Sudan's Harboring of the LRA in the Kafia Kingi Enclave, 2009-2013
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HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT Sudan’s Harboring of the LRA in the Kafia Kingi Enclave, 2009-2013 © DigitalGlobe 2013 WRITTEN BY CO-PRODUCED BY HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT Sudan’s Harboring of the LRA in the Kafia Kingi Enclave, 2009-2013 TABLE OF CONTENTS Methodology ........................................................................................................................................3 Executive Summary and Recommendations ....................................................................................4 [Map and Timeline] The LRA’s Long Road to Kafia Kingi ..............................................................7 I. The LRA’s Historic Alliance with Sudan .........................................................................................9 II. LRA Activity in and near Kafia Kingi ...........................................................................................13 [Feature] Disputed Territory: The Status of the Kafia Kingi Enclave ............................................16 III. Toward a Productive Role for Sudan ..........................................................................................20 Appendix A: Map and Detailed Timeline of LRA Activity in and around Kafia Kingi ...........................24 Appendix B: Satellite Imagery of Likely LRA Encampments in Kafia Kingi........................................28 Cover Image: Satellite imagery from December 2012, commissioned by Amnesty International USA and provided by DigitalGlobe, shows likely LRA camps within the Kafia Kingi enclave. © DigitalGlobe 2013 HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT | 2 ABOUT METHODOLOGY Published: © April 2013 This report was written by The Resolve LRA Cri- sis Initiative (The Resolve). It was co-produced by The Resolve, the Enough Project, and Invisible Children. The Resolve, with assistance from the Primary Authors: Paul Ronan and Michael Poffen- Enough Project and Invisible Children, collected berger, with assistance from Chelsea Geyer, of The information contained in this report from a variety Resolve LRA Crisis Initiative of sources, including firsthand interviews with for- mer members of the LRA who were eyewitnesses Co-Producers: The Resolve LRA Crisis Initiative, the to LRA activity in the Kafia Kingi enclave. In total, Enough Project, and Invisible Children report co-producers reviewed testimonies from Satellite Imagery Analysis: Commissioned by Am- eight former LRA combatants or abductees who nesty International USA and conducted by Digital- provided eyewitness accounts of LRA activity in Globe. © DigitalGlobe 2013 Kafia Kingi and five who provided evidence of the LRA’s collaboration with the Sudan Armed Forces Cartography and Design: Kenneth Transier, The Re- (SAF) between 2009 and 2013. Extensive informa- solve LRA Crisis Initiative tion was also collected from a review of existing lit- erature on the LRA crisis and recorded interviews with former LRA members. Additional interviews were conducted with civil society leaders in LRA-affected areas; represen- tatives from the United Nations and the African Union; and representatives from regional govern- ments and military forces. Most interviews were conducted by The Resolve during trips taken be- tween March 2010 and April 2013 to Sam Ouandja, Obo, and Djemah in the Central African Republic (CAR); Yambio, Nzara, and Raga in South Sudan; Dungu and Banda in Democratic Republic of Con- go (Congo); and Gulu and Kampala in Uganda. Satellite imagery analysis of likely LRA activity in the Kafia Kingi enclave was commissioned by Amnesty International USA’s Science for Human Rights program and conducted by DigitalGlobe from February to April 2013 and included imagery from 2009 to 2013. HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT | 3 HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT Sudan’s Harboring of the LRA in the Kafia Kingi Enclave, 2009-2013 EXECUTIVE SUMMAry military advisers from the United States (US) to pursue the LRA do not have permission to A growing body of evidence indicates that from enter Kafia Kingi. So long as Sudan permits it, 2009 until at least early 2013 the Ugandan Lord’s the small enclave can serve as a periodic safe Resistance Army (LRA) rebel group has periodi- haven for Kony and other senior LRA officers. cally operated in the Kafia Kingi enclave, one of Recent political upheaval in the Central African the disputed areas on the border between Sudan Republic (CAR), where rebels overthrew the and South Sudan. The enclave is currently con- previous government, has further destabilized trolled by Sudan, and numerous eyewitness re- the northeastern region of the country that ports indicate that elements of the Sudan Armed borders Kafia Kingi and has made the enclave Forces (SAF) in Kafia Kingi have actively shel- even more attractive for LRA commanders adept tered senior LRA commanders there and pro- at exploiting ungoverned spaces. vided them with limited material support. This dynamic jeopardizes progress made in According to LRA defectors and other sources, the past twelve months against the LRA, which LRA leader Joseph Kony himself first traveled includes a spike in LRA combatant defections to the Kafia Kingi enclave in 2010. He returned and the capture or killing of two senior LRA to Kafia Kingi in 2011 and was present there commanders in CAR. Unless addressed, it throughout parts of 2012. Along with other will also enable LRA leaders to outlast current senior LRA commanders, he found safe harbor counter-LRA operations. Though international in a series of semipermanent encampments diplomats and military officials working to stop on the banks of the Umbelasha River near the LRA attacks privately acknowledge recent LRA SAF barracks in Dafak. During that time, Kony movement in Kafia Kingi, they have not adopted continued to direct LRA attacks against civilians realistic strategies to prevent further support in neighboring countries and issue new orders from Sudan to Kony’s forces. for LRA fighters. The LRA abandoned the camps in early 2013 but may remain active in the In the absence of effective diplomacy, Sudanese enclave. government officials have refused to cooperate fully with regional counter-LRA initiatives and Sudan’s harboring of the LRA in the Kafia Kingi have denied allegations of the LRA’s presence enclave was the latest upswing in a cycle of in Kafia Kingi with impunity. Sudan, however, opportunistic collaboration between the two may not be as invested in its relationship parties that dates back to 1994. The military with the LRA as it once was. No evidence has training, safe haven, weapons, and supplies the emerged showing that the SAF’s recent support Sudanese government provided to the LRA were to the LRA included significant new arms or critical to the group’s growth into an increasingly that Sudanese officials have actively sought deadly rebel force. By 2004, Sudanese support to employ the group again as a proxy force to had waned, leading to a period of prolonged destabilize South Sudan. disengagement before the LRA reestablished contact with the SAF in Kafia Kingi in 2009. The LRA’s recent departure from its established camps in Kafia Kingi provides international The LRA’s ability to operate in Kafia Kingi diplomats with an opportunity to convince the with Sudanese support poses a severe threat to Sudanese government to definitively end its regional and international efforts to defeat the decades-long collaboration with the LRA. The rebel group. Ugandan-led forces authorized AU, which launched an initiative to facilitate by the African Union (AU) and assisted by regional cooperation to combat the LRA in HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT | 4 November 2011 and is mediating ongoing To the AU Special Envoy for the LRA Issue negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan, Ambassador Francisco Madeira: is best positioned to lead an international effort to press Sudan to fully cooperate with regional • Work with the UN and governments counter-LRA efforts. AU officials should work participating in the AU RCI-LRA to collect with the United Nations (UN) and governments of evidence of the LRA’s presence in Kafia Kingi other LRA-affected countries to forge a common and its links to the Sudanese government, diplomatic strategy aimed at preventing further including through interviews with former support from Sudan to the LRA and securing LRA members, to be shared with UN and Sudan’s cooperation to apprehend Kony and AU officials. other LRA members who may still be active in Sudanese-controlled territory. • Engage Sudanese officials more regularly on this issue and develop incentives for Sudan RECOMMENDATIONS to cooperate with the RCI-LRA. To the Government of Sudan: To UN Secretary General Ban ki-Moon: • Work with the AU to apprehend LRA • Provide recommendations to the Security elements present in Sudanese-controlled Council on how to address the LRA’s presence territory and turn them over to appropriate in Kafia Kingi in the upcoming report to the authorities from their countries of origin. UN Security Council on implementation of the UN regional strategy on the LRA. To AU Chairperson Dr. Dlamini Zuma: To UN Special Representative of the Secretary • Work with the AU Peace and Security General and Head of the Regional Office for Council, the AU High-Level Implementation Central Africa (UNOCA) Abou Moussa: Panel (AUHIP), the AU Special Envoy for the LRA Issue, and leaders of LRA- • Coordinate efforts by relevant UN agencies affected countries to develop a common and peacekeeping missions to collect diplomatic strategy aimed at securing evidence of LRA activity in Kafia Kingi Sudan’s cooperation in directly