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She Lost. Ten Reasons Why Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko Didn

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She Lost. Ten Reasons Why Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko Didn She lost Ten reasons why Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko didn’t win the 2010 Presidential elections Taras Kuzio Yulia Tymoshenko did better than expected on 7 February, coming in only 3% did begin to seep out about the possible political earthquake of a Regions- short of Viktor Yanukovych despite the fact that she went into the vote weighed BYUT tandem, wild rumours soon began to circulate. When the negotiations down by a failing economy and a disillusioned electorate. The current political collapsed in early June both sides should have theoretically suffered equally climate in Ukraine was always likely to favour the opposition candidate, but this but this does not take into account the culture of their different voters. Orange proved less the case than in 2004 when Yanukovych had been the serving PM voters who support Tymoshenko and her eponymous bloc are more willing to looking to take the step up to the presidency. Five years ago Ukraine’s economy punish their leaders than Eastern Ukrainian voters who do not hold up high was experiencing its best ever economic growth spurt of 12% but even in these expectations for their leaders. Having positioned herself as the champion of economic salad days the then incumbent Prime Minister Yanukovych lost to a European, democratic Ukraine, it was only natural that Tymoshenko should opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko by 8%. In this light Yulia Tymoshenko’s come away from the whole episode looking sullied and hypocritical. It was 3% defeat looks a fairly credible achievement. And yet this is the first time the from this moment on that the PM began to be described regularly as an ‘oppor- Ukrainian people have seen Tymoshenko taste anything approaching a clear tunist’, ‘cynical’, and, in one of the worst written and most biased articles of the cut electoral defeat. What caused her previously all-conquering election band- entire election cycle published in The New Republic, even a ‘chameleon’. wagon to go off the rails? No. 4: Freudian feuds - No. 1: Sitting Prime Ministers Gender in Ukrainian politics rarely win presidential elections The issue never discussed in the 2010 elections was gender and how Yulia Tymoshenko sought election from the PM’s office, and while such Ukraine’s post-Soviet male chauvinist culture impacted on Yulia Tymosh- vantage points can sometimes be a blessing they can just as easily turn into enko’s election chances. Yulia Tymoshenko is a unique politician in the post- a huge burden. She stood for president as an incumbent prime minister who communist world – there is simply nobody anything like her. The few female was widely blamed by voters for unemployment, the poor economic situa- presidents we have witnessed in the Baltic States have all been flown in from tion and even the decline in the hryvnia. Many of these factors were beyond their respective diasporas, whereas Tymoshenko is from the very heart of the her control and at root due to a global downturn that she inherited only nine old country, having grown up in Brezhnev’s home town. This uniqueness can months into office. Other factors, such as the sixty percent currency collapse, at times make her the political equivalent of what in sports is often to referred were beyond her prerogative as the National Bank remains controlled by the to as ‘unplayable’. president under the 2006 constitution. Nevertheless, she was widely blamed This certainly seems to have had an impact on her almost exclusively male for the sluggish economic recovery and lost much of her political stardust in the opponents. A psychological portrait of her erstwhile Orange Revolution ally process. In practice it is far easier to win an election as a former prime minister turned arch enemy Viktor Yushchenko published in Ukrayinska Pravda argued in opposition, as both Leonid Kuchma and Viktor Yushchenko did in 1994 and that the President possessed a male chauvinist patriarchal view of the world 2004 respectively, and as Mr. Yanukovych has now also done. where women should not be involved in the highest levels of politics. Mean- while, Viktor Yanukovych himself made an off the cuff remark during the recent No. 2: A healthy decline in negative voting election campaign in which he suggested that Tymoshenko, like all women, The 2010 elections saw a slight drop in the number of Ukrainian voters should not be involved in politics but should gossip in the ‘kitchen’. prepared to vote for a candidate they disliked for purely negative reasons. In Ukrainian politicians with their inflated egos and inferiority complexes that 1999 and 2004 many Ukrainians voted against Communist Party leader Piotr are often buttressed by the purchase of fraudulent degrees, appear to have Symonenko and Viktor Yanukovych respectively. Ukraine’s inherited regional trouble handling the super confident Tymoshenko. Although well ahead in diversity encourages such negative voting, but voter patterns suggest that all opinion polls at the