The EU, the SECI and Croatia

8 CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW The EU, the SECI and Croatia

Janko Vranyczany-Dobrinovic

An outline of Croatia's Austrian branch of the House of Hapsburg, with the logistic centre for Croatia at Graz. This fate- foreign policy strategy ful decision resulted in much grief, the fragmen- tation of the Kingdom, the creation of the mili- regarding relations with tary zone at Karlovac commanded by Austrian and German generals and of the Kraina borderland, the European Union settled by Orthodox peoples from the Balkans, and the loss of Dalmatia. After the defeat of the One of the most controversial issues preoc- Ottoman Empire, what was for the Croats a cupying the Croatian public opinion since autumn mainly defensive union, gradually turned into a 1996, and likely to continue doing so in the' fu- state structure dominated by the Hungarians and ture, is the report on the regional approach to a Austro-Germans. The Croats, concerned about group of Southeast European countries, covering the fate of the annexed Dalmatia, Rijeka and the Republic of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Istria, and wishing to achieve equality by creating the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Macedonia a larger grouping, began to dream about linkage and Albania, prepared by the Foreign Relations with what they thought to be "related southern Commission of the General Directorate Ia of the Slavs" in their immediate vicinity. European Commission and adopted by the Coun- This linkage, which was to last for 70 years, cil of Ministers at the meeting of the Ministerial briefly interrupted by the ephemeral Independent Council, in Luxembourg, 28 October, 1996. State of Croatia, could have produced even more The consensual integration of a number of tragic consequences for Croatia than the Turkish sovereign state entities, sometimes as a result of incursions and destruction. pressure, which was formerly motivated by dynas- And just now, when the protracted histori- tic, defence or economic considerations and more cal process, initiated in 1527, of reclaiming all recently to prevent war or conflict between them, Croatian lands and uniting them into a sovereign is being replaced by association and the creation Croatian state is nearing completion, a new po- of larger market, customs, trade and investment litical project is being touted on the European zones. political market, a project which, presented in in- Almost the entire Croatian history, which creasingly milder versions, produces apprehen- may be viewed as tragic or as the art of survival of sion, outrage and disappointment in all people in a small and threatened people, is filled with vari- Croatia, from the government and parliament to ous kinds of association, accompanied by a more the vast majority of the population. or less voluntary forfeiture of sovereignty: from the Pacta conventa', the Convention of Tsetin/, PROJECT OF THE POLITICAL the Pragmatic Sanction", the National Council", RECONCILIATION and up to the meeting of ZA VNOH5 and the To be true, this project of "reconciliation present day, on the eve of the process of integra- and economic and communication linkage" of tion with the European Union. countries east of Slovenia, conceived by the bu- In order to keep alive what was left of the reaucratic strategists from the European Commis- devastated and decimated Kingdom of Croatia, sion, cannot be compared with the voluntary or and perhaps to reclaim one day the lost lands, lack- forced institutionalised unions of Croatia in the ing adequate troops and money, a large part of past, but all our recent experiences produce in us the Croatian nobility, probably reluctantly, joined not only emotional rejection but also rational cau- their Hungarian peers in a primarily defensive tion. alliance with the southern and south-eastern duch- The paradox of this project is that, at the ies of the German Roman Empire, ruled by the end of the past century and during the first two JANUARY -JUNE 1997 9 decades of this century, it would have been en- gionallinks" with the Federal Republic ofYugo- thusiastically welcomed by the larger part of our slavia and the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and political and intellectual circles. The same could Herzegovina. This tendency will be reinforced by be said of the days of the so-called "Croatian the economic gravitation of the western part of spring", whereas today it can only provoke indig- the Republika Srpska around Bihac towards the nation and disillusionment. Republic of Croatia, as well as by our own inter- Let us try and cast a sober and realistic ests in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina glance on some facts, even if we don't like them. and in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole. The rebellion of the Croatian Serbs, the After the Illyrian dreams of a Croato- aggression from Belgrade, the war and our in- Serbian coalition, the Yugoslav Committee in volvement in favour of the Croatian minority and exile, the self-suffocation of the Croatian Conven- interests in Bosnia and especially in Herzegovina, tion, after accession to the Kingdoms of were driving Croatia farther and farther apart Karagjorgjevic and Petrovic- Njegos, and finallyby from Slovenia and from the other Visehrad coun- the creation of Yugoslavia, in the natural course tries. After the Washington and Dayton accords, of things, albeit reluctantly, Croatia developed moreover, Croatia was being driven closer and more economic, communication, sports, and even closer to the Balkans, similarly to the manner in family links with the majority Balkan part of the which it was occupied and later annexed by former Yugoslavia than its public is willing to ad- Austro-Hungary after the Berlin Congress, with mit. German support -with the difference that Austro- Like it or not, also in the future; the Croats Hungary was a Central European power. will continue to maintain more particular and The virtual balkanisation of Central Euro- mutually stimulating relations with