THEORY AND DECISION THEORY AND DECISION LIBRARY AN INTERNATIONAL SERIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES Editors GERALD EBERLEIN, University of Technology, Munich WERNER LEINFELLNER, University of Nebraska Editorial Advisory Board: K. BORCH, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration M. BUN G E, McGill University J. S. COLEMAN, University of Chicago w. KROEBER-RIEL, University of Saarland A. RAPOPORT, University of Toronto A. SEN, Oxford University W. STEGMULLER, University of Munich K. SZANIAWSKI, University of Warsaw L. TONDL, Prague A. TVERSKY, Stanford University VOLUME 50 THEORY AND DECISION Essays in Honor of Werner Leinfellner Edited by GERALD L. EBERLEIN Institute for Social Sciences, Technical University of Munich, F.R. G. and HAL BERGHEL Department of Computer Science, University of Arkansas, U.S.A. D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY ~. A MEMBER OF THE KLUWER " ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS GROUP DORDRECHT/BOSTON/LANCASTER/TOKYO Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Theory and decision. (Theory and decision library; v. 50) Bibliography: p. Includes indexes. 1. Social sciences-Philosophy. 2. Social sciences-Methodology. 3. Social history. 4. Leinfellner, Werner. I. Leinfellner, Werner. II. Eberlein, Gerald. III. Berghel, Hal. IV. Series. H61.T466 1987 300'.1 87-28487 ISBN-13:978-90-277-2227-0 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-009-3719-2 DOl: 10.107/978-94-009-3719-2 Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company, P.O. Box 17,3300 AA Dordrecht, Holland. Sold and distributed in the U.S.A. and Canada by Kluwer Academic Publishers 101 Philip Drive, Norwell, MA 02061, U.S.A. In all other countries, sold and distributed by Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, P.o. Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, Holland. All Rights Reserved © 1988 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland Soft cover reprint of the hard cover 1 st edition 1988 No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface vii Introduction ix PART I / PHILOSOPHY AND LOGIC ROBERT AUDI / On Some Limits and Resources of Common- Sense Psychology 3 JOHN POLLOCK / Probability and Proportions 29 PHILIP HUGL Y AND CHARLES SA YW ARD / Why Sub- stitutional Quantification Does Not Express Existence 67 PART II / METHODOLOGY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES MARIO BUNGE / Ideology and Science 79 OLE HAGEN / Some Imperfections in the Scientific Com- munication System and a Possible Remedy 91 GERALD L. EBERLEIN AND O. P. OBERMEIER / Value­ Free vs. Value-Conscious Social Sciences 107 PART III/ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL ISSUES LUCIAN KERN AND HANS-GEORG RADER / Public Bads and Socio-Moral Reasoning: The Case of the New Social Movements in Germany 139 H. L. BERGHEL AND D. L. SALLACH / The Impact of Computers on Job Opportunities: An Analysis of Employ- mentTrends, 1972-1982 169 KARL BORCH IInsurance Without Utility Theory 191 VI TABLE OF CONTENTS PART IV / GAME AND DECISION THEORY MAURICE ALLAIS / Three Theorems on the Theory of Cardinal Utility and Random Choice 205 STEVEN J. BRAMS, DAN S. FELSENTHAL, AND ZEEV MAOZ / Chairman Paradoxes Under Approval Voting 223 JOHN C. HARSANYI / Some Recent Developments in Game Theory 235 THOMAS A. COWAN AND PETER C. FISHBURN / Founda- tions of Preference 261 HEINZ J. SKALA / What Does Arrow's Impossibility Theorem Tell Us? 273 HANS W. GOTTINGER / Choice Processes, Computability and Complexity: Computable Choice Functions 287 Curriculum Vitae Werner Leinfellner 301 Werner Leinfellner: Selected Bibliograph 303 Index of Names 311 Index of Subjects 315 PREFACE This collection of articles contains contributions from a few of Werner Leinfellner's many friends and colleagues. Some of them are former students of Werner's. Others were colleagues of his at various American and European universities. Further, some have come to know Werner through his research, his long-standing editorship of Theory and Deci­ sion and his extensive participation in international conferences and congresses. The following articles are new to this volume. The areas covered are those in which Werner continues to play an active professional role. We offer them as a tribute to the many and multi-faceted contributions to the scientific enterprise for which Werner Leinfellner is so widely known. We believe such a festschrift to be fitting and long overdue. Because of the breadth of Werner's professional associations, it was difficult to select representatives from among his many spheres of influence. We apologize to the many scholars who could not be in­ cluded because of time and space considerations. Finally, we