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Home , Logical positivism, Positivism

THE END OF : LOGICAL AND

by Owen Blayne Chapman

A thesis submitted to the Department of

in conformity with the requirements of

the degree of Master of Arts

Queen's University

Kingston, Ontario, Canada

September, 1997

copyright O Owen Blayne Chapman, 1997 National Library Bibliothèque nationale 191 om,, du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395. rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A ON4 Ottawa ON K1A ON4 Canada Canada

The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence allowulg the exclusive permettant B la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distriiute or sell reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de rnicrofiche/nlm, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent êeimprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation, Recent reevaluations of have called into question the standard phenomenalist interpretation of that movement. These reevduations have focused on the anti-metaphysical agenda pursued by the positivists in a way which opens up their ideas to pragmatic interpretations of their views on about fundamental . In this thesis 1 explore how these new developments make room for a cornparison between positivism and the contemporary philosophical position known as postmodernism. 1 conclude that while the positivists' still situates them within the modem pandigm. the ad-metaphysical sensitivity which is common to both movements calls for a re- of the relationship behveen the two schools. ACKNO WLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank fist of al1 Sergio S ismondo for his help in tahgthe abstract ( fuuy ?) thoughts behind the idea for this paper and Runing them into the workable form which 1 have attempted to lay out in the pages below. His efforts at pushing me towards producing material and then fine tuning the often serni-coherent results were immensely appreciated. Without Sergio's support as an advisor and &end the completion of this thesis on Ume would certainly not have corne about. Henry Laycock's cornrnents as second reader were also very helpful in pointing out areas of unclarity in the very rough cirafts which he received. The entire philosophy department at Queen's University is to be cornmended for their efforts at developing an atrnosphere in which a student like myself could so easily find the kind of advice and guidance which makes one's first foray into graduate studies so much easier.

The presence and support of family and fiiends dong the way tumed the lonely task of and writing into an which combined work with play in a way essential to my state of well . On this note 1 would particularly like to thank the members of the household at 5438 Jeanne-Mance whose generosity paved the way for one of the happiest and most fulfilling surnmers of rny life.

Lastly. I'd like to thank for dying and making al1 the remarkable scholarship which followed this a possibility. iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

2: LOGICAL POSITMSM ...... -7 THE RECEIVED VIEW ...... 7 NEO-KANTIANAPPROACH ...... 16 THE "SUBTLE" VERIFICATIONIST APPROACH ...... -23 3 THE PRAGMATIC TURN ...... 28

3: POSTMODERNISM ...... 32 THE DILEMMA OF ...... -32 THE "OVERCOMING OF METAPHYSICS ...... 36 BENG-AS-PRESENCE ...... -43 EXAMPLES ...... 47

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 60

VITA ...... 63 CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION

The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes. "Whither is God?' he cried; "1 tell you. We have killed him-you and 1. All of us are his murderers. But how did we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this earth fkom its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we rnoving? Away fiom al1 suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward? sideward. fonvard, in ail directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing?... God is dead. God remains dead. And ive have killed him.... Here the madrnan fell silent and looked again at his listeners: and they. too, were silent and stared at hirn in astonishment. At last he threw his lantern on the ground, and it broke into pieces and went out. "1 have come too early," he said then; "my time is not yet. This tremendous event is still on its way, still wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men. Lightning and thunder require time; the light of the stars requires time; deeds, though done. still require time to be seen and heard. This deed is still more distant from them than the most distant stars-und yet they have done if themselves." '

According to many, modemity's unchallenged hold upon the style and content of philosophy has come to a close. Most situate this shift in Nietzsche3 infamous pronouncernent of the death of God. When Nietzsche's madman entered the marketplace and made his decree he realized momentarily afier that he had come too rarly. Thus at the moment of its conceptionpostmodernity withdrew in order to allow modernity its death throes. Modernity would finish itself off. "God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him." The aftershocks of this death would take a number of years to be

Modemity is ofien distinguished by its comrnitrnent to the developrnent of sysrerns of knoivledge () which start from clear and indisputable

', The Gav , tram. Walter Kauhann. (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), p. 18 1-82. -7 forrnu'utions. These foundations have c harac teristicdly taken the form of rneraphysical assertions. Thus when Descartes claimed that God guaranteed for him the truthflllness of clear and distinct ideas, he used this understanding to raise an epistemologicd structure which started From the simple thought of his being a diinkuig being and therefore existing. and finished by establishing the of everything else around him. The with which Descartes asserted the truthfulness of clear and distinct ideas he rrained from a metaphysicai insight concerning God's non-deceptive . For God to C be perfect. as God must be, it is impossible for God to be a deceiver, since that would imply an imperfection. Since clear and distinct ideas which Descartes found in himself came from God, it was impossible that these ideas were faise due to the that God did not deceive. Thus one way of reading Descartes' position understands him as asserting the daim that if 1 have a clear and distinct idea that 1 am not dreaming and that there are objects and people who exist around me etc., these ideas must be true. Descartes' moves from the security of one foundational (clarity and distinctness equalling tmthfulness) to the development of an entire picture.

For Kant, the non-subjective nature of the mind's arena of pure was the foundational concept he used to devetop his own epistemological system. Objects extemal to the mind which could not be perceived and appreciated objectively due to the subjective nature of our sense impressions could be so perceived, according to Kant, rvithin the pure intuition which was a SO~of nonphysical space within the mind--what we might now cal1 the imagination. Kant used this concept to explore the nature of true statements which seemed to hold pnmarily due to the logical relations between their 3 components. but which also had interesting things to Say about the nature of the world around us. Euclidean geometrical , for instance, were on the one hand sirnilar to algebraic or logical tmths (like a=a) in that their contents were discoverable through pure conceptuai manipulation, and yet on the other hand seemed also to hoId over the structure of the world as it existed externally to the mind. Kant designated tmths of this sort

"synthrtic n priori " in a narne designed to express both their empirical as well as their conceptual or logical nature. "Visualizing" empirical objects within the space of pure intuition allowed one to establish the synthetic a priori nature of their geometricai form.

The inability for Kant to intuitively visualize objects which did not conform to the rules of Euclidean geometry caused him to maintain that at the level of human experiential ability space had to be Euclidean. Hurnean rnaintained that objective about the empirical structure of the world could never be had since confïnning which one might gather in support of a could always be called into question due to the limited (and subjective) perspective fiom which it was collected. In opposition to this Kant asserted the true and objective nature of an entire empirical system based upon intuitively derived synthetic a priori knowledge.

The problem with foundational systems such as these is their vulnerability to attack upon their foundational . Once the rnetaphysical speculations upon which they depend are called into question, everythg else which the systems putatively establish as true based upon the foundational metaphysical claims also becomes questionable. The logical positivists saw this weakness as an unnecessary component of epistemological systems. Metaphysical speculations about God or the of the 4 arena of pure intuition could not be supported by empirical fact. Henceforth they were to be rejected. The task for the positivists, therefore, became the articulation of an epistemology which did not rely upon metaphysics. A new type of non-rnetaphysical a priori knowledge needed to be found to serve as the basis for epistemological systems.

Thus logical positivism's rise and fdl during the first half of this cenhuy cm be read as one of the last and most powerfùl afiershocks which followed the death of God.

The first chapter of this thesis is devoted to an exploration of positivism's attempt to remain within the modem methodology of foundationalist epistemology without reiying upon metaphysically denved certainty. In order to accomplish this task I focus upon two recent reevaluations of logical positivism which stress their anti-metaphysical agenda. 1 show that while both of these conceptions differ in certain areas of emphasis. the outcome of their reevaluations is basically the same--Le., that the positivists (Rudolph

Carnap in particular) were open to the use of various different basic in order to ground their epistemologicai systems. Metaphysical speculation kvas thus avoided in a move which prioritized not the particular bais of foundational systems but which looked instead towards their rigorous logical construction as a guarantor of their objectivity.

This rervaluation introduces the thought that a certain sort ofpragmatisrn entered into the positivist's deliberations on the justification of scientific knowledge-a feature of their program which went unacknowledged for most of this century. This oversight resulted in a conception of positivism which treated them as wholly modem in orientation instead of as standing on the threshold between modemity and postrnodernity.

The main between the positivist agenda and postrnodernism has to do with the latîer's opposition to both metaphysics and foundationdist epistemology. When

Nietzsche decreed the death of God this act expressed the demise of a in

philosophical endeavours which develop their positions layer by layer starting fiom

metap hy sically derived certainty (like God' s non-decep tiveness, or the O bjectivity of the

arena of pure intuition). Not only is the metaphysical speculation involved in this sort of

undertaking repudiated by postrnodemists. but system-building in general (like the kind

attempted by Descartes, Kant and the positivists) is also cast aside. For postmodemists.

the death of God also represents the death of epistemology.' Chapter Two of this thesis explores these ideas through an analysis of some of Nietzsche's as well as Heidegger's

insights on these matters--finishing off with an identification of similar thoughts in the

work of two representative postmodern authors, Jean-François Lyotard and Michel

Foucault. In my conciusion 1 corne back to the main thesis of the Iarger paper more

properly and advocate a re-conception of the relation between positivism and

postmodernism. one which takes into account their similarity in terms of anti-

metaphysical sensitivities. Such a re-conception would focus upon the pragrnatic tendencies of borh schools in a way which acknowledges their mutual insights concerning tmth about reality. Truths of this sort traditionally provided by are

not compelling, due to their other-worldly nature. Instead, what positivism and

'It is in this sense that the positivists' program represents an aftershock. Their quest for a species of truth which is supported by something other than what is to be found in human community (Le., formal tmth) encloses them an epistemological endeavour which iooks always for guarantees. However, Carnap's advocacy of a pragmatic position conceming the nature of objects foundational to our experience of the world represents a different attitude towards tmth about reality which makes a connection between his position and postmodernity possible. 6 postrnodernism both advocate is a shift towards talking about what is real in a way which situates this conversation in what is fundamental to the human as she and those around her manoeuvre their way through the Stream of life. 7

CHAPTER 2: LOGICAL POSITIVISM

INTRODUCTION: THE RECEIVED VIEW

[t is now well over half a century since the heyday of the known as logical positivism or logical . Depending on how one counts, it is now approaching half a century since the official dernise of this movement. Since that demise it has naturally been customary to view logical positivism as a kind of philosophical bogeyman whose faults and failings need to be enumerated (or, less cornmonly, investigated) before one's favored "new" approach to philosophy can properly begin.'

