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A Companion to
Analytic Philosophy

Blackwell Companions to Philosophy

This outstanding student reference series offers a comprehensive and authoritative survey of philosophy as a whole. Written by today’s leading philosophers, each volume provides lucid and engaging coverage of the key figures, terms, topics, and problems of the field. Taken together, the volumes provide the ideal basis for course use, representing an unparalleled work of reference for students and specialists alike.

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Blackwell
Companions to
Philosophy

A Companion to
Analytic Philosophy

Edited by

A. P. MARTINICH

and

DAVID SOSA

Copyright © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001 First published 2001 2 4 6 8 10 9 7 5 3 1 Blackwell Publishers Inc. 350 Main Street Malden, Massachusetts 02148 USA

Blackwell Publishers Ltd 108 Cowley Road Oxford OX4 1JF UK

All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposes of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

Except in the United States of America, this book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, resold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher’s prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser.

Library of   Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A companion to analytic philosophy / edited by A. P. Martinich and David Sosa. p. cm. – (Blackwell companions to philosophy)
Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-631-21415-1 (hb : alk. paper) 1. Analysis (Philosophy) 2. Philosophy, Modern – 19th century. 3. Philosophy, Modern – 20th century. I. Martinich, Aloysius. II. Sosa, David, 1966– III. Series. B808.5 .C555 2001

146¢.4 – dc21
00-050770

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Typeset in 10 on 12.5 pt Photina by Best-set Typesetter Ltd., Hong Kong Printed in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Contents

List of Contributors

viii
1

Introduction

A. P. MARTINICH

123456789
Gottlob Frege (1848–1925)

MICHAEL DUMMETT

6
21

Bertrand Russell (1872–1970)

THOMAS BALDWIN

G. E. Moore (1873–1958)

ERNEST SOSA

45

C. D. Broad (1887–1971)

JAMES VAN CLEVE

57

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951)

P. M. S. HACKER

68

Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970)

SAHOTRA SARKAR

94

Karl Popper (1892–1994)

W. H. NEWTON-SMITH

110 117

Gilbert Ryle (1900–1976)

AVRUM STROLL

Alfred Tarski (1902–1983), Alonzo Church (1903–1995), and Kurt Gödel (1906–1978)