the Serbs, pean Croatia began at the end of 1918, with the Bosnian Moslems and Montenegrins than with, entry into Zagreb of the Serb army, with the set- e.g., the Hungarians, Austrians and even the ting up of the armed forces and the gendarmerie Slovenes. and of local administration over the whole The world public opinion, the media and Croatian territory after the Serb model and staffed the major international factors and decision-mak- by Serbs. This balkanisation received added im- ers do not wish to take into consideration the "pre- petus during the forty-five years of the commu- 1918 phase", viewing instead things from the van- nist regime in Yugoslavia, imbued by a Balkan tage point of the familiar recent past. And this mentality and accompanied by a mass exodus of recent past, for most of these international fac- the Croat elite, raised on Central European tra- tors, was at first glance a history of four decades dition. of coexistence of all former Yugoslav ethnic If Croatia was submitted to "creeping groups within a single state structure without any balkanisation", reinforced by an influx of refugees major dispute. from Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time of the They are more interested in the realities of Independent State of Croatia, after 1945 and dur- the current geographic and communication logic ing the recent war, as well as by the arrival of larger of the area between Zagreb and Saloniki, and in numbers of Croats from the Dinara region, then the neuralgic spots in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we must admit at the same time that Northwest Mostar, Brcko, Sandzak and Kosovo, which are Serbia, in Voivodina, Novi Sad, Zemun and West- not likely to die out for many years to come, than ern Sirmium possesses certain Central European in our historicist Central European sentimental- traits which enable it, when necessary, to stress ity, especially since we contributed to the destruc- its position as a link with the Danubian region. It tion of a functioning Central European common- would appear that the Federal Republic of Yu- wealth of peoples, after having been one of the goslavia plans to invoke its geopolitical position initiators and co-authors of Yugoslavias of all and predominance in terms of population in or- shapes and hues. der to assume one day a central role in the region They show little interest in historical inter- between Zagreb and Saloniki. pretations, the Kosovo myth and the term "bul- "The Croatian Central European Serbs", wark of Christianity" only produce a semi-polite especially after the reintegration of Eastern smile, and the same goes for the complexities of Slavonia and the return of a portion of the Serbs the Croato-Serbian conflict; they have even less who fled after Operation Storm, will constitute understanding of the much more complex prob- the most numerous and the most important mi- lem of Bosnia and Herzegovina, except that it nority in Croatia, and thereby strengthen the "re- places us beyond the Balkan pale. 10 CROATIAN OOERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVrEW The international political and economic the new conditions this imposes, offer excellent factors apply a pragmatic approach in assessing excuses for procrastination. Moreover, Europe is the present situation in terms of potentials for no longer willing to admit some "poor relations", future cooperation, regardless of possible histori- as it did with Greece or Portugal, but wants eco- calor mentality preferences. However, this is not nomic peers, who will not constitute an incessant to say that Croatia should give up its efforts to drain on the expensive, jointly financed develop- inform the public that this part of the world has ment funds and subsidies. Actually, it was devel- long been divided into two antagonistic cultural oped countries like Austria, Sweden, Denmark and political groupings, one oriented to the Euro- and Finland who were the last to be welcomed Christian and the other to the Byzantine and Ot- into the extended circle of the Founding Six un- toman cultural and political heritage. It is on this der the old terms. foundation of tragically opposing mentalities that the conflicts of today have erupted - but this does THE CONCEPT OF not mean that present-day Croatia is not inclined THE REGIONAL ASSOCIATION towards a gradual reconciliation and linkage of The substance of the concept of regional this divided area. association is, in the view of the Fifteen, to be The gradual dissemination and acceptance found in the philosophy underlying the construc- of democratic values and tolerance among the tion of the European Union. This philosophy is younger generations, side by side with the unifor- based on two ideas: mity of the way of life typical for the Euro-Atlan- 1) putting a definite end to all wars and tic consumer society, and combined with the in- achieving a lasting reconciliation of the European fluence of the Anglo-Saxon entertainment indus- nations; the Treaty of Versailles kept up a spirit try, the culture of electronic media, Internet etc., of vengeance, and nationalisms led to economic can be expected to intensify the tendency of open- protectionism and war; ing and integration. 