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Dualistic Physicalism: from Phenomenon Dualism to Substance Dualism

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Dualistic Physicalism: from Phenomenon Dualism to Substance Dualism Dualistic Physicalism: From Phenomenon Dualism to Substance Dualism Joseph Polanik, JD Table of Contents Preface.................................................................................................................7 §1 The Central Question......................................................................................9 §2 The Brain/Experience Relation....................................................................11 §2.1 The Elements of Dualism.......................................................................11 §2.2 Proceeding from Common Ground........................................................13 §2.2.1 Evaluating Dennett's Defense of Materialism.................................13 §2.2.1.1 The Contradiction in the Dennett Defense...............................14 §2.2.1.2 Other Problems .......................................................................15 §2.2.1.2.1 Referring to Non-Existents...............................................15 §2.2.1.2.2 Violation of Common Sense..............................................16 §2.2.1.2.3 Denial of Experience.........................................................16 §2.2.1.2.4 Anticipating Type-Z Materialism......................................18 §2.2.1.3 Standing Precisely Against Eliminative Materialism ..............20 §2.2.2 The Argument for Dualism from Experience..................................21 §2.2.3 What Sort of Dualism is This?.........................................................25 §2.2.3.1 Phenomenon Dualism is Not Predicate Dualism.....................26 §2.2.3.1.1 Note on Classifying Searlean Philosophy.........................27 §2.2.3.1.2 Phenomenon Dualism is Not Conceptual Dualism............27 §2.2.3.2 Phenomenon Dualism is Not Property Dualism.......................27 §2.2.3.4 Phenomenon Dualism or an Atypical Event Dualism?.............31 §2.2.3.4.1 Garret on Event Dualism...................................................31 §2.2.3.4.2 Robinson's Dualism of Neural and Qualitative Events.....31 §2.2.3.4.3 Robinson's Epiphenomenalism.........................................32 §2.2.3.4.4 Atypical Event Dualism.....................................................33 §2.2.3.6 Conclusion...............................................................................33 §3 Objections to the Argument For Dualism From Experience.........................35 §3.1 Is Physicalism a Sufficient Defense against Dualism?..........................35 §3.1.1 Is Weakly Reductive Physicalism a Defense?.................................36 §3.1.2.1 Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives................................37 §3.1.3.2 Dualism as a Matter of Counting.............................................40 §3.1.3.3 Dualistic Physicalism is not Self-Contradictory.......................40 §3.1.2 Constitutional Physicalism.............................................................41 §3.2 Ontological Irreducibility is Insufficient for Dualism............................42 §3.2.1 The Case for Searlean Dualism......................................................43 §3.2.1.1 The Evidence of Phenomenon Dualism....................................43 §3.2.1.2 The Leap from Phenomenon Dualism to Property Dualism.....44 §3.2.1.3 Searle is Not a Property Dualist..............................................45 §3.2.2 Evaluating Searle's Defenses.........................................................45 §3.2.2.1 The Denial of Mutual Exclusivity..............................................45 §3.2.2.2 Distinctness Arguments ..........................................................47 §3.2.2.3 The Real Objection is Interaction............................................48 §3.2.2.4 Contesting the Language of Discourse....................................49 §3.2.2.4.1 The Intuition of Distinctness.............................................50 §3.2.2.4.2 Equivocation or Self-Contradiction?.................................51 §3.2.2.4.3 An Alternate Way of Overcoming the Opposition.............52 §3.2.2.5 Conclusion...............................................................................54 §3.3 Brain/Experience Identity Is A Viable Theory........................................55 §3.3.1 Theory vs. Meta-Theory...................................................................55 §3.3.2 The Knowledge Argument...............................................................56 §3.3.2.1 Jackson's Knowledge Argument ..............................................56 §3.3.2.2 The Charge of Equivocation.....................................................57 §3.3.2.3 The Total Knowledge Response................................................58 §3.3.2.4 Further