingtothetown injury andmaybeeven death.Theproblemisthathehasnoleads;nottheslightest man that committed the crime, then the town will be placated and people will not riot. McCloskey, ‘A Non-Utilitarian Approach toPunishment’. ”. 2

the actionoflyingisneither wrongnorright.Sotothequestion because — . So,infact, i.e. she is happy, youare happy, and she continues to no action lying is right or wrong would bring about wouldbring qua action worse oughtto consequences, which also in Utilitarianism, it be lie; notjustthat no trust in the McCloskey’s will dependonwhattypeofdeontologisttheyare.TheKantiansgroundthe when considering lyingbythinkingharderaboutwhatitactuallymeans to 4. TheKantianandLying In contrasttheKantian(see Kantian may not becommitted totheimplausible conclusion that she has to Evenpeople, yourownmotheroran consequence issavingabillion ifthe this makeslyingwrong.Forifwe lietosomeone then we are to myjumper,and my friend thinks itis an amazing jumper, but itreallyis not the truth!Sayingtoyourgran:“I really appreciatealltheworkyou’ve putin theory thatsaysactions arerightorwrongdependingonwhether God theories wouldaswell. Forexample,theDivineCommand Theory, the Catholic theologian lie. Eventhere are so,itseemsundeniablethat lying alsocomesoutaswrong.Kantsaidthatwe shouldalways treatothersas nothing qua deceive themforourownends.We arenottreatingthemasrationalagents decisions out of their hands; we arebasicallysayingwe should be allowed to and wrongactionstheyfirstdefinerightwrong.Howmightdothis and fortheKantianthisisalways morallywrong. an end in themselves, and never solely as a means to an end. We can see that consequence thathundredsofthousandspeoplediewouldbesimplyto commands or prohibits them. If God says lying is wrong —andatleastinthe commands them. IfGodsayslying or prohibits rightness andwrongness on reason. In particular,we introduced one version reveal thesecrets.Keepingsilentisnotsameaslying. of Kant’sCategoricalImperative. WeKant —and canshow,usingthis,that orphanage ofchildren. in factalldeontologists as anendinthemselves then it is, full stop. Or consider the is, fullstop.Or it main monotheisticreligions Hedoes —then morally acceptabletoliebutfortheKantianthere arenosuchcases. my style, I’mreallysorry”,seemlessobjectionablethan“No,Idonotlikeit”. she isbeingtorturedformilitarycodes.Itseemsthatoneway tostopthe so ifwesoldier case.Imagine to the Go back our definitionoflying. revisit This might seem counterintuitive,This might is. However, andit is perhapsless it It isworthnotingthatintheotherKantianformula that we introduced, Notice thatitisnotjusttheKantianwouldsay this.Otherdeontological Furthermore, itis worth remembering that thereare different ways of telling So thereare —maybe actions. So ratherthanfirstdefininggoodandthentheright . And, given ourdefinition,sayingnothingwould Aquinas butarecontrollingwhattheycandobytakingcertain — think thattheactionof lying — waysless objectionable Kant’s theory ofmaking Chapter 2 . ) claims that actionsarewrongorright, some cases wherewe think itis iswronginall cases not belying.Sothe not treatingthem say . 213 Telling Lies 214 APPLIED ETHICS SUMMARY As we write,Donald Trump has just been elected as US president. Whetheryou Wefalse. Weis patently because it true, donotmeanisit meando youthink we needreminding,thatthemoralstatusoflyingisvitalimportanceat won the popularvote because millions of people voted illegally” is this a lie? the conceptofaliehaschangedthroughouttime?Haspoliticallandscape the truth,thendoes this affectthemoralstatus oflying(atleastinthepolitical local, nationalandinternationallevels. groups have beenworkingonways toalertpeople“fakenews”. 5. SomeFinalThoughtsaboutthePoliticalContext arena)? We donotattempttoanswershow, asif they thesequestionsherebut all costs.However, Trumpseemsunaware anduninterestedintruth —hence agree withhispoliciesornot,whathasbeeninterestingishowthepresidential changed so dramatically that theconcept of lie has no currency? Related, what claim above,avoided at be to office issomething in public lying namely,that campaign has been run; in particular, ithas put under serious doubt our initial on social media sites —so much so that Facebookandothersocial media is themoralstatusoflying?Ifpoliticiansandconstituentsdonotcareabout era seems to becreatedinpartbecauseofthepropagationfalsenewsstories sense to talk about lying in the political “post-truth” era. WhenTrumpsays“I in thepolitical“post-truth” lying about sense totalk some peoplehave suggestedthathehasusheredina“post-truth” era. See 3 Thus, thequestionswe leave youwith arewhetheryouthinkthatitmakes what youclaimtobetrue,wheninfactthink itisfalse. Philosophers, in manyissues,liketostartbyaskingwhatwe lie. The deontologist lie?” itbecomesquicklyapparentthattheissues are complexand different responses to thequestion“isitwronglie”?The are better than telling the truth then wethe truth are betterthantelling aremorally requiredto utilitarian says“itdepends”. That is,iftheconsequencesoflying unclear. Toliedoes not justmeantosaysomethingfalse,ratherit mean by the key term. Oncewethe key mean by question “whatisitto askthe has something to do with trying to get another person tobelieveanother to get trying to dowith has something http://www.dailywire.com/news/4834/trumps-101-lies-hank-berrien Different theories weDifferent have lookedatsofarin thisbookhave — the Kantianor Divine Command Theorist for101ofhislies. 3 This ISSUES TOCONSIDER COMMON STUDENTMISTAKES • • • • 1. 4. 2. 3. 5. Thinking thatyourequirewordstolie. Thinking thattheutilitariansaysifalieleadstopleasurethenitis Thinking thatKantsayswe shouldalways tellthetruth.Whereas Keith, 40today!”Ithasbeen thereaboutayear. Isthislying? In thelocaltownthereis asignattheroundabout —“Happybirthday Read (1)–(7)atthestartofthischapter.Doyouthink thesearecasesof Mistaking beingnastywithimmoral. Could arobotlie? lying ornot?Give reasonsforyouranswers. Do youthinkitmakessense totalkabout“lying Do youever thinkitismorallyacceptabletolie? When? in facthesaysitiswrongtolie. morally acceptabletolie. how mightthischangeour definition? for ourintuitions! We finished this chapterwithsomegeneral is alwaysthat lying for example —thinks wrong.Thereareno thoughts abouttruthandlyinginthepoliticalarena. to lie. the counterintuitive responses to moral questions regarding lying arise because of a false or incomplete understanding of what it is it arise becauseofafalseorincompleteunderstandingwhat respond to thisisrevisitthedefinitionoflyingandclaim that our intuitionsatall.We mightsimplysay,somuchtheworse seem to lead to counterintuitive claims. One possibleway to situations atallwhenitwouldbemorallyacceptabletolie. Finally, weFinally, of capturing requirement simply rejectthe might Both theconsequentialistanddeontologist’s responses oneself ”? Ifitdoes, 215 Telling Lies 216 APPLIED ETHICS Walsh, Kirsten and Adrian Currie,‘Caricatures,Myths,andWhiteLies’, References KEY TERMINOLOGY McCloskey, H.J.,‘A Non-Utilitarian Approach toPunishment’,in 11. 10. 7. 9. 6. 8. Philosophical Perspectives onPunishment State University ofNewYork Press,1972),119–34. If youhadtogoforeitheradeontologicalapproachlyingor How mighttheruleandactutilitariandifferintheirresponseto Reflecting onyouranswers sofarwouldyouagreewithourdefinition this change(ifatall)howwe thinkoflying? Give anexamplewheretheconsequentialistwouldsaywe aremorally Give anexamplewherethedeontologistwouldsaywe oughtnottolie. Do youthinkthatwe arelivingina“post-truth”era?Ifso,howdoes consequentialist approach,whichwoulditbe? required tolie. question whetheritismorallywrongtolie? of “lying”?Ordoyouthinkitneedsmodifying? Rule-utilitarian McCloskey’s Sheriff Lie , 46.3(2015):414–35. , ed.byGertrudeEzorsky(Albany: “Post-truth” Duty

CHAPTER 14

Eating Animals

A man can live and be healthy without killing animals for food; therefore, if he eats meat, he participates in taking animal life merely for the sake of his appetite. And to act so is immoral.1

1. Eating Animals Introduction

The British, and many other nations, have something of an odd relationship with animals. I have, for example, just returned to begin typing up this chapter after adding extra straw for my chickens — chickens that I care for on a daily basis and chickens in whose well-being I am invested. This, however, followed on from my enjoyable consumption of a chicken dinner last night, a fact that would seem to suggest I am far less invested in the well-being of chickens more generally. This oddness in terms of the relationship between myself and my chickens is not, however, peculiar to me. Few people in the UK are vegetarians — the data has consistently suggested between 2% and 3% in recent years — yet many more would claim to identify as animal lovers.2 In this chapter, the applied ethical issue of the moral acceptability of eating animals is considered; it remains to be seen what conclusions might be drawn to be either justify or condemn some aspects of our multi-faceted behaviour and attitude towards animals.