2) a firm reconciliation is to be attained by After World War II, in the then conflict- a gradual process of integration, starting with eco- free region of the former Yugoslavia, a tough, nomic association and ending one day in volun- complex and prolonged conflict was going on, a tary political integration. conflict in which, regardless of who was to blame, regardless of the culprits and the victims, the Serbs For Western Europe, the road from the were the main factors in all parts of the region, original six to the present-day sixteen EU mem- followed by Montenegrins, the Moslem Bosniaks bers led through several stages of economic inte- and the Croats. The Albanians were also among gration, from the Coal and Steel Community, the these factors, especially those in Kosovo. In the Customs Union, the single market, the Maastricht eyes of the international community, the Slovenes Treaty and up to the monetary union in 1999.The are not a factor, and have no place in this vicious political and defence unions are only in their ini- circle of conflict. tial stages, lagging much behind the economic uni- Europe, highly preoccupied with its own fication, with the result that the EU still does not complicated transformation, the creation of a new constitute a single political and defence world Maastricht Treaty at the forthcoming summit in power. Amsterdam, beset by problems with Great Brit- All nations wishing to become members of ain, the monetary union, unemployment, social the European Union have to accept the objectives problems, budget deficits, difficulties with the fi- and frame of reference of this European regional nancing of pensions, health services, education, integration, which comprises common institutions research, agriculture etc., is currently not inter- and adopts European laws that supersede national ested in expansion and in negotiations with indi- legislations but does not preclude the political vidual candidates. Even when it makes declara- identity of nations. tory promises, they have a hollow, unconvincing No United Nations of Europe are being sound. Let them first integrate into larger group- constructed for the time being, but rather a com- ings, on a regional basis; let them first settle rela- monwealth of peoples built on a unique pattern: tions with their neighbours; let them meet the joint exercise of national sovereignty in an agreed conditions, and only then, step by step, by easy number of areas vital for their common prosper- stages, they might start joining a newly fashioned ity and influence. European Union in its new shiny armour. Europe The EU is aware, furthermore, that after is in no hurry, and the regional approach, with the end of the cold war and the collapse of the JANUARY - JUNE 1997 11 communist bloc most countries in Central and tomary logic of admitting associate and full mem- Eastern Europe, including the Baltic countries, bers, even including the pre-associative period, by aspire to join the Union. In 1993, at the time of progressive stages, especially in the conflictual ex- the war on the territory of the former Yugoslavia Yugoslav region. In addition, this procedure is and of the barbaric ethnic cleansing that accom- today made even more dependent on over-the- panied it, the EU agreed in principle to such ma- boundary regional cooperation, some kind of jor expansion. However, the Union first wishes to beneluxisation, only then to be followed by asso- complete its own transformation before enlarg- ciate and finally gradually by full membership sta- ing its membership, so as not to change its main tus. direction and character and without renouncing its final political goal. THE REGIONAL ApPROACH Apart from some statements made by some In the case of Croatia, the regional approach important individuals, the states which emerged . possesses yet another particular background and from the collapse of Yugoslavia, with the excep- connotation. It is the Dayton accord, the Bosnia- tion of Slovenia, have been referred to as poten- Herzegovina problem, that unresolved Gordian tial members, but at some undefined time. knot in Europe, of which everybody thinks - but To evade the welcoming attitude shown by does not say aloud - that Dayton does not offer a the EU in 1993 towards the countries of the solid solution. former Warsaw Treaty, with the "neutral" Ethnic cleansing, 250 thousand dead, one Slovenia easing itself into that space during the and a half million displaced persons, floods of hostilities between Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia refugees, scenes that not only CNN but almost all and Herzegovina and Croatia, a new formulation channels directly transmitted to the Euro-Atlan- was made up for that area, claiming that regional tic homes of politicians and consumers have left a association was at the basis of the original Euro- deep impression on everybody. This is not so much philosophy and would henceforward be applied motivated by sentimental, moral or humane rea- to future admissions to the EU. It is further sons as by the determination to avoid at all costs emphasised that this attitude is not new with re- a repetition of such an outrage in Europe, with gard to economic cooperation, with political links the possibility of new floods of refugees, even looming in the background, between the countries though smaller than before. Europe does not want of the former Yugoslavia. to be confronted yet again with discord in its own Jacques Delors attempted in the summer ranks and with the sad picture, or rather carica- of 1991 to win over the contending and centrifu- ture, of its own unreadiness, impotence and fail- gal republics of the former Yugoslavia by offer- ure as in the case of the former Yugoslavia. ing them 5 and a half billion US dollars to join After the US finally intervened - for purely the then European Community "en bloc" as a domestic reasons - to bring about a hastily patched , single confederation and within their existing bor- political settlement that would barely hold water, ders. Lord Carrington's plan contained, among its implementation was entrusted to the care of other things, conditions of economic cooperation the European Union, in whose zone of responsi- that the republics emerging from the former Yu- bility the ex-Yugoslav countries belong. In agree- goslavia would have to meet in return for the rec- ment with the American peace-makers, Europe ognition of their political independence by the EU strives to enclose the main agents of the most un- and its members. Later on, David Owen and his fortunate scandal in its recent history within the co-chairmen also nurtured ideas of association for boundaries of its criteria, thus washing its hands that warring region. of them and somewhat repairing its loss of face. The Dayton Agreement stresses good In other words, these conditions are to serve as a neighbourly relations, reconciliation and line of demarcation and reconciliation for the new stabilisation