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THE FASHODA CRISIS: A SURVEY OF ANGLO-FRENCH IMPERIAL POLICY ON THE UPPER NILE QUESTION, 1882-1899 APPROVED: Graduate ttee: Majdr Prbfessor ~y /• Minor Professor lttee Member Committee Member irman of the Department/6f History J (7-ZZyUtd^L. Dean of the Graduate School eV .•^C>v Goode, James Hubbard, The Fashoda Crisis: A Survey of Anglo-French Imperial Policy on the Upper Nile Question, 1882-1899. Doctor of Philosophy (History), December, 1971, 235 pp., bibliography, 161 titles. Early and recent interpretations of imperialism and long-range expansionist policies of Britain and France during the period of so-called "new imperialism" after 1870 are examined as factors in the causes of the Fashoda Crisis of 1898-1899. British, French, and German diplomatic docu- ments, memoirs, eye-witness accounts, journals, letters, newspaper and journal articles, and secondary works form the basis of the study. Anglo-French rivalry for overseas territories is traced from the Age of Discovery to the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, the event which, more than any other, triggered the opening up of Africa by Europeans. The British intention to build a railroad and an empire from Cairo to Capetown and the French dream of drawing a line of authority from the mouth of the Congo River to Djibouti, on the Red Sea, for Tied a huge cross of European imperialism over the African continent, The point of intersection was the mud-hut village of Fashoda on the left bank of the White Nile south of Khartoum. The. Fashoda meeting, on September 19, 1898, of Captain Jean-Baptiste Marchand, representing France, and General Sir Herbert Kitchener, representing Britain and Egypt, touched off an international crisis, almost resulting in global war. The territory in dispute was the Bahr-el-Ghazal, a province in the Egyptian Sudan which lay in a vast triangle between the White Nile, the Bahr-el-Arab, and the Nile-Congo watershed. Egyptian authority in this region had vanished some, thirteen years earlier with the fall of Khartoum to the Mahdist forces,. France claimed that the Bahr-el-Ghazal was r.es nullius, derelict:land belonging to no one, and, since Marchand reached Fashoda ahead of Kitchener, he was there by right of priority in cast-off fragments of the former Egyptian empire. The British insisted that the Bahr-el-Ghazal belonged to the Khedive of:Egypt, who was under their domination, by historical" right and that, because of the victory of the Anglo-Egyptian forces over the Mahdists at Orndurman in 1898, it also was Anglo-Egyptian property by right of conquest. The British further insisted that there would be no talks on the question as long as Marchand remained at Fashoda, and this fact, plus the failure of France to secure the aid of her Dual Alliance partner, Russia, caused the French to withdraw. Oddly enough, this move did not ease the tension and lead to a settlement. Britain continued to prepare for war, and the French, who were burdened with serious domestic problems, were in no position to fight Britain in the face of overwhelming odds. The initiative of the French diplomat, Paul Cambon, moved the crisis toward a settlement, and when diplomacy- began to function in January, 1899, the menace of war began to fade. The final settlement in March of that year marked the formal passing of the Fashoda Crisis, and further talks led to the Entente Cordiale of 1904, which made Britain and France virtual allies on African questions. Some historians have minimized the significance of the clash over Fashoda by calling it an affair. A day-by-day account of the diplomatic correspondence concerning the issue clearly shows that the Upper Nile question brought France and Britain to the brink of global war and that one rifle shot fired in the mud-hut village of Fashoda could have touched it off. The amazing thing about the story of Fashoda is that such a shot was not fired. THE FASHODA CRISIS: A SURVEY OF ANGLO-FRENCH IMPERIAL POLICY ON THE UPPER NILE QUESTION, 1882-1899 DISSERTATION Presented to the Graduate Council of the North Texas State University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i By James Hubbard Goode, B.A., M.A. Denton, Texas December, 1971 PREFACE. The clash of Anglo-French interests over the region of the Upper Nile in the last decade of the nineteenth century is of particular interest to those who are concerned with the origins of World War I. As Professor William L. Langer has so aptly put it, "more than perhaps any other great international problem in the pre-war period this question of the control of the Nile had the quality of an „1 ' epic. "You have here," says Langer, "issues of primary importance, you have grand conceptions, and you have a rivalry drawn out over more than a decade and marked at o every stage by drama, daring and.heroism." In short, the researcher in the field has every ingredient necessary for holding his attention and interest over a long period of time. The present writer was introduced to this era in a graduate seminar several years ago. After a thesis ^William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p. 573. 