DOCSLIB.ORG

Misconceived Relationships Between Logical Positivism and Quantitative Research Chong Ho Yu, Ph.D., D

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Misconceived Relationships Between Logical Positivism and Quantitative Research Chong Ho Yu, Ph.D., D Misconceived relationships between logical positivism and quantitative research Chong Ho Yu, Ph.D., D. Phil. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the 2001 American Educational Research Association, Seattle, WA Published in Research Method Forum, 2003 Included in the book Philosophical foundations of quantitative research methodology (2006, Laham, MD: University Press of America) Correspondence: Chong Ho Yu, Ph.D., D. Phil. Email: [email protected] Website: http://www.creative-wisdom.com/pub/pub.html Logical positivism and Quantitative Research 2 Abstract Although quantitative research methodology is widely applied by social scientists, there is a common misconception that quantitative research is based upon logical positivism. This misconception leads to misguided disputes between qualitative and quantitative researchers. This article points out that the polarities between the two are unnecessary, and the richness and continuity of “research traditions” is therefore proposed as a replacement for the incommensurability in the Kuhnian “paradigm.” Further, this article examines the relationship between quantitative research and eight major notions of logical positivism: (a) verification, (b) pro-observation, (c) anti-cause, (d) downplaying explanation, (e) anti- theoretical entities, (f) anti-metaphysics, (g) logical analysis and (h) frequentist probability. It is argued that the underlying philosophy of modern quantitative research does not subscribe to logical positivism. Associating an outdated philosophy with quantitative research may discourage social science researchers from applying this research approach. Researchers and students should be encouraged to keep an open mind to different methodologies because mixed methods have the potential to achieve the goals of convergent validity and completeness. Logical positivism and Quantitative Research 3 Misconceived relationships between logical positivism and quantitative research Introduction Feldman (1998) observed that while positivism has been universally rejected by philosophers of science over the past fifty years, current textbooks still either associate quantitative methods with positivist ones or cover quantitative methods within a positivist frame of reference. Despite the fact that newer epistemologies and methodologies, such as post-positivism, critical realism, and critical multiplism, have been discussed in numerous books and articles (Cook, 1985, 1991, 1993; Cook & Campbell, 1979; Cook & Shadish, 1994; Phillips, 1987, 1990a, 1990b, 1992, 2000; Phillips & Burbules, 2000), the debate regarding the paradigm of quantitative methods seems to be trapped in a time warp. The objectives of this paper are threefold. First, I argue that the dichotomy between the two approaches is misguided due to the popular notion of “paradigm” introduced by Kuhn, which tends to polarize methodological differences and thus leads to epistemological incommensurability. Instead, the problem would be reframed under the notion of “research tradition” advocated by Laudan. Second, historical and theoretical evidence is cited in attempt to break the philosophical ties between quantitative methodology and logical positivism. Logical positivism, which rejects theoretical constructs and causality and emphasizes reductionism, is too restrictive to apply to quantitative methodology, which supports the use of latent constructs, causal inferences, and the iterative process of undestanding the data and developing constructs. Last, I argue that when quantitative research departs from logical positivism and methodological differences/similarities are re-conceptualized in research tradition, it widens the door to triangulation with the goals of convergence and completeness. Misconceptions of quantitative research The misconceived relationships between positivism and quantitative research can still be found in recent textbooks. For example, Berg (2001) explicitly identified quantitative research as a positivistic approach: “Positivists utilize empirical methodologies borrowed from the natural sciences to investigate phenomena. Quantitative strategies serve this positive-science ideal by providing rigorous, reliable, and Logical positivism and Quantitative Research 4 verifiably large aggregates of data and the statistical testing of empirical hypotheses” (p.10). Merriam (1998) also related certain “positivist” characteristics to quantitative methods: In positivist form of research…knowledge gained through scientific and experimental research is objective and quantifiable…on the topic dropping out of high school…From a positivist perspective you might begin by hypothesizing that students drop out of high school because of low self-esteem. You could then design an intervention program to raise the self-esteem of students at risk. You set up an experiment controlling for as many variables as possible, and then measure the results. (p. 4) Further, in many texts comparing qualitative and quantitative research, the attributes of the latter are often misidentified. The following are some examples: particularistic (quantitative) vs. holistic (qualitative) emphasis, outcome-oriented (quantitative) vs. process-oriented (qualitative), fixed (quantitative) vs. emergent (qualitative) categories, static (quantitative) vs. fluid (qualitative) reality (Huysamen, 1997), mechanical (quantitative) vs. creative (qualitative), formulaic (quantitative) vs. interpretive (qualitative) (Howe, 1988), expansionist (qualitative) vs. reductionist (quantitative), and grounded (qualitative) vs. ungrounded (quantitative) (Reichardt & Cook, 1979). These comparisons are grounded in the misunderstood relationship between quantitative research and the positivist/logical positivist paradigms. For example, qualitative researchers use the grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) to develop “categories” that could fit the data until the categories are saturated. The process is said to be an iterative abstraction grounded on the data. In a similar vein, quantitative researchers employ exploratory factor analysis to develop latent constructs until all dimensions emerge and all observed variables can be properly loaded into the abstracted dimensions. It is difficult to see why the former is said to be grounded while the latter is ungrounded. Probably, this misunderstanding is due to the association between the one-way reductionism endorsed by certain logical positivists and quantitative methods. Further, the perception that quantitative research assumes static reality is attributable to the myth that logical positivists are realists. The notion that quantitative researchers are confined by fixed categories results from the omission of the fact that quantitative researchers utilize open concepts and Logical positivism and Quantitative Research 5 customized instruments in different contexts. In a later section this article will fully discuss the core ideas of logical positivism and point out that the preceding perceived connection is mistaken. Research tradition vs. Paradigm One of the sources of the misunderstanding can be traced back to the oversimplification of quantitative research. Usually quantitative research is viewed as Fisherian hypothesis testing, and various statistical procedures are regarded as a unitary approach that can be summarized in a single paradigm. However, at the ontological, epistemological, and methodological levels, the Fisherian school, the Neyman/Pearson school, the Bayesian school, the resampling school, and the exploratory data analysis (EDA) school are fundamentally different, and to some extent are incompatible (Lehmann, 1993; Berger, 2001; Behrens, 1997; Behrens & Yu, 2003). Further, in the arena of measurement, the classical test theory and the item response theory are also very different in their premises and assumptions (Embretson & Reise, 2000). According to Kuhn (1962), following a paradigm, all members of a specific scientific community accept a set of commonly agreed exemplars. However, it is doubtful whether the Kuhnian paradigm theory could be applied to such a rich collection of epistemologies and methodologies in quantitative research. Laudan (1977) argued that the paradigm theory does not fit with the history of science. Indeed, it is not uncommon for a number of competing theories based upon incompatible exemplars to coexist. Thus, Laudan proposed the concept of “research tradition” in an attempt to replace “paradigm.” Laudan is not alone. In reaction to the viewing of quantitative research as a positivist approach, Clark (1998) embraced the view that quantitative research is shaped by more than one philosophy. In a similar vein, Cook (1985) doubted that all social and natural scientists have subscribed to all positivist assumptions, that positivism adequately describes scientific practice as it occurs, and that this practice has evolved only from the positivist framework. Rather, Cook asserted that “scientific practice has multiple origins that include trial-and-error behavior of practitioners, selective adaptations from prior philosophies and research” (p.23). Thus, it would be an oversimplification to treat quantitative methods as a single Logical positivism and Quantitative Research 6 paradigm. A more appropriate treatment of this issue is to classify different schools of quantitative methods into different research traditions. Further, in the Kuhnian framework, paradigms are competing worldviews that would inevitably lead to incommensurability. Paradigms are said to be so different that
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Epistemology of Evidence in Cognitive Neuroscience1
    To appear in In R. Skipper Jr., C. Allen, R. A. Ankeny, C. F. Craver, L. Darden, G. Mikkelson, and R. Richardson (eds.), Philosophy and the Life Sciences: A Reader. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. The Epistemology of Evidence in Cognitive Neuroscience1 William Bechtel Department of Philosophy and Science Studies University of California, San Diego 1. The Epistemology of Evidence It is no secret that scientists argue. They argue about theories. But even more, they argue about the evidence for theories. Is the evidence itself trustworthy? This is a bit surprising from the perspective of traditional empiricist accounts of scientific methodology according to which the evidence for scientific theories stems from observation, especially observation with the naked eye. These accounts portray the testing of scientific theories as a matter of comparing the predictions of the theory with the data generated by these observations, which are taken to provide an objective link to reality. One lesson philosophers of science have learned in the last 40 years is that even observation with the naked eye is not as epistemically straightforward as was once assumed. What one is able to see depends upon one’s training: a novice looking through a microscope may fail to recognize the neuron and its processes (Hanson, 1958; Kuhn, 1962/1970).2 But a second lesson is only beginning to be appreciated: evidence in science is often not procured through simple observations with the naked eye, but observations mediated by complex instruments and sophisticated research techniques. What is most important, epistemically, about these techniques is that they often radically alter the phenomena under investigation.
