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Naturalism and Subjectivity Berk, K VU Research Portal Naturalism and Subjectivity Berk, K. 2010 document version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Link to publication in VU Research Portal citation for published version (APA) Berk, K. (2010). Naturalism and Subjectivity: A Philosophical Analysis. General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ? Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. E-mail address: [email protected] Download date: 29. Sep. 2021 © K. Berk Typeset by Zink Typografie (www.zinktypografie.nl). e text is set in Garamond Pro /, a typeface designed by Robert Slimbach as a revival of the sixteenth-century typefaces created by Claude Garamond (romans) and Robert Granjon (italics). Printed in the Netherlands by Ridderprint Offsetdrukkerij , Ridderkerk. Naturalism and Subjectivity A Philosophical Analysis ter verkrijging van de graad Doctor aan de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, op gezag van de rector magnificus prof.dr. L.M. Bouter, in het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan van de promotiecommissie van de faculteit der Wijsbegeerte op dinsdag december om . uur in het auditorium van de universiteit, De Boelelaan door Kiki Berk geboren te Amsterdam promotor: prof.dr. R. van Woudenberg copromotor: prof.dr. L. Stubenberg Acknowledgments ix Introduction xi e Subjectivity of Experience . Nagel’s Account of Subjectivity .. Nagel on the Subjectivity of Experience .. Point of View and Knowing What It Is Like . Other Accounts of Subjectivity .. More Definitions of Subjectivity .. Mapping onto De Sousa .. How Other Accounts Fit (S)-(S) . Subjective-Making Properties .. Does Experience Have ese Subjective-Making Properties? .. Do Other Mental Phenomena Have ese Subjective-Making Properties? . Conclusion Do Experiences Exist? . What Are Experiences? .. e Term ‘Experience’ .. Kinds of Experiences .. Structure of Experiences vi • . Contra: Arguments against the Existence of Experience .. Argument from Awkwardness .. Byrne’s Argument against Experience . Pro: An Argument for the Existence of Experience . First Reply: Behaviorism . Second Reply: Eliminativism . Conclusion Metaphysical Naturalism . Definitions of Materialism, Physicalism and Naturalism . Mapping onto the Literature . Varieties of Naturalism . Distinctions within Metaphysical Naturalism . Four Kinds of Metaphysical Naturalism .. Classical Materialism .. Spatio-Temporal Materialism .. Causal Materialism .. Anti-Supernaturalism . Conclusion Methodological Naturalism . Definitions of Methodological Naturalism . Methodological Naturalism: View, Stance or Research Program? . Hempel’s Dilemma . Two Other Problems . Does Methodological Naturalism Entail Metaphysical Naturalism? . e Objectivity of Science . Conclusion Are Subjectivity and Naturalism Compatible? . (S): Phenomenal Character of Experience . (S): A Single Point of View .. Argument from Perspective .. e Knowledge Argument .. Nagel’s Argument . (S): Argument from Privacy . (S): Knowledge of Experience . (S): Dualist Argument: Persons • vii . Objections & Replies .. Objection I: Lycan .. Objection II: Identity eory of Mind . Alternative Approaches .. Chrisley: Objectivity as Intersubjectivity .. Velmans: Objectivity as Intersubjectivity .. Howell: Subjective Physicalism . Conclusion Summary Bibliography Samenvatting – Summary in Dutch e first (two page) philosophy paper I ever wrote was for René van Wouden- berg’s class ‘Introduction to Metaphysics’, which I took my first semester of college. I wrote on dualism and physicalism; in particular, I tried to come up with arguments against physicalism, which I thought was an underdeveloped topic in the book we read for the class, Peter van Inwagen’s Metaphysics. Little did I know that four years later I would be taking a class with Van Inwagen himself and, soon afterwards, starting a four-year research project about the problems of physicalism (which I now prefer to call ‘naturalism’). It has been ten years since I wrote my first philosophy paper and four years since I started working on this dissertation, and I am happy to report that I am still fascinated by the same topic. Over the past four years I have learned a great deal about naturalism and subjectivity, how to do (and not to do) research, how to write more clearly, and how to overcome ‘feeling stuck’. But most of all I have learned that it takes determination and discipline to write a dissertation. Yet discipline and determination, though necessary, are not, in my experience, sufficient for success. I could not have written this dissertation without the help and support of many others, whom I am greatly indebted to and would like to thank here. First of all, I