Guggenheim Museum Bilbao: Cultural Tourism
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with with permission permission of the of copyright the copyright owner. owner.Further reproduction Further reproduction prohibited without prohibited permission. without permission. THE GUGGENHEIM MUSEUM BILBAO: CULTURAL TOURISM,
URBAN RENEWAL, AND POLITICAL RISK
by
John Thomas Suau
submitted to the
Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences
of American University
in Partial Fulfillment o f
The Requirement for the Degree
o f Master o f Arts
m
Arts Management, Interdisciplinary
lie VaiLFossiVanFossen StorrAnnie
Robert Goler
CUL&UU^S Laura Gomez
Dean^jf CAS
Date
1999
American University
Washington, D.C. 20016
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Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company 300 North Zeeb Road P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. To my family, Elio and Elaine Suau, Darius Suziedelis, George and Theo
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. THE GUGGENHEIM MUSEUM BILBAO: CULTURAL
TOURISM, URBAN RENEWAL, AND POLITICAL RISK
BY
John Thomas Suau
ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the long-term feasibility of the Guggenheim Museum
Bilbao. It examines the extent to which the feasibility study, conducted by the city
planners of Bilbao, Spain and the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation administration of
New York City, addressed the potential political risks of the region. It questions the
implications those risks may have on the long-term economic sustainability and tourism
potential of the project. A history of The Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, an
concise outline of the Basque culture, and an outline of the history of the city of Bilbao
assist in the analysis of the project’s success. By contrasting these components with a
personal interview of the director of the New York museum, the thesis challenges the
notion of tourism in an area ridden with terrorism and addresses the necessity of
continued negotiations between local and global cultures inherent in a project of this
kind.
11
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. PREFACE
The Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, as will become apparent in this thesis,
has been a frequent topic in the past five years for Journalists worldwide. In just the last
three months of 1997, hundreds of articles were written in every language about the
newest “star” in the Guggenheim constellation - the Museoa Guggenheim Bilbao in
Spain. Just five years in the making, Frank Gehry’s museum is an architectural model for
streamlining the building process by completing the project in record time, as compared
to Los Angeles’ Disney theatre, by the same architect. It is also the focal point for city
planners interested in rejuvenating economically failing urban areas through cultural
tourism. Unique to this project, however, is the direct challenge to terrorism by the
Basque government with major public expenditures in culture and tourism. Even more
crucial to the Basques’ success, however, is the press coverage of their homeland for
something other than terrorism.
Having lived in Madrid, Spain duringLa Movida, the “Golden Age” o f the
Socialists years, I worked for a young art dealer, a cultural monthly magazine El Europeo
and eventually for EXPO’92 in Seville. When the economic boom bottomed out in 1992,
my tenure in Spain came to a gradual end. By the mid-90’s, I began to make plans to
pursue graduate studies in arts administration in Washington, D.C. My knowledge of the
iii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. During my studies at American University, I had the pleasure of visiting the
museum on three occasions. Thanks to American University’s graduate scholarships for
thesis research, I was able to afford a trip in March of 1997. I toured the building just six
months prior to its inauguration. On that trip to the Basque Country, I had the
opportunity to interview Nerea Abasolo, Public Affairs Director for the Guggenheim
Museum Bilbao. Before that visit, I had serious doubts about the feasibility of the
project. During my six years in Spain, I never had the occasion to visit Bilbao. It was
not a city that figured prominently on the cultural tourism map of Iberia.
When I saw the structure, even before it opened, I was overwhelmed with a sense
of hope that architecture could still impact an entire region’s image, much like the
Sydney Opera house had done for Australia. I only hoped the project could survive the
violence of Basque separatists and the other political risks that I foresaw.
My second time in Bilbao was for a one-day visit. I was called to interview for a
position in the Corporate Membership offices of the new museum. The museum, I later
learned, received over 60,000 applications - a sign of the seriousness of unemployment in
the region. I was honored to have been chosen for an interview to work in the
monumental structure. When I arrived in Madrid two days before my interview with the
Guggenheim in Bilbao, I found Joseba Zulaika’s book Cronica de una Seduccion in
which he describes in detail his interviews with the Basques and Americans responsible
for the project. He outlines their relationship and interactions with Thomas Krens, the
New York museum’s director and the visionary behind the project. It was then that my
perspective about the project was altered.
iv
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. My last visit to the museum was at the opening on October 19, 1998. I went as a
U.S. journalist for a professional publication and as interpreter for a group of thirty
African-American children from the “Children of the Gospel Choir,” a group based in
Washington, D.C. Coincidentally, they had been hired by the Guggenheim Museum
Bilbao to perform at the inauguration of the museum. On the eve before departing for
Spain, my worst fears became a reality. A terrorist attempt was uncovered, bombs were
found on the grounds of the museum and anErxtaina, a local Basque policeman, was
killed in a shootout. While nervous about the political turmoil and traveling to the region
with thirty children and ten adults with little understanding of the Basque problem, I was
relieved that the attempt had been discovered before our arrival. It was on this trip to
Bilbao that I was able to first interview Thomas Krens among all the other reporters in
the city to cover the event.
The events leading up to the opening of the museum were the final turning points
for my thesis. My most rewarding exchange with Thomas Krens did not take place until
eight months after the opening of the Spanish museum in his office on Fifth Avenue in
New York City. Mr. Krens, in a two-hour conversation about the project, gave me the
insight to begin writing.
V
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The fact that my thesis is about this particular subject is, as are most oflife’s
events, based upon a combination of conscious decisions and odd circumstances, the
influence of external forces and the discovery of new friends and teachers, whom I would
like to acknowledge here. They each know their role in my life; my unending thanks are
extended to each and every one of them.
In Spain, I would like to thank Nerea Abasolo for taking me inside the
Guggenheim Bilbao before it was finished. Thanks to my dear friend and art teacher,
Mar Estrada and her “peque” Laura. To my professional mentor, Javier Aiguabeila,
thank you for giving me work. To my friends Hector Garrigos, Ignacio Merino, Yolanda
Garcia Serrano, Julia Altares, Nicolas Murga and my entire family of friends and
museum professionals who welcomed me during my six years in Spain. I owe my most
sincere gratitude for their hospitality and warmth. To Enrique Dorado Villalobos, a
Basque friend who risked his life and showed me San Sebastian for the first time, may
God be with you wherever you are.
In the United States, for their willingness to open their doors my thanks to
Thomas Krens, Director; Scott Gutterman, Director of Public Affairs; and Paul Pincus,
Director of International Planning Operations, of The Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum
in New York City. I must thank my thesis chair Annie Storr of American University for
vi
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. her patience. I would also like to thank the American University Graduate Student
Association for the thesis research scholarship that helped to defray expenses on my first
visit to Bilbao. At the American Association of Museums, thanks to my sponsors Patricia
Williams and Jerold Kappel. Thanks to my professional mentors Laura Gomez Ryan and
Kim Igoe who set the standards. I must extend a special thanks to Selma Holo who has
been most inspirational and supportive throughout the research and writing process. I
extend an enormous appreciation to Eric Torain and The Washington Performing Arts
Society for trusting me with their “kids” at the opening of the Guggenheim Museum
Bilbao. Thanks to my dear friends Samuel Rosa, Gloria Monti, and Marcela Amaya Satt.
To Mark I owe my unending gratitude for helping me finish my thoughts so that I may
reach my goals.
vii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CONTENTS
ABSTRACT...... ii
PREFACE...... iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... vi
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS...... x
LIST OF TABLES...... xi
Chapter
1. INTRODUCTION...... 1
2. THE SOLOMON R. GUGGENHEIM MUSEUM...... 5
History of the Foundation
Thomas Krens as Director of the Guggenheim
3. CULTURAL CONTEXT: THE BASQUES...... 20
History and Politics of ETA
4. BILBAO: HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF A REVITALIZATION PROJECT...... 28
Bilbao: The Rise and Fall of an Industrial Empire
Bilbao: The Need to Revitalize
The Role of Culture in the Revitalization of Bilbao
The Selection Process and Bilbao
viii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5. FEASIBILITY STUDY - GUGGENHEIM MUSEUM BILBAO...... 44
6. CONCLUSIONS: URBAN RENEWAL, CULTURAL TOURISM AND POLITICS...... 65
The Potential Impact of Terrorism on Tourism
The Basque Image and the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao
WORKS CITED...... 81
ix
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
On October 3, 1997, The Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum opened the branch
affiliate museum - the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao in Spain. This museum, designed
by Frank 0 . Gehry, represents the fourth o f five exhibition facilities for the museum’s
collections, and the first of two new international venues representing the Solomon R.
Guggenheim Foundation.
The Guggenheim Museum Bilbao project is an integral part of the urban renewal
efforts begun by the city in the early 1990s initiated by the associated group known as
Bilbao Metropoli-30. The museum project plans initially received negative reactions
from the Basque and Spanish populations because the elevated costs of the building
accounted for approximately 80% of the overall 1992 budget allocated for culture in the
entire Basque region.1 Moreover, the Basque political partyHerri Batasuna, which
supports the terrorist groupEuzkadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom, or
ETA), took a clear stance against the museum project.2
Because the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao was intended as a central component
to the overall revitalization of the city, an examination of the overall context of the
1 Almagia, K., “El Guggenheim se llevo el 80% del presupuesto,” EGIN, March 21,1993,109. 2 “HB, contra Guggenheim," EL CORREO, February 13,1992, I. 1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. museum within Bilbao and the Basque region is essential to an analysis of the project’s
success in urban renewal. This thesis will question the political risks involved in the
region and interrogate the extent to which the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation and
the Bilbao city-planners addressed those risks. This thesis will outline the selective
articulation of those risks in the feasibility study and posits the importance of
understanding the socio-political identity of the Basque people and their equitable
representation in everything the new American-Basque institution does.
The fiscally and politically autonomous Basque region has long been the center of
debate, as the area’s history, language and culture are unique within the Western
European context. Most importantly, economic development during the period of the
Spanish industrial revolution, and its subsequent demise, have combined with the on
going terrorist activity since the early 1970s to make this region of the Iberian Peninsula
one of the most problematic, economically as well as politically in Europe. Against this
background, this thesis will first examine the history of the Solomon R. Guggenheim
Foundation. A brief summary of the museum’s history will introduce the reader to the
mission of the institution and how the museum has established itself as an international
non-profit organization, relative to that mission. A description of the rationale behind
the museum’s expansion policy, the process involved in finding the right location for the
building and the final selection of Bilbao, Spain, as the home of the new museum will
inform these questions of purpose and success.
The thesis will then summarize the cultural context of the Basque region,
highlighting some of the most unique characteristics of the inhabitants of the region. A
presentation of the political situation in the region as well as an outline of the activities of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3
the principal terrorist group ETA, having determined they are relevant to this thesis, will
assist in the final analysis of the potential political risks of the project.
As a basis for an in-depth analysis of the project’s success, this thesis will
examine the 1992 feasibility study published by The Solomon R. Guggenheim
Foundation and the Basque regional government. It will examine the extent to which the
political risks involved in investing in the region were addressed and the implications that
those perceived risks may have on the economic and tourism aspects of the project. The
examination includes a presentation of challenges that a multinational business should
address when looking to invest in a foreign market like Bilbao. Most specifically, this
thesis is concerned with how the non-profit museum should be accountable for
articulating the Basque cultural identity. It will also address the risks that require
attention when such investment is in the tourism sector in an area where terrorism is
prevalent.
Chapter 5 is dedicated to the political risks which have remained in the
foundation’s original feasibility study and will explain the potential consequences that
political turmoil in the region could have on the long-term success of the museum. It is
not the intent of this thesis to predict results, but rather to assess the potential risks
involved in establishing an international art museum looking at this region for expansion.
Most specifically, the author will challenge the wisdom and long-term feasibility of
promoting cultural tourism in an area where terrorism is a risk. Finally, this thesis
examines the importance of the architectural and artistic significance of the museum
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. promoting cultural tourism in an area where terrorism is a risk. Finally, this thesis
examines the importance of the architectural and artistic significance of the museum
project, as it is touted as one of the most important factors in the success of the project to
date.3 The conclusion of the thesis will present the author’s assessment of the political
risks and potential problems for the institution based on extensive research and a personal
interview with Thomas Krens, director of the New York museum.
3 Cathleen McGuigan, "Basque-ing in Glory,” Newsweek. January 13, 1997, 68.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER TWO
THE SOLOMON R. GUGGENHEIM MUSEUM
The principal function of most art museums is collecting works of art, housing
and caring for those collections, interpreting them and educating the community about art
and art history. Many museums, with sites built during the early part of the 20th century,
have continued to collect art. Most such museums have encountered in the past, and/or
are now experiencing, serious building constraints because the size of the collections are
much larger than the combined exhibition and storage spaces. The Solomon R.
Guggenheim Museum in New York City is one of those institutions.
History of the Foundation
Recently expanded, The Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum (SGM) based in New
York City, now houses its collection in five different landmark structures spread across
Europe and the United States. The original New York City museum, a world-famous
Frank Lloyd Wright building, is complemented by a recently restructured Soho (a
neighborhood on the south east side of Manhattan - “South of Houston”) loft space
designed by Japanese architect Arata Isosaki. An additional museum in Venice, Italy,
houses the collection of Peggy Guggenheim, Solomon’s niece. Her collection came
under the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation administration a short time after she died
5
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 6 in 1979. The most important institutional expansion, in terms o f size alone, is the recent
Guggenheim Museum Bilbao, in Spain. Inaugurated in October of 1997, the museum has
been hailed as one of the most important architectural structures at the him of this
century.4 Just one month after the Basque museum opened, Berlin welcomed the final
addition to the constellation of Guggenheim exhibition facilities. Deutsche Guggenheim
Berlin, a small exhibition space on the ground floor of the Berlin branch of Deutsche
Bank, was jointly established by the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation and Deutsche
Bank and presents exhibitions of modem and contemporary art.
All of this began at the start of the twentieth century when Solomon R.
Guggenheim, a Swiss-bom Jewish American who amassed his fortune from the mining
industries, founded the museum which bears his name. He and his wife, Irene
Rothschild, initially began collecting European Old Master paintings. For lack of
expertise and having entered that limited market very late, their collecting shifted to
contemporary modem artists soon after Solomon met the young German baroness Hilla
Rebay von Ehrenwiesen in 1927. The collection eventually became one of the finest of
modem and avant-garde works of art. The Baroness Rebay introduced Solomon to
experimental artists like Jean Arp. She introduced Guggenheim to experimental and
avant-garde artists in Europe, whose works he later collected with a fervent passion under
Rebay’s direction.
