Peace and Security

Issue 58, Council Report May 2014

Current members of the Peace and Security Council: Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, , Burundi, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Guinea, , Mozambique, Namibia, Niger and South Africa

Peace and Security Council Protocol IN THIS ISSUE

‘The PSC shall encourage non-governmental organizations to participate actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. When required such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council’ – Article 20 of Early warning issues for the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC of the African Union 1 May 2014

Early warning issues for May 2014 Mission analysis: African During May, inter-communal and their criminal allies, demand even religious conflict in the Central greater vigilance and determination Union Mission for Mali 2 African Republic (CAR), continuing on the part of African and and the Sahel (MISAHEL) violence in ’s Darfur, ethnic international leaders to help restore violence in and peace, human security and stability instability and unrest in Libya and to Africa’s most vulnerable states , as well as ongoing violence and regions. in Somalia, the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Regional security resurgent violence in Burundi, are analysis: Lord’s likely to continue unabated. These Resistance Army (LRA) 5 and other crises, including the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, the possibility of drought in West and South-East Africa precipitated by the onset of the El Niño weather phenomenon, and the ever-present Open page: Cape Town to threats of terrorism presented by 8 Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda Cairo – a dream deferred? in the Maghreb, Ansar Dine and

Current PSC Chair Bio data: H.E. Madame Naimi SH Aziz Important dates to diarise 12 Current posts: Tanzania’s Ambassador to Ethiopia Permanent Representative to the AU and UNECA and Chair of the PSC

Livingstone formula

‘Civil Society Organizations may provide technical support to the African Union by undertaking early warning reporting, and situation analysis which feeds information into the decision-making process of the PSC’ – PSC/PR/(CLX), 5 December 2008, Conclusions of a Retreat of the PSC on a mechanism of interaction between the Council and CSOs.

1 PSC Report • Issue 58 • May 2014 exchange, cross-border cooperation, the Mali is still facing the challenge of Mission analysis fight against terrorism and other reconciliation, as well as a precarious organised crime, as well as capacity security situation both in the north of AFRICAN UNION building for countries and institutions the country and in the Sahel. responsible for these issues.’ This There are impediments to the MISSION FOR MALI meeting was an opportunity for the AU implementation of the Ouagadougou to reiterate its willingness to support the AND THE SAHEL Political Agreement, signed in June 2013 efforts of the countries of the Sahel in under the aegis of Blaise Compaoré, the fight against terrorism. It was (MISAHEL) mediator for the Economic Community therefore decided that ‘a generic concept of West African States (ECOWAS). These Introduction of operation for mixed units and joint impediments relate in particular to the patrols along the borders’ would be The last country analysis on Mali was cantonment, disarmament and published in the September 2013 issue developed. demobilisation of National Movement of the Peace and Security Council Report. At a press conference held on 4 March for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) The current analysis focuses on the 2014 in Bamako, Buyoya ‘reported on fighters. In addition, the actors have not African Union Mission for Mali and the developments in the peace and yet agreed on conditions for the Sahel (MISAHEL) with its mandate to reconciliation process, how the negotiation of a final comprehensive support Mali in the crisis recovery Nouakchott Process is progressing and agreement. In the long term, this delay process and help the countries of the the implementation of the AU Strategy constitutes a risk to the political stability Sahel face security, governance and for the Sahel’. He also ‘welcomed the and security of Mali and its neighbouring development challenges. These three progress ... made in the peace and countries. components of its mandate are set out reconciliation process with the From a security point of view, while the in the African Union (AU) Strategy for the installation of the National Assembly and terrorist and islamist groups (Al-Qaeda in Sahel region, whose implementation it the Workshop on lessons learned from the Islamic Maghreb [AQIM], the manages. past agreements as well as another on Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Previous AU press statements and the cantonment process’. Africa [MUJAO] and Ansar Dine) have PSC recommendations The MISAHEL press release of 28 dispersed, some of their fighters seem to be regrouping. In fact, elements of these The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of February 2014 gave an account of groups are making a comeback, as seen the AU, at its 426th meeting held on 7 Buyoya’s reception by Algerian in the sporadic attacks over the past few April 2014, ‘welcomed the report of the authorities. During his visit they months, particularly in Timbuktu, Gao African Union Commission on the discussed ‘the peace process in Mali, the security situation in the Sahel, as well as and Kidal. This resurgence of terrorism human rights situation in Mali threatens the stability of the country. developed on the basis of information the way forward for enhancing regional gathered by AU Human Rights Observers security cooperation between the Beyond the multidimensional crisis from deployed in Mali, in the implementation countries of the Sahel-Saharan zone’. which Mali is still struggling to emerge, of Communiqué PSC/AHG/COMM/2 In a press release issued on 23 January the Sahel continues to face challenges (CCCLIII) of the Peace and Security 2014, the head of the mission related particularly to the regionalisation Council adopted at its 353rd meeting announced that in 2014, ‘MISAHEL will of the terrorist threat. Niger and held on 28 January 2013’. It also give priority to security and Mauritania, due to the porous borders in welcomed the ‘commitment of Malian development in the Sahel regions’. He this region, could provide refuge for the authorities to combat impunity and to also stated that ‘all-inclusive talks will be terrorist elements occupying northern consolidate peace and national held in Mali in the course of the year’, Mali. Further to the west, Boko Haram’s reconciliation’. and added that ‘MISAHEL intends to rise in power has led to its gradual bring in extensive African expertise to expansion out of its traditional area of In a MISAHEL press statement released operation in northern Nigeria to on 25 March 2014, the head of MISAHEL, support Malian authorities in their efforts to meet the legitimate aspirations neighbouring countries. Southern Niger, Pierre Buyoya, in a meeting with the of justice, social cohesion and individual in particular, has been infiltrated by some president of the National Assembly, and collective development for all of its members. The group’s expansion is Issaka Sidibe, ‘reaffirmed the communities in Mali’. Lastly, it was stated worrying for the stability of the Sahel as commitment of the AU to support Mali that MISAHEL would endeavour to some of its members are reported to in its reconstruction efforts in the face of ‘identify common issues for countries of have links with AQIM. numerous challenges common to the the Sahel in order to offer solutions countries of the Sahel’. Post-Gaddafi Libya is also a major based on matters which have an impact concern for the Sahel. The weakness of On 20 March 2014, in the press release on development, ranging from religious state authority (or its absence, in some on the first meeting of defence attachés extremism to decentralisation’. cases), conflict and tension between and security advisors of AU member Crisis escalation potential communities mean its southern region states accredited to Mali in the remains vulnerable. Moreover, this part framework of the Nouakchott Process, More than a year after Operation Serval of the country has been the scene of the head of MISAHEL stated: ‘The and the deployment of the United various forms of trafficking (weapons, assessment shows that the process is Nations Multidimensional Integrated drugs and humans), which strengthens under way in the areas of information Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the link between terrorism and