It is a fairly undisputed fact that the principal players hvolved in bringing about the death of logicai positivism were W.V.O. Quine and . Both "Two

Dogmas of Empincisrn" (Quine) and The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn) stand as polemical against any and cognition which takes as its goal the reduction of al1 meaningful statements about the world into statements about immediate experience? In embarking on such an attack Kuhn and Quine saw themselves as opposing the logical positivist motivations which guided the philosophy of science of their day--motivations which they understood as directed towards an epistemological fozmndutionalism committed to the primacy of the autopsychological. This interpretation of the positivists' agenda holds that their account of justified knowledge incorporates an unusual of objects the immediate expenence of which is exactly the same for al1

'~ichaelFriedman, "The Re-Evaluation of Logical Positivism," The Journal of Philosophv, (Oct. 1991), p. 505.

4 See Quine's "," Philosophical Review, (1 95 1), p. 36. and Kuhn's discussion of a "neutral -" in 8 10 of his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 1970. 8

observers since their content is unquestionably transparent or given directly to the

perceiving subject (the rnost common for such objects these days is "sense-data").

An epistemology which takes these objects as simple and which holds complex

knowledge claims to be justified only if they cmbe shown to have been properly

constructed fiom these simple presentations thus represents a kind of phenomenalistic nrornisrn. This picture has become the standard interpretation of logical positivism's goal and method. 's Der Logische Aufbau der Welt is held up, on this account. as being the most earnest and complete attempt made to lay the requisite epistemic

foundation involved in this phenomenalistic project in its effort to show how the world

(in al1 its nchness and complexity) can be descnbed through statements which refer only to individual elementary . The attack spearheaded by Kuhn and Quine

focuses primarily upon the inadequacy of the positivists' account of how these irnrnediate experiences impinge upon the of statements which one might utter about the rvorld. Their questions the basic claim contained in the positivists' "principle of verifiability." What this claim amounts to is the thought that in order for a to be meaningful there must be some way in which the content of that statement cm be determined tme or false via a cornparison between what it says and the state of flairs of the world accessible through observation. On Quine's account, implicit in this principle is the notion that.

to each statement, or each synthetic statement, there is associated a unique range of possible sensory events such that the occurrence of any of them would add to the Iikelihood of tmth of the statement, and that there is associated also another unique range of possible sensory events whose occurrence would demct fkom that iikelih~od.~

The principal for understanding this thought as a dogma of empiricism instead of as an insight has to do with what is now referred to as 'Wie -ladenness of observation." Post-positivist of science like Kuhn and Quine, as well as

Pierre Duhem. , . N.R. Hanson and others argue fkorn a point of view which rejects the claim that observation can be considered justifiably objective in a way which allows for the establishment of the truth or falsity of one's j udgments. Conceming theory-lademess, Hanson asks,

What is it to see boxes. staircases, birds, antelopes, bears. goblets, x-ray tubes? It is (at least) to have knowledge of certain sorts...A is to see that, were certain things done to objects before our eyes, other things would result. How should we regard a man's report that he sees x if we know him to be ignorant of al1 x-ish things? Precisely as we would regard a four-year-01d7sreport that he sees a meson shower. 'Smith sees x' suggests that Smith could specify some things pertinent to x. To see an x-ray tube is at least to see that, were it dropped on stone, it would smash. To see a goblet is to see something with a concave interior. We may be wrong, but not always--not even usuaily. Besides, deceptors proceed in terms of what is normal, ordinary. Because the world is not a cluster of conjurer's tricks, conjurers can exist. Because the of 'seeing that' is an intimate part of the concept of seeing, we sometimes rub our eyes at illusion^.^

This attack on the naive belief in the -free nature of simple observation asserts itself through arguing for the influence of previously accepted theory over our very capacity to see that "such and such is the case. The theory-ladenness of observation

'Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empincism," p. 38.

6 N.R. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), 1961, p. 21. 10

thesis rejects the thought that in order for knowledge to be true it must (to use an

expression of 's) "mirror nature." Tnith conceived of as accurate

representation is replaced, on this account, with something close to contextually justified

belief. Any philosophy which claims to give access to true knowledge by directing us

towards a pnvileged class of representations which are immediateiy given to the

understanding (like sense-data) cmonly fail in its promise to deliver. The same sort of

skepticism which causes us to doubt the justification behind Cartesian-style clear and

distinct ideas or Kantian "pure '' works equally well here. Post-positivist

of science attempt to redirect our gaze away fiom such truth-guaranteeing

devices towards the comrnunity in which scientific knowledge arises as the proper key to

understanding the justification of knowledge. nius Duhem and Quine both assert that no

matter what observationally derived counter-evidence might be put forward against a

scientific hypothesis, the force of these can always be dissipated through a

readjustment of the body of theory supporting the theory in question. This readjustment

works towards appropriating and anticipating the observations without thereby

threatening the theory's "core" assertions. Knowledge understood as observationally justified tme belief is reinterpreted, on this account, as a simple by-product of particularly

resilient and resourceful research programs (Lakatos aiso articulates a similar idea).

Kuhn's situating of the justification of scientific knowledge within particular scientific

cornmunities also supports this latter thought. , and

revolutionary science (dl concepts found in The Struchire of Scientific Revolutions) are

al1 community-relative phenomena. And finally recent philosophy of science has also recognized the tendency within scientific communities to cal1 into question the accuracy

and applicability of observations which counter a cornmunity's paradigrnatic theoretical

assumptions. Truth, on this account, has nothing to do with a properly devised

reconstmction of sense-data combinations and everytbg to do with a scientific

communityosrhetorical ability. Peter Galison describes the gist of Kuhn et al's

objections nicely in his clah that,

[wlhen the inevitable reaction against logical empiricism came, it was powerfûl and widespred. And of the traditionai positivists' tenets, the placement of observation before theory was a primary target ....Thomas Kuhn assailed the universal adjudicating power of , and therefore their independence From theory. Instead of arguing that observation must precede theory, Kuhn contended that theory has to precede observation. The of science, for Kuhn. arnply dernonstrated the essential role theory played in the conduct of experimentation, in the interpretation of data, and in the of "relevant" phenomena.'

If one cannot trust one's experiments to provide objective (in the sense of theory-free)

observational data, then one's ability to conclusively verify or falsify hypotheses is lost.

The notion that meaningfulness is somehow connected to the verification of statements

through observation fails, on this account, since verification is possible only after the

acceptance of the basic theoretical assurnptions invoived in "seeing that" such and such is

the case. Moreover, one's sympathy for one hypothetical theory over another will

inevitably affect one's retention of any putatively unmediated presentation of phenomena.

The implications of these post-positivist notions mean that meaning as well as

7Peter Galison, How Experiments End, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1987. verification cm only be properly undestood in to the larger hmework that is a

community's shared basic assumptions as to what constitutes proper (scientific, cultural,

linguistic) procedure. On this account autopsychological experiences give way to

heteropsychological beliefs in terms of their justiQing positions with systems of

knowledge.

The understanding of logical positivism implicit in these criticisms. however, has recently been brought into question. The new account of positivism which opponents of the received view offer is one which focuses on the consirz~ctiveaspects of the Aufbau and works like it and which attributes these constructive elements to the neo-Kuntianisrn which was present in Germany around the turn of the century and which captured the minds of many of the logical positivists during their earlier penods (figures of note in this

Iist include Carnap, as well as Ham Reichenbach and ). In re-evaluating

Carnap's Aufbau (and thereby logical positivism more generally), authors like Friedman.

Alberto Coffa Alan Richardson, David Weissman and Thomas Uebel stress the emphasis

Carnap places on the forma1 properties of his constructed system and the relativis~icsorts of claims he makes concerning the nature of the concepts which he designates as foundational to his epistemological system.' Friedman states,

'While Reichenbach, Schlick and Carnap, as well as , Hans Hahn. , , and others were al1 members of the - the group which Carnap characterizes in the preface to the first edition of his Aufbau as having 'Yaken the strict and responsible orientation of the scientific investigator as their guideline for philosophical work"--much of the writing which has come forth in response to the positivists and their critics has addressed itself principally to Carnap and his Aufbau. The reason for this is that Carnap's book represents an easily characterizable effort of exemplary positivism (although this characterization, as easy as it might be. has proved to be rather multifaceted/variable--a fact which 1 will be exploring in this chapter) The ahof the Aufbau ... is not to use logic together with to provide empirical knowledge [as the received view maintains] .... Its aim, rather, is to use recent advances in the science of logic (in this case, the RusseIlian of ) together with advances in the empincal (Gestalt , in particular) to fashion a scientifically respectable replacemenl for traditional epistemology. Carnap's depiction of the construction of scientific knowledge from elementary experiences via the logical techniques of Principia Mathematica enables us to avoid the metaphysicai excesses of the traditional epistemological schools--"realism," "ideaiism," 'phenomendism," --transcendental " (8 177)--while, at the same tirne, capturing what is correct in al1 of these schools: allowing us to represent. in Carnap's words, the "neutrd basis" (neutrule Ftindament) common to al1 (8 178).9

This new position understands the empiricist inclinations of the logical positivists in a

way quite different from the received view. On that account. the logical positivists are

understood as carrying on in the manner of the traditional post-Humean positivist

Alrnost al1 of the bold statements made by the positivists during their days in Vienna find expression and application (to one degree or another) within this work--making the book ripe for analysis and critique. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the positivists' manifesto Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassun~der Wiener fiswas pemed in large part by Carnap himself--just after the publication of his book (the Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung was published in 1929, while the Aufbau was published in 1928--see Peter Galison's essay "AufbaulBauhaus: Logical Positivism and Architectural Modemism," in Critical , vol. 16 (Summer 1990)' p. 732). There are, however, two important exceptions to this "Carnap-centredness" on the part of commentators--the first being Coffa's magnum opus The Semantic Tradition: From Kant to Carnap which, while focusing much on Carnap as a pnnciple positivist, also spends ample tirne tracing a detailed historical account of a response to neo- which he reads in the work of Schlick. Reichenbach, and the early Wittgenstein. Secondly, Nancy Cartwright, Thomas Uebel. Jordi Cat. and Lola Fleck have written a book entitled Otto Neurath: Philosophy Between Science and which examines the issue of logical positivism in and through an account and exploration of Neurath's ideas. For the purposes of this essay, however. I will be proceeding in the more rnainstream manner-4ocusing most particularly on the figure of Carnap and his Aufbau.

'Friedman, "The Re-Evaluation of Logical Positivism," p. 509--N.B.The sections referenced in this passage are fiom the Aufiau. 14 positions of Mach and Comte. The neo-Kantian reading of the logical positivists, however, denies their putative privileging of observationaily derived empincal knowledge

(whether this be sense-data, or whatever) and accentuates instead their more Kantian- ternpered empiricism which strives to make the latter's notion of the a prion work in a way which leaves behind the metaphysically tainted notion of "pure intuition." Focusing more strongly upon the anti-metaphysical stance of logicai positivism ultimately leads the neo-Kantian reading to argue for the flexible nature of Carnap's constructional system in opposition to the received viewosphenomenalist interpretation. Neo-Kantian re- evaluators generally cite Carnap's conceming the traditionai metaphysical schools of realism, idealism and in support of their claims. Knowledge about the essential or real nature of the objects we refer to in our concepts is impossible, he says. since it falls outside of the capacities of scientific investigation and within '-the extrascientific domain of theoretical f~rm"'~--otherwiseknown as metaphysics.

