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'When Will This End and What Will It Take?'

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'When Will This End and What Will It Take?' ‘When will this end and what will it take?’ People’s perspectives on addressing the Lord’s Resistance Army conflict Logo using multiply on layers November 2011 Logo drawn as seperate elements with overlaps coloured seperately ‘ With all the armies of the world here, why isn’t Kony dead yet and the conflict over? When will this end and what will it take?’ Civil society leader, Democratic Republic of Congo CHAD SUDAN Birao Southern Darfur Kafia Kingi Sam-Ouandja Western Wau Zemongo Game Bahr-El-Ghazal CENTRAL Reserve AFRICAN SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC Haut-Mbomou Djemah Bria Western Equatoria Bambouti Ezo Obo Nzara Juba Zemio Yambio Bambari Mbomou Mboki Maridi Rafai Central Magwi Bangassou Bangui Banda Equatoria Bas-Uélé GARAMBA Yei Nimule Ango PARK Lake Doruma Kitgum Turkana Niangara Dungu Duru Arua Faradje Haut Uélé Gulu Lira Bunia Soroti LakeLake AlbertAlbert DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO UGANDA Kampala LRA area of operation after Operation Lightning Thunder LakeLake VictoriaVictoria end of 2008–11 LRA area of operation during the Juba talks 2006–08 RWANDA LRA area of operation during Operation Iron Fist 2002–05 0 150 300km BURUNDI TANZANIA © Conciliation Resources. This map is intended for illustrative purposes only. Borders, names and other features are presented according to common practice in the region. Conciliation Resources take no position on whether this representation is legally or politically valid. Disclaimer Acknowledgements This document has been produced with the Conciliation Resources is grateful to Frank financial assistance of the European Union van Acker who conducted the research and and the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Uganda. contributed to the analysis in this report. The contents of this document are the sole responsibility of Conciliation Resources and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union or the Norwegian Government. Table of contents Disclaimer 2 1. Executive summary 5 Recommendations 7 2. Methodology 9 3. Background to the conflict 9 4. The threat to regional stability 11 The impact of terror 11 Neglected hinterlands 12 Understanding the threat and the conflict 12 &RPSHWLQJSULRULWLHV Where are the LRA? 14 5. The neglect and limitations of civilian protection 15 National armies 15 UN missions 16 Self-defence 17 AU response 18 6. The need for a comprehensive strategy 18 Regional politics 18 Interwoven conflict systems 19 Coordinated return and reintegration 20 7. What will it take? 23 $FRPSUHKHQVLYHDSSURDFK &LYLOVRFLHW\ Dialogue and engagement 24 Bibliography and references 26 Glossary 27 Cover: The picture shows a young woman, held by the LRA for three years, sitting with her sister in a camp for Internally Displaced Persons following her escape a month earlier. Dungu, DRC, July 2011. © Conciliation Resources/Tom Bradley People’s perspectives on addressing the Lord’s Resistance Army conflictɒ A self-defence group’s homemade ammunition, which consists of match heads and lumps of metal. It can be dangerous to manufacture and this man lost a fingertip while making them. © Conciliation Resources/Tom Bradley 1. Executive summary communication. Here people express despair at the lack of prospects for an end to the conflict and anger at feeling “imprisoned” while the LRA The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has its roots has freedom of movement. in a rebellion against the current Government of Uganda, which took power through an armed Civilian protection has been neglected in the insurgency in 1986. The conflict with the LRA has military pursuit of LRA leader Joseph Kony now become a regional issue directly affecting and his commanders. When under pressure Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Central or attack, the LRA are widely known to strike African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan as well out against easy targets: unprotected civilians. as Uganda. Those who bear the brunt of the LRA’s violent retaliation are therefore all too aware of the Operating in remote areas devoid of provision risks of a renewed military strategy and an by the state, the conflict continues to result in overwhelming majority of those consulted destruction, abduction, displacement, trauma expressed an appetite for a solution based on and death for civilians and whole communities. protection and political engagement. The conflict has also reverberated more widely, displacing people beyond the region and Local perceptions of the LRA vary across the periodically drawing in external responses from region. In DRC many suspect the LRA presence the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN), to be a pretext for Uganda’s exploitation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the