2. Justifying Meat Eating

It seems sensible to begin by considering on what grounds the eating of meat might be morally justified. To this end, two possible justifications are considered below.

Comparative Justification

It is hard to give a proper name to this oft-cited justification for the consumption of animal meat. When questioned as to why meat-eating is morally acceptable,

1 L. Tolstoy, Writings on and Non-Violence. 2 Data available at https://www.vegsoc.org/sslpage.aspx?pid=753 220 APPLIED ETHICS “the Flood”, God says that “[everything] thatlives and moves about will be The second justification we willconsider for meat-eatingmayhave slightly vegetarian,might it fox, then bear orthe for ustomorallycriticisethelion, Dominion-Based Justification It is therefore apparently quite clearthatGodhasnoobjectiontotheeatingof It isthereforeapparently food for you. Justas I gave youthegreenplants, I now give youeverything”. types ofmeat(chickenasmoreacceptablethangorilla,forexample)willfind those whofindeatingsome types ofmeatmore acceptable thaneatingother thus differentiatingmankindfrom the restofanimalcreation.Inaddition, after to theBible,“[…]LordGodformedamanfromdustofground theory. limited resourceinthistypeofjustification.Ifthereissomemeritblunt precisely andsharply,perhaps within the contextof a wider normative ethical different speciesthatextendstotheactionsofnon-vegetarian humanbeings, a fairlycommon reply relates tothecomparison between humansasmeat- a variety ofotherfactors(thefactthat something isallowable doesnotmakeit animals, althoughanumberofChristiansdoopt foravegetarian lifestyle for of life,andthemanbecamealiving and breathedintohisnostrilsthebreath argument formeat-eating,itwillvery likelyneed to bebroughtoutmore and foxes etc. Indeed, the factthatlions sometimes eat human beings does not challenging toidentify.Forone,we donotoftenbaseourmoraljudgments regarding theacceptabilityofcertainactionsonbehaviourslions,bears more goingforit,dependingonyourwideroutlooktheworld. According meat. being”. eat pigs/cows/sheepetc.Given thatitwouldbeodd, even forthemostardent eaters andotheranimalsasmeat-eaters.So,justlionseatgazelles,bears suggest tousthateatingotherhumans may bemorallyacceptable.Inaddition, wesuch that tooshouldbefreefrommoralcriticisminourconsumption of seem to followthatthereisamoralequivalence between theactionsofthese salmon andfoxeseatchickens(iftheycangettheirpawsonthem),sohumans surrounding meat-eating from the perspective of Utilitarianism, Kantian necessarily desirable). 4 3 In theremainderofthischapter,however, we considertheethicalissues However, possibleweaknessesabove inthe too responseshouldnotbe Genesis 2:7, NewInternationalVersion, Genesis 9:3, NewInternationalVersion, 2%3A7&version=NIV 9:3&version=NIV 3 This verse is ofteninterpretedas God providingmanwithasoul, and

https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Genesis+ https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Genesis+ 4

would nothave any moralweight indecidinghowtomaximisetotalpleasure. Utilitarianism, asexplainedin Ethics and Aristotelian Virtue Ethics;theoriesinwhichBiblicalreferences forms familiar withtheapplicationofthreetheoriesmentionedabove inorder focussing on Biblicalteachingmayseem to provideaclearanswer onthe 3. Act Utilitarianism the ideaofequalconsideration of interests —thepleasures of aqueenshould comes tothe act utilitarians,whenit views ofJeremyBenthamandother the to bewell prepared for the exam. In the nextsection, we beginthisprocess of the equalconsiderationofinterests,anypainthatmightbesufferedbycow passages, hestatesthat: 3. The application of metaethical theories to this applied ethical topic can be are notcentralfor deciding how to act. Thus, although a religious ethic approach totheprincipleofequalconsideration. In oneofhismost famous applying tohumanbeingsonly.Ifunderstoodinthisway, theviewofact acceptability ofeatinganimals, would be fairlysimple to ascertain.The act the normativeapplying theoriesaspreviouslyoutlinedinChapters1,2and context in count nomore than thepleasures of apeasant,irrespective oftheirsocial Bentham of pleasure for the greatestnumberof people. Although Bentham holds to utilitarian of aBenthamitevarietyutilitarian amount simply seekstosecurethegreatest understood from utilitarian would be clear,as the pleasureofahumanbeingwheneatingbeef burger wouldoutweigh anymorallyrelevant pain. After all,onthisversion of standing andsocietalpower —this notionofequalitymightbethoughtas justification ofeatinganimals,studentsstudyingforthe AQA exammustbe . Bentham, J. 5 The day may come when the rest of theanimal creation mayacquirethoserightswhichneverthe rest day maycomewhen The However, Bentham did not adopt thisanthropocentric(human-centred) could have been discovered thattheblacknessofskinisnoreasonahuman beingshouldbeabandonedwithout insufficient for abandoningasensitive beingtothesamefate the legs,villosity of the skin,orthetermination of the reason?’ nor,‘Cantheytalk?’but, ‘Cantheysuffer?’ redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognised that the number of to thecapriceofatormentor.Itmayonedaycomeberecognisedthatnumber redress Bentham/bnthPML18.html — , Act, RuleandPreferenceUtilitarianismas suggested by John StuartMill Chapter 11 An Introduction tothePrinciples ofMoralsandLegislation An [withheld] Chapter 6 Chapter .