    [Show full text]
  • Denying a Dualism: Goodman's Repudiation of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 28, 2004, 226-238. Denying a Dualism: Goodman’s Repudiation of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction Catherine Z. Elgin The analytic synthetic/distinction forms the backbone of much modern Western philosophy. It underwrites a conception of the relation of representations to reality which affords an understanding of cognition. Its repudiation thus requires a fundamental reconception and perhaps a radical revision of philosophy. Many philosophers believe that the repudiation of the analytic/synthetic distinction and kindred dualisms constitutes a major loss, possibly even an irrecoverable loss, for philosophy. Nelson Goodman thinks otherwise. He believes that it liberates philosophy from unwarranted restrictions, creating opportunities for the development of powerful new approaches to and reconceptions of seemingly intractable problems. In this article I want to sketch some of the consequences of Goodman’s reconception. My focus is not on Goodman’s reasons for denying the dualism, but on some of the ways its absence affects his position. I do not contend that the Goodman obsessed over the issue. I have no reason to think that the repudiation of the distinction was a central factor in his intellectual life. But by considering the function that the analytic/synthetic distinction has performed in traditional philosophy, and appreciating what is lost and gained in repudiating it, we gain insight into Goodman’s contributions. I begin then by reviewing the distinction and the conception of philosophy it supports. The analytic/synthetic distinction is a distinction between truths that depend entirely on meaning and truths that depend on both meaning and fact. In the early modern period, it was cast as a distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact.
    [Show full text]
  • Would ''Direct Realism'' Resolve the Classical Problem of Induction?
    NOU^S 38:2 (2004) 197–232 Would ‘‘Direct Realism’’ Resolve the Classical Problem of Induction? MARC LANGE University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill I Recently, there has been a modest resurgence of interest in the ‘‘Humean’’ problem of induction. For several decades following the recognized failure of Strawsonian ‘‘ordinary-language’’ dissolutions and of Wesley Salmon’s elaboration of Reichenbach’s pragmatic vindication of induction, work on the problem of induction languished. Attention turned instead toward con- firmation theory, as philosophers sensibly tried to understand precisely what it is that a justification of induction should aim to justify. Now, however, in light of Bayesian confirmation theory and other developments in epistemology, several philosophers have begun to reconsider the classical problem of induction. In section 2, I shall review a few of these developments. Though some of them will turn out to be unilluminating, others will profitably suggest that we not meet inductive scepticism by trying to justify some alleged general principle of ampliative reasoning. Accordingly, in section 3, I shall examine how the problem of induction arises in the context of one particular ‘‘inductive leap’’: the confirmation, most famously by Henrietta Leavitt and Harlow Shapley about a century ago, that a period-luminosity relation governs all Cepheid variable stars. This is a good example for the inductive sceptic’s purposes, since it is difficult to see how the sparse background knowledge available at the time could have entitled stellar astronomers to regard their observations as justifying this grand inductive generalization. I shall argue that the observation reports that confirmed the Cepheid period- luminosity law were themselves ‘‘thick’’ with expectations regarding as yet unknown laws of nature.
