Augsburg Honors Review
Volume 12 Article 4
2019 Qualia, the Heart of the Mind-Body Problem and Epistemology’s Quagmire Allison Mangan Augsburg University
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Recommended Citation Mangan, Allison (2019) "Qualia, the Heart of the Mind-Body Problem and Epistemology’s Quagmire," Augsburg Honors Review: Vol. 12 , Article 4. Available at: https://idun.augsburg.edu/honors_review/vol12/iss1/4
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Undergraduate at Idun. It has been accepted for inclusion in Augsburg Honors Review by an authorized editor of Idun. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Allison Mangan
Qualia, the Heart of the Mind-Body Problem and Epistemology’s Quagmire Alio Maga, Augbug Univesty
ualia are layered and complex, the basic philosophic understanding a labyrinth of a concept, of qualia today. We will see how Q rife with debate as to their consciousness is necessary for qualia, existence, state, and what they mean and why this makes defning qualia for our understanding of knowledge, a challenge. Next, we will go over the relationship with the world, and explanatory gap of qualia. From there, ourselves. Toughtful exploration into we will see how qualia relate to the mind- the complexities of what qualia are body problem, and the early exploration and how they relate to the mind-body of this problem through Descartes, problem will be wrestled with though Locke, and Berkeley. Additionally, we research applied within this paper. will go over the main schools of thought Qualia can be found in philosophical that surround the mind-body problem: debates surrounding epistemology materialism, idealism, and dualism. and in branches across the spectrum, Tese schools cover a spectrum of from Rene Descartes to Simone de views on the mind-body problem and Beauvoir. While not mentioned by ofer solutions based on their respective name, the concept of qualia has played frameworks. However, we will fnd a large part in philosophy’s quest to that materialism and idealism fail to understand humanity, and by extension, present a compelling solution to the to understand others who share our mind-body problem, nor a framework humanity. In our current culture of that sustains qualia. Dualism, on the increasingly polarized political, racial, other hand, ofers a framework that can gendered, and cultural views, qualia are better support solutions to the mind- a concept that can shed light and insight body problem and qualia. Ten, we for better understanding of those whose will look at some more contemporary experience is fundamentally diferent understandings of the senses and from our own. Qualia ofer a description qualia’s relationship to the mind-body to the nature of experience, and can ofer problem. Te goal of this paper is to give a new way of understanding the barriers a general overview of qualia, the mind- and divides between individuals. body problem, and the various solutions Understanding can break down the philosophical schools ofer. Ultimately, walls of fear that fuel divides, and qualia we will see how qualia and the mind- are one way to bring understanding into body problem relate to one another a world desperate for more. and gain a deeper understanding of the In this paper, we will go over various views that surround these two 35 Augsburg Honors Review topics. states” (Wright 90). What this means Let us start with qualia. Qualia for us, is that our nature as conscious come out of consciousness and are beings allow qualia to be intrinsic to our related to experience and the senses. experience. Furthermore, since qualia Tomas Nagel explains qualia very are intrinsic to our experience, it is clear concisely in his paper What is it like that they originate from mind. One way to be a bat? “the fact that an organism to illustrate qualia is the classic black- has conscious experience at all means, and-white room example: basically, that there is something it is like Mary is raised in a black and to be that organism” (436). Qualia, as is white room in which she learns reiterated again and again throughout all the cognitive and functional discussion, is that they encapsulate the facts about color vision. When quality of to-be-like something. When she ventures outside that room an individual experiences anything, for the frst time, she learns (upon there is a particular quality unique to perceiving a ripe red tomato) a new the experience for that individual. Tis fact about color vision, something intrinsic nature of quale and experience she was not able to infer from her is one of the main origins for its divisive knowledge of the cognitive and and uncertain inquiry. But, there is a functional aspects of color-vision. general consensus that consciousness “Tis is what it is like to see red,” is a requirement for qualia. she might think to herself. “I didn’t Like qualia, consciousness know what that was like before”. is not well understood in scientifc (Wright 