The daims expressed in this new position have caught on like wildfire. The growth of articles written in this neo-Kantian vein has increased exponentially and indeed the recent and much noticed rebirth in interest in the logical positivists has been due primarily to the fertile nature of this new research. A critical response to these developments, however, has begun to make itself heard. This response acknowledges the relativistic. anti-metaphysical position at the root of Carnap's construction of the world and yet still maintains the priority of the principle of verifiability in the shaping of his thought. This new formulation puts more stock in the received view than does the

1 O Carnap, Aufbau, p. 284. 15

Kantian take of Friedman el a[ and insists that the logical positivists are still more accurately understood as having grown out of the tradition of Humean empincism.

Authors of this new position like Cheryl Misak and Robert G. Hudson da stand apart from the received view, however, in more than just their recognition of what I have cailed

Carnap's . This new position claims also that the revival of interest in pragmutism which occurred (according to the received view) in North Amencan philosophy departments as a direct result of the aforementioned failure of the positivist program can in fact be better understood as the outcome of the natural evolution of certain concepts and ideas which rooted themselves in Amencan philosophy with the arriva1 of the logical positivists themselves. Interestingly enough, Carnap is once again singled out as a figure the implications of whose ideas exceed the strict verificationist interpretation of his Aufbau. Although this new "subtle verificationist" approach as well as the neo-Kantian characterization can be interpreted, prima facie, as standing direcrly opposed to one another, it is the thesis of this chapter that the two positions boil down to basically the same thing--the recognition of a necessary openness to different (and possibly mutually exclusive) takes on where to begin logically constructing the world.

The adoption of one method or another depends solely upon what it is we are trying to do

(upon what sort of science we are practising)--making the question as to which system- base to choose a pragmatic one and the question as to the absolute tmth or falsity of a given system meaningless since it is metaphysical. 16

THE NEO-KANTIAN APPROACH

The constitution of reality, if conceived as a construction, must start fkom something, the basis, and by means of certain procedures... it mut generate everything--every object and every concept.... Carnap noted that it is in principle as legitimate to start with sensations and constmct physicai objects as it is to start with physicd objects and constmct sensations. In fact, it is conceivable that the whole world could be constructed starting fiom Hegel's Absolute or a close relative thereof (§56).' '

The main point maintained by those who assert the neo-Kantian re-conception of

logical positivism revolves around Carnap's own admission that the logical construction

of the world need not necessarily begin with autopsychological concepts. It is tme that

Carnap chose individual "elernentary experiences" and the two place relation

'-recollection of simila.rity7'as the basis upon which to erect a sarnple construction in his

Aufbau, but it would be a mistake to view this contingent fact as placing Carnap within the empiricist epistemological tradition of Locke, Berkeley, Hume and ~ach."Carnap himself acknowledges that '-theones of a positivist, especially sensationalist, are generally grounded upon a system form with a psychological basis." Carnap's choice of autopsychological elementary concepts couid, then, be interpreted as reflecting a positivistic attraction to sense-data type anaiysis, if it weren't for what he says in the passage irnrnediately following: "The fact that we, too, use such a system form, however. does not mean that we proceed fiom a sensationalist or positivist position. Any decision

"~lbertoCoffa, The Semantic Tradition fiom Kant to car na^: to the Vienna Station, ed. Linda Wessels, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991, (1 993)), p. 2 15. N.B. "$56" refers to the corresponding section of the Aufbau.

"See Friedman, "The Re-Evaluation of Logical Positivism," p. 509-1 0. 17

on problems of this type lies outside of construction theory, nameiy,... in the domain of

metaphy~ics."'~Fuelled by Carnap's radical anti-metaphysical inclinations, neo-Kantian

re-evaluators assert that the best way to understand the Aufbau is simply as an attempt to

combine the insights of Kant's constructional (or transcendental) mode1 of ouencounter

with the world with the rigorousness of logical analysis. The specific aim of this approach was to make manifest the formal or a priori content of our judgments in a way

which avoided the metaphysical (and henceforth nonscientific) nature of Kant's reliance

upon the concept of pure intuition. Developments in (Einsteinian relativity

theory) and math (non-Euclidian geometry. Hilbert's axiomatization of geometry) had

called into question the applicability and correctness of a priori constraints upon Our

experience developed through upon the structure of the arena of pure

intuition (the three dimensional, Euclidian nature of space which Kant thought he had established a priori through his transcendentd deduction, for instance, had recently been refuted and indeed non-Euclidean geometry was a well used (although not essential)

aspect of relativity theory). The implications of these developments and Carnap's

positivistic cornmitment to scientifically derived empirical knowledge led him to reject any and al1 statements about the structure of the world which were denved intuitively.

However, while Carnap and the logical positivists' displeasure with the metaphysical

flavour of Kant's transcendental deduction did lead them to reject the latter's notion of

putatively synthetic a prion concepts like the Euclidean nature of space, they did not give

''Carnap, Aufbau, p. 96. 18 up their belief in the viability of an epistemology which incorporated certain (or a priori) knowledge.''

Frege and Russell's new logic becarne the primary tool in the quest for a replacement of Kant's synthetic a prion. The aim this time was a non-metaphysically- derived objective or intersubjective knowledge. Carnap states,

Even though the subjective origin of al1 knowledge lies in the contents of expenence and their connections, it is still possible, as the constructional system will show, to advance to an intersubjective ob~ectiveworld, which can be conceptually comprehended and which is the same for al1 observers.ls

The intersubjective objective world of which Carnap speaks is just that reality which is communicable once a statement about the world has been formalized or translated into logical . It is the expression of this leflover, objective content which the new logic was designed to achieve. Translation of a statement into symbolic logic effectively

%rackets" out al1 content which cannot be expressed stnicturally. Thus a fully formalized statement will not use or words to designate the objects of which is speaks, but will instead isolate them as variables over which certain conditions hold.

Corresponding to the picnire expressed in such a transformed is the series of structural properties of the empirical object or state being described by the statement.

Appreciation of this formal/stnictural knowledge cm be obtained by anyone no matter

I4For more on this, see Coffa's work The Semantic Tradition fiom Kant to Carnap.

"Carnap, Aufbau, p. 7. Quoted in Michael Friedman's "Carnap's Aufbau Reconsidered," Noûs. vol. 21. (1987)' p. 526. what her relation to the objects contained within the statement. Lt is in this sense that the knowledge impartable this way is intersubjective or objective. Logical analysis of our statements about the world allows one to discover and communkate knowledge of phenomena which reaches beyond the subjective world of one's own sense impressions.

So long as we conduct our analysis in a rigorous and exact enough way error within knowledge claims of this sort should be eliminated. Hudson cites an example of what this sort of re-description rnight look like for the particula. case of the Eurasian railway network (taken fiom 3 14 of the Aufbau):

As a first approximation. we might characterize the individual stations by the number of railway lines that intersect at them. Should some stations possess the same number of co~ectinglines. thus making them indiscernible by this procedure, we might try to distinguish between these by counting the number of stations between one such station and the next, closest such station. Again and again, Carnap explains, we search for a relation that pemits us to uniquely specie each railway stop, keeping in mind to 3tay within the limits of the purely structural [and] ...not mention these relations by narne" (3 14).l6

What is important to notice with this exarnple is the fact that Carnap doesn't make any claims concerning what the proper basic concepts for use in a consû-uction should be. In the first place, with a simple exarnple like the one above any basic object will suffice so long as it allows us to distinguish each railway station fkom the next outside of our

I6Robert G. Hudson, "Empirical Constraints in the Aufbau," History of Philosoohv Ouarterly, (Apr. 1994), p. 240. Hudson's article stands on the side of the subtle verificationist reconsideration of logical positivism, and he henceforth uses this example to further different ends than he might have were he on the neo-Kantian side. However, the fact that he cites this exarnple fiom Carnap's text in order to make a similar point to the claims of Friedman et al conceming the nature of Carnap's "objectivity" only serves to Meraugment rny thesis. These points will be made in Merdetail below. 20

subjective relation to it (i-e., our being in one and not another, or our knowing some or al1

of the station-names, etc.). The above example uses railway lines and their relations to

each other in order to pick out the objects within the chosen domain of railway stations.

We could. however, just as easily have picked out the bathrooms in each station. or

windows etc., as basic objects whose different combinations fiom one station to the next

would allow for discrimination between stations. Given the complexity of constmcting

the world we need to be a little more selective with the type of simple objects which we

pick--however, which one we do end up choosing matters not at al1 so long as it works for

our purposes (i.e., Carnap allows us to use whichever son we like, be they autopsychological, physicai, heteropsychological, cultural, etc.). It is the patterns of combination which are important and not the objects combined since it is these patterns

which ultimately provide us with knowledge of a justifiably objective sort. As far as

basic concepts for the combination of basic objects go, this choice is also up to us. In the above example Carnap's suggested methods involve three basic concepts, narnely, similari@, combination and proximity--although the latter two, at least, could most likely be broken down into simpler concepts. In fact, the one basic relation which Carnap actually makes use of in his Aufbau is the recollection of similarity--it is through this two-place relation, symbolic logic and the choice of elementary experiences as basic objects that Carnap atternpts his worldly constr~ction.'~

I71t is interesting to note, however, that Carnap later came to regret his having chosen autopsychological elementary expenences and the recollection of sirnilarity due to his having come to appreciate the advantages of a physicalist object domain combined with a larger nurnber of basic concepts or relations "for a of the concept systems of the empincal sciences." See the preface to the second edition of In response to these considerations the Kantian position concludes its argument by

Irnmediate contact with the given is both fleeting and irredeemably subjective. Objective knowledge therefore requires concepts and judgments, which are to be carefully distinguished fiom intuitive sensory presentations. Concepts and judgments are in fact only possible in the context of a rigorous .... More specifically, the Hilbertian notion of "implicit definition" of scientific concepts via their logical places in a formal system ...can alone explain how rigorous, exact, and truly objective representation is possible. We are here obviously very farfiom traditional empiricism and very close indeed tu the supposedly antipositivist doctrine of the theory ladenness of observ~tion.'~

The objects basic to a constructional system, what Friedman refers to as "the given," are non-formalizable and for that reason their "real" nature is inconsequential. The achievement of objectivity through the use of these objects does not demand that they be of any particularly privileged sort. Instead. al1 that objectivity requires is their logically rigorous combination into more complex concepts (a notion which the received view of logical positivism's demise obscures in its ernphasizing of positivism's putative isolation of sense-data as epistemically primary). The which is inherent in our expenence of the world will always taint the informal picture which our observations enable us to create. Carnap's emphasis upon the formal content ofour experience is intended to redirect ouattention away fkom simple observation (as important as it is) towards that which cmbe adequately conceptualized and justifiably used in the fiering

Carnap's Aufbau, p. vii.