2 PSC Report • Issue 58 • May 2014 transnational organised crime. Southern One of the major challenges facing the 2014 indicate ’s growing interest Libya, where the terrorist elements who countries of the Sahel in their efforts to in the country. Visits to Algeria made by had occupied northern Mali now take address security issues is the difficulty of several Malian officials, notably President refuge, is also suspected of harbouring effective border control. This difficulty Keita (18–19 January 2014), the Minister training camps. comes with the Sahel’s distinct of Defence, Soumeylou Boubeye Maiga geographic characteristics and the (9 March 2014) and Zahabi Sidi Ould Lastly, the region’s pre-election context limited human, material and financial Mohamed, Minister of National is a significant additional risk factor. In resources of the countries concerned. Reconciliation (20 April 2014), seem to 2014 and 2015, important elections are The transnational nature of the threats indicate that Malian authorities favour to be held in four countries included in facing these countries emphasises the mediation conducted under the aegis of the AU Strategy for the Sahel, namely need for regional security cooperation Algeria. The possible rivalry between Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mauritania and through information exchanges and Algeria and Morocco in the negotiations Nigeria. joint surveillance measures. It is essential between the Malian government and Key issues and internal dynamics that MISAHEL mobilises states in the armed groups is also reflected in the implementation of the Nouakchott mediation proposal made by Algeria on MISAHEL, established by the AU Process, included in the security section 15 January 2014. It is supported by the Commission in August 2013, followed of the AU Strategy. Coalition for the People of Azawad (CPA), the transformation of the African-led a breakaway faction of the MNLA, while International Support Mission to Mali Moreover, the AU claims a unique the MNLA invited Morocco to become (AFISMA) into a UN mission in July 2013. position in coordinating various involved in the resolution of the crisis. It is a political mission, in keeping with activities in the Sahel, invoking its the progressive involvement of the AU in ‘undeniable comparative advantage, Regional initiatives with limited results, the Sahel region, starting with the linked to its continent-wide mandate, its such as the Joint Military Staff Libyan crisis in 2011. It is for this reason experience in the field and its in-depth Committee (CEMOC), or with ambitious that Buyoya, the former president of understanding of the issues’. While the goals, such as the Fusion and Liaison Burundi, the High Representative of the trans-regional nature of the crisis in the Unit (UFL), were created in April 2010 to AU for Mali and Sahel and head of Sahel justifies the primacy given to the address the terrorist threats affecting AFISMA, became head of MISAHEL while AU, the tension between the AU and states in the region (particularly Mali, retaining his position as High ECOWAS in the management of the Mali Niger, Mauritania, Libya and Algeria). Representative. crisis is an indication that some regional Since the crises in Libya and Mali, other economic communities (RECs) are regional organisations, including several While MISAHEL’s headquarters are in reluctant to accept AU coordination. RECs, have become involved in order to Bamako, it plans to expand to the other address the structural factors underlying major cities in the region: Algiers, Lastly, the security issues in the Sahel the Sahelian crises (drought, food N’Djamena, Niamey, Abuja, require a strong and consistent insecurity, isolation, crime). Ouagadougou and Nouakchott. Under commitment from the international the terms of the AU Strategy for the community. In applying the principle of The question thus arises as to what role Sahel, MISAHEL will focus its efforts on national ownership, the implementation MISAHEL could play beyond setting Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, of the MISAHEL action plan is supposed regional demarcations to limit possible Mauritania, Niger, Sudan and Chad. to be supported primarily by financial tension emerging from the distribution According to the AU, Côte d’Ivoire, contributions from African states. of tasks among different regional actors Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria and However, past experience, including in such as ECOWAS, the Economic Senegal also deserve special attention. Mali, has shown that the mobilisation of Community of Central African States local resources can be slow. The fact that (ECCAS), the Community of Sahel- The establishment of MISAHEL is in the AU depends primarily on financial Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and the Arab keeping with the various legal support from external partners in the Maghreb Union (UMA). instruments adopted by the AU to implementation of its strategy raises the ensure good governance, security and Therefore, the proposed common question of the real commitment of its development. Its Strategy for the Sahel is strategy for ECOWAS, the West African member states, in light of the political structured around four main areas of Economic and Monetary Union views expressed. activity: political process; human and (WAEMU) and the Permanent Interstates humanitarian rights; security; and Geopolitical dynamics Committee for Drought Control in the development in the region. The first two Sahel (CILSS), called the Consistency and Africa and RECs areas underpin those of MISAHEL’s Regional Action Programme in West activities specific to Mali. Within its mission framework, MISAHEL Africa for the Stability and Development must not only take into account the of the Sub-Saharan-Sahelian Areas While MISAHEL, as a political mission traditional rivalry between Algeria and (PCAR), reiterates the need for MISAHEL and particularly in light of its regional Morocco but must also deal with the risk to also act as a coordinator with states dimension, is a first for the AU, its actions of overlapping jurisdiction between such as Algeria, Libya and Mauritania and the implementation of its mandate different organisations in the Sahel. that are not members of ECOWAS. will face three main challenges: security developments in the Sahel; the King Mohammed VI’s attendance at the The establishment of new cooperation coordination of the initiatives of the inauguration of the president of Mali, frameworks such as the G5 (Burkina various actors involved; and the Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, in September Faso, Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad) financing of its activities. 2013 and his visit to Mali in February also illustrates the power relations

