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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. “A SACRED TRUST OF CIVILIZATION:” THE B MANDATES UNDER BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS PERMANENT MANDATES COMMISSION, 1919-1939

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School,

The Ohio State University

Paul J. Hibbeln, B.A, M A

The Ohio State University 2002

Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor Carole Fink, Advisor

Professor John Rothney C c u o a lg . 1C ______Advisor Professor Michael Hogan Department of History Graduate Program

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ABSTRACT

The study of the League of Nations Mandates System is not frequently explored in

the historiography of international history and the history of imperialism. The framers of

the League of Nations Covenant created it to supervise the governance of the German

colonies and Ottoman territories lost by those powers in World War I, intending the

mandates system to create a more humane form of imperialism France and Britain did

not annex the territories they conquered, but agreed to administer them on behalf of the

indigenous inhabitants and the League. The League created the Permanent Mandates

Commission to oversee French and British administration in the new mandates.

This study examines one part of the system, the B mandates. These include

Tanganyika Territory, Togo, and the Cameroons. They were divided between France and

Britain, which were to govern them, according to the mandate treaties, for the “material

and moral well-being” of the African population. Paris and London, however, feared that

the League’s influence over their governance would restrict policy choices, interfere with

their imperial goals, and encourage Germany’s attempts to reclaim its colonies. They

therefore resisted the Permanent Mandates Commission and over the course of the

interwar period progressively attempted to circumscribe its ability to supervise the

mandates. This applied to the diplomatic interactions between Geneva and the powers,

the economic development of the African mandates, and social policies.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. This dissertation concludes that the League prevented the mandatory powers from

using the mandates to as a tool to disguise their annexation of these African territories.

However, League supervision failed to ensure administration on the basis of African

interests. It also had only an occasional inpact on Anglo-French policies. Its long-term

influence on imperialism was significant, but during the interwar period it was limited.

iii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. To My Parents

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I could not have completed this dissertation without the enormous support of my advisor and mentor Professor Carole Fink. Her tireless training and patience during the last seven years has been invaluable for this project and my education as a historian. She will continue to guide my study of history for many years to come. I would also like to thank Professors Michael Hogan and John Rothney for their wisdom and help during my graduate career at Ohio State. I do not think I could have completed my graduate education without the constant support and friendship of my colleagues in the OSU History Department. I would especially like to thank Matt Romaniello, as well as the other members of our small dissertation-writing group Aaron Retish, Jennifer Walton, and Matt Masur. My fellow advisees of Professor Fink, Jeff Giaque, Stuart Hilwig, LaGreda Gopp, and Rajiv Khanna, have also been the best of colleagues. Jennifer Anderson, Doug Palmer, John Stapleton, and the rest of the crowd in Dulles 239 and 235, as well as my many students, made my career at OSU a fantastic experience. Finally, I would like to thank the History Department staff, especially Joby Abernathy, who provided her shoulder and a spare cigarette many times through the years. I owe a great debt to the archivists and librarians who provided their services while I was researching this project. The archivists and staff of the League of Nations Archives in Geneva were extremely helpful and friendly, despite my French. Aurora Tangkeko and the other archivists at the UN archives in New York Gty were also wonderful. I would also like to thank the staffs of the Public Records Office in Kew, the Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres in Paris, the Centre des Archives d’Outre-Mer in Aix- en-Provence, and the Ohio State Library. Finally, I would like to thank my mom, dad, and brother Christopher.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. VITA

199 4 ...... B. A History, B. A. Economics, New College of the University of South Florida

1995 ...... M. A , Economics, Northwestern University

1996-9 7 ...... Teaching Assistant, History, Ohio State University

1997...... Ph.D. Candidacy Examinations completed, History, Ohio State University

1997-2002 ...... Small section instructor, History, Ohio State University

PUBLICATIONS

1. Paul Hibbeln, “Supervising Imperialism- The League of Nations and petitions

from Africans, 1920-1939.” Pnxeedirg ( f the Ohio Aatdeny

2. Paul Hibbeln and Carole Fink, “Imperialism in Africa, 1875-1914.” Exploring the

European Past. Thompson Publishing.

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: History

European International History

Modem European History

American Diplomatic History

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

ABSTRACT...... ii DEDICATION...... W ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...... v VITA...... vi LIST OF TABLES...... ix LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS...... x LIST OF MAPS...... xi MAPS...... xii PERMANENT MANDATES COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP, 1920-1939...... xvii

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION...... 1

CHAPTER 2: THE MANDATE IDEA AND THE CREATION OF THE PERMANENT MANDATES COMMISSION, 1919-1922...... 19 The German Colonial Legacy...... 20 Wartime Intentions versus the Mandate Idea ...... 21 Debate over the Mandates ...... 29 Internationalists, The League, and the Final Form of the B Mandates ...... 37 The Creation of the Permanent Mandates Commission ...... 50 Early German Claims and the Formation of the Mandates System ...... 58

CHAPTER 3: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND SOVEREIGNTY: BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND THE PERMANENT MANDATES COMMISSION AT WORK, 1920-1939...... 63 Part I: Public Diplomacy and The Competence of the Commission ...... 65 Part II: The PMC in Action: The Central Issues of the B Mandates ...... 72 Nationality and Military Questions ...... 72 Sovereignty and Length of Tenure ...... 74 The Open Door ...... 78

vii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Loans to the Mandates...... 82 Petitions ...... 86 Part III: Germany on the PMC and Goser Union ...... 94 Locarno and German Entry to the League ...... 94 French and British Reaction to German Entry...... 97 The PMC after German Entry ...... 101 Qoser Union and French Administrative Assimilation in the late 1920s-1930s ...103 Conclusion: National Sovereignty vs. League Supervision ...... 115

CHAPTER 4: DEVELOPING THE MANDATES, 1920-1939...... 118 Part I: The Goals and Mechanisms of Economic Development ...... 124 Land and Infrastructure Investment: The Basis of Development ...... 128 Rail Construction in the Mandates ...... 144 Part II: The Great Depression and Development ...... 149 Part III: TTie PMCs reaction to French and British Development ...... 162 Conclusion: The Interests of Development ...... 166

CHAPTER 5: SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: LABOR, EDUCATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY...... 169 Part I: The Bases of Social Policy in the African Mandates ...... 172 Part II: Labor Policy ...... 178 Part III: Health Policy ...... 198 Sleeping Sickness and Tsetse Fly Control ...... 206 The Liquor Trade and Alcohol Policy...... 211 Part IV: Education ...... 224 Conclusion: The PMCs influence on social policy ...... 237

CONCLUSION...... 241

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 246

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. LIST OF TABLES

page Table 3.1: Petitions Filed with the Mandates Section, 1920-1939 ...... 92

Table 4.1: Tanganyika Imports, 1929-1933 ...... 151

Table 4.2: Oassede reserve levels, French Togo, 1925-37 ...... 160

Table 5.1: Days of Forced Labor in Tanganyika Territory, 1928-38 ...... 191

Table 5.2: Public Health Spending in the B Mandates, 1919-1939 ...... 201

Table 5.3: Loan funds spent on disease control, including sleeping sickness, Cameroun (francs) ...... 210

Table 5.4: Alcohol Importation in the French B Mandates, 1921-38 ...... 214

Table 5.5: Alcohol Importation in the Gold Coast Colony (British Togo), 1913-1930 215

Table 5.6: Education expenditure in the B mandates, 1919-1939 ...... 226

Table 5.7: Percentage of children educated by B mandate educational systems, 1926 .... 227

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AE Archives du Ministers des Affaires Etrangeres AEF French Equatorial Africa ANSOM Archives Nationales, Section Outre-Mer AOF French West Africa AS APS Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society BIPDI Bureau International pour la defense des Indigenes CACE Colonial Advisory Committee on Education (Britain) CDF Colonial Development Fund (Britain) CO Colonial Office (Britain) DAPCA Direction des Affaires Politiques et Gommerciales, Afriqi FO Foreign Office (Britain) FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States ILO International Labor Organization KNPA Kilimanjaro Native Planters’ Association KRAGS Koloniale Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft (German)) LONMR League of Nations Mandate Report LONU League of Nations Union MC Colonial Ministry (France) MF Foreign Ministry (France) NRLTU Native Races and Liquor Traffic United Committee PMC Permanent Mandates Commission SFSDN Service Frangais de la Societe des Nations (France)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. LIST OF MAPS page Map 1: East Africa ...... xii

Map 2: Equatorial Africa ...... xiii

Map 3: French and British Togo ...... xiv

Map 4: Cameroun in the Interwar Period ...... xv

Map 5: Tanganyika Territory in the Interwar Period...... xvi

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. MAPS

HU90. Cmua

Map 1: East Africa in the Interwar Period (From Raymond Buell, The N atke Problem in Tropical Africa) xii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Map 2: French Equatorial Africa showing Cameroun (from Buell, The Native Problem in Tropic Africa) Note: The “beak” of Cameroun has been left out of this map. xiii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ithk

Map 3: Togo in the Interwar Period (from Buell, The Native Problem in Tropical Africa) xiv

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Map 4: Cameroun in the Interwar Period (from LONMR for Cameroun, 1931) xv

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Map 5: Map of Tanganyika Territory in the Interwar Period (from Charlotte Lebuscher, Tangmyka Territory: Study (fEconcmc Development under Mandate) xvi

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. PERMANENT MANDATES COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP, 1920-1939

Great Britain Spain

Major William Ormsby-Gore, MP Ramon Pina (1921-22) (1920-23) Count de Ballobar (1922-24) Sir Frederick Lugard (1923-35) Leopoldo Palacios (1924-39) Sir William Hailey (1936-37,1939) Sir Maurice Hankey (1938,1939) Portugal

France Alfredo Freire d’Andrade (1921-29) Count de Penha Garcia (1929-39) Jean Beau (1921-26) Martial Merlin (1926-35) Sweden Francois Manceron (1935-37) Augustin Giraud (1937-39) Anna Bugge-Wicksell (1920-28)

Belgium Norway

Pierre Orts (1920-39) Valentine Dannevig (1928-39)

Japan Switzerland

Kunio Yanaghita (1921-24) William Rappard (1925-39) Chiyulri Yamanaka (1924-28) Nobumichi Sakenobe (1928-33) Germany

Ludwig Kastl (1927-30) Julius Ruppel (1930-33) Marquis Alberto Theodoli (1920-36) International Labor Organization Netherlands Flarold Grimshaw (1922-29) Daniel van Rees (1920-34) Charles Weaver (1929-39) Baron Frederick van Asbeck (1935- 39)

xvii

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INTRODUCTION

To those Colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modem world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and the securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the constitution of the League. The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be intrusted [sic] to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, their experience, or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

— Article 22 of the League Covenant, Causes One and Two

The era of modem imperialism in Africa dates from the “Scramble for Africa” that

began in 1884 and ended with the rapid decolonization of Sub-Saharan and West Africa

during the Cold War. The French and British empires reached their greatest extent

between 1919-1945, after they had absorbed the million square miles of the German

colonial empire. Before the Paris Peace Conference, Britain and France had divided

Germany's territories and planned to annex them as part of the peace setdement. At

Paris, however, the negotiations creating the League of Nations Covenant altered French

and British aims. After prolonged discussion of a new mandates system, the French and

British agreed not to annex their newly conquered territories, but to govern them as 1

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. “mandates” for an indefinite period, preparing the populations for independence under

League supervision.

Article 22 of the League Covenant contained the terms of the mandates, dividing

them into three categories based on their level of civilization. These included not only

Germany’s former colonial empire in Africa, but also its former Pacific possessions and

the non-Turkish territories of the former Ottoman Empire. A formal agreement between

the League and the mandatory power, containing legal protections for the inhabitants and

administrative directives for the mandatory power, established each mandate. The

protections provided depended on the level of civilization of the indigenous population.

The A mandates, former Ottoman territories, contained the highest level of protection as

well as the most immediate promise of future independence. The C mandates, German

Southwest Africa and the Pacific islands, had only a thin veneer of protection for the

population, and were freely amalgamated by the Japanese, British Dominions, and the

Union of South Africa. This dissertation deals with the B mandates, Germany’s former

colonies in central Africa. Positioned between the A and C mandates, the B mandates

were not to be joined to other colonies, but neither were their populations “ready* for

independence. This condition placed them in a particularly important, but ambiguous,

position. They were not colonies, because the mandates aimed at future independence,

but until the population was prepared for self-government, for all practical purposes they

appeared to form part of the British or French colonial empires.

The distinguishing feature of the mandates system was Article 22’s promise to

establish a new, more humane imperialism based on internationalist principles. The

system attempted to define and remove the abuses that had characterized the imperialism

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of the pre-war era.1 The negotiators at the Paris Peace Conference drafted prohibitions

against the slave trade, the liquor and arms trades, certain forms of forced labor, and

several other pre-war examples of brutality and exploitation in the colonial world. More

importandy, Article 22 attempted to mark out the goals of imperialism in terms of

trusteeship rather than European sovereignty. It termed the indigenous inhabitants of the

mandates “peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of

the modem world,” implying that Europeans would govern in their interests and that this

tutelage would end with independence for each mandate.

Article 22 also established the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) to

represent the League as the first international control over imperialism. The PMC was

designated to supervise French, British, Belgian, and Japanese administration over the

various mandated territories. Its ten members, drawn from different countries and

unaffiliated with any government, would mediate between the mandatory powers and the

League for the lifetime of the mandates. It could use several methods to evaluate French

and British policies, criticize violations of the mandates, and suggest alternatives. After

each of its sessions it reported its observations to the League Council and published its

deliberations. However, the PMC was not a decision-making body, its effectiveness

depended on the pattern and evolution of its supervision.

The primary theme of this study is the complex relationship between the League

and Anglo-French imperialism. The League created diplomatic and institutional structures

aimed at modifying existing conditions in Africa, and the British and French negotiators at

1 For one recent study of such abuses, see Adam Hochschild, Kb% Leopold's Ghost, (New York, 1998). For a 3

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Paris agreed to League supervision. However, imperialists in both countries opposed its

influence over their practices. Both governments had a well-defined imperialist tradition

in Africa, with strong colonial ministries and domestic constituencies. Because

international supervision threatened to limit their economic aims and setdement attempts,

officials in London and Paris were prepared to resist outside influence on their colonial

policies.

By 1918, however, the ideological foundations of imperialism were changing.

Even before the war, public opinion in Europe and the United States demanded more

humane treatment of non-whites in Africa. After the turn of the century the older belief

that Africans existed as a labor force that could be exploited for the benefit of white

settlers and the metropole had eroded under the pressure of international opinion. After

the war, temperance, missionary, and internationalist organizations saw in President

Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, the Paris Peace Conference, and the League a unique

opportunity to influence the framework of government in Africa. These humanitarian

groups hoped that the League’s supervision would limit European competition for

resources and prestige in Africa and end the exploitation of the non-European population

of Africa. They took the lead in lobbying for a new form of government in the former

German colonies at the same time the future mandatory powers were planning to divide

and annex the German possessions.

Pre-war Anglo-French imperial ideologies had assumed a permanent European

presence in Africa and, for Africans, a centuries-long civilizing process. Before the war

French colonial administrators had relied on the late nineteenth-century republican idea of

recent survey of the Scramble for Africa, see Thomas Pakenham, The Scrarriiefor Africa, (New York, 1991). 4

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. assimilation. Paris’ goal was the eventual creation of a true Franz OutreMer in Africa that

would support the metropole economically. African assirriles, properly educated and

inculcated with French economic, cultural, and social values, would join France as citizens.

In Britain, advocates of white settlement joined vocal white communities in Kenya and

southern Africa in viewing European colonization as the first principle of imperialism.

Others, primarily administrators in western African colonies, had begun to advocate

“indirect rule,” under which traditional African tribal structures would form the basis of

colonial government. European administrators would support the authority of tribal

chiefs and headmen, while guiding African societies gradually toward an understanding of

European values and government. Even in this conception of the British role, European

administrations would be required for centuries.

After 1918, undoubtedly under the influence of public opinion, some French and

British imperialists in the metropoles and in Africa endorsed the ideas and rhetoric of

trusteeship. In Britain, Sir Frederick Lugard began work on The Dual Mandate in Tropical

Africa and Albert Sarraut, in La Miseen Valeurdes Calories Francoises,2 proposed the idea of

association, a French version of indirect rule. Association was not a popular idea. French

colonial officials, far more concerned about protecting their practices from the League

than promoting new ideas of colonial government, continued to rely on assimilation as a

guide. On the other hand, some British colonial officials supported Lugard’s “Dual

Mandate,” which attempted to reconcile economic and social development for both

setders and the African population. Foes of Kenyan or South African abuses against

Africans, for instance, used the idea of the dual mandate to hinder white settlement.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Although imperial ideas were changing, older ideas were still strong within the

French and British bureaucracies and colonial governments. Even the most radical

reconceptualization of imperialism assumed that Europeans were an integral part Africa’s

future. Neither association nor the dual mandate aimed at African self-government or

translated into rapid modernization policies. Additionally, many officials and colonial

advocates believed that African colonies should provide resources for the metropoles

while becoming financially self-sufficient, and they were reluctant to provide the mandates

with funds. Moreover, post-war financial restraints in Britain and France limited the

resources available for social development, and few constituencies demanded extensive

services or rapid economic development for Africans.

The mandates system therefore meshed imperfectly with newer justifications of

European dominauon and seriously threatened older imperial goals. The League’s aim

was independence for the B mandates after disinterested French and British governments

developed them for the African population. Thus, the mandates system entailed a

potentially intrusive supervision, where imperial administration rested on unfettered

sovereignty and racial superiority. British and French officials feared and resented League

interference, especially if it limited or eliminated established policies such as white

settlement or the use of African labor on European plantations.

This clash between the mandate idea and imperialist policies defined the

relationship between the mandatory powers and the PMC Paris and London understood

the threat of League supervision and adapted themselves in various ways. Although both

dedicated sections of their colonial establishments to the new African mandates and

2 Frederick Lugard, The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa, (London, 1922); Albert Sarraut, LaMiseen Valeurdes 6

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. provided copious amounts of information to the commission, they attempted to limit the

League’s influence over their African mandates and asserted their prerogatives regularly.

When the PMC challenged their imperial goals in the mandates, they generally obstructed

it.

British and French resistance to the PMC intensified after Germany entered the

League. At the end of the war, German colonial propagandists began agitating against

British and French administration in the mandates. Paris had initially resisted German

membership in the League, and Britain and France had only reluctantly, and after

considerable delay, accepted a German member on the PMC After 1926, both powers

tried to limit Berlin’s influence, fearing its criticism or a concerted campaign to recover

Germany’s lost colonies. They also became more defensive about the PMCs

observations. The result was a decline in the commission’s influence.

The conflicting goals of imperialists and the League also affected the

administration of the mandates. The stipulations of the mandates often created tension

between the mandatory powers and among different parts of their colonial establishments.

The governments in the African mandates usually did not support the mandates system

but had to accommodate themselves to its provisions. I ik<» other overseas officials, they

sometimes disagreed with colonial officials over policies that affected their territories, and

also found themselves at odds with uncooperative foreign ministries or conservative

treasuries reluctant to provide adequate support. Finally, the mandate governments often

fought with neighboring colonies over their priorities and goals. This was especially true

Colonies Franpise (Paris, 1923). 7

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of Kenya, a settler colony with a large European population, and Tanganyika, a mandate

ostensibly dedicated to African social and economic development.

The Great Depression accentuated the administrative conflicts among these

different centers of power. The financial crisis of 1929 threatened Africa’s fragile

economy, particularly when the mandatory powers curtailed development spending. It

created many financial problems in the mandates and threatened France and Britain’s

long-term imperial goals. The depression also reinforced the French and British

inclination to amalgamate their mandates into their larger colonial empires. Their motive

was not only financial exigency, but also to assure the permanency of their rule.

Even within the PMC itself, the new system conflicted with the traditional ideas

and practices of imperialism. Article 22 expressed an uneasy compromise between

Wilsonian internationalists and traditional practice. For example, the new mandatory

powers had to approve their trusteeships, and each held a seat on the PMC The

commission’s other members were drawn overwhelmingly from the colonial powers.

Many were dedicated imperialists and supported British and French administrators and

colonial officials. During the 1920s, when the League enjoyed public support and had

dedicated functionaries, this was not a critical problem. However, in the 1930s, the

organization’s problems mounted and its finances shrank, and the declining quality of the

League’s personnel also contributed to its demise. The PMC became less active, its

membership more elderly and less energetic, and its supervision more generally supportive

of the French and British. By the late 1930s the PMC as an institution often defended

imperialism, rather than seeking to make it conform to internationalist principles.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The result of this rivalry between the PMC and French and British imperial

establishments was a steady erosion in the commission’s influence over policy in the

African mandates. The commission struggled to obtain information from the mandatory

powers. It had to defend itself against charges of partiality and shield its members from

criticism. The PMCs influence declined further in the later 1930s, when the League

suffered major political and financial setbacks. Diplomatically and institutionally weaker

than the mandatory powers, it failed to stop them from losing all interest in maintaining

their international obligations or altering their imperial practices.

The mandates system overlaps several different branches of interwar

historiography. It is part of the history of African imperialism, a stage defined by a less

exploitative form of control. Many historians, for instance, deal with Britain’s “indirect

rule” policy as it was implemented during the interwar period.3 On the French side, Alice

Conklin’s A Mission to Ckiiize is a recent addition that analyzes the halting evolution from

assimilation to association.4 Other works discuss the mandates as part of the larger pattern of

administration in Africa. The volumes edited by Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis

on administration in the French, British, and German empires contain articles on the

mandates, as do several of the shorter monographs on the ideology and policy of British

3 See David Gardinier, “The British in the Cameroons, 1919-1939," in Gifford and Louis, eds., Britain and Germtny in Africa, (New Haven, 1969), 538-547; Ralph Austen, “Varieties of Trusteeship: African Territories under British and French Mandate, 1919-1939,” in Gifford and Lewis, France and Britain in Africa, (New Haven, 1971), 515-541. * Alice Conklin, A Mission to Ckiiize, (Stanford, 1997). Conklin argues that association, developed in the early 1920s as a recognition that Africans were too different to incorporate into French political structures, did not truly replace assimilation, which assumed France would rule in Africa forever. In this, she agrees with other assessments of French imperial ideology. See William Gohen, “The French Colonial Service in French West Africa,” in Gifford and Louis, eds., France and Britain in Africa, 491-513. 9

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and French imperialism.5 However, many of the important works on imperialism end in

1914 or 1918 and therefore remove the interwar period, and the mandates system, from

analysis.6 Others draw no distinctions between pre- and post-War colonialism.7

The mandates system also falls within the boundaries of the history of

decolonization. In the post-colonial period, most writers on African independence viewed

it as part of the colonial period, making no distinction with the previous eras. However,

some scholars have investigated the changes from German to French or British rule,

viewing the mandates system was either a continuation of colonial exploitation or a

waypoint on the path to independence.8 Few, however, discuss it as an era unto itself or

approach its internationalist aspects comprehensively. John Illife’s Tanganyika Under

GermmRtde, 1905-1912 and-d Modem History cf Tartgtnfka show the continuities between

German and British policy in Tanganyika while analyzing the consequences of Governor

Donald Cameron’s experiment in indirect rule.9 Jane Guyer’s work on Cameroun during

5 Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis, eds., Britain and German) in A friat, and France and Britain in A frica, bring together a number of other historians on late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century imperialism. Several selections from these volumes address the wartime goals of the French and British governments, as well as the administration of the mandates. On British imperialism, see for example Penelope Hetherington, British Patemdism and Africa, 1920-1940 (London, 1978), Alice Conklin, A Mission to Ckiiize, and AD. Roberts, ed., The Colonial Moment in Africa, (Cambridge, 1990). 6 For instance, D.K. Fieldhouse’s E canonic andErrpire (London, 1973) ends in 1914. See also Judith M. Brown and William Roger Louis, eds., The Oxford History cfthe British E rrpire (Oxford, 1999) an otherwise excellent introduction to the historiography of twentieth-century imperialism, lacks a single piece on the mandates. 7 The best example of this is Jean Suret-Canale, French Colonialism in Tropical A frica, 1900-1945 (New York, 1964) which highlights the continuity of French exploitation in Africa. See also Hubert Deschamps, “French Colonial Policy in Tropical Africa between the Two World Wars," in Gifford and Louis, eds., France and Britain in Africa, 543-569, and Dieudonne Oyono, Calorie ou Mandat lrtem atkndi La Politique Franpise au Carrerounde 1919-1946, (Paris, 1992). Both conclude that the mandates system had little impact on French colonial polity'. For one view of British continuity, see Robert Heussler, “British Rule in Africa,” in Gifford and Louis, eds., Frants and Britain in Africa, 563-592. ! A good example o f the latter is Victor LeVine, The Camaoans from Mandate to Independence (Berkeley, 1964). LeVine is an excellent survey of the Cameroons and deals with the mandate period thoroughly from a political point of view, but makes few conclusions about the economic or political importance of the mandates. 9 John Iliffe, A Modem History c f Tanganyika, (Cambridge, 1979); Tanganyika Under German Ride, (Cambridge, 1969). 10

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. German, French, and national periods also demonstrates the continuities between French

government in French Equatorial Africa and that mandate.10

The third important area is the international history in the interwar period. T ikp

the League of Nations itself, it is a neglected topic. This is not surprising, as few works

written in the last thirty years have studied the League as an institution or as a center of

European diplomacy. One early apologist for the League in the post-World War II era

was F.P. Walters, a former official in the Secretary General’s office.11 Another was F.S.

Northedge, The L eage cfNadars: Its Life and Times , a basic survey with only a cursory

glance at the mandates system.12 The prevailing conclusion that the League was an

irrelevant part of interwar politics has undoubtedly contributed to the paucity of

monographs on its functioning or its many commissions. There are two areas in

international history where historians have discussed the mandates system. One is its

origins in the Treaty of Versailles.13 The second is the history of appeasement, because

the African mandates were one part of Germany's revisionist goals.M In these areas,

10 Guyer, Jane. “Head Tax, Social Structure and Rural Incomes in Cameroun, 1922-1937,” Cahiers d'Etudes A fric a n s, 20:3 (1980): 305-329; “The Depression and the Administration in South-Central Cameroun." AfricanE canonic History, 10 (1981): 67-79; “The Food Economy and French Colonial Rule in Central Cameroun.” Journal fAfriamHistory, 19:4 (1978): 577-597. 11 FP. Walters, A History fth e Leage fNations (London, 1952). Walters does not go into the mandates system. 12 F. S. Northedge, TheLeague fNations: Its Lfeand Tone, 1920-1946, (Leicester, 1986). Northedge’s section on the mandates system contains some technical errors and is not copiously noted. 13 One of the few books to consider the diplomacy of the territorial setdement in Africa is Brian Digre, Irrperialism’s NewQatha: The Reparation c f Tropical Africa, 1914-1919, (New York, 1990). Aseminal article on the topic is Andrew Crazier, “The Establishment of the Mandates System, 191-1925: Some Problems Created by the Paris Peace Conference.” Journal c f Conterrfarary History 14:3 (1979): 483-513. See also Andre Kaspi, “French War Aims in Africa, 1914-1919,” in Gifford and Louis, eds., France and Britain in Africa, 369- 396, and Peter Yearwood, “Great Britain and the Repartition of Africa, 1914-1919,” Journal f Irrperial and Corrrnanwalth History, 18 (1990): 314-341. M Andrew Crazier, Appeaserrut and Germany's Last Bidfar Colonia, (London, 1988); Wolfe Schmokel, D ream rf E rrfire German Colonialism 1919-1945, (New Haven, 1964); A. Edho Ekoko, “The British Attitude Towards Germany’s Colonial Irredentism in Africa in the Interwar Years.” Journal f Conterrfarary History 14 (1979): 287-307. 11

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. however, the mandates system has been depicted as an obstacle to be overcome either by

the British or the French in the former case, or Germany in the latter.

The historiography of the mandates system itself breaks into two periods:

contemporary and recent. Major interest in the mandates system, particularly the in B

mandates, ended in the early 1950s with the birth of the United Nations Trusteeship

system.15 Those who dealt with the topic later did not approach the mandates system

broadly, but as part of national history or as part of the study of imperial administration.

Very recently, a few historians have begun to examine the League and its commissions,

and at least one historian has attempted to reinterpret the history of the B mandates.

Contemporary students of the mandates system wrote almost exclusively during its

lifetime. Their assessments of the value of the system, and by extension of the League,

were universally favorable. A few contributions written at the end of World War II were

more critical, but could not take advantage of archival sources. Additionally, on the

British side, former governors and colonial officials wrote memoirs that defended their

administrations.16 Most of these early books on the mandates relied heavily on press

accounts, the published minutes of the PMC and the annual reports published by the

British, French, Belgian, and Japanese governments. These sources were heavily edited

and designed to reinforce support for the system; this is reflected in the scholarship.

One of the earliest and most valuable contributions was by American Quincy

Wright, a legal scholar who wrote extensively on the League of Nations. His Mandates

15 One of the few attempts to synthesize the mandates system into the history of modern African imperialism as a significant era is Ralph Austen’s “Varieties of Trusteeship." Austen proposes three areas of analysis in the mandates: the diplomatic axis of Geneva-London-Paris, the territorial administrations, “where European administrators executed colonial policies in collaboration with what they thought were the most politically relevant groups of Africans," and the African communities. See below. 16 Few French administrators wrote extensive memoirs. 12

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Under the League c f Nadars discussed the legal aspects of the mandates system, including the

problematic drafting of the mandate treaties and Articles 22 and 23 of the League of

Nations Covenant. He also dealt with the administration of the mandates and attempted

to engage the differences between the theoretical benefits of the mandates system and the

governmental structures of the mandatory powers. He concluded that the mandates

system was a valuable and potentially powerful addition to international law. Several of

his contemporaries writing in the late 1920s and early 1930s agreed. At the same time

Wright published, American Aaron Margalith wrote The International Mandates, and the year

before, Elizabeth Maanen-Helmer completed her study on the B and C mandates, The

Mandates System in Relation to Africa and the Pacific Island. All three of these early works

covered only the first decade of the PMCs lifetime and concluded that the commission’s

work had been successful. They also viewed the mandates as an important step in

imperialism’s evolution, praising the protections the mandate treaties and Article 22

provided for the African population. All three also looked to the League and mandatory

powers to fulfill the promise of eventual self-government.17

There were some critics of the mandates system during its lifetime. Responding to

the Great Depression, the rise of Adolf Hider, and the debate over appeasement induced a

few colonial supporters in France and Britain to defend their colonial record in the

mandates. Several British officials in the mandates published memoirs defending the

17 Quincy Wright, Mandate Under the Leagte

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. British record in the mandates.18 French colonial apologists also defended their

administrations.19 Tliis defensiveness was intensified by books that criticized French and

British administrations in Africa. These included Raymond Buell’s The Native Problem in

Africa and Manus Fortie’s Black and BeauofulT One of the few early attempts to critically

examine the administration of one of the African mandates over the entire interwar period

was Charlotte Leubuscher’s 1944, Tanganyika Territory A Study c fEconomic Policy Under

Mandate. Leubuscher concentrated on development, education, and public health policies.

Relying on published British reports and the public records of the PMC, she detailed the

economic problems caused by Tanganyika’s political relationship with Kenya.

One recent work devoted to the mandates system as an important development in

the history of African imperialism and one of the very few to consider the work of the

Permanent Mandates Commission is Michael Callahan, Mandates andErrpvre: T heL eagtef

Nations and Africa, 1914-1931.2X Working in British and French archives and using the

published documents of the Permanent Mandates Commission, he analyzed several of the

major issues relating to the creation of the mandates system and the impact of Article 22

(London, 1938) who revisited the legal aspects of the mandates, including the question of terminating a mandate, as pan of the debate over the transfer of a mandate to Germany. 18 Donald Cameron, M y Tanganyika Senior and Sam Nigeria, (London, 1939). See also Alexander Gilchrist, Tanganyika Memories: A Judge in the Red Korea, (London, 1936). Two later examples are E.K. Lumley, Forgxten Mandate A British District Officer in Tanganyika, (London, 1976) and Bryan Sharwood Smith, Recollections

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. on interwar imperialism. He has argued that the League’s supervision had a significant,

positive effect on the evolution of imperialism during the interwar period:

The League emphasized the protective obligations of the trustee and subjected the mandatory powerfs] to systematic supervision. The larger world now held the imperial powers hostage to their own rhetoric and pressed them to maintain their legitimacy by accepting international accountability in their colonial rule in Africa.

Further, he argued that “the system graduallyreshaped the ideology of imperialism.”22

However, Callahan’s interpretation of the effect of the mandates system, based primarily

on the first decade of its lifetime, did not take into account either the long-term effects of

the Great Depression or the diplomatic events of the 1930s. Callahan also did not discuss

the administration of the African mandates in detail and limited his analysis of the

Permanent Mandates Commission’s influence to its minutes and the mandate reports.

This study contributes to the historiography of the mandates system by evaluating

the effects of the League’s supervision during its entire lifetime. The dissertation is

focused on two areas first suggested by Ralph Austen.23 The first area is in Europe, where

the PMC and the two mandatory governments debated policy. This study examines the

changes created by Germany's entry into the League and the effects of the Great

Depression. The second area is in the B mandates themselves where policies were

executed and where the ideological commitment to imperialism by indirect rule,

assmilatkn, or association met the practical necessities of governance. To analyze the

system’s effect on the economic and social state of the African mandates, the dissertation

exammes economic and social development in Tanganyika, Cameroun, and Togo. It thus

evaluates the impact of the mandate idea and system on imperial practice.

x Callahan 6-7.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The mandates system in Africa was not ineffectual, nor did it enable disguised,

unrestricted imperialism in the former German colonies. Its very existence in the face of

the Anglo-French intent to annex those territories indicates the strength and popularity of

internationalism. It introduced and perpetuated ideas about the economic development of

Africa and the goal of independence for the African mandates. Over the long term, its

ideals and experience would form the core of the United Nations Trusteeship System and

it succeeded in limiting the extent of British and French de facto annexation of the

mandates.

However, the mandates system in Africa was of very limited influence in most

other ways. Its greatest successes were negative. It prevented some of the African

mandates from becoming indistinct pseudo-colonies, but it only rarely encouraged the

mandatory powers to implement policies that fostered self-government. The PMCs

supervision was constandy, and successfully, contested by the mandatory powers in

pursuit of their own aims. The administration of the African mandates was strikingly

similar to that of neighboring colonies; the mandate governments rarely accepted the

principles of the mandates system or PMC argument. Economic development policies

were similar to plans in other colonies and not structured to support African welfare.

Even when local governments or central bureaucracies attempted to govern in the spirit of

the mandates, they had to contend with dedicated imperialists, land-hungry white setders,

and parsimonious treasuries. Addirionally, the PMC itself often supported imperialist

goals and refused to raise controversial suggestions, even when the mandatory powers

23 Austen, “Varieties of Trusteeship," 516. 16

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. violated the mandates. Article 22’s ideological dedication to independence and economic

development evident in did not translate into policy in the African mandates.

Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between the problems of League

supervision in the interwar period and a verdict that the mandates system was an abject

failure or a camouflage for annexation. The rapid decline in the League’s influence over

imperialism notwithstanding, the principle of international control was reborn in the UN

Trust Territory System Furthermore, the PMCs difficult, twenty-year lifetime

represented a long struggle to implement Wilsonian goals, not a cover for French and

British ambitions. The continuous struggle of the French and British to evade its

provisions and hobble the PMC indicates that they paid attention to Geneva. Certainly

contemporary authors, such as Wright and Margalith, did not view the mandates system as

a sham To be sure, the PMC was designed to be a partner of the mandatory powers, not

their adversary or a powerful critic. They acknowledged the asymmetric relationship

between PMC and the mandatory powers, but they also praised the League’s

accomplishments in creating a new form of governance. However, the League lacked the

time, resources, personnel, and widespread public support to transform the face of

imperialism in the African mandates.

This dissertation is divided into four parts. Chapter Two examines the origins of

the system at the Paris Peace Conference and its elaboration during the early 1920s. It

also analyzes the various contesting forces behind the mandate principle. Chapter Three

explores the European dimension of the system, both diplomatically and in terms of the

major events of the interwar period. Chapter Four examines the forms economic

development in the African mandates as well as the limitations of the PMCs influence,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. particularly after the onset of the Great Depression. Chapter 5 examines three broad areas

of social policy: labor, public health, and education, issues that defined the mandatory

powers’ commitment to encouraging the eventual self-government of Africans.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 2

THE MANDATE IDEA AND THE CREATION OF THE PERMANENT MANDATES COMMISSION, 1919-1922

To the Right Honourable Mr. Lloyd George:

Sir I am herewith enclosing a short note pointing out the danger and inconvenience of international interference, that Pres. Wilson’s internationalisation of the late German colonies would entail.

The Way Not to Do It We don’t quite like President Wilson’s utopian scheme of intemauonalising the late German Colonies... It would entail unending friction and facilitate the disintegration of the British Empire, which possibly some of our friends are secredy hoping for. We have not forgotten the Fashoda incident, when a brave French officer was sent, almost to certain death, to filch the fruits of Kitchener’s victory... nor have we forgotten Uncle Sam’s attempt to twist the British lion’s tail in the Venezuela stunt. We notice that Messrs. De Wet and Go., have already started stirring up trouble in South Africa, and the Sinn Feiners in the Distressful Isle, by appealing to Mr. Wilson’s Interference Society. We thoroughly approve of a League of Nations, but thoroughly disapprove of any international corporation to interfere with its members’ private and domestic affairs, and to encourage discontented minorities making their homes intolerable. Such a system reminds us of the Vatican’s mischievous and autocratic interference during the middle ages.

- CB. Dressner, 40 Beulah Hill, Upper Norwood, London, 31 Jan. 1919«

The mandates system was created by the negotiators of the Big Four, France,

Britain, the United States, and Italy, at the end of World War I. Based on Article 22 of the

League Covenant and several mandate treaties, each covering a separate territory, it was an

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. amalgam of French and British views and those of non-govemmental oiganizations. The

system, including the individual mandates and the Permanent Mandates Commission

(PMQ, was conceived as an uneasy compromise between annexationist goals and the ideal

of international supervision over colonial development. From the beginning there was

conflict between the Wilsonian ideals espoused by the League and the Anglo-French

wartime intention to annex the German colonies.

The German Colonial Legacy

By 1914, Germany’s initially haphazard colonial expansion had created an empire

of over one million square miles. In Africa, it was an empire lacking ethnic or

geographical unity. It encompassed Swahili speakers in East Africa, the largely Christian

Ewe peoples of West Africa, and the diverse tribal groupings of the Cameroons, including

the Duala, the Beti, and Muslim Fulani emirates near Lake Chad.25

Without intrinsically wealthy territories, substantial capital investment from the

German government or industry, or a large number of setders (fewer than 10,000 setders

and administrators were present in German Africa), Germany’s African Empire

nevertheless possessed the beginnings of an impressive infrastructure. There was a large

railroad girdling German East Africa between Dar-es-Salaam and Lake Tanganyika, with

the beginnings of others in the colony of Kamerun, running inland from Duala to the

interior plantations, and a third in Togoland running from Lome, the capital, to Palime in

the center of the country. These railroads opened up considerable land for plantations,

and several prosperous European communities existed at Victoria in Kamerun and at

24 British Foreign Office General Correspondence (FO 371), Volume 3774 (FO 371/3774) F166/19099. Dressner was a Captain in the British Army. 25 When referred to as a geographical territory, “the Cameroons” is used. When reference is made to the French mandate, the French “Cameroun” is used. 20

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Morogoro, Moshi, Arusha, and Tanga in East Africa. The Germans had also set up an

array of over 120 government-sponsored primary schools, and there were several German,

Swiss, and Dutch missionary groups operating over a thousand more. The Germans had

begun concerted measures to improve agriculture and public health, although their

techniques for treating sleeping sickness (trypanosomiasis), yaws, syphilis, gonorrhea, and

other endemic diseases were still new and sometimes untested.26

Between 1850-1900 the African and Asian empires of most of the great imperial

nations experienced serious unrest, and the German Empire was not without its scandals

and difficulties. The largest of these was the famous Maji Maji rebellion in German East

Africa, which occurred in the decade before World War I. After a prolonged period of

hostilities, and perhaps 100,000 dead, German administrators implemented widespread

reforms. Maji Maji was a sharp blow to German colonial prestige. To recover its

reputation and restore the prosperity of the empire, between 1906-1914 German colonial

governments implemented several measures that increased expenditures on economic

development and education, and improved the condition of the African populations. The

result was a period of peace and reform in the German colonies. This did not stop the

French and British, in the heated atmosphere of the war, from revisiting earlier incidents

in order to tamish the name of the German governmental effort in Africa.

Wartime Intentions versus the Mandate Idea

Once war began, the strategic location of the German colonies marked them for

absorption by the Allied powers as part of any peace settlement. This consideration was

26 There are several studies of German colonial practice dealing with health policy and economic development. See, for instance, John IUife, Tanganyika Under Ceman Ride, 1905-1912, (Cambridge, 1969), passim, Ralph Austen, Northwest Tanzania under Germmand British Rule Colonial Policy and Tribal Politics, 1889-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. paramount for both the British and the French."7 The British Dominions and the

Japanese shared a similar desire for Germany’s Asian and Pacific territories. German East

Africa lay between the British South African and East African settler colonies. Given the

German use of submarines in the war and the possibility that the Reich might seek to

build submarine pens at the harbors of Tanga or Dar-es-Salaam, British setders and

officials feared Germany’s retention of its colonial empire. Also, the determined

resistance of German officers and their African troops, who at the end of the war were

still contesting the southern part of the colony, raised the specter of expensive, brutal

future campaigns involving large African armies for both the British and French. Paris

shared British fears, and also sought to repair the damage done to its equatorial

possessions as a result of the two Moroccan crises by recovering the parts of German

Kamerun ceded by France in 1911.