United natural resources and continued presence its States (US) and the European Union (EU), among forces on DRC soil. Uganda is suspected of other actors. collusion. In South Sudan people see the LRA as an instrument of Khartoum, used in turn by The following analysis, findings and Uganda as justification for its support for the recommendations were generated from research Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and its conducted between March and July 2011 in areas presence in South Sudan since 2002. In CAR, of Uganda, eastern DRC, south eastern CAR and the LRA presence is considered a spillover South Sudan (specifically the states of Western from another theatre of war and ultimately Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal) affected Uganda’s problem. by the conflict with the LRA and also builds on Conciliation Resources’ 15 years of peacebuilding Such perceptions point to the complexity of work in the region. The objective of the research relations at the strategic level; the underlying was to gain a “people’s perspective” by involving feature of this is the long-standing hostility those most affected in reflection on the dynamics between Khartoum and Kampala, which and impact of the conflict and on national and continues through alleged support to proxy international responses to it. This included forces.1 Tensions between South Sudan and community representatives, civil society leaders, Sudan over contested areas threaten instability LRA returnees (women and men), former or conflict, which could trigger wider regional combatants, members of the armed forces and instability. Mistrust between the Governments local, national and international officials. of DRC, CAR and Uganda also exists over the presence of Ugandan forces in the affected area While the conflict with the LRA does not pose and complicate responses to the conflict. a direct threat to the authority of national governments in individual states, the terror Given this complex regional context, a and displacement caused across an already comprehensive and coordinated response politically and socially fragile area pose a threat is imperative, which gives priority to civilian to the stability of the region as a whole. Yet, for protection and addresses the multiple national governments, beset by other urgent dimensions of the conflict and its consequences. domestic issues, resolving the conflict is not high The AU‘s most recent attempt to structure a on their list of priorities. coordinated response through the ‘regional cooperation strategy for the elimination of the For the people living in the affected areas, LRA’ is welcome, but there is concern that it is however, the LRA is a prime concern. These communities live in neglected hinterlands, 1. The Uganda–Sudan relationship and their proxies are areas with minimal infrastructure and poor explored further in Chapter 6. People’s perspectives on addressing the Lord’s Resistance Army conflictɒ A customary chief (left) in Dungu, DRC shares pictures of people who were attacked by the LRA. © Conciliation Resources/Nicolas Tillon not broad enough to achieve lasting peace. It They have important roles to play in improving risks relying too heavily on military means, which understanding of the local dynamics of the have failed to protect civilians and end the conflict conflict, aiding return and reintegration of over the past 25 years. It will depend centrally on abductees and combatants, and in promoting the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), reconciliation, particularly for women and young whose credibility among people on the ground is children who are the primary victims of the tarnished by suspicion of collusion with the LRA conflict. Investment in civil society capacities, and failure to protect civilians to date. their inclusion in programme design and implementation, as well as their protection The AU’s plans for a Regional Task Force as they encourage LRA members to return is (RTF) may, or may not, succeed in killing or essential, not least for the sustainability and capturing Joseph Kony; however the drivers and local legitimacy of aid efforts. consequences of the conflict will remain intact without a coordinated and sustained strategy As shown during the Juba peace process, civil addressing the political, security and governance society actors can also help pave the way for drivers of the conflict and its humanitarian dialogue with the LRA – initially through informal and psychosocial impact. A comprehensive engagement with mid-level commanders – in strategy should also put back on the table the order to build trust and explore options and option of dialogue with the LRA leadership and appetite for peace, as well as to create a basis engagement with its support network. for more formal engagement. The involvement of local civil society organisations, actors and networks – to date overlooked by international
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