Rebay was herself an artist and had previously been romantically involved with
artist Jean Arp. He initiated her into the avant-garde art world. Arp presented her with a
4 Alex von der Becke, “A Futurist Triumph for Spain: The Guggenheim Museum Bilbao,” Museums Journal. January 1998,25.
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copy of Kandinsky’s treatise On the Spiritual in Art (Uber das Geistige in der Kunst),
which differentiated between the aesthetic abstraction of forms in the real world and non
objectivity as an artistic invention.5 This genre of art form became the theme for the
collection she assisted Guggenheim to amass, and she became a spokeswoman for the
new movement. When she traveled to the United States in 1927, she began a personal
crusade to promote the art in which she so profoundly believed.6
In 1929, the Guggenheims traveled to Europe on a tour with Rebay and purchased
their first painting by Kandinsky, entitled Composition The8. painting started the “non
objective art” collecting core that became the basis for the emerging New York-based
museum. Selected works emphasized the “expressive” and “spiritual” rather than
“representative” or “traditional.” The Guggenheims built a collection of works by artists
such as Marc Chagall, Robert Delauney, Fernand Leger, Amedeo Modigliani, and Laszlo
Moholy-Nagy. As the number of works in the collection grew, Guggenheim decided to
establish a foundation for the “promotion and encouragement and education in art and the
enlightenment of the public.”7 Once the foundation was established in 1937,
Guggenheim began to dream about the construction of his own museum to house these
paintings. Rebay assisted him in conceptualizing the “museum-temple” space. He
alternatively contemplated establishing an exhibition hall at Rockefeller Center,
5 Thomas Krens, “The Genesis o f a Museum: A History of the Guggenheim,” Art of This Century. (NewYork: Guggenheim Museum Publications, 1993), 7. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid., 8.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8 the New York World’s Fair of 1939. Ten years after purchasing the Kandinsky,
Guggenheim, with the assistance of Hilla Rebay, established the Museum of Non-
Objective Painting on East Fifty-fourth Street in Manhattan in a rented automobile
showroom. The museum was a great success among young artists in New York for its
revolutionary way of viewing objects in the real world.8
As the collection continued to grow, the need for a permanent space became
apparent. Hilla Rebay and Irene Guggenheim persuaded renowned architect Frank Lloyd
Wright to take on the project because of his philosophical similarities with the conceptual
art being collected. Because of site alterations and post-war inflation, the building took
seven years to build. Unfortunately, Solomon R. Guggenheim never lived to see the
completion of the building. After his death in 1949, it seemed impossible for the new
administration of the museum to agree to finish the costly project. It was at Wright’s own
suggestion that the building be re-conceived as a memorial to Guggenheim, which
inspired the trustees to finally finish the structure. In 1952, the institution was renamed
The Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum.
In the early part of the 1950s, the museum was criticized for its limited
programming. Critics argued that it was too “mystic” to justify its tax-free status as an
educational museum. Harry F. Guggenheim, grandson of Solomon and then president of
the foundation, established a revised exhibition program that would include “objective”
examples of Modem art.9 The trustees requested the resignation of Rebay, then director,
8 Ibid., 8. 9 Ibid., II.
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to enable the museum to carry out the new mission without her input. She resigned in
March of 1952.10
James Johnson Sweeney, former director of the Department of Painting and
Sculpture at the Museum of Modem Art, replaced her as director seven months later.
From the beginning of his tenure until the death of Frank Lloyd Wright just six months
prior to the inauguration of the new building, however, Sweeney and Wright argued and
battled over the design of the spiral building. Sweeney’s forward-looking programs,
which included expanded administrative offices for conservation, preparation and
photography, required practicality in the design of the new structure. Wright was a tyrant
architect who thought only of his own aesthetic tastes. He insisted that the paintings be
installed to fit the building instead of designing a building that fit the space needs of the
works of art. The spiral ramp, to this day, is a controversial architectural element which
museum practitioners decry as architectural dictatorship while architects proclaim its
aesthetic beauty. Sweeney and Wright debated every detail of the museum’s design
including the color of the interior walls.11 However controversial, enormous crowds
gathered at the new museum opening on October 21,1959. Though critics questioned if
the art was not being overwhelmed by the structure, the building was a tremendous
success.
During his seven-year tenure as director, Sweeney pursued an aggressive
acquisitions policy. Before his resignation in 1960 and just a short time after the
10 Ibid., 11. 11 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 10 museum’s inauguration, he had purchased dozens of sculptures by the modem school and
other major works by Cezanne and seminal Abstract Expressionists.12 In addition to its
purchases, the museum received a bequest of works from the estate of Katherine S. Dreier
in 1953. Drier had founded the Societe Anonyme with Marcel Duchamp and collected
important works from the period. Sweeney also revamped the administrative staff, hired
a registrar, initiated a conservation program, established a photography department and
expanded the library.13
In 1961, Thomas M. Messer assumed the role as director of the Guggenheim.
During his 27-year tenure, Messer began to aggressively produce publications and
established a strong program of temporary exhibitions, while maintaining the growing
collections. He insisted upon in-depth cataloguing of the works and scholarly research.
He even initiated some of Wright’s original installation techniques, formerly abolished by
Sweeney. In 1963, the foundation received one of its most important bequests. Justin K.
Thannhauser donated a portion of his extensive collection of Impressionist, Post-
Impressionist, and Modem French masterpieces as a permanent loan. These works
formally became part of the collection in 1978, two years after Thannhauser’s death. His
widow, Hilde Thannhauser, likewise bequeathed ten very important works to the
museum’s collection.14
Of all the donors to the collection, Peggy Guggenheim - Solomon’s bohemian
niece - was one of the most important. According to most critics, her collection, built
during the 1920s and 1930s, has become one of the most intimately beautiful and
12 Ibid. 13 Ibid., 14. 14 Ibid., 20.
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complete of works from the early part of the modem art movements. Peggy was the
“wild” Guggenheim; she traveled to Europe at a very young age, and at the age of forty
she founded an art gallery in London with the assistance of Marcel Duchamp and Samuel
Beckett.15 Her opening exhibition featured the work of Jean Cocteau. Subsequent shows
included presentations devoted to Kandinsky and the Surrealist painter Yves Tanguy.
In 1939, Peggy closed the gallery and, following her uncle’s lead, decided to open
a museum of modem art in France. With an impending war in Europe and a lack of
building facilities, Peggy abandoned the plan for a museum but continued purchasing
works until she was forced to leave when Hitler’s troops invaded France. Her motto was
“buy a picture a day”16 and according to her biography, Out of This Century, she lived up
to it.
Once back in New York City, Peggy established her own gallery space devoted
exclusively to modem art. The gallery “Art of This Century” preceded her uncle’s space
by one year. In 1947, after the World War II and Peggy’s separation from then husband
Max Ernst (a Surrealist painter), she returned to Europe. Her personal collection was
exhibited in the 1948 Venice Biennale, and subsequently at the Strozzina in Florence and
the Palazzo Reale in Milan. Her attraction to Venice inspired Peggy to purchase the
Palazzo Venier dei Leoni, an uncompleted one-story eighteenth-century palace on the
15 Jennifer Blessing, “Peggy’s Surreal Playground," Art of This Century. (New York: Guggenheim Museum Publications, 1993), 181. 16 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 12 Grand Canal designed by Lorenzo Boschetti.17 In 1949 she opened her collection to the
public and presided over its direction until her death in 1979. Since that time, The
Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation has presided over the direction and administration
of the Peggy Guggenheim Collection in Venice, Italy, as a separate affiliated museum.18
The Solomon R. Guggenheim museum oversees the museum’s administration and
collections care.
Thomas Messer, who had moved the associated museums of Solomon and Peggy
Guggenheim from the character of private collections available to the public to truly
public institutions, retired from the Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum in 1988. Prior to
his retirement, however, he established a precedent-setting publications department and
maintained an outstanding reputation among museum professionals as an exemplary
administrator. Wright’s original building, however, continued to impose serious
constraints upon the museum’s programming. The deterioration of the structure had
motivated Messer to insist upon a major renovation and construction of a tower, based
upon Wright’s original design for an eleven-story annex. At the suggestion of Messer,
Thomas Krens carried out these plans after his appointment as the new director of the
Guggenheim museum.
17 Ibid. 18 Thomas Krens, “The Genesis o f a Museum: A History of the Guggenheim,” Art o f This Century. (NewYork: Guggenheim Museum Publications, 1993), 26.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 13
Thomas Krens as Director of the Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum
The plans for renovating the New York building, in the context of Krens’
accomplishments since taking control of the Guggenheim and its expansion, seem
insignificant. At the time, however, architects and city planners, not to mention
the citizens of New York City, decried the plans to touch the landmark building.
The firm’s [Gwathmey & Siegel] first scheme, which unleashed a storm of protests, would have replaced the old administrative annex with a 10-story addition, part of which was suspended to overhang the Wright building. The ultimate effect, critics contended, would have been to make the rotunda look like a giant toilet bowl.19
But Krens did not stop there. He initiated The Guggenheim Museum Soho, a
branch museum in the gallery district of New York City renovated by world-
famous Japanese architect Arata Isozaki.20 Rumors of other expansion plans
began to circulate, and Krens let it be known that he was talking with city
planners in Salzburg, Austria, about carving a Guggenheim museum out of the
side of a rocky mountain.21
Krens’ educational background gives some clue as to his entrepreneurial
and forward-looking “big-business” strategies. He studied political economics at
Williams College in Williamstown, Massachusetts, and later received his Master
of Fine Arts in printmaking from the State University of New York at Albany. He
19 Ken Johnson, "Starship Guggenheim,” Art in America. September 1992, 115. 20 Kim Bradley, “The Deal o f the Century,” Art in America. July 1997,48. 21 Joseba Zulaika, Guggenheim Bilbao: Cronica de una Seduccion. (Editorial NEREA, Madrid, Spain, 1997), 19.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 14 had also taken art history and studio courses as an undergraduate. He then began
teaching studio art at Williams in 1972 and went on to become the director of the
Williams College Museum of Art and Williams’ renowned artist-in-residence
program.22 In 1984 he earned an MBA from the Yale School of Management and
conceived the idea of the Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art (Mass
MoCA). After a yearlong consultancy to the Brooklyn Museum of Art in 1984,
he earned a reputation as an aggressive museum manager, causing him to be
classified as the “Clint Eastwood” of the art museum director’s world.23
Krens’ business training has enabled him to analyze the situation faced by
museums in a more profit-oriented manner, giving him both significant insight
and advantage when negotiating internationally. “The key word here is change,”
he says. “The fact is that the museum industry is in trouble, and for a very simple
reason, a simple economic analysis. Audience is leveling off; government
revenues have already leveled off; even though the corporate sector had been
increasing, that’s now tapering off; and endowment revenues are tied to the size of
endowments, and they’re not increasing either.”24 In Krens’ opinion, the museum
“industry” must expand: museums are so saturated with holdings of art that some
can only display 2 to 3% of their collections and are forced to exhibit in a
“piecemeal” fashion.25 His use of the term “industry” when applied to museums
has connotations that represent professional controversy.
22 Suzanna Andrews, “Self-Confidence Man,” New York Mayazine. May 9, 1994, 47. 23 Craig Bromberg, “Thomas Krens: Gunslinger for the Guggenheim,” ARTnews. May 1998,73. 24 Ibid., 74. 25 Thomas Krens, interview with author, tape recording, New York, New York, 24 June 1998.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Hence, in times o f tightening resources for most museums, Krens
anticipated opening a new museum in Europe. Also, he maintained the possibility
of opening other such museums in South America or Japan. These new
structures, equal to the Wright building in their architectural innovation, would
give the Guggenheim collection the much-needed elbowroom. Moreover, the new
museum in Bilbao, as eventually completed, allowed the museum to display more
of its collection. It is also designed to exhibit monumental artwork of the 1980s
and 1990s that few museums in the world have adequate dimensions to put on
view. Installations and industrially produced works have proved too large for the
dimensions of most art museums. Consequently, many museums are not able to
display the works indoors of artists like Richard Serra, Donald Judd, Claes
Oldenburg, Mario Merz, and Jenny Holzer.26
Many works by these artists came from the collection of Count Giuseppe
Panza de Biumo, purchaseden masse by Krens in 1989. By deaccessioning three
older paintings from the permanent collection (Chagall’sBirthday, Modigliani’s
Boy in Blue Jacket, and Kandinsky’s Fugue), Krens updated the Guggenheim’s
collection to represent works of the later part of this century, making it one of the
most complete collections of the this era.27 Although museum professionals do
not ordinarily consider the process of deaccessioning significant artwork “good
26 Walter Robinson, “Guggenheim Gets Panza Trove,” Art in America, April 1990,37. 27 Ibid., 37.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 16 practice,” Krens was able to defend the sales based upon the fact that the museum
has an enormous collection of works by Chagall, Modigliani, and Kandinsky. He
argued that the quality of these paintings was far inferior to others in the
collection so that it overall would not suffer from the sale of these works. On the
contrary, the collections would be doubly enriched by the acquisitions made with
the proceeds.28
Meanwhile, during his tenure, Krens has been criticized for his over
spending. In order to fund the major renovation and annex of the Fifth Avenue
Wright building, Krens oversaw the issuance of $54.9 million in tax-exempt
bonds.29 Though other prominent New York museums such as the Metropolitan
Museum and the Museum of Modem Art have financed projects similarly, the
Guggenheim did not secure the entire $55 million with an endowment fund as did
the MoMA and the Met. The entire Guggenheim endowment was comparatively
small at roughly $30 million. Furthermore, during negotiations, Krens has refused
to pledge works of art or the building as a guarantee against default.30
Krens believes that all of this expansion is profitable. Krens created a
powerhouse style for one of the world’s first multinational museum. While not
the only museum with operations in just one country - the Winterthur Museum in
Deleware, the Terra Museum in Chicago, Illinois, the Boston Museum of Fine
Arts, and Harvard’s Sackler Gallery all have international collaborative
28 Ken Johnson, “Starship Guggenheim," Art in America. September 1992,107. 29 Andrew Decker, “Can the Guggenheim Pay the Price?” ARTnews. January 1994,142. 30 Michael Kimmelman, “What on Earth Is the Guggenheim Up To?" The New York Times. October 14, 1990,39.
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relationships with other museums or institutions - the Solomon R. Guggenheim
Foundation is the first American institution to be multi-national, with facilities in
Italy, Spain and Germany.