Beyond the strategic dimension lay the economic potential of the German

colonies. The annexation of Togoland, Kamerun, and German East Africa would provide

certain obvious advantages for both empires. Some advocates of annexation in Kenya and

the Foreign Office promised seemingly boundless advantages from a link between British

East Africa and the German colonies. German East Africa, the largest and wealthiest of

these colonies, was an appealing prize for the British and the Belgians, who had fought

there between 1915-1918. Ruanda-Urundi, along its western border, contained over three

1939 (New Haven, 1968), chapters 1-2, and Helge Kjekshus, Ecology Cartrd, andEajnankDeuAaprnzrt in East African History: The Gtse afTangmyika, 1850-1950 (London, 1977), passim 27 See for instance British Cabinet Document (CAB) 16/36, “Committee on Territorial Changes, Report” 1917. There were several studies commissioned by the French Foreign Ministry on territorial changes. Some of these were communicated to the British and Americans as part of the preliminary peace negotiations in early 1919. See for one example Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Paris Peace Conference, Volume I, No. 10334, American Charge d’Affaires, London (Alfred Laughlin), to State Department, 10 Dec. 1918. 22

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. million people who might prove an invaluable labor supply for the Belgian Congo’s

eastern regions. In the north, the foothills of Mount Kilimanjaro were excellent coffee

land and were the center of a temperate highland region surrounding the Arusha region

roughly similar to the “white highlands” of neighboring Kenya. In the south, in the Lindi

and Rufiji regions, were other highlands. Kenyan settlers and British colonials from as far

away as the Union of South Africa were entranced by the idea of a new “white man’s

territory” between Kenya and Southern Rhodesia. German East Africa was also a center

of the sisal industry, home to the Amani agricultural research laboratory, contained many

German plantations, as well as a few thousand white settlers from other countries, and

seemed to afford many opportunities for In dian colonization as well. Finally, it would

form the last link in a chain of continuous British occupation from Egypt to the Cape of

Good Hope; not every dedicated imperialist was committed to the dubious economic

benefit of a Gape to Cairo Railroad, but the allure of such a project was great.

The French Colonial Ministry saw a similar benefit in the annexation of the

Cameroons and Togo. The town of Duala, in the Cameroons, had the one of the best

ports between West and South Africa, and could link the great territories of French West

Africa (AOF) and Equatorial Africa (AEF). Specifically, it had the potential to connect

the equatorial colonies of Chad and Oubangi-Chari by rail with the sea, vastly increasing

their value.28 It might also provide land suitable for white colonization; many German

plantations had been cleared before the war, and Kamerun had been a large producer of

28 French Foreign Ministry Archives (AE) Serie K, Afrique 1918-1940 (Serie K), Dossier 92, Colonial Ministry (MQ to Foreign Ministry (MF), Direction des Affaires Politiques (DAP), Nos. 301,302, 7 Dec. 1918. 23

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. rubber, bananas, cotton, and coffee.29 Togoland would provide the same benefits for

Dahomey. The German ports at Anecho and Lome would give the latter a better oudet to

the sea than its capital at Porto Novo. Finally, the occupation of Togo would satisfy the

British and French desire to eliminate a German salient jutting into both French and

British West Africa.

Despite Anglo-French plans for annexation, the end of German rule in its African

territories also appeared as a tremendous opportunity for internationalists and anti

imperialists. Among these were supporters of President Woodrow Wilson’s calls for

“peace without victor/’ and the Fourteen Points. Point Five called for the “impartial”

adjustment of all colonial claims, and maintained that “the interest of the populations

concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title

is to be determined.” Wilson thus gave the first public endorsement of a mandates system,

although his proposal was based on the work of others. Concerned public opinion, led by

Wilson’s British and French supporters, quickly attacked annexation and eagerly approved

of the mandate principle.

The idea of a “mandate” came from many sources. Each advocate of international

control opposed outright annexation either on moral or practical grounds. Fabian socialist

thinkers like Leonard Woolf and groups such as the British Aborigines Protection Society

imagined a postwar international commission that would administer African populations,

or a semi-independent African State with open borders, prohibitions against the liquor

traffic and forced labor, and international neutrality. General Jan Smuts of South Africa

29 French National Archives, Colonial Ministry (ANSOM), Ministry Files 18, “Series Geographiques Togo- Cameroun” (FM 18), Carton 1, Governor General of French Equatorial Africa (AEF) (Angoulvant) to MC, 7 Sep. 1919. 24

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. adopted several of these ideas in his short book on the League of Nations.32 Although he

retained the idea of international supervision, Smuts replaced an international

administration with “mandates” that would be distributed among the victorious powers.31

These mandatory powers would govern the territories on behalf of the League of Nations.

Nevertheless, the victors did not abandon the goal of annexation, but simply

altered the way it would be presented to the public. After the armistice, instead of

stressing the strategic and economic benefits of Germany’s colonies, the French and

British emphasized the benefits they planned to bring to the African population. The

Entente Powers adopted this rhetorical strategy to placate public opinion regarding their

intentions as well as arouse it against the idea of allowing Germany to reclaim any of its

colonial territory. David Lloyd George had made this plain in late 1917 when he assured

the House of Commons that the peace conference would settle colonial questions “on the

principle of respecting the desires of the people themselves.”33 He was confident that this

would doom German hopes of retaining any colonies, since the “poor, helpless people

[were] begging and craving not to return to German terrorism”33 Whatever the intent of

the victorious governments, however, internationalist groups anticipated that the

mandates would not disguise annexation underneath propaganda.

To justify the seizure of the German colonies, the Allies launched a major critique

of the former German administration. German colonization was publicly and privately

depicted as malicious, incompetent, and cruel. Allied leaders claimed that African interests

would be served much better by either a French or British administration. French and

30 Jan Smuts, The L atgue c f Nations: A Practical Suggzacn (London, 1918). 31 See ANSOM Ministry Files 66, “Series Affaires Politiques Togo-Cameroun” (FM 66) Carton 622. 32 Brian Digre, Irrperialism’s NewQoches (New York, 1990), 97.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. British colonial partisans, including missionary groups, provided bountiful material which

governments and the press used to illustrate the inadequacies of German government.

Such reports were reflected in the “petitions” sent to the Paris Peace Conference

requesting France, Britain, or occasionally, the United States as their new government.

One typical statement stated that “The ordinary native in these territories dreads with

whole-hearted fear such a return [of German government.]” The future mandatory powers

also drew attention to the lack of natural or ethnic boundaries between Togo and its

neighbors, French Dahomey and the British Gold Coast: “if the colony is regarded and

treated as a separate entity, a very grave injustice will be perpetuated which the tribes

themselves now ask should be rectified.”34 Along with the press articles, missionary

reports, and government memoranda there were also strategic arguments: “Certain

provinces of the conquered territory border on Lakes Nyasa and Tanganyika. If they

return to German occupation it is hardly possible to suppose that the Germans will not

place armed vessels on these lakes and fortify their ports.”35 The intent of these accounts

was very clear, a French or British mandate would ensure peace as well as help most

African communities.

By the beginning of 1919, colonial administrators weighed in on the importance of

these African territories. Although far from Paris, and confused over the about the

concept of the mandates, they tried to take part in the peace negotiations. The colonial

press was exceptionally active, hoping for annexations, security, and other racial or

33 Digre 97. This was not always the case. Many petitions came before the Permanent Mandates Commission in the 1920s and 1930s requesting a return to German rule. 34 British Colonial Office correspondence (CO) Series 96, Gold Coast (CO 96)/597,7257, Governor of Gold Coast (Clifford) to CO, 1 Feb. 1919.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. nationalistic goals. In addition, effusive articles about the promise of Entente victory

inspired hundreds of letters and petitions by Africans to the governments of their

respective colonies giving advice, pleading for succor from the Germans, and even, in

some cases, demanding self-determination on the basis of the Fourteen Points.

On a trip to the Cameroons at the end of the war, Governor General Gabriel-

Louis Angoulvant of AEF stated that the African population of that territory was friendly

to France and would provide a labor force that was “dense, active, intelligent, ready for

accelerated development, (prete au progres), and living in healthy areas (i.e. near areas of

potential French settlement).”36 “Influential natives” in the Gold Coast Colony wrote to

Hugh Clifford, the governor, beginning in 1918, and to his successor Sir Gordon

Guiggisberg thereafter. As early as March 1919 they formed committees that included

Togolese members and asked that no territory be returned to Germany, that “West Africa

[be given] an effective voice in her internal affairs and the grant of free institutions and

franchise,” that African land rights “be free from all interference” and that the liquor

traffic in West Africa be abolished.37 Other groups of Africans wrote that they feared a

return to Germany, but also feared French reprisals for their pro-British sentiments if the

territory were handed to the French. Octaviano Olympio, of Lome, styled himself

“President of a Committee on behalf of Togoland Natives” and repeatedly asked on the

basis of self-determination that Togo be “British only.”38 Similar notes were received

35 FO 371/3774, 166, Bishop of Nyasaland to OO, 31 Dec. 1919. This letter complained that the fortification of ports and a military buildup in the area “will inevitably produce conditions of excitement and unrest most prejudicial to the quiet missionary work which has done so much for the country'.” 30 ANSOM, FM 18, Carton 1, Dossier 1, Governor General of AEF, (Angoulvant) to MC, 7 Sep. 1919. 37 GO 96/598, 14101, Governor of Gold Coast (Clifford) to GO, 4 March 1919. 3! GO 96/599,22631 and 26660, Deputy Governor of Gold Coast (Slater) to OO, 12 April 1919. 27

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. from the Duala community in the Cameroons.39 French officials received similar requests,

although the British wondered at their sincerity.40

Even before a precise definition of a mandate existed, this correspondence was

influential in alerting the central governments that the promise of African self-government

was a powerful idea, and that hence the idea of the mandate was dangerous. Nevertheless,

French and British colonial officials took advantage of letters from Africa to put forward

their own plans for the territories in question, just as they took advantage of anti-German

sentiment. These requests from the colonies often contained expansive goals.

Encouraged by requests from the Dahomey Chamber of Commerce and other

commercial groups, French officials periodically suggested the fusion of Togo with AOF

well into the 1920s.41 British officials continued to forward African requests well after

governments had established the division of territory.43 Still, the central governments had

to restrain their ambitions, and those of Africans to exploit the idea of self-determination,

while confirming the wartime plans for the distribution of territory. At the same time, the

French and British would have to try to integrate their previous goals into the Wilsonian

framework of the Fourteen Points and the eventual League of Nations Covenant.

39 See, for instance, FO 371/3774, F166/33306, Admiralty to FO, 26 Feb. 1919. 40 There were far more requests to remain under British rule than under French rule. This was caused by several factors in the Cameroons and Togo, notably the British policy of not direcdy taxing the African population, while the French imposed a head tax and a yearly labor tax, the pretadcn See FO 371/3501, 2363, Admiralty to FO, 4 Jan. 1919, and OO 96/597, 7311, Governor of Gold Coast (Clifford) to OO, 2 Feb. 1919. The distribution of African territory was largely setded before the Paris Peace Conference, and these requests had no effect on the eventual territorial setdement. 41 See ANSOM, FM18, Carton 605, Dossier 1, particularly No. 1415, Commissaire of French Togo (Bonnecarrere) to MCDirecrion des Affaires Poliriques (DAP), 17 Oct. 1922. 42 Octaviano Olympio held the ear of more than one British army officer in the British-occupied parts of Togo, and even after the “joint recommendation’’ of 10 July 1919 British officers encouraged the government to revisit the division in order to obtain Lome and the surrounding territory. One British commander in Togo wrote to the Colonial Office “it is an indisputable fact, proven by the numerous peririons by the natives, the local meetings of protest... I consider [the border agreement] provides a frontier which is satisfactory to none of the participants concerned.” CO, Series 724, British Togo (CO 724) 724/1, 7500, 11 Feb. 1920. 28

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Debate over the Mandates

The Treaty of Versailles, signed on June 28,1919, only included a hasty and

imprecise definition of the general terms of Germany’s cession of its colonies and the

form of the mandates.43 The main commission dealing with the German colonies had

been set up in April, 1919 to draft Articles 119-127 of the treaty (Article 119 was the main

colonial clause dealing with Africa).44 Another commission, set up in June, drafted the

first model mandates and began the long debate over the terms.45 These commissions also

developed the A, B, and C mandates and defined the differences between them.46 Several

members would figure prominently in the 1920s and 1930s as members of the Permanent

Mandates Commission or as important policymakers in their respective colonial ministries.

♦7

These commissions found it expedient to leave unchanged the wartime territorial

agreements between Britain and France. Thus, Britain would exercise the mandate over

German East Africa, and the islands of the Pacific were distributed to the Dominions and

Japan. Togo and the Cameroons were not included in the original distribution. However,

Paris resisted the application of the system to their conquests, and on July 10, they and the

43 Many authors writing in the 1920s and 1930s agreed that the wordings of the Treaty and Article 22 of the League Covenant were inexact and legally confused. See Aaron Margalith, The Irtematicnd Mandates (Baltimore, 1930), Chapter 1, and Quincy Wright, Mandats Under the League c f Nature (Chicago, 1930), 25-30. 44 The first of these was appointed hy the Council of Foreign Ministers at Paris and was composed of George Beer, the noted American colonial expert, Sir Herbert Read of the British Foreign Office, M Peretti de la Rocca, of the French Foreign Ministry, M R. Piacentini, of the Italian Foreign Ministry, and M Yamakawa, of the Japanese Foreign Ministry (later a member of the PMQ. 45 This was the “Milner Commission,” which included Colonel House, Lord Milner, M Henry Simon, M Crespi, and Viscount Chinda. See FRTJ5, Paris Peace Conference, Volume VI, 727-729. 46 See below. Ottoman territories with familiar representative political or social institutions were made ‘A’ mandates: Iraq, Palestine, and Syria. The African possessions of Germany (except Southwest Africa) were to be the “B’ mandates, and were also divided first by the French and British. Finally, ‘C mandates were sparsely populated territories or particularly “primitive” areas: Namibia, Samoa, Nauru, and New Guinea. 47 Among these were Henry Simon, Martial Merlin (Former Governor General of AEF and later French member of the PMQ, Leo Amery (Colonial Secretary), and Vittorio Catastini, later head of the League of Nations Mandates Section, the secretariat for the PMC 29

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. British decided that because they could not setde on terms or even whether France would

accept mandates, they would postpone the issue and later make a “joint recommendation

to the League of Nations as to their future.”

The A mandates were areas of the former Ottoman Empire divided between the

French and British along roughly the same lines as they had been split by the modified

Sykes-Picot agreements in 1918. France was responsible for Syria and Lebanon, and

Britain for Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine (although no mandate for Iraq was ever

formalized). The C mandates included the former German possessions of Samoa, New

Guinea, and the smaller German archipelagoes, as well as German Southwest Africa.

Japan received mandates for the islands north of the equator, the British Dominions

received the mandates for Samoa (New Zealand), New Guinea (Australia), Naum (The

British Empire as a whole, Britain administering) and German Southwest Africa (Union of

South Africa).

As with the development of the concept of the mandate, the creation of A, B, and

C mandates represented a reluctant compromise between the Wilsonian idea of

governance in the interests of the indigenous population under international control and

the traditional imperialist goals of occupation and annexation. In all three cases the

mandate idea was measured against strategic interests, natural resources, and the potential

for setdement. The proximity of its A mandates to the Suez Canal and the potential for

oil exploitation made Palestine and Iraq vital to British strategic aims. French historical

interests in the Levant meant that Syria and Lebanon become formally French. South

Africa aimed at the extension of its racial system to Southwest Africa, and Boer interests

looked forward to bringing former German setders into the white community of South

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Africa. In the Pacific, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan saw the former German islands

as strategic outposts. France and Britain recognized that with their local traditions of

government and highly literate, civilized populations the A mandates were not likely to be

permanent, and the idea of self-determination should apply. The C mandates, on the

other hand, were lightly populated (Southwest Africa) or comparatively “uncivilized” (the

Polynesian islands) and the holders of these mandates viewed them as disguised

annexation. This was apparent in the mandate documents, and assumed by the Dominion

governments and the Japanese.48

In the case of the B mandates, the situation was even more complex and difficult

to define. The development of draft mandates involved several issues. These included not

only French security concerns, but also the mandatory powers’ views on land, labor,

taxation, their commercial practices, and their inclination to join their mandates to existing

colonies through customs unions and administrative amalgamations. In other words, the

peace conference did not resolve the question of whether the mandates would be colonies

in most essential respects. Also, the critical issue of the League of Nations’ authority or

supervisory influence was still to be determined.

Still, some of the most important and enduring principles of the mandate idea

were decided at Paris. The commissions on the German colonies debated the terms and

implications of the mandates, balancing internationalism and imperial interests. This often

involved considerable debate; for instance, while the Americans Colonel House and

George Beer, and British member Lord Robert Cecil supported the American idea of the

“Open Door” even if it meant that the mandatory powers would receive few benefits

48 The C mandates contained the clause governing them “as integral parts of the territory of the mandatory 31

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. from their new territories, French and British delegates Henry Simon and Lord Milner

were less eager to give up the privileges of sovereignty.49 On the other hand, some

provisions were not particularly controversial. In a 1919 meeting at the Quai d’Orsay,

Lloyd George agreed with Premier Qemenceau’s desire to recruit African troops as long

as this did not threaten the peace in Africa.50 In a memorandum submined to the

Supreme Allied Council in June, Milner laid out the committee’s conclusions. The

mandate would entail:

1. that the mandatory power would have “full rights of administration and legislation” 2. Peace, order, and good government were required, and the mandatory power undertook to “do everything possible to promote the moral and material welfare and progress of the inhabitants” 3.the elimination of the slave trade, the prohibition of forced labor, control in the traffic of arms, and the prohibition of “spirituous liquors to natives, and the trade in such liquors be kept under effective control.” 4. No recruitment of military forces except for the defense of the territory 5. Commercial equality for all nations51

However, because of disagreement over the meaning of each of these principles, the

commission recommended eliminating any specifics from the Treaty, and Article 119

simply ceded all the German colonies to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

TTius, even if the treaty foreclosed annexation, the terms of the mandates for Africa

power.” See Wright, Appendix III, 606-610. 49 League of Nations Archives, Mandates Registry Files (Mandates Registry Files), Rl, League of Nations document (LON document) 1.2366.52, “Commission on Mandates: Minutes, June 28-August 5,1919." Lord Robert Cecil was British representative in charge of negotiations for a League of Nations and a devoted supporter of the League idea Lord Milner, then Colonial Secretary, was not. Some of the privileges Milner and Simon claimed were the right to forced labor for public works projects, the right of the mandatory power to recover financial advances made to the mandatory territory (Le. that the mandates should not theoretically be a financial drain on the mandatory power), the right of the French to recruit troops in the mandates for use elsewhere, and the right of the mandatory power to reserve public works projects for its own nationals. ,c Mandates Registry Files, Rl, LON document 1.1225.161, 30 Jan. 1919. 5i Mandates Registry Files, Rl, LON document 12367.161, 26 June 1919. This was the “Milner Memoradum, or draft mandate clauses, and were still the subject of future debate. Each of the five

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. remained indistinct. The French resisted based on their strategic concerns, fear of the

League, and to ensure their continued administrative authority. Sharp divisions between

the French and the British on these subject developed over time.52 At first, the French,

skeptical about how Wilson’s ideas would work, stressed the needs of Africans as an

argument against mandates. Simon, while acknowledging “the rising tide of

internationalism,” rationalized that small African states were paralyzed by independence,

and that internationalization would be similarly unable to act decisively to help Africans

effectively. Only the great colonial powers had the resources and traditions to do so.53 At

the same time the French demanded the freedom to govern without restraint. Colonial

Ministry official Albert Duchene wrote in early 1918 “We [France] have suffered too

much from international obligations resulting from the Berlin and Brussels Acts of 1885

and 1890 to not try to regain our liberty.”54 In October 1918, the French ambassador to

Britain, Paul Cambon, told British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour that the Germans

must give up their colonies, but he emphasized French concerns about whether the

League could solve all problems. He hoped that “Wilson’s plans would take into account

the security needs of European nations.” Balfour agreed.55 Although Lloyd George and

Jan Smuts announced that colonial adjustments would take place “with regard to the

principles laid out in the “Milner memorandum’* was contested and rendered less sweeping in the final mandates. See below. 52 This division was important because the British and French “shared” the territories of Togo and the Cameroons. Hie mandates would appear meaningless if, for instance, the British Cameroons were a B mandate and the French Cameroons were a C mandate, or not a mandate at all. 53 AE, Serie K, Dossier 92, MCto MF, No. 302, 7 Dec. 1918. 54 Duchene was the Director of Political Affairs in the Colonial Ministry. ANSOM, FM 66, Carton 622, Memorandum by Duchene, 11 Jan. 1918. Duchene wrote: “D’ailleurs, en ecartant pour l’Afrique tout regime international, la France rester fidele a la ligne de conduite qu’elle s’est tracee depuis une dizaine d’annees. Note awns trap saufjert de obligators tntenudande resultant c I b A cte de Berlin et de Bruxdle de 1885 et 1890 pour nepas essayerdereprendre nacre libeni Dans ces entraves intemationales, dans des limitations de souverainete et le controle mutuel qui en est la consequence on trouve la premiere origine des conflits, des dissenssions, des polemiques violentes... ” emphasis mine. 33

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. wishes of the native inhabitants,” neither Britain nor France was prepared to acknowledge

the progressive or even the competent features of German administration, or the

similarities between German rule and their own.56

By 1919 the British position softened even as the French stiffened, due at least in

part to American suggestions that all occupied territories become mandates.57 Tlie British

came to accept the idea of a mandate because of considerable official sympathy for the

League of Nations and because the mandate clauses appeared to conform in many ways

with established ideas of British colonial government. Britain did not fear the Open Door

or the principle of governance in the interest of the African population. At least in theory,

such ideas jibed with British theories of indirect rule and the “dual mandate” that

emphasized governance in the interests of both settlers and Africans.58 But the French

remained distant from the idea of international supervision of their colonial

administration.

Although Paris had no objections to the new system in theory, it wanted to

exempt its portions of the Cameroons and Togo as special cases outside the regular

system in order to evade League interference.59 The French Colonial Ministry wished to

reserve the economic possibilities of the colonies for French commerce, and maintain the

55 AE, Serie A Paix, Dossier 293, No. 787, Cambon to MF, 23 Oct. 1918. 54 For instance, see Digre 121. 57 See Michael Callahan, Mandates and Errpire (Brighton, 1999), 29-32. 58 The most coherent expression of the “dual mandate" was Frederick Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, (London, 1889). Lugard was the former governor of Northern Nigeria and later, from 1924- 1936, the British member of the PMC 59 FO 371/3774 F166/126316, Legal Advisor to the FO (Ceca Hurst) to AJ. Balfour, 5 Sep. 1919. “Mr. Strachey [of the Colonial Office] and I went to see M. Simon yesterday to try and setde the difficulties with the French about the mandates... but the French attitude has hardened within the last month and my efforts to persuade M. Simon to agree to a settlement on the lines which you approved, Le. to a normal B mandate for the Cameroons and a C mandate for Togoland... were not successful... it is clear that the French intend to press vigorously for the principle that Togoland and the Cameroons were not to be subject to a mandate at all.” 34

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. French mission duiisatric£-60 Much more than the British, the French were afraid that a

mandate, in whatever form it might take, would compromise their effective control over

their new territories. Fearing the possibility of future German colonial claims, they

deprecated the idea of a mandate as an improvised and risky method of occupation.61 The

Colonial Ministry also rejected potential military clauses that barred them from recruiting

troops in the Cameroons and Togo for service in Europe in a general war. As early as July

1919 French mandate drafts discussed raising troops “for purposes of internal police and

defense of its [the mandatory’s] territory, whether colonial or metropolitan,” and the

regulation of the commerce in liquor rather than its elimination.62

The French would attempt to escape from the mandates system until after the Spa

conference of 1920. At Spa, France was forced to compromise on a number of questions,

notably the Rhineland, in order to get its own way on reparations. Included in the

discussions was the question of whether the Cameroons and Togo would be colonies or

mandates. The French continued to press for an accord with Britain, insisting that “Togo

and the Cameroons must be considered net as mandated territories, but as French and

British colonies.”63

60 For an early example see AE, Serie K, Dossier 92, No. 302, MC to MF, 17 Dec. 1918. For a recent interpretation of the French nissicn, see Alice Conklin, A Mission to Cnilize, (Stanford, 1997) 11-12. 61 For example see AE, Serie K, Dossier 95, MC (Sarraut) to MF, Direction des Affaires Politiques et Gommerciales, Afrique (DAPCA), No. 50,4 March 1920, particularly an excerpt from the magazine Depehe Cblan ale, 17 July 1920, “La question du mandat: Une these dangereuse," an interview with Henry Simon. Simon argued that German claims, and the lack of freedom of action over military recruiting and economic development made the Cameroons and Togo inappropriate for the mandates system. 62 Mandates Registry Files, Rl, LON document 1-2370.161,5 July 1919. 63 FO 371/4766, C2368/154/18, MF (Berthelot) to FO (Curzon), 8 July 1920. See also AE, Serie K, Dossier 97, No. 255, MC (Sarraut) to MF, DAPCA, 12 Oct. 1920. This violent defense of France’s colonial prerogatives is typical of Sarraut’s views. In this case, having discovered that the French will be required to submit a report to the League, he asked “What does this mean for Togo and Cameroun? What will become of our liberty of action, of the steps we’ve taken recendy to put the country under an organized administration?” He concluded that if France must, it could agree to a C mandate for both territories, which would preserve France’s liberty of action. 35

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. By late 1919, the British government had failed to budge the French. They

concluded that:

the French intend to press vigorously for the principle that Togoland and the Cameroons were not to be subject to a mandate at all, and that the language... in which they [the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers] allotted the mandates is meaningless except upon this hypothesis... the French do not, however, regard a C mandate as anything other than annexation and would be quite content to accept an arrangement embodying the terms of a C mandate, and even call it a mandate so long as they get the free hand which the mandate confers.64

Milner later noted that French proposals on the terms of the B mandates indicated that

they “ want[ed] to get out of having any ‘mandate’ at all for their part of Togo and

Cameroons, but [were] willing to pledge themselves by a formal declaration (which they

wish us to join in making) to carryout such of the conditions of the draft B mandate as

they do not object to.” Milner himself believed that applying the draft B mandates to the

Cameroons and Togo “was a useless complication.”65 But the French failed to convince

the British that the division of territory in Togo and the Cameroons made the idea of a

mandate for either territory extremely awkward from an administrative point of view.66

They also feared isolation by independently refusing a mandate. Paris fell back on a

proposal for the “joint recommendation” agreement to be formally submitted to the

League of Nations as a promise to fulfill “all undertakings embodied in the mandate,

provided that they could have what they wanted with regard to the natives... ” When the

British insisted on unconditional mandates, Paris’ final line of defense was the military

clause. France would not accept any “engagements which run contrary to assurances

w FO 371/3774, F166/126316, FO Legal Advisor (Hirst) to A.J. Balfour, 5 Sep. 1919. 65 FO 371/3775, F166/155993, memorandum by Milner, 26 Nov. 1919, 66 AE, Serie K, Dossier 94, No. 850, Charge d’affaires to England (Fleuriau) to MF (Pichon), 4 Nov. 1919. 36

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. given to M. Qemenceau [regarding compulsory military* service for Africans].”67 The

British agreed, leaving the French with no choice but to accept the mandates.

Thus, when the terms of the B mandates were debated in 1920, France had

presented serious objections to the military, commercial, and international clauses. These

had a profound impact on the final draft. The British shared some of these objections and

opposed others.68 By the end of that year, faced with pressure from Britain, the League,

and the United States, the French agreed on a mandate status for the Cameroons and

Togo.69 The form of these mandates was still open. Their ultimate form depended on

French and British interests and the attempts by internationalists to create a system of

trusteeship that would protect Africans and others from exploitation.

Internationalists, The League, and the Final Form of the B Mandates

The League of Nations was central to the mandate-drafting process because of its

treaty obligation to be supervisor of all the mandates. The terms of every mandate

agreement had to be ratified by the League Council. Thus, it was generally accepted that

the mandatory powers would draft the mandates and present them to the Council, the

Council in its turn would confirm them, and then create an institution to oversee the

system.

The drafting of the terms of the B mandates was not publicly debated but

consisted of a dialogue between France and Britain on the one side and the League of

Nations on the other. Anglo-French demands conflicted with the new organization,

67 ibid. 64 The British, for instance, took seriously the fears of some powers that the French would raise large numbers of African troops in the Cameroons and Togo, but they did not fear this eventuality themselves. Also, while they did not object to the Open Door provisions of the B mandates as eventually drafted they were willing to use the restrictions placed on those clauses by the French to increase the size of their own trade in Tanganyika and elsewhere. 37

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. which was intent on flexing its muscles. Consuming nearly three years, in part because of

France’s hesitations, these prolonged deliberations sparked efforts by internationalist

organizations, colonial lobbying groups, and concerned citizens to influence the terms of

the mandates. They also encouraged the populations of Togo and the Cameroons to do

the same - an extension of their early attempts to influence the choice of which powers

would occupy and administer them. None of these attempts was completely successful.

However, some organizations, through dogged persistence, succeeded in placing certain

principles, such as the end of slavery, before the League and thus into the final mandate

documents. Inevitably, the League made compromises that disappointed internationalists

and die-hard colonialists alike, and the mandates as eventually drafted were often vague,

without uniformity, and in places, contradictory.

During this process Africans presented numerous petitions and complaints to

British administrators (far more often than to their French counterparts) in an attempt to

select their government and exercise what they took to be their right to self-determination

under the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. Some praised British or French

administration or attempted to convince one side or the other to occupy most or all of the

territory, but virtually all asked that their respective territories not be returned to German

control.70 In some areas with literate populations Africans attempted to assert their

“rights” under the League Covenant as strenuously as they could, if only to get out of

69 AE, Serie K, Dossier 97, Nos. 831-2, Fleuriau to MF, 3 Nov. 1920. 70 0 0 96/597, 10128 and 7257, Governor of Gold Coast and Commander (ED.O. Rew) to GO, 24 Jan. 1919; FO 371/4401, A698/698/60, O. Qympio to Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, 19 Feb. 1920; AE Serie K, Dossier 95, No. 66, MC to MF, 22 March 1920. For the former German East Africa (Tanganyika Territory^ see FO 371/3774, F166/4142, CO to FO, 7 Jan 1919: “We are authorized by the entire Ismailia Khoja community who are the largest British Indian community living in the conquered territory of German East Africa and also by all living in British East Africa, Uganda, and Zanzibar to submit their earnest request

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. taxation or labor requirements: “We, wholly, refuse payment of taxes until we know' that

the League of Nations has warranted such a thing... [the French poll tax] makes the slave

trade on the quiet [sic]... if he [the French commissaire] uses any force, then the people

abroad, in Europe and West Africa or the whole world will know that the Togolanders are

being forced again.”71 The Duala sent similar demands from the Cameroons.72

Other messages came from concerned business interests. Requests for further

information on the conditions of the mandate, privileges for domestic industrial concerns,

questions about possible tax regimes, and complaints based on the possible provisions of

the B mandates were common. Tlie Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, Swanzy Brothers

Limited, Lever Brothers Limited, the Association of West African Merchants, and other

colonial businesses were frequent correspondents with the British Colonial Office, and the

Dahomey Chamber of Commerce, the Chambers of Commerce of French West and

French Equatorial Africa, and private firms were frequent correspondents with the French

Ministry of Colonies. Such firms saw the opportunity presented by a new territory and

were understandably eager to prevent it slipping back into the hands of German

to you... that under no circumstances should German East Africa be handed back to the mal administration, injustice, cruelties, and indignities of German rule.” 71 GO 724/2,21192, Messrs. FA. Swanzy, Ltd. to FO, 29 April 1921. This letter contains a letter from O. Olympio (see above) sent to the French Commissaire of Togo (Woeffel) on the subject of taxation. This method was often used by Africans to increase the range of their complaints. Olympio became a loyal notable under French rule. Others who participated in anti-French or anti-tax agitation in the early 1920s did not; protestors like Henry Kue Gaba, J.T. Mensah, and Sameul Gharteyfrequendy petitioned the League protesting French rule throughout the interwar period, and in some cases pleaded for the return of German rule. The French argued that such petitions were both illegal and made by “British agents.” AE, Serie K, Dossier 94, No. 275, MC to MF, DAPCA, 20 Nov. 1919. See Chapter 3. 72 FO 371/3775, F166/142947, CO to FO, 21 Aug. 1919. Copy of letter from “Inhabitants of the Cameroons to the GO: “The natives of the Cameroons and their Chiefs believe they have cause to make use of this right and to submit to the Allies the request that they may be kind enough to discuss whether the Cameroons could not be considered as neutral territory... we would be prepared to submit to a contrary decision of the Conference whereby we would be entrusted to the protection of one of the Allied Powers but we beg that the right of choosing such a power may be conceded to us.” This document also asked for specific rights, including personal liberty, freedom of trading and commerce, election of chiefs without

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. competitors. As often as not, British firms were concerned that in the absence of a formal

mandates system, the French occupation authorities were taking advantage of the

confused situation to eliminate British, as well as German, competition in the Cameroons

and Togo. They also usually advocated a much larger British claim to the Cameroons and

Togo.73

Both the French and British governments had little patience with these outside

attempts to change their already-existing agreements on the division of territory. The

British Colonial Office repeatedly sent irate telegrams to the Gold Coast instructing

British officials not to encourage Africans to make erroneous assumptions about self-

determination or the League’s power to limit French prerogatives.74 The French

governments in the Cameroons and Togo took pains to do the same, sometimes quite

severely (which only encouraged more petitions in later years). Requests from merchants

for preferential treatment or information on land alienation or investment opportunities

were sent back to the companies because the mandates had not been presented to the

League or confirmed.

There were several organizations that were interested not just in the division of

territory, but in the mandate terms and the way in which the new mandatory powers

would exercise their authority. By and large these organizations had access to the African

interference by the government, a guarantee of property (no alienation without African approval), and the abrogation of summary justice (right to trial). 73 FO 371/3774, F166/14647, John Fiolt Go. (Liverpool) to FO, 25 Jan. 1919. “It seems quite clear... that [if] native desires or wishes should be considered, the major portion of the Colony [the Cameroons] would fall under the British administration.” See also FO 371/3775, F166/154906,22 Nov. 1919, excerpts from a meeting between Milner and various colonial traders, in which Milner attempted to allay their fears of unfair competition and made light of their assertion that British political control was the only way to ensure commercial stability. 7* CO 96/604, 54963, Governor of Gold Coast to CO, 21 Sep. 1919, minute by Charles Strachey (head of the Tanganyika section of the Colonial Office). See also CO 96/605,69434, Governor of Gold Coast (Guggisberg) to CO (Milner), 18 Nov. 1919. 40

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. requests, the Chamber of Commerce queries, and even the drafts of mandate terms

debated at the Paris Peace Conference and afterwards. This was because their

memberships tended to overlap either with that of the various business organizations or

with government itself, particularly in Britain. Two prominent British groups were the

League of Nations Union (LONU) and the recently combined Anti-Slavery and

Aborigines Protection Society (ASAPS). In France, the most notable group concerned

with the mandates system was the Bureau International pour la defense des Indigenes

, (BIPDI).

At the Paris Peace Conference these groups were already active, attempting to

influence the drafting of both principles and clauses for the new B mandates. Because

they wanted much stricter guidelines for the mandates than the two mandatory

governments were prepared to consider, many of their suggestions were not successful.

For instance, the AS APS submined memoranda in 1919 pleading for an African member

of any future mandates commission and for a division of territory on the basis of self-

determination.75 Early demands from these private international organizations also

demanded alcohol prohibition, strict control over labor, taxation, and other administrative

matters. These proposals were far too restrictive for either the French or the British.

Nevertheless these groups won some indirect victories. Their activities promoted the

League’s stature and kept the mandates issue before public opinion. Even if they wished

to, the French and British could not ignore the proposals they introduced in Paris.

75 Mandates Registy Files, Rl, LON document 1.2371.161,12 July 1919; 00691/28, Nov. 1919 “Statement by ASAPS.” The ASAPS noted that the British government was taking few steps to “ascertain as far as practicable the opinions of the Chiefs and councils who are competent to speak for their tribes and members... any decision arbitrarily reached which forces a native tribe against the wishes of the people under any particular mandatory would be... a breach of faith.” 41

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. A year later, with the mandates still not drafted, the BIPDI submitted a completed

draft to the League and the mandatory powers. It included the right of direct appeal to the

League for Africans under the mandate, the complete abolition of forced labor, and total

prohibition of all alcoholic beverages. The LONU sent both governments its 1920

mandate draft as well, including clauses that spelled out in exhaustive detail the

implications of the system

Cause III (t 4): There shall be a gradual but steadily progressive education and training of the inhabitants of the territory with a view to the development of such a system of self-government as may be appropriate for the territory and the development of the territory for the benefit of its inhabitants.76

The LONU and other groups wanted the mandates system to ensure, in all possible ways,

rapid independence for indigenous inhabitants and they therefore tried to encouraged

detailed mandates. Paris and London were not prepared to accept such explicit demands

on their administrations.

TTie brand-new League secretariat also became involved in the drafting of the

mandates, at times by passing along confidential correspondence to groups like the

LONU and ASAPS so that they could present more professionally drafted and palatable

suggestions to the British and French governments. There was correspondence between

the Secretary of the ASAPS, John Harris (a former missionary), William Ormsby-Gore

(British colonial expert and member of the LONU), Philip Baker (principal assistant to Sir

Eric Drummond in the Secretary General’s Office) and William Rappard, head of the

League Mandates Section.77 Harris and Baker exchanged suggestions and the minutes of

76 Mandates Registry Files, Rl, LON document 1.9475.161,10 Dec. 1920. See also AE, Serie K, Dossier 97, LONU to MF, 4 Nov. 1920. 77 Ormsby-Gore was the first British member of the PMC, and Rappard was eventually elevated to membership as well. 42

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the mandate committees. Baker eliminated wording that revealed the subterfuge, and the

ASAPS presented his edited draft mandates to the Colonial or Foreign Office. In this

way, proposals that revenue raised in the mandates had to be spent there, for the

prohibition of land alienation, and the demand that the Portuguese be refused a mandate

were all forwarded to governments through the medium of the League.78 Rappard and

Harris also traded information and ideas. In private correspondence, they agreed that if

successful, the system should be extended to other colonies, and debated the questions a

future commission would have to ask the mandatory powers in order to safeguard the

rights of Africans. Rappard privately encouraged Harris to publicize such views.79

Ormsby-Gore attempted to elicit the views of commercial organizations by

performing the same trick with them, in one case presenting the Liverpool Chamber of

Commerce with a draft mandate in order to elicit their suggestions, and then meeting with

members to discuss them. They also advocated a total prohibition of forced labor

(“inexpedient and unnecessary... if treated with consideration and paid proper

remuneration, [Africans] will give their labor for any public works”) and demanded a very

strict commercial equality clause that would eliminate any “opening for preferential

treatment” by a mandatory power. Finally, they believed the mandates should be

submitted to the public before ratification. Ormsby-Gore passed this information on to

78 See, for instance, League of Nations Archives, Mandate Section Files (Mandates Section Files), S265, Harris to Baker (and replies), 10 July 1919: “I enclose herewith tentative draft of the document we propose... leaving with the representatives of the Powers. Would you be so kind as to look this through with a view to the elimination of anything that might indicate that we have seen the original document..." Baker replied, in part: “With regard to the terms of the Mandate, if I may suggest things upon which stress might usefully be laid, I would select the questions of economic monopolies, labor, and land laws... if your committee feel themselves inclined to make a strong case against any territory being handed over to the Portuguese, I think it might not be unwelcome on the Commission [Milner’s commission on the mandates.]” 7V Mandates Section Files, S265, Harris to Rappard (and replies), 14 Jan. 1921, 27 Sep. 1921,16 Jan. 1922, 18 Dec. 1922. 43

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Baker and Lord Cecil, and on his recommendation the Liverpool Chamber sent a

memorial to the Foreign Office.80

The results of this collusion between the League, the LONU, and certain elements

of the British government were some extraordinarily detailed suggestions on the mandates

and at least one scandalous leak (draft mandates were published in the Tines ( f London). By

1921 the LONU Mandates Committee (composed of Arnold Toynbee, Sir Harry

Johnston, John Harris, Leonard Woolf, and Ormsby-Gore, among others) was submitting

draft mandates strongly critical of those drafted by the governments themselves. They

insisted that “the mandatory shall neither recruit nor ailow recruiting within the mandated

territory for military service in any forces outside the mandated area,” and that Africans be

allowed to petition the League for non-observance of the mandate. Their draft mandate

prohibited unpaid forced labor and the “manufacture, importation, and sale of potable

liquids containing more than 12% alcohol,” demanded the supervision of all labor

contracts by the League, and League approval for any public works contract. The LONU

also protested the clause allowing the B mandates to be constituted into a customs or

administrative union with neighboring colonies as “not consistent with... Article 22.”81

Together with the ASAPS it requested that French portions of Togo and the Cameroons

not be allowed to fall under C mandate classification. Similar requests were sent by the

BIPDI (which nominated its president, M. Rene Qaparede, for membership in the

Permanent Mandates Commission), and the Women’s International League for Peace and

s: Mandates Section Files, S265, Generalities, 1920. 81 Mandates Section Files, S298, LONU draft mandate for Tanganyika Territory, date uncertain (Aug. 1921); see also AE, Serie K, Dossier 100, Bordereau d’Envoi, No. 64, Foreign Minister (FM) to MF (Sub-director of Africa), 18 Aug. 1921, which contains the 13 Aug. 1921 draft mandate from the LONU. 44

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Freedom, which wanted a guarantee that at least one woman would be a member of the

PMC82

Cognizant of these demands, the League wanted the mandates drafted quickly and

in a way that would eliminate all suspicion of disguised annexation. Article 119 of the

Treaty of Versailles specified that the German colonies were to be ceded to the Principal

Allied and Associated Powers (PAAP), and not to the League. This led to a discussion

over the legitimacy of the League’s role. Drummond and Baker believed that if the new

mandatory powers were to truly hold the mandates under the League, the PAAP would

have to cede it the territories. Drummond’s legal counsel, Joost Van Hamel, felt that this

was intrinsic to Article 22 of the League Covenant: “The Covenant does not express this

act of investiture by the PAAP in so many words. But I am nevertheless of [the] opinion

that it is included in the acceptation [sic] of Article 22.” Baker agreed, arguing that much

of the language of Article 22 was designed to defend the mandate against the possibility of

“a mandatory who should endeavor unilaterally to relieve itself of the obligations of the

mandate.”83 Drummond, who accepted this interpretation, communicated the League’s

view to the powers.84

Drummond, Baker, and Van Hamel worried about establishing the League’s

authority over the mandates, but they were also concerned over the delay in establishing a

mandates system. According to the Covenant the Council had the duty of receiving,

accepting, and confirming the drafts submitted by the mandatory powers. With the B

mandates still in abeyance, the League moved into the breach. Before the Spa Conference

82 Mandates Section Files, S299. Emily Balch and Catherine Marshall to Rappard, and reply, 23 Feb. 1921. 83 Mandates Registry Files, Rl, LON document 12211.161,28 Nov. 1919, particularly minute by Philip Baker. 84 Mandates Registry Files, Rl, LON document 1.661.161, 5 Aug. 1919. 45

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. in 1920 its officials urged the mandatory governments either to submit formal draft

mandates as soon as possible or allow the League to produce them. At Spa this put

pressure on the French and British to resolve their differences over the “joint

recommendation.” The alternative was to be berated publicly by the League for not

submitting formal mandates. Because of the close relationship between the pro-League

international organizations and the Secretary General’s staff, it was clear that mandates

drafted by the League would be more restrictive than those being worked on by the

French and British.

