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FAITH and OBJECTIVITY FAITH and OBJECTIVITY FRITZ Burl and the HERMENEUTICAL FOUNDATIONS of a RADICAL THEOLOGY

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FAITH and OBJECTIVITY FAITH and OBJECTIVITY FRITZ Burl and the HERMENEUTICAL FOUNDATIONS of a RADICAL THEOLOGY FAITH AND OBJECTIVITY FAITH AND OBJECTIVITY FRITZ BURl AND THE HERMENEUTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A RADICAL THEOLOGY by CHARLEY D. HARDWICK PREFACE by VAN A. HARVEY MARTINUS NIJHOFF I THE HAGUE I 1972 © 1972 by Martinus Nijhoff. The Hague, Netherlands Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1972 All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form ISBN-13: 978-90-247-1201-4 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-010-2760-1 DOl: 10.1007/978-94-010-2760-1 FOR ALLIE AND KEVIN AND CARY VII TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED XI PREFACE BY VAN A. HARVEY XIII FOREWORD XVI INTRODUCTION XIX I. THE PROBLEM OF OBJECTMTY IN THE GENESIS OF BURl'S THEOL- OOY 1 A. Consistent Eschatology and Philosophy of Religion: Burl's Early Position 2 B. Objectivity and Self-Understanding: The Transition to Burl's Mature Position 7 PART I THE PROBLEM OF OBJECTIVITY IN THE FOUNDATIONS OF A THEOLOGICAL HERMENEUTIC II. THE THEOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF OBJECTIVITY AND NON-OBJEC- TIVITY 23 A. Objectivity and Non-Objectivity in the Contemporary Dis- cussion 24 B. Knowledge and the Meanings of Objectivity 1. The Conditions of Objectivity in General 39 2. The Conditions of Scientific Objectivity 42 C. The Problem of Objectivity and Theological Language 45 D. The Limits of Objectivity 51 1. The Transparency of the Subject-Object Structure 53 2. The Limits of Scientific Objectivity 56 VIII TABLE OF CONTENTS E. BUrl's Clarification of the Problem of Objectivity 69 III. THE NON-OBmCTlVlTY OF FAITH AND REVELATION 72 A. The Self-Reference of Theological Language in Schleier- macher's Concept of Self-Consciousness 74 B. The Self-Reference of Theological Language in Buri's Con- cept of Self-Understanding 79 1. Faith as a General Human Possibility 79 2. Human Existence as Grace: Buri's Systematic Principle 81 3. Faith and the Christian Self-Understanding 90 C. The Historicity of Revelation in Burl's Theology 99 1. Revelation for Knowledge 100 2. Historicity and Revelation for Faith 103 IV. SYMBOL, MYTH, AND THE DIALECTIC OF OBmCTIVITY AND NON- OBmCTIVITY 110 A. The Theory of Symbols 111 B. Demythologizing, Existentialist Interpretation, and the Self- Understanding of Myth 117 1. Burl's Concept of Myth 117 2. The Reappropriation of Myth in Self-Understanding 119 C. Myth and Symbol 126 D. The Hermeneutical Significance of the Systematic Principle 129 PART II THE PROBLEM OF OBJECTIVITY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HERMENEUTICAL PRINCIPLES V. HISTORICITY AND THE SYSTEMATIC PRINCIPLE IN THE INTERPRE- TATION OF DoCTRINES 141 A. Anthropology and Christology in the Dogmatic System 141 B. The Imago Dei and the Historicity of the Christian Self- Understanding 147 C. The Person of Christ and the Christian Self-Understanding 153 1. The Divinity of Christ in the Christian Self-Understanding 155 2. The Humanity ofChrist in the Christian Self-Understanding 159 D. The Failure of Historicity 163 T ABLE OF CONTENTS IX E. The Systematic Principle, Historicity, and the Dilemma of Objectivity 167 VI. EXISTENTIALIST INTERPRETATION AND OBJECTIVE DESCRIPTION 179 A. Objective Possibility and Existential Actuality 179 1. Two Types of Limits of Knowledge 179 2. Existentialist Theology and Qualifying the Limits on Ob- jectification 182 3. Theology and Proclamation 187 B. The Objective Status of Buri's Systematic Principle 189 C. Objective Description of Existential Modes of Being 192 1. The Personhood of God in the Self-Understanding of Faith 193 2. Self and World in the Self-Understanding of Faith 202 VII. RADICAL THEOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF OBmCTIVITY 223 A. The Significance of Existentialist Interpretation for a Radical Theology 224 B. Ontology and the Subject-Object Structure 230 C. Existential Language in its Larger Linguistic Context 244 BmLIOGRAPHY 248 INDEX 255 XI LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED BntE Die Bedeutung der neutestamentlichen Eschatologie for die neuere protestantische Theologie. Ein Versuch zur Kliirung des Problems der Eschatologie und zu einem neuen Verstiindnis ihres eigent­ lichen Anliegens CF The Christian Faith DcG Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsiitzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt DG Denkender Glaube. Schritte auf dem Weg zu einer philosophischen Theologie I Dogmatik als Selbstverstiindnis des christlichen Glaubens Erster Teil: Vemunft und Offenbarung II Dogmatik als Selbstverstiindnis des christlichen Glaubens Zweiter Teil: Der Mensch und die Gnade ET English translation EoE "Entmythologisierung oder Entkerygmatisierung der Theologie" HSRG "How Can We Still Speak Responsibly of God?" DP Der Pantokrator. Ontologie und Eschatologie als Grundlage der Lehre von Gott PaP "Das Problem der ausgebliebenen Parusie" PuDR "Das Problem des ungegenstiindlichen Denkens und Redens in der heutigen Theologie" RF "The Reality of Faith" RG(]2 Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (2nd edition) SthUm