from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have fromthembutbythehandoftyranny.The already and , andthediscussion of Metaethicsinanapplied Peter Singer Chapter 1 Chapter 5 , comesinavarietyof different respectively. Itmightseemthat [pelvic bone] […]. The questionisnot,‘Canthey , http://www.econlib.org/library/ are reasonsequally Jeremy 221 Eating Animals 222 APPLIED ETHICS views were certainlysomewhat out ofkilterwithmanyhisphilosophical were morallywrong. would seeminglycountthose pains andpleasuresasjustvaluable asthe was nomoralissueinthistypeofaction,sinceasoullessanimalsuchas In this passage, Bentham makes it clear that animals cannotbeexcludedfrom In thispassage,Benthammakesitclearthat for thegreatestnumber;simplyput,allsufferingcreatures —humanor the calculationoftotalpainsandpleasuresassociated with aparticular the totalpleasureassociated with such acts, then Bentham and Benthamite to theviewthatBenthamwouldcountpains andpleasuresofanimalsas to thewall inordertostudyitsmechanisticmovements. ForDescartes,there philosophers would be forced to conclude that thoseinstancesofmeat-eating pain suffered by animals) associated with actsofmeat-eating were tooutweigh pains and pleasures of human beingsgiven his commitment toa principle of dog could not feel pain and only mimicked the appearance of genuine pain. appearance ofgenuine mimicked the and only dog couldnotfeelpain above isimportant.Neither Benthamnoranyother relativisticutilitarian and animalwelfare movements.with Benthamornot,his you agree Whether to talkortheirdeficientrationalcapacities act justbecauseoftheirinability contemporaries. Forexample,justalittleover acenturyearlier,oneofthe Bentham, had he knownof Descartes actions, would have likelyrecoiled at the on species alone is also arbitrary. If whatmattersispainandpleasure,thenthe on speciesaloneisalsoarbitrary. or pleasures. So, just asdenyingmoral relevance basedonskincolour or race of racism is drawn.Benthamsays that skincolour is deemed to beamorally inability torecognisethemorallyrelevant painsofthedog. utilitarian decision-makinghasmade him aheroic figure inanimalrights is arbitrary,andjustaswe inthecontemporaryworldbelieve thatdenying irrelevant featureofanindividual and affords no reason to ignoretheirpains in theinitialsection of thepassage,where acomparison to theethical failing into thecalculationdeterminingwhichactwillproducegreatestpleasure in comparison tohumanbeings.Onthecontrary,solongasananimaldoes morally relevant whenconsidering the acceptabilityofeatinganimals, and he most respectedphilosophersofall-time —RenéDescarteswas, accordingto moral relevance basedongenderisarbitrary,denyingmoralrelevance based equality whencountingpainsandpleasures.Thus, ifthetotalpain(including experience somesufferingorpain,thenthispainmustbefactored some accounts, cutting open his wife’s pet dog after nailing the poor creature the nailing dog after open hiswife’spet some accounts,cutting species that acts as host to thatpainand pleasure would seem to beirrelevant. not —are partofthegroupmorallyrelevant beings. This idea ofequalityconsiderationforanimals is justifiedbyBentham Bentham’s opennesstoweighingthe painsandpleasuresofanimalsin Before moving on,itis worth notingthat thelanguageused in theparagraph By puttingtheindividualpiecesofhistheorising together,we cancome These are,ofcourse,“cardboardcut-out”cases, some distancefromreal-world ( wrong. Theideasofrelativismandabsolutismareexploredinmoredetail would ever comment that eatinganimals is absolutely rightor absolutely 4. ChallengestoBentham However,of cases range for youtoconsiderthe benefit of fargreater will be it from originalBenthamquote,saysthat a“full-grownhorseordog this theory in this applied context. Does this theoryinappliedcontext. Act Utilitarianismseemtoprovidethe than aninfantofadayorweek oreven amonth,old”. that themakingofamoral distinction between animals and humanbeings Chapter 1 Chapter line but not thoseaboveline but a seeminglyinsurmountable theline,arefacedwith Chapter 7 Consider an elderly humanbeingwhoissufferingfrom dementia, oratwo- processes such as racism and sexism. Perhaps it is the case that thepleasures either rationality is morallyrelevantdilemma —either rationality andsosomehumanslack and painsofhumanbeingsareworthmore,invirtueourintellector capacity to fairly serious levels. To this end, in the portionof text removed capacity forhigher-orderthinkingandexperience. right sortofdecisionprocedure,withthesortsconclusions? dog inorderto cancer, needstoeatahealthy research scientist,closetocuring One challengetoBentham’s act utilitarian view may be based upon theidea order foryoutoformeitherarobustcritiqueordefenceoftheapplication of casesinwhich animals, in Act Utilitarianismwillspeakinfavourofeating in which Act Utilitarianism mayspeak againsteatinganimals, and the range about thegoodineachindividual interested onlyinworkingouthowtobring is farfromarbitraryandthatthereadifferencebetween sucha“ is beyondcomparison a morerational,aswell asamoreconversable animal, month-old baby,orapatientinPersistent Vegetative State(asdiscussed in human beingsfromanimals, alinethatmightjustifyeatingthosebelow the burger producedcheaplyandwithmuchsufferingtotheanimalmaynotbe making inthecontextof Act Utilitarianismandeatinganimals. seek to draw a line in the sand in terms of rationality, a line that separates seek todrawalineinthesandtermsofrationality, alinethat survive longenoughtopass his research on. On theotherhand, eating aturkey situation. Thus, meat-eating may be morally acceptable on this view if a justifiable becausethepleasureassociated with consumptionissominimal. Peter Singer 6  However, we shouldbecautiouswhenrespondingtoBenthaminthisway. Ibid . , but for nowitisworthremindingourselves, but is the actutilitarian that ). All threeoftheseindividuals wouldseemtobelackinginrational made this termfamous) distinction anddiscriminatory thought- 6 Thus,thosewho speciesist ” 223 Eating Animals 224 APPLIED ETHICS The previous two sections should make clear that for utilitarians such as The previoustwosectionsshouldmakeclearthatforutilitarians when thepainassociated with eatinganimalsoutweighs anycorresponding factory-farmed foods,asthefollowingquotesuggests: forward. Since babies of two months have the potentialtobecome more rational that anynon-humananimalhas. then themorallyrelevant lineinthesandbetween humans and animals may than theycurrentlyare,andsincethisappliestodementiapatientsPVS 5. UtilitarianReasonsforEating Animals pleasure. Itis worth noting,however, thatSingeris very clear that eating previous paragraph. potentially morerationalthanadog or a horse, they should not acquire any patients also if successful treatment could be discovered and administered, particular conditions, does point ustowards thesituationsinwhichmeat- animals can be entirelymorally justifiable, and not just in extremelyunlikely to morallyseparateanimalsandhumansongroundsofrationality attempt Bentham and Singer, therewillbetimes when itis morally wrong toeatanimals; range chickens; the same would presumably applytotheeatingof the chicken or intellect is again seemingly confronted by the dilemmaasstatedin confronted by or intellectisagainseemingly itself. However, this type of objection to theeatingof particular animals, in until heactuallybecomesaking. Analogously, althoughatwo-month-oldis is clear ifwe consider the powers of Prince Charles. Whilst he is a moral standing, or rationality is notmorallyrelevantmoral standing,orrationality to and thisattempt he has only the rights of a prince, not a king. He will not earn kingly rights he hasonlytherightsofaprince,notking.Hewillearnkingly be redrawn on the basis that all humanshavebe redrawnonthebasisthat rational skills higher potentially eating may be morally acceptable to a preference utilitarian such asSinger. to apreferenceutilitarian may bemorallyacceptable eating extra moralconsiderationuntilthatpotentialisactualised.Therefore,any situations. ItistruethatSingerscornful of themoralacceptabilityeating separate humansfromanimalsisafailure. king Singer also objects to the consumption of eggs that are notsourcedfromfree- consumption ofeggsthat Singer alsoobjectstothe 7 These arguments These In ordertoovercome thisproblem,a However, Singerhas a clever response to thispotentialitysuggestion,which animals whohave beenrearedinfactory farms —which meansthatwe shouldnoteatchicken, methods pork orveal,we unless knowthatthemeatwe areeatingwas notproducedbyfactory farm , PrinceCharlesiscurrentlyonlyaprince.This means that,atthemoment, P. Singer,‘Equality for Animals?’, p. 174. . 7 [relating to themoral relevance [relating ofpainsafflictinganimals] potentiality argument may beput apply to potential The various criticismsappliedtoUtilitarianismin If chickens,forexample,areallowedpainlessly being toroamfreely,before future preferencesthatwillgounfulfillediftheirlives arecutshort. them willknow,areunlikelytohave thementalcapacitytohave longrunning to theactofeatinganimalshave beensetoutasabove, thenapplyingrule- the sakeofavoidingrepetition,youshould consider the applicationof these preferences, forexample —arenotirrelevant inthischapter.However, for killed (somethingthatseems entirely possible,even ifthisisnotwhat discussion of Mill and Rule Utilitarianism, as well as a discussion of higher always achieved in reality),thenthebalanceof preference satisfaction may all thatwas suggestedearlier. Bentham, Animals farmedandkilled,thought agree. However, once theissuesregardingapplicationofUtilitarianism and lowerIn asense, we pleasures,isacriticalomissionfrom thischapter. continued existence of the chicken itself criticisms yourself whencomingtoyourview regarding thepotentialsuccess of apredator. of utilitarian(actandpreference)responsestoeating animals. utilitarian cannotprovideaclear-cutanswer onthegeneralacceptabilityof unmanaged wilderness. Well-managed andquicklyadministered slaughter issues aresuggestedforconsideration. utilitarian-style thinking should be a far easier task. For now, the following may leadtolesspainthanstarvation, diseaseorviolentdeathaftertheattack may sufferfarlesspainthananimalslefttodieintheharshrealityof based on demandingness,or based on issues of calculation ofpleasures or eating animals.Singersumsthisupwhenhesaysthat: slaughter vary from company to company and culture toculture,the swing infavourofthehungryfamilyseekingahealthydietandaway fromthe 8  1. In anever changingworld,wherethepractices associated with animal Indeed, even Benthamhimselfsupportedtheideaofeatinganimals, despite consequently we shouldboycotttheendresultofthisprocess. confident that itwas, theprinciple of equalconsideration of interests impliesthatit was wrongto Given thepreviouscomments, it maybesuggestedthatthelackof sacrifice important interestsof the animal in orderto satisfy less important interests of our own; […] whether the fleshwewhether areconsideringbuyingwasweUnless producedwithoutsuffering. canbe Ibid Is meat-eating a higherorlowerIs meat-eating pleasure? Doesitmakeadifference if lambis consumed in agreasy-spooncafé, or ifitispreparedbya theimportant question is not whetheranimal flesh could be producedwithout suffering, but ., p.175. — chickens, as those who deal with 8 Chapter 1 Chapter —objections 225 Eating Animals 226 APPLIED ETHICS According to Answering thesequestions,inthelightofdiscussion in boththischapter 4. However,those concernsto one side,itmaythenseemasthough putting which one may deal and dispose at one’s discretion”. Imperative as explored in Kant hasgiven usausefullyclearstatementofhisethicalthinkingasitmaybe 6. KantianEthicsandEating Animals to securefood,butthereisnothingnecessaryabout thistakingplacewhen animals existthemselvesto anend(andKantisclearthat onlyasameantoan that humanshave noresponsibilitytoanimals,andthereforemayseemingly direct duty to care for them. Kant says of a person that “[if] heisnottostifle direct dutytocareforthem. Kantsays of apersonthat“[if] different inrankanddignityfrom things, such as irrational animals, with and concern rather than with no consideration at all, despiteourlackofa no considerationat with than and concernrather and willonlybeimpermissible whenwe actwronglytowards afellowhuman permissible be animals willgenerally animals areconsumed.Thus,eating animals does not itselfentail the treatingof another person merely as a means applied inthiscontext. and consume thematwill,isopentothesameobjectionsasoutlinedinsection of ourduty. universalised or willingtheuniversalising ofthisaction.Inaddition,eating universal law,asthereisnoissuewitheitherconceivingthisactionbeing being insecuring our food end of animalsdoesnotfallfoulthetwoformulationsCategorical eating 10 . Kant, I. 9 2. 3. Yet,above, forallofthe animals withcare does encourageustotreat Kant