Clarification and Concessions.....................................59 §3.3.2.5 Promissory Deductivism...........................................................61 §3.3.2.6 A Muted Acquaintance with a Revised Representationalism..64 §3.3.2.7 The Transparency Argument...................................................65 §3.3.2.8 Updating Type-Type Identity Theory.......................................69 §3.3.2.9 Observations and a Plan for Moving Forward.........................70 §3.3.2.9.1 Setting [DFQ-2] to One Side.............................................71 §3.3.2.9.2 Embracing the Parody.......................................................72 §3.3.3 KA, The Next Generation................................................................74 §3.3.3.1 What Does Mary Already Know?.............................................75 §3.3.3.1.1 Subjective Physicalism......................................................76 §3.3.3.1.2 Perry and the Assumption of Identity...............................79 §3.3.3.1.2.1 The Source of the New Knowledge............................81 §3.3.3.1.2.2 In Search of an Informative Identity ........................85 §3.3.3.1.2.3 Argument for Physical/Experiential Non-Identity......87 §3.3.3.2 What Does Mary Learn Upon Her Release? ...........................90 §3.3.3.2.1 The Additional Abilities Hypothesis...................................90 §3.3.3.2.2 Instantiation in Experience................................................92 §3.3.3.2.2.1 Evaluating Horgan's Defensive Strategy...................97 §3.3.3.2.2.2 Evaluating Horgan's Identity Claim...........................97 §3.3.3.2.2.3 Crossing the Rubicon...............................................101 §3.3.3.3 Is the Nagel/Churchland Argument Repairable?...................103 §3.3.3.3.1 Premise 2: The Repairable Flaw.....................................103 §3.3.3.3.2 Premise 1: The Fatal Ambiguity......................................104 §3.3.3.3.3 Repairing the Nagel/Churchland Argument...................105 §3.3.3.3.3.1 Knowledge about Knowing by Acquaintance..........106 §3.3.3.3.3.2 Knowledge by Description of Physical Phenomena 107 §3.3.3.3.4 Further Considerations...................................................107 §3.3.3.3.4.1 How Would I Come to Know the Alleged Identity?..107 §3.3.3.3.4.2 Accounting for Belief in the Possibility of Identity...109 §3.3.3.3.4.3 Is There an Is of Appearance?..................................110 §3.3.3.4 Instructively Irrelevant Identity Claims.................................111 §3.3.3.4.1 David K Lewis..................................................................113 §3.3.3.4.2 Gilbert Harman...............................................................114 §3.3.3.4.3 Byrne and Hilbert............................................................116 §3.3.3.4.4 U. T. Place and The Identity Crisis of Identity Theory....119 §3.3.3.4.4.1 Is an Afterimage a Material Object? ......................121 §3.3.3.4.4.2 The Criterion of Success..........................................121 §3.3.3.4.5 A Comment on Competing Identifications......................123 §3.3.3.5 Is a Relevant Identity Theory Plausible?...............................123 §3.3.3.5.1 Is This a Theory of Sense Data?......................................125 §3.3.3.4.2 Is Representationalism Unmotivated?............................126 §3.3.3.4.3 Feigl, An Existential Identity Theorist............................127 §3.3.3.6 How to Justify a Relevant Identity Claim...............................128 §3.3.3.6.1 The Appeal to Leibniz.....................................................128 §3.3.3.6.1.1 The Argument from Phenomenal Properties............129 § 3.3.3.6.1.2 The Topic Neutrality Defense..................................130 § 3.3.3.6.1.3 The Color Realism Defense.....................................131 § 3.3.3.6.1.4 Is Greenness Phenomenal Greenness?...................132 § 3.3.3.6.1.5 The Privacy of Experience.......................................133 § 3.3.3.6.1.6 The Absence of Spatial Location.............................134 § 3.3.3.6.1.7 Evaluating the Defenses..........................................135 §3.3.3.6.2 Identity via Parallel Phenomenology...............................135 §3.3.3.6.2.1 A Non-Identity Alternative.......................................137 §3.3.3.6.2.2 Phenomenally Instantiated Information?.................138 §3.3.3.6.3 The Phenomenal Concepts Strategy...............................140 §3.3.3.6.3.1 Reply to Block...........................................................142 §3.3.3.6.3.2 Reply to Loar............................................................143 §3.3.3.6.3.3 Reply to Balog..........................................................147 §3.3.3.6.4 Claiming an A Posteriori Identity....................................149 §3.3.3.6.4.1 Scientific Essentialism and KA:TNG........................153
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