C. ANTHONY ANDERSON

124 139 148 v

10 Frank P. Ramsey (1903–1930)

BRAD ARMENDT

11 Carl G. Hempel (1905–1997)

PHILIP KITCHER

CONTENTS

12 Nelson Goodman (1906–1998)

160 169 175 181 205 218 231 239 254 274 281 296 315 326 334 350 357 361

ISRAEL SCHEFFLER

13 H. L. A. Hart (1907–1992)

SCOTT SHAPIRO

14 Charles Stevenson (1908–1979)

JAMES DREIER

15 W. V. Quine (1908–2000)

PETER HYLTON

16 A. J. Ayer (1910–1989)

T. L. S. SPRIGGE

17 J. L. Austin (1911–1960)

JOHN R. SEARLE

18 Norman Malcolm (1911–1990)

CARL GINET

19 Wilfrid Sellars (1912–1989)

JAY F. ROSENBERG

20 H. P. Grice (1913–1988)

STEPHEN NEALE

21 G. H. von Wright (1916– )

FREDERICK STOUTLAND

22 Roderick Chisholm (1916–1999)

RICHARD FOLEY AND DEAN ZIMMERMAN

23 Donald Davidson (1917– )

ERNEST LEPORE

24 G. E. M. Anscombe (1919–2001)

ANSELM MÜLLER

25 R. M. Hare (1919– )

WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG

26 P. F. Strawson (1919– )

P. F. SNOWDON

27 Philippa Foot (1920– )

GAVIN LAWRENCE

28 Ruth Barcan Marcus (1921– )

MAX CRESSWELL

29 John Rawls (1921– )

NORMAN DANIELS

vi

CONTENTS

30 Thomas S. Kuhn (1922–1996)

371

RICHARD GRANDY

31 Michael Dummett (1925– )

378 393 413 419 428 434 451 466 478 489

ALEXANDER MILLER

32 Hilary Putnam (1926– )

JOHN HEIL

33 David M. Armstong (1926– )

FRANK JACKSON

34 Noam Chomsky (1928– )

PETER LUDLOW

35 Richard Rorty (1931– )

MICHAEL WILLIAMS

36 John R. Searle (1932– )

A. P. MARTINICH

37 Jerry Fodor (1935– )

GEORGES REY

38 Saul Kripke (1940– )

DAVID SOSA

39 David Lewis (1941– )

ROBERT STALNAKER

Index

vii

Contributors

C. Anthony Anderson

Professor of   Philosophy, University of   California, Santa Barbara

Brad Armendt

Associate Professor of   Philosophy, Arizona State University

Thomas Baldwin

Professor of   Philosophy, University of Y o rk, England

Max Cresswell

Professor of   Philosophy, Victoria University of W e llington, New Zealand

Norman Daniels

Professor of   Philosophy and Goldthwaite Professor of   Rhetoric, Tufts University

James Dreier

Associate Professor of   Philosophy, Brown University

Sir Michael Dummett

Wykeham Professor of   Logic Emeritus, University of   Oxford

Richard Foley

Professor of   Philosophy and Dean of   the Faculty of   Arts and Sciences, New Y o rk University

Carl Ginet

Professor Emeritus of   Philosophy, Cornell University

Richard Grandy

Carolyn and Fred McManis Professor of   Philosophy, Rice University

P. M. S. Hacker

Fellow of   St. John’s College, University of   Oxford

John Heil

Professor of   Philosophy, Davidson College

Peter Hylton

Professor of   Philosophy, University of   Illinois, Chicago

viii

CONTRIBUTORS

Frank Jackson

Professor of   Philosophy in the Philosophy Program, Research School of   Social Sciences, and Director of   the Institute of   Advanced Studies, Australian National University

Philip Kitcher

Professor of   Philosophy, Columbia University

Gavin Lawrence

Associate Professor of   Philosophy, University of   California, Los Angeles

Ernest LePore

Professor of   Philosophy and Director of   the Center for Cognitive Science, Rutgers University

Peter Ludlow

Professor of   Philosophy, State University of   New Y o rk, Stony Brook

A. P. Martinich

Roy Allison V a ughan Centennial Professor of   Philosophy, Professor of   History, University of Texas, Austin

Alexander Miller

Senior Research Fellow, Cardiff   University

Anselm Winfried Müller

Professor of   Philosophy, University of   Trie r , G ermany

Stephen Neale

Professor of   Philosophy, Rutgers University

W. H. Newton-Smith

Fairfax Fellow, Jowett Fellow, Jowett Lecturer and Tutor in Philosophy, Balliol College, University of   Oxford

Georges Rey

Professor of   Philosophy, University of   Maryland, College Park

Jay F. Rosenberg

Taylor Grandy Professor of   Philosophy, University of   North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Sahotra Sarkar

Associate Professor of   Philosophy, University of   Texas, Austin

Israel Scheffler

Professor Emeritus of   Philosophy and Professor Emeritus and Directo r , P hilosophy of Education Research Cente r , G raduate School of   Education, Harvard University

John R. Searle

Mills Professor of   Philosophy, University of   California, Berkeley

Scott Shapiro

Assistant Professor of   Law, Benjamin Cardozo School of   Law, Y e shiva University

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Professor of   Philosophy, Dartmouth College

ix

CONTRIBUTORS

P. F. Snowdon

Lecturer in Philosophy and Fellow, Exeter College, University of   Oxford

David Sosa

Associate Professor of   Philosophy, University of   Texas, Austin

Ernest Sosa

Romeo Elton Professor of   Natural Theology, Brown University, and Professor of   Philosophy, Rutgers University

T. L. S. Sprigge

Honorary Fellow, University of   Edinburgh

Robert Stalnaker

Professor of   Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of   Technology

Frederick Stoutland

Professor Emeritus of   Philosophy, St. Olaf   College, and Permanent Visiting Professo r , University of   Uppsala

Avrum Stroll

Research Professo r , U niversity of   California, San Diego

James van Cleve

Professor of   Philosophy, Brown University

Michael Williams

Professor of   Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University

Dean Zimmerman

Associate Professor of   Philosophy, Syracuse University

x

Blackwell Companions to Philosophy: A Companion to Analytic Philosophy

Edited by A. P. Martinich, David Sosa
Copyright © Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001