Kant isclear that we have noDirectDutiestowards animals because the 10 Chapter 1 I. Kant,‘We Have noDuties to Animals’, p.395. ). Ofcourse,we may treatapersonmerelyasmeanstoanendinseeking Are animals worth less than humans because theycannotaccess higher Would anoutrightbanonfactoryfarmingbearulethat,ifuniversalised, would lead tothegreatestgood for thegreatestnumber?Whatother an of eating Shouldthemoralacceptability world-renowned chef? pleasures? animal turnontheway inwhichananimalispreparedforconsumption? rules mightbeadvocatedbyaruleutilitarianinthisappliedethical setting? Lectures on Anthropology Lectures , should provide asolid grasp ofutilitarianthinkinginthisarea. Immanuel Kant — the animal itself is not relevant totheassessment . Chapter 2 , ahumanbeingis “[…] abeingaltogether . The eating of animals can become a 9 Ofcourse, the idea 7. Virtue EthicsandEating Animals virtue-ethical thinking, wevirtue-ethical thinking, shouldaskinwhatcircumstances and atwhat vegetarianism could be avirtueinandofitself,since vegetarianism isaway with otherhumanbeings.Ourdutytoanimals,saysKant,isthereforeindirect will be,asaresult,lesslikelytoactinaccordance with dutyintheirdealings would eatnoanimalsatall,justsomeanimals,or allanimalsonoffer. Ethics to expect absolute moral answersEthics toexpectabsolute of eating ethical acceptability onthe Christine for DirectDutiestoanimals,even ifKanthimselfdidnot. fact”. times would a disposition to refrain from eating meat bevirtuous,andwhen times wouldadisposition torefrainfromeating draw the followingimportantlesson from the outset.Itis not possible that dispositions andcharactertraitsassociatedwith virtuouspeople,whothen animals. Rather thanattemptingtomake ethicaljudgmentsonthemoralityof act, oranendorsementof,cruelty.Inanycase,itseems that, rather ironically, are needlesslycrueltoanimals,whokillwantonly orwho treatanimalswith regarding howtoactinthesphereofeatinganimals. rather thandirect —itexistsonlyinsofaraspaysoutourdealingswith Being anagent-centredmoraltheory,itwouldbeamisunderstandingofVirtue our fellowhumans. of life rather than a character trait or a disposition. Rather, if weor adisposition.Rather, a charactertrait than of liferather aretofollow is permissibleoracceptabletotreatapain-experiencingcreaturemerelyas it is the case that theeatingof factory-farmed foods could be considered an is cruel toanimals becomes hard also in his dealings with men”. means to anend,since “[…] itis a paintobeinpain. And that is not atrivial may provide guidance when it comes to whether or not the virtuous person or notthe may provideguidancewhenitcomestowhether his humanfeelings,hemustpracticekindnesstowards animals,forhewho specific instancesofeatinganimals,Virtuediscuss the Ethics insteadoptsto scant regard for their suffering,become familiar with thisapproach to lifeand such adispositionmight belabelledasaviceofexcessordeficiency. Singer andKantendupinmuchthesamepositionwhenitcomestoadvice notion ofDirectDutiestowardsit animals.Korsgaarddoesnotacceptthat no objectionsolongaswe were notcruel orunkindinourapproach.Perhaps 12 11 . Korsgaard, C.  It isworthwhilenoting,finally,thatcontemporaryKantianssuchas In termsofapplyingthislinethoughttoeatinganimals,Kantwouldhave From theexplanationofVirtue Ethics offered in Ibid 12 ItthereforemaybeanopenquestionwhetherKantiansshould allow . The SourcesofNormativity (1952–)have objectedtoKant’sowndisregardingofthe , p.154. Chapter 3 Chapter 11 , we should Those who 227 Eating Animals 228 APPLIED ETHICS Aristotle virtue-ethical responsetothisissue). vice ofdeficiency. of animalswilloftenreflectavice-likecharactertrait eating the view that when otheroptions are unavailable (perhaps througheconomic factors). In weanimal inquestionmayhave purchaseourmeat,thatthe ledarather when itcomestochoosingwhetherornoteatanimals,Hursthousesays: Hursthouse suggests that Singer, in arguing against cruelty to animalsfrom against cruelty Singer, inarguing Hursthouse suggeststhat focussing on promoting compassionate rather thancruel decision-making to human conduct, but human flourishing is supposed to be a whole-life process to humanconduct,butflourishingissupposed tobeawhole-lifeprocess the virtueof meat-eating; his ideas are worth exploringfor a slightly different this setting,astubborncommitment to vegetarianism over and above a clear- animals as Hursthouse does. Whether this guidance is an accurate interpretation animals asHursthousedoes.Whetherthisguidance isanaccurateinterpretation and it isthereforenot without motivation tofocus on our dispositions towards alternative. However, it isnotdifficulttoconceive ofasituationinwhich of Singerinthisareaandtheapproachvirtueethicist. arguments chicken fordinnerratherthanamoreexpensive andlessattractive vegetarian rather thanavirtuouscharactertrait.Given thatmanyofusareaware, when outlined cases, it would be useful to have more general guidance. Again, decisions; wilful ignorancemaybeviewedor makingdietary of shopping as issue of eating animals into a particular setting,perhapsthechoice of cheap unpleasant existence, our willingness to ignorethisinformation hardly coheres meat-eating mightbeconsidered to betheresultofavirtuouscharacteristic, headed recognitionoftheneedsyourchildrenmayrepresentanaction his preference utilitarianperspective, provides evidence in favour of the based on a vice of excess. ( such as the eating of an animal in order to promote the health of yourchildren of ananimalinordertopromotethehealth eating such asthe neatly withexercising the virtuous mean of compassion in the sphere of life 15 14 13

The example above of shopping inthevalue aisle for our food puts the Rosalind Hursthouse apply virtueethicscorrectlytowhatwe aredoing are notonlyinterwovenand onlythen,willwe witheachotherbut therestofnature.Then, a clearly seen andeffective recognitionof the fact that human beings,andtherebyhumanlives, Of course, rather than thespecificstudyofvirtuousresponsesintwo Of course,rather […] R. Hursthouse,‘ApplyingVirtue EthicstoOurTreatmentoftheOther Animals’, p.154, R. Scruton,‘Eat Animals! It’s for TheirOwnGood’, R. Hursthouse, ‘Applying Virtue Ethics to Our Treatment of the Other Animals’, me-54_1_animal-rights hackettpublishing.com/pdfs/Hursthouse_Essay.pdf hackettpublishing.com/pdfs/Hursthouse_Essay.pdf we needa substantial change in ouroutlook to get any further — was more concerned with the application of the virtuesas they pertained

drawsinterestingcomparisonsbetween the 14

. 15 is one virtue ethicistwho speaks of http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07-25/local/ in virtue ethicists’ terms, http://www. http://www. 13

Aristotelian thinking,orhasshecreatedarival version ofVirtue Ethics? To concludethischapter,wereflect ontheideasofCoraDiamond, willbriefly your abilitytoapplyvirtueethicalthinkingtheissueofeatinganimals. (AQA alsorecommend reading Diamond’s article). whether theyhave rightstothesame degree ashumans when itcomes to who offersaperspectiveanimals that ontheethicalacceptabilityofeating If you can answer these questions, you should feel more confident in terms of the virtuesasactuallyoutlinedby to thisapproachentirely anddoes not seek tocriticisethemoralityofeating Considering the followingthreeissues may helpyoutoclarifyyourthoughts animals viatalkofmoral rights;shehasadifferentkindofcriticism altogether. as to the practicalusefulness of Virtue Ethics for deciding how to actinthis considering the ethical acceptability of consumingthem.Diamondobjects considering theethicalacceptability chapter has been on the question of whether animals are morally relevant, or question toanswer iswhetherornotHursthouse’sreasoninginlinewithcore 8. CoraDiamond of Aristotelian ideas, is something that is worth reflecting on in the context of of Aristotelian ideas,orwhetheritisanindependentlyadvantageous extension unclear guidance may seem highly troubling,even inspiteoftheideas above. stands apartfromthenormativediscussed ethicaltheory-basedviewshitherto setting. 16 1. 2. 3.