time, Viktor Yanukovych even refused to risk a public in the 2010 elections a number of voters turned away from the concept of debate with the formidable Ms. Tymoshenko, despite having previously faced negative voting, effectively saying they were unhappy at having to once again down his poison-scarred nemesis Viktor Yushchenko on national TV at the choose between the ‘lesser of two evils’. height of the Orange Revolution without a shudder. No. 3: Reformist credibility No. 5: The Yushchenko factor damaged by dubious constitutional gambit Yushchenko and his nationalist allies in Galicia described both candidates Yulia Tymoshenko’s reputation was badly damaged by the manner in which in the second round as ‘Moscow projects’ and recommended voters to vote wide-ranging spring 2009 negotiations between her bloc and the Party of against both because allegedly there was nothing to differentiate between Regions were undertaken. Everybody both in Ukraine and abroad would have them. The June 2009 Viktor Lozinski scandal, which saw a Tymoshenko bloc applauded a coalition of national unity to combat the global crisis but there (BYUT) deputy from Kirovohrad accused of shooting a person while on a hunt, would not have been so much support for other suggested clauses introducing fed views that there was no difference between BYUT and the Party of Regions changes into the constitution in what appeared to be an underhand and secre- in that both political forces harboured criminals. Lozinski’s escape from justice tive manner. The root of the problem was that both sides had agreed to hold reinforced the view that elites remain above the law. The myth that Tymoshenko secretive negotiations without informing the media. Inevitably, when word was no different to Yanukovych was repeated by Ukrainian media and in much 14 ELECTION 2010 No debate: Viktor Yanukovych refused to participate in scheduled the 2010 presiden- tial election debate show leaving PM Yulia Tymoshenko to spend the allotted time delivering a monologue to bemused viewers. Ukrainian voters have been inundated with political chat shows since the lifting of state censorship during the Orange Revolution, but the population has gradually tired of the novelty February 2010 15 Western coverage. This damaging myth was never seriously countered by the directly appealing to working class voters and pensioners. Meanwhile, Tymoshenko campaign, which failed to effectively compare and contrast her Tymoshenko’s first wave of billboards were excellent (“They quarrel, she domestic and foreign policies to those of Yanukovych. A key part of this myth works”) but subsequent billboards lacked a strong focus except to link held that Tymoshenko was as pro-Russian as Yanukovych. This was also not Tymoshenko directly with Ukraine’s fate. The white tiger billboard (2010 sufficiently countered, especially in Galicia where it hurt her campaign. Any is the year of the white tiger) had a mixed reception to say the least which reasonable comparison would have shown that would suggest that the Ukrainian electorate Yanukovych was significantly more pro-Russian is gradually maturing. than even Leonid Kuchma had ever been and that Tymoshenko’s pragmatism on energy rela- No. 7: Turned off tions with Moscow was precisely what Western by Orange infighting Europe and the EU was calling for. The Russian Many Ukrainian voters clearly wanted a elites, media and Unified Russia ruling party, led change from the sorry spectacle of squab- by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, supported bling Orange politicians which over the past Yanukovych in the elections – not Tymoshenko. five years has led to widespread popular Yushchenko’s call to vote against both disenchantment with Ukrainian politicians. candidates helped Yanukovych exclusively as In the first round of this year’s presidential in practice only Orange voters who potentially vote, this desire for change led to a twenty would have voted for Tymoshenko heeded his percent vote for so-called ‘new politicians’ call. In Galicia, extreme nationalist groups and Serhiy Tihipko and Arseniy Yatseniuk. Neither personalities such as the son of the legendary offered anything particularly new or original, Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) commander but both benefited enormously from not Yuriy Shukhevych, supported Yushchenko’s call being either Tymoshenko or Yanukovych. with similar petitions and their appeals were Three quarters of these ‘fresh face’ voters printed in local newspapers, allegedly with were former Orange voters and many of funding from the Yanukovych campaign. Anti- them did not vote in the second round, semitic leaflets appeared ahead of election day thereby hurting Tymoshenko the most. throughout Galicia calling on voters: ‘Don’t vote Less educated voters, whom Tim Garton for that Jew’, a featuring a detailed analysis of Yulia Tymoshenko’s family tree Ash described as ‘lumpen’ in The Guardian, appear to have been swung for traces of Jewish ancestry. Yushchenko’s 22 January decree giving one of the by Yanukovych’s populist promises or attracted by his association with country’s top honours posthumously to Ukrainian nationalist insurgent leader stability.
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