Introduction

A. P. MARTINICH

Though analytic philosophy was practiced by Plato and reinvigorated in the modern era by René Descartes and Thomas Hobbes among others, we are concerned with it only in its twentieth-century forms. As such, it was revived in two centers, Germany and England. In Germany, Gottlob Frege was exploring the foundations of mathematics and logic. His efforts introduced new standards of rigor that made their way into analytic philosophy generally, through the work of Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein. His discussions of the nature of language and reasoning have also become powerful tools in the hands of later philosophers. Among Frege’s many books and articles, the Grundgesetze, Begriffsschrift, “On Sense and Reference” (“Über Sinn und Bedeutung,” 1892) and “Thoughts” (“Gedanken,” 1918) stand out as especially significant.
During about the same period in England, G. E. Moore led the way in opposing the then-dominant philosophy of British idealism. While “The Nature of Judgment” is an early criticism of a point in F. H. Bradley’s Logic, the locus classicus of British analytic philosophy is likely “The Refutation of Idealism” (1903), a criticism of the formula esse est percipi (“to be is to be perceived”). A crucial part of that argument is Moore’s claim that the concept of the sensation of yellow contains two parts: the sensation that is unique to each person and the yellowness that can be perceived by many people. Even when idealists conceded that there was some kind of duality here, they insisted on a kind of inseparability.
To use a general name for the kind of analytic philosophy practiced during the first half of the twentieth century, initially in Great Britain and German-speaking countries, and later in North America, Australia, and New Zealand, “conceptual analysis” aims at breaking down complex concepts into their simpler components. Successive analyses performed on complex concepts would yield simpler concepts. According to Moore, the process might lead ultimately to simple concepts, of which no further analysis could be given. The designation “conceptual” was supposed to distinguish the philosophical activity from various analyses applied to nonconceptual objects. Physics was famous in the twentieth century for breaking down atoms into protons, neutrons, and electrons, and these subatomic particles into an array of more exotic components. And analytic chemistry aims at determining chemical compositions. The analogy between philosophy and science inspired the name “logical atomism,” a theory that flourished between

1

A. P. MARTINICH

1920 and 1930. Both Wittgenstein and Bertrand Russell maintained that there must be simple, unanalyzable objects at the fundamental level of reality. Wittgenstein thought that the simples existed independently of human experience, Russell that they existed only for as long as one’s attention was fixed on them.
Notwithstanding the analogy between scientific and philosophical analysis, most philosophers in the first half of the twentieth century maintained that philosophy was very different from science. In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921), Wittgenstein wrote: “Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. (The word ‘philosophy’ must mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside them.)” (4.111). This conveniently left open which was superior.
But if there is anything constant in analytic philosophy, it is change, and the opposite view of the relation between science and philosophy has dominated the second half of the century. Largely owing to the influence of W. V. Quine, many philosophers have come to believe that philosophy is continuous with science. Yesterday’s heresy is today’s orthodoxy. Whichever view is correct, the division between the philosophical analysis of concepts and the nonphilosophical scientific analysis of nonconceptual objects should perhaps not be taken too strictly. Concepts and hence philosophy would be of no use if they did not make contact with the nonconceptual world. In addition, science uses concepts, many of which may be among the most fundamental of reality. To paraphrase Kant, perceptions without concepts are blind; concepts without perceptions are empty.
Overlapping with the latter period of logical atomism is logical positivism, which may be dated from Moritz Schlick’s founding of the Vienna Circle in 1924. One of its principal doctrines was that science is a unity; and one of its principal projects was to show how to translate all meaningful language into scientific language, in other words, to reduce meaningful nonscientific language to scientific language. This project cannot be successful unless something distinguishes meaningful from nonmeaningful expressions. A. J. Ayer probably devoted more energy and displayed more ingenuity in trying to formulate a criterion of meaningfulness than anyone else. His first effort was presented in Language, Truth and Logic (1936), the book that became the most widely known statement of logical positivism and which introduced that philosophy to the anglophone public. The basic idea is that a sentence is meaningful if and only if it is either analytic (or contradictory) or empirically verifiable. Various objections were raised to this, and to every revision of this criterion. Part of the problem was the status of the criterion itself. Either it would be analytic and hence vacuous, or it would be empirical but then not completely confirmed. Logical positivism had been dead for some time when it was buried by Carl G. Hempel’s “Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning” (1950) and W. V. Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951). Nevertheless, Ayer and others never abandoned the spirit of verifiability.
What had already begun to take the place of logical positivism in the 1940s was ordinary-language philosophy, one strand of which emanated from Cambridge in the later philosophy of Wittgenstein, the other from Oxford. One of Wittgenstein’s motivating beliefs was that philosophy creates its own problems, and that means that they are not genuine problems at all. The confusion arises from philosophers’ misuse of ordinary words. They take words out of their ordinary context, the only context in which they have meaning, use them philosophically, and thereby discover anomalies with the