of the entire Balkan region as the Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina main goals, stipulating the establishment of eco- with its constituent Federation and the Republika nomic links at regional level, the protection of Srpska. To repeat, at the core of this regional ap- minorities and a number of other conditions in proach, however, are really Eastern Slavonia, return for assistance by the international commu- Dayton and the Kosovo problem. nity. These countries, in the view of the Fifteen, Since all the republics of the former Yugo- before starting to establish closer relations with slavia have expressed the wish to become mem- the EU, must first prove that they are willing and bers, the EU wants to remain consistent to its cus- able to settle their relations with their immediate 12 CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVrEW neighbours, by efficient association at economic sively involved in Bosnia and Herzegovina in de- level without any forfeiture of their sovereign fence of a small minority without a prosperous rights, and yet with the idea looming in the back- economy, major industrial centres, or oil and gas ground of establishing closer administrative and deposits, while the Hungarians reconciled them- legislative cooperation in the area stretching from selves to the loss of much larger minorities in Zagreb to Athens, with the ultimate objective of Romania, Slovakia and Voivodina, not to men- joining the EU. This "regional theme" is further tion the Germans in the Sudetenland, Silesia, meant to make Croatia more firmly co-respon- Pomerania and Prussia. Even though our diplo- sible for all the post-war developments in the re- mats offer well-argumented answers, there is the gion. impression that these are not always fully ac- Most areas with a customs union, free ex- cepted, with the implication that, although Serb change of commodities, free movement of work- aggression is primarily to blame for the ers, and the freedom of choice of residence tend radicalisation of the Moslems, Croat behaviour to opt for political association as well. In the last in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina could century, the German customs union played an have also been a contributing factor, while at the important role in the unification of German king- same time damaging the Croatian reputation doms, princedoms and duchies into a single state. abroad. The periodic deterioration of the situa- The Benelux countries, on the other hand, were tion in Mostar further reinforces the belief of some the first in Europe to economically integrate into that Zagreb is not sufficiently supportive of the a larger market and to form a customs union af- efforts to settle these disputes. ter World War II; but they retained their respec- The objectives of the regional approach, a tive sovereign identities and became full members clear and detailed account of its options and terms, of the EU as such. is currently being drafted and prepared for dis- In addition to economic factors, defence cussion, to be finally adopted a few weeks hence. and security considerations also playa major role. Before attempting to describe the strategic The regional concept for the Baltic countries, for guidelines and conditions characteristic of the the Visehrad countries, for the Middle East (Is- regional approach, we shall give an outline of the rael, Jordan, Palestine and Lebanon, while Syria present situation of Croatia. and Egypt are too large entities for such a grouping), for the Maghreb countries, for Central STEP BY STEP - RELATIONS TOWARDS EU America and for some other regions strongly de- The European Union regulates its relations pends on security aspects. In our case, the name with states which express the wish to become given to the region in question is the "Balkan re- members through a multi-phase process of gradu- gion" (covering the countries of the former Yu- ated agreements, with several years of intensive goslavia, plus Albania and sometimes Bulgaria, negotiation, conditioned by numerous structural but without Slovenia), with its immediate adjustments, legislative and sectorial changes, with neighbour, Greece, playing a particular role as new freedoms and new constraints. Without go- member of the EU. At the moment, there does ing into further details of this process, let it only not seem to exist a specific security concept for be remembered that no individual agreement on this region, with timetables for inclusion in NATO the adjustments needed for the preferential re- similarly to the Visehrad countries except gime, which constitutes the first stage, has yet been Slovakia. reached between the Republic of Croatia and the It is sometimes claimed by the Croatian and European Union, even though this status has been international public that this regional approach granted to Macedonia and Albania. is the result of the Croatian policy in Bosnia and Our relations with the EU are regulated on Herzegovina. The Croatian counter-argument, the basis of the Agreement on Trade and Coop- which is often accepted, is that our support for a eration signed in 1980 between SFRY and EEC "single" or "partitioned" Bosnia and Herzegovina and suspended by decision of the Council of Min- would not have made much difference, because isters in November 1991. Under the terms of this we are doomed in any case to become involved in suspension, at the proposal of the European Com- support of the Bosnian Croats, whatever the po- mission, the Council of Ministers adopts unilat- litical set-up in Bosnia, but especially if it threat- eral decisions at the end of each year on granting ens them in any way. Questions are also some- preferential status to so-called "cooperative times heard, often from "well-meaning quarters" states", Croatia among them. These are annual at home and abroad, as to why we are so inten- decisions, and have nothing to do with the ex- f··

JANUARY -JUNE 1997 13

