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The Dialog Between Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience: What Does Philosophy of Mind Say?

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The Dialog Between Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience: What Does Philosophy of Mind Say? Tin Psychiatryrends and Psychotherapy Review Article The dialog between psychoanalysis and neuroscience: what does philosophy of mind say? O diálogo entre a psicanálise e a neurociência: o que diz a filosofia da mente? Elie Cheniaux,1 Carlos Eduardo de Sousa Lyra2 Abstract Resumo Objective: To briefly review how the main monist and dualist Objetivo: Apresentar uma breve revisão sobre como as currents of philosophy of mind approach the mind-body problem principais correntes da filosofia da mente, monistas e dualistas, and to describe their association with arguments for and against se posicionam sobre a questão mente-corpo e relacioná-las a closer dialog between psychoanalysis and neuroscience. com os argumentos favoráveis e contrários a um diálogo mais Methods: The literature was reviewed for studies in the fields of estreito entre a psicanálise e a neurociência. psychology, psychoanalysis, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind. Métodos: Foi realizada uma revisão bibliográfica de estudos nas Results: Some currents are incompatible with a closer dialog áreas de psicologia, psicanálise, neurociência e filosofia da mente. between psychoanalysis and neurosciences: interactionism Resultados: São incompatíveis com um diálogo entre psicanálise and psychophysical parallelism, because they do not account e neurociência: o interacionismo e o paralelismo psicofísico, for current knowledge about the brain; epiphenomenalism, por negligenciarem os conhecimentos sobre o cérebro; o which claims that the mind is a mere byproduct of the brain; epifenomenalismo, por considerar a mente como um mero efeito and analytical behaviorism, eliminative materialism, reductive colateral da atividade cerebral; assim como o behaviorismo materialism and functionalism, because they ignore subjective analítico, o materialismo eliminativo, o materialismo redutivo experiences. In contrast, emergentism claims that mental states e o funcionalismo, por ignorarem as vivências subjetivas. are dependent on brain states, but have properties that go Diferentemente, o emergentismo considera que os estados beyond the field of neurobiology. mentais dependem dos estados cerebrais, mas apresentam Conclusions: Only emergentism is compatible with a closer propriedades que vão além do âmbito da neurobiologia. dialog between psychoanalysis and neuroscience. Conclusões: Somente o emergentismo é compatível com uma Keywords: Philosophy of mind, mind-body problem, maior aproximação entre essas duas áreas do conhecimento. psychoanalysis, neuroscience. Descritores: Filosofia da mente, problema mente-corpo, psicanálise, neurociência. 1 MD, DSc. Associate professor, School of Medical Sciences, Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ), Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil. Professor, Graduate Program in Psychiatry and Mental Health, Institute of Psychiatry, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil. Member, Sociedade Psicanalítica do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil. 2 Psychologist. PhD in Teaching, Philosophy and History of Science. Adjunct professor, Universidade Estadual do Piauí (UESPI), São Raimundo Nonato, PI, Brazil. Financial support: none. Submitted Apr 05 2014, accepted for publication Jun 18 2014. No conflicts of interest declared concerning the publication of this article. Suggested citation: Cheniaux E, Lyra CES. The dialog between psychoanalysis and neuroscience: what does philosophy of mind say? Trends Psychiatry Psychother. 2014;36(4):186-192. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/2237-6089-2014-0010 © APRS Trends Psychiatry Psychother. 2014;36(4) – 186-192 Psychoanalysis, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind - Cheniaux & Lyra Introduction The mind-body problem Sigmund Freud began his career as a neuroanatomist The mind-body, or mind-brain problem is defined and neurologist and published several neuroscientific by the question about what type of relationship exists studies on topics such as cerebral palsy and aphasia.1 In between our inner or subjective experiences and our 1895, he wrote The Project for a Scientific Psychology, brain functioning.21 The answers to this question divide in which he created a general theory of human psyche the currents of philosophy of mind into two groups: based on the models of thermodynamics and in the substance monism and substance dualism. very rudimentary neuroscientific knowledge of the According to the dualist view, mind and body time.2,3 Later, when developing psychoanalysis, Freud are different types of substances whose properties apparently moved away from what we currently call are incompatible. The body is material, and