When the mandatory powers continued to delay their submissions, the League

began to use the information gathered by other organizations to strengthen its attempts to

hurry the submission process along. This was the League’s first attempt to define the

limits of its authority over the mandates. It possessed not only the drafts and comments

of concerned organizations, but the details of the negotiations on the mandates at the

Paris Peace Conference.85 The ASAPS and LONU also forwarded to the League many of

the numerous petitions and complaints they had received from Africans. Baker collected

such correspondence as a method of encouraging the rapid drafting of the mandates.86

Like the LONU, ASAPS, and BIPDI, the League was very concerned that African self-

determination, as internationalists understood it, should be respected, and the wishes of

African communities help determine the division of territory.87

By this standard the drafts that arrived at the League in late 1920 were

unsatisfactory to the Geneva officials. The League was disappointed that the French had

85 For example Mandates Registry Files, Rl, LON document 1.43643099, 21 July 1921, copy of the LONUs amendments circulated to the League Council. 86 Mandates Section Files, S265, Harris to Baker, 21 and 23 Oct. 1919.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. won their point on recruiting Africans for a general war, including the formula “defense of

territory,” which made possible the use of troops from the mandates in France or

elsewhere.88 However the League officials firmly supported the international

organizations that called for the abolition of all forced labor and total prohibition of all

alcohol.89 The revisions they proposed were based on previous drafts by the LONU and

BIPDI, and aimed at ensuring the reality of international control.

The approval of the final mandates was further complicated by protests from

French officials and the American government. The French objected to the League’s

imposition of any revisions as an infringement of French rights. They insisted that the

Council could approve or deny the draft mandates; but it could not suggest revisions.90

The United States added to the French protests by claiming the right to approve the

mandates even after it elected not to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, based on its status of a

member of the PAAP. This delayed the submission of the mandates to the Council for

nearly a year while French, British, and American diplomats haggled over the status of the

island of Yap and over American demands for the same open door in the mandates

enjoyed by members of the League. By the time these negotiations were completed, the

League was eager to approve the mandates without insisting on revisions.

The B mandates were finally submitted to the Council of the League and signed in

the summer of 1922. The Council made no amendments and made no suggestions based

87 For one example, see FO 371/3774, F166/55635 ASAPS to FO, 9 April 1919, and F166/80327, ASAPS to FO, 27 May 1919. 88 In contrast, the League gladly accepted its phrasing included in the the British and Belgian B mandates, which was the more restrictive, “for the defense of the territory,” which precluded recruiting Africans in the mandates for service anywhere else. 8V Mandates Registry Files, R2, LON document 1.9769.161,20 Dec. 1920. League Comments, minute by Baker.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. on other drafts. They were a blend of conflicting great power ambitions, an untested

internationalism, and the mixed principles engendered by the Treaty of Versailles. The B

mandates were neither fully Wilsonian nor entirely based on annexation by a sovereign

great power.

The terms of the B mandates for Tanganyika Territory (the former German East

Africa), the British and French Cameroons, and British and French Togo were not

identical nor were any of them completely identical to that of Belgium for Ruanda-

Urundi.91 All included, in their preamble, the statement that Germany had ceded its

colonies to the Allies (PAAP), not to the League, and that as part of the Covenant they

agreed to exercise the mandates “on behalf of the League of Nations,” immediately

bringing into question the issue of sovereignty and authority over the governance of the

mandates. Sovereignty would become a critical issue in the coming decades, as the powers

attempted to widen the scope of their authority and severely circumscribe that of the PMC

and the League.

In terms of actual administration, the terms of the mandate were neither as strict

as some organizations (or the League) wished them to be, nor as liberal as the mandatory

powers initially felt was necessary. The mandatory powers had the obligation to govern

“for the promotion to the utmost of the material and moral well-being and the social

progress of its inhabitants.” In the British mandates military forces could be raised only

for “the defense of the territory,” but in the French mandates there was an explicit right to

raise troops which “may, in the event of a general war, be utilized to repel an attack or for

90 See, for one example of the French attitude, AE, Serie Y, International (Serie Y), Dossier 600, Service frangais de la SDN, (SFSDN) to MF, 31 Jan. 1921, “Note au sujet des Mandats B.” 91 For the text of the B mandates, see Wright 591-627. 48

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. defense of die territory outside that of the mandate.” Slavery was to be abolished, but

only as quickly “as social conditions will allow.” In some parts of the mandates domestic

slavery appears to have been present long after the mandates were established. Labor and

labor contracts were to be supervised to prevent fraud or abuses, and forced labor was

restricted to “essential public works and services,'” and “then only in return for adequate

remuneration,” but this did not eliminate the French labor tax, the pvestadan. Nor was the

phrase “essential public works and services” explicitly defined.92 No clauses existed

regulating the use of revenue or its collection.

Economic equality was guaranteed to League members, “subject to the

requirements of public order,” and “provided that the Mandatory shall be free to organize

essential public works... on such terms and conditions as he thinks just.” This left open

the option to limit many fields of industry to their own nationals. In addition, the

mandatory powers had the explicit right to grant monopolies to their own nationals if they

could be shown to be “in the interest of the territory.” Most importantly, to satisfy both

French and British freedom of action, included in all the B mandates was the clause:

The mandatory shall be authorized to constitute the territory into a customs, fiscal, and administrative union or federation with the adjacent territories under his own sovereignty or control; provided always that the measures adopted to that end do not infringe the provisions of the mandate.93

The equivocal language of this clause was a clear concession to the idea of annexation, and

came from the C mandates, which were all to be administered as provinces of the

mandatory power. The creation of an economic or administrative super-territorial unit,

92 In the French mandates the translation is, in fact, “traveaux publics et services essentieles,” which does not mean the same thing as the English phrase. 93 Tanganyika Mandate Article 10; other B mandates Article 9. 49

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. for instance between the Cameroons and AEF, or between Tanganyika Territory and

Kenya/Uganda, would carry with it the high probability that the mandated territory would

be linked inextncably to the colonial empire of the mandatory power. How the final part

of the clause would protea the integrity of the mandate was not obvious.

Given the compromises involved in the newly drafted mandates, the effectiveness

of the League’s supervision remained in doubt. Many clauses implied League

participation, but did not specify the exact meaning of clauses beyond general principles.

Most importandy, the League held no explicit powers to enforce the mandates.

Nevertheless, with a scrupulous supervision and dedicated mandatories, the mandates

promised a new practice of imperialism. The mandatory powers had to submit a yearly,

public report to the PMC The commission, in its turn, would submit a report to the

League Council. The consent of the Council was necessary for any modification of the

terms of the mandate, and disputes between the Council and a mandatory power were to

be submitted to the International Court at The Hague. This structure created many

opportunities for the League, but it exposed the League to criticism from the Germans

and other groups, because the composition of the PMC and the Council gave enormous

weight to the mandatory powers. The commission would include colonial powers, and

Britain, France, and Japan were permanent Council members. The form of the PMC

would be a critical factor in determining the effectiveness of the new mandates.

The Creation of the Permanent Mandates Commission

The PMC became an integral part of the League’s structure shortly after its first

session in 1920. It derived from the terms of Articles 22 and 23 of the Covenant, which

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. created a body to receive the annual reports from the mandatory powers.94 This body

would have the duty of studying those reports, evaluating the administration of the

mandatory powers, and reporting to the Council. The PMC did not have policy-setting

responsibilities or the ability to take independent action based on the mandate reports.

The “enforcement” of the mandates was beyond its power, the Council had to take any

decision regarding the conduct of the mandatory powers. In this sense the PMC was a

filtering mechanism, bringing issues of importance before the Council. This did not mean

that the PMC was

without power, or had a nearlysecretarial function. It was designed as a disinterested and

impartial body, but its creators took very seriously their responsibility to craft an

organization that would be able to fulfill its purpose to defend the principles and letter of

the mandates.

The PMC, in fact, threatened to diminish the political, economic, and

administrative powers of the colonial rulers. A strong commission would act as a guardian

over imperialism itself, opening a debate over Europe’s domination of Africa. On the

other hand a weak PMC without the ability to affect policy would compromise the

League. Thus, the controversies surrounding the drafting of the formal mandates could

not help but spill over into the discussion of the PMCs workings. It was therefore

extremely unfortunate that the United States withdrew from the League’s formation, for

this allowed the mandatory powers the upper hand in creating the PMC

From the start there was considerable debate over the commission’s scope and

authority, as well as its size, shape, and membership. The mandatory powers were intent

94 League of Nation Covenant Articles 22 and 23. See Wright 591-2. 51

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. on separating the PMC from the outside, and barring it from questioning administration

and policies.95 However, League advocates wanted to create an organization with real

power. American colonial expert George Beer stated in 1919, “what sharply distinguishes

the Mandatory System from anything existing in the past is that under it the League of

Nations has an unqualified right of intervention in case these principles are violated.”96

But he also admitted that unless the supervision of the League was extraordinarily delicate,

“there is no possibility of the system functioning satisfactorily.” Africans would be in

constant ferment, the League would be a court in constant session, and the mandatory

powers would be constandy resentful if the League were seen to undermine their

administrative authority.97 Baker acknowledged that the PMC had to be a circumspect

body, but “if necessary the League’s right of intervention must be ruthlessly used, and an

unfaithful mandatory held up to the opprobrium of the world.”98 Beer, Baker, and

Drummond all agreed that the commission had to be in the position of gauging “the

essential accuracy of the mandatory reports.”99 They understood that the mandatory

powers would defend their interests and that the commission’s structure would dictate its

95 The failure of the United States Senate to ratify the Treaty of Versailles eliminated the possibility of American membership. Most immediately, Cameron Forbes, former Governor-General of the Philippines, was instructed to reject membership in the PMC by the Wilson/Harding Administration, and so possibility of American support for a strong, anti-imperialist PMC was lost before the commission ever met. 96 Mandates Registry Files, R6, LON document 1.2062.248, 5 Nov. 1919. 97 Ibid. Beer wrote: “one tactless member of the commission [on mandates] might on a tour of inspection or even by injudicious remarks made in Europe stimulate grave political unrest and cause not only untold trouble to the mandatory power but also widespread misery to the people under his guardianship.'’ Beer’s solution to this problem was to have a mixed commission of government members from the mandatory powers and interested states, as well as non-official members, and that the non-official membership file a confidential report with the Council to augment the official government reports. This was an attempt by Beer to confront the problem of official silence on embarrassing questions. Questions and concerns raised by the non-official (or League) members of the commission would, through communication to the Council, penetrate the veil of official secrecy. This probably would not have worked, but the creation of a “body of experts” as the commission was eventually constituted, made up largely of government officials, did not often confront governments with inconsistencies in their reports. 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid. 52

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ability to avoid the dominant influence of the mandatories. They originally formulated a

commission of 40 members, drawn both from the governments represented on the

Council and members of the League Secretariat, and designed to dilute the influence of

official members representing their governments.

Paul Hymans’ report on the composition of the PMC reflected these ideas. He

presented this report at a League Council meeting in San Sebastian in August, 1920.100

Hymans, the Belgian Council member, became the spokesman for Drummond, Beer, and

Baker. He reviewed Article 119 of the Versailles Treaty and Article 22 of the Covenant,

and asked:

What will be the responsibility of the mandatory power before the League of Nations, or in other words, in what direction with the League’s right of control be exercised? Is the Council to content itself with ascertaining that the mandatory power has remained within the limits of the powers which were conferred on it, or is it to ascertain also whether the mandatory power has made good use of these powers, and whether its administration has conformed to the interests of the native population?

His answer “It appears that the wider interpretation should be adopted.”101 At the same

time, he admitted that the Council’s best source of information and expertise lay with the

mandatory powers. Although the League had wide powers, it should defer to those who

held the mandates.100

French Colonial Minister Albert Sarraut’s reaction was immediate and

unequivocal Dismissing the League as a “tribunal” and “debating society,” he called on

100 League of Nations Official Journal, Volume 1,334-441, “Powers and Responsibilities of the League of Nations in Regard to Mandates," 19 Aug. 1920. See also Hymans’ original memorandum, “Responsibilities of the League arising out of Article 22 (mandates), Report by the Council to the Assembly, 5 Aug. 1920. The report became Assembly Document 161. See also FO 371/4766, G4283/154/18, “Powers and Responsibilities... ” 19 Aug. 1920, and Mandates Section Files, S1655. 101 FO 371/4766, C4283/154/18, “Powers and Responsbilities... ” 102 On this question see also Wright, 112, and Elizabeth Maanen- Helmer, The Mandate Sysian in Rdanan to Africa and the Pacific Islands (London, 1929), 47,108. 53

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the French delegation in Geneva to oppose Hymans’ report.103 As Sarraut feared, the

report raised the worrisome question of how the League might attempt to enforce the

mandate. For instance, the Council might attempt to revoke a mandate, terminate it, or

assign it to another power on the basis of a recommendation by the PMC Since Britain

and France had already concluded that the PAAP had placed the territories with them, not

with the League, the French disputed the issue of the League’s sovereignty over the

mandates.1M Long after the commission was created, the French remained adamant that

Article 22 strictly limited the authority of the League and insisted on a tightly restricted

interpretation of the PMCs role.105

The mandatory powers had already put forward their own, more limited,

proposals. The British Colonial Office, like the French, wanted the PMCs role limited,

but rather than attacking it directly, took another tack. Recognizing that the problem was

one of composition, the British opposed the selection of members who were “too well-

known to the public.”106 In fact, to counter Beer’s original proposal, the British

disingenuously proposed a five-member commission, drawn from the mandatory powers,

with a meager budget of £5000 a year.107

Lacking consensus and without a ready solution, Drummond and the Council

agreed to establish the PMC as a provisional commission and allow it to draft its own

constitution and regulations. As Baker put it, “the success of the mandates commission

will depend I believe on two factors: a) the authority it acquires. If it is to succeed at all it

must command universal respect b) whether or not it induces habits of international

103 AE, Serie K, Dossier 98, No. 330, MC (Sarraut) to MF, 13 Dec. 1920. 104 FO 371/4310, F1362/69623, Parliamentary question by Major Edward Wood, 7 May 1919. 105 AE, Serie SDN, Dossier 600, SFSDN to MF, 31 Jan 1921, “Note au sujet des mandats B.” 106 Mandates Registry Files, R6, LON document 1-2062.248, Memorandum by George Beer, Nov. 5,1919. 54

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. cooperation among the colonial powers.”108 The easiest way to accomplish rh k was to

allow the PM C to define its own scope. However, this also left the commission without

definite institutional protection as it attempted to create procedures and assert itself with

mandatory powers intent on maximizing their own authority.

In its final form the PMC was neither the large, robust organization desired by

League advocates nor the tiny, crippled one promoted by the mandatories. By its nature

and composition it leaned heavily toward the non-intrusive body envisioned by the

mandatory powers. Its two main responsibilities were to receive the annual reports and to

invite representatives of the mandatory powers to its yearly meetings at Geneva. The

results of its deliberations were forwarded to the Council and published. The PMC was

left to define its other powers, such as formal visitations to the mandates, receiving

petitions and interviewing petitioners, and requesting specific action by the mandatory

powers. These manifestations of its authority were based on in the Hymans proposals and

the ideas of League advocates. However, under the terms of the Covenant the PMC, like

other League commissions could neither make policy nor commit the Council to any

particular course of action. The early meetings of the PMC indicate that its members

recognized this limitation. They were unwilling to enlarge their essentially passive role.

For instance, almost immediately the PMC denied to itself and its members the right to

inspect the mandates or interview petitioners about alleged violations of the mandates.

The PMCs composition also illustrated its ambiguous role as an instrument of

League policy. The colonial powers were given preference, and positions were filled on

107 Mandates Registry Files, R6, LON document 1.8343248, Philip Baker, 14 Nov. 1920. 108 Mandates Registry Files, R6, LON document 1.6435248, 26 August 1920, minutes by Drummond, Baker. 55

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. that basis. Its membership, initially limited to nine, included Britain, France, Spain,

Portugal, the Netherlands, Sweden, Italy, Belgium, and Japan: one extra position was

reserved for a representative of the International Labor Organization (ILO). Because only

Britain, France, Belgium, and Japan were mandatory powers, there was a majority of non*

mandatory states on the Commission. However, there was only one non-colonial power,

Sweden, from which the sole woman member was drawn. The Council never seriously

considered the requests of other non-colonial countries for membership. Indeed, even

before the PMC was created, its potential members were evaluated by the mandatory

powers. Smaller colonial and non-colonial European powers had lobbied for slots. So

while the constitution of the PMC stipulated that the members were to be selected for

their personal merits and competence, and were not to represent their governments or

hold any governmental position, the League took no steps to enforce these guidelines.109

The initial composition of the PMC was crucial, because its founding members

drafted its constitution and established the major precedents between 1920-1929. One of

the striking features of this group was its age, experience, and position.110 They were

109 Wright, 622-624. See also CPM 5, “Constitution of the Permanent Mandates Commission.” The French initially refused to accept the Italian government’s nomination of the Marquis Alberto Theodoli for membership. See AE, Serie SDN, Dossier 600, No. 242, Ambassador to Italy (Barrere) to MF, SFSDN, no date. The Italian government, furious at not getting a mandate, insisted on Theodoli, who became President of the commission. IIC The original membership in the PMC Anna Bugge-Wicksell (Sweden), was a lawyer. William Ormsby- Gore (Britain), was an MP and member of the LONU. Jean BP. Beau (France), was the former Governor- General of French Indochina and a former ambassador. The Marquis Theodoli (Italy), had been undersecretary of state for the Italian Colonial Ministry. Alfredo Freire d’Andrade (Portugual), was the former governor of Mozambique and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Ramon Pina (Spain), was undersecretary of state for Foreign Affairs. Pierre Orts (Belgium), was former secretary-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Daniel F.W. Van Rees, (Netherlands), was the former vice-president of the Dutch East Indies Council. Kunio Yanaghita (Japan), was formerly secretary-general to the House of Peers. Harold Grimshaw was from the International Labor Organization (ILO). William Rappard was the original head of the League of Nations Section on Mandates, the branch of the secretariat assigned to the mandates, which was composed of four clerks. With the exception of Valentine Dannevig, who replaced Bugge-Wicksell in 1928 (she was a high school principal) the later members of the PMC were also colonial experts. See Chapters 3- 4. 56

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. generally colonial experts, former governors or govemors-general of major colonies. Orts

and Ormsby-Gore, both rising stars (Orts in the Belgian Foreign Ministry and Ormsby-

Gore in the British Army and Colonial Office), were exceptions, as was Anna Bugge-

Wicksell, the Swedish member, who lacked any colonial experience. Most of the members

were retired when they were nominated to the PMC The result was a very

knowledgeable, but conservative, commission reluctant to mark out bold new

internationalist boundaries for its work

Although the Council was empowered to act on the PMCs yearly reports, it took

little action between 1920-1939. Only one question dominated its early discussions on the

mandates system, that of amending the mandate over time, but it took no action on this

important aspect of the B mandates. During the entire interwar period the League’s critics

and supporters debated this aspect of the PMCs work South Africa claimed sovereignty

over the former German Southwest Africa, and Britain retained control over much of

Iraq’s administration, including the army, after Iraq achieved independence in 1931. The

Council consistendy refused decisive action on questions of sovereignty over the

mandates. Even after Japan left the League in the 1930s, taking with it its C mandates,

little was done to clarify the authority of the Council on revoking a mandate. In theory,

the consent of the Council was necessary for any change to the mandates, but this was

unlikely because of the Council’s composition. In practice, this would entail agreement

between the PMC and the Council, and the Council would have to act unanimously, by its

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. own rules.111 The possibility of revision of the terms of the mandate, or any change in the

authority of a mandatory power, was remote.

The PMC was therefore required to operate in a limited way. As Beer had warned,

it had difficult tasks to perform and few means at its disposal. Institutionally the

mandatory powers were protected by several layers of the League’s bureaucratic

machinery, even if they did submit yearly mandate reports and despite the yearly sessions

of the PMC The commission could have publicized its criticisms; in practice, like other

organizations set up to supervise League members, it would have risked the animosity and

obstruction of the mandatory powers.

Early German Claims and the Formation of the Mandates System

One nation was constantly determined to uphold the authority of the League and

expand the mandates system. The German public accepted the loss of its colonies

grudgingly, if at all. German colonial advocates accused the mandatories of “disguised

annexation,” and were the earliest critics of the system. Although the colonies’

importance should not be overemphasized, they added to the Reich’s resentment of the

postwar settlement. However, Germany’s losses in Europe and its reparations burden

were far more important.112

The victorious French and British justified their seizure of the colonies by

criticizing German colonial administration. The Germans objected to these criticisms,

which were reflected in the language of the Versailles Treaty that depicted them as unfit

colonial masters. The German delegation at the Paris Peace Conference resisted the idea

111 Ormsby-Gore was one of the members who made efforts to layout the PMCs functioning clearly, but many others did in their respective national newspapers as well. See FO 371/7049, W4775/1149/98, Letter to the Tares ( f London by Ormsby-Gore, 3 May 1921.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of ceding the colonies, both because of economic need (raw materials) and because “it was

her [Germany’s] right and duty as a civilized people to cooperate in the education of

undeveloped races... the interests of the populations demanded that she should retain the

colonies.”113 Excluded by the Allies from the distribution of the mandates, the German

government protested their terms to the League of Nations.114

In 1920, the Germans launched a critique against the Hymans proposals, which

were published in the League’s OfficialJatmd in September, calling them “veiled

annexation.”115 Berlin argued that the Assembly, not the Council, had the authority to

appoint members to the PMC (which would eliminate the influence of the mandatory

powers), and that the League had ultimate control, if not sovereignty, over the African

mandates. The German note stated that:

The report in question [the Hymans Report] endeavours to make out that the appointment of the mandatory powers and the delimitation of the territories which are to be placed under mandates is exclusively within the sphere of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers... In fact, regarded as a whole, the provisions can only have one meaning, that is that the PAAP should hold the colonial possessions, as trustees, dll such time as the mandatories are appointed... seen as a whole, the system proposed by the Council of the League amounts to the almost complete eliminadon of the Assembly, and it reduces the role of the Council to a mere formality, and it thus invalidates the control vested in the League. The mandatory system would therefore become a mere ficdon, and we should find ourselves confronted, in fact, with the annexation of the formal German colonial possessions... the German government, for its part, would be

112 There were perhaps 50,000 German colonial supporters. See Wolfe Schmokel, DmamcfEnpire Germm Colonialism, 1919-1945, (New Haven, 1964), 5-11. '^Chapter II, Section 10 of die “General Observations o f the German Delegation.” See FO371/11303, C1733/539/18, Memorandum by the FO, 11 Feb. 1926. This is a brief, but comprehensive summary drafted by the British Foreign Office revisiting the major German claims to its former colonies. See also Alma Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Corferenoe (New York, 1941), 306-313, “German Counterproposals of 29 May, 1919.” 114 FO371/11303, C1733/539/18, Memorandum by the FO, 11 Feb. 1926. 115 Mandates Section Files, S1655, “The responsibility of the League under Article 22 of the Covenant, Memorandum from the German Government concerning the fate of the former German Colonies” League of Nations Assembly Document 106, 8 Dec. 1920. 59

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. bound to consider such a solution of the colonial question as a violation of the Treaty of Versailles.

Persuading neither the Council nor the French and British governments, the German

protest was ignored, despite its legitimate questions about how the League could influence

the governance of the mandates.

Former German colonial officials also attacked the mandate idea, again terming it

annexation in disguised form. As early as 1920, General von Lettow-Vorbeck, the hero of

the East African campaign, and Theodor von Seitz, fomer governor of Kamerun and

Southwest Afrika, protested to the League and to German newspapers against the seizure

of the German colonies and the idea that Germany was an incompetent colonial

administrative power. Seitz’s Congress of the German Colonial Society frequently came

to the attention of French consuls in Germany.116 The anti-French journal R ote Hand was

especially willing to draw attention to the plight of the German colonies.117 The German

Colonial Society, the umbrella organization for several colonial organizations, protested

the Spa Conference agreements, which “violatfed] the spirit and the letter of the Covenant

of the League of Nations and constitutefd] a flagrant rupture of the Treaty of

Versailles.”118

The Germans also acted to remove the stigma of German mismanagement.

Heinrich Schnee, former governor of German Southwest Africa, quickly published a book

which supporters forwarded to the PMC, stressing the beneficial measures of German

colonial government and accusing the French of turning Togo into another disastrous

116 ANSOM, Ministry Files 60, “Affaires Politiques, Generalites routes colonies, 1920-1957” (FM 60), Canon 900, Dossier 2, No. 575, MF to MC, 2 July 1921, and No. 48, MC to MF, DAP, 31 Oct. 1922. 117 AE, Serie Z, “Allemagne, 1918-1940” (Serie Z), Dossier 597. 118 AE, Serie K, Dossier 98, Consul at Berlin (Charles Laurent) to MF, No. 1221, 6 July 1920. 60

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. example of French mismanagement.119 Leaflets “for the Repudiation of Calumny by the

Hamburg Committee of German Colonials” attacked the idea that Germany lacked the

expertise to have colonies.120 Schnee and Seitz regularly published articles throughout the

early 1920s in nationalist Swiss and German newspapers such as the Frankfurter Zeitung

calling attention to deficiencies in mandatory administration, which the French

government scrupulously collected. Some of these articles took the tack that what the

French were doing wrong in the mandates was shocking (higher taxes and the prestadon ),

and what they did correctly was imitative of German methods from before the war.

Eventually, Theodore Marchand, the French Commissaire of Cameroun, would feel

compelled to respond formally to the Colonial Ministry about German critiques.121

Undoubtedly the Germans took advantages of the delays and divisions over the mandates

system to register their objections.

These early German criticisms added to the clamor against the PMC Whether

raised by Germans, the League, outside organizations, or the British and French

themselves, the issues of sovereignty, authority, and the role of the mandates in the

imperial systems of the mandatory powers became the key issues over the next two

decades. The following chapters will analyze the economic development policies followed

by the British and French between 1920-1939, attempts to place the mandates under the

administration of other colonies, and the similarities and differences between policies

119 Schnee, DiedeutsdxnKalcnen urterfrarderMandatsbemchafi, (Leipzig, 1922); Mandates Section Files, S261. 122 Mandates Section Files, S261. 121 ANSOM, FM66, Canon 1038, Commissaire du Cameroun (Theodore Marchand), to MC, Nos. 75-7,21 April 1924. Marchand refuted several German charges, sometimes poorly; if Africans under French administration paid more taxes, he argued, it was because times were better. The former German governors based their criticisms largely on the mandate reports. They complained of rampant disease, oppressive taxation in the territories under mandate, poor administration, previously developed plantations lying fallow, and pointed to the desire of the natives for the return of German administration. See, for instance, ANSOM,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. designed for the mandates and those in place for other colonies in Africa. A fundamental

conflict was posed between the mandate as a colony under another name, and a genuinely

new form of administration, and it affected the economic development of the African

mandates and the stance of the great powers toward the League of Nations.

FM 60, Canon 900, excerpts from the F rarkfm er Zetrwg 24 April 1924 and the Deutsche Allegnvine Zeitung, 26 Aug. 1924.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 3

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND SOVEREIGNTY: BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND THE PERMANENT MANDATES COMMISSION AT WORK, 1920-1939

In the first place, [the mandates system] may more easily than any other part of the Covenant, become an elaborate piece of camouflage without in any way ceasing to be a working mechanism. Such a result would be disastrous. It would be especially disastrous, because in the second place we should be storing up trouble for the time when Germany is a strong member of the League of Nations. This time may not be very far distant. Whenever it comes the League of Nations will be involved in very serious difficulties if the provisions of Article 22 are not effectively applied in the spirit of broad interpretation in mandated areas... this is more important in view of the most unfortunate history of the mandates system up to the present time.

-- Philip Baker, responding to the report of the League Commission of Enquiry, 6 June 1921122

The structure of European diplomacy during the interwar period defined Anglo-

French relations with the PMC The mandatory powers were both important members of

the League and the largest colonial powers. They were determined to preserve the fruits

of their victory, but at the same time they looked cautiously at reintegrating defeated

Germany into the European community. Their view of the PMCs role also changed as its

influence waned in the 1930s along with its prospects of shaping the practice of

imperialism.

122 Mandates Registry" Files, R38, LON document 1.12747.12747, William Rappard, “The Role of the Mandates System; Critiques of the formulations of the Commission of Enquiry on the subject of the mandates section,” 19 May 1921. The Commission of Enquiry recommended as a cost cutting measure that the mandates section be eliminated and its functions be folded into the general secretariat. 63

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The mandatory powers were often impatient with the PMCs meddling in their

administration, and were reluctant to cede influence to the commission because they could

not guarantee it shared their views. Their colonial ministries did not ignore the

commission. They created dedicated “mandate” sections and prepared explanations for

each session of the League. However, these ministries also integrated the B mandates as

much as possible into their existing empires. Thus, Paris and London were prepared to

resist the PMCs attempts to carve out a sphere of influence.123

The French and British approached the idea of the mandate system differendy at

the peace conference. This chapter will examine the differences, as well as the similarities,

in their approach to the PMC The mandatory powers held different views on the Open

Door, finance, and the issue of sovereignty. Yet both powers were uncomfortable with

the level of supervision the PMC attempted to exercise, even in an era of more public

diplomacy. In fact, although the mandatory powers only rarely challenged the PMCs right

to observe and comment on mandatory administration, their actions reveal a common

rejection of the commission’s mission that overshadows their different approaches to the

questions of administrative amalgamation, economic equality, and German entry to the

League.124

The German question also affected the evolving relationship between the PMC

and the mandatory powers. For the former Entente powers the important public issues

during the 1920s-30s included treaty revisionism, the Locarno treaties, Germany's

U3 There are several issues discussed below that were of great importance to the relationship. Some of these were not related only to the B mandates, but to the system in general or to the A or C mandates. Sovereignty was a question in all three types of mandates. Additionally, issues regarding Syria and Palestine affected the African mandates despite the fact that the B mandates were not as politically or culturally “developed" as the territories of the Middle East, particularly petitions and sovereignty.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. rapprochement with the League between 1926-32, the rise of Hitler, and the appeasement

policy. The complicated relationship between the two mandatory powers and Germany

involved the mandates because of German claims to their former colonies and by

extension, their reservations about the entire Versailles settlement. The German claims

and accompanying propaganda reinforced French and British resistance to public criticism

by the PMC

After Locarno, the German presence in the League and in a specially-created seat

on the PMC reinforced the adversarial atmosphere between the commission and the

powers. This was intensified by the presence, and at times the influence, of the European

press and German propaganda. However, as later chapters will show, this did not mean

that the work of developing the mandates ceased, or that the PMC and the mandatory

powers failed entirely to cooperate. But the relationship, which was not equal even before

Locamo, grew more unbalanced after 1926.125 Germany's exit from the League did not

repair relations between the commission and the mandatory powers. Paris and London

remained resistant to interference throughout the period even as the commission’s

personnel and financial resources disappeared.

Part I: Public Diplomacy and The Competence of the Commission

The League, its supporters, and the original members of the PMC attempted to

define the commission’s competence very broadly, but their ideas did not necessarily

124 See below Pan HI. Qoser Union was the amalgamation of Tanganyika Territory into a larger East African Federation including Kenya and Uganda. 125 At the same time it should be noted that there was only rarely a lack of cordiality or a breach of civility between the PMC and the mandatory' powers. While the Colonial and Foreign Ministries of both France and Britain displayed disdain for, and frustration with, the PMC, such things were displayed to the PMC “off the record,” in private, unofficial correspondence, or not at all. 65

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. reflect the practical realities of supervising colonial administration. For instance, Alfredo

Freire d’Andrade, the first Portuguese member of the PMC, considered that the Covenant

would “virtually constitute an administrative charter for the native populations” of Africa.

He proposed that the Covenant and the Constitution of the PMC enshrine several

principles, including: “Native populations should take part in any legislation that affects

them,” and “monopolies should only be granted in respect of works of public utility and

should only be accorded after notification to the League of Nations.”126 These would

have entailed a problematic transfer of authority from the mandatory powers to the PMC,

which was an advisory body without enforcement powers.

Several PMC members concerned with the commission’s competence understood

that it could not force the French and British to adhere to the mandates. Instead, its

influence on the policies of the mandatory powers would depend on public support for

the system. Publicity would widen the scope of the PMCs supervision and prevent the

mandatory powers from hiding their policies. For instance, Daniel Van Rees, the Dutch

member, suggested a special review on mandate questions to keep scholars and

commentators aware of relevant mandate questions.127 This revealed an essential

dependence on public opinion that limited the PMCs activity. William Ormsby-Gore,

first British member of the commission, compared the PMC to other international

commissions: “The Permanent Mandates Commission has no executive functions and no

power to order a mandatory to do, or refrain from doing, anything... [the members] are

126 FO 371/5850, C400/11/18, LON Secretary General’s Office to FO, 6 Jan 1921. This was a copy of a memo dated 8 Dec. 1920 by Freire D’Andrade, who was also the head of the Portuguese delegation to the League Assemby. 127 CPM 194, Van Rees, Nov. 1924. 66

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. purely expert and advisory.”128 Hence, Foreign Office officials could respond to early

PMC criticisms: “I don’t think the mandatory is called upon to provide chapter and verse

for everything he does in the mandated territory. Judgment should rather be on

results.”129

PMC members also discussed the scope of the commission’s activities during its

early sessions.130 Most took the position that Article 22 of the Covenant implied a strictly

advisory, observational role. However, several members, basing their views on the

Hymans Report, argued that this did not limit their ability to examine all aspects of

administration.131 As Van Rees wrote in 1926, “[the expansive view of the PMCs role] has

the encouragement of the mandatory powers themselves, since they, by embodying in

their annual reports increasingly detailed statements on their whole administrative

activities, have shown that they share the commission’s conception of its duties.”132 By

the mid-1920s the consensus among PMC members was that they could inquire about any

aspect of the mandates contained in the annual reports. If the mandatory powers wanted

to keep any aspect of their administration secret, they would have to omit it.133

128 FO 371/7049, W4775/1149/98,3 May 1921, Extract of letter by Ormsby-Gore to the Tam c f London. 129 FO 371/9425, W9475/70/98 0 0 to FO, 5 Dec. 1923. The PMC had criticized Britain for providing poor budget figures for the mandates. 130 The PMC initially met once yearly, but the wight of the reports and the impossibility of interviewing the accredited representatives of all of the mandatory powers over the course of one wek necessitated a change in 1923. At that point, the PMC decided to expand to semiannual meetings and met once in the summer and once in the autumn. For the rest of the year the members w n t their separate ways, but the Mandates Section in Geneva kept them apprised of public comment through a press-dipping service and occasional correspondence. In the 1930s the commission returned to one meeting a year. See for instance CPM 511(1), Van Rees’ confidential “General Competence of the Mandates Commission,” 15 Nov. 1926. 131 See Giapter 2. 132 CPM 511(1). 133 The mandate reports w re frequendy criticized by the PMC for not including enough information, but they were also typically self-congratulatory (emphasizing successes and continual progress), lengthy, and repetitive. It was very easy to miss omitted incidents, especially if they wre briefly mentioned. 67

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Most League officials connected with the mandates system knew' that its success

depended ultimately on the mandatory powers’ willingness to cooperate with the PM C134

For instance, in 1925 Mandates Section member Huntington Gilchrist stated that two of

the principles that defined the success of the PMC were the non-political character of its

members and world opinion, namely, “the whole movement toward international

cooperation.” But a third, “the value of a complete understanding between the mandatory

powers and the PMC” was the most important.135 This implied an unequal relationship

between the PMC and the mandatory powers, because to do its job the PMC needed

adequate information and the cooperation of administrators. The mandatory powers

could therefore guide debate by tailoring the information given to the PMQ

“understanding” between the PMC and the mandatory governments was only as

“complete” as the French and British allowed.

This ambiguity between the commission and the mandatory powers contributed to

the rapid establishment of their adversarial relationship, because neither the PMC nor the

mandatory powers could rely on definite rules to guide their interaction. The French, for

instance, reacted very defensively to early PMC observations on their administration, and

Paris soon approached the PMC as an opponent unwilling to accept the legitimacy of

French interests.136 Additionally, the French PMC member, rather than sitting as a

134 Callahan 69. 135 Mandate Section files S1656, Huntington Gilchrist, “The Mandates System: Summary of remarks made by Huntington Gilchrist at a session of the Geneva Institute of International Relations, held in the classroom of the secretariat, 12 Aug. 1925.” 136 See, for one example, AE Serie SDN, Dossier 555, No. 32, MF (Jean Gout, Chef du Service Frangais de la SDN) to MQ 20 May 1922, on a petition from ASAPS to the PMQ and AE, Serie SDN, Dossier 555, No. 413, MC to MF, Service Frangais de la SDN, 6 June 1922. The issue was that of land rights. The French maintained that “vacant lands [in the mandate] belong to the private domain of the State” and could be leased or alienated. The ASAPS worried that this placed the land in the category of French property, a violation of the terms of the mandate. The French argued that this came under “French internal rights to the territories they administered], and was quite outside the competence of the League.” 68

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. dispassionate expert, took an active role in government policy discussions, and became the

France’s defender on the commission.137 The Foreign Ministry also habitually solicited the

opinions of the Colonial Ministry on the business of the PMC, so that the Service Frangais

de la SDN (SFSDN) could inform the French PMC member of official policies.

British PMC members were not as tightly associated with London as the French

with Paris, but like the French, the British coached their accredited representatives and

acquainted them with methods for dealing with the commission’s questions.138 They also

regularly produced reports that omitted important, but embarrassing, incidents, refusing to

highlight any inadequacies of their administrations for the PMC139 This editing even

applied to statements provided to the PMC by the local mandatory governments. One

official noted in 1926, “[Governor Donald Cameron of Tanganyika] evidently does not

entirely appreciate the fact that it is a report to the League of Nations and that it should

not contain matters of a contentious nature, especially on subjects which have not been

before the League [previously].”140

Thus, although the League sought cooperation between the powers and PMQ

neither the French nor the British saw it as in their own interests. Both powers avoided

137 The first French member, Jean Beau, was the former French Ambassador to Switzerland and an advisor for the French Foreign Ministry. Callahan notes Beau’s attitude as well, Callahan 71. 138 See, for one example, 0 0 724/3,27395, Colonial Office memo, 15 June 1925, a memo drafted for the use of Capt. Mansfield, the accredited representative for Togo during the mid- 1920s. 139 The mandate governments drafted the reports and sent them on to the Colonial Office. Such omissions were common, and even before German entry into the League, the British feared the embarrassment of some of the incidents omitted. See Chapter 5, and CO 691/55,33046,10 June 1922, Officer Administering the Government (OAG) (Hollis) to CO, “Annual Report [Tanganyika] for 1921.” See also CO 672/5, X4233, OAG (Maxwell) to OO, 1 June 1927, “Togoland Report for 1926." Finally, see the GO’s egregious rewriting of the 1931 report, CO 691/124/4,31124, OAG (Jardine) to CO, 10 Much 1932, “Annual Report for 1931.” CO 691/83, X3061, Cameron to CO, 5 March 1926, “Annual Report 1925,” minute by Charles Strachey, head of the Colonial Office Tanganyika section. The British also omitted references to railroad building delays caused by the 1926 coal strike, fearing that the PMC might ask them why materials for the railroads were not purchased from non-British sources. See 0 0 691/90/6, X18318, Cameron to CO, 4 March 1927, “Annual Report, 1926.” 69

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. reporting on the more troubled aspects of their administration because they feared

publicity and its possible consequences. They feared that scandals in the mandates or calls

for reform from the PMC might be the first steps on the slippery slope towards actual

international control. The potential threat to their goals was unspoken, but given the

amorphous nature of the system, difficult to ignore. They therefore removed anything the

Germans, their parliaments, or their own public opinion might attack This applied to

every aspect of administration and development.141

The possibility of a collegial relationship between the commission and the powers

declined further when the PMC revised its questionnaire in 1924. The original

questionnaire that framed the yearly mandate reports was very basic; PMC members began

revising it almost immediately and desired an expanded set of questions to improve the

reports and guide their interviews with the accredited representatives.142 The mandatory

powers attacked the new questionnaire upon its publication.143 Additional, more detailed

questions implied more detailed observations and criticisms from the commission. The

possible addition of a German member wielding a thorough set of questions also worried

141 Strachey wrote: “HMG in accepting the mandate, accepted the obligation to give the natives of Tanganyika a better government than it had under the Germans. In such matters as education and medical and sanitary work were are at present far behind the German standard... criticism has already begun, and German propaganda is active..." GO 691/47, 60305, Byatt to GO, 2 Nov. 1923. Ironically, the Colonial Office would eventually come to use the strategy of comparison with the former German administration to gain funds for the mandates. 142 Answers to the questionnaire formed the basis of the mandate reports. The original was divided into several sections divided into areas of concern: labor, education, health, administrative questions, the status of Africans, taxation, economic equality', and so forth. It consisted of about 35 questions total, many essentially ‘yes or no.’ See LONMRs for French Togo, British Togo, Tanganyika, and Guneroun, 1920-39. 143 CPM 127, Lugard, 26 May 1924, and CPM 135, Freire d’Andrade, 13 June 1924. It was much more detailed than the old version: it began with questions about organic law and financial autonomy, and included long sections on education, labor, and the welfare of the African population, with questions on the distribution of teachers, wage rates and regulations for compulsory labor. One example is question # 44: “... please state approximately the total revenue derived from the natives by taxation and the total amount of the expenditure on their welfare (education, public health, etc.).” As later chapters will demonstrate, the implications troubled the mandatory powers. 70

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. London and Paris. They attempted to quash the new questionnaire and openly attacked

the PMCs role in supervising their administrations.