    [Show full text]
  • Philosophical Logic 2018 Course Description (Tentative) January 15, 2018
    Philosophical Logic 2018 Course description (tentative) January 15, 2018 Valentin Goranko Introduction This 7.5 hp course is mainly intended for students in philosophy and is generally accessible to a broad audience with basic background on formal classical logic and general appreciation of philosophical aspects of logic. Practical information The course will be given in English. It will comprise 18 two-hour long sessions combining lectures and exercises, grouped in 2 sessions per week over 9 teaching weeks. The weekly pairs of 2-hour time slots (incl. short breaks) allocated for these sessions, will be on Mondays during 10.00-12.00 and 13.00-15.00, except for the first lecture. The course will begin on Wednesday, April 4, 2018 (Week 14) at 10.00 am in D220, S¨odra huset, hus D. Lecturer's info: Name: Valentin Goranko Email: [email protected] Homepage: http://www2.philosophy.su.se/goranko Course webpage: http://www2.philosophy.su.se/goranko/Courses2018/PhilLogic-2018.html Prerequisites The course will be accessible to a broad audience with introductory background on classical formal logic. Some basic knowledge of modal logics would be an advantage but not a prerequisite. Brief description Philosophical logic studies a variety of non-classical logical systems intended to formalise and reason about various philosophical concepts and ideas. They include a broad family of modal logics, as well as many- valued, intuitionistic, relevant, conditional, non-monotonic, para-consistent, etc. logics. Modal logics extend classical logic with additional intensional logical operators, reflecting different modes of truth, including alethic, epistemic, doxastic, temporal, deontic, agentive, etc.
    [Show full text]
  • There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning
    There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning 1. Empiricism and the Question of Empirical Reasons Empiricism may be defined as the view there is no a priori justification for any synthetic claim. Critics object that empiricism cannot account for all the kinds of knowledge we seem to possess, such as moral knowledge, metaphysical knowledge, mathematical knowledge, and modal knowledge.1 In some cases, empiricists try to account for these types of knowledge; in other cases, they shrug off the objections, happily concluding, for example, that there is no moral knowledge, or that there is no metaphysical knowledge.2 But empiricism cannot shrug off just any type of knowledge; to be minimally plausible, empiricism must, for example, at least be able to account for paradigm instances of empirical knowledge, including especially scientific knowledge. Empirical knowledge can be divided into three categories: (a) knowledge by direct observation; (b) knowledge that is deductively inferred from observations; and (c) knowledge that is non-deductively inferred from observations, including knowledge arrived at by induction and inference to the best explanation. Category (c) includes all scientific knowledge. This category is of particular import to empiricists, many of whom take scientific knowledge as a sort of paradigm for knowledge in general; indeed, this forms a central source of motivation for empiricism.3 Thus, if there is any kind of knowledge that empiricists need to be able to account for, it is knowledge of type (c). I use the term “empirical reasoning” to refer to the reasoning involved in acquiring this type of knowledge – that is, to any instance of reasoning in which (i) the premises are justified directly by observation, (ii) the reasoning is non- deductive, and (iii) the reasoning provides adequate justification for the conclusion.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction to Philosophy. Social Studies--Language Arts: 6414.16. INSTITUTION Dade County Public Schools, Miami, Fla
    DOCUMENT RESUME ED 086 604 SO 006 822 AUTHOR Norris, Jack A., Jr. TITLE Introduction to Philosophy. Social Studies--Language Arts: 6414.16. INSTITUTION Dade County Public Schools, Miami, Fla. PUB DATE 72 NOTE 20p.; Authorized Course of Instruction for the Quinmester Program EDRS PRICE MF-$0.65 HC-$3.29 DESCRIPTORS Course Objectives; Curriculum Guides; Grade 10; Grade 11; Grade 12; *Language Arts; Learnin4 Activities; *Logic; Non Western Civilization; *Philosophy; Resource Guides; Secondary Grades; *Social Studies; *Social Studies Units; Western Civilization IDENTIFIERS *Quinmester Program ABSTRACT Western and non - western philosophers and their ideas are introduced to 10th through 12th grade students in this general social studies Quinmester course designed to be used as a preparation for in-depth study of the various schools of philosophical thought. By acquainting students with the questions and categories of philosophy, a point of departure for further study is developed. Through suggested learning activities the meaning of philosopky is defined. The Socratic, deductive, inductive, intuitive and eclectic approaches to philosophical thought are examined, as are three general areas of philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology,and axiology. Logical reasoning is applied to major philosophical questions. This course is arranged, as are other quinmester courses, with sections on broad goals, course content, activities, and materials. A related document is ED 071 937.(KSM) FILMED FROM BEST AVAILABLE COPY U S DEPARTMENT EDUCATION OF HEALTH. NAT10N41
    [Show full text]
  • Observational Determinism for Concurrent Program Security
    Observational Determinism for Concurrent Program Security Steve Zdancewic Andrew C. Myers Department of Computer and Information Science Computer Science Department University of Pennsylvania Cornell University [email protected] [email protected] Abstract This paper makes two contributions. First, it presents a definition of information-flow security that is appropriate for Noninterference is a property of sequential programs that concurrent systems. Second, it describes a simple but ex- is useful for expressing security policies for data confiden- pressive concurrent language with a type system that prov- tiality and integrity. However, extending noninterference to ably enforces security. concurrent programs has proved problematic. In this pa- Notions of secure information flow are usually based on per we present a relatively expressive secure concurrent lan- noninterference [15], a property only defined for determin- guage. This language, based on existing concurrent calculi, istic systems. Intuitively, noninterference requires that the provides first-class channels, higher-order functions, and an publicly visible results of a computation do not depend on unbounded number of threads. Well-typed programs obey a confidential (or secret) information. Generalizing noninter- generalization of noninterference that ensures immunity to ference to concurrent languages is problematic because these internal timing attacks and to attacks that exploit informa- languages are naturally nondeterministic: the order of execu- tion about the thread scheduler. Elimination of these refine- tion of concurrent threads is not specified by the language se- ment attacks is possible because the enforced security prop- mantics. Although this nondeterminism permits a variety of erty extends noninterference with observational determin- thread scheduler implementations, it also leads to refinement ism.