In 1990 Krens began a media blitz promoting potential Guggenheim
museum “franchises,” globe hopping in order to negotiate with European and
Asian city planners and urban developers. Initially, there were rumors, all
strategically publicized but never “official,” that the Guggenheim, that is, Krens,
was looking to expand.31 It was a well-known fact in the art world that the
Guggenheim had purchased the Panza collection in Italy and that the Peggy
Guggenheim Palace could never house such an enormous collection; the museum
was cramped enough already and was undergoing a redesign for expanded
exhibition space. Initially, there was talk about the museum in Salzburg
overlooking the city. A Japanese concept also emerged in conversation. In 1989,
Krens hired Carmen Gimenez, founder of the Reina Sofia and former Spanish
Minister of Culture, as the museum’s chief curator for twentieth century art. This
strategic move would later prove to be key in negotiations with Bilbao.32 In a
similar administrative hire, Krens brought on Germano Celant, an Italian art
historian, as curator of contemporary art for the New York museum.
31 Joseba Zulaika, Guggenheim Bilbao: Crdnica de una Seduccion. (Editorial NEREA, Madrid, Spain, 1997), 39-45. 32 Kim Bradley, “The Great Socialist Experiment,” Art in America. February 1996, 73.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Krens began to send exhibitions from the Guggenheim collections around
the world via a network of museums with which he had established ties. A
blockbuster exhibition featuring masterworks from the Guggenheim collections
(New York and Venice) traveled from New York to Madrid’s Reina Sofia
Museum of Contemporary Art in the early 1990s. From Madrid, the exhibition
traveled to Venice - a natural stop for an exhibition with work from that city’s
Guggenheim branch. Finally, the travelling show went to Tokyo in 1991. Ail the
while, Krens continued to meet with city planners in Austria and Japan to discuss
the construction of a new Guggenheim.33
It was the Salzburg version of a strategy for a new site for the SRG that
first started to take root. A competition for design was conducted, and the
architect Hans Hollein won. Estimated costs of the museum were around $90
million; feasibility studies delayed the approval of the project and the political
situation changed, as Krens explains it, because of the fall of the Soviet Union.34
But the strategy was clear: Krens wanted to build, and the Guggenheim
approached many cities or they initiated the contact themselves. At this juncture,
Spain emerged as a likely candidate.
In 1992, Spain celebrated its “coming out” party. Madrid was dubbed
Europe’s 1992 “Cultural Capital,” Seville was host to the world’s fair, EXPO’92,
and the 1992 Summer Olympics took place in Barcelona. After decades of
33 Joseba Zulaika, Guggenheim Bilbao: Cronica de una Seduccion. (Editorial NEREA, Madrid, Spain, 1997), 39-45. 34 Thomas Krens, interview with author, tape recording, New York, New York, 24 June 1998.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. economic isolation under General Frederico Franco’s dictatorship, the new
democratic Spain prepared well for the occasions. The ruling Socialist Party
invested $10 billion in government funds for infrastructures in and around Seville
alone, with a new high-speed train running between Madrid and Seville. Even
more money was spent in Barcelona. Bilbao, Spain’s fourth largest city, wanted
to entice more foreign investment in the Basque region, and, most specifically,
revitalize the city’s economy and clean up the polluted river and surrounding
environment. Basque regional developers began talks with Krens in late 1992.
After a few weeks of negotiations, an official announcement was made - Bilbao
would be the new home of the Guggenheim collections.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER THREE
CULTURAL CONTEXT: THE BASQUES
I shall defend the house of my father, against wolves, against draught, against usury, against the law, I shall defend the house of my father, I shall lose cattle, orchards, pine groves; I shall lose interest income dividends but I shall defend the house of my father. They will take my weapons, and with my hands I shall defend the house of my father, they will cut off my hands, and with my arms I will defend the house of my father; They will leave me armless, without shoulders, without chest, and with my soul I shall defend the house of my father. I shall die, my soul will be lost, my descendants will be lost; but the house of my father will endure on its feet.35 - Gabriel Aresti
35 Mark Kurlansky, The Basque History of the World. (Walker Publishing Company, Inc., United States, 1999), p. 9. 20
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This Basque poem summarizes the interminable desire of the Basque people to
preserve their heritage and cultural identity at any expense. Much has been written about
the Basque Country and its uniqueness in Spain. Universities dedicate libraries and
departments to the study of the region. From its language to its cuisine, the Basque
Country has been hailed as one of the most ancient cultures of Western Europe. The
culture and traditions have survived centuries of political changes and cultural migrations
in and around the region, and they are often mythologized as direct descendants of Cro-
Magnons - descendants of the human ancestor of 40,000 years ago.36 But the most
significant and revealing cultural artifact of the Basques is their language,Euskera.
According to Mark Kurlansky in his book, The Basque History of the World:
Though numerous attempts have been made, no one has ever found a linguistic relative of Euskera. It is an orphan language that does not even belong to the Indo-European family of languages. This is a remarkable fact because once the Indo-Europeans began their Bronze Age sweep from the Asian subcontinent across Europe, virtually no group, no matter how isolated, was left untouched.37
Kurlansky goes on to describe the myths and historical attributions of the mysterious
origins of the Basque language. He concludes in his first chapter entitled “The Basque
Myth” that it has been argued that the Basques are the original “Europeans” and that their
language has historically “kept them apart from others...[has] also...kept them together
as a people, uniting them to withstand Europe’s great invasions.”38
36 Ibid., 20. 37 Ibid., 23. 38 Ibid., 26.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Unquestionably, the Basques are among the oldest cultures of Europe. Despite
the region’s numerous invasions over the centuries, the Basques reached the tenth century
fairly isolated from the flow of history of the rest of Western Europe.39 During the tenth
and eleventh centuries, Navarra and the Basque regions unified to create a more or less
single Basque political identity. With the demise of the kingdom, however, the region
fell to disorder. By the end of the sixteenth century, Castile (now the central region of
Spain) had integrated the Basques into their kingdom. From that time until the nineteenth
century, the Spanish king recognized the special nature of the provinces and towns in the
Basque region. In the 1930s there was a chance to create a new autonomous Basque
regime during the second Spanish Republic, but the Spanish Civil War and Franco’s
dictatorship suppressed the Basques’ uniqueness and prohibited the use of the language.40
For decades, the Basque region has been an arena for battle between modem
culture and its values. Basques speak Spanish, identify with Spain, work in industry, and
live in a large city or speak Euskera, identify with native and traditional culture and one’s
village or province, work as a small farmer or fisherman, and live on a farm or in a small
village.41 The modem population is concentrated in large cities while the traditional
peoples live in the small fishing villages along the Bay of Biscay or in rural farmsteads in
the mountains nearby. Since the introduction of heavy industry to the region in the last
39 “Spain: The Basques,” The Library o f Congress Country Studies, on-line at http://lcweb2.1oc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@fIeId(DOCID+es0057) , 1988. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid.
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quarter of the nineteenth century, the centers of Basque traditional culture have been in
constant decline. It is feared that they will disappear altogether by the end of the next
century.42 The U.S. Library of Congress 1988 comprehensive study of the region reports
that of the 2.1 million people in the Basque Country, 23% understand Euskera, 21% can
speak it, but only 13% can read the language and only 10% can write in Euskera.43
Obviously, there existed an urgent need to “save” this culture and its language and
traditions any way possible.
In her book published in 1999, Selma Ruben Holo reveals the steadfastness of the
Basques when she discusses the post-Franco Basque region in the 1990s:
The greatest cultural achievement of the first generation living under the new democracy was to bring Euskera back to life as the region’s official language - one that could be spoken in the classroom and in public gatherings. Because Euskera was a language that had existed for a long time in many dialects without standardization, and was primarily used by the peasant classes, it required enormous financial, political, and intellectual resources to be brought to a viable state. It is now a living language used by intellectuals, businessmen, and peasants alike - it is also a scientific and literary language for the first time. In fact, the generations of children bom since the end of the 1970s all speak both Spanish and Euskera.44
Much progress has been made, as Holo states, to encourage the use of Euskera within the
region. The Guggenheim Museum Bilbao, for example, presents all materials in English,
Spanish, and Basque.
42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. 44 Selma Holo, Bevond the Prado: Museums and Identity in Democratic Spain. (Smithsonian Press, United States, 1999), 142.
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While the Basques account for only 5.5% of Spain’s population today — about 2.1
45 million inhabitants — the region accounts for 11% of the country’s exports. These
figures demonstrate the resourcefulness and industrious nature of the Basques. Their
main trading partner is greater Spain. Because of the fiscal autonomy of the region won
after Franco’s death, the Basque Country’s government is able to offer beneficial
conditions for both foreign investors as well as regional companies working
internationally.
For foreign investors, incentives like tax breaks and investments in new fixed
assets have increased multinational businesses in the region. Furthermore, there are tax
rebates of 25% for companies based in the Basque region which establish subsidiaries
abroad or invest in promotion in foreign markets. Even greater fiscal autonomy is
46 expected for the region by the year 2002.
History and Politics of ETA
Located in the northwest comer of Spain, the Basque people have lived under centuries of semi-autonomous rule. During Franco’s reign, however, this autonomy was drastically restricted. As a result, Basque nationalists, in conjunction with the newly formed (1959)Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuma (ETA), Basque Fatherland and Freedom, began to carry out acts of violence against a variety of targets. As the Basque movement grew, so too did the ETA. It was not long before the ETA made the decision to “divide” into two entities -- a political- military branch and a strictly military branch.47
45 “Basques open new avenues," The Economist. Federation for Enterprise Knowledge Development, On-line: http://www.fend.es, 1. 46 Ibid., 1. 47 “ETA," The Terrorism Research Center, http://www.terrorism.com/terrorism/ETA.html, 1.
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ETA was formed with the objective of creating an independent homeland for the Basque
regions of Spain and France.48 Historical facts about the group are confusing, and there
are differing versions of the group's activities. According to some sources, the political
wing of ETA ceased to function for unknown reasons between 1982 and 1994. Others
have reported that the group maintained contact with like-minded groups such as the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) leaders.49
The political situation in Spain and the Basque Country since the death of Franco
has been volatile. With ETA terrorist acts on the rise, the Socialist government under
Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez established a counter-terrorism group in 1983 called
Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberation (GAL - Antiterrorist Groups of Liberation), a
special unit of the Civil Guard responsible for identifying and assassinating members of
ETA. It was not public knowledge until recently that the group was financed and directed
by the Spanish Department of the Interior; however, it was widely understood that the
Socialists had taken matters of terrorism into their own hands.50 The first counter terrorist
act occurred on December 4, 1983 with the kidnapping of alleged ETA terrorist Segundo
Marey. The kidnapping was carried out by a group of French mercenaries hired by the
sub-commissioner of the Bilbao police, Jose Amedo Fouce. The kidnapping proved to be
48 “Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna (ETA)”, Office o f International Criminal Justice Online, http://www.acsp.uic.edu/OICJ/PUBS/CJE/060204.html 49 “ETA,” The Terrorism Research Center, http://www.terrorism.com/terrorism/ETA.html, 1. 50 “El Caso GAL: Preguntas Frecuentes,” (The GAL Case: Frequently Asked Questions), http://www.teIeline.es/personal/casogal/faqgalJitml
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a mistake, as Segundo Marey had no ties to ETA. None o f this was public knowledge
until March 21,1995, when the Spanish news daily El Diario 16. reported on the famous
“Lasa y Zabala Case” - revealing the Socialists’ involvement in killing 29 people and
injurying many men, women and children. The GAL acts ended on July 24,1987.
Compounded by enormous public expenditures for infrastructures in Barcelona for the
1992 Summer Olympics and in Seville for EXPO’92, the Basque hostility towards the
central Spanish Socialist government grew during the twelve-year period that Felipe
Gonzalez was Prime Minister.
When, in 1992, Basque officials signed a preliminary contract of agreement with
The Guggenheim Foundation in New York City, the Basque and Spanish press presented
the news with overtones of scandal and secrecy. The Basque fiscal budget for culture that
year allocated 77% of funds for the Guggenheim project, which sparked debate about the
importance of such a project and its impact upon Basque culture and identity.51 In their
articles during the 2 Vi months between the time of the signing of the initial
understanding of intentions and the ratification of the museum’s creation by the Basque
parliament, El Mundo journalists Ramon Zallo and Mario Gaviria challenged the
feasibility study of the museum with a vengeance. They argued that the study
overestimated attendance and the potential income and favorable economic impact upon
Bilbao.52
51 Ramon Zallo and Mario Gaviria, “Guggenheim, Radiografia de un Desproposito (I),” El Mundo. February 2, 1992,156. 52 Kim Bradley, “The Deal o f the Century,” Art in America. M y 1997,52.
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Fortunately for Krens and Bilbao politicians, the bigger political issues of Spain
took precedence over the cultural spending of the Basque Country. The changing powers
in the Basque Country created a situation that enabled the project to move ahead without
many political barriers. The initial opposition from the Partido Nacional Vasco(PNV)
(Basque Nationalist political party) about the quantity of public money being spent on
supporting an institution from the United States was, Krens believes, an excuse.53 The
project became a point of departure for political debate in the Spanish press. Although
the contract was signed and an agreement was reached, debate about the museum’s
influence and who had control over the programming broke out. The project became
increasingly controversial as opposing parties of the government in control argued that
the government was spending public funds to support a private American cultural
institution for the ultimate benefit of The SRG in New York City.
By the time the structure began to take on a real profile on the banks of the
Nervion River, attention became more focused on the fact that Bilbao was preparing for a
major architectural masterpiece. Critics who visited the site before the building was even
finished proclaimed that this was the greatest architectural feat of this century.
53 Thomas Krens, interview with author, tape recording, New York, New York, 24 June 1998.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER FOUR
BILBAO: HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF A
REVITALIZATION PROJECT
When the news was released to the general public, many art critics questioned
why The Guggenheim Foundation decided to build a museum in Bilbao, Spain, of all
places. Most pondered the economic feasibility of such a venture, since Bilbao had
become run down, with more than 25% unemployment and rising crime rates. Few
critics, if any, really questioned explicitly whether the Basque history of nationalist
terrorist activity from that region would jeopardize the museum’s long-term
sustainability. To reach a conclusion, one must weigh the unique circumstances of both
parties involved and analyze the potential risks of an international endeavor of this
magnitude. This business venture set the Guggenheim off on a journey few museums
could contemplate given the precarious prevailing economic situation of most American
cultural institutions. The Basques, one of Europe’s oldest cultural groups, also gambled
on the future. However, as this thesis will demonstrate, the city of Bilbao was in
desperate need of a project of this magnitude. The city’s slumping economy,
international public image of terrorism, and desperate need for an urban-renewal project
of some significance made the Guggenheim name a very attractive prospect.