Of the criticisms that might be appliedtoVirtueOf thecriticismsthat Ethics,theobjectionfrom C. Diamond, ‘Eating Meat and Eating People’,C. Diamond,‘EatingMeatandEating pdf Angela isavegetarian who iseatingwithafriendathighlyexpensive Would itbevirtuousfor Angela toeattheduck,orstandbyher Who arethevirtuousrolemodelsfromwhomwe canlearnwhenit TV presenterssuchasBearGrylls andEdStaffordare oftendropped animal” whencookingit?Vegetarian campaigners? courses toeat.Onedishinvolves theeatingofcarefullypreparedduck. comes toeatinganimals?TVchefs,whospeakof“doingjusticethe restaurant. Angela’s friendhaspaidfordinner,andchosenthe idea ofthe“Paris Exemption”todevelop youranswer.) into inhospitablelocationsforourentertainment,andcanonlysurvive beliefs even inanextremesituation?(ItisworthresearchingSinger’s by killinganimalsforfood.Doestheirreflectavirtue,orvice?

Aristotle http://www.laurentillinghast.com/DiamondEatingMeat. , andprovidedin 16 Muchofthefocusinthis Peter Singer Chapter 3 ? . A key key . A 229 Eating Animals 230 APPLIED ETHICS “a person is not something to eat”. This is a thought that comes about because that “a personisnotsomethingtoeat”.Thisathought This uncomfortableness is explainednotbytalkofrights,buttheideathat without anyassociated talk ofrights.Specifically,Diamond suggests thatour whereas myownchickensinthegardenarenot. For Diamond, such an argumentisextremelyunpersuasive. This is becauseit takes issuewiththefollowinglineofargument: the possibilityof consuming human dead bodies, or amputated human limbs. to add to thelistofthingsnotbeeaten.To this end,Diamond offers a Jane to eat,justasachickenondisplayinsupermarketissomethingformeeat them inways thatwe donotwithwildanimals.Wild animalsmaybethings decisions in otherspheresoflifethateatingcertainentitiesis unacceptable and amputatedhumanlimbs,arealsonotthingstobeeaten. As Diamond aversiondead of the moral right based onthe human deadisnot the toeating comes to explainingthemoral acceptability of eating animals, because we make realist wouldlike,orwhetherthesecalls reflect anon-cognitivist,perhapsan our lives. of thenatureourinteractionswithhumanbeingsandbodypartsin up ongenuinelyexistingmoralpropertiesinthe worldasthecognitivistor in interpretation of moral thought and moral talk (thesetheoriesareexplained moral status of certain animals as “things not toeat”aredesignedpick moral statusofcertainanimalsas“things misses, in its cold and logical form, the factthatpets,likedead human bodies be advanced, not bycold and logical arguments as previously identified, and body nottobeeaten,butbecausewe feeluncomfortableatthevery mentionof emotivist-style, attitude. says, pets aregiven names, we let them into our houses and we interact with not bytalkofmoralrights, butbyreshapingourrelationshipwithanimals 17 Chapter 6 Youis no primates, perhaps)becausethere least higher other animals(at shouldnoteat You wouldnoteatyourpets You wouldnoteathumanbeings  This approach may be appealing to a non-cognitivist, anti-realist to anon-cognitivist, appealing This approachmaybe However, Diamond herselfholdsavegetarianshe thinkscan position that For Diamond,thenotionof“moralrights”foranimalsisirrelevant whenit Extending thislineof thinking totheissue of eating animals, Diamond and If then meaningful differencebetween suchanimalsandthingsthatyouwouldnoteat. Ibid ., p.468. 17

). We mightwonder if thecries of thecampaignerregarding This poem,saysDiamond, doesnotpreach aformofbehaviour,butinstead Legge poem, dead human being. Cannibalism isnotalwaysdead humanbeing. viewedmorally wrong, asbeing as objectsforconsumption,thenwe maychangeourrelationshipwiththem challenge thatherlineofargumentopposingunethical treatmentofanimals sources which animalsareacceptable challenges assumedbeliefsregarding rights justifyfairandequal treatment,ratherthanthemerefactthatwe might or Kantianjustifications. of course,asdifficultsituationswillchangeour perspective; mostofthetime, of foodandwhicharenot.Ifwe viewanimalsasfellowcreaturesratherthan may befarmoreeffective forsecuringmovements towards vegetarianism: might createunfortunateanalogies with ways in which we should oppose however, we recoil at thispossible act without theneed for formal utilitarian happen toseepeopleas fellow creatures (a factthatappearstodepend on us, sexism andracism.Incasesofracism, wemoral mighthopethat such that killingand eating themwillseem as out of bounds as consuming a 18  Diamond’s and sherespondstoa paper isworthyourcarefulattention, Ibid ., pp.472–73. All yourlovely, juicymeat. Yes, thatleg’sfromPeter Rabbit They onlycomeonearthtodie, That’s whyanimalsarehere. Then thebreastfromMrsCluck Time fordinner!Comeandeat Woven intotalesfortots, (No, itdoesn’thurthernow). (In thecomicshe’sacorker), Kiss thehamster;skinmink. Pictured ontheirwalls andpots. Never thinkofslaughter,dear, Eat thefleshfrom“filthyhogs” Eat thecreatureskilledforsale, Chew itwell; makethatahabit. Liver nextfromClaraCow Grow upintodouble-think Ducks andchickens,sheepsows Dogs andcatsgoatscows, But never beunkindtodogs. But never pullthepussy’stail. Or thewingfromDonaldDuck. One dayhamfromPercy Porker So eatyourmeat,anddon’taskwhy. Learning tobeaDutiful Carnivore 18 , asanexemplaroftacticsthat 231 Eating Animals 232 APPLIED ETHICS Whether youfindDiamond’s approach compellingornotmattersmore,in COMMON STUDENTMISTAKES SUMMARY theories basedonreferencetorightsorduties? and notthepersonwhoshouldhave themoralright).We mightsuggestthat all likelihood,thanwhetheryouagreewithherconclusions;ifmethodis our recoiling atracial discrimination follows from the moral right a person has, notthatourrecoilingiswhatmakes such discrimination morally wrong. sound, thendoesthisshowaweakness intheapproachesof normative • • • (see Claiming thattheissueof eatinganimalsmustturnontheissueof Completely avoidingmetaethicalissuesthatmay berelevant to against anaturalisticutilitarian whoassociatesgoodnesswithpleasure considering the argumentofDiamond. criticising moralpositions —suchastheOpenQuestion Argument Over-simplifying Kant’spositiononanimals —noDirectDutiesdoes equal considerationofinterests andtherightsofanimals,without not meannodutiesatalltowards animals. Few moraltheoristswillclaimthateatinganimals is absolutely Evenof to animalsinspite idea ofcruelty the recoiled at Kant theories, aswell ascoming toyourownviewpoint. provide youwiththemoralframeworkintowhichreal-world acceptability of eatinganimalsmayoftenbedeterminedby acceptability animals. This factsuggeststhatconclusions regarding theethical in allcircumstancesandattimes. and completelyacceptable and then slaughtering animals forhuman consumption. The and thenslaughtering research can be plugged,inorder to explain thedifferentkey real-world situation isconstantlyinflux, butthischaptershould or pleasuresofanimalsandtheimpactprocesses ofrearing his expressed denial that humans possess any dutytowardshis expresseddenialthat empirical and real-world data regarding thepreferences, pains Chapter 6 ). ISSUES TOCONSIDER KEY TERMINOLOGY Some questionsareprovidedattheendsofsections5and7. • • 1. 4. 2. 6. 3. 5. Anti-Realism? your favourednormative moraltheorytoseeifitgets itrightinthis without drawingdeeperdistinctionsastowhenmeat-eatingmightbe How muchofthismoralissueturnsonempiricaldataregardingthe Falling intothetotalvegetarianism versus totalmeat-eatingnarrative Failing togive dueconsiderationtoEmotivismand/orPrescriptivism Moral statementsregardingtheacceptabilityofeatinganimalsare find thecorrectconclusioninthisethicalarea,orshouldyoucheck treatment ofanimalsbeforeslaughter? acceptability ofeatinganimals? animals? Whichones? acceptable andwhenitmightnotbe. as non-cognitive ways ofinterpretingthisdebate. Does moraldisagreementinthisappliedethicalarealendsupportto Do allanimalsdeserve equalconsiderationofinterests?Doonlysome often emotional.Doesthismeantheemotivistexplanationisbest ethical area? explanation? Should youapplyyourfavourednormative moraltheoryinorderto Should we expectclearmoralanswers whenitcomestothe Equal considerationof interests Speciesism Indirect Duties Direct Duties 233 Eating Animals 234 APPLIED ETHICS ―, Tolstoy, Leo, Bible References Korsgaard, Christine, Kant, Immanuel,‘We Have NoDutiesto Animals’, in Hursthouse, Rosalind,‘Applying Virtue EthicstoOurTreatmentoftheOther Diamond, Cora,‘EatingMeatandEatingPeople’, Bentham, Jeremy, Singer, Peter, ‘Equalityfor Animals?’, in Scruton, Roger,‘Eat Animals! It’sfor TheirOwnGood’, An IntroductionwithReadings Animals’, in Virtue Ethics Lectures on Anthropology Lectures 465–79, (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press,2012). July 1991),freelyavailable at University Press,1996), New SocietyPublishers,1988). Routledge, 2000),pp.169–79. Russ Shafer-Landau(Oxford:Blackwell Publishing,2007),pp.395–96. 2006), pp.136–55,freelyavailable at freely available at pdfs/Hursthouse_Essay.pdf me-54_1_animal-rights http://www.laurentillinghast.com/DiamondEatingMeat.pdf html biblegateway.com/ , NewInternationalVersion, freelyavailable at

https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100026334 Writings onCivilDisobedienceandNon-Violence , ed.byJenniferWelchman (Indianapolis:HackettPublishing, The PracticeofVirtue: ClassicandContemporaryReadingsin An IntroductiontothePrinciplesofMoralsandLegislation http://www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML18.