    [Show full text]
  • The Myth of Supervenient Microphysicalism
    The myth of supervenient microphysicalism Juan Diego Morales1 (Universidad de Cartagena) So my aim is only to establish conditional claims of the form: even if certain facts are emergent vis‑à‑vis the microphysical realm, Physicalism can still be true. Papineau, 2008: 132 1. What physicalism is Let us begin with the idea that physicalism is the ontological theory which claims that the entities that constitute our world are physical enti‑ ties, phenomena which the physical sciences must discover and articulate in their theories.2 Following the naturalistic trend of philosophy in recent times, con‑ temporary philosophers have considered that physicalism is both an a pos‑ teriori and contingent thesis. Its a posteriori sense derives from the fact of being a position that tries to overcome the problems of its direct predeces‑ 1 [email protected]. My thanks to Alejandro Rosas, Brian McLaughlin, Reinaldo Bernal, and Larry Shapiro, for helpful and clarifying comments on drafts of this paper. 2 Here I will use the general sense of “entity” and “phenomenon” for including both particulars (as objects, events, processes, and so on) and what many theorists take as universals (as properties, relations, and laws). Philosophica, 48, Lisboa, 2016, pp. 47-61. Philosophica 48.indd 47 22/11/2016 9:26:50 PM 48 Juan Diego Morales sor, materialism. The latter was established as a metaphysical doctrine that attempted to specify the entities of our world in an a priori way, in terms of a specific set of features that supposedly defined the material; features such as conservation, deterministic and on contact interaction, impenetrability, inertia, and solidity.3 But this a priori specification proved to be wrong.
    [Show full text]
  • "Utter Nonsense?" : an Examination of the Linguisitic Theories of F
    W&M ScholarWorks Undergraduate Honors Theses Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 1988 Did you say "utter nonsense?" : an examination of the linguisitic theories of F. de Saussure and Noam Chomsky R.G. Herndon Jr. College of William and Mary Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/honorstheses Recommended Citation Herndon, R.G. Jr., "Did you say "utter nonsense?" : an examination of the linguisitic theories of F. de Saussure and Noam Chomsky" (1988). Undergraduate Honors Theses. Paper 655. https://scholarworks.wm.edu/honorstheses/655 This Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Did you say "utter Nonsense?" An Examination of the Lingusi tic 'Iheories of F. de Saussure and NoamChomsky A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Bachelor of Arts with Honors in Linguistics and Philosophy fram the College of William and Mary in Virginia By R. G. Her'ndon, Jr. t{\ay 1'183 Accepted for: HOi\O ,S "Youwill observe the Rules of Battle, of course? the ~rute Knight remarked, putting on his helIoot too. "I always do," said the Red Knight, and they began banging awayat each other with such a fury that Alice got behirrl a tree to be out of the \vay of the blows. "I wonder, what the Rules of Battle are;." she said to herself, as she watched the fight, timidly peeping out from her hiding place.