The French and British mainly objected to the intrusiveness of the new

questionnaire. League Council members, particularly Gabriel Hanotaux, the French

representative, had already questioned the scope of the League’s activity.144 He and other

French officials, including Colonial Ministry councilor Albert Duchene, the head of the

SFSDN Jean Gout, and President of the League Council Leon Bourgeois, agreed that the

PMC was dangerously overstepping its bounds. They also believed that some members,

particularly the Italian president of the commission, the Marquis Alberto Theodoli, and

the head of the Mandates Section of the League Secretariat, William Rappard, focused

their criticisms on the French administrations, consistendy displaying what the French

called the “megalmanie” of the PMC145 One report to the Colonial Ministry read: “the

Commission this year manifested, in the exercise of their right of supervision, a sort of

spirit of animosity or acerbic criticism,” even when it praised specific French

144 Hanotaux was a consistent critic of the PMQ and this reflected the French defensiveness about the role of the League: “The mandates commission had a tendency to go beyond the powers with which it was entrusted... the commission could only make observations on action taken and not take the initiative in anticipation of such action... most of the questions dealt with in the last report of the Commission to the Council should have been omitted.” See CPM 144(1), Van Rees, 24 June 1924. Hanotaux had a very strict view of the PMCs role. As Van Rees observed, the Covenant stated that the PMC should “advise the council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates,” which did not limit its observations in any way to specific actions taken by the mandatory powers. One of the reasons for the French defensiveness was the state of the A mandates: Syria and Lebanon were almost constantly in revolt by the mid- 1920s. The A mandates were probably of more concern to the French government on this issue, just as the British A mandate of Palestine was, but the B mandates were also integrally connected to the Anglo- French objections to the new questionnaire and the larger question of the PMCs rights and responsibilities. 145 Theodoli was the President of the Commission; Rappard was the first head of the Mandates Section, and became an “extraordinary” member in 1925. AE, Serie Y, Dossier 436, “Report on the meeting of the Interministerial Committee of the SDN, 24 Nov. 1923,” 28 Nov. 1923. On the recent report of the PMC (3rd Session, Autumn, 1923), the Report states: “In this report equally the Commission reassigns (reconnait) to the territories under mandate a legal status absolutely different from that of the mandatory state. This thesis may be legally correct (exacte en droit) but the Commission draws from it extreme consequences which seem utterly ridiculous (tout a fait deraisonnables).” 71

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. accomplishments.146 The British government concurred. Foreign Minister and Council

representative Sir Austen Chamberlain accused the PMC of attempting to seize power

from proper governments.147 Along with the French Foreign Minister, Aristide Briand, he

complained that the new questionnaire was designed to make governance more difficult

for the French and British.148 However, the PMC stood firm, and the French and British

eventually abandoned their protests in face of public opinion support for the

commission.149

Part II: The PMC in Action: The Central Issues of the B Mandates

Nationality and Military Questions

The League’s greatest fear was that public opinion and the mandatory powers

would assume the mandates to be de facto colonies. To counter this, the PMC asked Paris

and London to address the issue of nationality by creating a special designation for

mandate inhabitants. In 1922 Theodoli and other members traveled to London, Brussels,

and Paris to meet with colonial officials. This was an seldom repeated exercise, despite

the importance of other issues in the next two decades. The French initially considered

the inhabitants French subjects, but soon reconsidered and designated them “administres

frangais.” The British developed the term “British protected persons.” Nevertheless,

146 AE, Serie SDN, Dossier 621, No. 482,9 July 1925, Report by Commissaire of Togo, Auguste Bonnecarrere, “Session de la Commission des Mandats, Examen de la gestion fran 9aise au Cameroun et au Togo." 147 FO 371/11876, W8578/59/98, 7 Sep. 1926, Austen Chamberlain, report from Geneva, 41“ League Council meeting. On interviews of petitioners and this attack on the League, see below. 148 Ibid. See also AE, Serie SDN, Dossier 553, Note pour la Direction Politique, “La question des mandats devant le Conseil,” 6 Sep. 1926. The French and British were also concerned about petition interviews. See below. 149 See Michael Callahan, Mandates andErrpbe, (Brighton, 2001), 123-9. Callahan argues that this episode represented a defeat for imperialist forces and a victory for League supporters. However, there were no other incidents of this type during the interwar period. The mandate reports did not change materially

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. both Colonial Ministries agreed that individuals who wanted to adopt the nationality of

the mandator}'-powers could do so on a case-by-case basis.150

Nationality was more than just naming the inhabitants of the mandates. The

mandatory powers saw the question of nationality as one of only symbolic importance,

and developed their terms to placate the PMQ but the commission saw the issue as part

of the larger question of autonomy, the mandates had to be recognized as separate

institutions, not colonies. Van Rees, who often considered the juridical status of the

system, did not attack the ability of mandate inhabitants to become naturalized citizens of

the mandatory power, but concerning their larger status, he was much less sanguine:

[the legal status of the inhabitants] implfies] very inadequate realization on the part of the mandatories of their obligation to promote the political education of the peoples, still minors, that the latter may one day stand alone. Such an obligation would appear to imply gradually familiarizing those peoples with the idea of nationality, or in other words, establishing a formula to express a legal relationship with the territory which, at some more or less distant date, would define the national status of the population concerned.151

He recognized that the PMC could not force the mandatory powers into such a policy,

and only recommended informing the Council of the commission’s views.

Military issues also indicated the importance of the nationality issue. Because the

inhabitants of the mandates were not French or British subjects, they could not be

conscripted except within the mandates. The mandates’ military clauses stated that the

because of the new questionnaire, and the mandatory powers successfully hid many of their policies even with expanded questions. 150 Mandates Registry Files, R57, LON document 1.17378.16844, Memo by Dr. Joost Van Hamel (League of Nations Chief Legal Counsel), “National Status,” 12 Nov. 1921, and LON document 1.17831.16844, Memo by Rappard, 2 Dec. 1921. See also Mandates Registry Files, R2338, LON document 6a.ll519.3807, and CPM 858, Van Rees, 13 June 1929, “Status of Native Inhabitants." Van Rees wrote that while the naturalization question was dealt with satisfactorily, the sums of inhabitants was still tenuous. The names had been given, but their legal sums was not secure dejtoe. The PMC, however, could not do much to improve the situation, since it could not dictate that the mandatory powers quickly change their legal codes. 151 CPM 858. 73

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. mandator}'power did not have the right to recruit troops for service outside the mandates,

but both the French and British did so in the early 1920s.152 The British argued that

Tanganyikans could be recruited into the King’s African Rifles if they traveled outside the

territorial borders of the mandate. Incorrectly, the British assumed that frontiers, rather

than the status of the inhabitants, were the effective restriction on military recruitment.

The French also recruited nearly a regiment of men in Togo, sending them from Lome to

Dakar for training.153 When the PMC inquired about the legality of the recruiting,

Duchene replied that in order to recruit effectively in the mandates during wartime,

French military forces had to be organized before a war broke out.154

Although both powers had attempted to escape the clauses of the mandate, once

caught, neither attempted to defend its position because the mandates explicidy forbade

recruiting. The British chose not to confront the PMC and privately abandoned the issue.

The French, with a more liberal mandate in regard to military recruitment, reiterated their

right to recruit troops in wartime for service elsewhere, but there were no further incidents

of recruiting in Togo or Cameroun.155 This early victory for the PMC was the result of

clear language in the mandate documents and the undeniable intent of the drafters, a rare

conjunction where the B mandates were concerned.

Sovereignty and Length of Tenure

Among colonial and League officials there was little consensus over who held legal

authority and sovereignty over the mandates. Article 22 contained no discussion of

152 The precise wording was that “the mandatory shall not organize any native military force in the territory except for local police purposes and for the defense of the territory.” The French did have the right to recruit in wartime. See Chapter 2. 153 AE, Serie SDN, Dossier 620, No. 1177, MF to Minister of War, 15 June 1921, and AE, Serie K, Dossier 100, No. 524, MF to MC, 16 June 1921, “Recrutement des indigenes du Togo et du Cameroun.” 154 Mandates Section Files, S1617, Duchene to Catastini, 3 Feb. 1925. 74

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. sovereignty over the mandates, and only the most implicit stipulations about their length.

Some outside commentators, such as American legal scholar Quincy Wright, equated the

indefinite length of the mandates with ck facto sovereignty for the mandatory powers, but

others disagreed.156 There was also no well-defined procedure for terminating a mandate,

which complicated the question of where sovereignty lay. In fact, in 1919 a panicky

Foreign Office asked an MP to postpone his question to the Foreign Secretary regarding

the procedure in the event of the “mandatory failing to carryout the obligations of its

mandate and charter” because it lacked an answer. The only standard for termination was

a broad “development” principle, which was both a new measurement for political,

economic, and social progress, and a pre-war distinction between “civilized” and

“uncivilized” societies. A sufficiently developed mandate would achieve independence; a

mandatory power that violated the principle might have the mandate revoked.

The two mandatory powers focused on defending the principle that the mandate

was indefinite. Paris found it difficult to accept a “temporary” mandate, although it made

no claim to formal sovereignty over its African territories.157 Still, the early PMC sessions

convinced the French that they had to defend their authority in the mandates against

League encroachment. One 1923 report demanded that “the delegate of the French

administration must maintain our point of view as analyzed in the following manner the

mandatory state, respecting in all ways the proper individuality of the mandated territory,

cannot consider as non-existent or negligible the legitimate interests which it has now

155 FO 371/11875, W5776/59/98, 5 June 1926. 156 FO 371/4310, F1362/69623, Parliamentary Question by Maj. Edward Wood, 7 May 1919. On Wright, see CPM 129, Extract from the American Journal cfInarruncnd LawVol XVIII, number 2, April 1924. “[Qases seem to support the present writer’s suggestion that there will be a close approach to truth in ascribing sovereignty of mandated territories to the mandatory acting with the consent of the Council of the League.” 75

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. acquired in the territory, or that the same needs of the country obligate it to take up [in the

future].”158

The British Conservative governments of the 1920s also did not claim sovereignty,

but attacked any hint that it lay with the League or with the inhabitants of the mandates.

London complained that the PMC excessively questioned the use of terms like “British

Togoland” that might imply the mandated areas were British.159 Chamberlain and the

Foreign Office also asserted Britain’s indefinite tenure of its mandates in parliament,

stating that “neither the covenant nor the terms of the mandate limited] the period for

which the mandate [was] to be held.”160 In 1926, Colonial Secretary Leo Amery also

insisted at a colonial dinner that Tanganyika would always remain British.161

To assess the questions of tenure and sovereignty, the PMC considered the

statements of the mandatory powers and legal scholars, and in addition it also examined

the political aspects of the issue in the international press. German papers, for example,

typically turned a jaundiced eye toward the PMCs ability to defend the autonomy of their

former colonies or resist Anglo-French claims of sovereign rights. In 1927, the

Harvxrdersdoer Kurier called the PMC the “employees” of the mandatory powers, and the

Neue Preussisdx Zdtung ran an article titled “Quo Vadis Britannia” accusing Britain of

157 See Chapter 2. 158 AE, Serie K, Dossier 103, No. 57, MF, Direction Politique, Service frangais de la SDN, to the Sous- direction d’Afrique, 14 Aug. 1923, “Rapports sur le Togo et le Cameroun.” 159 See, for instance, 0 0 96/689/1,6446, Governor of Gold Coast (Slater) to GO, 12 June 1929, “Togoland Report 1928.” 16C FO 371/11875, W6019/59/98 Parliamentary Question from Capt. Wedgwood Benn, 28 June 1926. Benn, a League supporter, asked “whether mandates held by the British government under the Treaty of Versailles are held in perpetuity or whether they are subject to the control of the Council as laid down in Article 22?" 161 Amery spoke at the annual East Africa dinner. See Chapter 4. 76

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. steadily erasing the distinction between a mandate and a colony.162 German papers

insisted that the British and French assertions of indefinite tenure were incorrect. The

British press also discussed the issue. The Mandxster Guardian compared different

scholarly views of the sovereignty question, including the opinion of a Belgian jurist that

“sovereignty over the mandated areas belongs entirely to the allied powers, who have

partitioned the among themselves... Article 22 of the Covenant is simply a sort of self-

denying ordinance agreed to by the victors in the interests of the natives... ”163 The

commission published no statement of conclusions in the 1920s, but left the question in

the hands of the Council and the mandatory powers.

In 1931 the PMC returned to the issue in depth when Iraq, which had never been

a formal mandate, achieved de jitre (if not defaetdj independence from Britain. Most

members approached the question in terms of the end of the mandate. Van Rees argued

that the mandates were of a limited duration, and that “the regime instituted by Article 22

of the Covenant should terminate as soon as it has brought those territories to a stage of

political, social, and economic evolution when they can reasonably be able to stand

alone.”164 Lugard speculated that part of a mandate might even be terminated while the

rest stayed under the tutelage of the mandatory power.165 Portuguese member the Count

de Penha Garcia, agreed that the existence of the system implied that it had a theoretically

limited duration. In practical terms, however, the tenure of a mandate was indefinite

163 CPM 641, 18 Oct. 1927, “Press Comments concerning the 11th Session... ” H a m n a sd xr Kuriar, 13 July 1927; Nate Pracsisdx Zetturg 25 July 1927. 163 Ibid. Manchester Guardian 17 Aug. 1927. im Q>M 1183, Van Rees, 13 June 1931. Van Rees actually considered that Article 22 did not impose a specific duration on the B mandates, but on the other hand the principle of self-determination existed for the B and C mandates: “the application of [self-determination was] suspended, but by no means cancelled. This seems to be a capital point which cannot be neglected and stands in the way of any interpretation to the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. because the end of a mandate “must have the consent of the mandatory power, as it is

best qualified to judge all the conditions and abilities of the inhabitants.” This also implied

that the mandatory powers held a veto a mandate’s termination. Pierre Orts, the Belgian

member, synthesized the views of others to present the PMCs view of the ideal tenure

conditions. The mandated territories had to have governments sophisticated enough to

encourage (and enforce) the protection of racial and religious minorities as well as the

interests of Europeans and members of the League for twenty-five years after the end of

the mandate.166

The commission’s conclusion that the theoretical limitations placed on the

mandatory powers by Article 22 did not affect the length of their tenure was a significant

blow to the authority of the League. The PMC accepted the French and British

contention that the mandated territories could not be taken from them without their

approval. In this sense only independence granted by a mandatory power could end a

mandate. However, the unrestricted ability of the mandatory powers to retain their

mandates did not mean that they could violate the mandates with impunity, they did not

possess sovereign rights. Nevertheless, the PMC was unable to do more than encourage

the mandatory powers to steer the African mandates toward independence, since it had no

hope of terminating a mandate.

effect that, according to the letter of Article 22 of the Covenant, even some of the mandates are permanent.” 165 CPM 1197, Lugard, 20 June 1931; CPM1191, Penha Garcia, 18 June 1931. 160 The clause guaranteeing the rights of members of the League was removed from the official document, CPM 1210(1), and was turned into a “desirable suggestion.” CPM 1206, Orts, 25 June 1931, “General Conditions to be fulfilled before the mandate regime can be brought to an end in respect of a country placed under that regime.” See also 1210(1), the official copy of CPM 1206. 78

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Unlike nationality or sovereignty, the mandates seemed to define precisely the

principle of economic equality, or the Open Door. The economic equality clauses in the

mandates demanded free trade as a privilege for all members of the League, with the one

exception of contracts for public works.167 However, the mandatory powers frequently

took advantage of their position in the mandates to ensure that they obtained favorable

conditions for their own trade, even in lieu of restrictions on that of other countries.

London understood the advantages British trade would enjoy even without protective

tariffs. In 1919, Colonial Secretary Lord Milner explained to the West African Merchants

Association that “there is going to be great profit... You will have the open door

undoubtedly, and the development of the colonies, if it is properly taken in hand, will be

an enormous advantage to the great trading nations, and we as a great trading nation are

always the first, are we not?”168 Paris took direct measures to ensure French interests by

imposing restrictions on any company doing business in the mandates - any company

exploiting natural resources at war’s end had to register in France and its board of

directors had to be at least 75% French.169

Thus, even with the Open Door the mandatory powers succeeded in favoring

their own interests for the entire interwar period. Britain encouraged an exclusive trade

between the mandates and its larger empire using the system of Imperial Preference,

167 Each mandate clause guaranteed the open door, “except for essential public works and services which it is free to organize on terms and conditions it considers correct.” Both powers felt that they had unlimited power to regulate public works under this clause. See AE, Serie SDN, Dossier 552, “Achat de foumitures et de materiel,” CM to FM, 28 June 1929. See also the Minutes of the 11th and 12th sessions of the PMC 168 FO 371/3775, F166/154906, GO to FO, 22 Nov. 1919. Minutes of a meeting between Milner and various commercial interests. 169 Mandates Section Files, S1617, Cameroun 1921-39. 79

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. granting low tariffs to goods from the mandated territories.170 It also lowered postal rates

from its mandates to the rest of the empire, while keeping rates to other countries high.

In Tanganyika, it also created a customs union with neighboring colonies Kenya and

Uganda to provide Kenyan settlers with a ready market.171 The French also included their

mandates in the French customs scheme, favoring the coffee, rubber, cocoa, and other

products from Cameroun and French Togo, while placing high tariffs and quotas on

goods from the British and Belgian empires.172

The PMC attempted to defend the Open Door, but was generally unsuccessful

because the French and British often adhered to the letter of the mandates. For instance,

the economic equality clauses forbade the mandatory powers to favor their own exports to

the mandates; the British tariff scheme only channeled trade from the mandates to the

British empire, and was therefore permissible. French restrictions applied to all nations,

and therefore technically favored no particular country’s merchants. In addition, other

nations often blocked imports from the mandates. PMC members tried to persuade the

powers that the A and B mandates should enjoy reciprocity; Van Rees argued, “It is only

fair that the community of states members of the League of Nations should regard itself

morally bound to do its utmost to promote the commercial interests of [mandates], and

should accordingly recognize it as a duty to treat goods originating in those territories

170 Tariffs were one method of linking the mandates to the home countries by developing the economy in certain directions. The British granted Tanganyika and its other B mandates imperial preference, which made their products cheaper to import into England. This was not a violation of the mandate, but it did encourage Tanganyikans to export to England before trading elsewhere. In the 1930s, the Germans would counter this by providing barter agreements and subsidies for Tanganyikan coffee and sisal. Over the lifetime of the League, the B mandates were added to several international tariff treaties. 171 Nothing was done to change these postal rates - several petitions about the matter were filed in the late 1920s and 1930s by the Indian community of Tanganyika Territory’. See below. See also CPM 741, Theodoli, 13 June 1928, and CPM 783, “Communications received from the Mandatory powers... regarding CPM 741." On colonial produce, see Chapter 4. 172 For one example see FO 371/9388, W1179/57/17, CO to FO, 14 Feb. 1923. See also Chapter 4. 80

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. exactly as the latter are obligated to treat goods originating in those states.”173 However,

the PMC could not enforce its desires and there were several violations.174

Public works were another problematic part of the economic equality clauses. The

mandatory powers were permitted to reserve public works projects for their own firms,

and the commission found it impossible to regulate French and British practices. It

attempted to encourage the Open Door in public works by asking the mandatory powers

to contract for public works by awarding contracts after a competitive bidding process.175

When, by 1929, both the French and British governments consistently favored their

nationals in public works, Gustav Kastl, the first German member, and Orts protested

repeatedly that the mandatory powers should not avoid competition by using

discriminatory administrative procedures, although with little effect.176

It was difficult for the PMC to affect the distribution of public works contracts

because the tension between the mandatory’s right of administration and League

members’ right to economic equality was hard to reconcile; both rights were absolute.

Neither mandatory power accepted any limitation on their right to favor their own

nationals.177 The French, in fact, justified favoring their own firms by arguing that

discrimination was in the interests of the mandated territory.178 Even so, the PMC

attempted to curtail discrimination by frequently, but ineffectually, informing the League

Council. Orts stated that

173 CPM 782, Van Rees, 18 Oct. 1928. 174 See Chapter 4. 175 This applied to public works that were not “essential.” There was great disagreement between the PMC and the mandatory powers over what was essential. 176 See CPM 892, Kasd, 5 July 1929, CPM 950, Van Rees, 7 Nov. 1929, and particularly CPM 970, 970(1), and 970(2), Orts, 20 Nov. 1929.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Though the Commission was divided on the doctrinal interpretation of this provision of the mandates [economic equality] it was unanimous in recognizing the that the administrative practice adopted in this matter remains subject to the supervision which the commission exercises over the general administration of countries under mandate. It will therefore be for the commission to decide in each case whether the mandatory power, in providing by private agreement for the carrying out of public works or the supply of material, has conscientiouslyand for good reasons adopted a practice which, from the point of view of good administration, is open to objection.179

Despite Orts’ strong words the PMC had no way of enforcing its views or

countering the French or British claim that discrimination in public works operated in the

best interests of the inhabitants of the mandates.180 In addition, the mandatory powers

flatly refused to contract with foreign firms if government money financed a public work.

The commission therefore settled for small victories. In 1930 Paris declared that not only

the firm, but all materials for public works had to be of French origin and delivered by

French ships if paid for from a French government loan. The PMC “noted with

satisfaction that the competent authorities are entitled to depart from the rule in question .”181

This purely theoretical possibility was one of the few results of the PMCs supervision; the

Great Depression, and its attendant protectionism, made it unlikely any French

administrator ever exercised his power to deviate from such regulations.

177 Or in any other way. The French, responding to a PMC memo on the subject in 1929 defended granting preference to French companies on a wide variety of “essential public works and services” by stating that the issue was so obvious they thought the question was superfluous. CPM 1106,3 Nov. 1930. i7g CPM 1033, Service Frangais to Drummond, 13 Aug. 1930. 179 CPM 1333, Orts, 21 Nov. 1932. 180 ibid. The PMC admitted that strict obedience, “to this principle would result in unduly hindering or delaying the administrative action of the mandatory.” 18 1 c p m 1579, “Draft Observations,” 9 Nov. 1934. My italics. 82

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Loans to die Mandates

The most important projects in the mandates were development projects run by

the mandatory governments. Loans financed extensive rail projects in the larger mandates

and harbor, road-building, and public works in every territory.18* In Cameroun the French

wanted to link the short German railroads to those of French Equatorial Africa (AEF).

Tanganyika Territory’s central rail line had been damaged by the war and was in desperate

need of repair and extension. Tanganyika also suffered from serious administrative

deficits. In every mandate damaged or neglected plantations needed considerable capital

to resume profitable operation. Loans from the mandatory governments were the only

source of ready cash for several of the B mandates, and loans in the form of investments

from firms and individuals were vital to the economic development of the territories.183

The PMC was therefore deeply concerned with the formulation of favorable loan

practices for the B mandates. Specifically, the PMC wanted to ensure that the powers did

not exploit the mandates for profit, as if they were colonies.184 Hie mandates were

responsibilities, not windfalls, and like tariffs or trade restrictions, loans to the mandatory

governments might serve to centralize trade in the hands of the state, or firms acting in

the state’s interests, eroding their special status.185 The PMC tried to address this issue by

182 In the cases of British Togo and British Cameroons the mandates did not receive loans, but over the course of the 1920s and 1930s they received a portion of the loans granted by the British exchequer for the Gold Coast and Nigeria, respectively. 183 See Chapter 4. 184 See CPM 147, Van Rees, 1924, “State Undertakings in Territories under B and C mandates.” As Van Rees noted, the mandatory powers could not “appropriate to themselves a portion of the revenues of the mandated territories.” It did not mean, for instance, that the mandatory powers could not hold property or make profits from plantations - they must only refrain from taking part of the revenues. As later chapters will indicate, this principle was followed only loosely, as the mandatory powers used loan payments to absorb resources from the mandated territories. 185 This might be done in several ways. British Crown Agents, for instance, were instructed to favor British firms when the proceeds of government loans were disbursed. Additionally’, a loan for a state-owned business that would remit profits to the mandatory powers’ government would violate the mandate. See 83

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. approving an early resolution that [if] any mandatory state should establish a

government undertaking... the profits of which would be included in the budget of the

home territory of the mandated state... [this] would be contrary to that spirit of

disinterestedness which is the distinguishing feature of the m andates system.”186 On the

other hand, the PMC understood that loans were often necessary, and to expect the

mandatory state to cover them without compensation was unrealistic: “the mandate,

although it should not be a source of profit, should not necessarily become a burden.”

The subtle distinction between these views meant the PMC had to remain vigilant in its

examination of the loan status of each of the mandated territories.187

Hie PMC was particularly concerned that the common practice of hypothecation,

the use of property in the mandates as collateral for a loan from the mandatory power,

would be open to abuse. In the event of default, the hypothecated property would revert

to the mandatory power, violating the principle that the mandated territory was not under

French or British sovereignty. If the mandate were ever transferred or terminated, unless

the new mandatory power or the new African government accepted responsibility for the

loan, or purchased the property, the former mandatory power would retain it. A large

enough load of debt might even prevent the transfer of a mandate to a country unable to

payoff its loans. The uncertainty of the issue unnerved private investors, who were

uncertain whether their investments or loans would be protected in the event a mandate

ended or was transferred. They were therefore leery of investing in the B mandates, as the

PMC noted: “the possibility of [the mandate’s] transfer is by some regarded as a defect of

CPM 62, 25 July 1923, “Questions discussed and decisions taken by the Permanent Mandates Commission during its Third Session.” I8t> CPM 62. 187 See CPM 553, Van Rees, 12 April 1927, “Financial Obligations of the territories under mandate.” 84

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. title which represents an obstacle to the investment of private capital in the country.”18*

In sum, the uncertain legal status of the mandates worried private investors; public loans

worried the PMC

After years of study, the PMC did not feel qualified to make definite conclusions

about loan questions.189 When it elicited the views of the mandatory powers, Britain and

France maintained their right to hypothecate loans without restraint, and asserted that in

the event of a transferred mandate, the new mandatory power would be liable for all loans

made by the old.190 The Council agreed with both views. The mandatory power had the

right to demand collateral and a guarantee of repayment. The PMC accepted the

Council’s decision and declined to recommend any restrictions on the method of

financing loans to the mandates.191

The British also used loan finance indirectly to take revenue from the mandates,

evading the PMCs concerns about exploiting the mandates for profit. The PMCdirecdy

admonished the mandatory powers against owning businesses, and no ventures in the

mandates remitted profits directly to the French or British governments. Few of the

plantations in Tanganyika, Cameroun, or Togo, for instance, were bought by the

mandatory governments (those that were became administrative buildings). But the PMC

could not object to loans, which were a critical form of capital. In Tanganyika, the

government incurred over three millio n pounds in debt, and paid over £450,000 in

us CPM 67(2), no date (1923), “Loans advances and investment of private capital in mandate areas.” The British did not hypothecate property, but rather the government guaranteed loans to the mandated territory. 189 There was some disagreement even among the PMC members about the validity of loans. See CPM 217, Van Rees, 28 Jan. 1925, and CPM 238, Rappard, 15 June 1925. 19C AE, Serie K, Dossier 105. See also CPM 224,13 Feb. 1925, “Loans, advances, and investment of private capital in mandated areas, Observations by the French Govt, on the report of the Permanent Mandates Commission on the work of its third session and forwarded by the Council.’ 191 Ibid. 85

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. interest annually on government-secured loans to the British exchequer. This enormous

flow of resources linked Tanganyika firmly to Britain.192 Loans thus served to tap revenue

and extend the effective sovereignty of the mandatory powers over the African mandates.

If the mandates were liable for those loans, it greatly decreased the probability that

another power would take up the mandate, and gave the mandatory powers the right to

demand full repayment before the mandate could be terminated.

Petitions

Several organizations in France, Britain, and other European countries periodically

petitioned the League, attempting to inform and influence it. The most important

corresponded directly with Secretary General Eric Drummond.193 Africans also attempted

to influence the PMC and the mandatory powers. The mandates permitted petitions and

the commission initially welcomed them as sources of additional information. They could

address issues omitted from the yearly reports and represented a link between the

inhabitants of the mandates and the PMC that the mandatory powers could not fully

control.194 Petitions from the A and B mandates also encouraged the PMC to pose

questions that would open mandatory administration a higher level of scrutiny. Petitions

therefore represented a threat to French and British authority. Paris and London felt

192 See for instance Mandates Section Files S242, PMC distribution, May, 1922, “Memo on British Parliamentary Debate.” In the House of Commons, Sir J. Norton Griffiths asked, and had confirmed, that the grants to Tanganyika were to be treated as loans and interest was charged on them. On the necessity of loans, See CO 691/35, 62443, Byatt to 00,12 Nov. 1921. The French used loans only’during the Great Depression, instead utilizing the pietadan (labor tax) and high taxes to construct public works. See Chapters 4-5. 193 These included the LONU and ASAPS. Drummond’s retirement ended this avenue of correspondence. Few petitioners or organizations discussed the mandates with Joseph Avenol, Drummond’s successor. See, for instance, the Colonial Office’s complaint about such letters, FO 371/7051, W560/1149/98, Aug. 1920. See also telegrams from “Mensah, Roi du Togo" complaining to the French Colonial Ministry that British functionanes in Togo were addressing many letters to the British government asking that Togo be ceded to Great Britain. Mandates Section Files, S285, Ormsby-Gore to Rappard, 16 May 1922. 194 Wright 169-171. 86

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. some problems could only be handled discreedy. Gvil disturbances or criminal activities,

like smuggling or labor abuses, were embarrassing and difficult to handle in the open.

Despite this reluctance to expose themselves to scandal, the mandatory powers knew the

PMC would receive petitions. To armor themselves, they wanted every petition to pass

through their hands.195 They wanted protection; the PMC wanted Africans to have a voice

in their own administration.

The French view of the petitions procedure was a reflection of their larger

objections to the role of the PMC Both in the A and B mandates, petitioners were

numerous, and if the PMC considered them seriously, its influence and inquisitiveness

might increase. For example, in the A mandates, the running crises over the Druse and

Syrian nationalism were a constant source of petitions. From the French B mandates,

petitions from the Bund der Deutsche Togdander, the Adjigo clan of Anecho, and the Duala

of Cameroun also came regularly before the PMC In the French view, all petitions from

the A and B mandates often did not “make known true grievances so much as [gave] their

authors notoriety and importance which they [did not] have.”196 What exasperated the

French was that the PMC seemed to give too much credence to these public nuisances.

For Paris, petitions indicated that in the mandates, the African student was able to play the

League parent off against the Gallic tutor.197

In principle, the British had fewer objections to petitions because colonial subjects

had always been allowed to petition the British government. Petitions from Palestine were

195 AE, Serie K, Dossier 101, no number, Leon Bourgeois (French Council Representative) to FM, 29 May 1922. 196 AE, Serie SDN, Dossier 552, no number, Secretaire-General des Hauts commissaires frangais en Syrie (Robert de Caix) to the President du Conseil, 27 March 1926. Caix was also a frequent accredited representative for the A and B mandates. 197 This was a common metaphor in French documents on the mandates system. 87

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. common, as were those from Indians in Tanganyika. In practice London’s proposal

seriously restricted petitioners’ ability to publicize their complaints before the mandatory

governments rebutted with their own comments. Africans had to submit their complaints

to the often-intimidating local authorities, and the British inserted a clause in their draft

procedure making sure that the mandatory power did not need to submit to the PMC

“petitions clearly of a trivial or purposely vexatious nature.” In the final version, the

commission president, rather than the mandatory power, held this power.198 The British

designed the procedure not only to limit the number of petitions, but also to shield the

mandatory powers against troublesome complaints and from publicity.

The PMC recognized that it would be difficult to hear petitions without irritating

or alienating the mandatory governments.199 Thus, when the British proposed a draft

procedure in 1922 that the French approved, the PMC made very few modifications and

then adopted it.200

i9s p o 371/8324, W4918/1110/98, GO to FO, 13 June 1922. This was the PMCs only major alteration from the British draft. :w Many petitions demanded changes in the mandate or accused the powers of abuses. Others asked for outright independence, an A mandate, or another form of political change. There were examples of large- scale political demonstrations in urban areas of Cameroun and Togo, but it is difficult to determine their connection to later nationalist developments. 200 Wright 119. Hie right of petition and the annual report were colonial practices adapted for League use; the specific procedure was based on that used by the minorities commission. Neither was a direct innovation of the mandates system itself. See FO 371/8324, W4918/1110/98, 0 0 to FO, 13 June 1922. The proposal became CPM 12, League document C485.1922.VI, 1 Aug. 1922. For the French position see AE, Serie SDN, Dossier 552, no number, MC to MF, DAPCA, 30 Aug. 1922, “Memorandum britannique sur les petitions des habitants des pays a mandat.” The French had little to say about the British draft, except for an objection to a clause stating that the PMC could send petitions to any member of the League or other organizations. The French argued that “this drafting seems to allow the supposition that the Commission possesses formal powers which in truth in terms of the Covenant, it does not.” The PMC changed only the section of the proposal that gave the mandatory powers the ability to quash petitions without informing the PMC See CPM 37, Theodoli, 15 Jan. 1923, “Procedure in Respect of Petitions Regarding Inhabitants of Mandated Territories,” and CPM 38, LON document C 44(1) .M73.1923.VI., the official copy of CPM 37. All petitions from the mandates were received by the mandatory powers, which could take up to six months to draft comments. Petitions from outside organizations were submined directly to the chairman of the PMC He decided on their admissibility and forwarded copies to the mandatory' powers. Accumulated petitions would be considered at each session of the PMC and the PMC would then decide 88

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The majority of the PMC approved of the British procedure because it conformed

to their view of the commission’s role. Most members viewed petitions as an example of

cooperation between themselves and the mandatory powers. Some members saw

petitions as a valuable additional tool for supervising the mandates system, but many

others, who took their status as dispassionate “experts” seriously, did not want

“executive” power.221 Therefore, the PMC took a conservative attitude toward receiving

petitions. It did not attempt to encourage them, generally deferred to the mandatory

powers, and eventually rejected every B petition.

Nevertheless, the PMCs mid-1920s proposal to interview petitioners in Geneva,

however, indicates that it took its responsibility seriously and was sometimes skeptical of

the mandatory powers.202 Several members favored interviews as a way to balance the

complaints of petitioners against the statements of the mandatory governments.203

Although the PMC always accepted French or British observations on specific petitions, it

suggested the desirability of outside testimony as additional information. The League

Council, led by the mandatory powers, rejected the proposal.204 The British government

what to do. It had two options: it could dismiss the petition, or it could submit them to the Council for action. 201 At least one member, for instance, was willing to allow the British “trivial or vexatious” clause to remain in the procedure, and another submined amendments limiting the president’s power to determine the receivability of petitions, although neither of these stipulations was approved by the entire commission or the Council. See Mandates Section Files, S284, Anna Bugge-Wicksell (Swedish member of the PMC, 1920- 28) to Rappard, 12 Nov. 1922 and Rappard’s reply, 17 Nov. 1922. See also League document 124276.22099. See also CPM 37, comments by Van Rees. 232 The mandate press indicated at least once that the mandatory powers did not take petitions seriously. See Mandates Section Files S1659, PMC distribution 1934-35, Tanganyika 1934, Extract from the Tanganyika. Opanan (an Indian paper), 13 Oct. 1933: “The comfortable position in which the accredited representatives are situated in the absence of a representative of petitioners offers strong temptation to them to use sometimes phantastic [sic] arguments quite contrary to actual facts.” 203 CPM 405, Lugard, 15 May 1926, “Rapport de Sir Frederick Lugard, Sur la procedure relative aux memories ou petitions.” 204 CPM 405, CPM 415, Drummond, 2 June 1926, “Mandats: Procedure adoptee pour les reponses aux petitions concemant des territoires sous mandat: Note du secretaire general.” CPM 428, Rappard, 12 June 1926, “Procedure Relative aux petitions, projet de recommandation au Cbnseil au sujet de I’audition de 89

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. argued that interviews would create “inquisitions by trivial detail” and the French that

interviews would mean “the exercise of supervision by those very persons over whom the

supervision has been instituted.”215 The British and French did not go beyond disparaging

rhetoric, but interviews were intrinsically problematic on several levels. They would have

been difficult to control, the protocols would have been nightmarish, and the precedents

they would have set were far too dangerous for the mandatory powers to accept under any

circumstances.

The B mandate petitions ranged from those sent by losers in court attempting to

use the PMC as a higher court to detailed demands for independence from literate

communities or disaffected Germanophiles.206 They varied in their particulars but most

complained bitterly of frequent abuses of the mandate by the French or British

governments and sought sweeping changes in mandate administration, the return of

German rule, or the end of the mandate. In time, many petitions filed referred to previous

petitions, forming long series of correspondence with the PMC207

petitioners." See also Minutes from the 41st session of the Council, 3 Sep. 1926: “It appears to us that the Commission usually secures all the information it could reasonably desire either in the peutions themselves or from the mandatory power. Members of the Commission have, however, sometimes found it impossible to form a definite opinion as to whether the peuuon is well founded or not. In order to obtain addidonal informauon the commission has therefore discussed the possibility and advisability of inviting peuuoners to make a statement before the Commission... [but] the members of the Commission, with regard to the quesuon of principle, have expressed a certain hesitauon as to the advisability of the proposed procedure.” For the British response to this idea see FO 371/11876 W8578/59/98, Austen Chamberlain to FO, 7 Sep. 1926. 205 LON document 1.55252.55252, 18 Nov. 1926. See also F0371/11876, W8578/59/98. For the French view, LON document 1.55600.55252,23 Nov. 1926. 236 There are approximately 65-75 B mandate peudons. For some Mustradve examples, See CPM 826,30 Nov. 1928, “from the Chief and inhabitants of Wome (French Togo)” and CPM 882,1 July 1929, “Observauons, dated 28 June, 1929, from the British Government.” 207 There were many peudons, far too many to cite, in this category. They came from the Adjigo family of Anecho, the Bund der Deutsche Togoldnder (BDT), the Duala community of Cameroun, the Indian Associauon of Tanganyika Territory, and several of the outside organizauons like the LONU, BIPDI, and AS APS. See for example CPM 733, “Peuuon en date du 20 Mai 1928, presentee par le Bureau intemauonal pour la defense des indigenes.” The Adjigos filed their First peuuon in 1922, and the BDT began filing peudons in 90

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In their comments, the mandatory powers used several different methods to

convince the PMC to reject petitions. The French and British both typically referred to

petitioners as troublemakers or in the pay of German agents.208 The French observations

to the PMC referred to most petitions as inadmissible (“irreceivable”), because they

demanded changes to the mandate that could only be made by the Council and the

mandatory powers acting together.209 They also hid information from their missions of

inspection that criticized administrators or policies, and might support a petition.210 The

British belittled petitions emanating from their mandates, trivializing the importance of the

petitioners or asserting that the petitions were protesting actions allowed under the

mandates. They also deflected the PMCs attention from particular issues by citing

successful resolutions of non-petition-related, irrelevant disputes.211

The PMC therefore only had evidence from the mandatory powers. However, it

could not complain about one-sided petition observations. Rather than expressing

1923. Both groups were from Anecho, in French Togo, and members of the Adjigo family were prominent members of the BDT. 208 See the petitions of the Adjigo family and those of the BDT in particular. See CPM 427,11 June 1926, “Petition presented by Mr. Casely Hayford on behalf of certain natives of the Adjigo Gan, CPM 679,10 Nov. 1927, “Casely Hayford Petition, Conclusions of the Commission,” CPM 682,10 Nov. 1927, “Observations on Petitions, 12,h Session," and CPM 1220,4 Aug. 1931, “Letter from the President of the PMC, dated 29 July 1931, to the Section, and letter from the French government dated 8 July 1931 to the Secretary General, transmitting a petition of the BDT, dated 14 Oct. 1931, with annex.” 239 For one example see CPM 133,10 June 1924, “Letter from the French Government to the Secretary General on the Petitions of members of the Adjigo Gan, forwarded by the French Government.” 213 See, for instance, the petition regarding the Lome riots in 1933, CPM 1385,26 May 1933, “Petitions, dated respectively 5 Feb. and 13 Feb., 1933, from M Sosuvi, Denu, Gold Coast,” CPM 1445, 17 Oct. 1933, “Petition dated 15 Aug. 1933 of the BDT, communicated with the text of a telegram sent on 8 Feb. 1933, transmined by the French government on 11 Oct. 1933, with its observations,” CPM 1433,27 July 1933, “Letter from the French Government dated 10 July 1933, transmitting its observations on the petitions of Sosuvi de Donu (CPM 1385),” ANSOM, FM 18, Carton 25, Dossier 19, MC, DAPCA, to the Service Fran?ais de la SDN, 20 May 1933, ANSOM FM 66, Carton 608, Dossier 3, De Guise (Gommissaire of French Togo) to MQ 3 March 1933, ANSOM FM 66, Carton 608, Dossier 3, De Guise to Colonial Minister, 16 June 1933, and ANSOM FM66, Carton 612, Dossier 2, Cazaux (Inspector of Colonies) to Colonial Minister, 27 May 1933. 211 See for instance, CPM 2022, “Petition dated 9 Aug. 1937, from Johann A Agboka, of the BDT, transmined on 29 April, 1938 by the UK government with its observations,” and CPM 2059, 15 June 1938, “Peuuon dated 9 Aug. 1937, (see CPM 2022), report by Penha Garcia.” 91

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. dissatisfaction with the tactics of the mandatory powers, the commission had little choice

but to agree that in many cases petitioners’ demands were specious. Some also agreed

with the mandatory powers. For example, Leopoldo Palacios, the Spanish member, stated

regarding a Dualan petition, “It would be contrary to all our principles and all our rules of

procedure to discuss such demands [as independence or the revision of the mandate].”212

Despite their fears of scandal, the powers could eventually rely on the PMC to dismiss

petitions without much debate.213

Year 1920-1925 1926-1930 1930-1939 Petitions Filed 5 14 30

Table 3.1: Petitions Filed with the Mandates Section, 1920*1939

As the table above indicates, the PMCs rejection of petitions armored the

mandatory powers against potential German agitation after 1927, even as the volume of

212 See CPM 1045, “Petition dated 19 Dec. 1929, from a group of persons at Duala, and observations of the French Government dated 26 May 1930," and CPM 1120,14 Nov. 1930, “Supplementary observations of the French Government dated 11 Oct. 1930 (CPM 1082), Report by Palacios.” The French member of the PMC in the mid- 1920s and early 1930s, Martial Merlin, repeated the French Government line to the rest of the commission: “When persons apply to the League of Nations outright their intention is to disregard all jurisdiction of the mandatory power... these persons feel that, whatever the ultimate destiny of their petition may be, they will have defied the mandatory power for a certain time, have experienced the pleasure of forcing that power to reply... justify its acts, and in short, look like an accused person.” CPM 967, 18 Nov. 1929, “Petitions, note by M. Merlin." Groups like the LONU were not as trusting. Hie LONU filed a petition in 1929 asking that the mandatory power inform the PMC “in case of any serious disturbance in any mandated area.” Like other petitions, it was rejected after comments from the mandatory powers, none of which supported the idea. See CPM 863, LONU to the League, 23 June 1929. 213 For one example see CPM 573, Bugge-Wicksell, June 1927, “Petition from the Bund Der Deutsch- Togoliinder (see CPM 467, 552) Report by Mrs. A. Wicksell." Bugge-Wicksell found several serious deficiencies in the French observations to a BDT petition, but nevertheless recommended the petition’s dismissal. 92

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. petitions increased.*14 Different African groups in Togo and Cameroun filed petitions well

into the 1930s, and evidence exists that some Africans went to Germany or met with

German journalists and travelers coming to the mandates after Germany entered the

League.215 French officials in the mandates, and the French Colonial Ministry, became

very worried in the late 1920s and early 1930s about the effects of such contact, and

increased their emphasis on “German influence” in their petition observations. Similarly,

the increased numbers of German immigrants in the British Cameroons and Tanganyika

Territory worried British Colonial Officials, who speculated about German influence on

the Indian community and Africans, although the volume of petitions from Tanganyika

did not increase.