material neuroscience. However, he believed that mental objects are extended in space and may be observed phenomena have a biological substrate until the end objectively. Brain functioning and human behavior of his life.4 In one of his last papers,5 he maintained are public, or, in other words, observed through a that psychoanalysis should occupy its place among all third person perspective. In contrast, mind (or soul) other natural sciences. Moreover, other authors, such is immaterial and does not extend in space; mental as Brook,6 believe that Freud never left the mechanist events are private and can only be observed by the and neuroscientific model of the Project, concealed in own individual. According to monism (or materialism), his metapsychological concepts, which, in his works, however, only the physical world exists, and nothing is coexisted with psychological concepts, originated in immaterial.20 The idea of a spiritualist monism, in which clinical practice. there is no body, has practically no followers. In the last decades we have witnessed an attempt Both monism and substance dualism are, in turn, to approach, or re-approach, psychoanalysis and subdivided into several philosophical currents, as shown neuroscience. The aim of the Neuropsychoanalysis in Table 1. journal, first published in 1999, is to promote the dialogue and the integration of these fields.7 The International Neuropsychoanalysis Society has Dualist currents organized annual conferences since it was founded in July 2000, in London.8 Interactionism According to several authors, the dialog between psychoanalysis and neuroscience may be profitable for René Descartes,22 the main representative of both, and, specifically for psychoanalysis, an anchorage the dualist view of the mind-body problem, aimed in neurobiology may bring greater refinement to its to conduct a systematic reformation of knowledge theories.9-15 in both philosophy and sciences using a method, At the same time, some authors16,17 clearly oppose called the hyperbolic doubt, which consisted in never any closer association between psychoanalysis accepting as true anything that raised any degree of and neuroscience because concepts, theories and doubt.23 Descartes defined that the basis on which investigative methods of the two areas are fundamentally one may build knowledge was the existence of an different and cannot be connected in any way. They “I”, or res cogitans (mind), whose main property was believe that only those events that occur in the analytical thought, which he distinguished from res extensa setting are relevant for psychoanalysis.18 Other authors (body), whose main property was, in turn, extension. argue that neuroscientific findings do not contribute to Descartes22 also defended the existence of God as the the understanding of meanings, the essential matter of ontological principle for the existence of an “I” and all psychoanalysis.19 that might be known when using his rational method. In face of this controversy, any position should be particularly based on the study of the philosophy Table 1 - Main currents of philosophy of mind of mind, the branch of philosophy that addresses the Substance dualism Substance monism mind-body problem.20 In this study, we summarize Interactionism Analytical behaviorism how the main currents of philosophy of mind define Psychophysical parallelism Physicalist or reductive materialism their concepts in relation to the arguments for and Epiphenomenalism Functionalism against a closer dialogue between psychoanalysis and Eliminative materialism neuroscience. Emergentism Trends Psychiatry Psychother. 2014;36(4) – 187 Psychoanalysis, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind - Cheniaux & Lyra He believed, moreover, that mind and body, although Specifically in epiphenomenalism, questions are separate, affect each other, and that their interaction raised because mind and consciousness are not, in fact, might happen in the pineal gland. synonyms, as most mental events are unconscious. The mind-body problem has been based, since the Therefore, Libet’s experiments may not lead to the onset of modernity, on Cartesian philosophy, and the conclusion that mental activity initiated only when the method developed by Descartes influenced a series of decision to make the movement became conscious.26 philosophical and scientific discussions about the mind and its relation to the physical world.24 Monist currents Psychophysical parallelism Analytical behaviorism According to Leibniz,25 mind and body do not affect each other, but mental and physical phenomena are The most important authors in analytical behaviorism parallel, simultaneous and correlated, which is ensured are Gilbert Ryle and Carl Gustav Hempel.21 This philosophical by God’s intervention. current abandoned the use of mind, consciousness and subjectivity constructs. Instead of mental terms (desires, Epiphenomenalism beliefs, intentions), analytical behaviorists
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