"Friedman, The Re-Evaluation of Logical Positivism," p. 5 13 (emphasis added to last ). 22 of our knowledge of the extemal world. The Hilbertian notion of implicit definition which Friedman makes reference to concerns just this comection between knowledge and concepts. Bnefly, the thought behind implicit definition is that 5t most what we can establish about concepts which are basic to an axiomatic or foundationai system (like sense-data, sub atomic particles or relations of similarity and difference) is just the place that they hold within the system (Le., what relations they engage in or make possible, etc.). Any attempt at explicit definition, at a definition which describes the basic elements of the system relative to something other than these formal properties, can oniy fail since it goes outside of the structure we have constructed. To attempt to define basic elements explicitly (as the received view of logical positivism claims Carnap does in his adherence to elementary experiences as imrnediately given to the perceiver) is just to do metaphysics-a pastime which the positivists were actively engaged in opposing. A blind adherence to a strict principle of verifiability is clearly incompatible with this goal. It is true that ifsimple objects such as autopsychological elementary experiences or physicalist subatomic particles are chosen as basic undefined building blocks for use in construction. then it is appropriate to assert that al1 statements about the world need to be verifiable in order for those statements to be meaningful within that chosen qstern (or to put this in a

Kuhnian way, within that operational puradigm). However, construction systems need not start fiom these foundations (they could start fiom a cultural basis, for instance) and moreover Carnap's efforts should be read and understood as primarily focused upon the intersubjective knowledge which is not subject to the verifiability principle (the formal or logical aspects of construction) since its nature as non-metaphysical a prion knowledge absolves it from any situatedness within a problematically observation-centric fiamework.

THE "SUBTLE" VERIFICATIONIST APPROACH

[Llogical positivism in the end embraced two themes of : an epistemology which made pragmatic such as utility and relevant to and the thought that tmth is somethhg like corroboration. This is unsurprising. for the thought at the very heart of pragmatism is the venficationist idea--our philosophical theones must be connected to experience and pra~tice.'~

[V]erificationism doesn't speciw a preferred . It doesn't assert the reality of autopsychological states and demur on the reality of physical ones. Instead is a theory of justification, one which recommends that we justify our scientific beliefs whenever possible with ernpirical data.... Carnap seeks justifications which will facilitate our coming to a decision about scientific statements, whether or not this decision, in the long run, is truthful. Empincal data fit in here by of the fact that they are intrinsicaily decidable. They are. we can say, intruisicaily 'verifiable,' so long as we remember to detach from this word any implications concerning their truth or falsity. In short. we can corne to a decision about empiricai data. And so using them in our reconstmctions of scientific statements will render scientific statements decidabIe as well."

The appreciation of the failings inherent in a strict verificationist interpretation of

Iogical positivism has recently been acknowledged by some. however, who still maintain that the best way to understand the positivist position is through a venficationist perspective. The gist of this view is expressed nicely in the above quote by Hudson when he speaks of koming to a decision." The for appealing to experience as a means

'9Cheryl Misak, Verificationism, (New York: , 1995), p. 97.

'O~udson,pp. 239-40. 24

for making decisions about what is the case and what is not are fairly straighnorward:

empirical data help to provide knowledge of the constraints which hold over

constructional systems. Camap rnakes use of both logical and empiricai theorems in the

development of his sample autopsychologicaI construction. Theorems of the first soa

arnount simply to the rules involved in the use of logic (which for Carnap were the rules of Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica) while those of the second sort corne out of hypothetico-deductive scientific reasoning. As an example of the latter Hudson daims that the basic concept "recollection of sirnilarity" which Camap introduces to

begin combining elementary experiences in his sample construction in the Aufbau is justifiably held by him to belong to the larger class of asymmetrical relations due to the empirical fact that "we've never recalled the sirnilarity of future expenence to a present experience."" Hudson dso points out another moment where empincal distinctions play a central role in the shaping of Camap's constructionai system which he (Hudson) draws out of Carnap's Eurasian railway network exarnple. If two railway stations elude our every attempt to distinguish the one fiom the other on purely forma1 grounds, then:

they are indistinguishable, not only for geographic reasons, but for science in general. They may be subjectively different: 1 could be in one of these locations, but not in the other. But this would not arnount to an objective difference, since there would be in the other place a man just like myself who says as I do: I am here and not there?

"~udson,p. 240.

--Carnap,11 Aufbau, p. 27. Quoted in Hudson, p. 240. 25

It follows fiom this that even though "absolute discemabiiity is not a prerequisite in the formulation of structurai def~tedescriptions,"" the limits of discernability are defuiable ody through reflection upon knowledge which one gains empirically. This is the case no matter which concepts one defmes as basic to one's constructionai endeavoun. The empirical theorems which one develops in the setting of limitations upon a constnictional system are appreciable fiom whichever bais one might adopt (autopsychologicaI, heteropsychological, cultural, etc.). The only criterion which is upon these empirical theorerns is that they be verrjiable in the sense of being well disposed to the engendering of interpersonal agreement. This is where Hudson's notion of the intrinsic "decidability" of empirical reflections cornes into play: empirical data stand as those entities which at first glance appear most promising in terms of providing through which to formulate general outlines of the concepts we use in our encounter with the world. And there is a Loose interpretation of the verifiability principle which runs along these lines claiming simply that our experiences of objects in the extemal world provide a means for the determination of the truth or fdsity of the judgments which we base upon those experiences. This formulation is not viciously circular so long as we understand that espenence does not provide a means for the determination of absolure truth or falsity, but instead can only help determine what is true and fdse to one who has chosen to abide by the claim that our expenence is the best means available to us for coming to these sorts of conclusions. And this corresponds nicely with the anti-metaphysical bent of the verifiability pnnciple itself--the truth or falsity of the principle is left unestablishable since what it says stands outside of the knowledge which we can glean from our encounter with the world. If the verifiability principle is to remain non-metaphysical our approval of it cannot rest on our conviction that it is absolutely tme or false, but can instead reflect only a choice which we have made to follow its advice--a choice which can be justified via a cornparison of it with other possible procedures in ternis of their usefülness for whatever project we might be engaged in. If this project is the exploration of the natural world through science, then (the subtle verificationist position maintains) the adoption of this principle over others is clearly pragmatically justified. Hudson States.

The possibility of agreement ... is the crux to what Carnap considers to be O bjectivity . Carnap's ovemding concem is to ensure the (intersubjective) decidability or tractability of scientific problems. There must be a method that shows how we cm arrive at definite resolutions to scientific problems. and this method Camap takes to lie in reducing scientific issues to logical constructions of empirical data. Metaphysical problems are distinguished by the fact that they are in principle inesolvable by logical and empincal methods--metaphysical claims are not constructible. Hence, metaphysical problems for Carnap lack objectivity."

"~udson,p. 249-Whether or not Carnap justified his belief in the objectivity of observationally collected empirical data is an issue which divides the two sides of the debate which 1 am outlining. While proponents of the Kantian approach assert that Carnap had a fairly well defmed appreciation of the theory-lademess of observation, subtle verificationist interpreters like Hudson and Misak maintain the received view's claim that Camap was not cognizant of this now well accepted notion. This debate, however, does not have much to do with the main issues being discussed in this section. More recent philosophy of science has begun to cnticize post-positivists which put theory ahead of observation in a simple reversal of what they daim to be the positivist position. Authors like Peter Galison (in How Experiments End) and (in Representing and Intervening (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983)) cal1 for a refocusing upon experirnent as the point where theory and observation collide--neither one dominating the other 100 percent. The issues involved in this debate are looked at again in the conclusion to this thesis where the modernist tendencies of both positivist and 1960's pst-positivist philosophies of science are discussed Mer. 37

The cooperative nature of science demands a system for the determination of truth and falsity which moves beyond the subjective world of the individual into a realm which can be appreciated and compared by many. Carnap's construction of this sort of world uses a

Ioose interpretation of the verifiability principle in order to achieve this end. The putative objective and interpersonal nature of formal content is not enough, on this account (unlike

Friedman et al's interpretation), and must be supplemented by an appeal to the communication engendering usefulness of grounding our constructions in the empirical world. Interestingly enough, the choice of appropnate basic concepts for the foundation of our construction remains open; so long as empincal considerations are allowed to enter into Our deliberations our starting fiom an autopsychological, heteropsychological. physical. social. etc., perspective dl cornes down to the same diing." Thus the relativism which neo-Kantian interpreters attribute to Carnap's constructional method viz-a-vis the choice of foundational material is still maintained by the subtie verificationist group.

Moreover, the anti-metaphysical implications of Carnap's system which Kantian interpreters take to be essential to a proper understanding of Carnap's aim are also acknowledged. Only this time the stance is understood as stemming not out of Carnap's comrnitment to logical or formal knowledge as the sole means of accessing information which is interpersonal, but is derived instead fiom his cornmitment to empirical data as pragmatically justified components of our understanding of the limits of our constructional abilities.

"See Hudson, p. 24 1. 28

The upshot of these claims amounts to this: the priviieging of empirical concems is an essential part of Carnap's project since it is only through this emphasis that Carnap is able to achieve the objectivity which is the main goal of his enterprise. In overlooking this fact Friedman et al have placed an inordinate arnount of emphasis upon Carnap's enthusiasm for logical or formal objectivity and have lefi out his equal commitment to a pragmaticaily justified use of empirical judgments as a source of reliable, objective data useful to science.

THE PRAGMATIC TURN

What I want to cal1 attention to here are the very substantiai parallels between central aspects of our post-positivist situation and basic elements of the positivists' own philosophical position. Thus, for exarnple, it is now clear, 1 hope. that, far fiom being naive empincists. the positivists in fact incorporated what we now cal1 the theory lademess of observation as centrai to their novel conception of science--a conception neither strictly empiricist nor strictly Kantian. Accordingly. they also explicitly recognized--and indeed emphasized--types of theoretical change having no straight-fonvardly rational or factual basis. In Carnap's hands, these conventionalist and pragmatic tendencies even gave rise to a very general version of philosophical "relativism" expressed in the "pnnciple of t~lerance.'"~

The later Carnap is ...set against the idea that we confront sentences with reality and he is led to a different brand of non-reaiism, with the principle of tolerance at its centre. That principle, we have seen, has it that ail choices of language are to be made on 'pragmatic' grounds or on grounds of utility. This view seems to entai1 a kind of relativism, where truth is relative to the language chosen and where there might well be two incompatible, equally good, ."

'6Friedman, "The Re-Evaiuation of Logical Positivism," p. 5 19.