By the late 1920s, the PMC no longer considered petitions an important source of

information. In addition to rejecting every B mandate petition, it restricted its own ability

to hear them. In 1927 it decided to automatically reject petitions that repeated previous

allegations or that it or the mandatory powers judged “incompatible” with the Covenant

or the mandates.216 Since the mandatory powers consistently denied the admissibility of

any petition asking for substantive change, the commission summarily rejected most

petitions after adopting its new procedure. For those it did consider, the PMC lacked the

information necessary to make conclusions, and the observations of the mandatory

powers were often vehicles for obfuscation. At the PMCs sessions, the accredited

214 However, the German members of the PMC did not take a very active stance on petitions, so it does not appear that the process was tainted. 215 For example ANSOM, FM 18, Carton 4, Dossier 43, no number, Governor General of Cameroun, 15 May 1933, ANSOM FM 66, Carton 611, Dossier 5, No. 357, MC, DAP to MF, DAPCA, 28 Dec. 1937, “Delivrance de passeports aux Camerounais resident en Allemagne,” and ANSOM FM 66, Carton 1038, 1919-1937, passim 216 CPM 558(1), 1927, and see also CPM 655, Van Rees, no date (1927). There was some debate about interviews between those in the Secretary General’s Office who wanted even less access to the PMC, and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. representatives easily answered the most pointed questions evasively, and the PMC,

unwilling to challenge them, did nothing.217 The institutional structure of the PMC gave it

the ability to hear petitions, but little protection if it approved one. It was dependent on

the cooperation of the mandatory powers to function, and the mandatory powers would

almost certainly have retaliated against the criticisms contained in an approval. Thus, the

mandatory powers successfully controlled the petitions process.

Part III: Germany on the PMC and Goser Union

Locamo and German Entry to the League

At Locamo, the French and British had reached an accommodation with the

German government that opened the door for cooperation and the peaceful adjustment of

the Versailles settlement. The Locamo treaties also paved the way for German entry into

the League in 1926. On the colonial question, the three powers drafted language that

accepted the Germans, theoretically, as worthy to hold mandates, although none was

promised to them. After Locamo the Germans (officially and unofficially pressured the

French and British for the outright return of the former colonies, “consideration in the

case of a redistribution of African mandates,” or various other schemes for an unofficial

German influence in Africa.218 Most German agitators were former colonial officials, but

those in the mandates section who defended the PMCs impartiality and prerogatives. See Huntington Gilchrist’s minutes to CPM 558, LON document 1.5616922099, 8 May 1927. 217 See, for one example, Minutes of the 19th session of the PMC, 1930,121-122. See also CPM 1045, “Petition dated 19 Dec. 1929, from a group of people at Duala, FRC, and observations, dated 26 May 1930, of the French government,” 17 June 1930, and CPM 1120, Palacios, “Petition dated 19 Dec. 1929, from a group of persons at Duala, and obs. of the French govt, dated May 26,1930 (CPM 1045). Supplementary obs. of the French Gov. dated Oct. 11,1930 (CPM 1082),” 14 Nov. 1930. 218 Mandates Section Files, S283, Germany and the League, 1924-1930, Memo by Mandates Section (Finn Tage Friis), 29 March 1926. Comments on German Chancellor Luther’s speech to the Reichstag on 23 Nov. 1925, shortly after the Locamo conversations had concluded: “As regards the colonial question, the right of Germany to colonial mandates has been expressly recognized... we expea that the practical consequences 94

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. some were more prominent, such as Hjalmar Schacht, the president of the Reichsbank.219

In addition, Germany pursued covert policies, such as paying the back wages of the

former askan (Swahili-speaking African administrative officials) in Tanganyika, which kept

the Reich in the minds of the African population, but riled British administrators.220

Germany’s initial propaganda rebutted the charges of its incompetence and

savagery in governing its colonies. After Locamo, Berlin’s propaganda became more

focused and intense, no doubt because it entered the League.221 Even before, the motifs

of German propaganda had changed. The Germans posed as defenders of African

interests and good government. They did this for two reasons: one, to demonstrate that

Germany should not be excluded from the colonial world, and two, to undermine the

mandatory powers and keep the question of eventual treaty revision alive. Germany

deplored the disappearance of its infrastructure and the delays in replacing it: “It is in the

interests of humanity, it is necessary to put an end to the suffering of the indigenous

peoples entrusted to powers whrch already have too many colonies for their own good...

it is necessary to give these needs over to the great civilized German people who have

of this claim will also be drawn.” In the same memo Friis commented on the programme of the KRAGS organization (Kalanale RadxarbaisgmBnsdxifi ), which in 1926, on the heels of Locamo, added to its “maximum program” of the return of the German colonies a “minimum program” demanding that the German representative to the PMC “in every way work to strengthen the control exercised by the League under the mandates system and [emphasize the difference] between mandated territories and colonies." See also AE Serie Y, Dossier 602, Fleuriau to FM, 19 April 1929. 219 See for one example of Schacht’s colonial solution to Germany’s problems, AE Serie Y, Dossier 601, No. 400, Ambassador to Berlin (Margerie) to FM (Briand), 25 March 1926: Germany’s shrunken state, the Dawes Plan and reparations, and its other production problems necessitated colonies that would produce food and primary materials for Germany. —c The askan were Swahili officials who had been part of administration in the coastal areas of East Africa before German rule. The Germans adapted them to their own administration, and the British continued, reluctandy, to employ them. See Robert Heussler, “British Rule in Africa,” in Gifford and Lewis, 571-590. See also GO 691/77 18711, Cameron to GO, 24 April 1925; OO 691/81, 8281, FO to CO, 20 Feb. 1925, and 46639, FO to OO, 15 Oct. 1925. 221 FO 371/10755, C2994/2994/18, Consul General Frankfurt (Bosanquet) to FO, 28 Feb. 1925, 0825/2994/18, Consul General Munich (Bentinck) to FO, 12 March 1925, and C4238/2994/18, CO to FO, 24 March 1925. 95

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. already made the land sanitary, educated and developed the native people.”” This

propaganda also criticized the PMC as too secretive and an inadequate defender of

African interests.

German colonial groups also attacked British and French attempts to permanently

link their mandates with adjacent colonies. They feared that the PMC was far too feeble to

prevent the mandatory powers from effectively annexing their former colonies. Colonial

Secretary Amery’s 1926 speech outraged the Germans, and renewed criticism of the PMC,

calls for a German member, as well as the revision of the colonial setdement.223 They also

attacked the British attempt at “Qoser Union,” which would have merged Kenya, Uganda,

and Tanganyika into a quasi-dominion of the British Empire.224 German colonialists were

also angered by maladroit British attempts to close the question. They were furious when

the Foreign Office responded to their agitation by stating that “the mandates... were

definitely allotted to the existing holders and there has never... been any suggestion that

any of the existing mandatories desired to be relieved of its responsibilities.”225

The PMC paid considerable attention to this propaganda, but could do little to

change its own established procedures to suit German opinion.226 Indeed, struck by the

222 AE, Serie SDN, Dossier 545, particularly “Note sur les Revendications Goloniales Allemandes, Etat actuel de la question,” no date (Autumn 1925). 223 On Qoser Union and Amery’s comments, see below. 224 FO 371/13615, C920/43/18, British Consul to Berlin (Sir PL Rumbold) to FO, 1 Feb. 1929. Herr Von Kuhlmann gave a letter in March, 1929 to Sir William Tyrrell, involving a partition of the Portuguese colonies. Scresemann disavowed the letter a month later, but the British did not know before then if the letter represented an official demand. See FO 371/13615, C2284/43/18 and C2541/43/18. 22 ‘ FO 371/13615, C2906/43/18, Parliamentary question from Lt. Cmdr. Kenworthy, 22 April 1929. 226 Hie information section of the Secretary General’s office took note of German criticism. Huntington Gilchrist wrote to Catastini discussing the policy of keeping the reports of the PMC and its minutes secret until after the Council. Catastini maintained that the mandatory powers could not be expected to approve such publicity before they saw the reports and edited the minutes. Hie policy was not changed, but the Information Section emphasized that because of the secrecy of private meetings and the lack of interest in the public sessions, by the time the minutes and reports were published, “interest has considerably evaporated... in the interests of publicity and understanding of what the mandates commission is doing, it 96

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. extent of German press criticism, the commission feared that this agitation might distract

public attention from the League’s work, diminish its prestige, or encourage the view that

it was simply a creature of the mandatory powers. It desired public support and courted

public opinion with introductory public sessions and the published minutes of its

meetings. However, to ensure candor, the substantive work of the commission was

accomplished out of public view, and the minutes of its sessions were edited. Neither the

mandatory powers nor the Mandates Section felt that frank discussions were possible

without secrecy.227 Thus, the PMC had no direct way to respond to German propaganda.

A German member of the PMC might reduce German criticism and agitation, even while

it threatened the relationship between the commission and mandatory powers in other

ways.

French and British Reaction to German Entiy

At the highest diplomatic levels the British and French were prepared for

Germany’s entry into the League. This had been decided at Locamo, and one year later

Germany took its seat as a permanent Council member in Geneva. There was, however,

no “Spirit of Locamo” in the French Colonial Ministry and British Colonial Office, which

feared that a German member on the PMC might obstruct or ridicule mandatory

administration, or even claim a mandate for the Reich.

Earlier, after France’s occupation of the Ruhr, its colonial officials had anticipated

Germany’s entry- to the League with dread:

If, in a compromise, Germany must be admitted into the League, our situation in the colonial arena is at a strong risk to be strained [or]

would be a great advantage if the reports could be issued to the press as soon as they are distributed to members of the Council.” Mandates Registry Files, R74, LON document 1.47626.42721,19 Nov. 1925. 227 Ibid. 97

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. shackled. Even if this is a hypothetical peril, I am obligated to forecast it. It is certain that Germany, deprived of its possessions, highly criticized during and after the war in its principles and colonial practices, will naturally endeavor, if it is officially qualified to judge the administration of other powers, to raise itself in comparison to them... No representative of the Reich must ever sit in Geneva on the Mandates Commission.228

The French were concerned for several reasons. One was the number of petitions they

were receiving from Togo and Cameroun, and another was the nascent German agitation

for colonial revision. On top of this, the Germans, by entering the League, would gain

economic equality and the other privileges of League members.229 The Colonial Ministry

demanded guarantees that they could still restrict Germans from the African mandates

after German entry, but British and Belgian support for such restrictions was tepid, at

best.230

Soon after Locamo the Germans began to make semi-official requests for a seat

on the PMC over strenuous French objections. After taking its seat on the League

Council, Germany claimed a PMC seat, based on its historical position and its special

228 AE, Serie K, Dossier 103, No. 215, MC to MF, DAPCA, 20 March 1923, “Pourparlers eventuels Franco- Allemanais: questions d’ordre colonial.* 229 See the fears expressed by Berthelot to the French delegation at Geneva, AE, Serie Y, Dossier 600, Nos. 52-54, MF (Berthelot) to Delegation Frangaise Geneve, 22 Sep. 1926. The French had previously forbidden Germans to even enter the mandates as tourists. 230 AE, Serie K, Dossier 104, MC to MF, 24 Sep. 1924. See also AE, Serie SDN, Dossier 621, Bordereau d’envoi (no number), Foreign Minister to the Chef du Service frangais de la SDN, 26 Sep. 1924 and No. 749, MC to MF, 23 Sep. 1924. Daladier (Colonial Minister in 1924) stated that the French could only consent to Germany entering the League with guarantees that French officials in the mandates should have the authority to “isolate anti-French propaganda” through censorship and other methods. On British and Belgian indifference to German entry, See FO 371/9821, C15519/2072/18, French Ambassador to FO, 4 Oct. 1924, and AE, Serie SDN, Dossier 600, W4752/333/98, FO (Austen Chamberlain) to Fleuriau, 31 May 1927. For French reaction see, AE Serie SDN, Dossier 621, No. 565, Ambassador to London to MF, 6 Oct. 1924, and AE, Serie K, Dossier 107, Fleuriau to MF, No. 229 11 May 1927. The British were not as troubled by the possibility of a German member, and their indifference swayed the Belgians, isolating the French. Austen Chamberlain had some objections, but more to the method of German demands than to the demands themselves. He delajcd, but raised no specific objections to a German member. The Dominions were against a German member, but also had no specific plan for rejecting a claim beyond encouraging the Germans privately from claiming a seat. See CAB 32/52, E122, Report of the Committee on Mandates, 1926. 98

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. relationship with its former colonies.231 Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann warned that

a refusal would damage the prestige of the League in Germany, as well as his own

domestic position.232 The French accused the Germans of claiming a seat based on

nationality, which ran counter to the PMCs status as an advisory, non-governmental

body.233 They also objected that the PMC was already too large, and even attempted to

convince the Germans that a Council seat was sufficient.234

However, the French found little support from the other mandatory powers.

London and Brussels were not prepared to deny Germany entry to the PMC In fact,

Chamberlain’s attack on the commission’s proposals for a new questionnaire and to

interview petitioners did not appear designed to keep Germany out; rather, it likely aimed

at limiting the commission’s influence after Germany’s entrance. Whatever the reasoning,

the British and Belgians refused to support French efforts, and thus, Paris could not

prevent the PMCs expansion.

The French resorted to rejecting German candidates. They blocked several

potential German representatives on the basis of personal connections and former

131 The Germans were the only Council member without a PMC seat. This was coincidental, but reflected the overwhelming importance of the western European powers in the League’s administration. The Germans were particularly chagrined that Italy, “although she possesses no mandate, [is] represented on the Mandates Commission.” FO 371/12680, W4354/333/98, German Ambassador to Chamberlain, (conversation report) 10 May 1927. On Germany’s historical position, see AE, Serie SDN, Dossier 555, MF to Ambassadors to Berlin, London, and Brussels, 21 May 1927, “Nomination d’une membre allemand a la Commission des Mandats.” 232 AE, Serie SDN, Dossier 600, No. 231, Fleuriau to Foreign Minister, 11 May 1927. 233 This principle was applied very selectively. Along with Gustav Kastl (an industrialist), the first German member, and Julius Ruppel, his successor, Anna Bugge-Wicksell and her successor Valentine Dannevig were the only non-colonial experts ever chosen. The membership of the PMC was for all intents and purposes limited to colonial powers. Attempts to include, for instance, a Latin American member were deemed too disruptive, even though most of the South American states were League members. Other women members were not considered because of their prominence or their expertise. See Mandates Registry files R2327, on the replacement of Bugge-Wicksell in 1928. The French initially attempted to coordinate a joint response with the British and Belgians rejecting German membership on the PMC, with which the British briefly concurred. The British position, however, quickly reversed. FO 371/12680, W4752/333/98, French Ambassador to FO, 23 May 1927. 99

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. positions (in fact rejecting colonial experts precisely on the basis of their competence).

Their methods were tactically sound, but strategically deficient. From a legal standpoint,

their original objections to a German member were legitimate; commission members were

theoretically chosen for their expertise, not their nationality. The French also briefly

contemplated asking the Germans to wait for a vacancy, although this would have meant a

great loss of prestige for the nation removed from the PMC Instead, Paris took the path

of least resistance, rejecting early German candidates (who were colonial luminaries), so

that they had to accept Gustav Kastl, who had little colonial experience but a benign

resume.235

After Germany entered the League, French and British reluctance to cooperate

with the PMC on substantive matters intensified. The French successfully discriminated

against German firms in public works projects, and evaded questions about German

interests in Cameroun.236 The British attitude also became more defensive during

Germany's tenure on the commission.237 The British Dominions, which had already

complained about the invasiveness of the PMC towards their C mandates, were

234 AE, Serie SDN, Dossier 555, no number, MF to Ambassadors to Berlin, London, Brussels, 21 May 1927. 3,5 The French rejected the first German candidate, Friedrich Von Lindequist, because of his involvement with the Agadir crisis, calling him a “colonial intransigent.” Schnee was also a candidate, and was rejected by the French and British out of hand. See FO 371/11877, W10578/59/98, Drummond to FO (Cadogan), 9 Nov. 1926. The French were not enamored of Kasd either, despite his businessman’s background. He did not have an “easy character,” and “his manners are rude and he is, perhaps, contradictory and obstinate.” But he was the best that could be hoped for. See AE Serie K, Dossier 68, Telegrams 719-22, Ambassador to Berlin (LaBouiaye) to MF, 28 Aug. 1927 236 AE, Serie SDN, Dossier 621, No. 168, Bordereau d’Envoi, 22 March 1927. See also AE, Serie SDN, Dossier 600, No. 11, Chef de Section, Service Frangaise de la SDN (Gaston Qauzel) to Foreign Minister, 22 June 1927. 237 This was due also to the physical and mental decline of the British member, Sir Frederick Lugard, who the British increasingly viewed as an embarrassment. See FO 371/12681, W11640/333/98, GO to FO, 12 Dec. 1927. In the same document is a comment on Kasd: “I am doubtful whether Dr. Kasd will be prepared to continue as a member of the Commission. Firsdy because he is rather intolerant (almost more intolerant than are accredited representatives) of the stupid nature of many of the quesuons asked and of the discursiveness of certain members of the Commission.” 100

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. apprehensive over the addition of a German member.238 The British also became more

defensive because after Locamo, opposition Liberal and Labor Party parliamentary

members such as Noel Buxton and Captain William Wedgewood Benn pressured the

government, hoping to prod it into concessions for Germany or the extension of the

mandates system with questions on German colonial claims and the future of the African

mandates.239

The PMC after German Entry

Germany’s entry created no immediate changes in the PMCs work.240 The two

German members, Gustav Kastl and Julius Ruppel, fulfilled their duties punctiliously.

Nonetheless Kastl was highly critical of policies that appeared to him to be deleterious to

the interests of the African population. He was particularly eager to sharpen the PMCs

supervision of complex financial issues.241 He also defended the German legacy in its

former colonies, objecting to many characterizations of German rule in the mandate

reports.242 Kasd and Ruppel also attempted to use the German seat on the PMC to re

open the mandates to German business and colonization. For instance, Kasd informed

:3i CAB 32/89, Committee on Mandates, Report, 31 Oct. 1930. 239 in 1926 several Members of Parliament demanded clarification on this topic. Regarding Amery’s speech, Benn asked on 1 July, 1926, “Do we understand that it is the view of the Government that despite the overriding authority of the League of Nations under Article 22, a mandatory holds its mandate in perpetuity?" Amery responded that “[Locamo] cannot mean, and the answer must get that beyond doubt, that we hold Tanganyika or any other territory as agents on behalf of the League who as the real owners can at their will and pleasure transfer the exercise of the mandate to someone else.” OO 691/84 X5421,1 July 1926. See also in that file questions by Noel Buxton and others. 24C Kasd (1927-30). Julius Ruppel, the second member (resigned 1932), was an official in the German Foreign Ministry and an active member of the German colonial movement. He had, in fact, filed letters and petitions with the League during the drafting of the mandates between 1920-22 on the question of German liability for loans to its colonies before 1914. 241 Two such issues were health policy and finance. See, for instance, CPM 760, Kasd, 27 June 1928, and CPM 942, Kasd, 4 Nov. 1929. See also Chapter 5. 242 See, for one instance, GO 691/100/27,29271, Cameron to GO, 21 Oct. 1928, “Annual Report 1927, Criucism by Dr. L. Kasd.” Amery, the Colonial Minister, feared that Kasd would attempt to derail closer union schemes, and demanded that representatives be sent to Geneva who “[would] stand up firmly to the

101

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. his associates in the Reichswiiand der Deutsdxn Industrie that they should pressure Paris to

open public works projects to German tenders.243

The German members also drew attention to the perils of administrative and

financial unification of the mandates with neighboring colonies. Ruppel, who was

otherwise not as active on the commission as Kastl, used his seat on the commission as a

bully pulpit, especially regarding the amalgamation of British Togo and Gameroons with

Gold Coast and Nigeria, and that of French Togo into Dahomey.244 In these territories

the mandate governments made few efforts to keep the mandates autonomous in any way.

Schools were moved into the colonies, administrative centers were moved to Accra,

Lagos, or Porto Novo, and customs barriers and immigration restrictions between the

mandates and their linked colonies vanished. Both Kastl and Ruppel pointed out the

absence of independent financial administrations in both mandates, accusing the British of

fortifying the mandates against any eventual transfer by making them proportionately

liable for the debts of Gold Coast and Nigeria.245 The German delegates saw this not as

an accounting convention, but as a serious aspect of the sovereignty and tenure

question.

It is important not to overstate German influence on the PMC between 1928-32.

Although their critiques were prominendy displayed in the right-wing German press, they

mandates commission... we cannot possibly admit the position that the mandates commission should discuss schemes of ours while they are still in contemplation, or veto them while in progress.” 243 Mandates Registry Files, R2337,6a.19236.2705, Von During to Friis, 3 April 1930. See CPM 1096, Ruppel, 30 Oct. 1930. See also Mandates Section Files, S1660, extract from the Deutsche Kdamd-Zema% 1 March 1935, by Ruppel. This article was written after Ruppel left the PMC and Germany left the League. 245 The British created budget and debt figures for the British Gameroons and Togo to satisfy the PMC, but these were fictitious. The British calculated budgets and loan obligations for British Togo and the British Cameroons by calculating the ratio between the mandated territories’ populations and that of the Gold Coast and Nigeria. 246 CPM 942, Kastl, 4 Nov. 1929. 102

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. had little influence on the German colonial movement or impact in the Reich.247 On the

other hand, the Germans developed allies on the commission itself. William Rappard, a

dedicated internationalist, frequently echoed Kastl’s detailed questions about mandatory

administration.248 Undoubtedly, the major result of Germany’s entry was to intensify

France and Britain’s distrust of the commission. It also increased their inclination to

withhold information and cooperation from the PMC249

Closer Union and French Administrative Assimilation in the late 1920s- 1930s

Between 1926-1933 the most important questions in the B mandates involved

British or French attempts to attach them to neighboring colonies.250 In the formal

mandates, the mandatory powers were permitted to create administrative unions between

the B mandates and neighboring colonies, but they had to respect the mandate’s

24r CPM 1020, “Press Comments on the Recent Work of the Permanent Mandates Commission, the Council, and the Assembly, concerning mandates,” 20 May 1930. Extract from D erDeutsdx Weg (Cologne), 28 Nov. 1929. See also Mandates Section Files S251, “Article on the Work of the Mandates Commission,” extract from the D aasdx A llgpnxne ZaXitng (Berlin), by Kastl. Kasd wrote: “All the members of the Mandates Commission go about their tasks, and if the German member concerns himself particularly with the mission of keeping vigil that all the mandatory powers observe exacdy the provisions of the mandates, that is to say that they don’t take measure that could be interpreted as some sort of annexation, he will not encounter the opposition of the other members of the commission.” On the nature and strength of the interwar German colonial movement, see Wolfe Schmokel, Drears cfEnpae German Colonialism, 1919-1945 (New Haven, 1964), 14-15. The ease with which German sources could affect public opinion troubled the French, especially because the tendency in Geneva was “to subordinate the interests of the mandatory powers” to the question of admitting Germany to the League and giving it back some form of colonial power. AE, Serie SDN, Dossier 545, no number, Colonial Minister to MF, DAPCA, 26 Sep. 1925, and “Note sur les revendications coloniales allemandes, etat actuel de la question,” no number, no date (Autumn 1925). 248 For instance see CPM 790, Rappard, no date (1928), “Public Health in the Mandated Territories, Report on CPM 760, and CPM 883, Rappard, 2 July 1929, “Public Health in the mandated territories." See also Chapter 5. 249 See, for instance, CO 96/691/10,6541, Bonnecarrere to Governor of Gold Coast (Slater), No. 730,25 June 1929, and Slater to CO, 26 Oct. 1929, “Control of Migration between Togoland and the Gold Coast.” See also Chapter 5. 250 British Togo was governed as part of Gold Coast; the British Cameroons were governed as part of Nigeria. French Togo was initially separate, and then governed as part of Dahomey. Cameroun was governed separately. It is interesting to note that British Togo became part of present day Ghana, and that part of the British Cameroons are today part of Nigeria. 103

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. autonomy.251 Both France and Britain took advantage of this clause to link their m an d ate

more closely to adjacent colonies.252 This was a legal practice, but it posed a dilemma for

the PMC, namely, to what extent did administrative amalgamation mean annexation. A

customs union or joint health service might link the mandate to other imperial structures

for fiscal reasons and might be advantageous; however, a comprehensive constitutional

union between the mandate and a neighboring colony was also permitted under the

mandate. Britain, in fact, considered the latter between 1924-32 when it developed the

policy of “Qoser Union,” the creauon of a super-colony comprising Uganda, Kenya, and

Tanganyika. The French and British also attached their Togo mandates to colonies for

fiscal purposes. In all cases, however, the explicit or implicit aim of administrative

amalgamation was to retain the mandates within the structure of the larger colonial empire

forever. The cases of Tanganyika and Togo illustrate several of the conflicts between the

mandatory powers and the PMC, including the problematic terms of the mandates, the

tension between imperial interests and the mandates system, and the role of the German

PMC member.

Britain during this period debated linking Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda into a

larger “East African Federation” with a quasi-dominion status. Most of its draft plans

preserved the governors and administrations of the three territories, but created a High

Commissioner to streamline correspondence with the Colonial Office, coordinate

development policy, and oversee health, agricultural, and native policy.253 Few plans

251 In most B mandates Article 9. In Tanganyika, Article 10. 252 British Togo to Gold Coast, the British Gameroons to Nigeria, Tanganyika to Kenya and Uganda, and French Togo to French West Africa. 253 The FEgh Commissioner’s duties were necessarily vague, since few in parliament or in East Africa could agree on how much power he should exercise and what resources he should command. For Kenyans, the Figh Commissioner’s value would be in forcing open Tanganyika’s land markets and labor markets for 104

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. reconciled the different principles governing the mandate, the Uganda protectorate, and

the settler colony of Kenya. In 1924 the Colonial Office appointed an East Africa

Commission under Lord Southborough, which sent Ormsby-Gore to report on the

possibilities. The result was a recommendation for a “closer coordination of policy'’

among the three territories and administrative measures to link them economically,

without a formal union.254

In East Africa, there were both ardent supporters and detractors of Closer Union

with Tanganyika. The Governor and white settlers of Kenya supported it for several

reasons. They were excited by the possibility of new land for white setdement, and

welcomed a customs union that would subsidize their inefficient and poor-quality

agricultural production. Also, the railroad traffic of northern Tanganyika would add

valuable revenues to help pay for the chronically indebted Kenya-Uganda railroad. Not

surprisingly, the East African press, represented by the Kenyan paper East Africa,

supported the idea of federation.255 On the other side, Governor Cameron opposed

Closer Union as a threat to the mandate’s economic independence and the welfare of its

African inhabitants.256 In 1927, he rejected closer ties with Kenya at the annual East

Kenya’s benefit. For opponents of the scheme “native policy entailed the opposite policy - the preservation of the autonomy of the mandate. For one blueprint of the High Commissioner’s duties, see FO 371/14948, W6292/10/98, 0 0 to FO, 20 June 1930, “Statement of the Conclusions of HMG as regards closer union in East Africa for transmittal to the PMC" 254 References to this work were omitted by the British from the mandate reports (because of the commission’s statements encouraging European settlement), although the PMC was informed of Goser Union’s evolution later in the 1920s. See CO 691/77,18878, OAG (Scott) to CO, 2 April 1925, “Annual Report for 1924.” See also Callahan 159. 255 East Africa conducted a running critique of Cameron’s administration and prided itself on its relendess promotion of closer union and anti-German attitude: “East Africa is the only journal interested in tropical Africa which has persistendy exposed Germany aims and ambiuons concerning Tanganyika.” See CO 691/84, X4972, Cameron to CO, 14 May 1926, and CO 691/96/3, 29060, Cameron to OO, 23 Jan. 1928. 256 Cameron had the longest tenure of any British governor in Tanganyika, (1926-31) and it was his administration that most self-consciously defended the mandate idea. His successors attempted to remove many of his policies. 105

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. African governors’ conference and also warned the PMC that a future governor might

take a different view.257

The British “official mind” also supported Closer Union, largely for political

reasons.278 Colonial Secretary Amery favored Kenyan economic plans, but also wanted

Tanganyika to be a British territory, not a mandate containing thousands of Germans.259

In 1927, he formed a cabinet committee to formally consider Closer Union. The

committee, made up of Amery, Ormsby-Gore, and Sir Samuel Hoare (then Secretary of

State for Air), approved the formation of a new commission to go to Africa and study the

benefits of Qoser Union, because

The presence of [Germans] many of them setders assisted, it is understood, by German funds, has caused some uneasiness both in East Africa and here. In spite of repeated declarations by ministers, there is still anxiety in the public mind regarding the future of Tanganyika. The one step which would allay this anxiety and give the greatest possible measure

257 Minutes of the 15th session of the PMC (Autumn, 1927). See also PMCD 28-9. Cameron and Sir Edward Grigg, the governor of Kenya, were frequent adversaries. Cameron refused to accept that Goser Union was in Tanganyika’s interest. Grigg wanted to extend Kenya’s “white man’s territory.” Their dislike of one another extended to personal attacks. Later Governors Stewart Symes, Harold MacMichael, and Mark Young supported Qoser Union. See Chapter 4. 258 See above on Amer/s controversial speech at the 1926 East Africa dinner. Amery stated that Tanganyika was a permanent part of the British Empire, and that “the conception of East Africa was steadily growing, and it was growing not least because in East Africa people were beginning to get away from two fears which had haunted their minds since the war... there was a fear in the first place that there was something temporary and uncertain about our tenure of Tanganyika... the foundations of the East Africa of the Future was as sure and as permanent in Tanganyika as theyr were in any other East African Territory [cheers].” FO 371/11303 C7069/539/18, Extract from the Turn c f London, 12 June 1926. 259 It was thought that European setders could not survive in Africa except at high altitudes that conformed to European climacuc conditions. Tanganyika had a small amount of such land, much less than Kenya. Governor Grigg: “Still thinking of the mandate, if we were to exercise it to best advantage, it was necessary to think in terms of East Africa as a whole, and it was inevitable that sooner or later, unless British history belied itself, some share of responsibility for the mandate would pass to the Europeans on the spot. It was, therefore, desirable to make timely provision that any such delegation of responsibility should be on the right lines,” Le. white setders should govern the territory. Cameron responded: “Kenya is interested in Tanganyika because it is desired to make Tanganyika part of “a Great White State... Sir Edward Grigg has told me verbally that I shall destroy this “dream” if I persist in the present native policy in Tanganyika... * ibid. See also AE, Serie K, Dossier 5, French Consul at Zanzibar to MF, No. 2,12 Jan. 1928, detailing the plans for the Governor of Kenya to be High Commissioner of a Federauon made by the “Convenuon of the Association of British Planters,” a Kenyan organizauon. 106

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of security as regards the future, would be to implement Article 10 of the mandate for Tanganyika [the financial and administrative union clause].260

The Colonial Office’s reasoning was clear. Qoser Union would inspire confidence in

Tanganyika’s future as a British territory and create a proper atmosphere for business and

investment. Administrative union would also weld the territory firmly into the British

Empire, eliminating future debate about sovereignty, British tenure, or German revisionist

claims.

However, Amery obtained a favorable report on Qoser Union only after

successive efforts. The Hilton Young report, the initial report of the Colonial Office

committee on Qoser Union,, did not unequivocally support Tanganyika’s union with

Kenya. It approved of Cameron’s administrative policies and asserted that amalgamation

would threaten African prosperity, advocated only slow, experimental steps, and actually

deprecated the possibility of further white settlement in Tanganyika. Undaunted, Amery

sent Sir Samuel Wilson to East Africa to draft a more favorable report.261 Predictably,

Wilson’s report argued that Tanganyika needed white settlement and union with Kenya

and Uganda. East Africa noted that Wilson understood that Qoser Union would “ ensure

the continuance of British control of Tanganyika Territory.” The German press, on the

other hand, used the reports as evidence that Britain was attempting to sabotage the

mandate.202

Despite Amery’s persistence, Parliament never adopted Qoser Union as official

policy. After hearings in 1930-31, a parliamentary committee quashed the idea, deciding

260 CAB 27/349, EA 24 Series, Cabinet Committee on Policy in East Africa, Report. 261 On the Hilton Young Report, see Callahan 161-163. Wilson sought out settlers and interviewed pro- Qoser Union officials, downplaying Cameron’s previous objections that Qoser Union would compromise the financial and poliucal status quo of Tanganyika, and ignored the objections of the sizeable Indian population. 107

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. that the “time was not yet ripe for any far-reaching steps in the direction of political or

constitutional union.”263 On the surface, its objections were largely financial, because the

world depression made a High Commissioner’s administration a redundant and expensive

luxury. The committee based its decision on the Wilson and Hilton Young reports,

neither of which considered the mandate an obstacle to Qoser Union.264 However, some

in the Colonial and Foreign Offices worried that the implementation of Qoser Union

would inspire a strong reaction from the PMC and, certainly cause a full-blown German

propaganda campaign. Legal advisors in the Colonial Office even warned of a suit before

the international court at The Hague.265 These fears undoubtedly affected the committee’s

negative decision.

Even if official Qoser Union was officially dropped, the Colonial Office, after

1930, implemented a slow, unstated policy of accretion among the three East African

territories. Labor’s Colonial SecretaryJ.H. Thomas had tried to halt Amer/s colonial

policy because of the possible dominance of Kenyan settler interests in a future federation,

and many Labor MPs supported the mandates system.266 However, after the Labor

government fell in 1931, Unionist Colonial Minister Philip Cunliffe-Lister, a great

M 0 0 691/96/4, 29061, FO to 0 0 , 16 Feb. 1928. 263 The “Joint Select Committee of Parliament on Qoser Union in East Africa.” The committee’s report was filed in 1932. See also CPM 1335, Palacios, 29 Nov. 1932. 264 Callahan 164. 265 Callahan 177-185. Callahan presents this episode as a victory for the Mandates System, but this interpretation does not take into account the later actions of the British administrations in Tanganyika and the Colonial Office. Several measures already laid the groundwork for Qoser Union by 1932, including postal service amalgamation and the Kenya-Uganda-Tanganyika customs union. The Labor department of Tanganyika, which protected African laborers from Kenyan-style exploitation, was abolished by Governor Symes in 1931, also paving the way for the introduction of Kenyan labor regulations (a measure contemplated, but never taken). See Chapters 4 and 5. 266 Mandates Section Files, S249, PMC distribution, 1927-28, Excerpt from House of Commons debate, 19 July 1927. 108

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. supporter of Amery, encouraged amalgamation by whatever policies appeared expedient

during the world depression.

As a rhetorical device, Cunliffe-Lister, Amery, and the Kenyan press used the

language of economic development to support unofficial union. Amery had approved the

governors’ conferences, customs union, and postal union ostensibly to encourage

efficiency. Thus, his successor and the other advocates of Qoser Union pressed for

further “efficiency’ in customs, railways, and white settlement. In addition they discussed

union in terms of “cooperation” and “partnership.” In 1934, Cunliffe-Lister stated that

“Historical circumstances and conditions have inextricably linked together the fortunes of

these [East African] territories. Their needs call for the closest cooperation, and I am glad

to say that that cooperation today exists to the full in spirit and in action... This

cooperation does not mean that one territory is to sacrifice its interest to another. It

means they will take the broad view, that there shall be a fair measure of give and take as

between partners who know that their fortunes now and forever are indissolubly

linked.”267 The “indissoluble link” between the two territories betrayed the true intention

of Cunliffe-Lister’s policy, the opening of the mandate to Kenyan settlers after ensuring it

was irrevocably British. The governors after Cameron used the same motifs, and added a

strategic component to the rhetoric as war approached.268

Many saw through this rhetorical disguise for white interests, and warned the PMC

accordingly. During the parliamentary debate on Qoser Union, Cameron wrote to Lord

267 Mandates Section Files, S1649, PMC distribution 1934-35, Tanganyika 1934. Extract from East Africa, 3 May 1934, Cunliffe-Lister at the “East African Luncheon." 268 At the St. George’s Society dinner in Arusha, Governor Harold MacMichael asking the audience, “on the question of the transfer of the mandate, to believe in the British government’s sanity, even if it doubted its good faith.” Strategically, he argued, the mandate could never be transferred, even if the government was

109

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Passfield, who forwarded his views to the League.269 Cameron used the mandate to

defend Tanganyika’s autonomy: “[A High Commissioner] must have the effect of

diverting funds which should be expended in the territory itself on medical, educational,

and other social services ”270 The French consuls in East Africa also noted that the

question of federation “has taken on a radical aspect for Africans, and all those of color

are against it because they see in it the extension to all East African territories of Kenyan

policy; fertile and healthy land reserved for whites, the rest for blacks.”271

The German colonial community, led by Schnee, also pounced on Qoser Union as

an attack on the mandates system by the new trustees of German territory.272 Schnee’s

KcUmtle Reidxarbdis^nwTsdx^i (KRAGS) reinforced the PMCs fears about the benefits of

Qoser Union by pointing out how difficult it would be to maintain Tanganyika’s

autonomy if its policies were determined in Nairobi and Mombassa.273 The German

government even presented a semi-official objection to the British, which the British

found “a legitimate criticism,” although they relied on Article 10 of the Tanganyika

Mandate to give them the unrestricted freedom to override any complaints.274

not willing to allay the fears of white settlers by defying Article 22. Mandates Section Files, S1662, PMC distribution, 1936, Extract from the Tims cf London, 6 Aug. 1936. 269 Passfield was Colonial Secretary in the second Labor government. 27c Mandates Registry Files, R4082,6a722.722, Cameron to CO, 5 July 1930. 271 AE, Serie K, Dossier 5, No. 5, French Consul at Zanzibar to MF, 15 March 1928. 272 For example see FO 371/12907, C1069/1069/18, British Consul to Berlin (Sir R. Lindsay) to FO, 6 Feb. 1928. 273 At least one member, Dannevig, agreed with the outline of the German protests in letters to Catastini, since Tanganyika’s autonomy would be compromised. Schnee's KRAGS organization stated that German rights were being brushed aside by the British and the “strong movement of the German people against the union of the East African Mandate with the adjacent British colonies.” It also maintained that Article 10 of the mandate was incompatible with Article 22 of the Covenant, because any union would be “insoluble” and therefore violated the mandate principle. See Mandates Registry Files, R2312,6a.21123.551 and 6a.l 194.722,24 Jan. 1931. 274 The German aide-memoire noted that “The far-reaching executive and legislative powers of the High Commissioner and his council, which extend directly and indirectly to the most important branches of economic life and administration as well as to questions of policy regarding natives and other matters would abrogate or considerably limit the administrative status which was accorded to the territory by Article 22... 110

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Qoser Union was the most oven attempt by one of the mandatory powers to

amalgamate a mandate into its colonial empire.275 However, the PMC approached Qoser

Union cautiously because it did not want to impinge on British administrative authority.276

It therefore withheld comment until British policy was defined over a period of several

years. Nevertheless, the PMC scrutinized both the official attempts at Qoser Union and

the later, unofficial policies encouraging the “indissoluble” connection between

Tanganyika and Kenya.

The PMC was inhibited by the fact that Qoser Union was a largely covert

operation. While neither appointing a High Commissioner nor unifying the rail systems,

Britain took a series of smaller steps. Thus, Leopoldo Palacios, in viewing the

parliamentary committee’s statement that the “time was not yet ripe for any far-reaching

steps in the direction of political or constitutional union,” warned that the time “may yet

become ripe. Indeed, it is already ripe for less far-reaching steps.” He also complained

The German government also doubt whether it is possible to realise the intention, announced in [the British] government’s statement, of advancing the interests of the population of the three territories [over their own.]” The British responded in minutes that “the wording of Article 22... is not... quite so explicit as the Germans maintain... it is however doubdess true that if the scheme comes into effect there will be a tendency' for Tanganyika to come both in administrative and constitutional matters more and more into line with other territories, with the consequent result that it will more and more imbibe English ideas and become less inclined towards Germany in the event of that country ever endeavoring to recover possession of it.” The British had no illusions about the true aims of German objections. FO 371/14948, W9126/10/98, German charge d’affaires to FO, 4 Sep. 1930. See also Callahan 173. 275 A Edho Ekoko, “The British Attitude Towards Germany’s Colonial Irredentism in Africa in the Interwar Years.” Journal

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. that there was only a fine distinction between “Qoser Union,” which was difficult to

reconcile with the mandate, and “closer cooperation,” which was already taking place.277

Although other members felt the same way the commission did not condemn

Qoser Union. Some, like Rappard, worried that union might succeed despite League

supervision: “closer cooperation and coordination are being pursued in an increasing

degree by a more adequate organization, the action of which might lead by imperceptible

stages to the complete realization of the project.”278 Moreover, the British, French, and

Belgian members all insisted that administrative amalgamation was compatible with Article

22 and disagreed with Rappard.279 The PMCs internal debate also centered on the

possibility of unofficial union. In an internal memo, a majority of the commission

opposed an East African governors’ conference with decision-making power and hoped

that “all measures that would tend toward Qoser Union would be avoided.” A minority

composed of Van Rees, and the British, French, and Belgian members, Lugard, Martial

Merlin, and Orts, rejected this draft. They complained that asking the mandatory powers

to avoid unofficial union “seems to throw doubt upon the exercise of the rights given to

the mandatory power under Article 10 of the mandate,” and that the majority had

disrespectfully inferred that “the mandatory power would ... be capable of enforcing by

circuitous methods a decision which it has formally promised not to put into effect.”280

Despite the minority’s objections, the PMC was only echoing a debate that had already

277 CPM 1122, Palacios, 15 Nov. 1930, “Scheme for Qoser Administrative Union... (confidential),” CPM 1287, Palacios, 26 April 1932, and Q JM 1335, Palacios, 29 Nov. 1932. 278 ibid. m See FO 371/17378, W9202/45/98, Catastini to FO, 4 Aug. 1933, Minutes by Ashley Qarke. See also the minutes of the 23 rd session of the PMC (1932). :sc Minutes of the 23rd session. See also Mandates Registry Files, R4086, Tanganyika Territory, LON document 6a.4139.722, “Question of a Qoser Customs and Fiscal Union." 112

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. taken place in the League Assembly’s 6th Committee, where the majority had confronted

the French and British on the same issue.281

The official Qoser Union debate ended in 1932, but the process of gradual

amalgamation in Tanganyika did not. Indeed, it became easier after 1933, when

Germany’s departure from the League ended its formal protests. As long as the economic

crisis of the depression lasted, amalgamation in East Africa could not proceed. However,

it is probable that the British would have pursued Qoser Union after the depression if

World War II had not intervened.