28
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Bilbao: The Rise and Fall of an Industrial Empire
Bilbao is a port city located on Spain’s northern coast, 50 miles west of the
French border. In ancient and medieval times, traders in the region relied on Bilbao and
the Bay of Biscay (derived from Bizkaia, the Basque name for the region) as a starting
point toward the south toward two of Spain’s wealthiest agricultural regions, Navarra and
Aragon/4
During the second half of the nineteenth and well into the twentieth century,
Bilbao experienced the boom of an industrial revolution. In the 1830s steam power and,
later, industrial mills converted this port city into one of Europe’s most important
industrial centers. Industrialization also made the Nervion River one of the most polluted
in Europe.55
In 1936, just a short period before World War II, the Spanish Civil War began and
culminating in a victory of Franco’s nationalist forces, supported by Mussolini in Italy
and Hitler in Germany. It was with Hitler's assistance that the Basque town of Guernica
was bombed to total destruction during the Civil War. This military attack became the
subject matter of Picasso’s most emblematic masterpiece, Guernica, which has
subsequently become recognized as one of the most important images of man’s
destructive forces. The Franco regime reached full control over the Iberian Peninsula in
54 Roderick Lee, “Port o f Bilbao," The Dock and Harbour Authority. London, February/March 1996, p 239. 55 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1939. All of Spain was broken politically and economically when Franco began his 40-
year reign. Spain was officially neutral during World War II, but followed a pro-Axis
policy in practice. Under the Franco regime, the government outlawed the Basque and
Catalan languages. The threat of these particular languages was the potential they had in
undermining the country’s national “Spanish” identity. Franco’s ability to centralize the
government depended upon his ability to eliminate any other cultural identity other than
the Spanish “Christian” and his domination over nationalist ideologies included the
prohibition of Euskera and Catalan languages.56 This cultural oppression, lasting more
than 40 years, has made nationalist pride in the two regions - Catalunya and the Basque
Country - of primary intensity since Franco’s death.
Bilbao: The Need to Revitalize
At present, Bilbao is the fourth largest city in Spain and can easily be compared to
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, because of its heavy steel industry in the early part of the
twentieth century and the similar economic decline of that industry since the 1960s. Like
Pittsburgh, Bilbao underwent an economic transformation in the last two centuries.
First, Bilbao became an economically successful urban area in Spain, because of its ideal
location on the northern coast of the Iberian Peninsula and the interest of many of the
steel industry’s foreign investors in the region at the middle of the nineteenth century.
56 Mark Kurlansky, The Basque History o f the World. (Walker Publishing Company, United States, 1999), 227.
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However, the city suffered the effects of post-industrialization in the 1960s, including
severe air and water pollution and high unemployment rates among its working classes.
The Bilbao that the Nationalists ended up with during the first part of the 1980s seemed close to collapsing...The urban undoing during the Franco era made this [Bilbao] the most unlivable city in Spain. An industry in an irreversible coma continued to devastate the area and to contaminate the atmosphere and the river’s water, well known for decades as “the shipping sewer”.
In 1989, a revitalization process of metropolitan Bilbao was initiated by a group
called “Bilbao Metropoli-30” - a group comprised of over one hundred Basque leaders
58 from small and large business, politicians, and other influential figures. The
collaborative effort among the Bilbaoans with economic interests in the city’s survival
helped them to launch a strategic plan for Bilbao’s revitalization. The process involved
four primary phases:
• Organization and exploration of the environment and identification of critical points of the Bilbao metropolitan area; • Internal and external analysis of the region; • Determination of objectives and methods and development of strategies; and 59 • Plan of action and implementation.
In the second phase, the internal and external analysis of the regions, the environmental
analysis produced a clear profile of Bilbao:
57 Jon Juarista, “Bilbao: La Metamorfosis de una Ciudad,” El Pais Semanal. June 1, 1997, p. 27. 58 Martinez Cearra, Alfonso, "Estrategias de Revitalizacion para la Bilbao Metropolitana,” Revista Interamericana de Plamficacion. p. 150. 59 Ibid.
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• A need to diversify and internationalize the business component with advanced technologies and increased service sectors; • An urgency of urban and environmental renewal; • Poor accessibility and internal movement and a lack of cooperation between the public and private sectors, and finally • The development of a cultural component in the metropolitan area.60
The Guggenheim Museum became a crucial opportunity relative to the last point
of the second phase of the overall strategic plan; it represented a major international
cultural organization with interest in a new branch museum in Western Europe. While
the Basques were developing their strategic plan for the revitalization of Bilbao, the
Guggenheim’s director, Thomas Krens, was in negotiations with Salzburg, Austria, for a
new Guggenheim museum.
The Role of Culture in the Revitalization of Bilbao
During the past three decades, urban planners and developers in the United States
have enlisted the arts as a central element in revitalizing declining urban centers. Cultural
development, usually in partnership with other strategies, has proven to be one effective
mechanism for the restoration of many downtown “brownfield” sites - areas with unused,
abandoned and decaying buildings and spaces that diminish the vitality and economic
development of cities.61
60 Ibid. 61 Anne Frost-Kumpf, “Cultural Districts: The Arts as a Strategy for Revitalizing Our Cities,” (Americans for the Arts, 1998), 9.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 33 The group Bilbao Metropoli-30 published a strategic plan in 1996 entitled “El Estimulo
de la Demanda Cultural en el Bilbao Metropolitano: Plan Estrategico para la
Revitalization del Bilbao Metropolitano” (“The Stimulus o f Cultural Demand in
Metropolitan Bilbao: Strategic Plan for the Revitalization o f Metropolitan In Bilbao ”).
this plan, the role of culture in the urban renewal of Bilbao was outlined extensively.
Supported by the Bilbao Metropoli-30 Association, the strategic plan included eight
specific themes that were addressed in the study. Fundamental to the success of this
strategic plan and the most important component (according to Bilbao-30) was the
strengthening of the cultural center of the metropolitan area so as to improve its
international competitiveness and the quality of life for individuals residing in the Basque
Country.62 This reinforcement of the cultural sector o f the area, as outlined in the plan,
provides the planners with a vision of the future that includes the following
characteristics:
• Vehicles for cultural and recreational information; • The positioning of metropolitan Bilbao as a point of reference for cultural circuits and the arts industry on an international level; • An educational system with arts and culture playing a vital role in study plans, and greater potential for international experiences; • A private initiative that, within its fiscal policy for incentives, accepts the commitment to an active participation in cultural diffusion, and coordination of the different public initiatives that together will help to convert Bilbao into a focal point for cultural creation; • Better infrastructures that enable access to culture for the entire population of the metropolitan area that will become an emblematic quality of the city.63
62 Bilbao Metropoli-30 Association, El Estimulo de la Demanda Cultural en el Bilbao Metropolitano (Bilbao: Bilbao Metropoli-30, 1996), 3. 63 Ibid., 3-4.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 34 The city planners built their hopes upon this description o f benefits of the revitalization of
Bilbao. It was a way of creating a dynamic cultural market to project an image as an
international cultural center. The Basques hoped that the implementation of the strategic
plan would establish Bilbao as a first-class city for arts and culture. They also wanted to
establish a new tradition for service sector industries, to augment the profile of their
prestigious university and to build structures like the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao and
the Euskalduna Palace for Conventions and Music Hall as a way to champion cultural
events of the highest caliber.
The Selection Process and Bilbao
Bilbao entered the competition for the new Guggenheim museum at a pivotal
moment for Krens and Basque politics. What follows is an outline of the selection
process of Bilbao as the site for an additional museum for the Guggenheim
administration. Bilbao’s interests in rejuvenating the metropolitan area have been
discussed, as has the Guggenheim’s interest in expanding the reach of its collections.
Thomas Krens explains his perception of the events in Spain that led to the
signing of the contract by the Guggenheim officials and Basques representatives as
follows:
The whole thing that motivated Bilbao would be the economic success throughout Spain in the 80s and the policies of the Felipe Gonzalez [former Socialist Prime Minister of Spain] government. The specific comparable example was probably the selection of Barcelona as the host of Summer Olympics in 1992. Barcelona had long reflected the strategies of substantial and inspired investment in public infrastructures and projects Bilbao was slow to rise to coordinate an industrial policy for a number of reasons. After getting out from under Franco in the late
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1970s, they were still blinking their eyes and for years they were getting charged up with developing their own destiny. It took them a little bit longer to come to the realization that they did indeed have the authority to do this. Also, the fact that they were fiscally autonomous was a huge factor, because it meant that the money came from the private sector and you didn’t have to mess around with the central government which if you did, it wouldn’t happen.64
Krens recognized that although the European Union was, at the time, comprised
of twelve countries, there were actually fourteen fiscally autonomous regions, adding the
two autonomous regions in Spain - the Basque Country and Navarra, with which he could
negotiate. Spain had created two additional fiscal entities within its new democratic
state, the Basque Country and Navarra. Carmen Gimenez, former Minister of Culture
under the Socialist Felipe Gonzalez and founder of the Reina Sofia Museum of
Contemporary Art in Madrid during the late 1980s, assisted Krens to initiate negotiations
with the Basques. Carmen was actually working for The Solomon R. Guggenheim
Museum as one of its high profile, international curators of twentieth century art and had
an outstanding reputation for developing projects and making them happen.65 Gimenez
assisted in the negotiations between Krens and the Basque politicians in the area, which
was basically the Basque Nationalist Party, the PNV.
The project was a party dream, with nationalist motives that involved almost every imaginable calculation other than art. Josu Ortuando, mayor of Bilbao said, ‘We were able to win out over Salzburg and other cities because city hall, parliament, and the Basque government could act as one.’ Though it is not clear that the other cities wanted to win, what the mayor was referring to was the fact that all three levels of government were controlled by the PNV.
64 Thomas Krens, interview with author, tape recording, New York, New York, 24 June 1998. 65 Kim Bradley, “The Deal of the Century,” Art in America. July 1997, 50. 66 Mark Kurlansky, The Basque History o f the World. (Walker Publishing Company, United States, 1999), 335.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 36 Krens admits that Bilbao was not an inevitable project and that timing had
everything to do with clinching the deal.67 Before he went to Spain, Krens considered
Austria as the country of choice for his new museum. But according to Krens, the
Salzburg project did not go forward because of the collapse in the Soviet Union. He
maintains that the extreme political situation in Austria during the late 1980s and early
1990s hindered the process of the Austrian Guggenheim museum.68 The government was
considering investing $500 million into the project at the time. When the Soviet breakup
began, however, Krens explains that the onslaught of economic refugees at the Austrian
border caused Austria to withdraw support for the Guggenheim project69 Krens was left
without a new museum for political reasons. Enter the Basque Country and Bilbao.
In the winter of 1990, Carmen Gimenez acted as a liaison between the Basque
Administration and The Guggenheim Foundation. She was, at that time, fully engaged as
the Curator of Twentieth-Century Art for The Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum in New
York. Gimenez presented the Basques’ invitation to Thomas Krens to visit Bilbao, which
he did for the first time on April 9, 1991. A group of Basque politicians, including Juan
Ignacio Vidarte Fernandez, Director of Fiscal and Financial Policy for the Diputacion
Foral de Bizkaia, escorted Krens via helicopter over the city of Bilbao. They took him to
visit the Lehendakari [governor of the region] and toured the site of theAlhondiga , an
early twentieth-century former wooden warehouse, which had been identified by the
67 Thomas Krens, interview with author, tape recording, New York, New York, 24 June 1998. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid.
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Basques as a likely site for the new museum.70 From this initial visit, the Guggenheim
Foundation, as represented by Krens, established six criteria for the continued
consideration of Bilbao as a potential location for the new museum. They were:
1. A new building of sufficient importance and stature to make the new museum a significant architectural statement in its own right; 2. A local and regional commitment to operations - sufficient to develop international programming; 3. A commitment to the development of an indigenous collection for a Bilbao museum with acquisitions funds provided by the Basque Administration; 4. Consultation of the Guggenheim Foundation at all stages of the planning process; 5. A professional feasibility study to assess the suitability of the project, and 6. Completion o f the study within the calendar year.71
Krens clearly articulated that if the debate had dragged on longer and he had not
reached an agreement with the Basques by 1992, the project might not have been carried
out.
The collapse of the Soviet Union just didn’t make it to the edge of the plot by the end of 1991, although you could feel it shaking and there was this desperate attempt to get the final decision of this project delayed until 1992. Had it been delayed until 1992 they [the Austrians] would not have been obligated to come to some resolution on it until the end of the year and by that time it would have dropped out of sight. And so there it was. It may have been a lucky thing in some respects. I believe it was a function of good timing.72
The Basques agreed to these six conditions and the process began with a visit by
Krens and architect Frank O. Gehry, acting as consultant, to Bilbao on May 24th. This
trip was intended to give Krens and the Guggenheim Foundation a better idea about the
70 Museo Guggenheim Bilbao: Estudio de Viabilidad/Guggenheim Museum Bilbao: Feasibility Study. Diputacidn Foral de Bizkaia (Deputy Government of Biscay) and the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, 1992, 1.10. 71 Ibid., 1.11. 72 Thomas Krens, interview with author, tape recording, New York, New York, 24 June 1998.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 38 feasibility of the Alhondiga as a potential site for an international museum. The
Alhondiga as cultural center was a project that the Basques had identified long before The
Guggenheim became a possibility. The historic building was to be restructured and built
to accommodate a modem cultural center dedicated to researching and interpreting the
history of the Basque people. Upon visiting the structure, both Krens and Gehry
concluded that the building was not “strong enough” to represent an international project
of renown, and Krens eventually suggested that the site on the Nervion River be
considered by the Basques as an alternative.73
The new site was researched for feasibility in terms of government ownership
land rights. In the meantime, a group of Basque officials visited the New York
museum’s staff and trustees, toured the new facilities under construction in New York
City, saw parts of the Guggenheim collection, and signed a preliminary “memorandum of
understanding” with The Guggenheim.74
Krens suggested an architectural competition. He recommended Dr. Heinrich
Klotz, Director of the Zentrum fur Kunst und Medientechnologie in Karlsruhe, Germany,
as facilitator and final judge of the selection process. Krens then devised a four-step
design development process:
1. Three internationally renowned architects were invited to Bilbao to examine the new site and discuss their ideas with Guggenheim and Basque officials; 2. A design competition would be conducted, leading to an invitation to one of the three competing firms to design the building;
73 Museo Guggenheim Bilbao: Estudio de Viabilidad/Guggenheim Museum Bilbao: Feasibility Study. Diputacion Foral de Bizkaia (Deputy Government of Biscay) and the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, 1992,1.11. 74 Ibid., 1.11.
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3. A short but intense architectural design development process would be initiated to produce the fist comprehensive schematics and model. The architectural design process, project feasibility study and detailed programming development, would occur simultaneously; and 4. With the completion of the feasibility study and the various programming documents and with the formal approval of the Basque Administration and the Guggenheim Foundation Board of Trustees, final design development and refinement leading to working drawings would take place.75
Much of the international press implied that Krens’ plans to expand were a way to
keep the New York museum afloat financially. But, according to Krens, the strategy for
expanding the Guggenheim was in place well before any of these issues ever surfaced.