'7~isak,pp. 94-95. The correctness of the subtle-venficationist critique of the Kantian approach to logicd

positivism aside, what remains to be appreciated is the fundamental similarity which exists between the two views." The roots of this similarity are twofold--the acknowiedgrnent of the paucity of the received view of logical positivism in terms of its overlooking the openness to the adoption of different foundational concepts which

Carnap's constmctional theory contains as well as the assertion which each view makes concemine the importance of pragmatic considerations to Carnap's project. At the bottom of these deliberations is the belief that there is a type of relativism which infuses

Carnap's work and which is most properly understood as the result of his rejection of metaphysical speculations as to the phenornenalistic, ideaiistic, realistic. solipsistic. etc.. nature of basic constmctional elements in favour of a pragmatic appeal to the adoption of a language which most effectively advances the goals of the project within which one is engaged. Interestingly enough, Quine himself acknowledges this relativism in his Word and Ob-iect when he states,

Carnap has long held that the questions of philosophy, when real at di, are questions of language.... He holds that the philosophical questions of what there is are questions of how we may most conveniently fashion our "linguistic frarnework," and not ...q uestions about extraiinguistic reality. He holds that those philosophicai questions are only apparently about sorts of objects, and are really pragmatic questions of language p~licy.'~

"For a neo-Kantian response to Hudson's position, see Thomas Uebel's "Conventions in the Aufbau," British Journal for the Historv of Philosophv, (1996), pp. 381-397.

'9~.~.0.Quine, Word and Object, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1960), p. 91. 30

The language we choose to adopt (or, to put it another way, the foundationai concepts which we speciG as basic to our constnictional efforts) remains up to us. Pragmatic considerations of usefulness and decidability are dl that we have to inform this choice, and what we find compelling will depend upon what it is we are trying to do. While a micro-physicist might choose to speak or in a scientifically redist way- asserting the reality of non-visible subatomic particles, a psychologist might instead speak in a way which appears phenomenalist or idealist--focushg on autopsychological elementary experiences. One might even find a sociologist who appears to confer reality upon cultural objects like economic forces or . What basis one chooses matters to

Carnap not at dl. For him al1 these different ways of speaking are equally justified. The above-mentioned principle of tolerance is just this openness to different ways of speaking about the world. Appropnate starting points for construction will depend precisely upon what comrnuniîy it is that one works in. At this level Carnap3 philosophy of science does not differ from the post-positivist philosophies which asserted themselves in opposition to the putative phenomenalism of the Aufbau. If one interprets the pragrnatism implicit in these later philosophies as a predisposition against our hankering for a "real" picture of the world through which to judge our various of that world absolutely tme or false, tlien Carnap's aversion to such metaphysical speculation conforms to this standard rather well. Heteropsychological objects like shared commitments or beliefs (developed through Our linguistic, scientific and social practices) become the pnmary avenue through which to understand one community's choice of certain foundational concepts over others. This acknowledgement of the pnmacy of the heteropsychological requires no 3 1 metaphysical specuiation since it doesn't specifi any particuiar ontoiogy. The nature of the community-centred &liations which persuade us to find certain concepts foundationafly useful will Vary fiorn situation to situation. This is a notion which Carnap appreciated even before leaving Vienna to emigrate to the U.S.--the historical home of pragmatism. CHAPTER 3: POSTMODERNISM

NTRODUCTION: THE DILEMMA OF POSTMODERNITY

Modemity is defined as the era of overcorning and of the new which rapidly grows old and is immediately replaced by something still newer, in an unstoppable movernent that discourages al1 creativity even as it demands creativity and defmes the latter as the sole possible form of life. If this indeed is the case, as Nietzsche clairns, then no way out of modemity can possibly be found in terms of an overcoming of it ....[ O]vercorning is a typically modem category. and therefore will not enable us to use it as a way out of rn~dernity.'~

[Olnly if we take seriously the outcome of the 'destruction of ontology' undertaken by Heidegger, and before him by Nietzsche, is it possible to gain access to the positive opportunities for the very of man that are found in post-modem conditions of existence. It will not be possible for thought to live positively in that tmly post-metaphysical era that is post-modemity as long as man and Being are conceived of--metaphysicalIy, Platonically, etc.--in terms of stable structures. Such conceptions require thought and existence to 'groundo themselves. or in other words to stabilize themselves (with logic or with ), in the domain of non-becorning, and are reflected in a whole-scale mythization of strong structures in every field of expenence."

To write about philosophical postrnodemity creates a puuling dilemma. Crucial to a discussion of the nature of postrnodemity is an explicit statement of what postmodernism is. However, engaging in this sort of essence-fixing dialogue runs completely counter to the postmodern spirit itself. Negative assertions, therefore, have

"Gianni Vattimo, " and the Postmodem in Philosophy," The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hemeneutics in Postmodem Culture, trans. Jon R. Snyder, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1988), p. 166.

"Gianni Vattimo, "Introduction," The End of Modemity: Nihilism and in Postmodem Culture, bans. Jon R. Snyder, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Universiq Press, I988), pp. 1 1-12. become the nom. This claim is supported by the works of writers like Jean-François

Lyotard who negatively defme "postmodern" as incredulity towards meta-narratives,

textualists like who condernn al1 non-textual explanations of statement-

rneaning, and like whose genealogical method denounces

tnditional history's attempts to uncover identity between historical penods?' In keeping with the nature of these descriptions 1 will also use a negative description. The issue to

be discussed in this chapter is postmodernity itself. I define postmodem. therefore, as opposed ro modernfiameworh. However. 1 will go further on this occasion and assert the positive claim that philosophical postmodemism also currently possesses certain common concems or sensitivities which go beyond a simple opposition to modernity.

The two main components of these concerns are expressed nicely in the above passages

by the Italian Gianni Vattimo when he speaks of overcoming and Nietzsche and Heidegger's "destruction of ontology." The discussion of these two interrelated ideas will be one of the primary aims of this chapter. On rny reading, philosophical

"For Lyotard's position, see his book The Postmodern Condition: A Reoort on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). For a discussion of ''textualist" ideas like Demda's, as well as postmodem historicist positions like Foucault's, see Richard Rorty's essay Wineteenth- Century Idealism and Twentieth-Cenw Textualism," Conseauences of Pra~matism IEssays: 1 972- 19801, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, l982), pp. 139-59. For first hand accounts of their positions, see Derrida's work Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) and the collections of Foucaultgsessays found in Power/Knowledge: Selected and Other Writines, ed. Colin Gordon, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977) and The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984). For Rorty's position on postrnodernity, see the introduction to his book Essavs on Heidegger and Othen: Philoso~hicalPapers Volume 2, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991 ), entitled "Pragmatisrn and post-Nietzschean philosophy." 34

postmodernism flows from an acknowledgrnent of the significance of these two ideas

given our current historicai or (more correctly) "post-historical" situation.j3 The notion of

-'post-historical" refers to the demise of the modem understanding of history which views

it as progressive and directed towards future States of flairs. In the final section of this

chapter 1 choose Lyotard and Foucault as two examples and show how they both operate

according to the themes which I have highlighted. A conception of as the

dnving force behind history and human development is repudiated by these authors dong

with the penchant for fimi foundations and certain knowledge which characterizes the

modem era."

There is one caveat which needs to be made conceming these two sensitivities.

The family resemblances between the different works and ideas 1 have listed are, at this

moment anyway, reducible to the two motivating concems which Vattimo highiights.

Other resemblances abound. but, contrary to Wittgenstein's use of the , 1 want to

''For a different (although similar) genealogy and approach (as well as his list of 20(!) concepts which he are loosely connecteci to the ideas of postmodernity), see Bemd Magnus' essay "Postmodern Pragmatism: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Demda, and Rorty'' in Praernatism: From Proeressivism to Postmodemism, eds. David Depew and Robert Hollinger, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993, pp. 256-83.

'"1t should be noted in passing, however, that this distinction fiom the tradition allows one to descnbe postmodernity as incorporating a type of pragmatisrn similar to (but more far-reaching than) the one I attributed to Carnap in the previous chapter. Current postmodernism opposes the notion of tnith-as-accurate-representation-of- ultimate-reality in a way which is reminiscent of Carnap's relativism concerning the nature of the concepts placeable at the bottom of his constructional system. Where Carnap and the postmodemists differ, however, is in the postmodemists' rejection of systematic attempts to discover truths of a formal variety as well. As 1 show in the sections below, any attempt to access truth through system-building is repudiated by postmodemity due to the modem nature of this enterprise. 35 say that these two characteristics fmd themselves manifested by al2 members of the family. The reason I retain the metaphor, however, is that in the case of these concems it is as though everyone in the family decided to get the same haircut. What I mean here is that we must not reduce our understanding of the postmodern to one of , since (as

1 will show) this would run entirely counter to the spirit of postmodernity itself. The time may corne when the hairdo starts to tire or embarrass its owners, at which point a visit to the hair salon might be in order. This would not mean, however, that whoever chose to change their look could no longer be properly called "po~tmodernist.'~To insist that this could not happen would be to remain Iocked within a modem way of understanding the histoncal position of these writers. So long as opposition to modem frameworks persists postmodernism is dive and well. It is only a contingent fact that philosophical postmodernists currently operate according to Vattirno's sensitivities. The opposition to modem frameworks is primary. What identically-coiffed postmodern authors tend to do with these frameworks is one of two things. Either they develop interpretive descriptions of these frameworks which they then pull apart or "deconstruct," or eIse they assert positive claims of their own fiom a position which takes for granted the dissolution of these fiameworks. Derrida, in particular, is fond of the former strategy, as is Lyotard, to a certain degree. Foucault, on the other hand, fits more properly into the second of these categories. His attack upon the methods of traditional history is followed by the writing of new sorts of (genealogical histories) which assert difference where traditional history wants to maintain identity. What unites Foucault with other postmodem authors, however, is his of the tradition and not his positive contributions. The 36

acceptance of the inadequacy of modem methods is primary; there is no cornrnon positive

postmodern position. This is one of the reasons why postmodernists are so fhstrating to

their critics: even when positive assertions are made the postmodem author will never

argue for the absolute truth of her position. Her deeply ingrained skepticism will not allow her to do so. And, like the skeptic, her philosophical position possesses an

insidious sort of resiliency which maddens her opponents. Such is the nature of the postmodem beast.

THE "OVERCOMING OF METAPHYSlCS

Postrnodernity emerges out of a nurnber of . The basic issue involved in one of these paradoxes is this: an understanding of the history of modemity points to its overwhelming emphasis upon progress and overcoming as the root of many of its difficulties. The best way to avoid these problems, then. appears to be through an overcoming of this history of progress itself. However, this act is impossible. since a predisposition towards overcoming ca~otbe left behind through an overcoming. To attempt to do so would be to remain locked within the very methodology which one is trying to avoid. According to Heidegger, Nietzsche was the first to appreciate and try to find a way out of this . Heidegger's account of Nietzsche claims that this attempt was successful, although only partidly. In response to this Heidegger takes it upon himself to finish Ihe project which Nietzsche began.