There were other unofficial “closer union” schemes. In the late 1920s, in British

Togo, the Gold Coast government began to create larger, artificial tribal divisions to ease

administrative costs and link the territories to adjacent districts in the Gold Coast. 11115

process upset the German member of the PMQ especially when the British produced

maps depicting “closer union” through “indirect rule.”282 Ruppel protested mildly, but “so

far as he was concerned that ended the matter.”283 After 1933, there were no major

complaints, although “certain members of the Commission are very jealous of what seems

to them something in the nature of a fa it accompli.”2**

281 FO 371/14110, W9349/49/98, Lord Cecil to FO, 23 Sep. 1929. The French Assembly member rejected the idea that union violated the “temporary nature of the mandates: “As far as any human instrument could be described as permanent, this could be said of the B and C mandates.” 282 GO 724/7, 7267, Governor of Gold Coast to CO, April 1932. See also, on the process of amalgamation, CO 96/716/9,21721, Governor of Gold Coast to CO, 1 May 1934. This file contains the comments of Hugh Thomas, the Gold Coast Secretary for Native Affairs, who wrote to the CO that “the Commission, though glad of the assurance that the unifications of the tribes in the Northern Section [of Togo] was not in any way jeopardizing the territorial integrity of the Mandate, would be glad of further information... ’ 283 ibid. 284 Comments by Cardinall, the Accredited Representative for Togo. See CO 96/709/16,17,1696, OAG of Gold Coast (Northcote) to CO, 29 April 1933 and 31 Oct. 1933. See also LONMR for British Togo, 1932, which detailed some of the resistance to administrative amalgamation. CardinalTs comments are quite detailed, and note contradictions and problems in the report that “M. Ruppel’s absence alone I feel certain prevented notice being taken of.” 113

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. During the depression, the French attempted to join French Togo to neighboring

Dahomey, ostensibly to cut costs. In 1934 the lieutenant governor of Dahomey became

commissaire of Togo, joining Togo to its neighbor, although the new joint official

delegated most responsibilities to the existing bureaucracy at Lome.*85 In 1935, the French

joined several other administrative posts, such as the police, health services, and the

railroads, to their counterparts in Dahomey and AOF, and also made it obligatory for the

mandates to contribute funds to the Colonial Ministry.286 In an effort to stave off criticism

from the PMC, Paris instructed its officials in Togo to avoid revealing the extent of the

merger.287 Only the existence of the mandate prevented the complete union of the two

territories.*

The PMC was helpless to halt these administrative unions, which were built into

the mandate structure. Article 10 was laced with ambiguity that allowed both sides to

contest its meaning. When the PMC asked for specifics, the mandatory powers upheld

administrative amalgamation as their right. Virtually all their methods were legal, despite

the fact that they undermined the mandates’ autonomy and merged them with

neighboring colonies. Qoser Union eroded the PMCs supervisory influence, but the

mandatory powers were prepared to defend their ability to institute whatever policies they

wished to facilitate amalgamation. Belgium, in the 1930s, called on France and Britain to

285 Mandates Section files, S1660, French Togo, 1935. D eoa of 9 Dec. 1934. 286 D eoa of 30 Oct. 1935, journal Cffiaddu Togo, 16 Dec. 35,579. See also Mandates Section Files, S1617, French Togo, 1921-38. See also ANSOM, FM 66, Carton 607, dossier 3, A rrae of 26 Apr. 1935, and dossier 4, no number, MF (Marius Moutet) to Governor General of AOF, Deoa of 19 Sep. 1936. 287 ANSOM, FM 66, Carton 607, dossier 4, No. 100, Commissaire of Togo to MC, DAP, 26 Jan. 1935. “L’essentiel de vos observations tient en ceci qu’il ne faut pas donner a penser a l’opinion internationale et a la Commission des Mandats que le Togo se trouve pratiquement rattache au Dahomey.” 288 ANSOM, FM 66, Carton 607, dossier 4, no number, Ligue Frangaise pour la Defense des Droits de l’Homme et du Gtoyen to MC, 25 Nov. 1936. This petition demanded the restoration of French Togo’s autonomy through the removal of the decrees linking it to Dahomey, which the government refused. The

114

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. coordinate a defense of their policies in the B mandates, specifically administrative unions,

including customs unions, unified immigration regulations, and other arrangements with

neighboring colonies. In the event of PMC criticism, the mandatory powers would defend

unions together.289

Conclusion: National Sovereignty vs. League Supervision

Germany’s exit from the PMQ along with by the departures of the Japanese

(1933) and Italian (1936) members, did not end the work of the commission, but its

smaller membership gave the mandatory powers greater influence, and the conflicts that

characterized the pre-1933 period diminished in significance. The overall activity of the

commission declined as well. Fewer documents were produced and fewer petitions were

considered. With much of the PMCs time consumed by Palestine and Syria, the B

mandates became a secondary priority for the commission.290

There were other reasons for the declining activity of the shrunken PMC in the

1930s. Because of the budget crisis during the Great Depression, the PMC abandoned

one of its yearly sessions in 1933. Moreover, many of its most dedicated members had

died, and their replacements were less energetic. Orts, the only surviving original member,

replaced Theodoli as president in 1936. This put the mandatory powers in charge of the

mandate did not protect French Togo’s autonomy in the 1930s, but it did keep French Togo from becoming a permanent part of AOF. 289 FO 371/17378, W?202/45/98, and WJ205/45/98, Belgian Embassy (Prince de Ligne) to FO, 8 Aug. 1933. 290 This is true of the B mandates, but the commission in the 1930s dealt with contentious issues in the A and C mandates, including the continuing, and expanding, troubles in Palestine and Syria, as well as the South African attempt to assert formal sovereignty over Southwest Africa. 115

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. PMCs agenda.*91 In 1934 Martial Merlin died and Paris appointed first Francois

Manceron, (1935-37), a Foreign Ministry diplomat who knew little of colonial policy, and

then a colonial bureaucrat Henri Giraud, (1937-39) to defend their interests.292 The British

appointed the well-qualified Sir William Hailey in 1936, but replaced him in the PMCs last

sessions with Sir Maurice Hankey, a seasoned member of the British government who had

virtually no colonial experience. Neither Hailey nor Hankey possessed the dedication or

experience of an Ormsby-Gore or a Lugard. The older commission members, the Baron

Van Asbeck of the Netherlands, Palacios of Spain, and Penha-Garcia of Portugal,

generally supported the mandatory powers. Only Rappard and Dannevig remained

defenders of the League.293

In the 1930s the PMC also became less relevant to the question of treaty revision

and German colonial claims because Germany no longer looked to the League. Hitler,

who was indifferent to colonial expansion but saw the propaganda opportunities of

agitation, changed the tenor and focus of colonial propaganda. German colonialists no

longer defended the mandates, but helped subsidize German settlements in Tanganyika

and Cameroun. Germany’s previous arguments for revision based on moral and legal

grounds vanished; now the Reich demanded colonies because of economic necessity.

Some propagandists even argued that since the mandates had been stripped from

Germany, the mandatory powers had only temporary rights; if the mandates ended, these

2vl When Italy, Germany, and Japan abandoned the PMC the commission was left with British, French, Belgian, Dutch, Norwegian, Spanish, Portuguese, Swiss, and International Labor Organization members. 292 Giraud was a colonial official who had worked in the Congo and Cameroun during the war, but the French did not believe he was of as high quality as previous members; Marius Moutet wanted an expert on Syria and Lebanon. See AE, Serie SDN, Dossier 556, No. 301, Ambassador to Brussels (Jules LaRoche) to MF (Yvon Delbos), 22 April 1937. When Manceron died Orts wrote to the French government pleading for a strong French presence on the Commission to prevent the idealists from becoming a stronger voice. 293 See Chapter 5. Rappard and Dannevig were increasingly marginalized by the late 1930s. 116

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. territories would revert to Germany/94 The Nazi government soon linked the colonies to

their price of peace. Far from utilizing legal arguments to retain access to the mandates,

the Germans virtually claimed their former colonies outright. In discussions of colonial

appeasement among France, Britain, and Germany, the League was no longer relevant.295

Some analysts of the PMC have concluded that it was very effective at guiding the

mandatory powers toward a more enlightened imperialism. However, a study of the entire

interwar period reveals a much more equivocal record, particularly on the critical questions

of sovereignty and public accountability. The PMC attempted to defend the principles of

Article 22, extend its influence as far as possible, and prevent the mandates from

becoming colonies in all but name. But the commission was hamstrung by the mandatory

powers, which succeeded over time in limiting the practical extent of the its authority.

This eroded the basis of the mandates system. The mandatory powers often refused to

cooperate with the PMC, driven by fears of scandal, irritation with what they saw as thinly

disguised attempts to embarrass them, or disdain for the distinction between a mandate

and a colony. German participation on the PMC, seen in this light, was both valuable in

extending the effective reach of the PMC, but also encouraged the mandatory powers to

resist the it as much as possible.

294 AE, Serie SDN, Dossier 547, Ambassador to Germany (Andre Francois-PoncetJ to MF, 9 Nov. 1937. As the French noted, this was incorrect under any interpretation, but also symbolized the abandonment of the German claim that sovereignty lay with the League. 295 See Andrew Crazier, Appeasarat and Gemwty’s L ast Bid fi r Colonies, (Londoa-1988), 130.

117

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DEVELOPING THE MANDATES, 1920-1939

In die territories under Gass B mandates there live African populations of varying degrees of development, from the primitive and almost savage character to the most highly developed negro elements, amounting in all to between twelve and thirteen millions. The aim of the Mandatory system is to secure disinterested and progressive colonial administration by experienced European powers of the more backward races. Successful conduct of such an experiment may have far reaching influences upon the character of European administration throughout Africa, and the whole world will watch with interest what is, and can be done by the application of the spirit and letter of Article 22 to this great and growing problem.

Wiliam Ormsby-Gore, MP, British member of the PMC, 1922296

It is stated in the Report [of the 1924 East Africa Commission], with reference to Tanganyika Territory, that since this is a ‘mandated’ area, “Great Britain has a special responsibility before the world for ensuring its good government and development-” It will, however, be generally agreed that the responsibility which we owe to our own imperial traditions, public professions and sense of duty is not less weighty and exacting than the obligations arising out of international engagements.

J. H. Oldham, “A Note on the Report of the East Africa Commission”297

Any assessment of the influence of the mandates system on imperialism must

include an account of how the powers administered their mandates and how the PMC

attempted to superrise and influence that administration. This chapter analyzes the

economic development and fiscal administration of the B mandates. Like the previous

296 Mandates Section Files, S262, Generalities, from “The Mandatory Systems,” by Ormsby-Gore. 297 Mandates Registry'Files,R40, LON document 1.44130.15313,25 Nov. 1925. Oldham was a missionary and supporter of the British Empire. 118

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. chapters, it also examines the fundamental difficulties of international supervision as a

guide for, or a brake on, colonial policymaking.

Chapter 3 underlined the difficulty of reconciling the PMCs concerns over

sovereignty-with the exercise of authority by the mandatory powers. In examining the

yearly reports and interrogating the accredited representatives, the PMC not only

investigated signs of political integration. It also asked for specific information on

education, labor practices, and social policies, all of which were vital to the “material and

moral well-being” of the African population. It scrutinized this legislation and policy in

the mandates as closely as it could to prevent the mandates from becoming disguised

colonies.

The mandates may have been politically distinct, and members of the League able

to trade there because of the economic-equality clauses in the mandate treaties, but they

still functioned as colonial economies. The colonial economy did not operate as a normal

market economy, but was subject to many distortions. Both European landowners and

the colonial state collaborated in creating a readily manageable, regulated economy.

Colonial governments had to balance two competing tendencies. They had to attract

private and public investment for growth and development, which entailed subsidies, tax

abatements, guarantees of affordable property, and low wages paid to African labor, but

also had to generate enough tax revenue to attract investors, or to pay for projects if

investments were not forthcoming. Colonial governments frequently enacted policies that

controlled supply and demand. Their aim was to provide abundant primary commodities

for European consumption at the lowest possible price so they could be readily sold on

119

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the world market."198 At the same time, this production had to be profitable to encourage

additional investment and enough tax revenue for budget surpluses.

The most important limit on economic growth in the mandates was investment

capital. Although French and British methods of financing development were different,

both relied heavily on capital development to open the interior and stimulate production.

Investment was critical for development, and the mandates, like other African territories,

did not possess large amounts of free capital nor did they produce goods that brought a

high return on the world market. As primary producers, they were direcdyand indirecdy

dependent on the international prices of cotton, cocoa, rubber, sisal, coffee, and vegetable

oils for their revenue; income levels, customs dudes, direct taxes on income, and indirect

taxes such as sales taxes, all depended on these agricultural prices. Increasing the value of

production by opening new land, improving farming methods, and increasing quality was

expensive, and faced with comperirion from Latin America, the United States, and the rest

of the colonial world, Africa provided a very limited oudet for private investment capital.

Both the French and British mandates had therefore to rely on their own resources and

the capital funds provided by the metropoles.

The relarionship between the French and British on one side, and the League on

the other, was not defined solely by strategic and political considerations. Economic

development, or the French rriseenvdeur, was the focus of many of the important policies

implemented by both administrations. The two mandatory powers took care to present

economic development in their mandates as steady and successful. Public opinion and the

298 Primary products are typically agricultural or mineral; in the mandates, the most important primary products were foodstuffs like cocoa and coffee, fibers, like cotton and sisal, and raw materials for industry, such as gold. 120

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. PMC sought to eradicate all the pre-war colonial abuses. The mandatory powers feared

that failed experiments or policy compromises would be construed as violations of the

mandate and cause scandals and embarrassment. In their reports, they used production

statistics and the lengthening of railroad tracks as measures of economic development.

This was especially clear during the Great Depression, when the pace of economic

“progress” in social services slowed and budgetary deflation became a higher priority than

the general welfare of the inhabitants.

Because the PMC and the mandatory powers differed over the goal of fostering

“development,” the League’s supervision over economic policy was contentious. Some

PMC members believed that policies that steadily increased the prosperity of the local

population and supported their interests in areas such as, schools, labor, and public health

took priority over the wishes of the mandatory powers. Others felt they were not

competent to criticize the mandatory powers’ fiscal and financial policies.299 Above all, the

PMCs dependence on information from the mandatory powers inhibited any detailed

examination of their specific development policies.

In general, the PMC was committed to economic development as a first step

towards independence. On the other hand, the British and French intended to link their

mandates with their larger imperial economies. Even under Britain’s indirect rule or

France’s association policies, the primary focus of development was to create an African

agricultural workforce, rather than ensuring local prosperity. In Tanganyika, for instance,

there were intense debates between the white setders and the territorial government over

whether Africans or Europeans should be the beneficiaries of development, while the

299 For the basis of this debate, see Chapter 3. 121

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. French mandatory governments used the new rail routes, roads, docks, and telegraph lines

they built to support plantation agriculture.300

The PMCs ability to regulate economic development was problematic because of

the inherent complexity of the issue and the impediments the mandatory powers placed

before it. First, because the mandate arrangements and the goals of development in

Article 22 were ambiguous, there was considerable room for different interpretations of

the population’s interests. Economic development was also a highly technical part of

colonial administration, in which long-term policies and short-term risks created

consequences that were difficult to predict. The mandate reports and statistical data

provided to the commission only provided periodic glimpses of the mandate economies.

The mandatory powers, if anything, increased the complexity of the PMCs task. They had

their own established methods of development and their own priorities. French and

British officials considered their collaboration with the PMC troublesome and

unnecessary. Even administrators sympathetic to the PMC often saw it not as a partner,

but as a potential adversary whose concerns needed smoothing over.301 Further, in all of

the B mandates the mandatory powers regulated production and trade according to then-

own interests, often with the justification that such policies were in the general interest of

the mandate. Finally, white settlers in Tanganyika and Kenya drove development away

from African and toward European development.

The most important single event that crippled the mandates system in Africa was

the world depression. Caught by the global trade contraction with enormous debts,

300 On the French, see Mandates Section Files, S241, PMC distribution May 1925, memorandum by Sarraut, 19 June 1921. On the British, see Mandates Section Files, S246, PMC distribution 1925, copy of memo to the Colonial Office from Col. GN. French, Assistant Director of the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation, Nov. 1925. 122

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. unprofitable production, and an expensive edifice of social services, the B mandate

governments reduced economic development and channeled it toward the benefit of the

home countries, although the economic and social effects were often disastrous. The

PMCs own budgetary contraction crippled its ability to scrutinize these policies and

provide adequate supervision.

At least one previous assessment of the mandates system has concluded that the

PMC was able to alter the theory and practice of imperialism.302 This chapter

demonstrates that this was not the case. The PMC served as an obstacle to such blatandy

annexationist policies as Qoser Union or to the amalgamation of French Togo into

French West Africa (AOF); and some officials, including Governors Horace Byatt and

Donald Cameron in Tanganyika, used the mandate provisions to protect their budgets and

development policies. But the PMCs influence was limited and inconsistent. The

mandatory powers were able to exploit the League’s weaknesses and blunt the functioning

of its supervisory system They designed their economic development policies in the B

mandates to link them directly and irrevocably to the metropoles and their larger colonial

empires. Whenever possible, they ignored or resisted the PMCs requests for

supplementary information, leaving Geneva of plans, projects, and outcomes.303

mi Callahan 100,138. 302 Callahan discusses the “merging’’ of the British imperial idea and the principles of the mandates system, for instance. Callahan 100. 3°3 The French aorrrrissams of the mandates, particularly Theodore Marchand and Auguste Bonnecarrere, were partners, or at least aware, that this was the policy of the Colonial Ministry. In the British mandates of Togo and the Cameroons, the policy was more or less explicit because the mandated territories were governed as parts of the Gold Coast Colony and Nigeria, respectively. In Tanganyika, the first two governors were dedicated to the policy that the territory should be “black man’s country,” Le. developed in the interests of Africans. Later governors under Conservative Colonial Secretaries Leo Amery and Philip Cunliffe-Lister did not share this sentiment and were hostile to the PMC 123

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Part I: The Goals and Mechanisms of Economic Development

Trade with the metropolitan country and the European market was vital for each

of the mandates. In Tanganyika, economic growth depended on the prices of coffee,

cotton, and sisal, all of which affected railroad receipts, African tax revenue, and customs

revenue. British Togo depended on cocoa, which commanded high prices during much of

the interwar period and was exported to Europe either through Palime in French Togo or

later through the Gold Coast. Cameroun and French Togo produced many of the same

products, which it exported to France, Britain, and Germany. Both the British and French

attempted to channel the mandates’ production to the metropole through the use of one

sided preference schemes (goods from the mandates entered Britain or France with low

duties).304 This often helped the mandates find markets and ensured the metropoles

another source of raw materials. It also limited competition and encouraged violations of

the economic-equality provisions of the mandates.

With trade in primary products critical to all of the B mandates, efficient

production at a low cost was absolutely vitaL Cheap transportation was the great

bottleneck for most plantations: most of the cost of getting agricultural products to

market from Africa was due to wastage and the high cost of transport. Private firms or

individuals ran most plantations, but successful European development on a large scale

was absent in the B mandates.305 Very little private investment flowed into the mandates

after the war for infrastructure development, even during the expansive 1920.

304 For French goals, see ANSOM, FM 66, Carton 1038, no dossier, no number, Bonnecarrere to MC, DAPCA, 14 June 1922, “Commerce avec l’Allemagne.” See also ANSOM FM 66, Carton 2706, Dossier 3. 305 For instance, there were no successful schemes to setde whites in the B mandates. 124

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The budgetary situation in each of the B mandates limited their resources for

economic development. Each was in a different financial position. The French mandates

were fiscally stable. In Cameroun revenue grew from 16 million francs in 1920 to 37

million in 1925, and after the 1926 depreciation from 66 million francs in 1927 to 95

million in 1931.306 Expenditure reached 28 million francs in 1925, sixty million in 1927,

and 95 million in 1931. The result was a large yearly surplus in the decade before the

depression that could be applied to development expenses. French Togo already had a

German rail line, but its small size limited the number of development projects it could

accommodate. Like Cameroun, it ran large surpluses until 1932, with an average revenue

of 33 million francs from 1925-30, against an expenditure that grew from 16.5 million in

1925 to 30 million in 1928.307

The British mandates were in a very different financial situarion. British Togo had

no budget independent of Gold Coast. Tanganyika was commonly assumed to be the

wealthiest and most valuable of the B mandates. However, even in its best years

Tanganyika ran only small surpluses. Its budget was balanced for the first time in the

1926-7 fiscal year, and revenue reached its highest point in 1928-9, nearly 2 million

pounds.308 The territory suffered from constant railroad deficits and growing debt service.

Its fiscal situation meant that it was the mandate hit hardest by the world depression

between 1929-1939.

Tanganyika’s financial instability caused its governors to look to London to

provide funds for development. However, the British Treasury refused point-blank to

306 95 million old francs would be worth roughly 545,000,000 today. 107 Roughly 513,000,000 today. 30!l £2,000,000 would be worth about £82,000,000 today, or roughly 5120,000,000. 125

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. consider covering Tanganyika’s persistent early 1920s deficits with grants, but charged

Tanganyika interest on “loans-in-aid.” In 1921 the first such loan was for an enormous

£750,OOC.’09 Since Tanganyika ran fairly consistent budgetary deficits, the precedent that it

had to payback such “in-aid” loans was significant. By 1927 Tanganyika was liable for just

over £3 million, of which £2 million carried immediate interest. By the tune the world

depression deepened in colonial Africa, Tanganyika was paying nearly £450,000 yearlyto

the Exchequer, approximately 20% of its yearly revenues.310 The Treasury demanded as

early as 1923 that Tanganyika begin immediate payments of interest and sinking fund

(amortization payments) on these funds. The Colonial Office resisted: The Duke of

Devonshire, then Colonial Secretary, demanded that the Treasury delay financing

Tanganyika’s debt until it was on firmer financial ground.311

The development of infrastructure and agriculture were the two main loci of

government activity in the B mandates. In the British case, the proceeds of government-

guaranteed loans typically financed development projects. The periodic “loans-in-aid”

covered budget deficits and provided some funds for extraordinary expenditures on

development projects. More productively, Tanganyika, the Gold Coast, and Nigeria could

partake of periodic development loans guaranteed by the British government for larger

projects. Tanganyika, for instance, received a portion of the £ 10 million East African

Transport Loan in the 1920s. These guaranteed loans typically had interest rates of 4.5-

309 OO 691/44,25781, Byatt to CO, 23 May 1921, “Estimates, 1921-2.” Tanganyika also applied for loans from the Treasury, as did many colonies, for projects that would relieve British unemployment, a form of public works spending financed by the government. 310 In any given year only about £ 135,000 of this amount was paid through the ordinary revenue of the territory. About £300,000 was shouldered by the railroad in a separate budget. By an arrangement with the Treasury in 1926, £2.1 million of the £3.1 million in debts to the Exchequer were repayable at 5% interest (this was the £135,000 yearly debt service), the remainder, about £1 million, would become repayable in 1933. See CD 691/84, X3200, Treasury'to OO, 1 April, 1926.

126

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5.5% and repayment was deferred for a number of years. Along with the loans from the

Treasury to cover deficits, however, the cumulative effect was a heavy load of debt.312

France did not possess the same financial resources the British commanded, and

until the 1930s it financed development in its mandates with local resources, as it did in its

colonies. The French mandates paid for public works from their individual caisses de reserte

[reserve banks]. These funds came from surpluses from the atpitaticn [poll tax] and the

occasional cash payments of the pm tadon [labor tax]. Funds could also be obtained from

other territories, as was the case in 1926, when French Togo loaned five million francs to

Cameroun. In both Cameroun and Togo the caisses were a valuable method of financing

development projects, and in the boom years of the 1920s they grew rapidly.313

Neither method of raising capital was ideal. The British method earmarked future

revenues for interest payments. The French method of using the cause essentially provided

money for development by creating capital from the revenues of the territories. This

limited the debt service of the French mandates, but by providing funds for development

out of the limited budgets of the mandated territories themselves, the French “squeezed

out” funds for other spending. The French methods also caused frequent protests by

African communities against the capitation and the hugely unpopular prestation. However,

France had few other sources of capital. Although its tight fiscal policy prevented rapid

growth in its territories, most colonial governments, in the years before Keynesian

311 OO 691/66,20746, OO to Treasury, 25 April 1923. '1J J. Morgan, The Official History t f Colonial Deidapmen (London, 1980) 56. 313 At its height, the otisse of French Togo contained 32 million francs, 19 million in cash and 12 million in annuities. The level of the otisse is an excellent indicator of the e ffe c t o f the depression on French budgets. See below. 127

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. economic theory, believed in balanced budgets and steady surpluses, and feared deficit

spending.314 This limited their range of finance options.

Land and Infrastructure Investment: The Basis of Development

Tanganyika

Tanganyika’s economic development policy was constrained primarily by finance,

and second by white setdement. Many of its few thousand European setders believed that

development should channel capital toward vasdy expanded white setdement, with

Africans providing the labor force for white plantations, and toward the eventual creation

of an East African Federation. However, the first governors, Horace Byatt (1920-24) and

Donald Cameron (1925-31) not only refused to favor exclusive white development but

also encouraged African production alongside European plantations. Both governors

attempted to fulfill the “dual mandate,” but neither supported one form of development

over the other.

Economically, African production was a practical option for several reasons. A

large number of small African farms were potentially more profitable than European

plantations, in part because labor migration from the interior to coastal plantations was

cosdy, time-consuming, and reduced the farming population.315 Large parts of Tanganyika

were thinly inhabited, and a considerable part of the population was pastoral or nomadic.

Drawing off a significant part of this population toward the plantations of Arusha, Moshi,

314 Instead of being used for current spending, which would have inflated the economy, surpluses were paid into the aasse, limiting economic growth rates. 315 Plantation agriculture was limited by the local labor supply and weather. Independent African producers were often more adaptable to weather conditions and market forces. 128

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the Eastern Coast between Morogoro and Dar-es-Salaam, and Tanga strained food

production in the plantation areas and separated laborers from their families and even

familiar ethnic groups for years at a time. The British administrations in Africa had

experience with this in Nyasaland, Kenya, and the Rhodesias, and the effect on the

population, and African production, could be severe.316

Additionally, Byatt and Cameron were both wary of the motives of Tanganyika’s

European population. Settlers and their supporters proposed settlement schemes

involving grandiose plans for rail lines, private monopolies, and sprawling white-owned

farms, but the first two governors remained adamant that the mandate not be transformed

into a second Kenya.317 To limit white settlement, Cameron decreed land legislation that

forbade large-scale land alienation, allowed leases only for land not claimed by Africans

and only by government auction, and established a broad interpretation of what

constituted “native” land.318

White settlers and their supporters in Parliament vehemendy protested the land

law and Cameron’s support for African production.319 Supporters of white setdement

ignored the mandate, particularly the idea that the territory was in essence an African

territory. The European Association of Tanganyika and newspapers such as East Africa

and the East African Standard, both published in Kenya, demanded extensive short-term

316 For a detailed examination of labor policy see Chapter 5. 317 See OO 691/45, 36393, Byatt to OO, 19 June 1921, proposal of Messrs. Close Bros., and OO 691/53, 8988, Qose Bros. Ltd. to OO, 23 Feb. 1921. Charles Strachey wrote of the Close Bros, proposal that “It is based upon several fallacies - one is that the land belongs to us to dispose of as we will. Another is that we are so anxious to get the district in question “developed” that we are prepared to shut our eyes and give away large areas and powers for nothing at all except the prospect of “development” by these people who may or may not be qualified for that purpose." For a later attempt, in which a committee of Europeans proposed that a £ 1 million loan from the Colonial Development Fund be used to subsidize European settlement, see OO 691/107/10,29610F, Cameron to OO, 15 March 1930. 318 In addition, individuals could not claim specific plots, so speculation was theoretically impossible. 319 OO 691/96/3,29060, Cameron to OO, 23 Jan. 1928. See also Minutes of the 11th session, 65. 129

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. alienation of land to Europeans and barely hid their contempt for the future status of the

mandate:

Only by grappling the mandated territories to the other British territories by political and economic coordination and by the provision of adequate transport links between north and south will there be any proper safeguard against the dangers that Tanganyika ... may once more be cut out from the group of territories ... that will eventually form a great East African Dominion or Federation ... in the formation of that political and economic entity of the future, white settlement in Kenya must play a major part... and all the external influences upon European and native policy must radiate from Kenya, where the principles of development of the subject races through contact with Western ideals have long been established and tested.323

And in 1929 the European Association wrote to the governor and Colonial Office:

The European Association has no wish whatever to advocate a policy of dispossessing the native of land which he is beneficially occupying or which may be reasonably wanted by the tribe in the near future. It does, however, say that it is not reasonable to lock up vast tracts of country because at some distant date it maybe required by the natives owing to the possible increase of the tribe, and because their present wasteful methods of agriculture may continue. Nor can the association subscribe to the theory that the African native is on the same plane as the European or for that matter ever will be. History shews [sic] that on every other continent civilisations have appeared, but the only civilisations ever known to Africa have been alien ones.321

The unofficial members of the Legislative Councils of the East African colonies and

protectorates also endorsed policies that would encourage white settlement and European-

oriented development.322 At a series of meetings in the mid-1920s they endorsed

unrestricted migration and emigration for labor, the registration of Africans, inexpensive

32c Mandates Section Files, S249, PMC distribution November 1927. Hie quotation of the East African Standard is from 1 Jan. 1927, used in a debate in the House of Commons, 19 July 1927. Sir Sidney Henn and Colonial Secretary Amery were defending the policy of an “informal" Qoser Union against JJd. Thomas, a Labor MP and earlier Colonial Secretary in the first Labor government. 321 GO 691/104/11,29505 Cameron to CO, 11 June 1929. Emphasis in original. W.C. Bottomley, Assistant Undersecretary of State at the Colonial Office, and previous head of the Colonial Office’s East Africa Section, minuted that the views of the European Association were “grotesque."

130

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. land for white settlers, detention camps, and the complete elimination of African cash

crop farming in the mandates.323

Cameron vigorously defended his refusal to grant large European concessions, and

the Colonial Office agreed.324 The head of the Tanganyika section, Charles Strachey,

commented that

In East Africa owing to the influence of the Transvaal and Union school of thought which regards the native as a nuisance... when he is not working as a manual laborer for a white man, [the land question] is by no means a matter of course to the European residents [of Tanganyika]. Their numbers in Tanganyika, which is bigger than England and France combined, amount to those of a small village in England, and in Kenya, where they are very vociferous, they barely equal the population of Broadstairs even when government officials are included. The situation is not without comic elements.323

The Colonial Office supported Cameron out of respect for the mandate, but this was

based on contempt for Kenyan settlers and its fears of a wave of German setdement if

restrictions were lifted.326 The Colonial Office worried that Cameron’s refusal to consider

322 Most British colonies had a legislative council made up of official and unofficial members. Unofficial members were usually white settlers and were typically in the minority to ensure they could not influence policy. 323 For copies of the Tukuyu (October, 1925) and Livingstone (October 1926) meetings of the “Conference of Unofficial Members of Kenya, Tanganyika, Nyasaland, and Northern Rhodesia* see Mandates Section Files, S247, PMC Distribution, June/July-Dec. 1926. 32,1 Callahan, Chapters 5, 7, passim Callahan does not deal with policies in Tanganyika in detail, but does emphasize the role of mandate supporters in the Colonial Office like Charles Strachey, who was head of the Colonial Office Mandates Section and then Assistant Undersecretary of State until 1927. For one example regarding land policy, see 0 0 691/52,29056, memo by Charles Strachey, 4 Aug. 1921, “Land Policy in Tanganyika." Strachey wrote that “The highlands of Kenya extend only a short distance into Tanganyika, and with the exception of that area and an area near the north of Lake Nyas a, the country is no more suitable for European settlers than Nigeria is. Bearing in mind this fact, and also the mandatory conditions, the Indian problem, the scarcity of labour, the experiences of the Germans, and the difficulties which have arisen in Kenya, it seemed worth while to consider whether it might not be advisable to regard the territory as primarily a Black Man’s country, and adopt a land policy on West African, rather than on Kenyan, lines.” However, in the minutes of the same memo advocates of Qoser Union were already worried that such a policy would place obstacles in the way of an East African amalgamation. 325 GO 691/69, 13963, Byatt to CO, 26 Feb. 1924. In 1929 the European population of Tanganyika was approximately 6,000. 326 If restrictions on land purchases were lifted, under the economic-equality provisions of the mandates German setders would have the same right to purchase land as other members of the League. British officials feared that the newly British character of the mandate would be threatened if large numbers of 131

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. alienation for •white settlers would cause more problems than it solved, but it also

understood that his devotion to maintaining African lands protected the territory from a

German return. Strachey wrote that “the special reason for proceeding very cautiously in

Tanganyika is, of course, the fact that we can give no preference to British subjects, and

that we do not want large areas to revert to German ownership.”327 Cameron disagreed

with the limited support for land alienation given by the Hilton Young report, and the

Colonial Office concurred, worrying that increased white settlement would likely mean

German settlement, and quoted from the German paper Kalaniale Rundschau for support.328

Cameron and the Colonial Office used the mandate principle, in other words, to keep the

territory British.329

Another way the territory was linked to the British Empire was through trade. At

the beginning of Cameron’s administration, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika entered a

customs union recommended by the East Africa Commission designed to facilitate trade

among the three territories. This was in line with the mandate, which recognized the

mandatory power’s right to form a customs union with adjacent territories. It was also a

naked attempt to link Tanganyika’s commerce with that of Kenya and Uganda, since the

German settlers arrived and agitated among the Africans. A German scheme to agitate in Tanganyika by paying off former soldiers fueled this fear in the mid-1920s. See GO 691/77,18711, Cameron to GO, 24 April 1925 and OO 691/81. See also Chapter 3, Part III. 327 OO 691/82,26303, Cameron to CO, 18 May 1925, and minutes. While Cameron’s policy was continually approved by the Colonial Office, some did dissent: Ormsby-Gore, fresh from the East Africa Commission, argued that if the British policy was in fact a “dual policy," Cameron’s approach was extreme. 328 Any restrictions on Germans that were not applied to the British settler also would be a violation of the mandate. CO 691/111/16,29777, Cameron to CO, 5 May 1930. The Kalaniale Rundschau issue No. 10-12, 16 Dec. 1930, was appended to Cameron’s letter, and was translated by the War Office. It discussed areas in Tanganyika supposedly suitable for white settlement, particularly the Ufipa plateau. 329 After 1926, German entry to the League removed the ability of the British government to restrict German settlers on this basis, and by 1935 there were as many Germans in the territory as British, which displeased both British settlers and the Colonial Office, but the land alienation law was enforced into the depression in order to keep the numbers of Germans down. Illegal German squatting did take place, and the British also violated their own land laws during the depression to encourage British settlement. See below. 132

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. customs union removed or lowered all transport duties. This made shipping coffee and

sisal from northern Tanganyika on the Kenya-Uganda railroad much cheaper and became

a significant issue for the mandate during the world depression.

The mandate government attempted to encourage several crops in a series of

development schemes. Cameron wished to expand agriculture into more profitable crops

than sisal. Few of these efforts were entirely successful. His administration encouraged

projects for the production of ghee, or clarified butter, wheat, meat, and ore, but none

provided the basis for the territory’s economic future. In the 1930s the Lupa goldfield in

the southwest began production, but its output was of a middling quality and extraction

was expensive. The two most profitable commodities in the territory were cotton and

coffee. Cotton was introduced in the early 1920s; coffee had been grown on Mt.

Kilimanjaro since before the war.

Britain’s attempts to grow cotton were sporadic and suffered both from inperfect

conditions (including periodic droughts lasting two years or more) and corporate

unwillingness to allow the market to operate. The Empire Cotton Growing Corporation

introduced cotton to the territory with government help in 1921. Their intention was for

Africans to grow cotton, which the corporation would buy for below-market prices at

regional ginneries. These experiments resulted in crops left to rot because of inadequate

funds, transportation and labor.330 The corporation’s official operations ceased a few years

later because Cameron would not suspend land and labor laws to subsidize its profits.

The corporation demanded the right to use forced labor and below-market wages to make

330 See, for one example, OO 691/45,35557, Byatt to CD, 15 July 1921. 133

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the cotton plantations profitable.331 Later, Tanganyika’s government attempted to

encourage cotton growing by Africans by distributing free seed from the corporation and

building regional ginning facilities, with only limited success. Monopolistic and subsidized

efforts to grow cotton were increasingly hampered during the depression, when, as the

Joint East African Board (a regional chamber of commerce) complained, Indian

merchants “pirated” cotton, offering Africans better prices than would Europeans.332

Coffee production was more promising, and as a high-quality, high-demand

product, it was claimed both by advocates of native production and white settlers.333 The

East Africa Commission report recommended that arabim should be grown only by

Europeans, who would allegedly prove more reliable in protecting and extending the fields

of the delicate plants; Africans would grow rcbusta, a hardier, more disease- and pest-

resistant variety with a much smaller market.33,4 However, the Chagga tribe on Mt.

Kilimanjaro held less acreage land than Europeans (117,000 acres vs. 197,000 acres)

because of pre-war alienation and required a high-profit cash crop to support the

community. At the same time, one official wrote, “the area contains the most highly

developed and intelligent natives in the territory as well as the least responsible and least

educated European settlers; the. latter being, in addition, to some extent under Kenyafn]

331 It used the guise of “self-government” as a cover for these demands, arguing that “it will be difficult, if not impossible, for a large development company to “carry on" if they are subject to the same restrictions and regulations as are necessary in the case of small companies, and if constant reference must be made to Dar-es-Salaam." See Mandates Section Files, S246, PMC distribution, Nov. 1925-May 1926. 332 The Joint East Africa Board |JEAB] bought cotton from Africans at below-market prices, and during the depression demanded guaranteed fixed prices to prevent Indian pirating as well as the forced sale of cotton to their regional ginneries. See OO 691/127/1, 5001, JEAB to OO, 1932. The Tanganyika administration approved measures to support European investments like ginners with a “grown here, ginned here” restriction which guaranteed a “fairer" price to the African grower. This was, in essence, a subsidy for European business and pushed the depression onto the African grower, a sharp divergence from Cameron- era policy. 333 SeeGO 691/62,26562, Byatt to OO, 18 April 1923, for one early report.

134

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. influence. The natives are keenly alive to their own interests and if the settlers carry their

interest politics to extremes, there is every chance of a collision eventually.”335 Byatt and

Cameron allowed the Chagga to cultivate arabiat, although they discouraged African

competition with European plantations. By 1929 African cultivators had proven more

profitable than European.336

The clash came in the late 1920s, after the Chagga had proven their ability to grow

coffee profitably and created the Kilimanjaro Native Planters’ Association (KNPA), which

regulated production and skillfully marketed their coffee. In 1928 there was scandal over

the publication of Raymond Buell’s The Name Problem in A frica that inspired a detailed

petition from the BIPDI attacking the limitations on African production.337 Cameron

admitted that his government had “discouraged” the Chagga and “persuaded” them to

cease growing arabim, although the British denied any legal prohibition.338 Unwilling to

completely ignore setder interests, Cameron had also imposed registration requirements

on coffee planters that forced them to register annually and assume the financial liability

for government-ordered improvements. The primary intent was to increase the quality of

the coffee through inspection, but it also drove small African producers out of business by

334 Report of the East African Commission; and also CO 691/78,40022, OAG Scon to CO, 8 Aug. 1925. Cameron halfheartedly advised the Chagga to grow mbusta, but most Chagga grew arabiat. 335 OO 691/102/7,29356, OAG Scott to CO, 8 Jan 1929, minute by Eric Machtig. 336 By the 1930s the KNPA was complaining to the government that theft, diseased coffee plants, and inferior quality coffee from European plantations constituted a menace to African cultivation. However, by 1931 the KNPA’s organization was itself under investigation by the government, with its marketing firm and president suspected of embezzlement. The KNPA was later placed under government control. See OO 691/116/6, 30066, 4 March 1931, and Hansard, Parliamentary Question, 4 March, 1931, Admiral Beamish, Mr. Leslie Boyce. The Armitage-Smith Report of 1932 estimated that 70% of the coffee grown in Tanganyika was cultivated by Africans. See Report by Sir Sydney A m ita^Snuh... OnaFmandal Mission to Tangtryika (1932) [Armitage-Smith Report], Chapter 3. 33' Raymond Buell, The N am e P m biem m A foa (New York, 1928) 494-500. See also CPM 733, “Petition, dated May 20lh 1928, from the Bureau International pour la defense des indigenes,” and CPM 828, “Letter from the British Government with regard to the petition, dated May 20th, 1928, from the BIPDI,” 4 Dec. 1928. 338 For the British view of the BIPDI’s 1928 petition, see CO 691/100/4,29191 CO to FO, 31 July 1928. 135

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. imposing a high, fixed, “price of entry” into the industry. One bitter advocate of African

production in the Colonial Office wrote of the regulations, “I note that coffee may still be

drunk without a license.”339

London defended its policies before the PMC, which rejected the BIPDI petition.