The Guggenheim buildings had not grown in 30 years. In the early 1960s it was the same
size floor space as the Museum of Modem Art. According to Krens’ theory, museums
continued to grow and take market share from one another, but the Guggenheim
administration and board did not want to try to counter-balance that and “grow to its own
demise.”76 The Guggenheim saw a potential to capitalize on an inherited situation of
having an international venue in Venice and expand on that “paradigm.” New York City
is saturated with art museums expanding into their own markets and vying for high-
priced real estate. In an attempt to exhibit more and draw crowds, they conduct large
capital campaigns to raise funds for just a few more square feet of exhibition space.
Krens, however, saw a way of building on the Guggenheim’s established international
audience and “economy of scale” with the potential to reach new audiences through a
common denominator of architecture and programming.77
75 Ibid., 1.12. 76 Thomas Krens, interview with author, tape recording, New York, New York, 24 June 1998. 77 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 40 In terms of programming, Krens has been criticized by art critics and museum
professionals for going beyond the Guggenheim’s “perceived” parameters of only
exhibiting modem and contemporary art. In February of 1998, the Guggenheim opened
an exhibition of Chinese history. Art critics asked why the Guggenheim should exhibit
China. Five months later, the museum presented a retrospective exhibit on the history of
the motorcycle (installed by Gehry) in the New York museum. The motorcycle exhibit
proved to draw the biggest audience for a single exhibition the Guggenheim museum had
ever seen. Krens has been able to generate the same audience numbers in Bilbao. The
Guggenheim is profiting from generating almost every exhibition they present, “whereas
at an institution like MOMA maybe 50% of what they do are major exhibitions with
collaborations with the Tate and other places.”78 One look at attendance and one begins
to see that Krens was right. The Guggenheim had a direct audience in New York and
Venice of 300,000 in 1988, and today, with Bilbao and Berlin, it has an audience of
3,000,000.79
In the book Cronica de una Seduccion. published in Spanish just before the
opening of the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao, Joseba Zulaika details the negotiations
between the Basque Country and The Guggenheim. Zulaika portrays Krens from the
Basque perception as a liar and manipulator. Zulaika’s book cover depicts an image of
the Gehry building in the foreground with an image of Uncle Sam extending his hand,
against an implied “Uncle Sam needs you to give me your money.” Zulaika talks of the
negotiation process as the Americanization of the Basque Country. He describes his
78 Ibid. 79 Ibid.
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fellow Basque citizens as poor, innocent and naive businessmen who were entirely
unaware of details of the contract they signed with Krens.80 Krens explains this portrayal
of his character as a manipulation of a series of interviews he had with Zulaika. His
discourse about the role of museums in society tells all:
We create desire inside the museum. I say that from a philosophical standpoint. Why do people want to come and see a motorcycle exhibition, for example? Why do they want to come and see objects of physical and aesthetic beauty? It has everything to do with the profession of desire. And even to the degree, this man [Zulaika] wrote, that I manipulated desire. Anyone can take any words they want and figure out a way to use them, and Zulaika had a very specific agenda. He wanted to become the kind of guy like our great friend Jose Oteiza [a renowned Basque sculptor], this sort of Basque man of letters who maintains a very independent profile. Oteiza is a smart enough guy to manipulate the popular press. They are men with sort of pro-Basque sentiments who take the standpoint of “me against the rest of the world” - that is Mr. Zulaika.81
Zulaika’s portrayal of his countrymen has overtones of nationalist sentiment and
fails to address the region’s need for creating a new identity. He mentions Basque
terrorism in his book only in passing. As an example of the stereotypical perception
Zulaika describes a scenario that occurred during negotiations. Krens invited leading
Basque politicians to opening receptions in the U.S., Russian and French Embassies in
Rome, Italy. The occasion was an exhibition of Kandinsky. When Krens introduced the
Basques to the party, “one member of the diplomatic corps who had lived in Madrid said,
‘Basques? Boom boom!”’ indicating their reputation as terrorists.82 Zulaika
acknowledges that during his tenure teaching at the University of Nevada in the Basque
80 Joseba Zulaika, Guggenheim Bilbao: Cronica de una Seduction. (Editorial NEREA, Madrid, Spain, 1997), 39-45. 81 Thomas Krens, interview with author, tape recording, New York, New York, 24 June 1998. 82 Joseba Zulaika, Guggenheim Bilbao: Crdnica de una Seduccion. (Editorial NEREA, Madrid, Spain, 1997), 39-117.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 42 Studies program, they received a call from The Guggenheim Foundation inquiring into
the Nationalist group ETA and the history of terrorism. The tone used indicates
Zulaika’s frustration that Basques are perceived as terrorists. Throughout the book,
Zulaika treats the Basques as poor, humble and innocent, while Krens is personified as a
big city capitalist shark only interested in saving his American museum.83
Contrary to this view, in the process of trying to build certain sustainability for the
New York Guggenheim, Krens has been subsequently hailed by the Basque Country for
helping them build a new sustainability in Bilbao. What was it that eventually convinced
the Guggenheim that Bilbao was the place to build? Krens argues that the process of
urban renewal that Bilbao had initiated, and their commitment to architectural excellence,
was very seductive to the Guggenheim. According to Krens:
We looked at the fact that they were building a new subway system and they selected Norman Foster to do it, Calatrava designed a new airport, Sterling renovated the train station, the overall redevelopment project was designed by Cesar Pelli, and they built a new concert hall and conference center. They drove all of that. But they wanted a new museum, and they wanted the museum to be in the Alhondiga, which was a renovation of an old building. We were in a position of being very simple and specific. We wanted to build a museum, and they wanted us to come to Bilbao - it had to be better than the Sydney Opera House, better in scale and better in location. Better location was where it sits now, on the Nervion River. Now whether that was arrogance or intuition, the fact of the matter is that the project works there. It crystalized at a certain time when we could take a leadership role.84
Krens went on to say:
I think it would be an exaggeration to suggest that we were doing anything more than becoming an extra motor for a plan or direction that was already underway. If you look at the options, what were the extremes for Bilbao and the Basque Country? To become like Albania five years ago isolated from the rest of the world and become an independent country? Or to become an economic region
83 Ibid. 84 Ibid.
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where matters of nationality and national boundaries matter less than regional economic vitality. They are moving, obviously, in this latter direction to where it won’t matter whether they are a part of Spain or not, because they will have their own identity. And there will be certain advantages to being part of a certain kind of union. And these unions will overlap - the European Union, a union with Spain, their own kind of regional coordination and an urban institute in the Basque Country. I think that when you are going to look for a symbol - to the degree that architecture has the capacity to become symbolic - then the people will be able to say, “Ah yes, the Guggenheim played this role in a watershed moment.” You can see it a little bit like when Australia started to become more o f a part of the rest of the world because the Sydney Opera House gave it a discemable image to the outside world. Would that have happened without the Sydney Opera House? Probably, but it wouldn’t have that identity. So that is what we have been able to do with our architecture. And that is what we both profited from because that identity is something that has now become a part of the Guggenheim as well. We have done it twice: Frank Lloyd Wright and Frank 0. Gehry.85
Krens and the Basques were clearly in need of one another. The Guggenheim
needed a city in Europe to finance a new museum building for its collections, and the
Basques needed to revitalize their economy and draw international press attention for
something other than terrorism. The feasibility study, published in 1992, provides more
insight into the collaborative efforts of both entities.
85 Thomas Krens, interview with author, tape recording, New York, New York, 24 June 1998.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER FIVE
FEASIBILITY STUDY - GUGGENHEIM MUSEUM BILBAO
The publication Museo Guggenheim Bilbao: Estudio de Viabilidad / Guggenheim
Museum Bilbao: Feasibility Study, details the plausibility of the project, its budget, a
market study of the projected attendance, and the overall impact on the Basque
community of the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao.86
Jose Alberto Pradero, then Deputy General of the Diputacidn wrote the Basques’
preface to the report In his brief letter, he summarizes motivations for the Basque
interest in the collaboration with the Guggenheim Foundation. The museum of modem
and contemporary art is presented as a way of “improving the Basque socio-cultural
environment.”87 He discusses the rapid negotiations and the importance of moving
forward with a project of this magnitude because, “a museum of modem and
contemporary art needs to have some basis, and no one doubts the quality of the
masterpieces the American [Guggenheim] foundation has...We would have to devote
years — many years -- to achieving a museum of such international reputation. At the
same time, this collaboration with the Guggenheim Foundation will allow us to open new
vistas for the development of Basque art.” He concludes, “It will enable the works of our
artists to circulate to an even greater extent, together with the best art exhibitions on an
86 Museo Guggenheim Bilbao: Estudio de Viabilidad/Guegenheim Museum Bilbao: Feasibility Study. Diputacion Foral de Bizkaia (Deputy Government of Biscay) and the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, 1992. 87 Ibid., ii. 44
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 45 international level. Most importantly, we will be enriched with the wholesome
atmosphere of spaces dedicated to art and culture.”88 This is a truly revealing section of
the report because it demonstrates the Basques’ desire to position themselves on an
international level while maintaining and promoting their local interests.
The preface from The Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, by Peter Lawson-
Johnston, grandson of Solomon and President of the Solomon R. Guggenheim
Foundation, confirms the Guggenheim Foundation’s interest in establishing a museum in
Bilbao and talks about the legacy of art collecting in the Guggenheim family.
In the introduction, the objectives of both entities are characterized briefly. The
fundamental rationale for the museum is detailed and there is a brief description of the
principal features of the collaboration, which are detailed in the body of the feasibility
study.
Fig. I. View o f downtown Bilbao, with new metro entrances designed by James Stirling.
88 Ibid.
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In the first chapter, entitled “Bilbao in the Twenty-First Century,” a concise and
general overview of the region is presented. The introduction informs the reader of the
geographic location of Bilbao within a description of the topography of the Basque
Region. Following this is a section entitled “Political Organization and Autonomy.” It is
within this text that the writers of the feasibility study articulate the political organization
and autonomy of the area and make a brief mention of the problem of terrorism.
After a period of heightened political and economic turmoil in the 1960s and 1970s, marked by widely publicized acts of separatist violence, the Basque Country has emerged from the post-Franco regime in Spain as a highly autonomous community.* 89
The text describes the political liberties granted to the Basque Region after the death of
Franco. This is perhaps the most blatant misrepresentation of the Basque Country in the
entire document. The feasibility study clearly underplayed the potential political risks to
the American-Basque museum. In contrast to the study, the terrorist activity of the
Basque group ETA had only recently begun to decline. It was not until after the
Guggenheim Museum Bilbao opened that ETA began to negotiate a truce with the
Spanish Partido Popular. But terror has threatened even the museum itself. The
museum planners clearly wanted to deter any terror-related attention to the museum as a
focal point for the international media and thereby minimize the importance of the
inherent risks. It was in the best interest of both groups, perhaps, to minimize the most
obvious, albeit stereotypical, risks of this multinational endeavor.
89 Ibid., 2.2.
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The study goes on to describe the fiscal authority of the government of the Basque
Region and a brief history of the region and its relationship to Europe. In the concluding
remarks of the section “Bilbao in the Twenty-first Century,” the study outlines the plans
of revitalization. It presents Bilbao as a major financial center on the Iberian Peninsula
by highlighting the fact that Spain’s largest private bank, Banco Bilbao-Bizkaia, is
located in the Basque Country. The subsection that follows includes a description of the
Port of Bilbao and its imminent relocation to the outer banks of the Nervion River. The
report details the improvements in the region’s communications and transportation
infrastructures, which include a new airport, improved highways, and alludes to the
amplification of the high-speed train T.G.V. from Madrid to Bilbao, construction of
which, to-date, has not begun. The report indicates a shift in industry interests, moving
from heavy metallurgical to the service sectors. The challenges in this conversion are
outlined briefly in the final section, which concludes with a summary of how the cultural
component, and most specifically the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao, will help to
transform Bilbao into a more desirable tourist destination within the Basque Region.90
Following the section on Bilbao as an urban cultural setting is “The Guggenheim
Foundation.” This is an extensive 30-page presentation on the history of the New York
institution, as outlined in the Chapter 1.
90 Ibid., 2.11.
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Fig. 2. Top front view o f Guggenheim Museum Bilbao under construction. Basque hills are seen in background.
“Guggenheim Museum Bilbao: The Art and Exhibitions Program,” the next
section of the feasibility study, details the future of the museums’ mutual relationship. It
projects the underlying global strategy of the Guggenheim Foundation and the
institution’s interest to “decentralize” the museum’s collections.
In the last decade, New York’s position as the center for contemporary art has waned. Artistic activity has become decentralized as a result of many factors, including dramatic increases in the speed of travel and communication.91
In two sentences, the Guggenheim Foundation positions itself at the very center of artistic
creation and articulates a need to reposition itself because that center has shifted. One
could argue that New York had lost the monopoly on the art market or that competing in
91 Ibid., 4.3
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the global economy has created a need to decentralize the museum so that it can maintain
its stronghold in the field of contemporary art museums. The authors confirm:
The contemporary art world has become increasingly international - linking the United States and Europe, as well as parts of Eastern Europe and Russia, the Far East, the Middle East, and South America. Likewise, major exhibitions such as the quadrennial “Documenta” in Kassel, Germany, and the “Biennale” in Venice have brought together artists, critics, and collectors from many points on the globe, and have helped establish an international forum for contemporary art.92
Evident throughout the feasibility study is a call for an international perspective on the
cultural world. The Guggenheim articulates the urgent need for a structure like the
Guggenheim Museum Bilbao in this section by stating, “Ideally, the presentation of
postwar European and American art requires a facility unlike any museum built before,
and a perspective that straddles both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. Those requirements are
met in the creation of the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao.”93
The study continues to outline the purpose and objectives of this site-specific
museum. It asserts the importance of creating an experience unlike that of the New York
and Venice museums. The Guggenheim Museum Bilbao, according to the study, would
distinguish itself by:
1) emphasizing European and postwar painting and sculpture; 2) presenting a group of artists in great depth, visually and historically; 3) presenting intense and quality programming in special exhibitions in an effort to draw repeat visitors; and 4) being housed in the Frank 0 . Gehry “architectural masterpiece” which will attract visitors.94
92 Ibid., 4.3 93 Ibid., 4.4. 94 Ibid., 4.4
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 50 It is the last point that has been attributed by many critics and travel journalists, both
implicitly and explicitly, as the main “draw” to the museum.