3 PSC Report • Issue 58 • May 2014 between member states in several reorganisation of its military presence in strengthening cooperation between organisations. This proliferation of the Sahel-Saharan band). intelligence services and the defence institutions primarily indicates that and security forces of the countries of In addition to its surveillance system in MISAHEL must still make an effort to the Sahel, as provided for in the place in some of the countries of the establish its leadership in the region in Nouakchott Process. These forces, with Sahel (Burkina Faso and Niger), the order to achieve results. the support of international partners, United States (US) continues capacity manage to reduce significantly the United Nations building in, and strengthening security terrorist threat and transnational crime cooperation among, the states of the In view of the implementation of its in the Sahel. Sahel in the fight against terrorism, Integrated Strategy for the Sahel, particularly within the framework of the Scenario 2 developed in partnership with the AU Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism and ECOWAS, the UN created a Steering Partnership (TSCTP) and through the Despite the support of MISAHEL in the Committee and three regional working annual regional exercise, Flintlock. dialogue and reconciliation process, the groups covering the main axes of the breakdown in trust between the Malian strategy. The strengthening of regional and government and armed groups persists international cooperation in this region and the struggle for influence between A coordination platform, responsible for is also managed within the framework of the various mediators reduces the monitoring the implementation of the Sahel Region Capacity Building negotiations’ prospects of success. The Sahelian strategies, was created on 5 Working Group of the Global lack of financial, human and logistical November 2013 in Bamako under the Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). This resources and political will on the part of chairmanship of Mali for the following framework, under the joint chairmanship states delays the objectives of the two years. Furthermore, cooperation of Turkey and the US, is presented as a Nouakchott Process. between the UN, more specifically the discussion platform charged with UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), and identifying capacity shortfalls and Scenario 3 MISAHEL was formalised on 21 February suitable solutions in the areas of police Due to persistent delays in the dialogue 2014 with the establishment of a and judicial cooperation, border security, and reconciliation process, the security Technical Secretariat. Chaired jointly by the fight against extremism and the situation deteriorates following renewed the AU and the UN, the Technical financing of terrorism. hostilities between certain armed Secretariat is composed of ECOWAS, the groups and the Malian army. Crises arise African Development Bank (AfDB), the Lastly, the action taken by other in other countries of the Sahel, in World Bank, the Islamic Development countries, such as Switzerland and the particular as a result of heightened Bank (IDB), the Organisation of Islamic United Kingdom (UK), can be seen in tension, including increased tension in Cooperation (OIC), the UMA, ECCAS and their appointment of Special Envoys for pre-election contexts, and there are the CEN-SAD. the Sahel, in these cases Didier Berberat and Stephen O’Brien respectively. recurrent attacks by terrorist groups and In accordance with the principles set out armed militias. As a result, MISAHEL does in resolutions 2056 (2012) and 2100 Civil society not reach its political objectives in Mali (2013) of the UN Security Council, the The AU Strategy makes provision for and is faced with the emergence of new main challenge will be to increase supporting civil society organisations, crises. cooperation efforts between the AU, the particularly in the section on Options UN and the RECs in the field. ‘consolidation of the rule of law and Option 1 International community strengthening of democratic institutions’. It also makes provision for operational The AU could entrust MISAHEL with a The European Union (EU) was one of the partnerships with these institutions in its more active role in the coordination of first international actors to develop a actual implementation. MISAHEL could mediation efforts, in order to ensure Strategy for Security and Development build on initiatives already in place at the better coherence between the actors in the Sahel. The strategy’s regional level. The first forum bringing involved in the dialogue and the implementation has been coordinated together 123 civil society representatives national reconciliation process. In order by a special representative, Michel from the Sahel region was held in Algiers to avoid conflicts of interest, MISAHEL Reveyrand de Menthon, since March in June 2013 to try to offer solutions to could define a new framework, 2013. This strategy, first implemented in the crisis in Mali, especially its human incorporating all actors, so that March 2011, took on additional activities dimension. negotiations could be resumed following the Mali crisis, in particular immediately. through various training programmes Scenarios and by strengthening the Malian and Scenario 1 Option 2 Nigerien armed forces through three Due to its efforts to coordinate the In an environment where there is a missions: the EU Training Mission in Mali various mediation initiatives in Mali, strong risk of various African actors’ (EUTM Mali), EUCAP Sahel Niger and, MISAHEL facilitates the resumption of a efforts overlapping in terms of peace from 15 April 2014, EUCAP Sahel Mali. comprehensive and inclusive dialogue and security issues, the challenge for France has invested in the Sahel both between the Malian government and MISAHEL is to ensure that organisations politically (supporting the African Peace armed groups and manages to further with experience in the region (ECOWAS) and Security Architecture) and militarily the process of national reconciliation. At or with specific expertise (CILSS) are (Operation Serval in 2013 and the the same time, it succeeds in involved in implementing its plan of

4 PSC Report • Issue 58 • May 2014 action and that their strategies are taken Sahel region (PSC/MIN/3 (CCCXIV)), Sahel-Saharan areas (PCAR)’, into account in any developments within Bamako, 20 March 2012 ECOWAS, 2014 MISAHEL and its mandate. • MISAHEL press release, Bamako, 4 United Nations documents March 2014 Option 3 • Resolution 2056 of the UN Security • MISAHEL press release, Bamako, 28 Council, 5 July 2012 MISAHEL covers a vast geographic February 2014 region where security challenges may • Resolution 2100 of the UN Security arise in different ways locally in the same • Reports of the Nouakchott Process Council, 25 April 2013 ministerial meetings regarding country. In light of the mission’s current • UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel, strengthening cooperation in resources, the multitude of factors 2013 security matters and making the contributing to instability may be an African Peace and Security International community obstacle to its effectiveness in the field. It Architecture in the Sahel-Saharan should therefore ensure that it has • EU Strategy for Security and region operational: Nouakchott, 17 sufficient funding and that it musters the Development in the Sahel, 2011 March 2013; Ndjamena, 13 resources to set up sub-offices, September 2013; Niamey, 19 particularly in Algeria, Burkina Faso, February 2014 Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Mauritania. • Reports on the meetings of Heads of Intelligence and Security Services for Documents the Nouakchott Process, Bamako, 18 April 2013; Abidjan, 20–21 June 2013; AU documents N’Djamena, 11 September 2013; Niamey, 17 February 2014 • Press statement of the Peace and Security Council of the AU, 426th • The AU Strategy for the Sahel region, meeting, Addis Ababa, 7 April 2014 Niamey, 19 February 2014 • MISAHEL press release, Addis Ababa, ECOWAS documents 20 March 2014 • Community Development Plan, • Report of the Chairperson of the AU ‘Regional Coherence and Action Commission on the situation in the Programme for the Development of

