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Sensation and Intentionality in Kant's Theory of Empirical Cognition

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Sensation and Intentionality in Kant's Theory of Empirical Cognition UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO Sensation and Intentionality in Kant’s Theory of Empirical Cognition A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy by Timothy P. Jankowiak Committee in Charge: Professor Eric Watkins, Chair Professor Rick Grush Professor Don MacLeod Professor William O’Brien Professor Clinton Tolley 2012 Copyright 2012 Timothy P. Jankowiak All rights reserved The Dissertation of Timothy P. Jankowiak is approved, and it is accept- able in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically: Chair University of California, San Diego 2012 iii DEDICATION To my mother, Annabelle, for showing the unwavering and single-mindedly optimistic confidence in me that only a mother can show with sincerity; to the memory of my father, Paul, for always encouraging me to do with my life whatever I would find most satisfying; and to my wife, Joy, for keeping me happy and sane over the last seven years. iv EPIGRAPH Is our soul in itself so empty that unless it borrows images from outside it is nothing? (Leibniz, New Essays) For how else should the cognitive faculty be awakened into exercise if not through objects that stimulate our senses and in part themselves produce representations, in part bring the activity of our under- standing into motion to compare these, to connect or separate them, and thus to work up the raw material of sensible impressions into a cognition of objects that is called ex- perience? (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason) Shall I project a world? If not project then at least flash some arrow on the dome to skitter among constellations and trace out your Dragon, Whale, Southern Cross. Anything might help. (Thomas Pynchon, The Crying of Lot 49) v TABLE OF CONTENTS Signature Page. iii Dedication........................................................ iv Epigraph......................................................... v Table of Contents................................................. vi ListofFigures.................................................... ix Acknowledgements................................................ x Vita.............................................................. xii Abstract.......................................................... xiii Chapter 1: Introduction ....................................... 1 1.1 Reading Kant on Sensation and Intentionality . 1 1.2 Outline of the Work . 8 1.3 Sensation in Early Modern Thought . 15 1.3.1 The Representationality of Sensation . 18 1.3.2 Sensations and Beliefs About External Objects . 23 1.3.3 The Relation Between Sensing and Thinking . 27 1.4 Preliminaries Regarding Kantian Representation . 32 1.4.1 Metaphysical Status and Cognitive Function . 33 1.4.2 Matter and Form...................................... 37 1.4.3 Relation to an Object.................................. 40 Part I: SENSIBILITY ......................................... 49 Chapter 2: The “Objectivity” of Sensation.................. 50 2.1 Three Accounts of Sensation in Critique of Pure Reason ... 56 2.1.1 Sensation as Subjective Modification . 58 2.1.2 Sensation as Subjective Representation. 62 2.1.3 Sensation as Objective Representation . 65 2.2 Two Distinctions Between Subjective and Objective . 69 2.2.1 Sensation in Critique of Judgment ..................... 71 2.2.2 Sensation in the Anthropology ......................... 77 2.2.3 Summary . 80 2.3 Revisiting the First Critique . 82 2.4 Conclusion................................................. 97 vi Chapter 3: Empirical Intuition and the Objects of Percep- 98 tion 3.1 Two Kantian Theses about our Relations to Objects . 104 3.1.1 Phenomenalism . 105 3.1.2 Direct Realism......................................... 114 3.1.3 First Pass at a Solution . 121 3.2 Empirical Intuitions . 125 3.2.1 What are Empirical Intuitions? . 125 3.2.2 What do Empirical Intuitions Represent? . 135 3.2.3 How do Empirical Intuitions Represent?. 149 3.3 Empirical Intuitions and the Objects of Experience . 163 3.3.1 Intuition and Phenomenalism . 166 3.3.2 Intuition and Direct Realism . 171 3.4 Conclusion................................................. 175 Appendix A: Nonconceptualism and Intuitions ............. 178 Appendix B: Sensory Determination of the Content of In- 191 tuition Part II: UNDERSTANDING ................................. 209 Chapter 4: Sensation, Reality, and Intensive Magnitudes.. 210 4.1 Judgments of Reality . 214 4.1.1 The Category of Reality. 215 4.1.2 Substantial Reality. 222 4.1.3 Accidental Reality . 228 4.1.4 The Real of Sensation. 233 4.2 Anticipations of Perception . 235 4.2.1 The Argument . 236 4.2.2 The Inferred Cause Interpretation . 245 4.2.3 The Constructivist Interpretation . 