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  • Jhap Handout: Ruth Barcan Marcus and Quantified Modal Logic

    Jhap Handout: Ruth Barcan Marcus and Quantified Modal Logic

    JHAP HANDOUT: RUTH BARCAN MARCUS AND QUANTIFIED MODAL LOGIC FREDERIQUE JANSSEN-LAURET 1. Ruth Barcan's Early Work and Its Significance Was Barcan the originator of quantified modal logic [1, 2], and of direct reference theory [8]? Or was it Carnap (1947) and Kripke (1970) respectively? Or just Kripke (1963, 1970)? I'll argue that Barcan was not only the first to publish a quantified modal logic, but that hers, deeply entwined with her direct reference theory of names, was more influential especially in overturning the extensionalist consensus in early analytic philosophy, and in changing Quine's mind. Quine had long been vigorously anti-modal; when he found that Carnap had embraced intensional languages, he shot off a letter saying, `your principle of tolerance may finally lead you even to tolerate Hitler' (Quine 1990, p. 241). But his debate with Barcan Marcus led him to abandon several arguments which he had to concede were bad or not effective against her { in part because while they had different views there was common ground between them on metaphysics and ontology. 2. W.V. Quine and Ruth Barcan Marcus on Ontology { Russellian legacy of ontological questions: logical atomism and the world being built up out of unanalysable, directly knowable constituents. { Russell argued that only `this', `that', and `I' are real proper names: they must stand for something we know directly. He also offered a theory of definite descriptions: they ascribe some predicate(s) to exactly one thing; possibly but not necessarily something directly perceived. |Two different developments of Russellian approach to ontology. W.V.
  • Theories of Personal Identity

    Theories of Personal Identity

    Dean Zimmerman Materialism, Dualism, and “Simple” Theories of Personal Identity “Complex” and “Simple” Theories of Personal Identity Derek Parfit introduced “the Complex View” and “the Simple View” as names for contrasting theories about the nature of personal identity. He detects a “reductionist tradition”, typified by Hume and Locke, and continuing in such twentieth‐century philosophers as Grice, Ayer, Quinton, Mackie, John Perry, David Lewis, and Parfit himself. According to the Reductionists, “the fact of personal identity over time just consists in the holding of certain other facts. It consists in various kinds of psychological continuity, of memory, character, intention, and the like, which in turn rest upon bodily continuity.” The Complex View comprises “[t]he central claims of the reductionist tradition” (Parfit 1982, p. 227). The Complex View about the nature of personal identity is a forerunner to what he later calls “Reductionism”. A Reductionist is anyone who believes (1) that the fact of a person’s identity over time just consists in the holding of certain more particular facts, and (2) that these facts can be described without either presupposing the identity of this person, or explicitly claiming that the experiences in this person’s life are had by this person, or even explicitly claiming that this person exists. (Parfit 1984, p. 210) Take the fact that someone remembers that she, herself, witnessed a certain event at an earlier time. When described in those terms, it “presupposes” or “explicitly claims” that the same person is involved in both the episode of witnessing and of remembering. Purging the psychological facts of all those that 1 immediately imply the cross‐temporal identity of a person will leave plenty of grist for the mills of psychological theories of persistence conditions.
  • The Barcan Formula in Metaphysics*

    The Barcan Formula in Metaphysics*

    The Barcan Formula in Metaphysics * Ori SIMCHEN Received: 02.11.2012 Final version: 17.02.2013 BIBLID [0495-4548 (2013) 28: 78; pp. 375-392] DOI: 10.1387/theoria.6918 ABSTRACT: The Barcan formula (BF) is widely considered a threat to actualism. I show how BF can be cleared of such a charge by construing it as a bridge principle connecting modality de dicto and modality de re while re- taining a Russellian robust sense of reality in modal matters. Keywords: Barcan formula; modality; de dicto and de re. RESUMEN: La fórmula Barcan (FB) se considera por lo general una amenaza al realismo. Muestro de qué modo FB puede verse libre de esta imputación si se construye como un principio puente que conecte la modalidad de dicto y la modalidad de re al mismo tiempo que retiene un sentido russelliano robusto de realidad en cuestio- nes modales. Palabras clave: fórmula Barcan; modalidad; de dicto y de re. 1. Introduction The Barcan formula is a schema introduced by Ruth Barcan Marcus as an axiom schema in her pioneering work on quantified modal logic (QML): (BF) ◊∃xφx → ∃x ◊φx.1 It is paraphrased as the schematic conditional that if it is possible that there be a φ, then something or other is possibly a φ. Together with its converse CBF it gives ex- pression to the most straightforward way of combining modal operators with classical quantification. But it is customary nowadays to think of BF as posing a threat to a view in modal metaphysics known as ‘actualism’, roughly the claim that there are no non-actual (or ‘merely possible’) things.2 This, we are told, is regrettable if true to the extent that BF is validated by the most straightforward systems of quantified modal logic and actualism is highly plausible and attractive in its own right.
  • Willard Van Orman Quine's Philosophical Development in the 1930S and 1940S Frederique Janssen-Lauret