Heidegger's position begins by distinguishing overcoming as the principal modus operundi of modem inquiry. The roots of this method go back as far as and are 37

intimateiy comected to the latter's position at the starting point of the philosophical

tradition known as metaphysics. Metaphysics, on this account, is loosely defined as the

attempt to uncover the pre-expenential conditions or limits which affect the means which

we have available to experience, or be in, the world. Heidegger sees Plato as marking the

moment where the hierarchy between Being. understood as that which confers existence--

which opens up the possibility of experience generaily. and (those things which

exist) is reversed. Frorn this point on, Heidegger claims. our pursuit of an understanding

of Being begins to focus simply on the question of what it means to be. By distinguishing

the Foms as ideas Plato roots our expenence of Being in that which cm be contemplated

by the subjective mind. Thus the avenue which Plato opens up for contact with the

possibility of existence is made accessible through a means which privileges the perspective of a subjective interpreter. This moment is Fundamental to metaphysics since

it marks the introduction of one of its central : that it is within the capacity of a single hurnan rnind to corne to terrns with the phenornenon of existence generally.

As 1 mentioned previously, rnodernity is characterized by its development of foundationalist epistemologies. These foundations have typically been provided through metaphysical spe~ulation.'~An opposition to rnodernity, therefore, characteristically incorporates a refùtation of rnetaphysics. Heidegger is no exception. His description of the successive metaphysical barrages upon Being perpetrated by the likes of Descartes.

Kant and finally even Nietzsche connects each one of them with the metaphysical

"The logical positivists, of course, are an exception to this generalization in a way which 1 outline more precisely in my concluding chapter. philosophical tradition inaugurated by Plato. At each stage in the history Heidegger lays out Being is said to withdraw Merand hirther fiom the world--meanhg that the metaphysical conceptions of Being which are produced subjectify our encounter with it to greater and greater degrees." At each successive stage in Being's ''deparhue" we find an attempt at overcoming that metaphysical speculation which came previously.

Foundationalist epistemological pursuits like Descartes' or Kant's operate by razing previous metaphysically-based constructions in anticipation of pouring fiesh epistemologicai foundations derived through the use of new metaphysical insights. These bits oPcertain" knowledge (clear and distinct ideas. synthetic a priori tniths. etc..) are then used in defence against skeptical attacks upon any of the new system's various higher level components. This cycle of metaphysical deductions and overtumings represents. according to Heidegger. Western philosophy's platonically motivated search for a description of existence itself which is unrnediated (uncorrupted) by our subjective impressions, but which is at the same time there for us to grasp. This suggests that the justification of metaphysics is based upon an unanalysed assumption--Le., that knowledge of Being is possible for one who starts Frorn a subjective perspective. Heidegger's entire philosophical project can be read as an attempt at refuting this one central idea. On his account Being is such that it cmot fit into the shape of an object presented to the mind

j6~ora complete description of this history see Heidegger's essays "The Question Conceming ," and 'The Word of Nietzsche: God is Dead," in The Question Concemine Technolow and Other Essavs, (Toronto: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977), as well as his book Nietzsche: Volume IV. "Nihilism", (Toronto: Fitzhenry & Whiteside Ltd., 1982). For a detailed and critical account of Heidegger's method and genealogy. see Phillippe Lacoue-Labarthe essay "Typography," Tvpogaphv. Mimesis. Philosophv, Politics, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989). for contemplation. Moreover, the subject/object dichotomy which is taken for granted by the aforementioned assumption is understood by him to be a faise abstraction.

Metaphysics' unjustified attraction to the latter side of this dichotomy as the fundamental source of tmth causes it to hide from itself the privileging of the subject-centred position which it perpetuates.37 This obfbscation is responsible for the perpetuai cycle of construction and dernolition which c haractenzes modemity . Al1 attempts to obtain tnie knowledge by catching a glirnpse of Being as it is "objectively" via the window of metaphysics are doomed to failure. From day one metaphysics has used the subject as the perspective through which it mediates this encounter--thereby dissolving any hope of reaching the "objective" truth it seeks. Ail that it can do is roll on until it fmally nuis out of steam.

Heidegger picks out Nietzsche as standing at the end of metaphysics' run-at once culminating its possibilities as well as inaugurating the moment of its radical self- effacement. The way in which Nietzsche effects this culmination/effacement is through the drastic overcoming of metaphysics' tendencies which his position of nihilism represents. Nihilism's main thesis is that there is no fündamentally %ue" conception of the state of affairs of the world which hurnanity has access to and which could be used to justifi our various of how and why things work the way they do. Understood in this way nihilism represents a radical skepticism which calls into question any positive claim which asserts itself as foundationally- denved hue knowledge-4.e.. which

"~eeGianni Vattimo, "The Crisis of Hurnanism," The End of Modemitv: Nihilism and Henneneutics in Postmodern Culture, tram. Jon R. Snider, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1988), p. 32. 40 legitima~esitself based upon an aileged resemblance between it and the way the world is apart fiom our subjective impressions of it. Nietzsche uses this skepticism to justi@ abandoning the notion of absolute truth-replacing it instead with in a move which annihilates any future possibility of developing an epistemology based upon metaphysically established "certain," ?rue," "objective," etc., foundations.

Even though this radical overcoming of metaphysics suggests no other foundation with which to replace that one which was lost, Nietzsche's project still functions through an overcoming or rejection of ail that which came before him. This inauguration of a new sensibility through the ousting of the old still represents, for Heidegger. a characteristically modem way of operating. It is in this sense that Nietzsche's attempt to solve the first paradox I enumerated is only partially effective. It is partially successful in that it does manage to reject metaphysics (and thereby a hankenng for '?rue." "certain." etc., foundations). His method of overcoming, however, locks Nietzsche within the tradition which he sought to transcend. This uniqueness possessed by Nietzsche in relation to the tradition stems fiom the resiliency of his position. Nietzsche marks the final stage of metaphysics' development since his replacement of the notion of absolute truth with value forever erases the possibility of any new overcoming. Any assertion of a new metaphysically deduced foundational truth will inevitably fail to overcome

Nietzsche's thought since his position appropriates al1 %th-discovery" by marking it as misguided "tmth-~reation."~~

'8Thus we have the Iogical positivists following after Nietzsche and attempting to develop epistemologies which do not found themselves metaphysically. Carnap's pragmatism, for example, causes him to reject any metaphysical clairn as to the essential 41

What is at once most compelling and at the same time btrating about

Nietzsche's position is its similarity to the traditionai voice of the skeptic. Tirne and time again throughout the history of Western philosophy authors have asserted against a skepticism which questions our ability to know anything objectively. And time and time again these efforts have failed. To accept the nihilism propounded by Nietzsche is just to accept that the skeptic cannot be beat and that al1 efforts which either consciously or unconsciously ignore this fact are to be rejected outnght. Whether or not one agrees that this sort of radical skepticism is compelling, the fact remains that for

Heidegger and postmodernism more generally skepticism's tnumph is not so much compelling as it is decisive. In Heidegger's view it was only a matter of time before metaphysics' unjustified privileging of the subjective perspective became realized in a moment which dissolved the project entirely.

Postmodem andysis cannot effect its repudiation of modemity through the method of overcoming if it wants to avoid modernity's particular pitfalls. Moreover. postmodemity cannot conceive itself as having progressed out of a critique of rnodemity since the notion of progress is tied up so inextricably with a modem methodology.

Postmodemism, therefore, mut instead be understood as part of the history of modemity itself--as existing alongside it as its unacknowledged destiny. This is precisely what distinguishes the complicated history which Heidegger has developed; its account of the unravelling of metaphysics does not assert itself as an advancement but instead claims nature of the concepts which he places at the foundation of his system. His structure- building method and focus upon logicai or formal tnith, however, like Nietzsche's attempt at overcoming, keep him locked within a modem framework. 42 simply that this was the inevitable outcome of metaphysics' cycle of construction and dernolition. Postrnodem positions do not make assertions about the way things really are so much as they comment upon our current state of &airs &om within this altered perspective. The methodology of deconstruction is well adapted to this end-- deconstruction allows one to engage in an anaiysis which destabilizes modem metaphysicai postures without overcoming them through new assertions of fkesh metaphysicai foundations. Instead. deconstruction makes room for the clairns of various conflicting positions by dis-empowenng those or commitrnents which aim to exclude through their belief in the absolute authority of what they have to Say. This goal cm be accomplished in two ways. Either it can be realized by attacking the foundations of a rnetaphysically-grounded epistemology, by showing how these foundations fail to stand up to skeptical attack (a task which Heidegger accomplishes in a generd way for al1 traditional metaphysical speculation). or it can be accomplished by poking at the connections which putatively exist between different levels of the system in question. In both ways the authority of this system is broken dom in a move which opens up the possibility of new .

This subsequent proliferation of new, inclusive discounes is just as important as the destabilizing of old exclusive discourses in moving towards the dismantling of progress-chauvinism. This is where the second, more positive type of postrnodem writing cornes in. Positive postmodemism fills the void Ieft by the dismantling of modem systems in a way which does not attempt to assume any sort of privileged status with respect to tmth conceived of as accurate representation. These positive 43 contributions, therefore, cannot corne from a metaphysicai cornmimient to the rightness of a certain idea which demands its expres~.'~Instead, the driving force of positive postrnodem thought cornes simply fiom the desire to participate (in one fom or another) in the always ongoing conversation that is human life. This notion will be made more explicit in the sections which follow.

1 have already alluded to many of the components of the "destruction of ontolog~" performed by Nietzsche and Heidegger. The general shape of this destruction, however, rernains to be stated more explicitly. Issues of ontology rest on issues of rnetaphysics since ontological discourse (as discourse on what there is) generally uses metaphysical speculation in order to express knowledge claims about the nature and shape of Being.

And as I have already mentioned, it is Heidegger's belief that the history of such speculation. when properly appreciated. shows the inherent (and yet hidden) subject- centredness of al1 such inquiry in its treatrnent of Being as an object which is presented to the subject for contemplation. The subjedobject dichotomy used by metaphysics, therefore, is inherently problematic.

The central issue involved in these considerations is contained within metaphysics' tendency to treat Being as presence. What this notion boils down to is rnetaphysics' defining of Being "in tenns of objectivity, that is, in tenns of clarity,

j9Heidegger is often called on this point with the claim that his cornmitment to opening up the possibility for the return of Being to the world engages him in the same sort of exclusive discourse which postmodernity avoids. 44

stabili ty , and unshakable certainty ."O The dichotomy be~eensubject and O bj ect whic h

is central to metaphysics treats Being as a "fustY'object--Le., as that object whose

presentation (accessible through metaphysical contemplation) is so clear and distinct that

it provides the foundation and therefore the content of our knowledge of ail other objects.