250 4.3 Objections Considered . 257 4.3.1 The Cause of Sensation . 257 4.3.2 Sensory Determination of Judgments of Reality . 259 4.3.3 Transcendental Necessity Undermined?. 262 4.4 Conclusion................................................. 267 vii Chapter 5: Things “Outside Me”: Actual Objects and 269 Things in Themselves 5.1 The Actuality of Empirical Objects . 272 5.1.1 Actuality in Intentional Object Phenomenalism . 272 5.1.2 Skepticism Regarding the External World . 279 5.2 Sensations and Things in Themselves . 288 5.2.1 There is no “Problem of Double Affection” . 289 5.2.2 The Existence of Things in Themselves. 296 5.3 Conclusion................................................. 304 Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusion ........................ 306 6.1 Kant’s Theory of Sensation . 306 6.2 Intentional Object Phenomenalism. 311 Bibliography .................................................... 318 viii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Summary of the Interpretation . 307 Figure 2: Appearances as Intentional Objects . 311 Figure 3: Things in Themselves as Intentional Objects . 313 Figure 4: The Langton/Allais Model . 314 Figure 5: The Two-World Model . 316 ix ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation and the thought process that led up to it would not have been even remotely possible were it not for the intellectual stimulation provided by my years of interaction with the very smart people in and around the UCSD philosophy department. I owe thanks to all of my professors and fellow graduate students who have helped me develop as a philosopher over the last seven years. Several people in particular, though, stand out as meriting special acknowledgement. Some of my best interlocutors over the course of the development of the dissertation have been my fellow graduate students. The other students of German philosophy proved to be an especially valuable resource for helping me work out the details of my interpretation of Kant’s view. Most noteworthy here are James Messina, Peter Yong, Silje Eggestad, Daniel Althof, Ben Sheredos, and Kim Brewer. I have also benefitted from detailed feedback from the participants in a dissertation writing workshop: Adam Streed, Joyce Havstad, and Erick Ramirez gave me invaluable feedback which ultimately helped me improve the intelligibility and expression of my views. Other students with whom I’ve had the opportunity to discuss my ideas include Per Milam, Marta Halina, Justin Knoepfler, Nate Rockewood, Dan Schwartz, Dan Burnston, Julie Walsh, Spencer Hey, Craig Agule, Erin Frykholm, Amanda Brovold, Amy Berg, Veronica Pear, and Mike Tiboris. Among the faculty whose expertise has helped me in my development, I must acknowledge first and foremost my advisor, Eric Watkins. During my time at UCSD, Eric has consistently been more than generous with his time and effort in paying close attention to the progress of my work. Between reading, critiquing, and discussing multiple drafts of the various chapters of the dissertation, encouraging my profes- sional development in various ways, and working to ensure that I had sufficient x employment to keep from starving during the summer months, Eric has gone far above and beyond what is expected from an advisor, and for this I am immensely grateful. Clinton Tolley has also always shown a great deal of focussed attention to the development of my interpretation. My conversations with him consistently chal- lenged me to think through the possible alternatives and objections to my claims, and the final product is clearly the better for this. Other faculty members whose feedback was particularly helpful, especially in the context of the History of Philos- ophy Roundtable discussion group, include Don Rutherford, Rick Grush, Michael Hardimon, Monte Johnson, Sam Rickless, and Gila Sher. Each of the above has, in various ways, helped make this dissertation better than it could otherwise have been. The responsibility for any and all remaining imperfections lies only with myself. Lastly, and most importantly, I must thank my wife, Joy. She was more than understanding and encouraging during the many long days and late nights of work on this document, and the fact that I have come away from it with my sanity mostly intact can only be attributed to the comfort and support she provided. xi VITA Education 2005 Bachelor of Arts, University of Illinois, Chicago 2006-2012 Teaching Assistant, UCSD Philosophy Departments and Revelle Human- ities Program 2009 Master of Arts, University of California, San Diego 2012 Doctor of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego Areas of Specialization Kant Early Modern Philosophy Areas of Competence German Philosophy Phenomenology Philosophy of Mind and Perception Scholarly Work Editorial work for De Gruyter for Proceedings of the 2010 International Kant Congress, (2011) Editorial work for Eric Watkins for
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