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Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan Assessing ISSUE 3, 2016 Editorial focus: Building local and national instruments to resolve conflicts Agreement Assessing Strengthening Ideology Participatory Youth on the the AU’s Community and Cultural Media Activism and Resolution New Engagement Violence Practices Non-violent of Conflict in Financing in UN Peace in Darfur in Conflict Action in In this Issue: South Sudan Plan Operations Communities Zimbabwe CONTENTS EDITORIAL 2 by Vasu Gounden FEATURES 3 Conflict Resurgence and the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan: A Hurried and Imposed Peace Pact? by Clayton Hazvinei Vhumbunu 13 African Funds for African Peace: Assessing the African Union’s New Financing Plan by Lesley Connolly 20 Strengthening Community Engagement in United Nations Peace Operations: Opportunities and Challenges by Natasja Rupesinghe 27 SADC Interventions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by Martha Mutisi 36 Ideology and Cultural Violence in Darfur by Daniel Rothbart and Adeeb Yousif 42 Participatory Media Practices in Conflict Communities by Olubunmi D. Akande 50 The Rise of Youth Activism and Non-violent Action in Addressing Zimbabwe’s Crisis by Hillary Jephat Musarurwa Cover Photo: The 27th African Union Summit held in Kigali, Rwanda (July 2016). Photo credit: GovernmentZA. conflict trends I 1 EDITORIAL BY VASU GOUNDEN Twenty-five years after the cold war, we are experiencing these conflicts, and analysing whether our efforts have been one of the most peaceful and prosperous eras in the history sufficient and correctly deployed. of humanity, and yet inequality is at its highest level ever Intrastate conflict requires the external intervention of and violent intrastate conflicts continue to proliferate across regional organisations, such as the AU or the Southern African the world. In Africa, inequality and violent intrastate wars Development Community (SADC), when the conflict reaches overshadow the progress that the continent has made in a stage where it borders on civil war and threatens to spill growing its economies by getting young people into schools over into neighbouring countries, thereby jeopardising global and rolling out the necessary infrastructure to create a climate peace and security. It is for this particular eventuality that for businesses to grow. we have invested so much over the last 25 years in building The last five years in Africa have been particularly conflict resolution mechanisms, infrastructure and personnel. disappointing in the number of countries that seem to revert While all these efforts have been valuable and useful in to instability and conflict after a period of relative stability. maintaining global peace and security, we have missed one Why is Africa experiencing this apparent reversal of fortunes? important opportunity to build a more effective response: In the last 25 years, we have built a formidable global, regional building local and national capacities for conflict resolution. Many intrastate conflicts have a growth trajectory; they do and sub-regional architecture for peace and security. The shift not just suddenly appear as civil wars. These conflicts begin from interstate to intrastate conflict has led to the creation of with some level of dissatisfaction that manifests in low-level mechanisms to deal with conflicts that involve not just the peaceful opposition and graduates to street-level protests, opposing armies of two or more states but, increasingly, a which can be peaceful or violent. This state of conflict can combination of states, militia or rebel groups, and civilians. fester for years in a country and increase in complexity and As a consequence of this change in the nature of conflict intensity over a period of time. By the time it reaches the stage and the protagonists, existing mechanisms had to be of a civil war, trust and confidence among the protagonists adapted and new ones created. Peacekeeping departments have completely broken down, combatants on all sides may at the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU) and other have been killed, thereby hardening attitudes, and the nature intergovernmental organisations had to adapt their of the grievances may have changed and become more peacekeeping doctrines to include protocols on the protection complex. At this stage, resolving the conflict becomes much of civilians, respect for human rights, mainstreaming gender more difficult. Syria is a current case in point. into peacekeeping and a host of other initiatives that take into The gap, therefore, in our elaborate architecture for account the fact that civilians are at the centre of conflicts. resolving intrastate conflicts is our lack of investment in Mediation has been strengthened with the creation of building local and national capacities for peace that can be mediation support units and the preparation of hundreds of deployed at an early stage to mitigate conflicts before they mediators. Peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction escalate into civil