The subject. on the other hand, is emptied of al1 content by this dichotomy. It becomes

pure observaiional capaciîy. This account of the subject removes fiom it any substance

which could be metaphysically appreciated and then placed at the foundation of an

epistemological system. The foundational role of Being-as-presence is thus doubled. The subject at work in metaphysical speculation can never be an object--it provides simply a perspective. Thus not only must Being ground al1 that objectively is, it is also required to support that which observes it as first cause. However, this is not possible since metaphysics starts its inquiry by first taking for granted the subjective perspective which it uses to "observe" Being. This notion provides the locus of another paradox within metaphysics. By treating Being as an object of contemplation presented to the subject metaphysics forever removes the potential for Being to serve as that subject's foundation.

The very act that distinguishes the subject fiom the object (i.e., emptying it of al1 objective content) places it outside of any foundational system which is based upon observation of Being-as-presence. This treatment of the subject as standing outside of the fundamental order of things which Being signifies represents another unacknowiedged/unjustified assumption on the part of metaphysics akin to the one mentioned in the first section of this chapter. Metaphysics' obfuscation of this fact (the

40Vattimo,"The Crisis of ," p. 42. 45 inability of Being-as-presence to ground the subject) has characteristically taken the form of dogmatic assertions about our appreciating Being in a way which places the subject within the system. One only has to think of Descartes' non-deceiving God who guarantees our clear and distinct ideas and therefore our notions about our existing in a world filled with other objects and other minds to understand how this works. Kant's turn to human cognition as the place where objects of knowledge are fust constructed out of a chaotic manifold of sense impressions and thereby made available for empirical recognition also provides another example of this sort of rnanoeu~re.~'

Heidegger's deconstruction of metaphysics thus makes room for the development of a new conception of the subject-a task which many postmodem authors have taken on whole-heartedly. Recent literature upon the nature of the subject in the contemporary world is vas. The gist of its postrnodern content has been expressed nicely by one cornmentator in his daim that the subject's nature is situated by contexrs:

"'This latter description represents the basic substance of Kant3 %anscendental idealism." This placement of the subject at the centre of his epistemologicai system (thereby creating a space for the subject within the system) is often referred to as Kant's "Copemican Revolution." Friedman describes this move nicely when he claims that for Kant,

the object of knowledge does not exist independently of our judgments ...; on the contrary, this object is first created or "constituted" when the unconceptualized data of sense are organized or fiamed within the a priori logical structures of judgment itself. In this way, the initially unconceptualized data of sense are brought under a priori "categories" and thus first become capable of empirical objectivity .

For more on this see Friedman, "Overcorning Metaphysics: Carnap and Heidegger," Ongins of Loeical Empincisrn, ed. Ronaid Giere and Alan Richardson, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 55. Flvery subject is both agent and patient-both actor and acted upon ....To accept this is, in fact, to dissipate the notion of a "ground'iat least insofar as it is defined by the modem project of seeking an axiomatic foundation for what is to count as "real." In a situation of individuals detennining environments determinhg individuals, there is no fust cause, no uitimate detemilliant or even manageable system of deterniinants of the real. Where each action is both ground and grounded, the notion of a ground is robbed of its foundationai character. Embracing the circle of such determination is, then, to abandon any claim to the metaphysics of ultimate grounds or causes which c haracterizes the modem project. It is, as a consequence, to escape the distinctions between reality and mere appearance which are based on them. To twist successfully out of these distinctions is to ...cross the line From the modem to the postmodem."

A strong subject, Le., a subject conceived of as pure observational capacity in relation to

Being-as-presence, is discarded on this account in favour of a subject which is at one and the sarne time both constituted by the context in which it finds itself as well as participatory in the constituting of that very context itself. By playing a passive as well as an active role within the maintenance of these contexts (whether these are nation States. workplaces. families. cornmunities. businesses, etc.) the subject is allowed to step out of the subjedobject dichotomy in a way which eliminates the requirement for a conception of Being as presence which foundationdly establishes our place in the world system.

That place is always already there for one who looks first to the context within which the subject finds itself. We are bom into a world where many of OLU placements in terms of institutional interaction are already well defined. By adopting a conception of the subject which sees it both as acted upon as well as active (Le., as fulfilling both roles outlined by the metaphysical subject/object dichotomy), modemity's empty vesse1 is filled in a way

'"lames Richard Mensch, Knowine and Being, (University Park. Pemsylvania: The Pemsylvania State University Press, 1996), p. 8. 47 which dissolves any metaphysical question as to its role or place within a foundational system.

In order to establish the points 1 have been making in the past two sections conceming the nature of postmodem discourse, it is important to show how the two thernes which 1 have attributed to commonly-coiRed postmodernists are actuaily manifested in their work. In the introduction to his book The Postmodern Condition,

Lyotard defines his interpretation of "postmodern" in a way which serves as an excellent example of the two sensitivities 1 have highlighted. He says:

SimpliGing to the extreme, 1 define postmodern as incredulity toward . This incredulity is undoubtedly a product of progress in the sciences: but that progress in turn presupposes it. To the obsolescence of the apparatus of legitimation corresponds, most notably, the crisis of metaphysicai philosophy and of the university which in the past relied on it. The narrative function is losing its functors, its great hero. its great dangers. its great voyages, its great goal. [t is being dispersed in clouds of narrative language elements--narrative, but also denotative, prescriptive, descriptive, and so on. Conveyed within each cloud are pragmatic valencies specific to its kind. Each of us lives at the intersection of many of these. However, we do not necessarily establish stable language combinations, and the properties of the ones we do establish are not necessarily communicable.'"

Metanarratives are those higher level narratives which uni@ smaller dispersed discourses by explaining how these discourses stem fiom the sarne source. In this sense a metanarrative is simply the articulation of a foundational epistemological system. One

"lyotard, The Postmodem Condition, p. xxiv. 48 cm easily restate Heidegger's thesis about the history of metaphysics within these terms: the history of the successive, progress-directed overcomings of past positions within

Western philosophy is identical to the histoncai nse and fa11 of belief in various different metanarratives. Lyotard's daim that progress in the sciences annihilates our ability to hold onto these fictions as real, while at the same time depends upon these fictions for its legitimation parallels Heidegger's claim that metaphysics hides fiom itself its subject- centredness. Progress is not possible without the presence of explanatory metanamatives which set limits upon discoverable knowledge of Being through outlining its parameters.

However. the incredulity towards metanarratives developed through science annihilates the possibility of creating new kinds of super-systems: overcoming no longer fmctions as a legitimate manoeuvre.

In terms of the "destruction of ontology," Lyotard's claim about the comection between science and the crisis of metaphysicai philosophy roots his thesis in the deconstruction of the tradition which Heidegger and Nietzsche have effected. Lyotard's book outlines a new conception of the subject which he believes is the inevitable outcome of a transformation which he perceives in contemporary 's methods for the production and dispersal of information. Increased demand for knowledge as the source of (political. economic, military, etc.) power is on its way to reducing the role of individuals to nodal points in the production and dispersal of disparate "petit récits,"

(little narratives) useful for the production of Merknow~edge.'~ The "writing" of these little narratives possesses pragmatic rules which structure the linguistic contexts, or lungtiuge games upon which they depend. However, the desconcerning acceptable utterances within these language games will Vary fiom cornrnunity to community. The role of the subject as a strong interpreter of Being's presence gives way, in Lyotard's work. to a self which "does not amount to much, but [which] ...exists in a fabric of relations that is now more complex and mobile than ever before."" Postmodem science becomes the production of reality,

since "reality" is what provides the evidence used as in scientific argumentation, and also provides prescriptions and promises of a juridical, ethical, and politicai nature with results, one cm master al1 of these games by mastering "reality." That is precisely what technology can do. By reinforcing technology, one -'reinforces" reality, and one's chances of being just and right increase accordingly. Reciprocally, technology is relliforced al1 the more effectively if one has access to scientific knowledge and decision-making authority. This is how legitimation by power takes shape?

Technology, understood under these auspices, stands as a force which is used by in their own attempts to assert their understanding of the world as the reality.

At the root of these conflicts one does not find an equd interplay between various different knowledge-systems striving to find out whether or not what they have to Say is

-'truc." Instead what one uncovers is a power-struggle between different institutions which each attempt to upprupria~ethe title of "tme" in order to legitimate their clairns and thereby increase their knowledge base in order to Merdevelop power.

'"Lyotard, p. 15.

"6Lyotard, p. 47-emphasis added. 50

However, "power," understood under these auspices, should not be interpreted in

a way which subsumes it under a subjective interpretation as a thing possessed and put to

use by individuals. Power, understood by post-Nietzschean, postmodem philosophers, is

perceived quite differently. Foucault, for instance, States,

It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the supports which these force relations fmd in one another, thus forrning a chah or a system. or on the contrary, the disjunctions and which isolate them from one another; and lady, as the strategies in which they take effect whose general design or institutionai crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus. in the formulation of the , in the various social hegemonies ....plower is not an institution. and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the narne that one attributes to a cornplex strategicai situation in a particular society?'

This account avoids understanding power through use of the traditional subject/object dichotomy. Power is not something which individuals wield over others, but is instead that which wields itself over them. Subjects here are once again no more than outlets within a grid through which power, like knowledge, fluctuates. My nature as a subject is constituted by this place which 1 occupy in the grid (the context in which 1 find myself).

It is Foucault's goal as a postmodern to catalogue and describe the layout of previous such grids.

Foucault, following volume two of Nietzsche's Untimely Meditations, characterizes traditional history as the search for origins. Under that the histonan

"~ichelFoucault, The History of Sexualiv: Volume 1, tram. Robea Hurley, (New York: Vintage Books, 1980), pp. 92-3. look back honzontally through the systematic sequence of events which history is said to represent in search of the significant moments which are putatively responsible for the shape of contemporary society. Another way of descnbing this would be to suggest that traditional history tries to trace the route of the historical overcornings which led to the systems which the historian takes for granted as part of her present day experience. This emphasis placed upon the original moment stems fiom out of traditional history's modem leanings towards foundationalist systems of knowledge. Concem with uncovering identity between various different epochs and events and the corresponding unspoken belief in the capacity of the human mind to uncover such knowledge is rooted in a belief that tmth is most properly pursued through a reduction of complex events to their basic foundational moments. Unsurprisingly, Foucault rejects this type of history-telling in

îàvour ofa rnethod which emphasizes not the original moment of appearance, but the historical pathway or lineage which histoncal phenomena follow. The goal of this new kind of history is not the discovery of identity between each manifestation of the histokal phenomena in question but is instead the articulation of the fundamental disparity which exists between appearance. Foucault refers to this type of history-telling as genealogical due to this stressing of lineaged8 Thus Foucault's book Discipline and

48 [t is a fairly well-known fact that Foucault's writings underwent a significant shift just after the publishing of his work The Order of Thines. This shift is most often attributed to his reading of Nietzsche and his reaction to the failure of May 1968's student revolts in Paris. It is the Foucault of this later period, the Foucault who wrote genealogies of power and not archaeologies of kuowledge (his own name for his former histoncal method) with whom 1 am interested in here and who is most properly called postmodem. An explicit defence of this latter claim, however, falls beyond the scope of this paper. F'unishf9 outlines the history of the concepts contained in its titie by focusing on the

transformations which they have undergone en route to their current social statu.