The exhibition programming is outlined without articulating any specific artists
names o f works to be displayed in the museum. In the section “General Program and
Standard of Excellence,” the study stipulates that the New York foundation seeks to
establish one of the best museums of modem and contemporary art in the world,
featuring international artists of the twentieth century. Furthermore, the museum’s
standards of excellence, in collections, scholarship, and programming expertise, are made
available to the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao (GMB). In the final paragraph, there is a
vague stipulation of works that will not be made available to the GMB, “With the
exception of works of art that are bound by contract or other legal restrictions not to be
lent, and works of art whose precarious condition prevents them from traveling, all works
in the Guggenheim Foundation collections can and are likely to be shown.”95
Many Basque and Spanish journalists criticized this clause extensively, blaming
the Basque planners for not insisting upon a clearly articulated document detailing which
works would be available for display. However, as has been demonstrated by the
programming in the first two years of operation, the GMB has had access to many of the
best works on display in New York. The works referred to as “bound by contract or other
legal restrictions” are most likely bequeathed gifts which, as stipulated by the donor,
cannot travel outside of the New York museum. By articulating this in the feasibility
study, the Guggenheim Foundation was demonstrating a very high level of museum
95 Ibid., 4.5
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Spanish journalists.
Next, models of organization and presentation are outlined. Here, the Solomon R.
Guggenheim Foundation (SRGF) “recognizes three basic models, or paradigms, for
museum exhibitions and development of a permanent collections,” and continues thus:
• Encyclopedic, chronological as the most traditional way to collections and installations; • Monographic (single-artist or single art movement) as a biographical or stylistic approach; • Site-specific installations, regarded as the most contemporary.
The Guggenheim Foundation articulates that a combination o f the above three models
optimizes the museum-goer’s experience.96
The study outlines the distribution of space in the new museum and how it will be
used for exhibitions. The space breakdown is as follows:
• Core collection installation of European and American painting and sculpture from the 19th century to the present (30%) • In-depth installations of ten to thirteen artists of historical importance who have made a significant contribution to the international development of postwar art, to be contiguous to and integrated with a general presentation of the core collections • Large and small-scale special exhibitions either organized by the Guggenheim or by other international prominent museums • Temporary site-specific installations for both established and younger artists.97
Again, criticism has been made because of a lack of a specific presence for Basque and
Spanish artists in this section. This is one of the most crucial errors of the feasibility
study and the overall exhibition strategy of the museum. Thomas Krens said it himself,
There was a letter from the Herri Batasuna [the political party which backs the terrorist group ETA] about laying priority for the Basque culture, which I have no
96 Ibid., 4.6 97 Ibid., 4.8
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 52 disagreement with whatsoever. I consistently told the Basques from the beginning that our objective is hardly cultural imperialism, which was an easy “handle” for many of the political differences for this project for other reasons. But in fact it was and is quite the reverse. We are very much interested in not only providing those cultural activities the opportunity to be developed and flourish within the Basque Country, but to also import those cultural ideas and attitudes here because we have positioned ourselves as an international institution.98
If Krens were to be taken by his word, the presence of the Basque artists would
have been clearly articulated in the original study, which it was not. In his defense, an
internationally recognized Basque artist bom in San Sebastian, Cristina Iglesias, had a
one-woman show originate in the New York museum and then travel to the Guggenheim
Museum Bilbao from November 6,1998 to February 14,1999." Further, Eduardo
Chillida, a renowned Basque artist whose work usually takes the form of immense iron
sculptures, is part of the GMB’s permanent collection. The GMB gave him a
retrospective exhibition in the summer of 1999, recognizing his contributions to Basque
culture in a way that many Basque and Spanish critics felt he richly deserved.100
Next, the feasibility study outlines the importance of special exhibitions and
programming of superior quality which should be generated by the GMB, from the
following sources:
• Exhibitions developed by the Guggenheim staff and shown at both institutions - New York and Bilbao - as well as other major museums in various countries. • Those developed by the Guggenheim staff specifically for and shown exclusively in Bilbao; and
98 Thomas Krens, interview with author, tape recorder, June 24,1998. 99 “The Guggenheim Museum Bilbao to Inaugurate an Exhibition o f Work by Cristina Iglesias,” Press Release from the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao, 1998. 100 “Action Plan and Program for 1999,” Press release from the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao, January 12, 1999.
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• Those exhibitions developed by other major museums and presented at the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao, which may or may not include New York.101
This is clearly the point where the Guggenheim Foundation hoped to capitalize on the
economy of scale and assist its branch museums in resourceful exhibitions planning. The
section that follows in the study articulates the administrative and curatorial expertise,
which specifies that the exhibitions and programming are to be determined by the
international curatorial group, comprised of Krens, Carmen Gimenez and Germano
Celant, among others.
The last section, “New Acquisitions and Collections Development,” details the
interrelationship between the New York, Venice, and Bilbao museums and the
importance of on-going collecting by each institution to make the sum of the collections
one of the most extensive of its kind in the world. Funds are to be provided by the
Basque administration to purchase works with curatorial assistance provided by the
Guggenheim Foundation. The function of this collecting is threefold:
• To strengthen the historical appeal of the museum in terms of a permanent collection; • To provide a measure of long-term security in creating an independent body of work with which to anchor the museum in Bilbao; and • To create and build a collections development program in close collaboration with the Guggenheim Foundation, which will work to guarantee the long-term participation of the Guggenheim in the Bilbao museum.102
It is specified that the Guggenheim curatorial staff, in collaboration with the GMB, will
recommend acquisitions to be made to the Basque administration and that any purchase
101 Museo Guggenheim Bilbao: Estudio de Viabilidad/Guggenheim Museum Bilbao: Feasibility Study. Diputacion Foral de Bizkaia (Deputy Government of Biscay) and the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, 1992., 4.8 102 Ibid., 4.10-4.11.
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will be property of the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao. In conclusion, the Guggenheim
Foundation encourages the extension of the museum’s role in the urban revitalization of
Bilbao by identifying sites throughout the city where outdoor sculpture, paintings and
installations may be displayed.103
Fig. 3. Front view of the museum under construction, with a view of the Puente de la Salve Bridge.
The feasibility study section “Guggenheim Museum Bilbao: The Site,” is a
detailed description of the use of the land designated for the GMB. While the actual
location may be important as a component of the overall success of the museum, little
information is revealed about the direct implications on the long-term feasibility o f the
institution. The single most interesting fact about the site location is the fact that it was
Thomas Krens (and perhaps Frank 0. Gehry himself) who had the vision to place the
museum along the banks of the Nervion river rather than in the old Alhondiga building.
L03 Ibid., +.13
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 55 This location is strategic in so far as it places the Guggenheim building at the very heart
of the city, surrounding it with the chaotic traffic of thePuente de la Salve (the Salve
Bridge) and incorporating the structure within the noise and bustle of the metropolis.104
Fig. 4. Panoramic back view of the museum under construction.
The most intriguing side of the Bilbao Guggenheim is the back. Set against a man-made pond, the shiny titanium structures look like a cartoon port, the sort of place where tugboats with big smiles might dock. The traffic speeding over the high, green La Salve Bridge, across the Nervion, appears to be getting swallowed by this titanium monster.1 3
The chapter “Guggenheim Museum Bilbao: The Architecture” focuses on what is
perhaps one of the most important considerations whether addressing the immediate
success, or potential for short-term sustainability for the project. The study articulates
Frank 0 . Gehry as architect for the museum and the building-design process. The
process for selecting Gehry was orchestrated by Krens, and it could be argued that he
104 Joseba Zulaika, Guggenheim Bilbao: Cronica de una Seduccion. (Editorial NEREA, Madrid. Spain, 1997), 95-97. 105 Mark Kurlansky, The Basque History o f the World. (Walker Publishing Company, Inc., United States, 1999), 340.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 56 manipulated the competition so that Gehry would win.106 Even before the competition
was established, Gehry visited Bilbao with Krens to assess the feasibility of the
Alhondiga as the site of the GMB.107 Krens was responsible for envisioning the future
GMB at its present location along the banks of the Nervion River. He appointed three
architects to the competition. No Basque architect was considered for the project. Not
even Santiago Calatrava or Rafael Moneo, two world-renowned Spanish architects, was
asked to submit designs for the building. Meanwhile, Gehry competed against Arata
Isosaki of Japan, and Wolfgang Prix and Helmut Swinzky of the firm Coop Himmelblau
in Austria.108
All the apparent maneuvering by Krens ended with the selection of Gehry as
architect for the building on the site that Krens most desired. The building’s architecture
has been the most important factor for the short-term feasibility. As such, Krens’
manipulation of the process could arguably be his most important role as “visionary” - he
made the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao the architectural masterpiece it is by ensuring
Gehry’s role in its design.
The Bilbao Guggenheim is not a construction with anything secret about it: it is an open celebration of the supremacy of sight, containing one cave only, set aside for its designer. The museum visually occupies the heart of the city, and its mass has become the city’s center; all that can be admired and viewed inside the museum is of no importance. Built on an abandoned portion of industrial land, Gehry’s edifice has grafted a genetic mutation so spectacular that not even the
106 Joseba Zulaika, Guggenheim Bilbao: Cronica de una Seduccion. (Editorial NEREA, Madrid. Spain, 1997), 95-97. 107 Ibid., 93. 108 Museo Guggenheim Bilbao: Estudio de Viabilidad/Guggenheim Museum Bilbao: Feasibility Study. Diputacion Foral de Bizkaia (Deputy Government o f Biscay) and the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, 1992., 6.2
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most reckless of scientists could ever have imagined it: the city of Bilbao, once the “forge” of Spain, has become a single, great museum.109
Without a doubt, the architectural design of the GMB has been the pivotal marketing
force behind the entire project. Without an edifice o f this magnitude and scale, who
would have cared about a new contemporary art museum opening in such a remote
destination like Bilbao? In her book, entitled Toward a New Museum. Victoria
Newhouse demonstrates that “architecture is art and a museum’s architecture is part of
the art experience.” 110 The book, which features the Guggenheim Bilbao interior on the
cover and the most extensive photographic essay within, includes the museum in the
section entitled “The Museum as Environmental Art,” which would in fact confirm that
Bilbao the city is the museum and the museum’s architecture - the art.111
However, the building itself is not enough to bring art and architecture lovers to
the doorstep of Bilbao. Arguably, Krens and his vision of the Guggenheim
“constellation” of museums requires both enormous administrative expertise and a
thorough understanding and practice of the highest museum standards. Krens’ vision for
The Guggenheim Museum is not one central museum controlling all of the venues or
“satellites” as the press has termed it, but rather a “constellation” of cultural institutions
with programmatic and some administrative autonomy. The ultimate long-range success
of the museum depends upon return visitors and quality programming. It has been
109 Francesco Dal Co, “The World Turned Upside-Down: The Tortoise Flies and the Hare Threatens the Lion,” from Frank O. Gehrv: The Complete Works, by Francesco Dal Co, Kurt W. Forster; building descriptions by Hadley Arnold, Electa, Milano, English Edition, The Monacelli Press, Inc., both 1998, page 59. 110 D.J.R. Bruckner, “Framing Devices,” review of Towards a New Museum, by Victoria Newhouse, The New York Times Book Review. August 16,1998, p.9. 111 Victoria Newhouse, Towards a New Museum. (The Monacelli Press, 1998), 220.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 58 enough for the moment that architectural critics around the world declare this building an
international monument of the turn of the new century. The short- and long-term success
of the museum depends upon a continued collaboration between the Basques and the
New York institution as well as the continued politicalsavoir-faire of the museums’
directors.
Further, the museum programming and exhibitions schedule is of such an
enormous scale that without the backbone of an institution like The Solomon R.
Guggenheim Foundation and its inherent reputation for quality exhibitions, the
Guggenheim Museum Bilbao cannot have produced the same success with just another
Gehry building. Many buildings have been proclaimed masterpieces but few have the
combination of elements that have made the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao so fascinating,
and, hence, successful.
The following section of the feasibility study, “Capital Costs and Technical
Analysis,” outlines the architectural, engineering and technical costs for the building.
Again, while of interest for the museum planner because of the extremely efficient use of
resources and timeliness in completion (Gehry has been hailed for completing the
building on schedule and within budget), this section is not key to the thesis. However, a
brief overview of the section is as follows:
• Construction cost - the 24,000 square-meter museum cost $98 million to build; • The original model was 36,000 square-meters but was reduced for budgetary and programming reasons; • Costs include building, landscaping, parking lot, and surrounding area redesign; • Museum has four levels of galleries built over a single level of parking.112
112 Museo Guggenheim Bilbao: Estudio de Viabilidad/Guegenheim Museum Bilbao: Feasibility Study.’Th'putacion Foral de Bizkaia (Deputy Government o f Biscay) and the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, 1992., 7.1-7.8
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The purchase of the land for the building, ownership of the building,
establishment of the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao Foundation and other legal and
financial responsibilities are all described in the section “Legal Structure and Capital
Funding.” Three components of the region’s government --the Basque Government, the
Diputacion Foral de Bizkaia (Regional Council of Biscay), and the Ayuntamiento de
Bilbao (Bilbao City Council)-- all contributed funds for the property management
company which contracted and paid for the architect and the building. In turn, the
building is leased to the newly created Guggenheim Museum Bilbao Foundation. This
Foundation is then responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of the building and
surrounding facilities as an overall cost of the museum operations. The permanent
members of the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao Foundation are the Basque Government,
the Diputacion Foral de Bizkaia, and the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation.
Membership is open to other institutions and individuals that make substantial economic
contributions to the foundation.