pected signing of the Agreement on Cooperation DILEMMAS WITHIN EU between the EU and Croatia. The Federal Re- The dilemmas and thus the wariness of the public of Yugoslavia has not yet received prefer- EU members, who burnt their fingers on ex-Yu- ential treatment, although there were some hints goslavia, and which have a bearing on the late in 1996 that this was planned. However, the regionalisation of the problem, could be summed decision has been postponed until some future up as follows: , date. 1. Will Bosnia and Herzegovina become Regulating preferential trade regimes is consolidated one day as a state, even as a phan- only one part of this agreement. The granting of tom state? an autonomous preferential regime depends on 2. Will the Republika Srpska continue to the will of the EU. More specifically, in the case support the Dayton accords, meeting at least the of our country, this involves preferential import basic requirements, or is it waiting for a favourable from Croatia into the EU of some products which moment to secede? are specifically named and classified. In our case, 3. Will not every government in Serbia and the result is an unspecified, internationally irregu- the new Yugoslavia (supported by the Orthodox lar situation, which could be changed with the sig- Church) insist on a revision of the Dayton Agree- nature of a new, direct and more favourable agreement, leading to a pro-Serbian solution of the ment, introducing and consolidating the first stage Brcko issue and to an intensified return of the of relations between the Republic of Croatia and Serbs who fled from the former "Kraina" as well .. the European Union . as to the restitution of their property? This would not be a particularly important 4. Given these circumstances, how is a step, but it would have symbolic significance, and settlement to be reached of the Kosovo question the next steps would be admission to the PHARE as the central issue, with Sandzak and Programme and the granting to Croatia of the sta- Voivodina as peripheral issues? tus of associate member on the strength of an 5. Will the present or the future Croatian Association Agreement. Up to the moment of government continue to offer unambiguous sup- signing the agreement on association, Croatia is port to Dayton, will it maintain Herzeg-Bosnia in not obliged in principle to adopt reciprocal mea- some form as a secret weapon or as a stand-by sures named in the agreement on the preferential solution, with secession when the time is right? trade regime. 6. With the return of the displaced Croats We must also bear in mind the fact that the to Eastern Slavonia, will the Mostar syndrome be opinion prevails among the Fifteen not only that repeated in some places, e.g. in Vukovar? Bosnia and Herzegovina and FR Yugoslavia are 7. Will the Moslems-Bosniaks give up the not democratic states, with the rule of law ensured idea of creating a Moslem state? and free market reforms implemented, but that 8. Will the problem of Mostar, into whose also in the Republic of Croatia, due to the war- settlement much money and effort have been in- time and post-war circumstances and an authori- vested, be truly and efficiently resolved tarian one-party rule with some reminiscences of one day, with concrete help from Zagreb? the recent political past, there is room for the improvement of the uncompleted development of It is these crucial issues, the wish for con- democracy and the free market. This adds to the solidation, stabilisation and economic and com- regional approach a markedly didactic-moralistic munication linkage, that the regional approach note, claiming to be a "guideline to democratic endeavours to address. The accent is not on the improvement" en route to Brussels. establishment of a political entity but primarily All countries within the South European economic, communication and energy association regional boundaries can become EU members of individual entities, with the main centres around exclusively as "totally open democratic societies". Zagreb and Belgrade. This apparently well-meaning professorial atti- The main guidelines observed by the EU tude with a dose of arrogance indicates the inten- Foreign Relations Commission in formulating the tion to use the "conditionality" clauses on some negotiating terms with the countries of Southeast countries as a kind of Master of Democracy de- Europe are roughly the following: gree, whereby the EU undertakes their democratic Even if not quite the same for each coun- education, followed by an examination, so as to try, e.g. for Croatia, the process will be protracted make up for and conceal the EU inefficiency and and attended by a series of conditions, especially discord in that region between 1990 and 1995. at later stages. 14 CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVrEW The philosophy of this process is step-by- ment of price controls, cooperation in the imple- step progress, mainly in the four familiar stages mentation of peace treaties, cooperation with the (agreement on preferential trade and customs International Tribunal at the Hague, including the regime, which is non-binding on both sides; ad- extradition of persons indicted for war crimes, and mission to PHARE; agreement on association, proven results in cooperation with neighbours. mutually binding; and finally, agreement on mem- For the Republic of Croatia, this list is ex- bership, with deep-reaching rules and obligations). pected to be augmented by some individually for- All of this is further supplemented between phases mulated conditions: proof of the possibility for by additional adjustments and assessment of re- Serb refugees to return to their original homes if sults. they so wish, absence of any intimidation of such The main criteria in assessing the fulfilment persons, the fulfilment of the obligations under of conditions will be the implementation of the the basic agreement on Eastern Slavonia, the democratic principles of human rights, the rule opening of customs control posts on all borders, of law, freedom and independence of the media, the exercise of convincing pressure on the Bosnian freedom of assembly, absence of inhumane or Croats to dissolve the Herzeg-Bosnian structures, degrading