Regional security the African Union-Led Regional The Chairperson’s report PSC/PR/2 Cooperation Initiative (RCI) for the (CCCLXXX) was prepared and presented analysis Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance after a request made by the Council Army’ in its meeting on 17 June 2013. through its communiqué PSC/PR/COMM The Commissioner for Peace and (CCCXXI) following its 321st meeting LORD’S Security also briefed the PSC and held on 22 May 2012. The RESISTANCE representatives of the Democratic comprehensive report covered Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan numerous developments and challenges ARMY (LRA) and Uganda (as member countries of the concerning the operationalisation of the RCI-LRA), Rwanda, the EU, the UN, the RCI-LRA, the operations of its various Previous AU/PSC communiqués CAR and the Joint Coordination components, activities being undertaken and recommendations Mechanism (JCM). The JCM is chaired by by the AU Special Envoy for the LRA and the AU Commissioner for Peace and interaction with the UN, as well as efforts In a press release dated 22 April 2014, Security and comprises the Ministers of to mobilise international support for the the AU Commission (AUC) announced Defence of RCI-LRA members and the regional initiative to combat the LRA. that the AU-led Regional Task Force AU-RTF, which in turn is composed of (AU-RTF) troops in the Central African The report included updates on the units provided by the affected countries. Republic (CAR) had captured a high- activities of the RCI-LRA involving the The Chair of the JCM referred to the ranking Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.2 situation in the CAR as one of the most commander, Lt Charles Okello, three (CCCLXXX) on the implementation of the serious problems affecting efforts to days earlier. The AUC commended the RCI-LRA. The PSC commended the hunt down the LRA. The report of the AU-RTF for its successive successes operationalisation of the various Chairperson on the LRA added: ‘The components of the RCI-LRA and the against the LRA, which led to a decrease evolution of the situation in the CAR contribution of troops to the AU-RTF, as in LRA attacks on civilians. since the resumption of hostilities by the well as ‘the increasing military pressure In its follow-up on the LRA issue, the PSC Seleka rebel group in December 2012 being exerted on the group, which led to listened to the report of the AUC has negatively impacted … the the capture of key commanders and the Chairperson on the ‘Implementation of implementation of the RCI-LRA.’ surrender of a number of its elements’.

5 PSC Report • Issue 58 • May 2014 The communiqué also highlighted the the ongoing peace and political Despite the huge geographic and negative impact of the situation in the processes in these countries. The LRA logistical challenges faced by the CAR on the operations of the RCI-LRA in also continues to take advantage of the AU-RTF, the campaign is succeeding in the CAR and beyond. escalating security problem in the CAR. reducing the LRA’s capacity to attack civilians. According to OCHA, between Crisis escalation potential The security and political crisis in the CAR has made dealing with local rebel 2010 and 2013, some 50 per cent fewer A December 2012 report by the UN groups a priority, adversely affecting the people were abducted and 75 per cent Office for the Coordination of campaign against the LRA. The fewer were killed by the LRA. ‘Since 2012, Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said that possibility of the LRA forming the African Union-led forces have over 326 000 people remained displaced opportunistic alliances with regional removed two of the LRA’s top five in areas that were threatened by the LRA governments or other rebel groups and commanders from the battlefield, and in east-central Africa. Most of the the alleged support from elements in we have credible reporting that a third, displaced people were living as refugees the Sudanese army are also cause for Okot Odhiambo – who was the LRA’s in the CAR, the DRC and South Sudan. concern. Moreover, ongoing instability in second-in-command and an In late March 2014 it was reported that the eastern DRC and escalating fighting International Criminal Court [ICC] the LRA had forged an alliance with the in South Sudan may also enable the LRA indictee – was killed late last year.’ The notorious Christian militia group, to rebound. number of defections and releases from the LRA has also dramatically increased, anti-balaka, to fight Muslims and foreign Key issues and internal dynamics forces in the CAR. The UN also confirmed further reducing the LRA’s capacity. that the alliance was responsible for a On 22 April Uganda announced it had According to the LRA Crisis Tracker, the spike in attacks on Muslims and captured one of the commanders of the group committed 90 attacks in the first peacekeepers in the CAR. At the end of LRA and freed ten hostages following a half of 2013, a 54 per cent drop from the March 2014 a clash between members of battle. According to the Ugandan army, 194 attacks in the first half of 2012. In the African-led International Support which is leading the AU-coordinated and particular, the DRC experienced a Mission to the CAR (MISCA) and the LRA US-backed mission to capture LRA significant drop, from 158 LRA attacks in and anti-Balaka alliance resulted in 20 leaders, Charles Okello was captured in the first half of 2012 to 66 in the first half deaths in Bangui. The deteriorating the south-east of the CAR. of 2013. However, the report noted that security situation in the CAR has Quoting defectors from the LRA in April despite the dramatic drop in attacks, LRA negatively affected the AU-led campaign 2014, the Ugandan state newspaper New forces killed more civilians in the first half against the LRA elements in that country Vision reported that members of the of 2013 (47) than during the first half of and created a safe haven for the group. brutal group were tired and disillusioned 2012 (32), a 47 per cent increase. Taking According to the US-based civil society and wanted to defect. The newspaper advantage of the political and security organisation The Resolve, LRA fighters claimed that most LRA fighters did not crisis in the CAR, the LRA committed its have abducted more than 200 people in want to fight anymore. According to the most notable attacks in the first half of a ‘quiet surge of violence’ in isolated report, the rebels claimed that it had 2013, in the eastern CAR’s Haut Kotto areas of the CAR since the 2013 coup. been a long time since they had prefecture. The LRA alliance with anti-balaka, which communicated with their infamous Some of the RCI-LRA member countries is blamed for numerous brutal killings leader, Joseph Kony. experience persistent difficulties in and attacks on the MISCA, has made the providing logistical support to their latter’s activities more complex. About a Encouraging the defection of LRA fighters is a top priority for those fighting contingents operating as part of the quarter of the country’s 4,6 million AU-RTF, included mobility (air and people have been displaced since the the LRA. A significant majority of the remaining LRA fighters may well be ground), medical support, rations and start of the crisis and thousands have effective communications. Funding for been killed. abductees. The AU-led mission has expanded efforts to promote defections the AU-RTF HQ and the JCM Secretariat The March 2013 coup in Bangui has from the LRA’s ranks, using leaflet drops, also lacks the required level of allowed the LRA more space and radio broadcasts, aerial loudspeakers predictability and sustainability. freedom to commit its atrocities. In June and the establishment of reporting sites The LRA is taking advantage of the alone, the LRA killed 19 civilians and where LRA fighters can safely surrender. current situation in the CAR and abducted 68 in Haut Kotto in the CAR. Reports show that the campaign exploiting the instability in the DRC. The The LRA Crisis Tracker records reflected air-dropped more than 1 million leaflets activities of the AU-RTF are seriously 16 additional LRA attacks from January encouraging defections at 17 locations compromised by the changing security to June 2013 in the eastern CAR. in the LRA-affected areas of the CAR, the and political situation in the CAR, while The LRA’s ability to adapt to evolving DRC and South Sudan. The leaflets, the current operational limitations political and security developments in produced in several local languages by present a serious challenge to the difficult terrain is evidenced by its Invisible Children, promise fair treatment continued effective implementation of survival and expansion into the DRC and by the Ugandan government for those the RCI-LRA in the CAR. Currently, the CAR. Given the fragile security who leave the LRA. The effort is showing LRA is poaching and trading ivory from arrangements in Central Africa, the LRA results. In December 2013, 19 the Garamba National Park in the continues to present a grave threat to individuals, including nine Ugandan north-eastern DRC. The situation in the the wellbeing of civilians in the DRC, males, defected from the LRA in the CAR, CAR has further destabilised the South Sudan and the CAR, as well as to the largest defection since 2008. north-eastern region of the country