The SourcesofNormativity

, ed.by Allen WoodandRobertLoudon https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511554476

, ed.byRosalindHursthouse(London: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07-25/local/ http://www.hackettpublishing.com/ Ethics, HumansandOther Animals: (Cambridge:Cambridge Philosophy https://www. ; freelyavailable at Ethical Theory Los Angeles Times Los Angeles (Philadelphia: , 53.206(1978): , ed.by , (25 Agápē Agápē Act Utilitarianism Activeeuthanasia Act-centred Absolutist Anti-Realism Antinomianism stage Anal Agent-Neutrality Agent-centred wrongness withpeople(e.g.Virtue Ethics). was causedbyexternalintervention ratherthannaturalcauses,mostlikely wrongness withactions(e.g. when it suggests that an action is wrong (or right) in all circumstances, without through alethalinjectionorthevoluntaryswallowing ofadeadlycocktail does notgive anyspecialconsiderations toanyone. drugs. agent candowhatever heorshewants inasituation. and itstartswithcontrollingthebladderbowels (beingpottytrained). an roughly fromone and a halftothree years old. Pleasure is gained through of anymind-independent, objective, moralproperties. controlling going to the toilet irrespective ofanycircumstances. humans exception. Forexample,murder might bethoughttoabsolutelywrong, special weighting beinggiven to personal feelings. so astobringaboutthemost attitude : Greek word meaning“love”.: Greek love Referstothe

calculus for God andnotafeeling, : A normative moraltheoryisabsolutist,ratherthanrelativistic, : The second stage of : A normative moral theory thatassociates moral rightness/ : Simplythedenialof : A normative moraltheorythatassociates rightness/ : Introduced byFletcher.The claim that we ought to always act . The“highest”formoflove. : The term introduced by Fletcherwhich says that morally an : The view thatmoral decisions should be made without : Ifapersonisactivelytheir death euthaniseditmeansthat : See Consequentialism . This stage isaboutgainingcontrolofone’s body,

one Utilitarianism love Glossary

which does not expect anything in returnand which does not expectanything Freud forthemostpeople. Realism ’s Psychosexual Development Theory Development Psychosexual . ). Agápē . Anti-realists denytheexistence , as discussed by Fletcher, is Fletcher, , asdiscussed by of God forhumansand

235 Glossary 236 Glossary “Boo/hurrah” theory A posteriori A priori tiuia Hedonism Attitudinal good Apparent Theory. An apparentgood is whena your ownperson as well asinthe person of anyother,always atthesame time Natural Law ontvs, Psychological Cognitivism, ends of Kingdom 3: Imperative Categorical Categorical Imperative 2: Means and ends Universalization 1: Imperative Categorical Imperative Categorical Biting-the-bullet Belief this view. that when wethat makemoral claimsoftheform“murderiswrong”or“helping law”. as anend,never merelyasameans”. apparently awkward conclusionasanon-fatalimplicationoftheory. can workouthowwe oughttobehave. Itisacommand (imperative) which others isright”we aregivingvoice to our universal kingdom of ends”. states maxim throughwhichyoucanatthesametimewillthatitbecomeauniversal makes a lifego well is entirely determined by theamountofpleasureaperson experiences where pleasure is understood as an experience theworld. so actasifhewere throughhismaximalways a lawmaking memberinthe should befollowed irrespective oftheconsequences(categorical). something tobetrue. pleasure in . Kant, I. 1 2  3  Ibid Ibid. 1 suchasemotions.

: A psychological state.Ifyoubelieve something,thenyoutakethat ., p.21. , p.66. : Knowledge gainedthroughreason alone, withoutneedingtotest/ something)ratherthanasensation. Moral Law : Knowledge gainedasaresultofexperiencetheworld. sowe arenotmorallyrequiredtofollowit. : Introducedby : Theargumentative strategyofsimplyaccepting an , p.15. : See : The theoryof : Kant’ssupremeprincipleofmorality.Usingthiswe Emotivism : Nottobeconfused with 3

Aquinas . 2 secondary precept well-being whendiscussinghisNaturalLaw beliefs : “So act thatyouusehumanity,in : “…actonlyaccording to that : “…every rational beingmust Fred Feldman , ratherthanour attitudinal state which holds that what is out oflinewiththe Realism isadefender of . Itsuggests (i.e. non-belief taking

“bears witness”,anditisa“sign-post”towhatrightwrong.It The first is that the actmustbeagood one; the second is that theactmust come what iscommanded/forbiddenbyGod. when we makemoralclaimsoftheform“murderiswrong”or“helping others Utilitarianism If an act fulfils four conditions then it is morally acceptable. If not, then it is not. If not,thenit If anactfulfilsfourconditions thenitismorallyacceptable. He callsitthe“applicationofknowledge toactivity”. Consequentialism ( Conscience ( Conscience Semantic Cognitivism, Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) Law Divine Theory Command Divine Dispositions Duties Direct Deontological objection Demandingness fourth, itmustbeforserious reasons. thought ofassynonymouswiththe“guiltyconscience”. given byGod which we find in scripture; for example, the tencommandments. psychology. Forexample,Imayhave thedispositiontobeangryifsomeone ego duties arrived atviaaformulationofthe about beforetheconsequences; the thirdisthatintention mustbegood;the Divine Lawisdiscovered through case thatpleasureneedstobemerelypromotedbutactually outcomes. of anactionisdeterminedwhollybytheconsequencesthat(e.g. is right”ourclaimscanbetrueorfalse(whatphilosopherscall has, in His grace, seen fit togive us and are those “mysteries”, those rules steals fromme,orthedispositiontobeforgivingifsomeoneme. source of moral knowledge. This means that for Aquinas conscience is opportunities takesinaddressing the ego.This understanding of “conscience” can be : Introduced by , thenanextremelyhighbarisset. : Inrespectof Virtue Ethics, dispositions are tendencies in our Aquinas Freud : Used in discussion of Kantian ethics. Direct Duties are those ). : A normative moraltheorythatfocuseson : A normative moraltheorythatstatesthe value ) : ForFreudtheconscience is the form that the ) : For Aquinas conscience is morallyneutral,itsimply : Not to be confused with : Nottobe : The metaethical view that what is right/wrong is is right/wrong what : Themetaethicalviewthat : A challengeto Aquinas : Introduced by revelation aspartofhisNaturalLaw Theory. The Categorical Imperative . DivinelawsarethosethatGod Utilitarianism Aquinas Realism in Summa Theologica . Itsuggeststhat . Ifitisnotthe duty maximised atall truth-apt . rather than fallible super- ). not Act a . . 237 Glossary 238 Glossary “flourishing”. vices ofexcessanddeficiency. voluntary Eudaimonia Golden Mean Guilt Introduced by PlatoIntroduced by inhisdialogue Felicific Calculus dilemma Euthyphro Euthanasia Eternal Law Epistemology Empirical Emotivism Electra omplex Ego that holdsmoraljudgementsareexpressionsofthespeaker’s emotions the problematic. The questions: (i)issomethinggood God’s God’s rationalpurposeandplanfor desire experiencedbygirlstohave asexualrelationshipwiththeirfathers,and and interactionwiththeworldasstudiedbyscience. can we know?” consequently beingincompetitionwiththeirmothers. rather thanadescription of anything. This is not tobeconfused with requires certainthingsfrom uswhichwe failtoachieve. questions you can ask about DCT, but each answer that can be given is Or (ii)doesGodcommandit otherwise mightbefaced with amuch more unpleasant death(see also include, “What is knowledge?”; “Canwe knowsomething something thatGoddecidedatsomepointtowrite. orrelativism(sometimes referred toasthe“boo/hurrah”theory). id : Onofthethreepartsmind according to : toallowaperson’ssocialinteractionintheworld. Freud mind / : A method for gainingknowledge thatrequiressense-experience non-voluntary : A metaethicaltheory. A formof ithas always, and will always, exist.The Eternal Lawis : Theactofseekingtoprovideagooddeathforpersonwho : Introducedby : The Aristotelian ideaof“thegoodlife”;besttranslatedas uses this termtoreferthefeelingthatariseswhenourconscience : Thephilosophicalstudyofknowledge. Questionsmight : In Virtue Ethics, the morally virtuous middle way between the : In Jungian psychoanalysis, the namegiven: InJungian totheunconscious : See : A challenge to Hedonic Calculus

and Aquinas because itis

passive whendiscussing his NaturalLawTheory. / active euthanasia all things Euthyphro Good. iie omn Theory Command Divine . P sychological Non-Cognitivism sychological . The Eternal Law is part of . TheEternalLawispart , itsuggeststherearetwo because Freud ). . The“ego”polices God commands it. a priori not ”? “What

simply (DCT).