Ironically, the new regulations incensed the Europeans more than the Africans. The

KNPA assumed the burden of regulation for African planters, while angry white planters

protested that they were being persecuted by Cameron’s “pro-native” policies solely for

causing “two blades of grass [to] grow where none grew before.”340 Coffee is an

instructive example of the problems of development in Tanganyika. Development policy

had to take into account not only the financial interests of the territory, but the competing

interests of whites, staunch advocates of imperialism, and Africans. It is remarkable that

the PMC did not examine the conflict over coffee production more closely, the British

appear to have rigorously downplayed the conflict.341

British Togo

As integral parts of adjacent colonies British Togo and the British Cameroons had

very different development experiences than Tanganyika. This study concentrates on

British Togo rather than examining both territories.342 In fact it is difficult to assess the

economic development of either of these mandates, as both were small and incorporated

339 GO 691/100/13,29221, Cameron to OO, 17 Aug. 1928, “Coffee Industry Registration and Improvements Ordinance.” 340 OO 691/102/7,29356, OAG Scott to OO, 8 Jan 1929. 341 See OO 691/102/7,29356. See also OO 691/103/3 29420A and 29420B, OAG Jardine to CO, 9 Mar 1929, “Annual Report for 1928,” which excised all mention of the controversy. 342 The problem of comparison created the necessity to study British Togo, rather than the British Cameroons. The British Cameroons were so much smaller than Cameroun, and were further divided into two disconnected sections, that they are difficult to compare with the French mandates. British Togo, while also much smaller than French Togo, had a much more intimate relationship with the neighboring French mandate. Both British mandates, however, are difficult to study because their development was subsumed into the larger development of Gold Coast and Nigeria. 136

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. into neighboring colonies. British Togo was a producer of cocoa, palm oil, and cotton,

but there was no organized plan of development between 1920-39.343

The economic development of British Togo was subsidiary to that of Gold Coast

Colony. In the British view, British Togo formed a narrow extension of the eastern Gold

Coast, and it was administered in much the same way. Gold Coast was a wealthy colony

with a budget of around four million pounds a year, nearly twice as much as Tanganyika

Territory in the 1920s. Like British Togo, its main products were cotton and cocoa. The

Gold Coast was divided into three sections, the colony itself along the southern coast, the

Ashanti state, and the Northern Territories. The colony was the most “European,” the

Ashanti state less so, and the Northern Territories inhabited by nomads. The British

administered Togo in the same way, incorporating the central region into large “tribal”

areas based loosely on linguistic and ethnic similarities, keeping the north closed to many

European influences, and leaving the southern region around the administrative center of

Ho open to European trade.

British Togo’s small size and its wealthy neighbor limited most economic

development to links between the mandate and Gold Coast. Togo’s only pre-war railroad

lay in the French mandate, and the unequal customs regimes between the British and

French colonial empires prevented intra-Togolese commerce.344 British Togo’s cocoa

production, by a special arrangement, continued to flowthrough Palime to Lome, but the

British attempted to encourage trade and production to flow through the Gold Coast.345

The Gold Coast government did not build railroads to British Togo, but expended

343 See the LONMR for British Togo, 1922-1935. 344 See OO 724/2,33850, Governor of Gold Coast (Guggisberg) to GO, 7 July 1921. On the order to implement a merger of British Togo to the Gold Coast, see OO 724/2, 57176, Secretary of State (Duke of Devonshire) to Guggisberg, 19 Feb. 1923. 137

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. considerable resources constructing a network of roads from Togo to the Gold Coast as

“main trade routes.”346 Aside from these attempts to connect British Togo to the Gold

Coast’s economy, there was little other active economic development during the mandate

period.

Cameroun and French Togo

Of all the B mandates, Cameroun was the easiest to return to profitability, and

after a slow start economic development projects flourished. The administration of

Cameroun took several jears to set up. The territory was not completely pacified until

two years after the end of the war. There were many profitable former German

plantations in Cameroun, all geared toward the export trade through the town of Duala. In

addition most chiefs and powerful headmen possessed farms, some, like the paramount

chief of the Beti Charles Atangana, holding hundreds of hectares of cocoa, livestock,

coffee, and oil palms.347 The French mandatory government did not prioritize African

peasant production, but instead rebuilt the German plantation economy and used African

labor on farms owned by Europeans or African chiefs.348

There were significant differences in the practice of economic development in the

French and the British mandates. These were not merely a result of the ideological

differences between assodatkn and assim ladan versus indirect rule. France had far fewer

white setders, perhaps 2,750 Europeans in Cameroun and 500 in French Togo, and of

these, the overwhelming majority were French officials. Not only did white setders in

345 CD 724/2, 61068, Guggisberg to GO, 14 Nov. 1922. 346 For an early plan see GO 724/1, 62639, Governor of Gold Coast to GO, 23 Dec. 1920. The main routes were between Ho and Adidome and from Kpandu to the Volta River near the village of Sencht. 347 Frederick Quinn, “Charles Atangana of Yaounde,” The Journal c fAjrican History, 21:4 (1980), passim Atangana, the most powerful chief during the German period, took an annual salary from the French of 24,000 francs, as well as possessing the right to farm taxes for over 100,000 people. See also Guyer 595. 138

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Cameroun not agitate for a white-oriented development policy, but African chiefs and

notables were more educated and politically aware, as illustrated by the volume of

petitions. Although France’s aims of economic development, agricultural production for

export facilitated by railroad construction, were similar to those in the British, its methods

were very different.

Even more than the British, French development policy was designed to control

every aspect of the economy of their mandates for the benefit of the metropole, even if

this caused problems for administrators and generated criticism from the PMC The

French used direct taxation, the otpdtaticn, as well the pm tadan, (which could be paid either

in days of labor or in cash). Despite the destructive effects, the French also continued the

practice of labor migration.349 The result was that the French mandated territories were

fiscally more sound than the British, but another consequence was a steady African

emigration from Cameroun and French Togo to the British mandates, encouraged by

higher wages for their labor and higher prices for their produce.350 A frustrated

Gommissaire Auguste Bonnecarrere accused the British of luring these laborers to the

398 LeVine 106-7. 399 LeVine 66. See also Guyer, passim, and Ndobegang M. Mbapndah, “French Colonial Agricultural Policy, African Chiefs, and Coffee Growing in the Cameroun Grassfields, 1920-1960,” The IrtematianalJournal c f African Historical Sadies, 27:1 (1994) , 41-43,57-58. 350 Until 1924,10 days of pratation labor was required, and thereafter four days until the depression, when it was raised to six. While commutable for cash in theory, the French often did not allow Africans to remit their labor, and until the late 1930s, the wages paid for pnstatian labor were only one-third the market wage rate. See Jane I. Guyer, “The Food Economy and French Colonial Rule in Central Cameroun,” The Journal c f African History, 19:4 (1978) 592-3. According to Guyer’s analysis of prices in Cameroun, the French mandatory administration systematically overvalued the food rations they provided to laborers on public works in order to avoid paying market wages (part of the wage was in food and housing) as well as paying a severely" below-market wage. 139

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Gold Coast.351 It is probable that the restrictive French regulations and the ubiquity of the

pvestadan and capitation explain the frequency of petitions from French Togo to the PMC

The French in Cameroun and Togo hoped to create a rural bourgeoisie made up

of African chiefs and notables. In the first year of peacetime administration, Marchand

promulgated an arrete (15 Sep. 1921) placing virtually all undeeded land into the hands of

the state, and leased some of it to the few European settlers. Although the pre-war

plantations recovered, French investors were reluctant to place fortunes in Togo or

Cameroun. Government attempts to lease thousands of hectares to French investors

enjoyed a very limited success.352 The greater beneficiaries were African chiefs, who had

control over the distribution of village communal lands, in many areas preventing

commoners from farming it.353

The creation and rapid growth of coffee planting in the western grasslands

illustrates the methods of French development policy. This densely populated,

prosperous volcanic region encouraged the French to begin arabica cultivation, but the

growing number of restrictions by the early 1930s created a situation where only chiefs

and white planters could grow coffee. Independent producers were forbidden to even

own seedlings. The official rationale was that chiefs and whites were the only landowners

351 ANSOM FM 18, Canon 24, Dossier 211, Bonnecarrere to MC, DAPCA, No. 31,29 Jan. 1923: “Ges exodes qui jusqua ce jour ne furent que saisonnieis pourraient dans l’avenir devenir definitifs ... en tous cas ces exodes sont singulierement encourages par le gouvemement anglais a 1’aide d’une propagande intense aussi bien que par des primes tres elevees aux chefs indigenes pour la recrutement des travailleurs, ainsi que par des salaires superieurs a tous ceux que nous pouvons allouer.” 352 For one example of a failed attempt at a large alienation, see the case of M Gasparin and the Societe Frangais du Togo, which attempted to lease 10,000 hectares in 1921. ANSOM, FM 66, Canon 607. 353 The arrete created four categories, free hold, native collective, native usage, and vacant land. Over 50% of the land in Cameroun was classified as “vacant.” See PMC Minutes 3rd Session, Mandates Section files, S241, PMC distribution, 1921-22, extract from LeGMtrrier Colonial, 6 Jan. 1922, which defended the arrete as necessary to give Africans the tools to understand property and increase their appreciation of civilization: “Est-il besoin d’observer que cette stabilisation [brought about by this law] est absolument necessaire pour amener les indigenes a un degre de civilisation superieur?” 140

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. who controlled enough acreage to grow coffee as well as food. French administrators

argued that if small peasant farmers grew coffee for export, it was likely that the entire

region would go hungry. Officials and white planters also argued that small farmers would

maintain the land poorly and encourage disease, the identical complaints of white settlers

in Tanganyika. The evidence indicates that these were unrealistic fears, but effective

policy rationalizations for stifling the creation of a prosperous peasant class.354

The parallels with the situation on Mt. Kilimanjaro are striking. French policy was

designed primarily to win support among the chiefs and encourage profitable plantation

crops.355 The size of the annual harvest seems not to have been an issue, since the French

made few attempts to encourage any small African production. Ndobegang Mbapndah

argues that the French wanted to create an elite to cultivate cash crops while using peasant

labor to grow food for prestadan workers and migrant laborers. They encouraged local

chiefs in the region to use the prestadan xo find workers for the coffee plantations and

punish those who illicitly grew coffee with the indigemt, the French administrative

disciplinary code.356 When white planters complained during the depression that small

African producers were putting them out of business, in fact, the government and local

chiefs destroyed most small coffee plantations.357

Cameroun’s pattern of economic development indicates a general reluctance on

the part of the French to use economic development to improve the conditions of the

354 Mbapndah 55-58. 355 The French created an award, the Order peter le Merite Inbgne, for African chiefs who distinguished themselves “in the domain of export crop cultivation.” At the same time “the colonial administration demonstrated remarkable intolerance to the generalized cultivation of coffee.” See Mbapndah 48-50. 356 See Chapter 5. The m digna was an “on-the-spot" punishment system, requiring no trial, witnesses, or proof. Like the pretadan, the French were criticized regularly for its use, but i d not abandon the system until after World War II. 357 Mbapndah 51. 141

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. population at large. Marchand, Bonnecamere (acting ajmmssaire of Cameroun from 1933-

34), and later canrissam Henri Boisson appear to have placed their faith in the creation of

an African cultivating elite who would be loyal to France because they were able to amass

wealth and influence by exploiting French policies. African peasants were closed out of

cultivating cash crops so that they would be available as laborers and food producers.

However, to keep the price of labor down, the French enforced a low-wage standard and

instituted the policy of the rrEmfrial, price controls on food set so low that local officials

often had to threaten farmers with the indigm to t get food to market in Yaounde, Duala,

and other commercial centers.358 Along with the capitation and the prestadan, the French

easily kept their budgets in surplus, even during much of the 1930s.

French Togo’s prosperity depended greatly on trade, both in exports to France

and to the surrounding AOF. The relationship between AOF and French Togo was as

troubled as that of Tanganyika with Kenya. In 1923, a srm ssam Bonnecamere complained

that administrative independence was against Togo’s interests and prevented Togo’s

economic (and political) integration into the larger French Empire. He wrote that

neighboring French colonies, like Dahomey, refused to open their borders to trade from

Togo: “On the contrary I encountered as systematic hostility. Togo was a foreign country,

Togo must be returned to Germany... it was suitable to prepare the way for retrocession,

and naturally to take action to favor Dahomey and Upper Volta to the detriment of

358 Marchand stated that “equitable remuneration is non-competitive remuneration.” Only if all wages, public and private, were more or less the same would there be any hope of the large development projects attracting labor with low wages. See ANSOM, FM 66, Carton 2689, Dossier 5, Marchand to MC, DAE (Department of Economic Affairs), 8 June 1928. 142

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Togo.”359 He then proposed the outright absorption of Togo into AOF, but this was

rejected by the Colonial Ministry an open violation of the mandate.

In fact the system of customs barriers between French Togo and AOF

discouraged most commerce before 1927.360 That year, customs duties were equalized, but

to make up the revenue Dahomey raised its turnover tax (driffre d'affairs) on imports and

exports higher than that of Togo, which gave goods from Togo a steep competitive

advantage. As a result Dahomey restricted imports from Togo, effectively closing the

border in 1930. The Togo Chamber of Commerce noted that these were tighter

regulations than those in effect during German rule (“la barriere separant [les] deux pays

frangais etait plus etanche qu’a 1’epoque ou le Togo etat allemand.”) Eventually the taxes

were equalized, but the repeated trade disputes between French Togo and Dahomey

indicate the degree of conflict between the two.361

The main reason for the trade difficulty between the two territories was similar to

that between Tanganyika and Kenya. The limited amount of traffic had to support the

budgets of two different territories, and Dahomey’s government was constantly fearful

that Togo’s lower taxes were a ploy to attract Dahomian products to Anecho and Lome,

buttressing the budget of the mandate with traffic that was legitimately Dahomian.362

Additionally, French Togo was more highly developed and prosperous than the

159 ANSOM FM 66, Canon 615, dossier 2, Bonnecarrere to DAPCA, No. 264,10 April 1931. One of Bonnecarrere’s greatest complaints was that during his tenure there was never a customs union between Dahomey and French Togo. 360 Customs duties in French Togo were lower than those in AOF, which made goods from Togo expensive in Dahomey and encouraged smuggling from Dahomey to Togo. 361 The two sides began to compromise on taxes and smuggling after a sharp letter from the Colonial Ministry, although Bonnecarrere continued to blame Dahomey for the entire dispute. See above. See ANSOM FM 66, Carton 615, dossier 2, Colonial Minister to Governor General of AOF, No. 2, 8 Jan. 1931, “Relations commerciales enue le Dahomey et le Togo.” An identical reprimand went to Bonnecarrere. 363 For one example of this fear, See ANSOM, FM 66, Carton 615, Dossier 2, Governor General of AOF to MQ DAE No. 187, 5 Feb. 1930. 143

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. neighboring French colonies, creating an interesting problem for Bonnecarrere. If Togo

remained wealthy and prosperous, it would hurt the development efforts of AOF. If it

became an integral part of the French Empire, it might lose the basis of its prosperity.

Thus, until the depression, the mandate system appears to have supported the autonomy

of French Togo, although it had little effect on the economic development of the territory.

French Togo had similar difficulties with British Togo. The wealth of the Gold

Coast and British development plans in their portion of Togo had the effect of drawing

production in the British sphere away from French Togo and toward the Gold Coast.

Bonnecarrere complained to the Colonial Ministry that British efforts to develop their part

of Togo would inevitably result in the valuable cocoa traffic flowing into Gold Coast,

rather than across the mandate frontier to Palime and thence to Lome for export, a

“calculated plan to ruin Palime.”363 Again, both mandatory powers aimed at channeling as

much trade as they could into their respective colonial empires. The British road-building

projects did exacdy what Bonnecarrere feared, and by the late 1920s Gold Coast had

absorbed much of British Togo’s trade.

Rail Construction in the Mandates

For most European colonies in Africa, rail construction was the heart of economic

development. Expensive to build and maintain, railroads took several years to construct

and unless carefully planned, could take decades to pay back investors. However, they

were vital to tapping inland resources, taxing trade, and opening land. In Tanganyika the

Germans had built two main lines: a long central line running from Dar-es-Salaamto the

Belgian Congo on Lake Tanganyika and two shorter lines, and one inland from the port of

363 See ANSOM, FM 18, Canon 24, Dossier 211, Bonnecarrere to MQ DAPCA 29 Jan. 1923. 144

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Tanga.304 Both were heavily damaged during the war. The Tanga line was profitable, as

it ran to the coffee plantations in Moshi and Arusha. But it was poorly maintained and

ran parallel to the Kenya-Uganda railway, which connected Mombassa with Lake Victoria.

Early development plans recommended the demolition of the line and the diversion of

Tanganyika’s traffic to Mombassa’s new Kilindini harbor. The central line was, itself, not

profitable without Belgian traffic from the Congo. It also ran through areas (Tabora

province in particular) with a large non-agricultural population (the Nyamwezi), and the

land over much of its length was savanna or desert.

Cognizant of the need for profitable feeder lines to keep the rails running and

provide desperately needed revenue, the Byatt and Cameron administrations planned

several extensions.365 A coastal line was considered, running from Ngerengere (east of

Morogoro) to Kioatu and providing a second harbor for Dar-es-Salaam. A second ran

from the central line to Lake Eyassi, and a third from Tabora to Shinyanga and thence to

Lake Victoria in the prosperous Mwanza district. Only the latter was built. The

Tanganyika administration also succeeded in preventing the demolition of the Tanga line.

In Tanganyika, the rail system lay at the heart of die conflict with Kenya’s

economic interests. Tanganyika’s development depended on the revenue generated in the

territory. Cameron’s interpretation of the mandate (and his interest as governor) was that

Tanganyika should be as financially strong as possible, and this meant that the produce of

the territory should travel on the rails of the territory to maximize tax and customs

See map. The German owners received only token compensation, paid into the German reparations account. 365 OO 691/82,36630, “Recommendations of the East Africa Commission,” which describes an ambitious set of lines that would link Tanganyika to Kenya, Northern Rhodesia, N y as aland, and Uganda. The East African Commission was devoted to the idea of integration. See Chapter 2. See also See also OO 691/70, 23388, OAG Scott to OO, 25 April 1924. 145

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. revenue.366 Tanganyika needed a large surplus to show it could repay development loans.

Without it, at best development would lag. At worst the territory might become a chronic

debtor to the British Exchequer.367

Yet virtually all traffic on the Tanga line could also be carried on the Kenya-

Uganda railways and shipped from Mombassa.36* Not surprisingly, this was the goal of

Kenya’s administration. The expansion of the central line also caused strain between

Kenya and the mandate, since the Lake Victoria trade had been monopolized by Kenya

until the Mwanza connection was complete. By 1928, the Kenyan government complained

that the Tanganyika rails would soon render unprofitable a sizeable length of the Kenya-

Uganda railway.309 More opposition was forthcoming at the governors’ conferences in the

mid- and late-1920s. At the 1926 Nairobi meeting, Cameron found himself isolated,

facing the dedicated opposition of the Governor of Kenya, Sir Edward Grigg, and the

governors of Uganda, Sudan, Zanzibar, Nyas aland, and the Rhodesias. In a non-binding

366 Sir Sydney Armitage-Smith, a rail expert, evaluated the Tanganyika system in the early 1930s and his report indicated that the customs union with Kenya, combined with Tanganyika traffic moving on Kenyan rails and Kenyan produce entering Tanganyika duty-free on Tanganyikan rails, was costing the Tanganyika Territry some £30,000 a year. See GO 691/126/7,31265, Symes to OO, 14 Nov. 1932, and Sir Sydney Armitage-Smith, “Report on a Financial Mission to Tanganyika," (Command Paper 4182 of 1932) [Armitage-Smith Report] Chapter II, section 3. 367 This potential was recognized by the “Report on the Railway rates and finance in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika,” [Gibb Report] (Command Paper 4235 of 1932). Gibb recommended reducing costs by routing all traffic to Mombassa, but crediting all the profits from Tanganyika’s traffic to Tanganyika, reducing competition but retaining the independence of the mandated territory. His recommendations were not followed. See also Mandates Section Files, S1651, Tanganyika 1928. 368 This was over the Voi extension, built during the war, which connected the Tanga line to the Kenya- Uganda railroad. 369 Tanganyika’s administration made the same argument especially after the Belgian government completed a rail connection to the Atlantic, which removed much of the profitable ore and agriculture traffic that had previously flowed from the Eastern Belgian Congo across lake Tanganyika to Dar-es-Salaam. See OO 691/31,13503, Byatt to CO, 8 March 1920, in which he advocated as early as 1920 that the Voi connection between the Tanga line and the Kenya-Uganda Railway) be dismanded, and argued against the sale of the Tanga line to Kenya. The Shinyanga extension to Bukoba and Lake Victoria was also an issue of contention, because for Tanganyika, the lake traffic would make the line profitable, but without much of the lake traffic, the line would be a failure. As Byatt noted in 1920, “over two thirds of [the distance between Tabora and Mwanza], I am satisfied that [the land] is ... arid, sterile, infested with tsetse, and very sparsely supplied with water of bad quality.” CO 691/32,25545, Byatt to CO, 19 May 1920. 146

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. vote designed to browbeat him into abandoning railroad expansion, “Cameron was

outvoted 6-1 on the question of completing a railway in his own territory.”372 Both sides

competed for the lake traffic, and the resulting rate war profited neither side.371

The political debate surrounding Closer Union also involved the railroads. Closer

Union would eventually demand the unification of the Tanganyika and Kenya-Uganda rail

systems along with their customs agreement. Since neither the Kenya-Uganda line nor the

Tanganyika line were reliably profitable, each would gain a significant advantage if it could

draw traffic from the other territory. With the construction of the Kilindini port and the

creauon of a customs union, the Kenyan line had the advantage. The 1932 Gibb report,

commissioned by the Colonial Office to improve rail profitability, in fact again

recommended the demolition of the Tanga line, steering the profitable Moshi and Arusha

trade onto Kenyan rails.372 Although the Tanga line survived, the pattern of railroad

development and administration in Tanganyika was therefore clean the Kenya-Uganda line

was to be the profitable line.373 The Tanganyika rail system, as it was, was subsidized not

37c OO 691/84, X4515, Cameron to OO, 3 May 1926. See minutes by Machtig, Green, and Charles Strachey. The Governors’ Conference was not an official body. Grigg was attempting to block the construction of the Mwanza extension through an informal, but highly critical, attack on Cameron, and indirectly on the mandate. Grigg and the other governors clearly saw the finances of the setder colonies as under threat from the mandate. The Colonial Office did not agree, and there was no way the Governors’ Conferences could affect Tanganyikan policy. See Chapter 3. ,7; OO 691/99/5,29135. See also Mandates Section files S250, PMC distribution, 1928, from the East African Standard 21 July 1928. Freight duties on cotton had been lowered drastically by the Kenya-Uganda line in 1927 to obtain part of Tanganyika’s cotton production in Mwanza. The article noted a belated attempt by the Tanganyika rails to recover that market share. 372 Gibb Report, Chapter 2. 373 For protests against this situation, see CPM 1599, “Petition, dated Sep. 22,1933, from the Indian Association, Dar-es-Salaam, transmitted by the British government by letter dated Dec. 19,1934, together with its observations,” 2 Jan. 1935. The Indian Association was an Indian business organization. The petition protested that Indian traders did not want to ship via Kenya to Kilindini, but rather wanted the Tanga line to remain open indefinitely, and they also advocated that all lake traffic travel on Tanganyikan lines, since Tanganyika was developing the region but not reaping the returns. The British government disagreed with the Indian assessment, arguing that the lake traffic was carried more efficiendyon Kenyan rails. That this was due to Kenya’s willingness to undercut Tanganyikan rates was not menuoned in the British comments. 147

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. by the British government, but with loans. The Crown did not pay the bills, the territory

did, through its massive debt service. Kenya received the economic benefits, but the

mandated territory had to pay for a rail system that was, in a sense, designed to run at a

loss. Tanganyika would always find it difficult to be fiscally sound if its infrastructure was

not. In other words, the combined effect of the customs union and the rail system’s

development, especially once the depression struck, made Tanganyika the colony of other

colonies.374

Like the British, the French inherited an ambitious, but damaged, rail system that

had been seriously overworked during the war. The motivation for the rapid

improvements was not merely economic. The French used transportation development to

reinforce their moral superiority over the African population.375 French Togo had only

one rail line, stretching inland from Lome to Palime, and it was extended north during the

interwar period. There were the beginnings of two rail lines in Cameroun, running north

toward Lake Chad (the Nordbahri), and inland from the town of Duala ( M ittdbahn ).

French plans for development in Cameroun were geared toward infrastructure

improvements, to make Duala the preferred port of exit for all of northern AEF. Early

French plans for Cameroun included an extension of the former M ittelhahn to the capital at

Cameron’s testimony before the Joint Select Committee on Goser Union also indicates the extent of the unequal relationship: “In 1920 or 1921, against the repeated protests of my predecessor to the Government at home, Kenya demanded the extension of the Kenya-Uganda railway to Moshi. The result was to create competition... another result was to depreciate the capital value of one of the lines of the Mandated Territory [the Tanga line] because naturally that part of the country was unable to support two railways - and for the right to come into Moshi and take away the Tanganyikan traffic the Tanganyika government gets the absurd sum of £400 a year!” See Mandates Section Files, S255, PMC Distribution, 1931, Tanganyika, excerpt from East Africa, 2 Apr. 1931. 374 The Indian community in Tanganyika was one of few commentators that drew attention to the effect of the customs bamer and the rail links to Kenya: “In spite of loud protestations regarding British intentions of preserving the political and commercial integrity of Tanganyika, every step that is taken forges a link chaining and subordinating it to Kenya.” See Mandates Section Files, S249, PMC Distribution, Nov. 1927.

148

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Yaounde and further extensions to Deng-Deng and Meigauga near T nkp Chad.376 TTie

rapid construction of the extensions toward T nkp Chad and Yaounde before 1927 was the

first stage in a plan to hook up Cameroun to the rail systems of the French Congo,

Oubangi-Chari, and Chad.

Whatever the French government’s development policy, the French press dutifully

denied that Cameroun would one day be linked to AEF permanently. L e Terrps

reassuringly supported the mandate, attempting to allay fears in 1927 that the new rail

routes from Yaounde to Bangui and Brazzabille would chain the economy of Cameroun

to that of AEF: “The mandate, and [our] international reputation (probite intemationale)

reserve to Cameroun a strict autonomy, and the mandatory powers would never dream of

evading this part of their obligations.”377 In any case, the French government had to delay

the creation of a unified rail system because of the lowering of the prestaticn, which

provided the labor, the PMCs concern over the high mortality rate along the construction

sites, and the onset of the world depression.378

Part II: The Great Depression and Development

In each of the mandates the effect of the world depression of the 1930s was

devastating. British Togo partook of the massive retrenchment and deflation in the Gold

Coast.379 The sharp decline in industrial production in Europe and the United States

caused companies to stop importing Tanganyika’s primary products, particularly coffee,

375 Mandates Section Files, S241, PMC distribution 12 Apr.-28 May 1921. Selection from the French Parliament “Journal Cffiad da Daurrms Parierrmaire,” 19 June 1921. 376 ANSOM, FM 18, Carton 28, Dossier 246, Marchand to MC, No. 152, 12 Sep. 1921. 377 Mandates Section Files, S249, PMC distribution November 1927. Excerpt from Le Terrps , 18 Sep. 1927. 378 This topic is discussed in detail in the next chapter’s labor section. In a rare victory for the PMC, the French lowered the prestadan requirements in Cameroun to quell the PMCs worries about forced labor, and Raymond Buell’s allegations and the resulting petitions (such as that of the BIPDI) also led the French to

149

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. sisal, and cotton. Massive declines in customs revenue and of both direct and indirect tax

revenue followed, and the crippling interest payments to the British Treasury only

tightened the budget further. By 1932 the surpluses of the Cameron years were gone and

under the governorships of Stewart Symes, Harold MacMichael, and Mark Young,

Tanganyika saw not only a virtual end to its development but its increasing subordination

to Kenya.

The world depression coincided with the prolonged collapse of the official Closer

Union movement. Closer Union was defeated as much by the dire economic conditions

as by official concerns about violating the mandate. European planters used the

depression to try to convince the Colonial Office to reverse the equality of African

production put in place during the Cameron years. As with the cotton ginning

controversy, Moshi and Arusha coffee growers, such as the Brigadier General L.B. Boyd-

Moss and Jerome de la Mothe, demanded that the mandate be converted to a C mandate

or be abolished. This would enable the government to balance the budget by removing

the structures of indirect rule, alienating more land to whites, and forbidding Africans to

grow coffee.38C

Despite the desires of European settlers for a “South African solution” for

Tanganyika, the depression highlighted the necessity for the colonial establishment to

defend the mandate.381 The defense would be expensive. By the beginning of 1931 the

improve conditions. However, this was not a general pattern in Cameroun. The French administration habitually included few details about work conditions in its annual reports. 379 BRT 21, OO 96/704/8,7268, OAG Northcote to OO, 6 April 1932. 380 GO 691/138/4, 25129, British Union of Tanganyika to OO, 22 Feb 1934. De la Mothe had been a primary instigator of the 1929 Kilimanjaro riots. 381 Mandates Registry files, R4082, LON document 6a.722.722, “Papers relating to the Question of Closer Union, of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika Territory (Colonial Office # 57). Letter from Cameron to OO, 5 July 1930, commenting on Cmd. 3378, “Statements of the Conclusions of HMG in the United Kingdom as 150

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. full dimensions of the depression became clear. As the budget figures show, Tanganyika’*:

revenues plummeted while expenditures proved far more inelastic.382 Exports declined in

value by over £ 1 million compared to 1929, and imports by £300,000. The Colonial

Office was disheartened by the massive deficits, especially in light of the interest payments

on the Treasury debt.

1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 Total Value of 4,568,305 4,063,035 2,546,615 2,003,142 2,073,277 Imports (£) Imports from 195,223 177,585 172,610 164,210 196,280 Kenya/Uganda

Table 4.1: Tanganyika Imports, 1929-1933

The connections with Kenya also hurt Tanganyika’s economy during the

depression. As customs revenue declined across the board, duty-free Kenyan imports

remained relatively inelastic. As a result, the proportion of Tanganyika’s revenue from

customs dropped from 36% in 1929 to 28% in 1935.383 The Tangtnyika Opinion estimated,

and Cameron concurred, that the customs revenue losses to the mandate were nearly

£30,000 a year. In 1931, Sir Sydney Armitage-Smith was sent to Tanganyika to report on

its financial prospects, and concluded that the mandate had lost significant revenue

because of the customs agreements with Kenya and Uganda. The customs agreement

between Kenya and Tanganyika heavily favored the former, whose setder population

regards Qoser Union in East Africa." Cmd. 3378 was the Wilson Report. Cameron’s meaning was that economic and political union would give paramountcy to whites, and anything that gave paramountcy to whites would be contrary to the mandate. 382 See budget graphs. 383 Table following taken from GO 691/139/1,25183, MacMichael to G O , 29 May 1934. 151

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. exported sugar, ham, bacon, tea, and butter to the mandate free of duty, whereas

Tanganyika’s products were exported to Europe. Kenyan producers profited from the

arrangement, but Tanganyika simply lost customs revenue.384 Armitage-Smith concluded

that “there appears to be a clear case for restoring a large element of revenue now lost [to

Kenya].”385 Even an analysis done by the Cunliffe-Lister Colonial Office concluded that

the customs union was costing the Tanganyika rail system £50,000 a year in lost

revenues. 386

However, the Colonial Secretaries in the 1930s argued that the links favoring

Kenya had to be maintained. They regarded Tanganyika as British, and the mandate’s

autonomy merely a formal consideration. Its dependence on Kenya had become part of

the goal of dedicated imperialists to weld it to British East Africa for all time. Gmliffe-

Lister, at the East African luncheon in 1934, defended Kenyan and British imperialist

sensibilities:

Historical circumstances and conditions have inextricably linked together the fortunes of these territories. Their needs call for the closest cooperation, and I am glad to say that the cooperation today exists to the full in spirit and in action. There are the customs union and the postal union, and the recognition in all quarters that for the economic future of these lands it is essentially that they maintain the closest contact and cooperation... this cooperation does not mean that one territory is to sacrifice its interest to another. It means that they will take the broad view,

3M This was also the conclusion of at least one contemporary study of the territory. See Charlotte Leubuscher, Tanganyika Territory: A Study cfE canonic Policy Under Mandate, (Oxford, 1944), 101-112. 385 Mandates Section Files S256, PMC Distribution, 1932, excerpt from Tanganyika Opinion 5 Feb. 1932. See also the Armitage-Smith Report, 94-95, “Summary." See also Mandates Section Files S257, PMC Distribution, 1933, excerpt from East African Standard, 14 Jan. 1933. Kenyan public opinion blamed the Tanganyikan government for the inequality in customs traffic, and advocated, unsurprisingly, that white setdement in Tanganyika would have solved the problem. The East African Standards viewpoint was an excellent indication that Kenyan public opinion was aware of their advantages under the customs agreement. 386 C O 691/136/12,25089 part 2, particularly items 55-77. Even Governor MacMichael, a supporter of closer ties to Kenya, noted that sentiment in Tanganyika was building against the Kenyan arrangements by the 1930s. 152

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. that there shall be a fair measure of give and take as between partners who know that their fortunes and forever are indissolubly linked.387

Both the terms of the mandate and Tanganyika’s interests could not come between

“cooperation” with Kenya. European business interests in Tanganyika advocated Goser

Union as a solution to the depression, and continually reiterated that the expense of the

mandate would be fixed by an amalgamation of government functions. Several officials in

the Colonial Office worried that this line of reasoning was dangerous, but Cunliffe-Lister

responded that the “greater” interests of East Africa outweighed those of Tanganyika,

even if the PMCs goodwill was lost:

So long as Tanganyika is a separate political unit, it will always be possible to make capital of isolated cases where it would have been more advantageous, on a narrow view, for her to have acted as a separate economic unit - and to support such cases with figures. But can it be seriously doubted that, on a broad view, Tanganyika stands to gain by acting in the closest possible economic cooperation with the two northern territories, even if this does mean a sacrifice of her interests on some particular point or points?388

Therefore, by the 1930s development in Tanganyika was definitely of secondary

importance even among its former defenders in the Colonial Office.

However, as the depression deepened, the Colonial Office and the Tanganyika

government resolved to defend the development budget of Tanganyika using the mandate,

just as they had done in the 1920s.389 Even as Unionist Colonial Secretaries protected

Kenya’s interests, the Colonial Office and the governors attempted to sway the Treasury.

387 Mandates Section files, S1569, PMC distribution, Tanganyika file, 1934. Extract from E ast Africa 3 May 1934. See Chapter 3. 388 For a detailed file concerned with this issue, see CO 691/136/12,25089 part 2, various (FO to CO), 14 Feb. 1934. See also FO 371/18819, C21/21/18, CO to FO, 1 Jan 1935, minute by Cunliffe-Lister. 389 However, the Tanganyika Section of the Colonial Office did not give a complete picture of the financial condition of the mandate to the PMC It was not defending the mandate perse, but rather defending the territorial budget. See CO 691/124/4,31124 Jardine to CO, 10 March 1932. Green eliminated most discussion of the depression’s effect on services from the annual report draft. 153

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Deputy Governor D .J. Jardine sent several panicky memoranda to the Colonial Office

complaining that retrenchment would reduce the medical, education, and agricultural

department budgets by nearly a third. As a frequent accredited representative to Geneva,

he wondered how he could justify this to the PMO “I cannot myself see how the

Mandatory can announce that she cannot discharge her obligations, even on the scale

hitherto achieved, because she cannot extract sufficient revenue from the Mandated

Territory.” The mandate, he believed, should give Tanganyika a blank check to keep up

economic development.390 One Colonial Office official argued that

it is impossible to defend before the Permanent Mandates Commission or the House of Commons the reduction of inadequate social services for the natives in order to maintain payments of interest, largely from native taxes, to relieve taxation here. We can cut other services to the bone, but not these, and the Treasury will have to understand it.391

Another responded that “I suggest that the Treasury should be told that the Secretary of

State is not yet prepared to advise HMG to direct the Governor to ... withdraw social

services to a point which could only be defended before the PMC by asserting that Great

Britain is not in a position to fulfill [its] obligations.”392 The Treasury had already refused

to aid Palestine under a similar rationale, but the Colonial Office still attempted to use the

PMC as a weapon against the Treasury, arguing that the members would “take the view

39C The Colonial Office, while using the same tactic with the Treasury, did not want the PMC to become aware of the situation. Bottomley replied to Jardine that under no circumstances should he indicate to the PMC the scope of the budgetary crisis. So while the mandate could be used within the British government as a lever (however flimsy), the British attitude that most serious problems should be withheld from the PMC did not change. See OO 691/116/2,30050(part II) Symes to CO, 5 Aug. 1931, esp. item 46, “Minutes on memo by Mr. Jardine re: possible discussion of financial position at Geneva.” 391 CO 691/116/1, 30050, Cameron to CO, 30 Jan. 1931, “Draft Estimates, 1931-2.” Minute by Green. 392 OO 691/123/1, 31090(parts 1,11), Symes to OO, 11 Feb. 1932. 154

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. that [Britain], having accepted mandates for various territories, was under obligation to see

that such territories were provided with the necessary funds for development.”393

The Tanganyika government also attempted to use German colonization as a way

to gain additional aid from the Treasury. Most business interests in the mandate, such as

the Joint East African Board were greatly disturbed by the growing discussion of colonial

revision, as illustrated by the D aily MaiTs campaign to return the territory to Germany.394

Harold MacMichael, Syme’s successor, noted the evidence of a lack of confidence in

Tanganyika’s future to argue for a “substantial grant of financial assistance” as a way to

improve British confidence. His successor, Mark Young, two years later requested special

treatment from the Treasury specifically to limit the influence of the large German

community of settlers, but this was summarily denied by the Treasury.395

The Treasury absolutely refused to offer Tanganyika grants, nor would it allow the

interest payments on the mandate’s debt to be waived. Tanganyika’s administration was

forced to curtail development for the foreseeable future, including projects under

construction.396 In 1933, the Treasury demanded a balanced budget, which put the

Tanganyika government in the unenviable position of slashing £300,000 from the budget

while continuing to pay interest.397 Over the next several yean the budgets for education,

health, tsetse reclamation, and other development projects were sharply curtailed, and

393 CD 691/116/1, 30050. 394 CD 691/139/1, 25183, MacMichael to CD, 29 May 1934. 7 he Daily Mail was then owned by the Hitler admirer Lord Rothermere. 395 0 0 691/157/7, 42154 part one, Young to OO, 11 Dec. 1937. Hie Tanganyika Government “drew attention tot he subsidies given to the German coffee-growers against which it was difficult for the non- German growers to compete... he [Chief Secretary Sanford] hoped that k would be appreciated that these factors rendered the request for the repayment of the loans... most inopportune.” 396 In 1933 One Treasury Official remarked that “A grant-in-aid of £300,000 [to bridge the deficit for that year] was too high a price to pay for the privilege of the mandate.” See CD 691/126/7, 31265. 397 Hie Colonial Office minute: “Bloodless harlequins of finance!” See CD 691/129/1, 5051, Treasury to CD, 3 April 1933. 155

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. railroad maintenance and reinvestment were nearly eliminated.398 Ormsby-Gore, by then

Parliamentary Under-Secretary in the Colonial Office, echoed the prevailing view at the

Colonial Office regarding the Treasury’s intransigence:

The Treasury have for years resisted colonial development... because they have always regarded expenditure in colonies as a “drain” on the credit and resources of Great Britain rather than as opportunities for the development of a great estate, which we now say is a sacred trust of civilization but which the Treasury regard as an incubus. But colonial development does not consist merely in building railways into new and undeveloped country... but by wise expenditure on public health, scientific agriculture, education, etc. The history of all... Treasury controlled dependencies in the last thirty years has always shown the starvation of these life-giving services.399

Nevertheless the territory once again had to rely on the Treasury's loans and

previous guaranteed loan funds to cover its depression-era deficits: £500,000 in 1932

alone. In 1934, the Treasury finally agreed to allow the territory to waive a portion

(£ 125,000) of its interest payments, but by 1935, customs revenue was beginning to rise

again and Tanganyika could pay the interest due to the Exchequer. The governors took

the supposed end of the depression as a sign to resume loan-driven infrastructure projects.

MacMichael pushed hard for a further issue of £500,000 from the Palestine and East

Africa Guaranteed Loan fund, which would have added to the enormous debt service

problem.400 The next year Mark Young, his successor, attempted to access the Colonial

Development Fund to the tune of £3 million, which stunned the Treasury and Colonial

Office: “development is what got the territory into the debt mess.” More development

3,8 For one example of rail cutbacks, see OO 691/119/16, 30250A, Symes to OO, 15 Oct. 1931, in which the Colonial Office complained about the Territory's inability to find money for the reconstruction of the Ruvu Bridge and realigning the central railroad in the flood plain of the Ruvu river. 399 OO 323/1064, 61526, 23 Jan. 1929, regarding Ckser Union in East and Gerard Africa, Le. the Hlton Young Commission report. Minute by Ormsby-Gore. 400 OO 691/147/6,42011 part three, MacMichael to Co, 10 Feb. 1936. The Colonial Office, after much consideration, rejected the governor’s proposals. 156

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. with borrowed money before previous loans were paid off, the Colonial Office scoffed,

was “ridiculous.”401

The Colonial Office’s implication was clean the payment of the debt of the

territory was far more important than continuing development in any direction, much less

the improvement of African societies. However, even the Colonial office was amazed by

the Treasury’s treatment of the mandate. In 1938, Parliament considered a general

remission of colonial debts, but the Treasury refused to consider Tanganyika’s application.

Its reasoning was frank; Tanganyika was a scapegoat, forced to pay off its debts to prove

to Parliament that the colonial empire was not hopelessly crippled by the depression. It

might then be willing to forgive the debt of more important colonies with larger debts,

such as Kenya (with a £5.5 million debt).40* Colonial Office attempts to use the mandate

to protect Tanganyika had failed.