6 PSC Report • Issue 58 • May 2014 bordering Kafia Kingi and has made the the AU-led campaign against the LRA. Scenario 1 enclave even more attractive to LRA He said: ‘Only by providing the necessary The addition of modern aircraft and commanders. resources will we be able to ensure the extra soldiers by the US facilitates the success of continuing efforts by the LRA leaders were the first individuals successful hunt for LRA fighters and the national authorities, the African Union indicted by the ICC in 2005 for war protection of civilians. and other international partners in this crimes and crimes against humanity, regard.’ including murder, rape and the forced Scenario 2 recruitment of children. Efforts by the UN, AU and international The possibility of a rift in the LRA Geo-political dynamics partners to address the threat and leadership results in more high-level impact of the LRA and Kony are defections by captives. Such a scenario Africa and RECs becoming more coordinated. The UN would help the regional force to gather On 19 July 2013, the PSC authorised the Regional Office for Central Africa vital information about the locations and African-led International Support (UNOCA), a political mission established operations of the group, thereby leading Mission in the CAR (AFISM-CAR), which in 2011, is playing an important role in to further operational successes. The incorporated elements of the existing fostering a coordinated UN response. capture or killing of Kony with necessary Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in International community external support restricts the LRA’s the CAR (MICOPAX). The mission was sphere of activity and helps capture or given several mandates, including the On 23 March, the US announced it would kill other LRA leaders and fighters, protection of civilians and restoring the boost the counter-LRA mission by thereby putting an end to two decades authority of the central government. It deploying at least four helicopters to of LRA atrocities. operates alongside the AU-RTF, although help find Kony. The CV-22 Osprey Scenario 3 no mechanism to coordinate activities helicopters now support the AU and share information has yet been Regional Task Force. The high-speed, The new crisis in South Sudan and established. night-capable Ospreys will be vital for ongoing instability in the CAR weakens A report by The Resolve has stated that transporting AU troops operating in the the regional force and adds to the elements of the Sudan Armed Forces CAR, South Sudan and the DRC. The logistical and financial challenges faced (SAF) in Kafia Kingi actively sheltered Obama Administration also approved an by the task force, which creates fatigue senior LRA commanders and provided additional 150 special operations forces and rifts between the different national them with limited material support. The and other air personnel to fly and armies that make up the mission. Resolve said that ‘according to LRA maintain the aircraft. As detailed in the Scenario 4 defectors and other sources, LRA leader US War Powers Act notification, this will Joseph Kony himself had first travelled to increase the total number of US forces in Kony’s proven presence in Sudan the Kafia Kingi enclave in 2010. He Uganda from 100 to around 300 troops. escalates regional tension and continues returned to Kafia Kingi in 2011 and was the legacy of proxy conflict in the region. The US is the most visible international present there throughout parts of 2012.’ The merger of the LRA with other partner supporting the fight against the The LRA’s ability to operate in Kafia Kingi regional armed militias in South Sudan, with Sudanese support poses a severe LRA. The US government has designed a Darfur, Rwanda or the DRC effectively threat to regional efforts to eliminate the comprehensive, multi-year strategy to multiplies the magnitude of the existing rebel group. If The Resolve’s allegations end the threat the LRA poses to civilians security threat. are accurate, it will be a big blow to the and regional stability. The strategy regional operation against the group. It outlines four key objectives: increased Options will also strain regional relations and protection of civilians; the apprehension Given the above scenarios, the following possibly weaken cooperation to or elimination of Kony and senior LRA options could be considered by the PSC eliminate the group. commanders from the battlefield; to improve security and stability in the promotion of defections and support for Sudan’s support for the LRA dates back region: to 1994. In the absence of effective the disarmament, demobilisation and diplomacy, Sudanese government reintegration of remaining LRA fighters; Option 1 officials have refused to cooperate fully and the provision of continued The PSC could continue to request the with regional counter-LRA initiatives and humanitarian relief to affected involvement of partners and the UN to have denied allegations about the LRA’s communities. presence in Kafia Kingi. Michael resolve the logistical and financial Poffenberger, executive director of The In March 2014 the EU announced that it challenges faced by the regional task force Resolve LRA Crisis Initiative, said: ‘As long would provide close to €2 million to by improving aerial surveillance and as Kony is able to find a safe haven in support the fight to eliminate the LRA human intelligence in Central Africa. The Sudan, he can avoid pursuit by Ugandan and support the RCI-LRA for a period of PSC could design a specific hybrid plan forces by simply crossing the border 17 months. The support is intended to with the UN Security Council to develop a whenever they get close.’ Sudan has cover staff allowances, communication joint response strategy based on a close consistently denied the accusation. equipment and operational costs. partnership with UN missions in the war-affected countries and which would United Nations Scenarios address defensive gaps in the eastern CAR In his report to the UN Security Council Given the nature of the LRA and the as well as much of the northern DRC. Such on the LRA, UN Secretary-General Ban state of security in the region, the mechanisms could help improve the Ki-moon requested partners to support following are potential scenarios: safety of civilians in the region.