    Willard Van Orman Quine's Philosophical Development in the 1930S and 1940S Frederique Janssen-Lauret

    W.V. Quine's Philosophical Development, F. Janssen-Lauret, in The Significance of the New Logic, CUP 2018 Willard Van Orman Quine's Philosophical Development in the 1930s and 1940s Frederique Janssen-Lauret Published in The Significance of the New Logic: A Translation of Quine's O Sentido da Nova Lógica (ed. and tr. W. Carnielli, F. Janssen-Lauret, and W. Pickering), Cambridge University Press (2018), pp. xiv-xlvii. 1. History of Analytic Philosophy and Early Quine's Place Within It W.V. Quine (1908-2000), pioneer of mathematical logic, champion of naturalism in philosophy of science and epistemology, atheist, materialist, unifier of an austere physicalism with the truth of logic and mathematics, globetrotter, polyglot, Harvard stalwart and celebrated naval officer, was both an establishment figure and a free-thinking radical. Quine's life began shortly after the emergence of analytic philosophy. He was soon to become one of its towering figures. Taught by A.N. Whitehead, interlocutor to Rudolf Carnap, Alfred Tarski, and Ruth Barcan Marcus, teacher of Donald Davidson and David Lewis, Quine was at the scene of the development of modern set theory, logical positivism, modal logic, truth-conditional semantics, and the metaphysics of possible worlds. Hardly a significant new movement in analytic philosophy passed him by. Yet Quine's relationship to many of these movements is surprisingly ill-understood. Everyone knows that the logical positivists, including Quine's mentor Carnap, sought to place truth and meaning on a proper scientific footing by countenancing only a priori analytic and a posteriori empirically testable statements as properly significant.
  • The Problem: the Theory of Ideas in Ancient Atomism and Gilles Deleuze

    The Problem: the Theory of Ideas in Ancient Atomism and Gilles Deleuze

    Duquesne University Duquesne Scholarship Collection Electronic Theses and Dissertations 2013 The rP oblem: The Theory of Ideas in Ancient Atomism and Gilles Deleuze Ryan J. Johnson Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/etd Recommended Citation Johnson, R. (2013). The rP oblem: The Theory of Ideas in Ancient Atomism and Gilles Deleuze (Doctoral dissertation, Duquesne University). Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/706 This Immediate Access is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE PROBLEM: THE THEORY OF IDEAS IN ANCIENT ATOMISM AND GILLES DELEUZE A Dissertation Submitted to the McAnulty College & Graduate School of Liberal Arts Duquesne University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy By Ryan J. Johnson May 2014 Copyright by Ryan J. Johnson 2014 ii THE PROBLEM: THE THEORY OF IDEAS IN ANCIENT ATOMISM AND GILLES DELEUZE By Ryan J. Johnson Approved December 6, 2013 _______________________________ ______________________________ Daniel Selcer, Ph.D Kelly Arenson, Ph.D Associate Professor of Philosophy Assistant Professor of Philosophy (Committee Chair) (Committee Member) ______________________________ John Protevi, Ph.D Professor of Philosophy (Committee Member) ______________________________ ______________________________ James Swindal, Ph.D. Ronald Polansky, Ph.D. Dean, McAnulty College & Graduate Chair, Department of Philosophy School of Liberal Arts Professor of Philosophy Professor of Philosophy iii ABSTRACT THE PROBLEM: THE THEORY OF IDEAS IN ANCIENT ATOMISM AND GILLES DELEUZE By Ryan J. Johnson May 2014 Dissertation supervised by Dr.