via activities like poetry, reading or attending the theatre. Lowerthe theatre. reading orattending via activitieslikepoetry, pleasuresare (for example, animals, the environment) is in fact a duty we owe to humans. willing Id Good will Good Indirect Duties Indirect Freud likensittochaos. E.g. we have an indirect duty towards animals because if we treat animals Harm principle Humean Theory of Motivation of Theory Humean Higher and lower pleasures Hedonism Calculus Hedonic Hypothetical Imperative Hypothetical Hume’s fork from relationsofideasandknowledge gainedfrommattersoffact the leadrole.Furtheritisviewthatbeliefsanddesires are distinct mental get fit. lazing onasun-lounger. pleasure. Higherpleasures are thosepleasures oftheintellectbroughtabout power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, part ofthemind. The a animalistic and base; pleasures associated with drinkingbeer,havingsex or associated withapossiblefutureaction. against hiswill,istoprevent harmtoothers.Hisowngood,eitherphysical or of thedesires/wants oftheagent,e.g.yououghttogoforarun other factorsarerelevant atall. of ourprimaldrives,oldest drink andisthe the basicdesiresforfood,sex, e.g. is entirely determined by the amount of pleasure that person experiences; no moral, isnotasufficientwarrant”. badly thenwe willnotupholdourdutiestowards humans. states suchthatabeliefcannotentaildesire. 4 belief : Oneofthethreepartsmindaccordingto J. S.Mill, alone combineswithanappropriatelyrelateddesire —wheretakes : TheKantianideaofourspecificwillwhichisgoodthroughits : A theoryof On Liberty ratherthanwhatiteffectsoraccomplishes. : Hume : Discussed in relationtoKantianethics. A duty we owe toX : John StuartMill : , http://www.econlib.org/library/Mill/mlLbty1.html Jeremy Bentham dividedknowledge intotwocamps —knowledge gained id well-being : applies tosomeone onlybecause A command that cannot beproperlyformalized or understood and : Distinction made by Mill between: Distinctionmadeby of thequality : Theviewthatmotivation onlyariseswhen ’s principle that:“Theonly purpose for which 4 which hold that improves whichholdthat aperson’slife ’s waythe pleasure/pain ofcalculating Freud . Id is thecollection if you . want to 239 Glossary 240 Glossary “Is/ought” gap “Is/ought” When humansactinaccordance with theirpurpose/functionofreasonthen Naturalistic Fallacy Realism Naturalism, Natural Law nicbe ignorance Invincible Intuitionism Intrinsic oa Err Theory Error Moral Mature genital stage Maxim Realism Development Legalism Development stage Latency through theuseofreason.Doingsomethingwrongwhenthey precepts they actaccording to theNaturalLaw (see learn abouttheroleofboys. girls in order to learntherole of a girl and boys playwith in order to known better. desire isrepressed.Therearenonewsexualdesiresformed.Girlsplayswith does not ruleoutotherways ofjustifyingmoralclaims, nor does it meanthat as thosepropertiesdiscussed andexaminedinthesciences. claim froma(descriptive) claim. can be reduced to naturalproperties.Moore believes that onecommits the one moral in thatsystem“blindly”observes moralruleswithoutbeingsensitive tothe intuitionists believe judgestobeinfallible. moral claimsthatwe makeare situation. satisfaction. just inandofitself;itdoesnotrelyonanythingelsefortobegood. naturalistic fallacybyclaiming thatgoodness = pleasure/happiness/preference : A generalprincipleorruleuponwhichwe act. andthe ). : Something is intrinsically good if it is essentially or necessarily good, : Term used by Fletchertoreferasystem of ethicssuch that someone belief : Introduced by : A view inmoral , roughlyfromsixtotheonsetofpuberty. At thisstage sexual . : Thesupposed problem ofderivingan“ought”(prescriptive) : Thefourthstagein , and possibly many, that are self-evidently justifiable. This justifiable. are self-evidently many, that , andpossibly T uhmkr hoy f Truth of Theory ruth-maker : According to : According : Fifth and finalstageof : Fifth : Theviewthatmoralpropertiesexistandareas natural : Combination of : From Aquinas Aquinas systematically anduniformlyfalse E pistemology G. E. Moore G. when discussing his Natural Law Theory. . Ignorancethatcannotbeovercome Freud S mni Non-Cognitivism emantic primary precepts primary Freud

, the idea that moral properties idea that , the that holds that thereis at least ’s . Theconclusionisthat hoy f P of Theory ’s Theory of P

. and could not sychosexual sychosexual secondary , have Anti- all

“murder is wrong” or “helping others is right” our claimsare “murder iswrong”or“helpingothersright” “murder is wrong” or “helping others is right” we are notgivingvoice to our Non-belief state Nihilism Neurosis Normative Non-voluntary euthanasia Psychological Non-Cognitivism, Non-Naturalism Semantic Non-Cognitivism, Open Question Argument Question Open complex Oedipus ObjectiveTheory List Moral ErrorTheorycanbelabellednihilisticbecauseitdeniestheexistenceof for howtobehave/live. false. Theyarenot themselves. to be true. It is typically thoughtto be a non-descriptive or non-representational term meansthesameas anaturalterm.Thismeansthatmoraltermsare life gowell is determined by alist ofitems (e.g. lovingrelationships,meaningful person, becausethepersontobeeuthanisedisunablemakeadecisionfor knowledge, autonomy). desire ofachildtohaveof theoppositesex; a parent asexualrelationshipwith beliefs any moralvalues intheworld. are naturalproperties(e.g. pleasure)thenmoralterms(e.g.“goodness”) must correctly withthe regarding prematureandmercifuldeathismadeforonepersonbyanother realist positionsinMetaethics.Itholdsthat open question —theanswer is not obvious to us up onthescientificpictureofwhatexists. identical with naturalproperties. most likelythisisexpressedasaboy’ssexualattraction tohismother. be synonymouswithnatural terms(e.g.“pleasure”).However, itisalways an state. Forexample,anemotionalstatesuchasjoy,oranger. synonymous with natural terms. This means that moral properties cannotbe terms. Thismeans that natural synonymous with , we areratherexpressingour : Associated with theoriesthattrytoeliminatevalues. Forexample, : Term used by : A normative moraltheory isatheorydesignedtoprovideguidance : something is notrelatedtotaking that A psychologicalstate : Theviewthatifmoral properties existthey could not show id : In psychoanalysis, the name given: Inpsychoanalysis,the totheunconscious truth-apt . Inparticular,whenthepleasureprincipleisrepressed. : A theory of Freud : Non-voluntaryeuthanasiaoccurs when adecision : Putforward by . : Whenwe makemoralclaims of theform toreferwhenthe : When we make moral claims of the form well-being non-belief states if G. E.Moore moral

which hold that what makes a — to askwhetheramoral properties super-ego suchasemotions. . Itattacksnaturalist (e.g.goodness) neither failstodeal true nor not 241 Glossary 242 Glossary Phronesis you as comfortable as possible, bymanagingyour pain and other distressing world. The state is labelled persistent when it is unlikely this conditionwill world. Thestateislabelledpersistentwhenitunlikely whereas inothercontexts,suchashorrorfilms,roller-coasters,dramas they with youasa“whole”person”. Freud thinks we develop the Oral stage rfrne Utilitarianism Preference Principle Pleasure Phallic stage (PVS) State Vegetative Persistent euthanasia Passive Tragedy Paradoxof Palliative care the mostimportantvirtuousdispositionorcharacter trait. greatest goodforthenumber genuine paradox.Theodditythatinreallifenegative emotions arenotdesired putting thingsintheirmouth,pleasurebiting,chewingandsucking. determined by the die duetothedeliberatewithdrawal oftreatment thatmightkeepthemalive. alter throughanytreatment. and your familyorcarers.This is called a holistic approach, because itdeals roughly from three to sixyears.from three roughly discovering Itisabout and one’s genitals, raw or higher forms. Instead, what makes a lifegobetterforperson is entirely of pleasure. identifies andunifiesthedrives ofthe importantly thattheyaredifferentinmenandwomen.This stage iswhere moving throughthisstagewillcauseproblemswithintimacyinlaterlife. are biologically alive,shows nosignofpsychologicalinteractionwiththe but birth to about one and a half. This stage is where babies getpleasure through symptoms. It also involves psychological, social and spiritual supportforyou H definition, NHS 5 desired. starts.aspx : From Aristotelian ethicsreferringto“practicalwisdom”. Arguably : Firststagein :