7 PSC Report • Issue 58 • May 2014 Option 2 (PSC/PR/COMM(CCCLXII) (23 March Mechanism of the Regional Cooperation 2013), Communiqué on situation in the Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s The PSC, through the AU special envoy Central African Republic (CAR) Resistance Army (16 January 2013), to the LRA, could try to include Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Khartoum in efforts to eliminate the LRA. Press release on situation in the Central (PSC/PR/COMM.1 (CCCXLI) (13 The envoy could also initiate discussions African Republic (CAR) (4 January 2013) November 2012), Communiqué on the between the DRC and Ugandan (PSC/PR/2(CCCXLV) (6 December 2012), Prevention and Combating of Terrorism governments to improve intelligence Report of the Chairperson of the and Violent Extremism in Africa sharing and cooperation. Commission on the situation in the CAR Press Release on the 2nd Regional Option 3 (PSC/PR/COMM.1(CCLV) (6 December Ministerial Meeting on the Lord’s 2012), Communiqué on situation in the Resistance Army (LRA) (6–8 June 2011), The PSC, in collaboration with members Central African Republic (CAR) Addis Ababa, Ethiopia of civil society active in the area, could (PSC/PR/2(CCXV) (8 January 2009), Assembly/AU/6(XIII) (1–3 July 2009), encourage countries affected by the LRA Report of the Chairperson of the AU to take measures to address the trauma Report of the Peace and Security Council Commission on the situation in the to the African Union on its Activities and experienced by LRA victims through Central African Republic (CAR) the State of Peace and Security in Africa, traditional and state conflict resolution 13th Ordinary Session, Sirte, Libya and legal institutions. The PSC could also PSC/PR/Comm.(CCXV) (8 January 2009), Communiqué on situation in the Central institute and support more defection (PSC/PR/2(CCXV) (8 January 2009), African Republic (CAR) initiatives. Report of the Chairperson of the PSC/PR/COMM.2 (CCCLXXX), Commission on the situation in the Option 4 Communiqué on the implementation of Central African Republic The AU could consider the possibility of the Regional Cooperation Initiative for PSC/MIN/Comm.2 (CLXIII) (22 December convening a mini-summit of the RCI-LRA the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance 2008), Communiqué on the situation in Army (LRA) (17 June 2013), Addis Ababa, member states and other countries like the eastern part of the Democratic Ethiopia Republic of Congo (DRC) Sudan at the level of heads of state on the sidelines of the next AU Summit, to PSC/PR/2 (CCCLXXX) Report of the thoroughly discuss the LRA issue and Chairperson of the AU Commission on develop ways to effectively and the permanently eliminate the group while ‘Implementation of the African Union- ensuring greater protection for potential Led Regional Cooperation Initiative (RCI) LRA victims. for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army’ (17 June 2013), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Documentation Press release: Democratic Republic of AU documents Congo hands over 500-strong contingent to the African Union-led (PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCLXIII)) (25 March Regional Task Force for the elimination of 2013), Communiqué on situation in the the Lord’s Resistance Army (13 February Central African Republic (CAR) 2013), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Press release on the Central African Press release: Important action-oriented Republic (CAR), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia decisions adopted by the 2nd Ministerial (24 March 2013) Meeting of the Joint Coordination

Open page linking the peoples and regions of continental railway line between an integrated and united Africa. South Africa and Egypt, as Although not referenced in her proposed more than a century ago CAPE TOWN TO speech, it is difficult to contemplate by Cecil Rhodes. Africa four decades from now Such a transportation link should CAIRO – A DREAM without the expectation of at least logically be the ‘spine’ that joins one reasonably fast, unbroken, DEFERRED? north to south and intersects heavy haul, north-south rail route, essential east-west rail links, linking the southerly regions of In January 2014, at the AU Summit traversing Northern, Central and Africa to North Africa and beyond. in Addis Ababa, Dr Nkosazana Southern Africa, functioning as rail Dlamini-Zuma, Chair of the AU Hampered by at least three ‘ribs’ that reinforce and strengthen Commission, anticipated Africa’s different rail gauges, three broken the economic capacity and achievements by the year 2063. She links, inhospitable terrain and capabilities of 21st century Africa. highlighted many possibilities, sporadic political turmoil, there is Yet, at a time when trains routinely including a high-speed rail network still no continuous north-south criss-cross North America, Europe