wars. Respected members of societies have become mainstream thinking in intergovernmental who have gravitas, authority and respect, and who stand organisations. out as role models, need to be equipped with skills that This comprehensive conflict resolution architecture is enable them to intervene in societies to diffuse situations backed by significant funding and an army of personnel that can explode into violent conflict. Over the next decade, experienced in managing such conflicts. The funding and while we strengthen our global and regional instruments to personnel have been deployed around the world with resolve conflicts, we must also build our local and national relative success. The question, then, is why are we still instruments. seeing resurgence in these conflicts? The answer lies in understanding the nature of such conflicts, determining Vasu Gounden is the Founder and Executive Director where our emphasis has been in attempting to resolve of ACCORD. 2 I conflict trends CONFLICT RESURGENCE AND THE AGREEMENT ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN: A HURRIED AND IMPOSED PEACE PACT? BY CLAYTON HAZVINEI VHUMBUNU UN PHOTO/ISAAC BILLY Introduction 10 September 2015. The agreement sought to end the deadly The hope for peace and stability in South Sudan civil war that had broken out in South Sudan in December was restored when a peace pact – the Agreement on 2013, following power struggles between Kiir and Machar the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South and the allegations of an attempted coup made by the former Sudan (ARCSS) – was signed between the Sudan People’s against the latter. Liberation Movement and Army in Government (SPLM/A-IG) ARCSS culminated in the formation of a Transitional and SPLM/A in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), as represented by Government of National Unity (TGoNU) on 29 April 2016 President Salva Kiir Mayardit and First Vice President Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon respectively. The agreement, which Above: Salva Kiir, president of South Sudan, signs the was signed on 17 August 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the and on 26 August 2015 in Juba, South Sudan, was ratified Republic of South Sudan at a ceremony held in Juba on by the South Sudan National Legislative Assembly on 26 August 2015. conflict trends I 3 D i 24° 26° 28° 30° 32° 34° nd 36° er En Nahud 12 Abu Zabad SOUTH 12 ° S O U TH SUDAN SUDAN ° SUDAN Ed Damazin Al Fula Renk Ed Da'ein Tullus Nuba Mts. Famaka Kadugli Umm Buram Muglad Barbit Kologi T Talodi Paloich B Kaka e a l y h i ba r A 10 N Junguls 10 ° e ° l Riangnom e Radom 'A it ra Kodok h b W Boing Abyei Fagwir UPPER Malakal Kafia Kingi WESTERN Mayom NILE Bai War-awar Bentiu Daga BAHR Wun Rog Fangak Abwong Post EL GHAZAL NORTHERN The boundaries and names shown BAHR Wang Kai Kan and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or Malek Jur l Gossinga EL GHAZAL UNITY Gumbiel a Nasser Kigille n acceptance by the United Nations. Gogrial f a Raga a Akop C Aweil r i a e Kuacjok Leer l Z g z n Waat e 8° WARRAP Adok o Fathai 8° r J S Bisellia S h oba Deim Zubeir Madeir a t l B o Duk Fadiat Akobo ETHI OPI A CENTRAL L Wau u Bir Di Atum P d i AFRICAN Wakela JONGLEI b o r o Tonj LAKES d g Kongor REPUBLIC n W Peper Akelo o Bo River Post Rafili h P Rumbek ite N Jonglei Pibor o Akot i Ukwaa m Yirol le O Lol National capital Bor Kenamuke 6 Khogali Pap Swamp Towot 6 ° State (wilayah) capital Boli Malek ° Town Mvolo Lowelli Tambura Jerbar Kobowen Administrative Major airport WESTERN Swamp boundary International boundary Amadi Li Yubu EQUATORIA Terakeka Undetermined boundary* EASTERN EQUATORIA Ezo Madreggi Lanya Bunduqiya State (wilayah) boundary Lafon Abyei region** Maridi Juba Kapoeta Main road Yambio CENTRAL Torit Lotagipi Railroad DEM. REP. Roue EQUATORIA Nagishot Swamp 4° 4° * Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan OF THE CONGO Yei and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet Opari Lofusa L. Turkana Kajo Keji (L. Rudolf) been determined. 0 100 200 km ** Final status of the Abyei area is not yet le determined. i 0 100 mi N t KENYA r e b l 22° 26° 28° 30° A U G ANDA 34° 36° Map No. 4450 Rev.1 UNITED NATIONS Department of Field Support October 2011 Cartographic Section with the return of Machar, who had fled Juba following Machar, both in government and within the Sudan People’s the outbreak of the civil war. However, events on the night Liberation Movement (SPLM). During the Comprehensive of 7 July 2016, less than 48 hours before the celebration Peace Agreement (CPA) interim period from 2005 to 2011, the of the country’s fifth anniversary of independence, were two political leaders were said to have supported different characterised by violent confrontations in Juba between the candidates in the run-up to the envisaged 2010 elections.1 SPLM/A-IG and SPLM/A-IO and spread to many parts of the GALLO IMAGES/REUTERS/TIKSA NEGERI city, resulting in the deaths of many soldiers and civilians as well as the destruction of property and displacement of people.
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