practices and of arbitrary arrest, mi- cooperation in establishing a genuinely unified nority protection, market reforms, across-the-bor- Town Council in Mostar, and cooperation in the der cooperation with neighbouring countries, co- establishment and operation of federal institu- operation with the International War Crimes Tri- tions. bunal, the possibility for the return of refugees A closer look at this summary of condition- and displaced persons. alities underlying the regional approach in the For the first phase, EU considers it suffi- conduct of negotiations with the countries of the cient to establish the existence of a genuine de- former Yugoslavia, without Slovenia, despite all sire and of signs of progress in the implementa- the justified criticisms and offence to our Central tion of the above principles, aware that all condi- European vanity, reveals an undeniable dose of tions cannot be met all at once. Thus, it does not realpolitik logic in the positions of a portion of want to raise too many obstacles at the outset but the international community, which does not to enable a fast start in evolving relations with the mean, however, that we must uncritically accept EU, conditional upon the development of inter- all these positions. regional relations. Furthermore, after so many people killed, As regards Bosnia and Herzegovina, the wounded, exiled, and after damage that can be conditions cannot be met by one party alone, and measured in billions, any normal collocutor will cooperation is required by other parties as well. have understanding for Croatia's aversion and In the case of FRY, stress will be laid on great mistrust at the mention of any regional re- cooperation in the implementation of the Day- association within a framework from which we ton Agreement, on the issue of succession, recently escaped by superhuman concerted effort Kosovo, and on some other questions. rarely matched in history. For each entity of the former Yugoslavia Not a single conversation conducted so far, which is undergoing the first stage of negotiations, from the middle to the highest EU level, not a i.e. for Croatia, FRY and Bosnia and single strategy paper, document or statement con- Herzegovina, "individualised" conditions will be tains an allusion to some institutionalisation or formulated. There is a wish to extend the PHARE disguised creation of a confederal or federal Programme to all the countries in the region if it pseudo-Yugoslavia. is found that they meet the relevant conditions at The EU members are increasingly aware least to some degree. that such a solution, even if certain parties might In the next stage of relations (Association desire it: would be highly sensitive and could even Agreement - Europe Agreement), as in the case be counterproductive. The EU has neither the of the Visehrad countries and Slovenia, the mini- energy nor the technical and financial means to mum conditions will be gradually raised, accord- re-establish on the ex-Yugoslav territory an ing to the evaluation of the fulfilment of the origi- institutionalised grouping of nations, threatening nal terms. These conditions are the application to become a potential hotbed of new conflicts. of European standards of democracy, market re- If the EU and NATO did not overstrain forms, human and minority rights, and especially themselves to stop the aggression against Croatia the absence of any discriminatory practices to- and Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is even less likely wards the minorities and the media, the abolish- that today, in the new circumstances, they will try JANUARY - JUNE 1997 15 to turn the wheel of history back ami attempt to has only recently managed to separate itself. establish an expensive new post-Yugoslav struc- This is reflected in discreet hints to hamper ture. Baker, Delors, Mitterand, Carrington and Croatian efforts to conclude bilateral preferen- Owen tried it and failed, and others would have tial economic and customs agreements with as little success. CEFf A countries, claiming that we are not en- However, this is not to say that the regional titled to this since we are neither an associated concept should be taken lightly. In the first place, member of the EU nor a WTO member, and that it provides a framework for the revival of the this should be made possible only with EU ap- broad spectrum of Yugo-nostalgic tendencies. proval, primarily depending on progress in the This approach to the problem might provide a East European region. framework for new formulations of old slogans, Great Britain, for all its "positive attitude, with "reconciliation and across-the-border asso- in consultation with its Euro-partners", recently ciation" as the main aim, and fertile soil for a fu- tried to thwart the extension of the preferential ture multitude of intellectual theories, designs, agreement, threatening that next time, unless we seminars and meetings, all under the mantle of make progress in a number of issues (Eastern this EU-formulated and sponsored topic. Slavonia, the return of Serbs, Mostar, opening of the line of separation, the Hague Tribunal), we THE NEGATIVE ASPECTS have to expect the cancellation of the existing pref- OF THE REGIONAL ApPROACH erential agreement. In this obstructive attitude, Even though the regional approach does not purportedly motivated by a strict advocacy of de- represent an "international conspiracy" for the mocracy where Croatia is concerned, compared creation of a new Yugoslavia, and there are no to the more tolerant positions of Austria and Ger- technical mechanisms or conditions for this at the many, a more balanced attitude ofItaly and lately moment, it nevertheless possesses a number of also of France, Great Britain has received the sup- negative aspects which Croatia cannot afford to port, which is not without a political background, ignore. of the uncompromising champions of human and In its essence, the regional approach, by minority rights in Scandianvia, and sometimes also according equal treatment to all, releases the au- in the Benelux countries. thors of the idea