    [Show full text]
  • Linguistics As a “Special Science”: a Comparison of Sapir and Fodor Els Elffers
    Chapter 4 Linguistics as a “special science”: A comparison of Sapir and Fodor Els Elffers Independently of each other, the linguist-anthropologist Edward Sapir (1884–1939) and the philosopher of mind Jerry Fodor (1935–2017) developed a similar typol- ogy of scientific disciplines. “Basic” (Fodor) or “conceptual” (Sapir) sciences (e.g. physics) are distinguished from “special” (Fodor) or “historical” (Sapir) sciences (e.g. linguistics). Ontologically, the latter sciences are reducible to the former, but they keep their autonomy as intellectual enterprises, because their “natural kinds” are unlike those of the basic sciences. Fodor labelled this view “token physicalism”. Although Sapir’s and Fodor’s ideas were presented in very different periods of intel- lectual history (in 1917 and 1974) and in very different intellectual contexts (roughly: Geisteswissenschaften and logical positivism), the similarity between them is strik- ing. When compared in detail, some substantial differences can also be observed, which are mainly related to contextual differences. When applied to linguistics, Sapir’s and Fodor’s views offer a perspective of autonomy, albeit in different ways: for Fodor, but not for Sapir, linguistics is a subfield of psychology. 1 Introduction In 1974, Jerry Fodor (1935–2017) introduced “token physicalism”, a non-reductive variety of physicalism, which applies to “special sciences”.1 According to Fodor, special sciences, such as economics, psychology and linguistics cannot be en- tirely reduced to physics, which is a “basic science”. Such a reduction would im- ply that special sciences actually disappear as autonomous sciences. According to Fodor, special sciences retain their autonomy, because reduc- tion is possible only with respect to the events they describe (“tokens”), not with 1Token physicalism belongs to a larger class of non-reductive types of physicalism.
    [Show full text]
  • Death and Nonsense in the Poetry of George Macdonaldâ•Žs at the Back of the North Wind and Lewis Carrollâ•Žs Alice Books
    North Wind: A Journal of George MacDonald Studies Volume 30 Article 4 1-1-2011 Death and Nonsense in the Poetry of George MacDonald’s At the Back of the North Wind and Lewis Carroll’s Alice Books Melody Green Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.snc.edu/northwind Recommended Citation Green, Melody (2011) "Death and Nonsense in the Poetry of George MacDonald’s At the Back of the North Wind and Lewis Carroll’s Alice Books," North Wind: A Journal of George MacDonald Studies: Vol. 30 , Article 4. Available at: http://digitalcommons.snc.edu/northwind/vol30/iss1/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the English at Digital Commons @ St. Norbert College. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Wind: A Journal of George MacDonald Studies by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ St. Norbert College. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Death and Nonsense in the Poetry of George MacDonald’s At the Back of the North Wind and Lewis Carroll’s Alice Books Melody Green n The Literary Products of the George MacDonald-Lewis Carroll FriendshipI, John Docherty explains not only that MacDonald and Carroll were friends for more than 40 years, but also that they explored some of the same ideas in their texts. In “Some Linguistic Moves in the Carroll- MacDonald ‘Literary Game,’” Fernando Soto takes this even further by arguing that these two writers played linguistic games with each other, based on their understanding of the Scottish and Cheshire dialects. Meanwhile, R.
    [Show full text]
  • Against Logical Form
    Against logical form Zolta´n Gendler Szabo´ Conceptions of logical form are stranded between extremes. On one side are those who think the logical form of a sentence has little to do with logic; on the other, those who think it has little to do with the sentence. Most of us would prefer a conception that strikes a balance: logical form that is an objective feature of a sentence and captures its logical character. I will argue that we cannot get what we want. What are these extreme conceptions? In linguistics, logical form is typically con- ceived of as a level of representation where ambiguities have been resolved. According to one highly developed view—Chomsky’s minimalism—logical form is one of the outputs of the derivation of a sentence. The derivation begins with a set of lexical items and after initial mergers it splits into two: on one branch phonological operations are applied without semantic effect; on the other are semantic operations without phono- logical realization. At the end of the first branch is phonological form, the input to the articulatory–perceptual system; and at the end of the second is logical form, the input to the conceptual–intentional system.1 Thus conceived, logical form encompasses all and only information required for interpretation. But semantic and logical information do not fully overlap. The connectives “and” and “but” are surely not synonyms, but the difference in meaning probably does not concern logic. On the other hand, it is of utmost logical importance whether “finitely many” or “equinumerous” are logical constants even though it is hard to see how this information could be essential for their interpretation.
    [Show full text]