Schweizerische theologische Umschau TdE Theologie der Existenz PREFACE In the last decade, too many American theologians have been preoc­ cupied with charting and interpreting in a superficial manner the move­ ments of the newest stars in the Continental theological firmament. This preoccupation contributed much, unfortunately, to that faddism that was so characteristic of American theology in the Sixties, the period imme­ diately following the passing of a generation of theological giants like Barth, Bultmann, Tillich, Gogarten, and the Niebuhrs. There has seldom been a period in which so many promissory notes were issued so care­ lessly onto the intellectual market, notes that were not, and perhaps could not, have been redeemed. Given this temper of the times, it is difficult to account for the almost total neglect of the work of Professor Fritz Burl of Basel, whose "theolo­ gy of existence" is one of the most interesting and impressive contempo­ rary attempts to interpret the myths and symbols of the Christian faith in terms of an existentialist philosophy. Even if one were to apply that most superficial, though for many apparently decisive, criterion of "radicality," one might have expected his work to attract some sustained attention be­ cause Buri has consistently posed a radical solution to most of the hotly debated issues of the times: the problem of demythologization, the mean­ ing of theological language, the problems raised by historical criticism, and the meaning of the historical Jesus for faith, to mention a few. But when one takes account of other more important features of his thought, the neglect of it becomes even more difficult to understand. Consider, for example, the basic sensibility underlying and informing XIV PREFACE his point of view. It is peculiarly congenial with that sensibility characte­ ristic of American theology in both its liberal and neo-orthodox manifes­ tations: the drive to establish what one can theologically believe and ex­ press in a secular culture impressed by the achievements of the scienc"l;, the concern with the results of historical criticism, with the limits of the human intellect and, above all, with the way in which the categories and symbols of the mind are conditioned by one's culture and history. Buri's thought, like that of H. Richard Niebuhr, which stamped the thinking of an entire theological generation, is pluralistic and relativistic, and it is no accident that Buri has attempted to come to terms with Niebuhr's thought in his recent writings. In short, Buri's concern is, to use a popu­ lar neologism, how "to do theology" in the modem world, and this mo­ dem world is one that most Americans will recognize to be much more like their "world" than the "world" of many of those European thinkers upon which so much attention has been lavished. A second reason one might have expected American theologians to be concerned with Buri is that he, perhaps more than any other Continental theologian, has felt it important to read, digest, and enter into discussion with his counterparts in America. I have already noted his concern with H. Richard Niebuhr, but his recent and as yet untranslated book, Gott in Amerika: Amerikanische Theologie seit 1960, is a remarkable testi­ mony to the extent and depth of his knowledge of American theology. There is scarcely a contemporary American theologian whose work is not discussed in some detail in this book - Altizer, Cobb, Cox, Flet­ cher, Gilkey, Hamilton, Kaufman, Lehmann, MacQuarrie, Michaelson, Ogden, Robinson, van Buren, Winter - and the bibliography in the fi­ nal pages is an impressive piece of Kulturgeschichte. The third and most important reason of all why it is difficult to under­ stand the neglect of Burl's work is the range and magnitude of his achieve­ ment. He is, at this writing at least, the only radical theologian who has, as Professor Hardwick has pointed out in a recent article, advanced beyond the stages of methodological controversy and promissory notes and developed a full-blown systematic theology that attempts, on the one hand, to be consistently existentialist and, on the other, to stand in con­ versation with the entire Christian tradition. It seems clear, then, that a rigorous and thorough assessment of Burl's achievement is long overdue, and it is a happy fact that Professor Hard­ wick, a young theologian at American University in Washington, D.C., has now provided it. The significance of Hardwick's accomplishment is two-fold. First, he has not written a superficial introduction to Burl's PREFACE xv thought but, on the contrary, interprets it against the background of the most profound currents of Protestant theology since Schleiermacher. Sec­ ond, Hardwick carries on a running debate with his subject over the lat­ ter's basic premise regarding the necessity of translating all objective theological statements into statements regarding human existence. Hard­ wick argues, if I understand him, that Buri's method makes a distinctive Christian theology impossible because when Buri tries to specify what is unique in the Christian self-understanding according to the hermeneutical principles derived from existentialism, the actual content that emerges is nothing more that a restatement of the basic, formal principles of exis­ tentialist philosophy.
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