of Greater Serbia, from guilt for Croatia has achieved independence by re- aggression and wanton destruction, reducing the lying on its own resources. But it would be wrong conflict to civil war, without the right to repara- and unreasonable to believe that it is an island tions and without a balanced pressure for the di- and that it can indefinitely walk alone on the road vision of the inheritance among the successors, to reconstruction, development and prosperity. It even though this is not explicitly stated in the first should be clear to everybody that an isolationist drafts of the European Commission. stance does not offer good prospects for the im- Moreover, the regional approach, although peratives of our export and production, for com- this is strenuously denied by the authors of this munication linkage, foreign investment, growth philosophy, will provide the possibility to find con- of GNP, education, research, health service, the stantly new excuses for subtle attempts to slow needs of our consumers, our pensioners, our un- down the process and for the equalisation of all employed, our disabled, and of our increasingly parties, especially in the second stage of negotia- impatient youth, who are calling for a greater tions, using the prolongations of admission to as- opening up. There is no need to stress that es- sociated status as levers of pressure in the pursuit pousal of national autarky, of greater indepen- of their objectives. dence from other countries, is counterproductive An additional objection to the regional ap- and should be instantly abandoned, because this proach is the fact that a sovereign state, member is something that even the rich Switzerland can of UN and the Council of Europe, even though no longer afford, which is why it is already warily young and a very recent actor on the international knocking at the Brussels door. scene, is not permitted to choose its own "prefer- All of this clearly indicates that cooperation ential partners", groupings and clubs. Instead, with the European Union, loved or unloved, is solutions are being forced upon it, in a paternal- one of the main options of Croatia's foreign policy. istic and ostensibly well-meaning manner, to make This is not to say that for various, mostly domes- it a member of a regional club consisting of po- tic, reasons we should stop stressing our disagree- litically, economically, and also emotionally, ment and principled objections against the re- "unpreferred" partners, from whom this country gional approach in its entirety, as a process that JANUARY - JUNE 1997 17 interest in their ideas and dilemmas, including belonging to the Central European and Mediter- NATO expansion. All of this would lend addi- ranean sphere, we could pursue in parallel a policy tional strength to our role as a link, and "honest of - why not - an individualised "light non-align- broker" in many relations and on many sides rel- ment", which would give us more space, less pres- evant to our economic interests and diplomatic sure, and more freedom in acting as a link, a me- role. diator, a broker, in keeping with the broad range The principled insistence on an Euro-At- of our possibilities and interests and with our spe- lantic position also presupposes a principled ex- cific geographic position. pression of interest in NATO. A letter in this sense Today we cannot, and do not wish, to imi- was sent in March 1996, declaring Croatia's in- tate or continue the foreign policies of the Re- terest in joining the Partnership for Peace. Know- public of Dubrovnik", the attempt by Petar ing NATO's views regarding our part of the world, Zrinski'" to practicerea/politik, the efforts of mem- shaped by the SFOR-mandate and by the multi- bers of the Autonomous Party Sokcevic and faceted, not to say hypocritical, attitude of the US, Mazuranic", or the policies of Supilo, Radle", who wants to take advantage of our "NATO-ea- Macek or Josip Broz", for each moment in his- gerness" for its own current ends, it is my belief tory has its specific set of circumstances. Never- that a temporary low-profile behaviour on that theless, these glances into our history indicate that issue would leave Croatia more diplomatic breath- Croatian foreign policy, though fundamentally ing space than is allowed by our all too frequent oriented to the unification of all Croatian lands and not particularly effective pro-NATO decla- into a single state, is at the same time tradition- rations. ally broadly conceived and complex. It would be useful to make a careful ap- The one final basic postulate is that the praisal whether for Croatia, a non-member of the Republic of Croatia will not consent, within the former Warsaw Treaty and not threatened by the framework of a regional approach or of any re- Russian Federation, NATO membership, apart gional association, to the loss of any sovereign or from the Partnership for Peace, is really a burn- political powers, except, one day, those which ing issue and whether a more balanced policy, as other members have also voluntarily ceded in the practised e.g. by Finland, Austria or Slovakia, process of direct integration in the European would not offer a broader manoeuvring ground Union. in our foreign policy. In this, we should be guided by our historic In conclusion, let me say that I believe that realisation, under the leadership of Dr. Franjo Croatian foreign policy should be conducted in a Tudjman, with future variants and adjustments sober and balanced manner, without exclusive demanded by historic developments and dictated commitment to a unilateral Euro-Atlantic policy by the imperative demands of Croatian sovereign with bloc connotations. Instead, while continu- rights and interests. ously insisting on our Euro-Atlantic option, our •

