What Does Ukraine's Orange Revolution Tell Us About the Impact
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Fascism, Russia, and Ukraine by Timothy Snyder | the New York Review of Books Page 1 of 8
Fascism, Russia, and Ukraine by Timothy Snyder | The New York Review of Books Page 1 of 8 Font Size: A A A March 20, 2014 Issue Fascism, Russia, and Ukraine Timothy Snyder This article will appear in the coming March 20, 2014 issue of The New York Review. Valery Sharifulin/ITAR-TASS/Corbis The opposition leader Vitali Klitschko attending a protest rally in Maidan square, Kiev, December 16, 2013 The students were the first to protest against the regime of President Viktor Yanukovych on the Maidan, the central square in Kiev, last November. These were the Ukrainians with the most to lose, the young people who unreflectively thought of themselves as Europeans and who wished for themselves a life, and a Ukrainian homeland, that were European. Many of them were politically on the left, some of them radically so. After years of negotiation and months of promises, their government, under President Yanukovych, had at the last moment failed to sign a major trade agreement with the European Union. When the riot police came and beat the students in late November, a new group, the Afghan veterans, came to the Maidan. These men of middle age, former soldiers and officers of the Red Army, many of them bearing the scars of battlefield wounds, came to protect “their children,” as they put it. They didn’t mean their own sons and http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/mar/20/fascism-russia-and-ukraine/?... 20/02/2014 Fascism, Russia, and Ukraine by Timothy Snyder | The New York Review of Books Page 2 of 8 daughters: they meant the best of the youth, the pride and future of the country. -
Ukrainian Civil Society from the Orange Revolution to Euromaidan: Striving for a New Social Contract
In: IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2014, Baden-Baden 2015, pp. 219-235. Iryna Solonenko Ukrainian Civil Society from the Orange Revolution to Euromaidan: Striving for a New Social Contract This is the Maidan generation: too young to be burdened by the experi- ence of the Soviet Union, old enough to remember the failure of the Orange Revolution, they don’t want their children to be standing again on the Maidan 15 years from now. Sylvie Kauffmann, The New York Times, April 20141 Introduction Ukrainian civil society became a topic of major interest with the start of the Euromaidan protests in November 2013. It has acquired an additional dimen- sion since then, as civil society has pushed for reforms following the ap- pointment of the new government in February 2014, while also providing as- sistance to the army and voluntary battalions fighting in the east of the coun- try and to civilian victims of the war. In the face of the weakness of the Ukrainian state, which is still suffering from a lack of political will, poor governance, corruption, military weakness, and dysfunctional law enforce- ment – many of those being in part Viktor Yanukovych’s legacies – civil so- ciety and voluntary activism have become a driver of reform and an import- ant mobilization factor in the face of external aggression. This contribution examines the transformation of Ukrainian civil society during the period between the 2004 Orange Revolution and the present day. Why this period? The Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan protests are landmarks in Ukraine’s post-independence state-building and democratiza- tion process, and analysis of the transformation of Ukrainian civil society during this period offers interesting findings.2 Following a brief portrait of Ukrainian civil society and its evolution, the contribution examines the rela- tionships between civil society and three other actors: the state, the broader society, and external actors involved in supporting and developing civil soci- ety in Ukraine. -
Ukraine's Political Crisis and U.S. Policy Issues
Order Code RL32691 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Ukraine’s Political Crisis and U.S. Policy Issues Updated February 1, 2005 Steven Woehrel Specialist in European Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Ukraine’s Political Crisis and U.S. Policy Issues Summary In 2004, many observers believed that Ukraine was at a key period in its transition that could shape its geopolitical orientation for years to come, in part due to presidential elections held on October 31, November 21, and December 26, 2004. In their view, Ukraine could move closer to integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions, real democracy and the rule of law, and a genuine free market economy, or it could move toward a Russian sphere of influence with “managed democracy” and an oligarchic economy. For the past decade, Ukraine’s political scene had been dominated by President Leonid Kuchma and the oligarchic “clans” (regionally based groups of powerful politicians and businessmen) that have supported him. The oligarchs chose Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych as their candidate to succeed Kuchma as President. The chief opposition candidate, former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, was a pro-reform, pro-Western figure seen by many observers as a man of high personal integrity. International observers criticized the election campaign and the first and second rounds of the election as not free and fair, citing such factors as government-run media bias in favor of Yanukovych, abuse of absentee ballots, barring of opposition representatives from electoral commissions, and inaccurate voter lists. Nevertheless, Yushchenko topped the first round of the vote on October 31 by a razor-thin margin over Yanukovych. -