8 PSC Report • Issue 58 • May 2014 and Asia, there is no train capable Union together with the Union of goods and/or passengers to a of travelling between Cape Town African Railways resolved that different train); bogie changing and Cairo and there are no standard gauge should be adopted (fitting different wheel sets to functioning east-west for the construction of new railway trains); dual gauge tracks; and transcontinental lines. lines on the continent’. variable gauge wheel sets. The absence of an African rail ‘spine’ The 2007 AU deliberations Dual gauge or mixed gauge tracks is surprising in view of the number concluded that: enable trains with different wheel of rail conferences that have taken gauges to share the same routes. place in Africa, the impressive The conversion to standard gauge Some countries in Western and projects that have been planned, (1 435mm) for new railway lines Central Europe also employ a the reports that have been should enable African railways to variable gauge system, which produced and the progress that has benefit further from the wide range enables rolling stock with multiple been made in some African regions of material and equipment at wheel tracks or variable axles to to develop regional rail global level, and will contribute quickly and easily adapt to using transportation networks, significantly to resolving the two or more track gauges. Opinions particularly in Northern, Eastern problem of interoperability in the are divided over which system is and Southern Africa. future Pan-African railway network. best for Africa. Some experts have At a meeting in Brazzaville in 2006, Although 60 per cent of the world’s recommended the use of rolling for example, the African Rail Union’s railway lines are standard gauge, 85 stock with variable axles; others report on Rail Development in Africa per cent of Africa’s rail networks, have proposed introducing a noted that 14 countries in Africa did totalling about 80 000 km, use four-rail system to support a triple not even have rail networks. It narrow gauge (1 067 mm) tracks. gauge mix of 1 435 mm, 1 067mm provided the following list of Only a relatively short east-west and 1 000 mm, thus allowing gauge reasons for Africa’s glacial approach trans-border railway in North Africa, unification in Africa. toward the development of an potentially linking Morocco, Algeria Africa’s east-west rail routes, the intra-continental rail network: and , uses 1 435 mm gauge ‘ribs’ crossing Northern, Central and tracks, which will also link up with 1 Southern Africa and connecting • Lack of political goodwill to work 435 mm lines in Egypt when the with the north-south Cape to Cairo out real transport policies Libyan section (delayed by the civil route, could be standard gauge war) is completed. A few other • Gradual abandonment of feeder links connecting important African countries such as Guinea coastal centres and land-locked operational subsidies granted to and South Africa also have isolated the rail industry cities with a broad gauge ‘spine’ sections of standard gauge track. that connects with the rest of the • Extraordinary road transport Some key rail transportation world via Cairo by rail. Ideally, the development countries, notably Russia, India and ‘spine’ link should be a four-rail dual China, use 1 524 mm, 1 676 mm and system that allows both standard • Investments reserved for roads 1 435 mm respectively. The gauge and broad gauge rolling due to procedures and policies difference between the standard stock to use the Cape Town–Cairo applied by international gauge (1 435 mm) and the broad route to facilitate eventual institutions (the World Bank) gauge measure used predominantly connectivity with European and Asian systems. • (Report/ratio 26 per cent road by Russian Railways (1 524 mm) is a against 13 per cent rail) mere 89 mm. Nonetheless, different The spin-off economic benefits for track gauges, usually at border Africa of an extensive regional rail • Fall in railway investments crossings, result in time-consuming network are potentially enormous. (maintenance and renewal) and expensive logistical delays and Moving high volumes of goods and disruptions in the flow of goods people in and out of Africa quickly • Since the 1950s: doubling of and passengers en route to various and efficiently by rail can be investments intended for roads destinations. Africa’s mix of 1 067 expected to help stimulate Africa’s mm, 1 000 mm and 1 435 mm economic growth, as occurred in • Since the 1980s: priority given to gauge track is therefore an India. agriculture impediment to smooth and cost- In the last few years, [India] has • Since the 1990s: economic effective intra-continental and intercontinental rail travel. been experiencing a steady adjustments economic growth enabling the As the NATMAP 2050 report also country to realise 9% growth in • Priority given to human resource notes, a number of different GDP and very soon we will be management in adjustment techniques are currently in use to realising 10% or more. The growth programmes of the transport address the problem of breaks-in- is always associated with sector (PAST) gauge, ‘all of (which) add to transportation and movement and Subsequently, in 2009, South operational costs and origin to railways have a major share in Africa’s NATMAP 2050 Master Plan destination transit times’. These ensuring cost-effective movement recorded that, ‘in 2007 the Africa include trans-shipment (relocating for industry for freight and

9 PSC Report • Issue 58 • May 2014 passenger to maintain its International Peace Research away from the most remote African competitive edge. Institute (SIPRA). Setting even half destinations. Conversely, African these funds aside every year for ten producers could transport their Of course, the development of an years should enable Africa to products to foreign consumers in a African intra-continental rail accumulate almost $240 billion for matter of days rather than months. network would require a dedicated the required rail network. Having labour force, a competent pool of In her speech the AUC Chair already received $1 trillion in engineering expertise, adequate referred specifically to ‘an Africa developmental aid over a period of funding and effective leadership (where) young people could tour 60 years (the Marshall Plan required backed by political will. on high-speed rail links similar to a paltry $13 billion to rebuild Europe’s Inter-Rail system’. Although Labour is readily available. There is war-torn Europe), Africa now bullet trains transporting working surely no better time than now to receives about $50 billion per year commuters, tourists and students at turn swords into ploughshares, a in aid from other countries. Twenty 300 km/h would be impressive, goal of peace lovers everywhere per cent of that amount over ten initial planning should focus on that could be given new meaning years, devoted solely to the creating economic opportunities to within the African context by development of rail transportation, enable Africans to actually benefit creating a workforce drawn from would total $100 billion, which from anticipated super-fast the ranks of the continent’s 35 could be added to the amount of commuter trains in 2063. million unemployed and some of its $240 billion. China has reportedly estimated 2 million professional already allocated a similar amount An intra-regional rail network military personnel; a workforce that to upgrade its rail system and India would enable job seekers to access could build essential railway lines, is spending $280 billion to upgrade job opportunities; students to roads, stations, tunnels, bridges and 64 000 km of tracks over a ten-year access schools, colleges and port facilities to sustain an intra- period. universities; and tourists to access African and intercontinental rail tourist sites more easily and safely. The cost advantages of rail network linking Africa to Europe Africans would also have quicker construction, in comparison with and Asia. and easier access to specialist the development of long-distance medical facilities. A modern A workforce of 3 500 would take 18 highway systems, include traffic integrated African rail network is months to complete 250 km of and freight volumes, speed and also essential for farmers, track, using the latest Tubular safety considerations, fuel industrialists and small business Modular Track (TMT) technology. A efficiency, maintenance costs, entrepreneurs to be able to get much larger workforce might be weather considerations and the their products to urban and foreign expected to complete the entire amount of land required for the markets, either indirectly via road, project, including supportive construction of a single-lane air or sea or directly by rail. infrastructure, in ten years. TMT was highway per kilometre as opposed designed and perfected by a South to the amount of land required for a A direct rail route between Cape African civil engineer, Peter Küsel, kilometre of dual rail track. In terms Town and Cairo would extend for and has already been used of cost-effectiveness, railway about 10 000 km, even longer than successfully in the deserts of Saudi construction is economically the Trans-Siberian railway. In theory, Arabia and Namibia. Apart from superior to road construction. getting rail freight from one of presenting an African solution to an Investment in rail infrastructure also these cities to the other in under 72 African problem, the great has other important benefits for the hours, including stops en route, advantage of using the TMT design continent as a whole in that fewer would require an average speed of to expand Africa’s rail long-haul trucks would need to slightly more than 140 km/h. transportation network, in addition travel long distances by road, As the NATMAP 2050 report noted, to the obvious initial cost savings, is thereby saving funds normally ‘experience has shown broader its relatively light maintenance required for highway, bridge and gauges to be generally better than schedule and its suitability for harsh tunnel maintenance as a result of narrower [gauges], causing regret terrain, including desert conditions. heavy road traffic. Highway use in regions where narrow gauges This type of track is also virtually could therefore be reserved almost emerged as standards’. Two broad theft-proof when compared with exclusively for private cars, gauge (1 524 mm) tracks, one traditional ballasted track, an emergency vehicles and smaller north-bound and one south-bound, important additional saving in commercial vehicles. from Cape Town to Cairo, would terms of maintenance. In addition, there are mutual make it possible to transport Financing a mega-infrastructural economic advantages in linking containerised freight between any project such as a continental rail virtually every country and region major African city and Europe or network would no doubt include a in Africa to Europe, Asia and the Asia a lot quicker than by sea; and re-allocation of existing funding Middle East by rail. Motor vehicles in greater volumes than by air. and effective cost-saving measures. and heavy capital equipment, as Double-stacking of containers In 2012, Africa devoted over $39 well as spare parts, clothing, food, would double the freight load, but billion to military expenditure, household appliances and medical would also require the enlargement according to the Stockholm equipment, could then be only days of some tunnels, the possible

