The Paradox of Peace in Sudan and South Sudan Why the Political Settlements Failed to Endure
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
The Paradox of Peace in Sudan and South Sudan Why the Political Settlements Failed to Endure Jok Madut Jok IPS Paper 15 Abstract This paper emphasises the contradiction that has emerged in Sudan and South Sudan since the two regions signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, ending their two decade long civil war. The CPA was a compromise between the risk of violent state disintegration on the one hand – should the war continue any longer, and allowing for a peaceful split on the other, should the two sides fail to agree on equitable terms for continued unity. In either case, the hope was for an end to violence through a mediated political settlement. Unfortunately, the settlement neither saved the unity of the country nor produced peace. Instead, the country broke into two and violence continued both between the two Sudans and within them. This paper argues that the continuation of violence within each country and the threat of return to inter-state war are a result of the failure of the political settlement reached through the CPA. This is due to the win-lose attitude held by the parties going into the negotiations, with the South's Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) set to achieve all its political demands without conceding anything and Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party (NCP) aiming to frustrated the SPLM’s demands without losing anything. They are also born of the inclusivity project that was to undergird the whole accord. It was the variety of stakeholders excluded from both the negotiations and the implementation of the Agreement that intrinsically “spoiled” the Agreement. © Berghof Foundation Operations GmbH 2015. All rights reserved. About the Publication This paper is one of three case study reports on South Sudan produced in the course of the collaborative research project ‘Avoiding Conflict Relapse through Inclusive Political Settlements and State-building after Intra-State War’, running from February 2013 to February 2015. This project aims to examine the conditions for inclusive political settlements following protracted armed conflicts, with a specific focus on former armed power contenders turned state actors. It also aims to inform national and international practitioners and policy-makers on effective practices for enhancing participation, representation, and responsiveness in post-war state-building and governance. It is carried out in cooperation with the partner institutions CINEP/PPP (Colombia, Project Coordinators), Berghof Foundation (Germany, Project Research Coordinators), FLACSO (El Salvador), In Transformation Initiative (South Africa), Sudd Institute (South Sudan), Aceh Policy Institute (Aceh/Indonesia), and Friends for Peace (Nepal). The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the Berghof Foundation, CINEP/PPP, or their project partners. To find more publications for this project please visit www.berghof-foundation.com. For further information, please contact the project research coordinator, Dr.Véronique Dudouet, at [email protected]. About the Author Jok Madut Jok is co-founder and senior researcher at the Sudd Institute, a policy research centre based in Juba, South Sudan. He is also a professor of African Studies at Loyola Marymount University in the United States. Jok is an anthropologist and holds a PhD from the University of California, Los Angeles. He authored three books and numerous articles covering political violence, politics of identity, gender-based violence and security studies in Sudan and South Sudan. This project has been funded with support from the International Development Research Center in Ottawa. To cite this paper: Jok, Jok Madut 2015. The Paradox of Peace in Sudan and South Sudan: Why Political Settlements Failed to Endure. Inclusive Political Settlements Papers 15, September. Berlin: Berghof Foundation. Via internet: www.berghof-foundation.org. Page 2 | 17 Table of Contents 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................4 2 Contextualising the Sudanese Peace Process.......................................................................................................6 2.1 Africa’s multi-layered conflicts ................................................................................................................................. 6 2.2 Scholarly debates on inclusivity within negotiations............................................................................................... 7 3 Negotiating the Sudan CPA: Inclusion, Participation and Representation ...........................................................8 3.1 The CPA negotiation parties ..................................................................................................................................... 8 3.2 The negotiation process and dynamics .................................................................................................................... 9 3.3 Excluded stakeholders ........................................................................................................................................... 11 3.4 How the CPA was popularly perceived .................................................................................................................. 11 4 South Sudan after Independence: Statebuilding Challenges and Persisting Insecurity .................................... 12 5 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................................... 15 Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................................... 16 List of Acronyms CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement IGAD Inter-Governmental Authority on Development NCP National Congress Party SPLM Sudan People’s Liberation Movement SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army SPLM-N Sudan People’s Liberation Movement - North Page 3 | 17 1 Introduction Though the political settlement, which broke up Sudan in 2011, was hinged on the idea that it is better to have two viable states living side-by-side and having stability inside each one of them rather than a single country torn apart by war, the reality is that the two Sudan’s continue to face constant threats of a return to war between them. They have been experiencing increased violence within their territories, contrary to what the mediators and negotiators of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) had envisioned for what was Africa’s largest country. The many skirmishes on the border areas and increased ethnic or regional rebellions in each of the two States have since become the most obvious indictments of the CPA, which ended the protracted north-south war in 2005.1 It was this accord that had paved the way for the independence of South Sudan in 2011 and was expected to be the panacea for the rest of the conflict within the rump state, the Republic of Sudan. The Agreement was dubbed “comprehensive” as it had been envisioned (and needed) to be an inclusive process, in terms of both the multitudes of issues connected to the root causes of the conflict and the variety of actors that had their stakes pinned to the new negotiated political settlement. Mediators, regional advisors and most of the political forces in Sudan had argued that it was no longer possible to address all of Sudan’s protracted political crises, economic injustices and the periphery-centre clashes through the piecemeal approach that the successive governments in Khartoum had practiced for decades – such an approach had only meant relapse into violence, agreement after agreement. By the time of the CPA in 2005, Sudan was a country wrecked by 50 years of war. The Second Sudanese Civil War had been raging since 1983, in pursuit of a variety of incompatible goals between the North and the South, with the former trying to keep the unity of the country at all cost and the latter trying to either push through major reforms or exit the union. This wrangling had caused the death of over three million people, mostly in the south of the country.2 These wars had wasted national resources, with the latest round costing an estimated one million US dollars per day for twenty years, depriving the majority of the population of any social services, destroying much of the little infrastructure that existed in the South, internally displacing and sending over 4.5 million civilians, and above all, creating more rifts between communities than any other time in the country’s history, since the end of the slave trade.3 Issues related to marginalisation of the peripheries, state violence, religious and racial biases that relegated a large part of the citizenry to a position of second class citizenship, all of which had sparked multiple regional rebellions against Khartoum, were all rooted in the failure of the Sudanese state to become a nation that encompasses all of its citizens. Pacifying such a country required a single process where all stakeholders could hammer out the solutions once and for all – as argued by the stakeholders, mediators and peace experts (ICG 2006). To make such an inclusive peace process sustainable, all the various actors beyond the main warring parties, such as traditionally marginalised communities, political parties and all regions of the country, needed to