Kremlin-Linked Forces in Ukraine's 2019 Elections
Études de l’Ifri Russie.Nei.Reports 25 KREMLIN-LINKED FORCES IN UKRAINE’S 2019 ELECTIONS On the Brink of Revenge? Vladislav INOZEMTSEV February 2019 Russia/NIS Center The Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. As an independent think tank, Ifri sets its own research agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debate and research activities. The opinions expressed in this text are the responsibility of the author alone. ISBN: 978-2-36567-981-7 © All rights reserved, Ifri, 2019 How to quote this document: Vladislav Inozemtsev, “Kremlin-Linked Forces in Ukraine’s 2019 Elections: On the Brink of Revenge?”, Russie.NEI.Reports, No. 25, Ifri, February 2019. Ifri 27 rue de la Procession 75740 Paris Cedex 15—FRANCE Tel. : +33 (0)1 40 61 60 00—Fax : +33 (0)1 40 61 60 60 Email: [email protected] Website: Ifri.org Author Dr Vladislav Inozemtsev (b. 1968) is a Russian economist and political researcher since 1999, with a PhD in Economics. In 1996 he founded the Moscow-based Center for Post-Industrial Studies and has been its Director ever since. In recent years, he served as Senior or Visiting Fellow with the Institut fur die Wissenschaften vom Menschen in Vienna, with the Polski Instytut Studiów Zaawansowanych in Warsaw, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik in Berlin, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Johns Hopkins University in Washington. -
How Far Can the EU Expand? the Dilemmas of Ukrainian Membership
EU crisis simulation 2013 issue brief How Far Can the EU Expand? The Dilemmas of Ukrainian Membership By Scott N. Duryea While the Council of Europe faces many important issues affect the future of the EU, few involve the geopolitical pressures and question of European identity raised by the possibility of Ukraine membership. Opening membership to European democracies is a foundational concept of the EU, but Ukraine possess great difficulties; it is a very large country (roughly the same in size and population to France), poor it brings difficult relations with Russia. Ukraine has a long border with Russia; 2300 km (1400 miles) long and hosts Russia’s most important navy base. Its population includes are large Russian minority. Some 30 percent of its population (14.5 million out of 45.6 million people) are native Russian-speakers. Bringing Ukraine into the EU would transform the country, and the EU. Refusing to admit Ukraine might have equally powerful consequences. Ukraine is increasingly falling into the fold of the European Union. Many Ukrainians seek eventual membership into the EU, but a number of pressing issues must be resolved before Ukraine fully goes west. These include reforming Ukrainian bureaucracy, obeying the rule of law, cracking down on corruption, and evading Russian attempts to keep Ukraine from breaking away from its unhealthy Eurasian ties. At stake is not just the future of the concept of Europe and European relations with Russia, but the future of Ukrainian democracy and national identity. As stated in the EU Council Conclusions on Ukraine of 10 December 2012, Ukraine’s EU status focuses on three elements of reform: 1 The compliance of the 2012 parliamentary elections with international standards and follow-up actions, Ukraine’s progress in addressing the issue of selective justice and preventing its recurrence, and Implementing the reforms defined in the jointly agreed Association Agenda. -
Resilient Ukraine Resilient
Resilient Ukraine: Safeguarding Society from Russian Aggression Russian from Society Ukraine: Safeguarding Resilient Research Paper Mathieu Boulègue and Orysia Lutsevych Ukraine Forum | June 2020 Resilient Ukraine Safeguarding Society from Russian Aggression Mathieu Boulègue and OrysiaLutsevych Chatham House Contents Summary 2 1 Introduction 3 2 The Impact of the Armed Conflict 13 3 Creating Resilience Dividends: Case Studies 27 4 Recommendations 33 5 Conclusion 37 About the Authors 38 Acknowledgments 39 1 | Chatham House Resilient Ukraine: Safeguarding Society from Russian Aggression Summary • Despite military conflict and an increasingly adversarial relationship with Russia, Ukraine has largely maintained its democratic reforms thanks to its resilience and determination to decide its own future. The country is gradually developing the capacity of its state institutions and civil society to address the political and social consequences of Russian aggression. • Russia’s three main levers of influence in Ukraine include the ongoing armed conflict, corruption, and the poor quality of the political sphere. The Kremlin seeks to exploit these vulnerabilities to promote polarization and encourage a clash between Ukraine’s citizens and its governing elite by taking military action, manipulating the corruption narrative, supporting pro-Russia parties, and fuelling religious tensions through the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). • The ramifications of the military operation in Donbas reverberate strongly across the country and domestic politics. The most prominent spillover effects include the circulation of firearms and the weakened capacity of authorities to reintegrate internally displaced people (IDPs) and war veterans. • With no clear way to end the armed conflict, there is a growing risk of societal polarization. This could have negative consequences for any prospective peace agreement. -