Freud : “Ifyouhavecured, palliative anillnessthatcan’tbe caremakes http://www.nhs.uk/Planners/end-of-life-care/Pages/what-it-involves-and-when-it- satisfaction of their preferences : Idea put forward by : Passive euthanasiaoccurs when aperson is allowed to ’s third stageinhis : Also knownastheparadoxofnegative emotions.Nota Freud : A non-hedonisticversion of Oedipus ’s 5 Theory of P : A state of being inwhich a person is Theory of P id cannot , and the istheavoidanceofpainandpursuit Freud sychosexual Development bereducedtopleasureineither (e.g. defended by . This is the claim that what Electra complex Electra sychosexual Development Utilitarianism Peter Singer . A problem . A , from . The ). ; A real good is whena Prima Facie you togive with ourmoraljudgments(e.g.Hare). would produce thegreatestamountoftotalhappiness(e.g.defended by when itallows that an action can be moral in one situation butimmoral in Queer Problem of Parity Principle of Utility Charity of Principle Primary Precepts Primary Prescriptivism Rule-Utilitarianism Good Real Relativistic Realism Ratio to thegreatestgoodfornumber. Associated with to berationalandgivingthestrongestinterpretationoftheirargument. the ideathatlifeisGod-given. Sanctity of Life agents. Hisexamplesare:protectandpreserve humanlife;reproduceand are overarching and consequentlywe aremorallyrequiredtofollow it. to be thought morality ofstealingmightbe another situation.Forexample,the relative tothesituationinwhichstealingtakesplace. is queerifitutterlyunlikeanyotherexistingproperty/entity. utterances expressasubjective prescriptionforotherstoactinaccordance beings andcanbelocatedintheworld. educate one’soffspring;knowandworshipGod;live inasociety. express morethanjustemotionalapproval anddisapproval. Instead,ourmoral Stuart Mill : : Theideaof Aquinas : Theviewthatmoralpropertiesexistsindependentlyofhuman ). Seealso, : Introducedby : A normative moral theory is relativistic, rather thanabsolutist, extra moralweight : “Onfirstimpression/look”or“At firstglance/appearance”. : A metaethicaltheoryclaimingthatourmoralutterances ’s termforthereasonthathelpsdiscover theNaturalLaws. : Theideathatlifeholds absolute value, veryjustified by likely general rules : Introduced as part of : Introducedaspart : A challenge to J. L.Mackie : The principle that an actionismoralifandonlyitleads : Theprinciplethat : The view that should create a set of rules that, if followed,of rulesthat, should createaset : Theviewthat : An argumentativeone’s opponent strategyofgranting Strong secondary precept secondary Aquinas and tothelifeofaloved one(see . Theyare , associated with MoralErrorTheory.Something Utilitarianism Weak RuleUtilitarianism whendiscussing his NaturalLawTheory. Aquinas absolute is accordance with the . Utilitarianismdoes andbindingonallrational ’s Natural Law Theory.They ’s Natural Agent-Neutrality . Utilitarianism Natural Law Natural not allow John . ).

243 Glossary 244 Glossary hoy f scoeul Development Psychosexual of Theory Teleologist Teleological Telos would promotethegreatestamountoftotalhappinessmust weakest form,sothatitiseasytodefeat.Straw-menargumentsallowaperson Law Theory.Secondarypreceptsare takes ittobemorallyequivalentanother persondifferentlybased totreating that theyarefromonespeciesratherthananotherismorallywrong.Singer the eternal/Divinelaws. to avoidarguingwithadifficultobjectionon“level ground”. purpose. Synderesis Super-ego Utilitarianism Rule Strong Straw-man Speciesism Semantic Precepts Secondary and maturegenitalstage. account. always wear a helmet when riding a bike; do not hack into someone’s bank governments,are imposedby groups,clubs,societiesetc.Examples,might constraints. consequences (e.g. conscience but is the innateabilityofmind (a relates toafocusonlanguageandmeaning. on adifferenceingender(sexism)orrace(racism). include: do not drive above 70mph on a motorway; do not kidnappeople; human animalsdifferentlyfrom humans based purelyonthearbitraryfact ego is the voice of authority issuing prohibitions, inhibitionsand moral sexual development from birth todeath:includes the oral,anal,phallic, latency : For : Semanticconcernsare about wordsandtheirmeanings;it Aristotle : Oneof the threepartsof the mind according to : Someone who holdsthatevery objecthasafinalcause/goal/end/ : Term introducedby : A straw-manargumentisanphrased deliberately inits : Term introduced by : A teleologicalnormative theoryisoneconcernedwith , Utilitarianism telos : Introduced by isthepurposeofsomething. : Guidancefrom the setof rules that, iffollowed, ). Peter Singer Aquinas not generated by ourreason not generated Aquinas : Developed by . Synderesisis whendiscussing the Natural . Theclaim that treatingnon- habit of the mind Freud always Freud not butratherthey ) toapprehend thesameas . of A theory befollowed. . The super- Voluntary euthanasia Voluntary Virtue ignorance Vincible V-rules Verification principle ek ue Utilitarianism Rule Weak Well-being yan o te Majority the of Tyranny Truth-maker Theory of Truth Truth-apt Thought-experiment Thomson’s “thetransplantsurgeon”(see would promote the greatestamountof total happiness world, suchasproperties,makesittrue. Utilitarianism isopentocaseswherethemajorityaremorallyrequired Utilitarianism Utility form “dowhatishonest”or“avoidenvious”. for example. the useofreason. Doing somethingwrong whenone provides guidance in theform of “v-rules”. These are guiding rules of the aboveis itselftruth-apt, of themeaningphrase“truth-apt” explanation claim mayneveror false.This true of being capable could stillbe it but true be character dispositionortraitthatrepresentsamoral vice. circumstances wheremore happinesswouldbeproducedbybreakingtherule or potentiallyempiricallyverifiable thenitis it is. highlight andchallengetheintuitionswe have onvarious topic.E.g.Judith better. exploit theminorityforgreatergoodofmaximisingtotalpleasure. someone toterminatetheirlifeinorderavoid futuresuffering. satisfaction associatedwithofaparticularaction. : A morallycorrectcharacter dispositionortrait,asopposedtoa : A term used by utilitariansto refer to thepleasure/pain/preference : Introducedby : Ifaclaimistruth-aptthenit : Themeasure of howwell alifeis going, for the person whose life : See : From Consequentialism : A hypotheticalsituation —oftenfantasticalused to : The principle that states that if asentenceis notanalytic states that : Theprinciplethat : Voluntary euthanasia occurs whenapersonchooses : Voluntary Rosalind Hursthouse Aquinas : Guidancefromthesetofrulesthat,iffollowed, : A challengeto : A claimistrue . Ignorancethatcanbeovercome through . capable Chapter 1 . She suggests that Virtue. Shesuggeststhat Ethics meaningless if andonly Utilitarianism ofbeingtrueorfalse.N.B.the ). ought to . some feature of the somefeature can be ignoredin . Itseemsthat have known . 245 Glossary

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Ethics for A-Level

Mark Dimmock and Andrew Fisher

What does pleasure have to do with morality? What role, if any, should intuiti on have in the formati on of moral theory? If something is ‘simulated’, can it be immoral? This accessible and wide-ranging textbook explores these questi ons and many more. Key ideas in the fi elds of normati ve ethics, metaethics and applied ethics are explained rigorously and systemati cally, with a vivid writi ng style that enlivens the topics with energy and wit. Individual theories are discussed in detail in the fi rst part of the book, before these positi ons are applied to a wide range of contemporary situati ons including business ethics, sexual ethics, and the acceptability of eati ng animals. A wealth of real-life examples, set out with depth and care, illuminate the complexiti es of diff erent ethical approaches while conveying their modern-day relevance. This concise and highly engaging resource is tailored to the Ethics components of AQA Philosophy and OCR Religious Studies, with a clear and practi cal layout that includes end-of-chapter summaries, key terms, and common mistakes to avoid. It should also be of practi cal use for those teaching Philosophy as part ofthe Internati onal Baccalaureate. Ethics for A-Level is of parti cular value to students and teachers, but Fisher and Dimmock’s precise and scholarly approach will appeal to anyone seeking a rigorous and lively introducti on to the challenging subject of ethics. This editi on includes: • End-of-chapter summaries • Issues to consider • Key terminology • Study questi ons • Mistakes to avoid • Glossary of terms

As with all Open Book publicati ons, this enti re book is available to read for free on the publisher’s website. Printed and digital editi ons, together with supplementary digital material, can also be found here htt p://www.openbookpublishers.com

Cover image: Malaysia from the Sky, photo by Ishan @seefromthesky on Unsplash Cover design: Anna Gatti

book ebooke and OA editi ons also available