92-93) terms nor agreed upon philosophically. Mary learned all she could, Exactly what constitutes consciousness all of the facts about color and vision. and what it is, is uncertain. Tis makes But this is unable to give her qualia, it particularly difcult to defne qualia, since it does not arise from her sensory since they rely on consciousness. experience. She only knows what it is However, it is agreed that humans have like because she experiences it, and this consciousness. Tis assumption is vital “what it is like” is required for qualia. in any discussion on ethics, and for Tis also brings us to another the most part, epistemology as well. one of qualia’s slippery traits, the So, understanding that consciousness explanatory gap. Mary might have read exists, and humans have it, we can move someone’s account of seeing read, and forward. she herself might try to articulate what Qualia come out of our seeing red it like. However, she will fail. consciousness, they “are intrinsic to To further illustrate this idea, take this their subjects” (Byrne and Tye 241) example; you and I both look at the same that is, there is no way for us to fully swatch of the colour orange. Do you separate qualia from our experiences. see the same exact colour as I? Maybe. As conscious creatures, our experiences Tere is no way for either of us to be in the world have “characters or sure, we can only speculate and attempt qualities that consist of something it is to describe our understanding of our like for conscious subjects to be in such own experience. But can words clearly 36 Allison Mangan convey the essence of our experience mind, but also rest in some capacity on as we experience it? Doubtful. It seems sensations, is what will be explored in likely or inevitable that, both of us have the mind-body problem. diferent qualia of this experience. If Te mind-body problem is we perceive the same colour, it might the general topic of how the mind (i.e. prompt a diferent emotion, or thought, thoughts, emotions, experiences) relates and certainly present you with a to the physical realm (i.e. the senses, diferent experience than myself. external stimuli). Tis problem arose As we can see, qualia have a as we understand it today during the level of inefability. “Tese experiences Enlightenment period, when there was have in each case a specifc subjective a general optimism in the humanity’s character, which it is beyond our ability ability to know and trust in the senses. to conceive” (Nagel 439). Whether the René Descartes and George Berkeley organism in question is a bat or a fellow are two prominent writers from this human, qualia cannot be fully explained period, whose work was impacted by or understood by another. Tis may be the issue of qualia through the mind- due to the unique physiology behind our body problem. Tis is largely because eyes, skin, muscles, neurons, and brain. in order for us to give substantial stock While we may have the same basic to scientifc inquiry, which is solely physiology, these are still unique to the based on our theory and observations, individual, since no one experiences the we must also be secure in the reliability world through their senses the same of the senses and the physical world. as another (as far as we know). But, Tis line of thought naturally led to the beyond the senses, this explanatory question of how the physical aspects gap can also be due to our individual of existence relate to the internal ones. mental worlds: past experiences, biases, Materialism attempts to answer this thoughts, and feelings about what we question. are experiencing. Most likely, it is due to Materialism is a school of both. thought that ofers a framework for Because of the explanatory dealing with the mind-body problem. gap, qualia cannot be easily described or In terms of the philosophy of the mind, explained. Even a single event, a single it is “the view that the mind is the quale, cannot be accurately described brain and that mental states are brain to another person. Rather, as we saw states. Mind and brain are one and with Mary, qualia are tied to experience; the same-- they are identical” (Mandik qualia arise from experience and 77). Toughts, feelings, consciousness, consciousness. Tis experience does and everything that constitutes the not rely solely on external objects, while mind can be reduced to purely physical they may prompt internal phenomena, phenomena. One of the implications qualia are reliant on the subject’s of this framework is that qualia must conscious experience and intrinsic be rejected. As we have distinguished internal mechanisms that allow qualia qualia, they have a “what it is like” to be generated. Tis relationship quality that emerges from conscious between qualia, which require the experience. Qualia have no physical 37 Augsburg Honors Review manifestation, rather they are a non- solutions to non-material concepts. material property. Terefore, qualia Descartes, and particularly