Augsburg Honors Review Volume 12 Article 4 2019 Qualia, the Heart of the Mind-Body Problem and Epistemology’s Quagmire Allison Mangan Augsburg University Follow this and additional works at: https://idun.augsburg.edu/honors_review Part of the Epistemology Commons Recommended Citation Mangan, Allison (2019) "Qualia, the Heart of the Mind-Body Problem and Epistemology’s Quagmire," Augsburg Honors Review: Vol. 12 , Article 4. Available at: https://idun.augsburg.edu/honors_review/vol12/iss1/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Undergraduate at Idun. It has been accepted for inclusion in Augsburg Honors Review by an authorized editor of Idun. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Allison Mangan Qualia, the Heart of the Mind-Body Problem and Epistemology’s Quagmire Alio Maga, Augbug Univesty ualia are layered and complex, the basic philosophic understanding a labyrinth of a concept, of qualia today. We will see how Q rife with debate as to their consciousness is necessary for qualia, existence, state, and what they mean and why this makes defning qualia for our understanding of knowledge, a challenge. Next, we will go over the relationship with the world, and explanatory gap of qualia. From there, ourselves. Toughtful exploration into we will see how qualia relate to the mind- the complexities of what qualia are body problem, and the early exploration and how they relate to the mind-body of this problem through Descartes, problem will be wrestled with though Locke, and Berkeley. Additionally, we research applied within this paper. will go over the main schools of thought Qualia can be found in philosophical that surround the mind-body problem: debates surrounding epistemology materialism, idealism, and dualism. and in branches across the spectrum, Tese schools cover a spectrum of from Rene Descartes to Simone de views on the mind-body problem and Beauvoir. While not mentioned by ofer solutions based on their respective name, the concept of qualia has played frameworks. However, we will fnd a large part in philosophy’s quest to that materialism and idealism fail to understand humanity, and by extension, present a compelling solution to the to understand others who share our mind-body problem, nor a framework humanity. In our current culture of that sustains qualia. Dualism, on the increasingly polarized political, racial, other hand, ofers a framework that can gendered, and cultural views, qualia are better support solutions to the mind- a concept that can shed light and insight body problem and qualia. Ten, we for better understanding of those whose will look at some more contemporary experience is fundamentally diferent understandings of the senses and from our own. Qualia ofer a description qualia’s relationship to the mind-body to the nature of experience, and can ofer problem. Te goal of this paper is to give a new way of understanding the barriers a general overview of qualia, the mind- and divides between individuals. body problem, and the various solutions Understanding can break down the philosophical schools ofer. Ultimately, walls of fear that fuel divides, and qualia we will see how qualia and the mind- are one way to bring understanding into body problem relate to one another a world desperate for more. and gain a deeper understanding of the In this paper, we will go over various views that surround these two 35 Augsburg Honors Review topics. states” (Wright 90). What this means Let us start with qualia. Qualia for us, is that our nature as conscious come out of consciousness and are beings allow qualia to be intrinsic to our related to experience and the senses. experience. Furthermore, since qualia Tomas Nagel explains qualia very are intrinsic to our experience, it is clear concisely in his paper What is it like that they originate from mind. One way to be a bat? “the fact that an organism to illustrate qualia is the classic black- has conscious experience at all means, and-white room example: basically, that there is something it is like Mary is raised in a black and to be that organism” (436). Qualia, as is white room in which she learns reiterated again and again throughout all the cognitive and functional discussion, is that they encapsulate the facts about color vision. When quality of to-be-like something. When she ventures outside that room an individual experiences anything, for the frst time, she learns (upon there is a particular quality unique to perceiving a ripe red tomato) a new the experience for that individual. Tis fact about color vision, something intrinsic nature of quale and experience she was not able to infer from her is one of the main origins for its divisive knowledge of the cognitive and and uncertain inquiry. But, there is a functional aspects of color-vision. general consensus that consciousness “Tis is what it is like to see red,” is a requirement for qualia. she might think to herself. “I didn’t Like qualia, consciousness know what that was like before”. is not well understood in scientifc (Wright 92-93) terms nor agreed upon philosophically. Mary learned all she could, Exactly what constitutes consciousness all of the facts about color and vision. and what it is, is uncertain. Tis makes But this is unable to give her qualia, it particularly difcult to defne qualia, since it does not arise from her sensory since they rely on consciousness. experience. She only knows what it is However, it is agreed that humans have like because she experiences it, and this consciousness. Tis assumption is vital “what it is like” is required for qualia. in any discussion on ethics, and for Tis also brings us to another the most part, epistemology as well. one of qualia’s slippery traits, the So, understanding that consciousness explanatory gap. Mary might have read exists, and humans have it, we can move someone’s account of seeing read, and forward. she herself might try to articulate what Qualia come out of our seeing red it like. However, she will fail. consciousness, they “are intrinsic to To further illustrate this idea, take this their subjects” (Byrne and Tye 241) example; you and I both look at the same that is, there is no way for us to fully swatch of the colour orange. Do you separate qualia from our experiences. see the same exact colour as I? Maybe. As conscious creatures, our experiences Tere is no way for either of us to be in the world have “characters or sure, we can only speculate and attempt qualities that consist of something it is to describe our understanding of our like for conscious subjects to be in such own experience. But can words clearly 36 Allison Mangan convey the essence of our experience mind, but also rest in some capacity on as we experience it? Doubtful. It seems sensations, is what will be explored in likely or inevitable that, both of us have the mind-body problem. diferent qualia of this experience. If Te mind-body problem is we perceive the same colour, it might the general topic of how the mind (i.e. prompt a diferent emotion, or thought, thoughts, emotions, experiences) relates and certainly present you with a to the physical realm (i.e. the senses, diferent experience than myself. external stimuli). Tis problem arose As we can see, qualia have a as we understand it today during the level of inefability. “Tese experiences Enlightenment period, when there was have in each case a specifc subjective a general optimism in the humanity’s character, which it is beyond our ability ability to know and trust in the senses. to conceive” (Nagel 439). Whether the René Descartes and George Berkeley organism in question is a bat or a fellow are two prominent writers from this human, qualia cannot be fully explained period, whose work was impacted by or understood by another. Tis may be the issue of qualia through the mind- due to the unique physiology behind our body problem. Tis is largely because eyes, skin, muscles, neurons, and brain. in order for us to give substantial stock While we may have the same basic to scientifc inquiry, which is solely physiology, these are still unique to the based on our theory and observations, individual, since no one experiences the we must also be secure in the reliability world through their senses the same of the senses and the physical world. as another (as far as we know). But, Tis line of thought naturally led to the beyond the senses, this explanatory question of how the physical aspects gap can also be due to our individual of existence relate to the internal ones. mental worlds: past experiences, biases, Materialism attempts to answer this thoughts, and feelings about what we question. are experiencing. Most likely, it is due to Materialism is a school of both. thought that ofers a framework for Because of the explanatory dealing with the mind-body problem. gap, qualia cannot be easily described or In terms of the philosophy of the mind, explained. Even a single event, a single it is “the view that the mind is the quale, cannot be accurately described brain and that mental states are brain to another person. Rather, as we saw states. Mind and brain are one and with Mary, qualia are tied to experience; the same-- they are identical” (Mandik qualia arise from experience and 77). Toughts, feelings, consciousness, consciousness. Tis experience does and everything that constitutes the not rely solely on external objects, while mind can be reduced to purely physical they may prompt internal phenomena, phenomena.