want to thank my director, René van Woudenberg, who has greatly shaped my philosophical thinking ever since the very first class I took with him. I have been very fortunate to work so closely with René throughout college and graduate school, and I have learned more than I can say from him both as a philosopher and as a person. I would like to thank René for teaching me what it means to be a philosopher, for trusting me to carry out this project, for his detailed and helpful comments on papers and drafts of chapters, and for x • encouraging me every step of the way. I could not have written this dissertation without his unrelenting support. I also wish to thank my co-director, Leopold Stubenberg, for his comments and suggestions for improvement on an earlier draft of this dissertation. I greatly enjoyed and learned very much from the classes I took with him at the University of Notre Dame. is project was carried out at the Department of Philosophy at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. I want to thank the board for its hospitality and for allowing me to spend a semester at the University of Notre Dame as a visiting student. My time at Notre Dame proved to be very inspirational through the classes I attended and the many discussions I had with other graduate students. I would like to thank the University of Notre Dame, especially the Department of Philosophy, for its part in making this possible. At the Vrije Universiteit, the research group provided a wonderful opportunity to get feed- back on earlier drafts of the dissertation. I am grateful to the members of this group for their helpful comments and suggestions, especially Arianna Betti, Martijn Blaauw, Lieven Decock, Rik Peels and Jeroen de Ridder. I would like to give a special thanks to Jeroen for his detailed comments on Chapter . In the very last stage I got help from a couple of different directions. First, I want to thank my mother-in-law, Margo Tepley, for proofreading and copy- editing the entire manuscript. I am very grateful for her incredible effort, and any remaining errors are, of course, entirely my responsibility. Second, I am very happy to have chosen Zink Typografie for designing the lay-out of my dissertation. I want to thank Job and Roel Zinkstok for their fast and professional work. On a more personal note, I would like to take the opportunity to thank my parents, Tom Berk and Ineke Slootweg, for encouraging me to study and pursue a Ph.D. in philosophy and for all their advice, love, and support. I am very lucky to have them as my parents. I also want to thank my oma, Oma Slootweg, for being the best oma in the entire world. Last but not least, I want to thank my husband, Joshua Tepley, for reading earlier drafts of this dissertation, for talking with me (and listening to me talk) about my project on a daily basis, and for all the times philosophy was far from our minds (at least from mine). I benefited greatly from sharing the intellectual and emotional burden of writing a dissertation with a fellow philosopher who knows, from his own experience, what it is like to write a philosophy dissertation. e main question that this dissertation aims at answering is whether the subjectivity of experience is compatible with naturalism or not. In order to be able to establish this, two sub-questions need answering first: What is the subjectivity of experience? And: What is naturalism? However, before doing even so much, we need to pause and consider why one should care to ask the question whether the subjectivity of experience is compatible with naturalism. Let me give a short summary of the answer before going on to explain it in more detail. A great many philosophers think that the subjectivity of experience is a very important phenomenon, not just in theory or for philos- ophy, but also in and for (daily) life. Because this real-life phenomenon is so important, it ought to have its place in, or at least be compatible with, any metaphysics or ontology that is to be taken seriously, especially one which is frequently adopted and enjoys popularity. Nowadays the ontology that is by far the most popular is naturalism; virtually everyone, scientists, philosophers and laymen alike, claim to be naturalists, a trend which will most likely only expand in the near future. Given the importance of the subjectivity of experience and the popularity of naturalism, whether the phenomenon of subjectivity can be accounted for or have its place within a naturalistic ontology is a relevant and pressing question. Maybe unnecessary to add, I think that it is very important for this phenomenon to be compatible with this theory, and if it is not, I think this is a good reason to reject naturalism.
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