are irreducible to a purely physical Berkeley, sit away from materialism in phenomena. Tis idea of a non-material their epistemological queries. Both of mental property is contradictory to these philosophers ofer insight into materialism’s framework. Tus, it cannot how qualia have been an unnamed, but be accepted in materialism. A major central part in the mind-body problem. issue that surrounds materialism is the Before delving into Descartes, let us question of consciousness; it is not until look at Berkeley’s idealism. more recent years that consciousness Idealism, like materialism, has been contested to be solely a has a range of viewpoints, but at its physical object. Most concerningly, in core it is the antithesis of materialism. materialist circles, there is debate as to While materialism reduces everything whether consciousness exists (Ramsey). to material substance, idealism brings If it does, consciousness must be purely everything back to the mind, “according physical, and therefore can be localized to idealism, everything is either a mind within the human mind. However, there or something that depends on the mind” is no consensus within neurology, nor (Mandik 45). Berkeley is the epitome of philosophy, that this is the case. idealism thought; in his metaphysics, On the surface it would seem there is only the mind, and the external that materialism ofers the best solution world that we perceive, originates from to the mind-body problem, since there is it. Idealism as a whole would be able no separation between the mind and the to accept qualia as a concept, but in body, there is no issue with reconciling Berkeley’s philosophy this does not the two. However, in order to have this seem to be the case: solution, there are assumptions, logical All our ideas, sensations, or the leaps, and concessions that must be things which we perceive, by made. Firstly, we have to assume that whatsoever names they may be everything in the mind is material, and distinguished, are visibly inactive-- concede that consciousness either does there is nothing of power or agency not exist, or that it is reducible to physical included in them. So that one phenomena. Te main implication of idea or object of thought cannot this, is that humans become reducible produce or make any alteration beings. Humanity’s reducibility does in another. To be satisfed of the not seem capable of being reduced truth of this, there is nothing else to only physical phenomena. As of requisite but a bare observation of yet, materialism has been unable to our ideas. For since they and every account for the subjective qualities of part of them exist only in the mind, experience (Agius 102; Stoljar), and it follows that there is nothing in this is exactly what qualia accomplish. them but what is perceived; but Overall, the materialist framework fails whoever shall attend to his ideas, to adequately deal with complex ideas whether of sense or refection, will of the mind, and, other than outright not perceive in them any power rejection, is incapable of fnding or activity; there is, therefore, no 38 Allison Mangan
such thing contained in them. has been less enthusiasm for idealism. (Berkeley 173) Since it is quite difcult to completely To unpack this viewpoint a reject the idea of material substance. little, let us look at the frst claim; that Unless we accept idealism, the mind- ideas, sensations and things perceived body problem is still a question to be are inactive. Tis goes against the idea tackled. that the sensations and perception While Berkeley is the poster have no power, this would indicate child for idealism, Descartes is the that qualia are not possible. But it is father of dualism (Baker 11; Mandik 16). understood that qualia are a type of Since Descartes originally pushed the activity that relate intrinsically to our mind-body problem to the frontlines of experience. philosophical thought, his account of As we have established, qualia dualism has been shown to have several are unique to an individual’s experience issues with its argumentation, or lack and subjective to their owner. Qualia thereof. Nevertheless, his philosophy are an active quality of ideas and is important to understand in order to sensations, which Berkeley claims have a frmer grasp on the mind-body are inactive. Qualia are intrinsically problem and the qualia that come with intentional, and this directly it. In Descartes’ philosophy, our internal contradicts Berkeley’s conception of mind is where we can begin with what ideas and internal phenomena are knowledge “so, my knowledge of my capable of (Wright 92). Furthermore, thought is more basic and more certain in Berkeley’s metaphysics (which are than my knowledge of any corporeal inseparable from his epistemology) the thing” (8). Our internal world is the mind is the only thing we can know. Te most knowable aspect of existence to external world is forever covered with us. Tis is where idealism would stop, doubt, and