wish to express appreciation to Dean John Guilds of the University of Arkansas for providing financial support early on in the evolution of this project, to Jennifer Bauman for her bravura performance in copy-editing the manuscripts, and to our publisher at Reidel for bringing this volume to press. G. EBERLEIN H.BERGHEL vii INTRODUCTION In the late sixties the controversy between objectivism and subjec­ tivism in the English-speaking countries subsided, as did the so-called Positivismusstreit in the German-speaking Western democracies. The latter term refers on the one hand to the dispute between critical rationalism, frequently designated as "positivism" in Germany, and the critical theory of the Frankfurt School on the other. The objectivism/subjectivism controversy had shown that there was only an apparent dualistic alternative between the objective methodol­ ogy of "hard" empirical sciences and the subjectivistic methodology of "soft" action sciences and hermeneutics. In fact, the issue was, and still is, one of a gradual difference based on the decision as to whether to recognize the qualitative characteristics of the human subject matter as well. Today we find, not grand dualism, but rather detailed disagreements over theory and method, disagreements which cannot be reduced to anyone pattern and which cannot be easily resolved .... The two opposing theories turn out to be supplementary, each important in its own way and each equally scientific. I And Diesing concludes: What remains of the philosophical argument are two types of theory (for example, game theory and learning theory) which are both useful, both scientific, and frequently equivalent. Choice between them by scientists can be made on empirical grounds rather than on the grounds developed in the philosophical controversy.2 The positivism controversy, however, maintained that there was a fundamental, even dogmatic difference between Popperian rationalism as strict deductivism on the one hand and the highly sophisticated neomarxian theory of Habermas on the other - a difference which could not be eliminated by a relation of complementarity between "hard" quantitative and "soft" clinical methods - as in the objectivism/ subjectivism controversy. Rather, the opponents parted just as funda­ mentally intransigent as they were at the beginning of the dispute over terminology and arguments. And no one would have been able to say at that time whether the social sciences or at least the philosophy of the lX Gerald Eberlein and Hal Berghel (Eds.): Theory and Decision, ix-xix. © 1988 by D. Reidel Publishing Company. x INTRODUCTION social sciences had gained in any way from the controversy. Adherents of "hard" and "soft" social sciences confronted each other as uncom­ promisingly as those of a classical social philosophy and a "trans­ classical" philosophy of the social sciences.3 The question of whether it made any concrete difference that the social sciences pursued their research as critical rationalists or critical theorists was not satisfactorily answered. Social scientists and philosophers, at that time, lacked an approach which integrated the legacies of logical empiricism,4 critical rationalism,s hermeneutics and phenomenology - the continental philosophies - with the legacies of North American pragmatism 6 and pragmaticism, and with the analytic philosophy of science, arising from the impact of European immigrants on American philosophy between the W orId Wars. This enumeration of philosophical approaches reflects a range of different methods in the social sciences, and precisely this indicates the fact that contemporary philosophies are not to be interpreted as dogmatic systems, but rather as alternative or complementary meth­ odologies. In this unsatisfactory situation Werner Leinfellner, who had chosen the USA as his academic home, together with Werner Kroeber-Riel and Gerald Eberlein, his European colleagues and friends, decided to propose a fresh conception for the social sciences and social phi­ losophy. Their approach was methodological and topical in character - as opposed to the objectivism/subjectivism controversy and even more so with respect to the positivism controversy. Thus, in October 1970, THEORY AND DECISION: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES had as the theme of its first issue a 'Symposium on Decision Theory'.1 The title of the journal and the topic of this special issue both emphasized the intended integration of philosophy and the social sciences. Quite con­ trary to classical philosophies of the past, the new journal conceived of philosophy, not as a closed system based on metaphysical premisses, but as a philosophy of the social sciences in three basic respects: First, on a fundamental