1 Pacta conventa - a treaty concluded in 1102 between ferred supreme and executive powers; the thousand-years- 12 Croatian tribes and the Hungarian King Coloman, pro- old Croatian Convention was never convened again. viding for a personal union, non-payment of taxes and 5 ZAVNOH - the session of the Antifascist Council of the military assistance. People's Liberation of Croatia, which annulled all treaties 2 Convention of Tsetin - in 1526, at Tsetin, the Croatian between Serbia and Povelic with Italy and annexed to Convention elected Archduke Ferdinand of Hapsburg, later Croatia all occupied Croatian territories, including Rijeka, the German Emperor, as King of Hungary and Croatia, in Istria and Zadar, within the framework of the community return for a certain number of troops for the defence of of peoples of Yugoslavia. the Kingdom and for a permanent stand-by contingent to 6 - Baron Josip Sokcevic (1811- 1896), Croatian Ban and be kept in the Duchy of Corniola, the present-day Slovenia, general; together with an undertaking to send supplies to the main -Ivan Mazuranic (1814-1890), Croatian poet and Ban; fortifications. -Ivan pl. Kukuljevic-Sokcinski (1816-1870), historian and 3 The Pragmatic Sanction - in 1712, the Croatian Con- politician; vention gave separate and independent approval to the - Baron Ambroz Vrcnyczony-Dobrinovic (1801-1870), first proposal that succession to the Hapsburg crown could go administrator of Croatian autonomous finances, deputy to the female line. of Croatia in the extended Imperial Council; 4 The National Council- set up in Zagreb, in March 1918, - Ljudevit pI. Farkas Vukotinovic (1813- 1893), poet, poli- for the unification of all Slovenes, Croats and Serbs on the tician, botanist. territory of the disintegrating Austro-Hungary, to which the These were the leading figures in the Autonomous Party, Croatian Convention, following its decision to sever all ties whose aim was the unification of all Croatian lands within with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, temporarily trans- a federal Hapsburg Monarchy, a kind of broad and toler- 18 CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVrEW

ant Croatoslavia, politically, economically and culturally more distant protectors of its free trade, such as Venice attractive to all Southern Slavs, including those still under and Istanbul. Ottoman sovereignty. All of this was to have been sanc- 10 Count Petar Zrinski (1621-1671), Ban, military leader tioned under a direct arrangement with the Austrian Crown in the Thirty-Year War against the Turks, disappointed with without Hungarian co-tutelage. the terms of the Vosvcr Peace, which did not provide for 7 - Josip Juraj Strossmayer (1815-1905), bishop, patron the restitution of Croatian and Hungarian lands, consid- of the arts, chief donator of the Yugoslav (today Croatian) ered a more direct settlement with Turkey, on more Academy of Sciencesand Arts; advocated federalism within favourable terms for Croatia. the Monarchy, the strengthening of ecumenism, and closer 11 See note 6. ties between all, especially the South, Slavs. 12 See note 8. 8 - Frano Supilo (1870-1917), publicist and politician, 13 - Vlatko Macek (1879-1964), succeeded Stjepan Redic member of the Yugoslav Committee formed abroad dur- at the head of the Croatian Peasant Party; negotiated an ing World War I; advocated a broadly federalist Yugosla- agreement with the government in Belgrade on the cre- via. ation of a large autonomous Banate of Croatia, with parts - Stjepan Redic (1871-1928), leader of the Croatian Peas- of Bosnia and Herzegovina. ant Party, the most important political grouping between - Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980), communist fighter against the two world wars; died of wounds sustained in an assas- the German and Italian occupation, military leader, states- sination attempt in the Belgrade parliament. man; severed the ties with Stalin; co-founder of the non- 9 The foreign policy of Dubrovnik aimed at maintaining aligned bloc. good and peaceful relations with all neighbours, and with

Economic and Social Cohesion Policy and Enlargement of the EU

Jorgen Mortensen

INCOME DIFFERENTIALS IN THE EU IN THE graphical and economic balance in the EC in PAST AND IN THE FUTURE favour of low-income Mediterranean countries. At the time of the first enlargement of the The German unification, furthermore, European Community, in 1973, the original six brought into the EC East Germany with a popu- member states constituted a relatively closely knit lation of some 16 million and a per capita GDP and homogeneous trading zone. GDP per head some 30% of that of West Germany or 60% of of population (in purchasing power standards) in that of the level of Portugal. Italy stood only some 20% below that of the Fed- The 1995 enlargement, involving the entry eral Republic of Germany, with Belgium, France of Austria, Sweden and Finland, on the contrary and the Netherlands within this range and only entailed the addition of high-income countries of Luxembourg substantially above the FRG. Northern "obedience" and thus, to some extent, The 1973 enlargement entailed the entry of re-established the North-South equilibrium exist- two new member states (Denmark and the United ing among the original Six. Kingdom) with per capita GDP close to the me- In 1994 the level of GDP per capita within dian of the founding members and one new mem- the EU, converted at current rates of exchange, ber state (Ireland) with a per capita GDP only ranged from about 7,000 ECU in Greece and about 50% of that of Germany and 60% of that Portugal to some 25,000 in Denmark (and even of Italy. more in Luxembourg), corresponding to a spread In 1981 the then nine EC member states of about 1:3.5. Enlargement of the EU to include were joined by Greece with a per capita GDP close the ten CEECs would, first and foremost, entail a to that of Ireland and in 1986 by Spain and Portu- pronounced rise in income differentials within the gal with a GDP level respectively somewhat higher Union. than and somewhat lower than that of Greece. The two latter enlargements, involving three coun- Among the candidate countries only tries with a total population of 58 million, conse- Slovenia has an income level comparable to that quently resulted in a significant shift of the geo- of Greece and Portugal. In fact, at some 6,000

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