Whereas a traditional historical account might look back upon the history of confinement through the veil of the rehabilitation rhetonc which dorninates contemporary discussion on this topic, Foucault's method treats each moment in this history as a separate event with separate goals incorporating a separate . Thus Foucault avoids interpreting historical events via their relation to contemporary metanarratives or foundational philosophical systems. His histories do not follow the horizontal ais, but vertically descends into each and every historical moment as its own emergence. Foucault says:

Nietzsche's criticism. beginning with the second of the Untimelv Meditations, always questioned the form of history that reintroduces (and always assumes) a suprahistorical perspective: a history whose function is to compose the finally reduced diversity of time into a totality fully closed upon itself; a history that always encourages subjective recognitions and attributes a form of reconciliation to ail the displacements of the past; a history whose perspective on al1 that precedes it irnplies the end of time, a completed development... . [Genealogy, on the other hand,]corresponds to the acuity of a glance that distinguishes, separates. and disperses; that is capable of liberating divergence and marginal elements--the kind of dissociating view that is capable of decomposing itself, capable of shattenng the unity of man's being through which it was thought that he could extend his sovereignty to the events of his past."

The search for generalities, essences and common threads within history is inverted by the geneaiogist in favour of discontinuities, contingencies and loose ends. While the picture of the past which is created might seem disjointed, this is genealogy's

"Discipline and Punish, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977).

''Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), p. 87. 53

fundamental goal since the cohesiveness which is sought for by traditional history is achievable only through a rnetanarrativical abstraction which understands the world foundationally from the historian's own point of view (i.e., her own place in history).

Foucault's work shows how history should be written at the end of history-Le., once this privileged. Whiggish tendency to interpret historicd events according to our own contemporary sensitivities is repudiated. History is no longer understood as progressive- as directed towards any sort of end as modernist (e.g., Hegelian or Marxist) positions maintain. The sarne sort of rnetaphysical speculation which Lyotard claims cannot legitimate the sciences Foucault also discards in relation to history. Foucault's positive contributions--his histones--whiIe not engaghg in any deconstnictionist task per se. do operate from out of the same accepted themes of postrnodemism as Lyotard does.

Moreover. their treatment of histoncal phenornena as contextually-situated (instead of

Future-oriented) represents an inclusive as opposed to exclusive form of discourse which allows different historical moments to corne forth with al1 their elernents intact--both marginal (in our eyes) as well as significant. CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION

In the first section of my chapter on postmodemity 1 defme my understanding of

'-postrnodern" as "opposed to modem frameworks." 1 would like to use the concluding chapter of this paper to speak about this idea in a iittle more depth. Specificaily, what 1 want to address is the form which this opposition takes. By characterizhg modem philosophy as particularly directed towards epistemological pursuits 1 have been tacitly adopting a distinction between modem and postrnodem philosophy akin to the one Rorty makes in PhiIosoohv and the Mirror of Nature between sysfernaficand ed~fiingfonns of philosophy. The former notion corresponds to that quest for objective, intersubjective. tme. certain, etc., knowiedge which 1 have maintained underlies al1 forms of modem philosophy-both the metaphysically founded varieties as they are exemplified in the works of Descartes and Kant, as well as the non-metaphysical, formally-motivated endeavours which charactenze the work of Carnap and the logical positivists. Edifying philosophy. on the other hand, is a notion which Rorty uses to describe Heidegger, for one, and which 1 believe accurately descnbes the shape of postrnodem philosophy in general.51 What 1 am trying to get at with the "opposed to modem frameworks" thesis. therefore, is postmodemity's cornmitment against a style of philosophy which starts fiom foundational concepts (whether these are asserted as metaphysically justified or simply

''~nChapter VI1 of his Philosophv and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979) Rorty also characterizes Wittgenstein and Dewey as edifying philosophers. However, whether or not these two authors are opposed enough to modem frameworks for me to describe them as postmodem is a question which I cannot speak to. 55 axiomatically chosen) and then moves systematically through the development of increasingly complex claims. The desired outcome of such a methodology is the construction of a complex system which integrates and accounts for al1 the myriad different expenences which are presented to the human subject in her manoeuvring through life. At the root of such an enterprise is the thought that if we cm ody get it nght. the ensuing world view which we produce will be one which defuiitively establishes the shape, essence and cause of al1 human expenence. Attached to this thought is the belief that once this perfect system is built its insights could be cornmunicated to al1 in a move which would forever silence the voice of the skeptic.

Postmodernisrn. however, denies that this day will ever come.

This Iast claim is the starting point of al1 edi@ing/. This is the edification or education which it wishes to effect. Methods for achieving dùs end

Vary almost as much as those directed towards system-building. Thus we have

Nietzsche's attack on the notion of progress, Heidegger's destruction of ontology and metaphysics, Demda's program of deconstruction, Lyotard's rejection of metanarratives.

Foucault's polemic against traditional history. etc., etc. The negative work involved in these undertakings, however, would not be possible without the existence of systems to dismantle. It does not matter whether these systems are Cartesian or Kantian, rationalist or empincist, rnetaphysically founded or logically maintained--al1 that is required is that these systems be modern--which is just to Say epistemological or systematic.

Postmodemity cannot effect its negative commentary without doing so alongside positive modem endeavours. There can be no overcoming of modernity through postmodernity. 56

This is the case for both the rhetorical reasons which 1outlined in Chapter Two as well as due to the simple fact that the former is parasitic upon the latter.

Current postmodeniism, however, is more that just negation. It dso involves the proliferation of new discourses. Understood as inclusive, however, these discourses are simply a continuation of the attack upon modem frameworks. The opening up of new possibilities of discourse which do not attempt to legithnate themselves by asserthg that they and only they uniquely charactenze the way things are acknowledges the

Fundamental contextual-situatedness of al1 inquiry. My take on how things "really are,"

(scientifically, politically, morally, socially, historically, etc.) will differ more or less drastically from another's depending upon how many cultural contexts we have in cornmon. To hold this sort of position is not to revel in the kind of relativism which maintains that there is no such thing as truth since any account of the way things are is rqually justified. it is instead to assert the pragmatic claim that there is no one absolute description of "the Truc'?--no one account of the way things are which it is our job to attempt to mirror or represent as accurately as possible. Truth will vary fiom case to case.

It will Vary depending upon what it is that we are trying to do. It will also vary depending upon what it is that others around us are trying to do since this will affect what they will accept as accurate and compelling testimony. It is this sort of thought which leads Rorty to claim that,

Lplragmatists think that the history of attempts to isolate the True or the Good, or to define the word "truc" or "good," supports their suspicion that there is no interesting work to be done in this area ....The history of [such] attempts ...and of cnticisms of such attempts, is roughly coextensive with the history of that literary genre we cal1 "philosophy"-a genre founded by Plato. So pragmatists see the Platonic tradition as having outlived its usefulness. This does not mean that they have a new, non-Platonic set of answers to Platonic questions to offer, but rather that they do not think we should ask those questions anymore. When they suggest that we not ask questions about the nature of Tmth and Goodness, they do not invoke a theory about the nature of reality or knowledge or man which says that %ere is no such thing" as Tmth or Goodness. Nor do they have a "relativistic" or "subjectivistY7theory of Tmth or Goodness. They would simply like to change the subject."

In attempting to highlight the pragmatic thoughts contained within Carnap's system-building, it has been my intention to bring to light the subtlety of the difference which separates the endeavours of logical positivism and postmodernity. While the two movements do possess dramatically different , the positivists? arriva1 der the death of God (so to speak) gives them a radically altered comection to the tradition similar to postrnodemism's. The locus of this similarity is contained within the positivist's proto-pragmatism. The anti-metaphysical sensitivity which causes positivists like Carnap to reject the traditional metaphysical schools of realism, ideaiism and phenomenalism parallels nicely the postmodem acceptance of the destruction of ontology performed by Nietzsche and Heidegger. For both schools, tmths of the sort typicaily denved through metaphysical speculation are uninteresting, non-cornpelling. Where the two schools differ is in what they do find interesting. For the positivists, truth can still be expressed through system-building. For postmodemists, tniths of this formal sort are just as exclusive as the metaphysical varieties produced by Plato, Descartes and Kant. It is

''~ichard Rorty, "Introduction: Pragmatism and Philosophy," Conseauences of Pragmatism (Essavs: 1972-1980), (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), p. xvi. 58

this methodological choice in favour of construction as opposed to deconstniction which

keeps the positivists modem. Moreover, their attempt at overcoming the metaphysicai

tradition which preceded them is also charactenstically modem in orientation. The

philosophers of science who attacked the positivists in the 19603, however, were no more ediQing than the which they sought to critique. Not only was the post- positivist phenomenaiist conception of positivism fdse, as both the Kantian and subtle verificationist reevaluations show, but the %eory-first" philosophies which they used to overcome positivism did not proceed much Merin developing an understanding of science which was any less "dogrnatic." On their account theory plays the sarne sort of

foundational role that they daim observation played for the positivists. In this sense

1960's post-positivist philosophy of science is just as modem as positivism was. Even though truth on their account is contextually situated, the method of overcoming adopted by the post-positivists and their system-building enterprises show them to be cut from the same post-Nietzschean modernist cloth.

Logical positivism and postmodernism, when compared at dl, are most often conceived as diametrically opposed. On one level this is tme--the forma1 constructional methods adopted by the positivists in their search for objective truth epitomize a modem style of doing philosophy which postmodernists emphaticaily reject. However, at the level of their relationship to metaphysics the two hoid remarkably similar positions. For both schools rnetaphysics represents the attempt to answer questions which lie beyond the capacity of human thought. Our beliefs about the structure of the world can never be justified by asserting that they corne fiom discoveries about the essential nature of the 59 objects which underscore ouexpenence. Instead, positivists like Carnap and postmodemists like Foucault and Lyotard offer up accounts of knowledge which situate these beliefs in the interpersonal processes which constitute our day to day life. This fundamental convergence of opinion calls for a new account of the relationship between the two movements, one which hanscends the putative oceanic divide which exists between those influenced by both schools. Such a cooperative reevaluation would inevitably corne to regard the pragmatic tendencies evinced by both positivism and postmodemism as reflective of their mutual recognition of the inability of metaphysics to procure truths which satis@ oucornrnonly-held curiosities about the natural world and

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