The GMB Foundation is ultimately responsible for all the management of the
museum, funding all capital requirements and operating expenses to the museum and is
entitled to any revenue surplus generated by the museum operations. The direction and
operation of the museum is delegated to the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation under a
programming and management services agreement with the GMB Foundation. The term
o f management is twenty years and renewable for an indefinite number of successive
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 60 terms.113 While the tradition of personal and institutional philanthropy in the Basque
Region and even Spain is limited, the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao introduced the
partnership between individual, government and foundation supported institutions in the
region. The Thyssen-Bomemisza Museum, a private collection amassed by the Swiss
family by the same name, created a museum in the early 1990s in Madrid very similar to
the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao.114
During construction, the SRG Foundation assisted with ensuring the building was
completed on schedule and as stipulated by the architect. The SRG Foundation also
began to develop the collection for the GMB Foundation. Upon opening, the SRG
Foundation provides curatorial, technical and management expertise in operating the
following facets of the museum:
• Developing collections and special exhibitions programming; • Designing educational programs for visitors to the museum; • Publishing and research; • Creating and directing the implementation of a marketing and retail plan; and • Conducting conservation, storage, photography, and other functions typical of a museum of this scale and quality.115
Finally, this section articulates the creation of an Association of Friends of the
Museum; “Membership in the Association of Friends would be available to individuals
and corporations who contribute to the museum either financially, or by volunteering
their services for museum activities or to persons whose achievements in the arts and
113 Ibid., 8.1-8.5. 114 Selma Holo, Bevond the Prado: Museums and Identity in Democratic Spain. (Smithsonian Press, United States, 1999), 46-54. 115 Museo Guggenheim Bilbao: Estudio de Viabilidad/Guggenhcim Museum Bilbao: Feasibility Studv.”Diputacion Foral de Bizkaia (Deputy Government of Biscay) and the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, 1992., 8.6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 61 dedication to the promotion of a wider understanding of the visual arts merits special
recognition” can also be recognized.116
The Operating Plan details extensively the economy of scale to which the GMB
would be privy through its affiliation with the SRGM. The benefits of this collaboration
are outlined as follows:
• GMB secures an organizational and programming advantage rare among start up museums; • Upon opening, the GMB is equipped, staffed, and trained at the highest level of museum professional standards; • GMB benefits from the expertise, goodwill, and ongoing synergies with the Guggenheim in New York; • From the beginning the GMB enjoys privileged access to art loans, traveling exhibitions, corporate sponsorships, and technical expertise, placing it on par with other mature and internationally respected museums; • A dedicated Bilbao liaison office in New York City offices; • Computer network linking Bilbao, New York and Venice; • Programming direction, conservation, and collections management, and policy guidelines to be established and executed by the Bilbao museum administrative director.117
Fig. 5. Front view o f museum - shown are the administrative offices o f the structure.
116 Ibid., 8.7. 117 Ibid., 9 .1 -9 .6
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In “Market Study and Economic-Impact Analysis,” the most crucial and criticized
information of the study is detailed. When it was presented to the public, none of the
museum’s detractors believed the projected number of tourists the group predicted. The
purpose of this portion of the study was to examine and evaluate the potential demand
and likely market for the museum and projected the positive impact the GMB would have
on the Basque economy. KMPG Peat Marwick conducted the attendance study. The
group developed surveys of the market to determine the potential draw the museum
would have. One survey was directed toward the Basque region and another toward “at-
large,” more distant visitors.118 The second group was defined as tourists and business
people who would normally come within a reasonable distance of the building to enable a
visit to the museum. The market study for the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao projected an
anticipated demand o f267,196 to 801,032 visitors per year.119 This range of visitors was
based upon the study’s development of four scenarios:
Table 1.-Annual Demand120 ART PREFERENCE ANNUAL MUSEUM GOING TOTAL VISITORS FREQUENCY Modem Art Two or more times 267,196
Modem Art & Indifferent Two or more times for visitors 594,547 between modem and classical from outlying areas Modem & Indifferent between One or more times 668,948 modem and classical Modem & classical and One or more times 801,032 indifferent between modem and classical
118 Ibid., 10.2 119 Ibid., 103 120 Ibid., 10.4
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The study goes on to break down the statistics into charts and graphs, accounting
for type of museum preferred, responses to permanent and temporary collections, i museum price sensitivity, visitor age, and geographic studies of the projected visitorship.
Much of the data collected was based on figures from other museums throughout Spain,
including the Prado Museum in Madrid (2,473,001 annual visitors), the Picasso Museum
in Barcelona (446,537), and the Museum of Fine Arts in Bilbao (109,008).121
The report goes on to predict the economic impact that the museum will have on
the metropolitan area of Bilbao. The studies projected that the museum would generate
$4 million in annual tax revenues and, using the economic multiplier to project overall
rise in gross economic activity, the study predicted increased business spending
throughout the region of approximately $3 5 million per year.
Finally, the authors anticipated that the museum would create 500 new jobs
during the four-year construction of the museum and 200 new jobs directly related with
the daily operations of the institution. The section concludes with a subsection entitled
“Catalytic Economic Impact,” which talks specifically about the long-term multiplier
effect of building a museum of international reputation upon the economy. According to
the study, cultural tourism pays, eight dollars for every one-dollar spent on tourism and
image promotion.122
In October o f 1998, the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao released its first annual
report on the operations of the museum. Since the grand opening o f the museum on
121 Ibid., 10.15 122 Ibid., 10.21
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 64 October 19, 1997 the total number of visitors to the museum was 1,360,000.123 The art
museum critics never expected the museum to draw the number of visitors projected by
the study, let alone surpass them to that extreme. The report goes on to state that during
the months of June and July of the first year, 84% of visitors to the museum came to
Bilbao expressly for that purpose.124
Similarly, KPMG Peat Marwick conducted surveys during the first year of
operations and reported incredible numbers in their annual report. In the first year of
activity, they reported that with the domino effect of the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao,
Bilbao experienced:
• $50 million earned by hotels, guest houses and other kinds of accommodations • $14 million earned by transportation • $80 million earned by restaurants, bars, cafeterias • $62 million earned by shops • $30 million earned by the museum itself (tickets, restaurants, purchases, etc.)125
Demonstrably, the museum is a financial success, and Bilbao is benefiting from the
success.
Finally, the last chapter o f this thesis briefly outlines the timeline for the construction of
the museum. According to the report the museum was originally scheduled to open in 1996.
Delays were caused by a lag in the early planning stages, though the building was, in fact, »
completed on schedule and within its budget.
123 “First Anniversary Report,” The Guggenheim Museum Bilbao Foundation, October 19, 1998, 3. 124 Ibid., 4. 125 “Impact o f the activities o f the Fundacion del Museo Guggenheim Bilbao on the Basque Country,” KPMG Peat Marwick, October 1998,4.
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FINAL CONCLUSIONS: URBAN RENEWAL, CULTURAL TOURISM
AND POLITICAL RISK
Fig. 6. Entrance to the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao, October 16. 1997.
Not everything went as planned as prefigured in the feasibility study. On
October 15,1997 - just one the day before the grand opening of the Guggenheim
Museum Bilbao -- Thomas Krens presented a letter to the international press
flocking to the metropolis for the event.
On behalf of the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, I want to express my profound sadness that a member of the Bilbao police force, Jose Maria Aguirre, was killed this week while in the course of monitoring the avenues surrounding the new museum. At no time was the staff of the museum or the collection at risk. We are grateful to the local police and the security team of the museum for their swift and effective response. Security will continue to be tight to assure the safety of all visitors to the museum and of the artworks.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 66 I do want to state that I deplore this incident not only because of the death of the police officer, but also because it projects to the press and international visitors assembled in Bilbao for the opening of this great museum a very different image of the Basque country than the one we have experienced in our six years if working here. From our colleagues in the government to those highly skilled teams who have worked on the museum, to the restaurant owners and local Bilbaoans— our partners—we have found the Basque people to be uniformly warm, hospitable, outward looking, and adventurous. We look forward to our long association with the Basque people, and sincerely hope that this cynically opportunistic attack will not undermine the perception of the enormous efforts that have been made by so many people to bring this remarkable project to fruition.126
Just before the grand opening of the museum, and only one day before the
preview to the press, ETA placed a bomb outside the museum in the giant Jeff Koons’
sculpture “Puppy.” The bomb was intended to detonate the following day when Spain’s
King Juan Carlos arrived at the inaugural event.
Most of the media’s attention was focused on the spectacular building and the
media buzz was about all of the celebrity art lovers in the city for the event. Meanwhile,
the citizens of Bilbao and the Basque region expressed their outrage against the terrorist
attempt against the monarchy with a public demonstration in the streets of Bilbao. Since
the early 1990s, Spaniards, Basques, and Bilbaoans alike have protested separatist
violence with increasing unity and numbers. A small mound of flowers was created by
citizens at the exact location where the policeman had lost his life, just a few feet from
the entrance of the museum. The Spanish press decried the attempt and ETA, who took
126 Thomas Krens to members o f the press, October 15,1997
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 67 responsibility for the act, was accused of using the museum’s opening as a way of
attacking the monarchy.127
As a report on the Spanish National Radio that day from Bilbao disclosed:
The ETA commando had a long list of targets with the names of politicians, judges, journalists, businessmen, policemen, and soldiers. Their next action would have been an attack on the Guggenheim museum at its inauguration this coming Saturday. But Atutxa [Juan Maria Atutxa, the Basque Regional Government’s Interior Minister] did not believe that the attack would have been directly aimed against the King. This is what he said: “I would not go so far as to say that the King would have been the priority target, that is to say, they can attack the person of the King on any other occasion. I would say that the priority goals were the repercussions, the publicity, the notoriety at international level, millions and millions of people seeing through the media that ETA had the capacity for such an attack.”128
The museum and the international press in the city were the targets for the terrorists,
according to this report. The terrorist attempt, however, received very little coverage in
the media. In the U.S., reports were buried in newspapers and did not surface in articles
until some time after the opening of the museum. Journalists minimized the significance
of the attempt on the building, which was overshadowed by Gehry’s architectural
wonder. Although Thomas Krens’ letter expressed astonishment that there even was such
an attempt, after his having dealt with the Basques for almost seven years, it is hard to
imagine that he was unaware of the political situation in the region. When asked whether
he ever thought terrorism was a potential risk, he responded:
Of course I was aware of it. I thought that it was a potential risk because it is somewhat of an issue, but what are you going to do? I have always said when the issue came up along the way, if you were to calculate the victims of physical violence in the Basque Country, for example in the years that I have been traveling to Bilbao, London outweighs Bilbao about five-to-one in indiscriminate
127 “Basque Minister Confirms Attempted ETA Museum Attack,” Madrid Radio Nacional Espadola- 1, Radio Network in Spanish, October IS, 1997, Foreign Broadcast Information Services (FBIS) Translated Excerpt 128 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 68 violence. Yet London is hardly known as a terrorist battleground and somehow Bilbao is. That is point number one. Point number two is that there was a big difference in atmosphere between 1991 and 1992 when there were certain amounts of terrorist activity I think that in those days between 1992 and 1997 - if there were going to be any generation of a political confrontation between the Guggenheim and the Basques, it probably would have surfaced with certain indicators. The indicators have never been in that direction. They have always been against the monarchy and the King, not the museum. If anybody ever wanted to perpetuate some violence against the museum, it is a pretty easy target and there was never any evidence that it was an issue.129
Krens’ assessment that the Basques’ primary targets were politicians and the monarchy is
accurate to a degree. In the two years leading up to opening of the museum, there were
several attempts by ETA targeted at key tourist destinations in Spain as a way of
attacking the most important industry in the country.
The Basque separatist organization ETA carried out three-weekend bomb blasts, including one causing five serious injuries, in its continuing campaign to cripple Spain’s tourist industry. In the worst of a series of attacks that began two weeks ago, a bomb exploded late Saturday at the Reus airport near the northeast city of Tarragona, 85 kilometers (50 miles) down the coast from Barcelona, injuring 33 people including 25 Britons. Five people - a Spanish airport worker and four British tourists - were seriously injured but out of danger, medical officials said. Also Saturday, two small bombs went off at a hotel in Cambrils and on a boardwalk In Salou, where security forces evacuated the areas concerned. Both towns were targets of ETA attacks last year. On Sunday another explosive device was disabled at a hotel in Salou.130
Although Krens acknowledged in an interview that the profile of the museum
lends itself towards garnering international attention for the group, he declined to
acknowledge his awareness of the fact that tourism and attractions in Spain have also
been a target of ETA.131 Could he really have been surprised by the attempted attack?
The data of actual deaths attributed to ETA is as follows:
129 Thomas Krens, interview with author, tape recording, New York, New York, 24 June 1998. 130 Claude Casteran, “Basque Militants Target Spanish Tourism Industry,” Agence France Presse, July 21,1998. 131 Thomas Krens, interview with author, tape recording, New York, New York, 24 June 1998.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 69 Table 2.-Assassinations by ETA132
By Year Number Percentage By Region Number Percentage 1960-1964 I 0.1% Basque Country 555 68% 1965-1969 3 0.3 Madrid 116 14 1970-1974 25 3.1 Catalonia 52 6.4 1975-1979 201 25 Navarra 37 4.6 1980-1984 247 30.5 Aragon 13 1.6 1985-1989 170 21 Andalusia 11 1.4 1990-1994 124 15.3 Cantabria 6 .74 1995-1999 39 4.8 Other regions 20 2.5
These statistics are startling because they indicate the highest number of assassinations in
the Basque Region and continued activity well in to the 1990s. They do not, however,
reveal many of the serious thwarted attempts to kill tourists, politicians and innocent
citizens, nor do they reveal the extensiveness of the group’s many other tactics. This data
only reflects the number of assassinations and not the number of attempts.
The Potential Impact of Terrorism on Tourism in Bilbao
Basque government leaders built the new Guggenheim Museum in the Basque city of Bilbao hoping to deflect attention from their region’s separatist violence. Instead, the museum has become a focal point of it — even before King Juan Carlos inaugurates the showcase structure on Saturday. Blood was shed on museum grounds Monday, when a policeman was shot and killed by three men he was questioning as they unloaded flower arrangements from a van. Police later found machine guns and grenades hidden among the flowerpots. Two of the gunman fled, including the killer. A third, Kepa Arronategui, was captured and acknowledged Friday in a Madrid courtroom that he was a member of the armed Basque separatist group ETA.133
132 “La Banda Terrorista ETA Ha Asesinado a 810 Personas,” La Banda Terrorist ETA, http://www.avt.org/etc.victimas.html 133 Pamela Rolfe, “Spain's Guggenheim Museum, built to deflect attention from violence, attracts it,” The Detroit News. Saturday, October 18, 1997, detnews.com.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 70 Terrorism is meant to threaten governments politically and economically, an
attempt to force the government to concede to the political demands of the terrorists.
