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Logical Studies in Early Analytic Philosophy.Pdf %3,L$D)AC4CDC4;:'8L%3,;?JL;0L8'AA,AL "?;>;A4C4;:AL$C'C,9,:CAL4:LC3,L$D)AC4CDC4;:(8 %3,;?JL %3,LL %3,;?JL;0L;24*'8L%J>,AL #DAA,88AL LD8C4>8,L#,8'C5;:AL%3,;?JL;0 D+29,:CL %3,L%3,;?JL;0L#'941,+L ;24*'8L%J>,AL ;:*8D+4:2L #,9'?7AL;:L #DAA,88AL L:C?=+D*C4;: C;L L ;25*5A9L':+LC3,L "?,+4*'C4F,L 'CD?,L ;0L;:*,>CAL "?,+4*'C4;:L D:*C4;:'84CJL I4AC,:C4'8L";A4CAL':+L C3,L'HAL;0L ;24*L 'AL;:*,>C;??,8'C,AL ?,2,AL;D)8,L;??,8'C4;:L%3,A4AL':+L4AL'A5* 'HL&L #DAA,88L':+L ?,2,L;:L ;94:'84K,+L"?,+4*'C,AL #DAA,88AL"'?'+;IL#,F4A4C,+L ?,2,AL#,6,*C5;:L;0L $*3?<+,?AL4,?'?*3JL;0 :+4F4+D'8AL ?,2,AL ;D)8,L;??,8'C4;:L%3,A4AL ':+L C3,L%3,;?JL;0 $49>8,L ;24*'8L%J>,AL %3,L%3,;?JL;0L ;9;2,:,;DAL$59>8,L %J>-AL'AL ' $,*;:+L!?+,?L;24*L ?,2,L':+LC3,L"?4:*4>8,L ;0LIC,:A4;:'84CJL #DAA,88L':+LC3,L"?4:*5>8,L;0L #424+4CJL ?,2,AL;:C,9>8'C4;:L;0LC3,L),8'?+4':L&4.HL L$,*;:+L#,*;:AC?D*C4;:L;0L?,2,AL;24*4A9L :L:C,:A4;:'84K,+L;?9L ;0L?,2,AL ;24*4A9L #DAA,88AL ;24*5A9L'AL ;:*,>CD'8L"8'C;:4A9L L G/@BEBL ,4:;:24':L!)6,*CAL #DAA,884':L:+4F4+D'8AL 'A??088?F F<::6@:0;@F@<F-?@>,.@ ,.@?F "<46.,8F@<:6?:F,;/F@50F <.@>6;1F<2F"<46.,8 )E=0?F &><=<?6@6<;,8F A;.@6<;?F,?F"6;4A6?@6. <;B0;60;.0?F 'A??088?F+0,70;0/F<>:F<2F@50F&>6;.6=80F<2 @<:6.6@EF F 9 @<:6.F(6@A,@6<;?F,;/F <:=80:0;@,@6<;F 80:0;@,>EF&><=<?6@6<;?F,;/F<:=80:0;@,@6<;F &><=<?6@6<;,8F<;;0.@6B0?F,?F&A;.@A,@6<;F#,>7?F (0:,;@6.F ?.0;@ %>F+,?F )56?F )>6=F '0,88E $0.0??,>EF B0>?A?F F9 )50F &><=<?6@6<;,8F#</,8F,8.A8A?F(F 9 $04,@6B0F,. @?F,;/F <:=80:0;@,>EF$0DA?0?F $<:6;,86?:?F*60CF<2F"< 46.,8F(=,.0F ;F-?@>,.@F(0:,;@6.?F2<>F$<:6;,86?@F"<46.,8 @<:6?:F )50F %;@<8<46.,8F >,::,>F<2F $<:6;,86?@F"<46.,8 @<:6?:F )50F&><-80:F<3F /0;@6@EF6;F"<46.,8F@<:6?:F "<46.,8F)>A@5F "<46.,8F$0.0??6@EF )50F!;.<:=80@0;0??F<2F$<:6;,86?@F"<46.,8 @<:6?:F Preface The essays collected here deal with the development of ana­ lytic philosophy in the first quarter of the twentieth century. In addition to providing a historical account of early analytic philosophy, these es­ says also contain logical reconstructions of Frege's, Russell's, Meinong's, and Wittgenstein's views during the period in question. Several of these re­ constructions can and have been used in the new logicolinguistic develop­ ments in pragmatics and intensional logic that make up the vanguard of contemporary analytic philosophy. Others, such as the interpretation of the logical modalities in logical atomism, or the determination of the ob­ jects of fiction and dreams in Meinong's theory of objects or Russell's early logic, provide a useful introduction, if not also a solution, to a num­ ber of problems confronting analytic philosophy today. Indeed, for that matter, all of the essays collected here provide a useful propaedeutic to much of the research now going on in the study of logic and language. A number of small changes have been made in all of the essays re­ printed here, mainly for stylistic purposes. Their histories are brieflyindi­ cated as follows. Chapter 1 first appeared in Synthese, vol. 45, no. 1 (Sep­ tember 1980):71-115, Copyright© 1980 by 0. Reidel Publishing Com­ pany, Dordrecht, Holland. A somewhat longer version of chapter 2 first appeared in Frege Synthesized, L. Haaparanta and J. Hintikka (eds.), 1986, pp. 197-252, Copyright © 1986 by 0. 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