Whereabouts of Yanukovych and Azarov in Russia
Whereabouts of Yanukovych and Azarov in Russia Table of contents Part 1 Yanukovych and his family Part 2 Azarov and his family Part 1 So far, the media have made a few versions of the whereabouts of Ukrainian ex-president Viktor Yanukovych. The main ones point toward two Russian southern cities: Rostov-on-Don and Sochi, along with the capital of Russia and the Moscow region. Hereinafter, you’ll find an analysis of media references to the location of the Ukrainian former president from 2014 till early 2016, as well as information about what has happened to his close allies and assets obtained through corruption schemes during the specified period. 1. After the flight After the flight of Viktor Yanukovych from Ukraine in the twentieth of February 2014, conflicting reports on the whereabouts of the disgraced president began appearing in the press. Thus, on February 22, 2014 some sources reported that Viktor Yanukovych wasn’t in Kharkiv1, others – that he indeed was in Kharkiv at the moment, where he was going to sign the recently adopted 1 http://kharkov.comments.ua/news/2014/02/22/152813.html laws by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (the Ukrainian Parliament)2. On the same day the border guards denied a charter flight, with Viktor Yanukovych on board, the permission to take off from Donetsk, as quoted by Sergey Astakhov – head assistant of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine3. By all appearances, at that time Viktor Yanukovych was in Kharkiv, where the Congress of Deputies from the South-Eastern regions took place on February 224. -
40 Individuals 1 Viktor YANUKOVYCH(YANUKOVICH
(Attachment) 40 individuals 1 Viktor YANUKOVYCH(YANUKOVICH) Former President of Ukraine Date of birth:July 9, 1950 Place of birth:Yenakievo (Ukraine) 2 Sergey(Sergei) AKSYONOV(AKSENOV) “Acting Head of the Republic of Crimea” Date of birth:November 26, 1972 Place of birth:Balti (Republic of Moldova) 3 Vladimir KONSTANTINOV “Speaker of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea” Date of birth:November 19, 1956 Place of birth:Vladimirovca (Republic of Moldova) 4 Rustam TEMIRGALIEV Former “Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea” Date of birth:August 15, 1976 Place of birth:Ulan-Ude (Russian Federation) 5 Denis (Denys) BEREZOVSKIY(BEREZOVSKY/BEREZOVSKII) Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy Date of birth:July 15, 1974 Place of birth:Kharkiv (Ukraine) 6 Aleksei(Alexey) CHALIY(CHALYY) Former “Governor of the City of Sevastopol” Date of birth:June 13, 1961 7 Petr(Pyotr) ZIMA Former Head of the Security Service of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea Date of birth:March 29, 1965 8 Yuriy (Yurii) ZHEREBTSOV “Counsellor of the Speaker of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea” Date of birth:November 19, 1969 9 Sergey(Sergei) TSEKOV Member of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation (from “the Republic of Crimea”) Date of birth:September 28, 1953 10 Mikhail MALYSHEV “Chairman of the Electoral Commission of the Republic of Crimea” Date of birth:October 10, 1955 11 Valery(Valeriy/Valerii) MEDVEDEV “Chairman of the Electoral Commission of the City of Sevastopol” Date of birth:August 21, -
Ukraine and NATO: Deadlock Or Re-Start? Ukraineukraine and and NATO: NATO: Ukraine Has Over the Past Ten Years Developed a Very Close Partnership with NATO
Ukraine and NATO: Deadlock or Re-start? UkraineUkraine and and NATO: NATO: Ukraine has over the past ten years developed a very close partnership with NATO. Key areas of Deadlock or Re-start? consultation and co-operation include, for instance, peacekeeping operations, and defence and Deadlock or Re-start? security sector reform. NATO’s engagement serves two vital purposes for Ukraine. First, it enhan- Jakob Hedenskog ces Ukraine’s long-term security and serves as a guarantee for the independence of the state; and JAKOB HEDENSKOG second, it promotes and encourages democratic institutionalisation and spreading of democratic norms and values in the country. JAKOB HEDENSKOG Ukraine and NATO: Deadlock or Re-start NATO’s door for Ukraine remains open. The future development of the integration depends on Ukraine’s correspondence to the standards of NATO membership, on the determination of its political leadership, and on an effective mobilisation of public opinion on NATO membership. This report shows that Ukraine has made progress in reaching the standards for NATO membership, especially in the spheres of military contribution and interoperability. However the absence of national consensus and lack of political will and strategic management of the government hamper any effective implementation of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration. It is also crucial to neutralise Russia’s influence, which seriously hampers Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic course. Leading representati- ves of the current leadership, especially Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions of Ukraine, prefer for the moment continued stable relations with Russia rather than NATO mem- ? bership. Jakob Hedenskog is a security policy analyst at the Swedish Defence Re- search Agency (FOI) specialised on Ukraine. -
