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ISS Peace and Security Council Report, No 58 Peace and Security Issue 58, Council Report May 2014 Current members of the Peace and Security Council: Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Algeria, Burundi, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Guinea, Libya, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger and South Africa Peace and Security Council Protocol IN THIS ISSUE ‘The PSC shall encourage non-governmental organizations to participate actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. When required such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council’ – Article 20 of Early warning issues for the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC of the African Union 1 May 2014 Early warning issues for May 2014 Mission analysis: African During May, inter-communal and their criminal allies, demand even religious conflict in the Central greater vigilance and determination Union Mission for Mali 2 African Republic (CAR), continuing on the part of African and and the Sahel (MISAHEL) violence in Sudan’s Darfur, ethnic international leaders to help restore violence in South Sudan and peace, human security and stability instability and unrest in Libya and to Africa’s most vulnerable states Egypt, as well as ongoing violence and regions. in Somalia, the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Regional security resurgent violence in Burundi, are analysis: Lord’s likely to continue unabated. These Resistance Army (LRA) 5 and other crises, including the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, the possibility of drought in West and South-East Africa precipitated by the onset of the El Niño weather phenomenon, and the ever-present Open page: Cape Town to threats of terrorism presented by 8 Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda Cairo – a dream deferred? in the Maghreb, Ansar Dine and Current PSC Chair Bio data: H.E. Madame Naimi SH Aziz Important dates to diarise 12 Current posts: Tanzania’s Ambassador to Ethiopia Permanent Representative to the AU and UNECA and Chair of the PSC Livingstone formula ‘Civil Society Organizations may provide technical support to the African Union by undertaking early warning reporting, and situation analysis which feeds information into the decision-making process of the PSC’ – PSC/PR/(CLX), 5 December 2008, Conclusions of a Retreat of the PSC on a mechanism of interaction between the Council and CSOs. 1 PSC Report • Issue 58 • May 2014 exchange, cross-border cooperation, the Mali is still facing the challenge of Mission analysis fight against terrorism and other reconciliation, as well as a precarious organised crime, as well as capacity security situation both in the north of AFRICAN UNION building for countries and institutions the country and in the Sahel. responsible for these issues.’ This There are impediments to the MISSION FOR MALI meeting was an opportunity for the AU implementation of the Ouagadougou to reiterate its willingness to support the AND THE SAHEL Political Agreement, signed in June 2013 efforts of the countries of the Sahel in under the aegis of Blaise Compaoré, the fight against terrorism. It was (MISAHEL) mediator for the Economic Community therefore decided that ‘a generic concept of West African States (ECOWAS). These Introduction of operation for mixed units and joint impediments relate in particular to the patrols along the borders’ would be The last country analysis on Mali was cantonment, disarmament and published in the September 2013 issue developed. demobilisation of National Movement of the Peace and Security Council Report. At a press conference held on 4 March for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) The current analysis focuses on the 2014 in Bamako, Buyoya ‘reported on fighters. In addition, the actors have not African Union Mission for Mali and the developments in the peace and yet agreed on conditions for the Sahel (MISAHEL) with its mandate to reconciliation process, how the negotiation of a final comprehensive support Mali in the crisis recovery Nouakchott Process is progressing and agreement. In the long term, this delay process and help the countries of the the implementation of the AU Strategy constitutes a risk to the political stability Sahel face security, governance and for the Sahel’. He also ‘welcomed the and security of Mali and its neighbouring development challenges. These three progress ... made in the peace and countries. components of its mandate are set out reconciliation process with the From a security point of view, while the in the African Union (AU) Strategy for the installation of the National Assembly and terrorist and islamist groups (Al-Qaeda in Sahel region, whose implementation it the Workshop on lessons learned from the Islamic Maghreb [AQIM], the manages. past agreements as well as another on Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Previous AU press statements and the cantonment process’. Africa [MUJAO] and Ansar Dine) have PSC recommendations The MISAHEL press release of 28 dispersed, some of their fighters seem to be regrouping. In