therefore, not “real” in the but Descartes endeavors to merge the same sense as the mind; it is the mind physical with the immaterial through that can account for reality. With the dualism. external world being unknowable, and To oversimplify dualism, the internal world being the only aspect it is the idea that the mind and the we can know, qualia seem to pose a body/brain are two distinct things bit of a problem. Since the senses and (Mandik 16). In Descartes, these two experience are both required, at least are completely separate and distinct in part, for qualia to arise, the concept from one another. Te main question of qualia partially rests on the need for Descartes’s dualism produces is if these material substance. two are separate, how do they interact? Like materialism, idealism While we are not going to try to answer gives a simple answer to the mind-body this question here, we will look at how problem, particularly in Berkeley. Since qualia ft into the bigger picture of there is no material world, the body is dualism. “Just as the physical world is simply a product of the mind. So, there is ‘populated’ by physical objects (tables, nothing to reconcile between the mind chairs, human bodies), the mental and the body. But, in recent years there world is ‘populated’ by mental objects 39 Augsburg Honors Review
(mental events and states). Space is operates within ourselves. Te senses occupied by corporeal things, the mind are necessary for our perception to by incorporeal things” (Baker 12). We take place. Perception, the frst faculty can see from Baker’s description of of the mind, makes it the threshold for dualism that qualia, which are classifed our understanding and knowledge. as a “mental state”, ft nicely into both According to Locke, the mind is passive Descartes’ dualism and dualism as a in regards to perception, and sensation whole. infuences perception. Just as we can’t So, Descartes and Berkeley help but taste or feel, we cannot help but sit along this gradient of accepting the perceive sensory input. Tus, in Locke, mind before moving out to explore with one’s perception so enwrapped in the external world. Berkeley rejects the senses, qualia are an aspect of the the idea that we can know of external lived experience. objects through our senses, due to Perception, as it is the frst faculty how the senses and ideas relate to of the mind, exercised about our consciousness and perception. We do ideas; so it is the frst and simplest fnd, however, that Berkeley and Locke idea we have from refection, sit on similar sides of the mind-body and is by some called thinking in debate, in regards to how qualia impact general. Tough thinking, in the our understanding of the mind-body propriety of the English tongue, problem. signifes that sort of operation in In Berkeley’s frst four sentences the mind about its ideas, wherein of section 25 in Treatise Concerning the mind is active; where it, with Human Knowledge, he goes over a some degree of voluntary attention summary of how he fnds perception considers any thing. For in bare relates to ideas and sensations. Berkeley naked perception, the mind is, for holds that the senses are indeed, the the most part, only passive; and start of our perception, agreeing with what it perceives, it cannot avoid Locke that we must gain our knowledge perceiving… from some external source. Locke and whatever alterations are made Berkeley assert that this external source in the body, if they reach not the comes through our senses, and from mind; whatever impressions are there to our perception. From this, we made on the outward parts, if they form ideas and concepts, which we are not taken notice of within; perceive. Bridging this gap between the there is no perception… senses and our experience of them has So that wherever there is sense, long been central to our understanding or perception, there some idea is of the mind-body question. actually produced, and present in Locke’s view of the mind- the understanding (Locke 138). body problem is that perception is Here, what Locke is describing twofold, requiring both external input with perception, is essentially qualia. and the internal workings of the mind. Qualia ft into Locke’s theory of the Tis distinction is important for the mind and his solution to the mind-body formation of ideas and how perception problem. Te senses allow perception 40 Allison Mangan