2Ibid. 1X1 on the subjectj which was little, if anything, more than a short voyage of exploration, research has continued, and hopefully, an in-depth study of the problem will result. There has never been an adequate study made of the Fashoda Crisis in all of its many-sided aspects, and the present attempt is no exception. For one thing, the epic proportions of the entire story do not lend themselves to the monographic approach, which has become so popular in recent years. The present study is a survey of Anglo-French imperial, policies on the Upper Nile question and the Fashoda Crisis which resulted, and it is an attempt to place this conflict within the framework of the "new imperialism" after 1870. Its limitations are many. Time and distance problems are not easily met by using the facilities of inter-library loan, and to deal with European history without doing research in the archives of Europe can only result in a poor production at best. If the present study makes any contribution at all, it is in the use of some documentary source material, principally from the first series of Documents diplomatiques frangais, concerning the Egyptian Question. Hopefully, the bibliography will be of use to those who are doing research in the field. iv One last admonition., again from Professor Langer, does a great deal to explain one of the major difficulties in writing on the Fashoda Crisis. The complexity of the problem, he says, "is simply baffling and the. many contra- 3 dictions on all sides only serve to enhazice the confusion.' It is to be hoped that, in some small way, the present study enables the reader to overcome these barriers. Within the framework of the few studies that have been made and published on the Fashoda Crisis, very little atten- tion has been given to the imperialistic setting in which the conflict and the settlement of the Upper Nile Question took place. Like all historical events, the Fashoda Crisis is always subject to re-interpretation, and this needs to be done by taking a broad view of the imperial policies of the disputants, France and Britain, and by applying those policies to the recent scholarship on the term imperialism. 3Ibid. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PREFACE iii Chapter I. MODERN EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM: AN ASSESSMENT 1 II. THE BRITISH DRIVE TO FASHODA: PHASE ONE, THE ANGLO-FRENCH ENTENTE IN EGYPT 43 III. THE BRITISH DRIVE TO FASHODA: PHASE TWO, THE OCCUPATION OF EGYPT AND THE RE-CONQUEST OF THE SUDAN 76 IV. FRANCE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE UPPER NILE, 1882-1896 ........... 117 V. MISSION MARCHAND: THE FRENCH ARM OF THE AFRICAN CROSS. 154 VI. THE FASHODA CRISIS 181 VII. CONCLUSION 216 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 224 VI CHAPTER I MODERN EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM: AN ASSESSMENT The practice of one group of people in setting their political and economic dominance over their weaker neighbors appears to be as old as mankind itself.'*" While there are no written records with which to substantiate this claim for the early life of man down to about 4000 B.C., there are, never- theless, various indications of such power extensions during the pre-literary period that have been brought to light as a result of archaeological research. The empires that were built and destroyed during the course of ancient history are well~known. Imperialists such as the Egyptians, the Persians, the Greeks, and the Romans set examples of long and successful authority over conquered peoples, and this experience was used by the new nation-states of early modern Europe in the creation of strong government at home and in collecting foreign holdings after the Age of Discovery began in the late 15th century. 1 Evelyn Baring, Ancient and Modern Imperialism (New York: Longmans Green and Co., 1910), p. 4; Irwin St. John Tucker, A History of Imperialism (New York: The Ullman Press, Inc., 1920)7 pp. "l ff".~ " Imperialism, in one form or another, has continued to be a part of modern history down to the present day. Since about 1500, European expansionism has passed through three distinct phases, and a fourth stage has yet to be concluded. These eras are usually recognized by sharp changes in govern- mental policies where overseas holdings are concerned. The first segment of modern European imperialism, commonly called the "old colonial" period, began with the early Portuguese voyages along the coast of west Africa in the late 15th century and ended with Britain's loss of the thirteen American colonies in 1783.