Elections, Revolution and Democracy in Ukraine
ELECTIONS, REVOLUTION AND DEMOCRACY IN UKRAINE: REFLECTIONS ON A COUNTRY’S TURN TO DEMOCRACY, FREE ELECTIONS AND THE MODERN WORLD By Jeffrey Clark With Jason Stout October 2005 DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES: STRENGTHENING ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION IN UKRAINE PROJECT This publication was made possible through support provided by the Regional Mission for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, U.S. Agency for International Development, under the terms of Agreement No. 121-A-00- 04-00701-00. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Agency for International Development. PREFACE A USAID-supported activity known as the Strengthening Electoral Administration in Ukraine Project (SEAUP), administered by Development Associates, played a decidedly important role in facilitating Ukraine’s turn to democracy in 2004. The pages that follow provide evidence of that unequivocal conclusion, but just as importantly offer reflections on how the project was perceived and implemented of interest to promoters of free elections and democratization elsewhere. SEAUP’s success would have been unattainable without the unwavering support USAID gave the initiative and the trust placed in its professional staff. The Kyiv Mission granted considerable administrative flexibility that proved essential as political tensions increased and unplanned program inputs had to be devised virtually overnight to meet the challenges of a massively fraudulent vote and a court-ordered revote. The efforts of external players to foment anti-American sentiments further complicated the environment and imposed additional constraints on project implementers. USAID sponsored other implementing agencies actively supporting democratic consolidation in Ukraine, working directly with NDI, IRI, Freedom House, InterNews, and ABA/CEELI. -
Ukraine's Presidential Elections and U.S. Policy
Order Code RS21959 Updated December 1, 2004 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Ukraine’s Presidential Elections and U.S. Policy Steven Woehrel Specialist in European Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Summary This report discusses Ukraine’s presidential elections, held on October 31 and November 21, 2004. The report discusses the election’s importance in Ukraine’s political transition, the conduct of the elections, and the political crisis that emerged after the elections. It also addresses U.S. policy on the elections, and congressional action. This report will be updated as needed. Congress has adopted legislation on the Ukrainian elections. S.Con.Res.106 and H.Con.Res. 415 call on Ukraine to end violations of democratic standards and hold free and fair elections. S.Res. 473 also raises these issues and calls on the President to consider sanctions against Ukrainian leaders if they improperly influence the outcome of the election. For more background on Ukraine, see CRS Report RL30984, Ukraine’s Future and U.S. Policy Interests. Ukraine’s Political Transition Ukraine may be at a key period in its transition that could shape its geopolitical orientation for years to come, in part due to presidential elections held on October 31 and November 21, 2004. Ukraine could move closer to integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions, real democracy and the rule of law, and a genuine free market economy, or it could move toward a Russian sphere of influence, with a “managed democracy” and an oligarchic economy. Ukraine’s current political scene is dominated by President Leonid Kuchma and the oligarchic “clans” (regionally-based groups of powerful politicians and businessmen) that have supported him. -
Congressional Record—Senate S614
S614 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE January 26, 2005 peaceful demonstrations in Kiev and else- Resolved by the Senate (the House of Rep- PROGRAM where to protest the unfair election and the resentatives concurring), That Congress— declaration by the Ukrainian Central Elec- (1) commends the people and Government Mr. MCCONNELL. On Monday, the tion Commission that Viktor Yanukovich of Ukraine for their commitment to democ- Senate will be in a period of morning had won a majority of the votes; racy and their determination to end the po- business. It is our hope we will be able Whereas, on November 25, 2004, the Ukrain- litical crisis in that country in a peaceful to consider any nominations available ian Supreme Court blocked the publication and democratic manner; for Senate action. The nomination of of the official runoff election results thus (2) congratulates the people and Govern- Samuel Bodman was reported earlier preventing the inauguration of the next ment of Ukraine for ensuring a free and fair today by the Energy and Natural Re- president of Ukraine until the Supreme runoff presidential election which represents sources Committee. We hope that nom- Court examined the reports of voter fraud; the true choice of the Ukrainian people; (3) congratulates Viktor Yushchenko on ination can be cleared for action on Whereas on November 27, 2004, the Par- Monday. We have no requests for a roll- liament of Ukraine passed a resolution de- his election as President of Ukraine; claring that there were violations of law dur- (4) applauds the Ukrainian presidential call vote on the Bodman nomination.