fact, elements of these The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of February 2014 gave an account of groups are making a comeback, as seen the AU, at its 426th meeting held on 7 Buyoya’s reception by Algerian in the sporadic attacks over the past few April 2014, ‘welcomed the report of the authorities. During his visit they months, particularly in Timbuktu, Gao African Union Commission on the discussed ‘the peace process in Mali, the security situation in the Sahel, as well as and Kidal. This resurgence of terrorism human rights situation in Mali threatens the stability of the country. developed on the basis of information the way forward for enhancing regional gathered by AU Human Rights Observers security cooperation between the Beyond the multidimensional crisis from deployed in Mali, in the implementation countries of the Sahel-Saharan zone’. which Mali is still struggling to emerge, of Communiqué PSC/AHG/COMM/2 In a press release issued on 23 January the Sahel continues to face challenges (CCCLIII) of the Peace and Security 2014, the head of the mission related particularly to the regionalisation Council adopted at its 353rd meeting announced that in 2014, ‘MISAHEL will of the terrorist threat. Niger and held on 28 January 2013’. It also give priority to security and Mauritania, due to the porous borders in welcomed the ‘commitment of Malian development in the Sahel regions’. He this region, could provide refuge for the authorities to combat impunity and to also stated that ‘all-inclusive talks will be terrorist elements occupying northern consolidate peace and national held in Mali in the course of the year’, Mali. Further to the west, Boko Haram’s reconciliation’. and added that ‘MISAHEL intends to rise in power has led to its gradual bring in extensive African expertise to expansion out of its traditional area of In a MISAHEL press statement released operation in northern Nigeria to on 25 March 2014, the head of MISAHEL, support Malian authorities in their efforts to meet the legitimate aspirations neighbouring countries. Southern Niger, Pierre Buyoya, in a meeting with the of justice, social cohesion and individual in particular, has been infiltrated by some president of the National Assembly, and collective development for all of its members. The group’s expansion is Issaka Sidibe, ‘reaffirmed the communities in Mali’. Lastly, it was stated worrying for the stability of the Sahel as commitment of the AU to support Mali that MISAHEL would endeavour to some of its members are reported to in its reconstruction efforts in the face of ‘identify common issues for countries of have links with AQIM. numerous challenges common to the the Sahel in order to offer solutions countries of the Sahel’. Post-Gaddafi Libya is also a major based on matters which have an impact concern for the Sahel. The weakness of On 20 March 2014, in the press release on development, ranging from religious state authority (or its absence, in some on the first meeting of defence attachés extremism to decentralisation’. cases), conflict and tension between and security advisors of AU member Crisis escalation potential communities mean its southern region states accredited to Mali in the remains vulnerable. Moreover, this part framework of the Nouakchott Process, More than a year after Operation Serval of the country has been the scene of the head of MISAHEL stated: ‘The and the deployment of the United various forms of trafficking (weapons, assessment shows that the process is Nations Multidimensional Integrated drugs and humans), which strengthens under way in the areas of information Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the link between terrorism and 2 PSC Report • Issue 58 • May 2014 transnational organised crime. Southern One of the major challenges facing the 2014 indicate Morocco’s growing interest Libya, where the terrorist elements who countries of the Sahel in their efforts to in the country. Visits to Algeria made by had occupied northern Mali now take address security issues is the difficulty of several Malian officials, notably President refuge, is also suspected of harbouring effective border control. This difficulty Keita (18–19 January 2014), the Minister training camps. comes with the Sahel’s distinct of Defence, Soumeylou Boubeye Maiga geographic characteristics and the (9 March 2014) and Zahabi Sidi Ould Lastly, the region’s pre-election context limited human, material and financial Mohamed, Minister of National is a significant additional risk factor. In resources of the countries concerned. Reconciliation (20 April 2014), seem to 2014 and 2015, important elections are The transnational nature of the threats indicate that Malian authorities favour to be held in four countries included in facing these countries emphasises the mediation conducted under the aegis of the AU Strategy for the Sahel, namely need for regional security cooperation Algeria. The possible rivalry between Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mauritania and through information exchanges and Algeria and Morocco in the negotiations Nigeria.
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