(which also requires consciousness) to hearing or sight. Afterall, compared to lead to ideas, and by extension qualia. the mantis shrimp, we are blind; and We can see from Locke’s compared to a dog we are essentially “An Essay Concerning Human deaf. But, we would not say they are Understanding” that he is a dualist, more knowledgeable than we are. and this makes the mind-body Likewise, a person with sight would not problem a constant factor in terms have a much greater understanding of of understanding qualia. Until Locke, what someone else sees than a blind the interaction between the mind and person would have of someone who the external world was chalked up to can see. Since, we cannot really begin to God. Tis classical cause is especially understand another person’s perception embedded in Berkeley’s understanding of the world, we are greatly limited to of the mind-body problem. cross referencing any data we have Experience ties directly into about the external world. Furthermore, perception in Locke’s philosophy; with the explanatory gap, it would seem the senses and perception aspects that even with identical experiences of experience. For, our senses garner two people may not have the same experience from which we formulate “knowledge”. ideas and perceive the world (i.e. the However, Frédérique de blind man example). It is only through Vignemont’s writings about the mind- experience that we can come to know body problem, would show how certain things about our external the senses can be overridden and world. For example, just by looking qualia can be based of of “unfactual” at a soft cat one cannot know how its information. She points to the rubber coat feels to the touch. Likewise, we hand hypothesis, which demonstrates can never know what it feels like to how “the spatial content of bodily another person. Tey may agree that it experiences is shaped by the body map is soft, but is their concept of soft the which can be distorted and includes same as another person’s soft? We will extraneous objects” (Vignemont 89). In never know, since we are so beholden the rubber hand experiment, subjects to our singular perception. Locke takes experience a rubber arm as their own, this into account with his concept of despite having no feeling in the foreign perception and experience. object, they can feel sensations and A problem arises from Locke’s react when the arm is threatened. But idea that the senses are our sole base does this then make that quale “false” in for knowledge. With Locke, because we some sense? Or is it just as real as qualia are locked so completely into our own that come from senses as typically little perception viewpoint, the more experienced? Tese are just a few of the experiences we can gather, from the questions that surround qualia. most senses, the greater the amount of Would language then be our ideas and knowledge we gain. However, main mode for knowledge? Following reasonable people would not agree the assertion that people lacking a sense that a deaf or blind person is any less are no more or less knowledgeable than knowledgeable than someone who has people with the standard faculties 41 Augsburg Honors Review in terms of cognition. Regardless problem. Consciousness is a necessary of our sensory input, we are able to condition for qualia, but, it seems, so conceive abstract ideas and reason are the senses. As we have seen, many even with extremely limited sensory philosophers have argued about what input. Furthermore, with our senses the senses and consciousness means susceptible, qualia become extremely for our understanding of the world. subjective. Berkeley would vehemently Materialists attempt to reduce mental deny this, as he sees language as an phenomena to a material cause, inhibitor for understanding. while idealists argue that material is Simone de Beauvoir deals dependant on the mind. Meanwhile, with the mind-body debate as well. In dualists accept both the material and her Te Second Sex, she rejects the idea immaterial and are faced with uniting that females are inferior to males based the two. With the identifcation of on biology. She says “the body is the qualia, this exchange has only gotten instrument of our hold on the world, the deeper. Due to qualia’s immaterial world appears diferent to us depending nature and its dependance on sensory on how it is grasped” (66). Here we see input, it has caused issues for both that the mind-body interaction directly materialism and idealism. Dualism, on impacts qualia. For our experience the other hand, is not contradicted by is based on how our bodies interact qualia. Troughout this paper, we have with the world. However, her framing found that the combination of qualia’s includes society, which is not a inefable quality and the explanatory component in this paper. gap indicates that our experiences are Regardless, for Berkeley, the inherently imbued with subjectivity mind-body problem is resolved; only through qualia. With qualia collapsing the mind exists and the senses and into our experiences, it may be near body muddle our perception and impossible to separate the qualia from understanding of the nature of reality. subjective experience itself. Tis makes But, for Locke and others the issue is it even more imperative to continue to still alive and well. We have given a explore the concept of qualia, which can general overview of what qualia are, only yield a better understanding of our and how it relates to the mind-body perception of the world.
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