Terrorist-imposed economic costs may stem from at least four sources:134
1. Losses from tourist revenue, when tourists respond to the risk of terrorist attacks by spending their vacation in a safer location. 2. The country’s future stock of capital may be reduced through smaller inflows of investment from abroad. 3. Terrorist attacks can destroy infrastructure, thereby causing economic disruption. 4. Resources used to deter terrorist attacks and/or to capture terrorists represent opportunity costs.135
In their study of the effects of terrorism upon foreign direct investment (FDI) in Spain
and Greece, Walter Enders and Todd Sandler introduce the assertion that “if the expected
costs are associated with making concessions, then the government should hold its
ground. Otherwise, the government should negotiate or else allocate sufficient resources
to nullify the threat.”136 They go on to conclude that there exists a measurable and
significant threat of terrorism on FDI in both Spain and Greece. According to their 1996
study, terrorism reduced annual FDI in Spain by 13.5% and that this figure is significant
because of its effect upon economic growth.137
Ironically enough, it is Zulaika’s highly critical book “Cronica de una Seduccion”
that gives some indication of such an effect upon economic growth in the Basque
Country. In his opening paragraph of the section entitled “Esperando al Guggenheim”
(“ Waiting for the Guggenheim "), he alludes to the fact that many American companies
were contemplating investing in the region:
134 ‘Terrorism and Foreign Direct Investment in Spain and Greece,” Enders, Walter and Todd Sandler. KYKLOS. Vol. 49, 1996, Fasc. 3,311. 135 Ibid. 136 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 71 It was a period of waiting. McDonnell Douglas, General Motors, Volvo, Rolls Royce were all among the companies being rumored close to landing in the Basque Country to save the economy. Just like the British in the last century, they were about to dock with their ships of gold, their finances, and their football teams. But, for whatever reason, they never came. It was the period in which Lopez de Arriortua, the Basque “emissary” to General Motors in Detroit, promised to be the savior with a line of super-economical cars in Amorebieta. Not even they came. Arriortua would wind up walking out on the Americans and taking his team and his controversy to the German Volkswagen.138
Basque native Jose Ignacio Lopez de Arriortua, who became a top executive at General
Motors in the United States, dreamed of building an automotive factory in his hometown
of Amorebieta in the Basque Country. But not even a Basque working for General
Motors could find a way to get an American company to invest in the region. Could
terrorism have been the deterrent? The Koordinadora Abertzale Sozialista (KAS) --
believed to be the umbrella group that directs the operations of ETA - obtains a
significant portion of its operating funds from the extortion of Spanish businessmen and
through bank robberies in the Basque region. The businesses and bank robberies are not
indiscriminate: letters to victims of ETA indicate that targets of this blackmail were
suspected supporters of government-sponsored attempts to oppress the Basques.139
While the connection can only be inferred, there must be a reason that these companies
did not risk what the Guggenheim did.
The propensity of ETA to strike tourist attractions and their attempts to gamer
international attention for their cause makes the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao a
particularly vunerable target. Although ETA has declared an official cease-fire on
137 Ibid. 138 Joseba Zuiaika, Guggenheim Bilbao: Cronica de una Seduccion. (Editorial NEREA, Madrid, Spain, 1997), 19. 139 “ETA: Euskadi ta Askatasuna,” The Terrorism Research Center, http://www.terrorism.com/tenorism/ETAJitnil
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particularly vunerable target. Although ETA has declared an official cease-fire on
September 18,1998, after 30 years of violent conflict with the Spanish government,140
the violence has not stopped altogether. There have been a number of reported incidents
in the Spanish and French media since the ceasefire. Radio Nacional Espahola (Spanish
National Radio) broadcasts include reports of homemade bombs placed in Galdakao’s
Telefonica [Spanish telephone company] office building on October 9, 1999141 and petrol
bombs thrown at Civil Guard corp’s barracks in Bilbao on October 16,1999 (injurying
one Civil Guard).142 Most alarming, however, is a report fromLe Monde on September
30, 1999 of a theft of explosives in Plevin, France. “A group of seven or eight armed and
masked persons got away with 8 tons of “industrial” dynamite, 11 kilos of fuses and
6,000 detonators. The police suspect the Basques because some of the company’s
employees held hostage during the robbery heard what they believed was a foreign accent
the word “venga” - meaning “come on” in Spanish.”143 Clearly, terrorism is far from
over. And the Guggenheim is still very much in the center of the bull’s eye for the group.
139 “ETA: Euskadi ta Askatasuna,” The Terrorism Research Center, http://www.terrorism.com/tenorism/ETA.html 140 “Basque Separatists Announce Cease-fire,” Agence France-Presse, http://www.ict.org.il/spotlight/detcfin?id=162 141 “Overnight Violence Reported in Basque Country,” Radio Nacional Espafiola, October 9,1999. 142 “Spain: Civil Guard Officer Injured in Basque Attack,” Madrid EFE, October 16, 1999. 143 Le Monde, September 30, 1999,39.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Fig. 7. Side view of the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao, October 16.1997
The Basque Image and the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao
You hardly knew anything about this little Country, or what you knew about it has hardly anything to do with what you have gazed upon in this building. You knew, perhaps, of its historical antiquity. Perhaps you have heard of its unique language, time-honored customs, devotion to tradition, zeal for preserving identity. You may have known about its industriousness, its deep-rooted industrial and manufacturing tradition, its naval and seafaring vocation. And, without a doubt, you have received news and images of what our people have most hated always being recognized for - violence.144
This letter from the “governor” {Lehendakari) of the Basque region greeted
members of the international press in Bilbao just two days prior to the grand opening of
Frank 0. Gehry’s Guggenheim Museum Bilbao. Most significant about this letter is its
clear statement about the Basques’ awareness of their image to foreigners. According to
144 Jose Antonio Ardanza, Lehendakari of Euskadi, letter to press and visitors to the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 74
the political leader, Basque violence is the topic any visitor to Bilbao has “without a
doubt” received news and images. This building, symbol of dispute for the Basque
leaders and their adversaries, became charged with political and economic significance
during the development of the revitalization planning. It is upon this building which the
Basque politicians have not only built their hopes to transform not only the cityscape of
Bilbao itself, but also more importantly the image of Bilbao and the Basque Country. For
the political leaders, the building represents international recognition for something other
than terrorism. For the separatist groups, it is this building which embodies American
capitalism and cultural imperialism over the Basque homeland and its separatist
defenders.
In the case of Bilbao and the Basque Country, it is clear that culture was used as a
direct firearm against terrorism, or at least as a weapon against the image as a terrorist-
ridden state. But in order to reach the level of success that the Guggenheim Museum
Bilbao has achieved, it was important that the art-weapon have an international reputation
with name recognition, outstanding art collections and tremendous marketing “know
how.” With these, the Basques have not only made an enormous impact on the economy
of the region, but have also highlighted their cultural uniqueness in the global setting.
“Art” within this context becomes “arms.” The Basque leaders who were
interested in changing both the urban landscape and, more importantly, the socio-political
profile of the region invested in this project whole-heartedly, but not without internal
conflict. The Basques trusted Thomas Krens’ “vision” for an architectural structure that
would be able to do both things, and more. Krens also envisioned a different Bilbao. He
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 75 saw the potential that great art and architecture could have on an economy. More
importantly, however, was his understanding of seduction. He seduced the Basques with
the Guggenheim name, collections, know-how, and architecture. His vision for a
museum of the future seduced art critics, museum professionals, and even business
analysts to write about him and the new Bilbao museumad infinitum.
Krens understands the post-modem machinery of the media. He toyed with the
press in his attempts to get the international art world’s attention and as a way to attract
urban developers, like those he eventual found in Bilbao, to buy a Guggenheim museum.
He captured the attention of the media with the titanium-clad spaceship in a remote and
almost forgotten part of Spain and, in the interim, has been hailed as a hero for jump-
starting a dying economy. But in the information age, using the media to one’s own end
has its disadvantages. In the process of negotiating Bilbao, Krens was severely criticized
by art critics in the United States and in Spain. His negotiation process created doubt
about the museum’s stability and his intentions. But with the success of creating a
building that invokes the viewer to desire a new museum “experience” - the space as art
form - Krens has beaten all odds. In this age of the “experience economy,” where
generating revenue is based upon creating new multimedia experiences for an ever-
increasing global market and demanding tourists, Krens raised the stakes dramatically.
With five museums in four countries, the Guggenheim has taken on what is being
termed the “McDonaldization” of culture. Thomas Krens argues that it is not a central
museum with “satellites” but rather a “constellation” of cultural institutions. He believes
that globalization has made the art museum world expand so much that Bilbao is as close
to the optimal museum visit - the maximum contemporary cultural “experience” - as one
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can get. With an extensive permanent collection, blockbuster special exhibitions and
“inspirational architecture,” the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao and its potential to display
art in 240,000 square feet make it unique in the international museum world.
But since the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao does not have an artistic director,
critics have claimed that this concept of a constellation of museums is not an accurate
description of an independent and self-determining museum. Programming comes from
the New York museum, making the Guggenheim a cultural empire. Krens dismisses this
criticism as momentary. The New York museum is trying to “develop a program that is a
mask for the constellation of the institution.” According to Krens, Bilbao will generate
its own programming and Venice already does. In the case of the Berlin institution,
programming is developed specifically for it rather than massed produced exhibitions for
all five spaces - “not like a hot dog or a hamburger. McDonalds is like that.”145
“It was expensive,” [Xabier Arzalluz, leader of the Basque Nationalist Party said], “It was expensive, but it was cheap for what we got. When we decided to do it, everyone was against it. But then, it was argued that in the center of Bilbao would be a center of modem art for Europe. Then we saw the light. It is a great thing for the future. More than we ever thought, it is an important building. Everyone recognizes that it is a great building, greater than what is in it.”146
With all its detractors, the new paradigm of selling a museum name, collections,
curators, programming, and museological expertise, as invented by Krens, is lucrative.
The Guggenheim received a $50 million donation in 1997 from Peter Lewis, Chairman of
the Board at the Guggenheim and CEO of Progressive Insurance. This donation,
earmarked for the Guggenheim endowment, is one of the largest individual donations to a
145 Thomas Krens, interview with author, tape recording, New York, New York, 24 June 1998.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 77 private institution. When asked if the Guggenheim empire is sustainable, Krens
responds:
Sustainability is “wait until you get to the point where you feel absolutely comfortable.” With the Getty, for example, they were afraid o f something because they didn’t want to sit on their hands. They were probably afraid of the Guggenheim. There is money out there and it’s been captured for cultural activities of imagination. Demand is what is pushing this. In other words, relevance is about contributions to cultural voids. It is also about standing across the threshold that you can see whatever it is. Pulling in 900,000 visitors a year here you know that you are close to the capacity of the building, but if you are only pulling in 300,000 visitors a year here then you are visiting a tomb. The performance situation creates opportunities as you go along all the media, technology, education.147
No one can be too sure what will happen to the Guggenheim legend after Krens, but if his
first ten years as director of the multinational institution are indication of things ahead, I
believe there will soon be a Guggenheim museum on every continent.
Clearly, the multinational cultural institution must establish itself so that the new
“constellation” of museums can operate smoothly. For Krens, however, the Bilbao
museum has made one thing ring true: the importance of architecture. While buildings
designed by Gehry, especially museums, spring up around the globe, Krens continues to
develop plans to brighten the constellation of the Guggenheim museums. There is a
proposal in the offices of the city of New York for a new Gehry/Guggenheim
collaboration to be constructed on the Lower East Side of Manhattan, an $850 million
structure that would include an ice rink and generously proportioned museum galleries.148
146 Mark Kurlansky, The Basque History of the World. (Walker Publishing Company, Inc., United States, 1999), 338. 147 Thomas Krens, interview with author, tape recording, New York, New York, 24 June 1998. 148 “The Guggenheim Proposes Gehry Museum for New York,” Ralph Blumenthal and Carol Vogel, The New York Times. September 27,1999, p. 15-18.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 78
“Despite the discrepancies that emerged during the long process of its gestation,”
editorialized the Bilbao daily El Correo Esnanol-El Pueblo Vasco, “it seems evident that
an avant-garde and emblematic building like that designed by Frank Gehry, the
extraordinary works of modem and contemporary art that it houses, and the impulse of
revitalization that it represents, can and should convert it into an important symbol for the
149 Basque people.”
The museum has, in fact, become an icon for the “new” Basque identity. No
longer subject to Spanish central government, Bilbao has identified itself as an
international player in civil society. The New York Times' travel section now reports on
the region frequently, citing the cuisine and, o f course, the museum in Bilbao as tourist
“musts.” The Guggenheim Museum Bilbao is, in conclusion, the Bilboans’, Basques,’
and even Spain’s weapon fighting the image of terrorism. Krens admits that identity is in
fact the central and practical issue of the Basque involvement in the Guggenheim
Museum.150
Identity is the central issue, the practicality at some point. You have to take a look at all this talk of world culture. World culture has dissolved local culture because local cultures by a dialectical process of influence cancel out....Let’s project well into the next century. Will such thing as local cultures exist? You have to come to the conclusion that they will not. And it is not about me liking or not liking local culture and tradition. It is that the forces of culture are out there. I don’t believe that our objective is necessarily to stand in the way of an eroding tradition - our culture aesthetic doesn’t make sense. Will there be culture on a local level? Probably not. Will it be recognizable in terms o f traditional characteristics? Probably not either. There will be a world culture out there; there is already a world culture out there.151
149 Robin Cembalest, “Bilbao - What the Papers Said," ARTnews. December 1997, page 66. 150 Mr. Thomas Krens, interview with author, tape recording, New York, New York, 24 June 1998. 151 Thomas Krens, interview with author, tape recording, New York, New York, 24 June 1998.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 79 The central issue is in fact cultural identity. The museum’s role in collecting, preserving
and interpreting contemporary art can help to shape both the identities of the museum/s
and the Basques. But Krens, in his discourse o f world culture, identifies himself and The
Guggenheim Museum as the antithesis of what being Basque is all about. He posits
precisely that which ETA defenders, Basque Homeland and Freedom “fighters,” are
opposed to - the extinction of their local culture. Therein lies the problem for the future of
the Guggenheim in Bilbao. If the museum is to continue to draw the number of visitors
anticipated, if it is to be successful long-term, violence must never be associated with the
institution. In order to avoid this real and constant risk, New York and Bilbao must
negotiate global interests with local culture and local interests with global culture.
As the introductory article from the August 1999 issue of National Geographic
entitled “Global Culture” asserted, ‘Today the world’s people speak about 6,000
languages, a good measure of diversity; by the year 2100 the number of languages could
drop to 3,000, as traditional cultures change.”152 Bilbao and the Basques used
international culture and the global economy to preserve their language, their culture.
Hopefully, Krens will learn that negotiating globally does not mean the end of
local culture. The Guggenheim, if it is to establish global relevance, must use its
multinational “constellation” to articulate both global and local cultures. In the
museum’s endeavors to reach a global market, it should attempt to preserve local culture
and traditions and to educate the global consumer about those cultures. Krens, for all the
criticism he has received, has created an institution with exceptional potential. His
constellation represents an unprecedented collaboration between Americans, Basques,
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Germans, Italians, and Spaniards. Given their expertise in preserving local traditions and
culture for centuries, the Basques will serve the Guggenheim well. Their relentless
struggle for and success in rescuing their own language and customs will, in an ideal
world, assist the global Guggenheim to impact the survival of local cultures.
152 Joel L. Swerdlow, “Global Culture,” National Geographic. August 1999,4.
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