10 PSC Report • Issue 58 • May 2014 redesign of some rail bridges and reliability and cost-effectiveness of means required for the the raising of electricity lines where a continental rail system would also implementation of the NEPAD [New electrified trains are used. effectively shorten Africa’s long- Partnership for Africa’s overdue journey towards political Development] action plan. The use of road-railers (hybrid integration, social development, Ministers of transport have to trailers that can be used on both economic prosperity and peace. prepare and direct the decisions of roads and rail tracks) would ensure highly placed officials in charge of the smooth transportation of Although Africa is at the the continent. freight between factories, farms, geographical centre of the shippers, importers and consumers. international trade system, it lies The AUC Chair’s vision of Africa in The road-railer is essentially a south of the world’s dominant trade 2063 should encourage the region’s heavy-load truck and trailer with an route; a golden commercial leaders to do what is necessary to exceptional and innovative highway that stretches from Japan transform the vision into reality. As modification to the undercarriage through continental Asia and a first step in the process of that enables the trailer to be Europe to North America, establishing a modern African coupled to a freight train in a connecting major trading blocs transportation network that one matter of minutes and hauled by such as the North American Free day includes inter-city bullet trains rail to its destination. The truck Trade Association (NAFTA), the EU, and transcontinental heavy haul driver, freed of his trailer, is then the Association of Southeast Asian freight trains, the completion of the able to fetch another loaded trailer Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia- Cape to Cairo rail link, if pursued for the next freight train. Heavy- Pacific Economic Cooperation urgently with dedication and duty road-railers would spend most (APEC). The engineering capability tenacity, need no longer languish as of their time on the road travelling already exists to begin building the a dream deferred. between respective warehouses kinds of bridges and tunnels and the nearest freight train station, needed to physically connect North leaving highways relatively free for Africa with Spain and the Horn of SOURCES: other lighter traffic. Africa to Yemen. NATMAP 2050, National transport Passenger and freight trains cannot As the African Rail Union noted in master plan 2050: rail working group be expected to wait idly for borders April 2006: report, rail gauge study report, to open or for customs and prepared for South Africa’s Taking into account the fact that Department of Transport, August immigration officials to spend the railway in spite of its hours checking freight and 2009 (Note: the working group insufficiencies, had advantages in comprised Africon, SSI and Ingérop) passenger documentation. particular with regard to long- Therefore, one anticipated distance transportation, the African Dream deferred, poem by Langston consequence of a continental rail leadership should have taken the Hughes network would be the facilitation of decision to confer to it the role of open borders, with passenger and Rail development in Africa: stakes and lynchpin of an integrated African prospects, objectives and missions of goods documentation cleared at system of transport by combining both source and final destination. the African Rail Union (ARU), First both complementary and African Union Conference of African This approach would be cost competitive modes of transport. Ministers Responsible for Railway effective, market friendly and Transport, 10–14 April 2006, beneficial to trade and investment The political factor thus appears to Brazzaville, Republic of Congo, AU/ in Africa. It would also encourage be the weak link in the delivery line. EXP/RT/3(I) use of the continental rail Given the demonstrated absence of transportation system, reduce the realistic technological, financial and APJ Kalam, Connectivity leads to need for long-distance, intra- physical impediments to the economic prosperity, address at the regional travel by road and keep rail creation of an intra-African rail Conference on Railways Vision 2030, costs down. network, the main reason why there New Delhi, 1 March 2008. is not a rail network linking north to Clearly, Africa’s future growth and south and east to west seems to be Stanley Mkoko, African Railways– unification, as well as its stability a lack of political will on the part of Vision 2025, TransNet, power point and pacification, depends on an African leaders, an absence of vision presentation, 4 March 2009. effective transportation network. In and perhaps a lack of leadership Interviews with Craig Tengstrom, addition, an efficient, cost-effective itself. Contracts Director, Tubular Track, rail grid connecting every state and As the report of the First African www.tubulatrack.co.za and Jaap van regional economic community, Union Rail Conference concluded in der Merwe, Group CEO, Infradev, supported by viable road links and 2006, www.infradev.co.za urban transit networks, would strengthen the continent’s Response to rail development in economy and generally raise Africa is political and must come African living standards. A modern from highly placed Africans transportation network responsible for defining the new underpinned by the relative safety, vision for Africa and ways and

11 PSC Report • Issue 58 • May 2014