Evidence of the erosion of Tanganyika’s independent status as a mandate also lay

in the dilution of the previous restrictions on white settlement. By 1934 British fears

about German settlement and the desire to keep Tanganyika British drove MacMichael

and Cunliffe-Lister to remove features of Cameron’s land policy. They agreed to alienate

land at the discretion of the Governor, rather than continuing the restrictive auction

procedures Cameron had put in place to defend African grazing and hunting lands.403 This

effectively limited the ability of non-British citizens to purchase valuable plots near the

Lupa goldfields or in the valuable agricultural regions of the territory, but it had other

O O 691/161/3,42025, G O to Treasury, 1 April 1938 and 8 April 1938. 403 OO 691/163/14,42081, 14 Feb. 1938, Treasury Memorandum. 403 OO 691/140/6, MacMichael to OO, 9 Aug. 1934. Cunliffe-Lister wrote: “I would much rather give or refuse land at discretion... we don’t want anymore German Nazis than we can help." The 1934 changes removed the auction requirements for the long-term lease of land for areas of over 5000 acres, and for any

157

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. implications as well. It limited competition, enabled discrimination, speculation, and

ignored the economic-equality stipulations of the mandate. For these reasons, Cunliffe-

Lister demanded that the Governor take ultimate responsibility for the policy, so that the

Colonial Secretary could deny approving it before the PMC if necessary. Some Colonial

Office clerks disparaged the plan, worried about creating thousands of poor British

farmers who would represent such a failure that the PMC would take notice, but the

policy was used at least once before the Second World War.404

For the French mandates the fiscal effects of the depression although difficult,

were not nearly as catastrophic as in Tanganyika. This was partly due to France’s practice

of creating the caisses de reserve, which the Colonial Ministry used to m aintain its personnel

and budget. Additionally, beginning in 1935, each of the mandated territories was

required to contribute to the budget of the Colonial Ministry, a violation of the mandate

except under the broadest possible definition of “the interests of the mandate.”405 The

French also attempted to create an exclusive market for mandate products in France,

taking advantage of the depression to provide subsidies for mandate products exported on

area subject to potential speculation. The Governor could alienate land without auction and without prior advertisement. 404 CD 691/141/1,25253, MacMichael to GO, 7 Nov. 1934. At least one failed scheme that benefited white settlers was undertaken under this new law. Lord Chesham used the law, and his acquaintance with Governor MacMichael, to bail a partner of his, Major Dew, out of his failed Tanganyika farm. Chesham then used that farm as the core of a sixteen-square-mile settlement area, which MacMichael granted him for a nominal rent. Dew was appointed to the Tanganyika legislative council. The scheme was not widely publicized, although three papers were aware of it. Chesham received a great deal of land at a low rent, Dew sold his failed farm; Tanganyika was left with promises of “white settlement” and “development” that never materialized. The 0 0 allowed the scheme. See 0 0 691/148/3,42042, Lord Chesham to 0 0 ,2 Jan. 1936, and then 0 0 691/154/18, 42042, Lord Chesham to OO, 5 Feb. 1937. 405 Mandates Section Files S1617, French Togo 1921-38, Law of 30 Oct. 1935. Excerpt from the Journal Cffirid du Togo, 16 Dec. 1935. 158

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. French ships. Tliis aid to French shipping interests, which France used throughout the

mandate period, was also a violation of the economic-equality clauses of the mandates.''06

In the French mandates the depression struck later than in the British, but even so,

had a marked effect on the development of the two territories. One of the measures taken

by the Colonial Ministry in 1934 was the union between the posts of Gommissaire of

Togo and the Lieutenant Governor of Dahomey, who reported directly to the Governor

General of AOF.407 By 1931 deficits were draining the ozisse, and almost all development

projects were halted, including rail and public health projects, but with revenue falling

rapidly (by over 1.6 million francs in 1932), steady reductions in expenditure resulted, and

the Colonial Ministry encouraged officials to spend less than was budgeted.408 By 1933

Togo’s administration was once again proposing that the territory merge with Dahomey to

unify the bureaucracy and cut costs.409 In Cameroun the prestadan was raised from four

days labor a year to six days, or in cash from 8 francs to 18.410

As the table below illustrates, in both mandates the ozisse was drained completely

by 1935, and did not recover before the end of World War II. Revenue from both

indirect and direct taxes stagnated or collapsed between 1931-1936; in the case of

Cameroun the value of the ozpitatian fell by 11 million francs between 1933 and 1935, with

indirect taxes falling three million during the same period.

40,1 The PMC noted, but did not protest, this practice during the depression jears. See ANSOM FM 18, Carton 25, Dossier 225. See also ANSOM, FM 18, Carton 4, Dossier 42, Gaston-Joseph (Director of DAPCA) to Merchant Marine, No. 223,2 Apr. 1931. See also Minutes of the Autumn, 1936 session of the PMC 407 In 1937, the Governor General of AOF became High Commissioner for Togo, and the Administrateur Superior of Togo became the Commissaire. While politically placing the Gommissaire of Togo under the titular authority of the Governor General of AOF, the further measure was not financially significant. See ANSOM, FM 66, Carton 2706, Dossier 3, Anete of 20 July 1937. See Chapter 2. 408 ANSOM FM 18, Carton 4, Dossier 40, “Political, Economic, and Financial situation of Togo, 1935." 409 ANSOM FM 66, Carton 2700, Dossier 2, Interim Commissaire of Togo (De Guise) to MQ DAPCA, No. 443, 28 Nov. 1932. 159

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. j 31 Mav, Year In Caisse Totals Liquid Portfolio ! 1925 22,296,256.88 20,598,338.53 1,637,918.35 1926 32,383,858.37 19,135,940.02 12,397,916.35 1927 23,567,017.24 4,969,108.89 18,597,918.35 1928 21,106783.23 11,507,864.88 9,597,918.35 1929 23,114,344.47 13,416,326.12 9,897,912.35 1930 15,683,534.96 8,860,616.61 6,822,918.35 1931 9779715.51 8754715.51 1,125,000 1932 8750,876.29 8,147,376.29 603,600 1933 7,343,900.40 6,790,400.40 553,500 1934 6,533,314.45 5,979,814.45 11 1935 553p00 0 11 1936 627,191.41 73,691.41 it 1937 4,362,636.22 3,809,136.22 11

Table 4.2: Caisse de reserve levels, French Togo, 1925-37*"

Taxes in the French mandates remained comparable to those in the rest of the

French African empire, but at the height of the depression Africans protested the steep

reduction in social services. In Cameroun, Marchand complained that Africans had a poor

understanding of the crisis and could not understand why they had to produce more and

sell for less/12 In French Togo the situation was not as critical, but Africans used to a high

level of prosperity sent numerous anonymous letters to colonial inspectors that

Bonnecarrere was wasting resources with unnecessary projects: “Togo used to be the

41C ANSOM, FM 66, Canon 608, Dossier 22. 411 ANSOM, FM 66, Canon 2702, Dossier unique, “Gompte definitif,” 22 Aug. 1937. 412 ANSOM, FM 66, Canon 2535, Dossier 5, Marchand to MC, DAPCA, 22 June 1930. Marchand was also alarmed over that he did not understand how Cameroun would maintain its revenue in depressionary conditions, especially when its production of rubber, coffee, and oils were undercut in price by Brazil and the East Indian colonies. 160

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. richest colony of its type, but under the French mandate it is depopulated and empty.”413

In the later 1930s a group calling itself the “Comite du Guide de Togo” presented a

petition to the administration demanding a return to the pre-1934 situation, with better

education and the suppression of unemployment.414

In 1931, the French government approved the first of a series of government

loans to aid the colonial empire, with Togo and Cameroun receiving 105 million francs.415

By 1934 the depression in the French mandates was bad enough that the French

government attempted to maintain public works spending by guaranteeing another 84

million franc loan for Oceania, Djibouti, and Cameroun, from which Cameroun obtained

25 million. These loans provided valuable money for infrastructure, but also paid a

considerable portion of the capital raised into the caisse to cover previous deficit

spending.416 The two mandates also had to pay debt service charges for the first time. As

in the British mandates, the problem was that private investors and banks were reluctant

to loan money to primary producers in a mandate with an indefinite future; a fifth of the

money was allotted to plantation relief. As the justification for the loan stated: “credit is

missing at the moment when it is most necessary.” A third loan in 1937 provided more

413 ANSOM, FM 66, Canon 2662, Dossier 5 (“Mission de M Franceschi, observateur fran^ais”), “Les Habitants du Togo” to Colonial Ministry, 11 Feb. 1931, and “Conference de M Franceschi avec les notables de Lome,” No. 254, 18 Feb. 1931. 414 A N S O M FM 66, Canon 610, Dossier 4, Memo by DAPCA, no date, no number. This set of demands was never transmitted as a petition to the League. 415 Law of 22 Feb. 1931, which authorized 3.9 billion (milliard) francs for Indochina, AOF, Madagascar, and Togo-Cameroun. 73 million francs went to Togo, 32 million to Cameroun. Most of the loan money was allocated for railroads in Togo and Cameroun. See ANSOM FM 66, Carton 2700, Dossier 1, “Budget Exercise 1932." 416 ANSOM FM 66, Canon 2695, “Law of 20 Jan. 1934.” 161

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. for infrastructure and hygiene than relief, indicating that the need for government aid had

passed/17

These loans from the French government partially ameliorated the effects of the

depression in Cameroun. Budgets began to show surpluses quickly, Cameroun had only

one year of actual deficit, although loan proceeds and the caisse provided much of the

revenue in the later 1930s. More significantly, wages rose, and the government found it

difficult to recruit laborers for the railroads by 1937, indicating that unemployment was

shrinking and the economy strengthening (but also dissaffection growing). The French

mandates profited from the depreciations of the franc, whereas in the British mandates

the Treasury’s reluctance to depreciate the pound left Tanganyika crippled with high real

interest payments.

Part III: The PMC’s reaction to French and British Development

The Permanent Mandates Commission favored steady, if not rapid, economic

development in the B mandates. Its secondary concern was for development in a

“proper” direction, i.e. to prevent development from turning the mandates into colonies

by creating a pattern of financial dependence on the metropole or a situation where the

revenues of the mandate were being taken out of the territory as profit. Thus the PMCs

ignorance of the true state of affairs regarding Tanganyika’s debt was important: its

scrutiny' and supervision were necessary to prevent a situation in which monies were

extracted from Tanganyika in the form of interest payments and prejudicial customs duties

■"7 The 1937 loan was for 159 million francs, and included only 3 million for agricultural loans, but 105 million for infrastructure and 40 million for hygiene and sleeping sickness measures. ANSOM, FM 66, Carton 2695, Dossier 9. The real value of the loan was in the neighborhood of 25 million 1934 francs. 162

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. for Kenya.418 The PMC was neither designed nor developed to fulfill this intention. In

the specific case of Tanganyika no PMC member ever criticized the British or requested

any changes.

Early in its tenure the PMC did attempt to elicit precise and specific information

about the financial situation in the B mandates, but the mandatory powers rarely offered

details of their development policies. The finances of British Togo and the British

Cameroons were difficult to ascertain because they were governed as parts of the Gold

Coast and Nigeria. The British consistendy refused to utilize the colonial bureaucracy to

provide accurate information on revenue and expenditure in their West African mandates.

Instead, they provided the PMC with “estimates” simply based on the percentage of the

population in the mandates compared to the population and expenditure of the larger

colony. The PMC complained that

on the one hand, it is unable to inform the Council whether the administration of the two mandated territories shows a deficit or surplus, and on the other it has not been able to ascertain with sufficient clearness whether the efforts accomplished with a view to ensuring the wellbeing of the natives, especially in matters of education and public health are in full accordance with the nature of the protective mission undertaken by the mandatory powers.419

The Mandates Section compiled budget figures periodically from the mandate reports, but

the mandatory powers seldom presented the PMC with detailed financial breakdowns.

Thus, while PMC specifically criticized French budgets in the 1920s and worried about the

418 See Chapter 3, “Loans.” Orts wrote in 1923 that “The action of any mandatory state which, by reason of its mandate, should establish within the territory and administration of which has been entrusted to it a government undertaking of an industrial or commercial character, the profits of which would be included in the budget of the home territory of the mandated state, would be contrary to the spirit of disinterestedness which is the distinguishing feature of the mandates system.” CPM 62, “Questions discussed and decisions taken by the PMC during its third session,” 25 June, 1923. The railroads were not the specific topic of Orts’ memorandum, but the principle was clear that the PMC did not want to see resources flow from the mandate to the metropolitan country.

163

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. caisse system, it had to accept French assurances that the revenue would be used for the

territory.✓ *

The PMC also did not draw much attention to either French or British attempts to

keep valuable projects or resources for themselves before and during the depression. In

1929, Kastl complained that the French were preventing German firms from placing

tender offers for Cameroun projects by advertising them in German papers only days

before the deadline, but the practice continued.421 Regarding Tanganyika, the Colonial

Office kept several economic opportunities secret from non-British firms, which violated

the economic-equality clauses, but it kept these from the PMC as well. It recommended

the East African Goldfields, Ltd. company as a good investment risk to private British

financiers in order to keep the company solvent and channel gold production towards

Britain. It also encouraged British sisal concerns by encouraging private investors to

finance the British Consolidated Sisal Esates of East Africa, Ltd.422 However, as Chapter

3 indicates, some members of the PMC consistendy refused to exert surveillance over the

decisions by the mandatoiy powers.423

At least one petitioner attempted to draw the PMCs attention toward the perils of

development in the B mandates. Between 1933-35, Marius J. Fortie, an American writer,

urged the PMC to scrutinize the mandatories’ conduct with three petitions.424 Fortie, who

was familiar with the PMCs records and the reports of the mandatory powers, made an

419 CPM 190, Nov. 1924, “Draft Observations with regard to B mandated territories [British Cameroons and Togo].” 420 See the post-mortem assessment of the 1925 session of the PMC by Duchene, AE, Serie SDN, Dossier 621, Duchene to Foreign Ministry, No. 482,9 July 1925. 421 LON Registry Files, R2337, LON document 6a. 19236.2705, Friis to Kasd, 3 April 1930. 422 On the Lupa Goldfields, see particularly OO 691/136/12,25089 part 2. 423 See Chapter 3 on Qoser Union.

164

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. incisive critique of the British administration in Tanganyika, as well as the impact of its

economic development. Fortie criticized the PMC and the mandatory powers for

interpreting the “moral and material welfare of the native population” solely in terms of

economic development, without considering the dangers to African societies. In fact, he

feared the consequences of the very basic goal of creating a colonial economy through

taxation and the use of money. He condemned a recent British tax increase as

another step in the process of forcing the Tanganyikan Native into an alien money economy that destroys the most valuable and unreplaceable [sic] elements of a native culture based on a non-competitive communal activity. Money economy is our product, and among us the evils of greed and of the love of money are greater today than ever... the White man is not justified in forcing his money economy on the Tanganyikan native; forcing it on him so rapidly that there is no time for understanding, adjustment, assimilation...425

Taxes, he argued, coerced Africans into an artificial pattern of development:

Instead of increasing the pressure of taxation to compel him to do work he does not like, and from which he derives no real benefit; instead of compelling him, under threats of fines, to raise cash crops and neglect his food crops and husbandry, he should be carefully helped to improve his methods in accordance with the conditions under which he lives... much of his land is taken away from him because, it is alleged, he makes no good use of it... too much revenue is expended to introduce foreign and cash crops ... which at best, compel the native to work in order to obtain tax money, and make him compete unfairly with communities on higher standards of living ... [he] becomes more and more a mere serf of the White Man and of the Hindu, a slave of money.426

Fortie’s solution was tighter supervision from a PMC sympathetic to African interests. He

wanted the PMC to place an observer from a non-mandatory country in Tanganyika to see

that the spirit of the mandate was respected.

424 Fortie owned a plantation near Tanga before the war and went on several safaris in Tanganyika in the 1930s. 425 CPM 1692, “Petition dated June 9, 1935, from Mr. MJ. Fortie, Washington,” 23 July 1935. The British law concerning the increase in the poll-tax is Tanganyika ordinance No. 20 of 1934. 426 CPM 1692. 165

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. However, the PMC refused to engage Fortie’s critique of the desirability of

economic development and rejected his admonition that it should more closely regulate

development practices. The British defended their development policies as the necessary

sacrifices for economic progress in an expanding world economy;

The introduction of economic systems differing in some respects from those which preceded them is an inevitable result of the advent of civilization and the establishment of European rule in Africa, and the cultivation of valuable crops such as coffee and cotton... has inevitably placed on native labor and possessions a value which is measured by the peasant in terms of money. Whether he was happier under a system whereby he obtained his requirements by barter and rendered tribute to his chief in service and labor is a matter of opinion, and, in any case, an “alien money economy’ cannot now be displaced in Tanganyika, or indeed, in any other part of Africa.427

This rationale appealed to the PMC rapporteur, the Baron van As beck (Dutch member of

the PMQ, who stated that “I think, after reading the admirable annual report for 1935 and

hearing the accredited representative, the Commission will declare itself satisfied with the

refutations contained in the mandatory power’s observations.”428 The PMC accepted

Britain’s view that development was in the hands of the mandatory powers. It had, in fact,

rejected the idea that its own mission required any appraisal of the value of French or

British economic policy, and left in the hands of the mandatory powers the “material and

moral well-being” of the African population.

427 FO to PMC, FO VTO16/1/98, 8 Feb. 1936. See also CPM 1754, “Petitions from Mr. M[ Fortie, dated June 9, 1935 (CPM 1692), July 30, 1935 (CPM 1695), and Oct. 15, 1935 (CPM 1743) - Letter, dated Feb. 8, 1936, from the Government of the UK, transmitting its observations on the above petitions, together with two annexes on the activities of the petitioner,” 13 Feb. 1936. 428 CPM 1794, “Petitions dated June 9, July 30 and Oct. 15,1935, from Mr. MJ Fortie, Washington (CPM 1692,1695,1743,1754) Report by van .Asbeck,” 9 June 1936. The Baron van Asbeck replaced van Rees as the Dutch member in 1935. 166

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Conclusion: The Interests of Development

The basic issue of economic development in the B mandates was the inherent

conflict between the interests of the mandatory powers and the interests of the mandated

territories themselves. The mandates system depended on a delicate relationship between

the mandatory powers and the PMC However, a concerted supervision of economic

development required adequate information and cooperation between Geneva and

London and Paris. The mandatory powers refused to neglect their interests and frequently

refused to limit their policies or open their administrations to scrutiny.

It would have been surprising had economic development evolved in the spirit of

Article 22. Nevertheless, the commission’s supervision sometimes bore fruit. In some

cases, such as the amalgamation of French Togo with AOF and the encouragement of

African production in Tanganyika, the mandatory powers attempted to mold development

to the idea that governance should be in the “material and moral well-being” of the

African population. However, economic development was the aspect of administration

where it was hardest for Paris and London to ignore the advantages of holding the

mandates. It was especially difficult for colonial establishments to favor the mandate over

vociferous settler populations or their trading and financial companies. This was one of

the many obstacles blocking the internationalist goal of a “disinterested” administration.

Another was the world depression, which hampered economic development and forced

the powers into difficult fiscal choices. By the late 1930s, the polices based on respect for

the mandates’ economic well-being had eroded or been abandoned.

Even in the boom years of the 1920s economic development was not always

undertaken on behalf of the mandated territories. In the case of Tanganyika, the politics

167

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of the empire helped create an informal policy of dependence. Tanganyika’s growth was

constrained by Kenya’s demands which neither its governors nor the Colonial Office

could always withstand. During the depression, the Treasury, a third actor, also forced

Tanganyika down a path of debt and dependence on Kenya, overriding the protests of the

Colonial Office officials and the mandate’s governors. In Cameroun, the French strict

control over the wage and price structure enabled it to develop the territory but was hardly

in the interests of the African population.

When the PMC did exert itself, for instance in response to Raymond Buell’s

controversial book and the BIPDI petition, it was capable of interrogating the mandatory

powers on their development practices. Such opportunities were rare. The mandatory

powers found it easy to evade the commission over development simply because their

policies were complicated and the information could easily be disguised in bland

generalities. As the Fortie petitions demonstrate, the PMC in the 1930s approached its role

less rigorously. As its own resources dwindled along with those of the depression-era

League, the PMC was less inclined to delve into long-standing policies or scrutinize arcane

data. Its members were also less experienced and less committed to the task. Finally, part

of the difficulty came from the ambiguous terms of the mandates themselves. Tanganyika

may have suffered from the customs union with Kenya, but such a customs union

conformed to the mandate. The mandatory power had the legal authority to maintain

such an arrangement even if it was demonstrably clear that it did not help Tanganyika’s

fiscal health.

168

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SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: LABOR, EDUCATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY

The institution of the mandates is based essentially upon a recognized distinction between the advanced civilization of the mandatory power and the less highly developed condition of the population placed upon its guardianship.

The Marquis Theodoli, President of the PMC, 192 2*N

Development was as much a social and ideological as an economic question. In

other parts of their African empires both France and Britain had a history of creating

schools, health services, and labor regulations to foster local development. Although

policies to support and educate the African population brought no short-term direct

economic benefits to the mandatory powers, they were necessary to preserve the labor

supply and provide educated workers for medical and administrative posts. In the B

mandates, the mandatory powers were obliged not only to prepare the mandates for self-

government but also to protect the “material and moral well-being” of the African

population. The League Covenant and the mandate agreements therefore established one

set of goals and limits within which the mandatory powers established labor, education,

and health policies which were to form the basis of African independence.

■439 Minutes of the 2nd Session, 86. (1922) 169

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. On the other hand, Britain and France framed a second set of limits for their

social policies, which did not conform to those of the mandates. Their concern was the

integration of Africa into their African empires. Thus, the foundation of their social

policies was that African welfare was best served by participating in the colonial economy.

To advance, Africans had to acquaint themselves with the benefits of European

civilization over a long period. The two mandatory powers were therefore reluctant to

accelerate African development with lavish, expensive social services. In this way social

policy was also subordinated to European economic interests.

Like economic interests, European racial and paternalistic ideas also contributed to

the limits on the growth and evolution of social policy in the B mandates. The mandates

system aimed at the independence of territories inhabited by Africans. This was

incompatible with the recent association or dual mandate ideas, and anathem a to traditional

imperialists such as Kenyan or Southern African setders. Thus, the mandatory powers did

not reconcile the mandates with imperialism; while accepting the need for modernization

and paying lip service to the goal of independence, they took few potentially radical

measures to prepare the mandates for self-government. Rather, they insisted on social

policies that would not threaten their political supremacy.

Hence, there was a largely insurmountable obstacle separating established colonial

attitudes and practices and the social development envisaged by the new mandates. The

conflict intensified after Germany entered the League, the Great Depression erupted, and

Germany, Japan, and Italy left Geneva. Germany’s presence on the PMC between 1927-

33 increased criticism of the mandatory powers. The Great Depression devastated

colonial finances and reduced all social services in each B mandate. The exit of the future

170

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Axis powers from the mandates system strengthened the ability of the mandatory powers

to resist an increasingly feeble PMC

Social development was also the League’s greatest challenge because its long-term

consequences affected the entire colonial world. It was the PMCs task to defend the goal

of preparing Africans for self-government. It focused on social development issues such

as education, the development of a free labor system, the eradication of alcoholism and

the improvement of public health. The League was especially concerned about the French

pm tatian, or labor tax, and about labor recruiting, conditions at work sites, and low

wages.430 Some members also often criticized the mandatories’ health and educational

polices, urging them to do more, often for political reasons.431 Others supported the

established colonial perspective, insisting that social development required the work of

centuries and supporting the French and British efforts to retain their mandates as de facto

colonies. Indeed, one of the commission’s major internal weaknesses was its division over

social policies.432

TTie social policies practiced in the African mandates were neither experimental,

nor innovative. The PMC failed to stimulate a new set of policies designed to lead

Africans toward independence. It bowed to the fact that the mandatory powers would

430 For one example see CPM 275, Lugard, no date (1922), “Economic development of mandated territories in relation to the well-being of the natives.” Lugard attempted to define how economic development could be carried out without destroying African societies because of excessive hard labor and “European methods.” 431 On forced labor, see Mandates Section Files, S298, Philip Baker to Eric Drummond, William Rappard, and Joost Van Hamel [Legal Counsel to the Secretary General], 20 Dec. 1920: “The truth is that labor can always be obtained in Africa if a large enough wage is offered. Moreover, public works for which forced labor is taken are usually for the benefit of white and not native areas. There are, therefore, strong a priori reasons for prohibiting such forced labor altogether.” See also AE, Serie SDN, Dossier 621, MC (Albert Duchene) to MF, No. 374, 30 June 1926, on the intrusiveness of PMC questions, and No. 482,9 July 1925, “Session de la Commission des Mandats de la SDN, Examen de la gestion fran^aise au Cameroun et au Togo,” for early French complaints about PMC questions regarding the p reta d a i 432 See Wright 219-259 for one example of the sharp debates over social policy. 171

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. not commit significant resources to African welfare, allowed violations, and permitted the

French and British to link the B mandates ideologically, as well as economically, to their

larger empires.

Part I: The Bases of Social Policy in the African Mandates

German administrators in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had shared

the paternalistic attitudes of the other colonial powers. By 1914 the governments in Togo,

German East Africa, and Kamerun had only begun to construct the infrastructure

necessary for organized social policies. In the decades before the war, each territory had

experienced widespread unrest. Largely in response, the Germans reformed their colonial

administration, passing legislation to improve public health and education and regulating

the supply of labor less harshly.

As a result, in each of the three German colonies social services were growing, but

from a very basic level. In Kamerun, the Germans had begun constructing hospitals and

climes in the coastal regions in order to control malaria and other diseases.433 European

doctors, missionaries, and teachers came to the territory in small numbers.434 In 1914

there were 41,500 pupils in mission schools, and 1,000 in seven government schools.435

However, the continuation of harsh labor policies emphasizing compulsory work on

public works projects and plantations, the spread of sleeping sickness, and a sharp

433 LeVine 29-30. 434 DeLancey 12-13. 433 Suret-Canale, 378-9. See also LeVine 72. LeVine’s numbers are slightly different than Suret-Canale’s. LeVine: four government schools with 833 pupils, 631 mission schools with 49,000 pupils. Hiis was still a fraction of the school-age population, probably less than 5% of the school-age population. Estimates vary, but the population of Kamerun may have been as much as 4 million with over 900,000 school-age children. 172

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. population decline indicate that Germany’s policies before the war were less than

successful.436

In Togo, the German government allocated little money to health and other social

services, about 6% of the yearly budget.437 The territory was entirely without running

water. Sleeping sickness was rampant; the German government sent three doctors and

several technicians to treat over one thousand cases between 1909 and 1914, and these

doctors informed Berlin that they feared future epidemics.438 Still, the Germans controlled

smallpox and malaria and established four government hospitals. In 1914 there were

12,000 mission school pupils, but no government schools.

Before 1906, in German East Africa forced labor was widely used to compel

Africans to collect rubber and ivory, leading to the Maji Maji revolt. In the years after the

rebellion the Germans built up a small, but growing infrastructure of hospitals, schools,

and work camps to deal with the economic collapse caused by the unrest.439 By 1914,

health services were beginning to recover, and education was greatly expanded. By 1913,

there were 99 government schools with 6,000 students and another 1,830 mission schools

with 108,000 students.440

After the war, the British and French brought a wealth of colonial experience with

them to Togo, Cameroun, and Tanganyika. Each had its well-developed colonial ideology

and set of policies followed in different parts of its own colonial empire. The British

436 DeLancey, 13-15. 437 Arthur Knoll, Togo Under Irrperial Germtny, (Stanford: 1978), 87. 438 Knoll 89-90. 439 Helge Kjekshus, E oology Catnd andEam ric Deidapnm mEast African History, (London, 1978,1996), chapter 2, passim Maji Maji caused a general population decline, widespread famine, and the destruction of hospitals, dispensaries, and research stations. Some regions were depopulated, which in turn aggravated other ecological disasters, particularly the spread of tsetse fly belts. 440 O O 691/29,24682, Byatt to O O, 15 April 1920. Memo on German education. 173

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. “dual mandate” and the French assmtlatian and association concepts were the bases of social

development in their colonial empires and the B mandates. Over the interwar period

there were many international and economic changes that altered the details of these

policies and the ideologies behind them, but they remained consistent because of political

inertia, economic benefits, and fiscal pressures.

Paris centered its social development policies on the assirriladan and assodadan

principles. Both conceptions emphasized permanent French control over the African

population. This would foster the consistent French goal of integrating its mandates and

colonies into the French cultural sphere and economy. The French mandate

governments, like their colonial counterparts, had no intention of inspiring Africans to

seek self-government or independence. Several authors also point out that French

colonial ideas rarely resulted in generously-funded programs for the African population.

In other words, France’s social policies for labor, education, and the public health were

not ends, but means.441

French social development was also harnessed to the mandates’ economic needs.

Because the French mandate economy relied on African workers for its prosperity, French

social development policies were designed to maintain an African labor supply.442 The

assirriladan policy had concentrated on the limited education of a few Africans, but had not

applied sizeable resources to education or public health.443 After the war Sarraut’s

assoaadan idea encouraged the social development of Africans through education and

public hygiene, but administrators provided these mainly to the chiefs. The French did

441 D. K. Fieldhouse, “The Economic Exploitation of Africa,” in Prosser and Louis, eds., France and B rita n in A fiu n , 597-8, 622. 442 See chapter 3. Other discussions of the basis o f French social policy can be found in Mark DeLancey, Carreroan Dependence and Independent, (San Francisco, 1989), 23-25, and Conklin chapters 4 and 5. 174

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. not make resources available for broad education and health initiatives in the mandate

period because many policymakers feared the consequences.444 Moreover, they considered

the mandates no less than the colonies subordinate to the fiscal needs of the

government. 445

The British view of social development was based on the “dual mandate,” which

postulated that prolonged exposure to European administration would give Africans the

benefits of civilization providing they adapted to European economic and social values. It

aimed at improving the quality of African life, but Africans had first to be trained in

civilization to improve their welfare. The mandate report for Togo in 1920-21 notes:

The native [in Togo] as a rule has more spontaneity and less application, more intuition and less reasoning power, than the inhabitant of temperate climes. In early life the native, compared with the European, appears precocious and acquires knowledge and faculty until he arrives at the age of puberty, when the physical nature masters the intellect, and frequendy completely deadens it... they have no letters, aits, or science. They can imitate, but they cannot invent or even apply.446

Other commentators in Parliament and commercial venues openly linked African welfare

to British economic gain. Lugard argued that education should produce “happiness and

progress” but also admitted that “European brains, capital, and energy have not been and

never will be expended in developing the resources of African from motives of pure

philanthropy.”447 Critics in temperance and missionary organizations certainly disagreed

with the mercantilist aspect of the dual mandate, but they agreed that Africans needed

help achieving civilization and “maturity.”448 They even agreed with the British

443 Conklin 177-187. 444 Conklin 61-68,194-5,220. 445 Fieldhouse, 622-3. 446 LONMR for British Togo, 1920-21,7-8. 447 Penelope Hetherington, Bndsh Patermlismand Ajwu, (London, 1978), 49. 448 Hetherington 54-56. 175

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. government that the problems of administration were at least in part due to the

backwardness of Africans. Both the British and the French were therefore engaged in the

work of civilizing Africans, but they did so according to their own ideological precepts,

and generally ignored those of the mandates system.

The League developed no set policy on social development, and the PMC and

mandates section relied on the Covenant and the terms of the mandates as a guide to their

observations on French and British practices. Articles 22,23, and the formal mandates

laid out several principles on social policy. Article 22 set out the principle of African

development in preparation for independence. Article 23, the labor article of the

Covenant, prohibited abusive and exploitative labor practices and demanded “fair and

humane” conditions for colonial workers, and the individual mandates also contained

similar prohibitions.449 However, there were no direct, explicit instructions on the

League’s expectations of the mandatory administrations.

This placed a large burden on the Permanent Mandates Commission. As in the

issue of petitions, the PMC was not well-equipped to handle such a task, for two main

reasons. The first was because of its dependence on the mandatory powers. In order to

make cogent observations, the PMC depended on the mandate reports. Each year, Dar-

es-Salaam, Lome, Yaounde and Accra reported on public health, labor policies, ecological

problems, the progress of education, and the financial resources devoted to social policies.

Yet, as in other areas, these reports gave the PMC an uneven view of the state of social

services. This was because the mandatory’powers were reluctant to give public opinion,

especially German opinion, ammunition for criticism of their administration. Therefore,

449 Wright 597-611. See below. 176

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. without arguing that their rule in the B mandates was flawless, the mandatories’ reports to

the League stressed a constant social progress in the face of great difficulties/50 The PMC

may have suspected this, but never established an alternative source of information.

The second limitation on the PMC was its own membership. This was its most

important asset, but also, over time, a liability. The commission was drawn largely from

the same pool of talent as colonial administrators. Therefore, both the powers and many

members of the commission saw social development in the same terms.451 Some members

often collaborated with the mandatory powers to justify existing policy and to blur the

distinction between the new mandates system and traditional imperial practices. In the

early years of the system this was not the case, but over time PMCs members grew older

and even more supportive of the French and British. After the exit of the Germans and

Italians, critics and dedicated League supporters were in a minority. As a result, the

commission lacked the tools to change social policies in the mandates and its successes

were rare.

450 See, for one example, 0 0 724/2, 16783,20 March 1925, Governor of Gold Coast (Guggisberg) to OO, “Annual Report on the British Sphere of Togoland for 1924.” See also ANSOM, FM 18, Carton 4, Dossier 43, Commissaire of Cameroun to MC, no number, 15 March 1933, advising French administrators to avoid any references to forced labor (“travail force”) in the Gamerouns. 451 The best discussion is “The Material Basis of Colonial Society, 1900-1940,” in Bill Freund, TheMakir%

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Part II: Labor Policy

The development of the colonies’ labor supply constitutes the essential factor in their economic prosperity. The examination of the best methods to encourage this growth makes it the object of concern for the metro pole and the local authorities and reveals its marked immediacy at the moment when the government intensifies the production of primary products and demands that its distant possessions contribute to the national economic welfare.

- French Colonial Ministry to Commissaire Marchand, 17 Nov. 1928452

Cheap labor was vital to the colonial economy. European plantations required a

large supply of labor, typically more than a local populace could provide. Migration from

other parts of the territory was necessary, but potentially expensive in terms of lives and

diminished food production. Thus, colonial administrators regulated African labor to

ensure efficient cash crop production and an adequate food supply, and to prevent

adverse consequences in other regions.

In each of B mandates, African production was a critical aspect of the economy.

However, despite differences in their policies, neither mandatory power placed African

welfare above other concerns. This remained the case throughout the period because no

matter what the economic situation, Africans were the only source of workers for any

chosen project. Despite changing economic and political circumstances, British and

French administrators refused to alter their policies in the mandates and justified them as

valuable methods of fostering civilization.

The French and British did litde to create favorable conditions for African labor.

In Cameroun, French development policy was similar to that in its other colonies, and its

452 “Le developpement de la main d'oeuvre aux colonies consume le facteur essentiel de leur prosperite economique. L'examen des moyens propres a favoriser cet accroissement fait l'objet des preoccupations de la Metropole et des pouvoirs locaux et revet un caractere d'actualite ires marque au moment ou le Gouvemement intensifie la production des matieres premieres et demande a ses possessions lointaines de

178

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. labor policy followed suit. Both French mandates, in fact, used the prestadan, adopted

from AOF and AEF, to ensure a plentiful, inexpensive, labor supply. In the two Togos

the mandatory governments encouraged labor migration to plantations or mines. Only in

Tanganyika did British administrators in the 1920s attempt to regulate labor differently.

Governor Cameron created a Labor Department to protect Africans from abuses and

ensure that African production remained unharmed by labor migration to coastal

plantations. However, Governor Symes dismantled the department during the Great

Depression in an attempt to increase the labor supply for European plantations. Later

governors refused to reinstate it despite the recommendations of the Colonial Office and

the PMC

Labor policy was especially critical in the two largest mandates, where plantations

clashed with the local production economy.453 In these territories the problem of labor

was political as well as economic. Settlers and advocates of imperial integration not only

viewed labor as a valuable tool for increasing their wealth but also saw the regulation of

labor as a defining aspect of the overall future of the mandates. An African population

coerced or convinced to work for Europeans instead of making an independent living

would cement the British or French character of the mandate because it would indicate

the supremacy and indispensability of settlers. In other words, a tightly regulated labor

supply dependent on setder plantations would further the aim of transforming the

mandates into colonies by turning Africans into employees and subjects, not independent

economic agents.

contribuer au relevement economique national.” ANSOM, FM 66, Canon 2689, Dossier 5, MC to Marchand, No. 5916,17 Nov. 1928. 453 See Chapter 4. 179

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In each of the mandates the exact circumstances of the post-war labor situation

differed, as did the evolution of labor policies. British Togo became a reservoir of labor

for the Gold Coast, but its small population limited the number of plantations.

Tanganyika’s circumstances were very different. Its large size, unevenly distributed

population, and white setder community made every major labor decision a potential

crisis even before PMC supervision complicated policy choices. In the French mandates

the problems were similar but the policy solutions were very different. French policies

openly directed labor for the benefit of the state even when the result was condemnation

by the PMC

The PMC displayed conflicting attitudes toward labor issues. The mandates

forbade most forced labor and demanded regulations designed to prevent Africans from

being coerced into working on European plantations. However, the PMCs membership

also sympathized with French and British desires to build the mandates’ economies by

strictly controlling the flow of African labor. Therefore the PMC often accepted British

or French rationalizations for using forced labor as well as other policies that threatened

the spirit of the mandates. Only occasionally did it criticize some of their practices.

The creation of British Togo came as a great windfall to the British Gold Coast

Colony, which suffered chronic labor shortages in its southern section. British Togolese

laborers for the Gold Coast mines provided a ready supply that could be tapped with a

minimum of effort, and there were soon thousands of migrants from the southern and

central portions of British Togo to theore mines in the Gold Goast.454 Labor conditions

were poor, with high incidences of nutritional and venereal disease because of the

454 GO 96/601. The population of British Togo was estimated at 150,000. 180

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. migration, but wages were high and Gold Coast workers were also affected by diseases at

the work sites.455 Britain insisted, in its reports to the League, that African inhabitants

were familiar with venereal diseases and so downplayed the consequences of their labor

migration.456

In Tanganyika, Britain had to balance the demands of European settlers with their

own aim of establishing a “black man’s country’ governed by indirect rule. Plantation

owners demanded wage controls as well as virtually unrestricted permission for their

recruiters to entice labor from other parts of the territory. In addition, plantation owners

desired labor contracts to run for up to 500 days, with laborers “consigned to the estates”

for the entire period and desertion a jailable offense. The coffee planters of Kilimanjaro

insisted on the continuation of forced labor that the Germans had legalized temporarily

during the war or else they would be ruined.457 Governor Byatt eliminated these practices,

limiting forced labor to a punishment for tax evasion: “compulsory labour. . . does not

exist, and will not be countenanced, in this territory... forced labour, if it can be so

described, is exacted from natives generally who, having made no attempt to obtain paid

employment, deliberately default in their payment of their hut tax.”458

Governor Byatt regulated labor using the Masters and Servants Ordinance (1922),

adapted from similar legislation used in India, Nigeria, and other British colonies with

large indigenous populations. As settler complaints indicate, this ordinance was successful

455 GO 96/730/3, 31215,18 Aug. 1936, “Medical report for 1936." 456 LONMR for British Togo, 1920-21,17: “there is no professional prostitution in the territory, the reason for this being that the morals of the people are so lax that what amounts to practically promiscuous fornication is so common that there is no room for such a class." See also LONMR for British Togo, 1923, 64. 457 0 0 691/23, 54894, Lewa Rubber Estates Ltd. to OO, 1 Aug. 1919;GO 691/21,25040, Greek Planters’ Union petition, 12 March 1919.

181

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. in protecting African labor. It regelated child labor, limited migrant labor agreements to

six months, and prevented the detention of plantation workers beyond their contract.459 It

also regulated labor recruiters, paid by plantation owners to provide workers, who were

constrained from creating press-gangs, making false promises of high wages, and

committing other abuses. Finally, it required medical examinations certifying that workers

were well enough to travel to their employment.

Byatt’s successor Donald Cameron also recognized that the territory’s condition

necessitated formal arrangements to preserve its labor supply.460 British surveys of

Tanganyika conducted in the early 1920s indicated that it was sparsely populated,

containing many different terrains and ethnicities, and its population had declined under

German rule. Early British attempts to use Tanganyika as a labor reservoir for Kenya had

been disastrous and only exacerbated the labor problem.461

To conserve the working population, in 1926 Cameron created a Labor

Department, under the direction of Major Grenville Orde-Browne. Orde-Browne

appointed five regular inspectors who were in charge of enforcing the Masters and

458 OO 691/44,28505, Byatt to CO, 4 May 1921. Byatt wrote this statement in response to a parliamentary question. 459 CO 691/158/6,42191/8 Director of Agriculture (E. Harrison) to CO, 5 May 1937. Regulations were originally passed in 1927. Children under 16 could not work with machinery, but they could work in agriculture. See below. 460 See for one report on migrant labor CD 691/78,41784, OAG Scon to CO, 21 Aug. 1924. Scon wrote that many recruits arrived from so far that they were unfit for work and susceptible to the diseases of different areas. Sleeping sickness, malaria, yaws, and syphilis were problems for almost all workers because of poor water supplies, poor sanitation on the road, and a lack of housing in all the major towns. 461 Governor Byan had approved one disastrous anempt to send Tanganyikan labor to Kenya to work on the Kenyan rail system, which resulted in a high mortality rate and a scramble to hide the incident from the PMC OD 691/56,33983, OAG Hollis to GO, 12 July 1922: “the death rate among TT labourers for May and June averages 280 [later revised to 230] per thousand recruiting has been suspended.” See also CO 691/58, 63471, Byan to 00,22 Nov. 1922, in which Byan wrote that “I am not sure that any useful purpose would be served by pursuing the enquiry further; finally, see 0 0 691/55,33046,10 June 1921, OAG Hollis to OO, “Annual report on the territory for 1921.” Machtig wrote that “I have struck out the latter part of the 2nd paragraph of section 21, as the recruiting of labor from Tanganyika to the Uasin-Gishu railway has been stopped owing to the heavy mortality among the labourers.” 182

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Servants Ordinance as well as providing sanitary and medical aid for migrating laborers.462

Cameron also amended the Masters and Servants ordinance to make desertion punishable

by fine, not prison. Plantation laborers often deserted because of harsh conditions, news

from home, or various other reasons. Although the settlers demanded severe

punishments as a deterrent, the administration saved time and costs by making desertion a

civil, rather than a criminal, violation.463 Official medical reports revealed the human toll

of unregulated labor migration, and the labor department succeeded in reducing forced

labor and improving working conditions.464

Governor Cameron was not an enemy of the plantations, even if his labor policies

increased the cost of their workforce. Hie beginning of his tenure as Governor of

Tanganyika coincided roughly with the publication of the recommendations of the East

Africa Commission, and that report’s ambiguous attitude toward Tanganyika’s future as a

settler colony or a West African-style territory were reflected in Cameron’s view of the

labor situation. He could not ignore white settlers and the territory also profited from

labor-intensive sisal and coffee plantations, and later, the Lupa goldfields. As a result,

Cameron defined the labor policy of Tanganyika as “impartial.” He wrote that

... as between the competing claims of peasant cultivation of economic crops and labor for the plantations... it is certain that if he [the district administrative officer] specifically urges the natives to take up one of these activities, the other will suffer... if it is thought that peasant cultivation of economic crops should be pressed on the people by the Administrative officers without regard for the effect it may have on the supply of labour for the plantations we shall have to declare that our attitude is not one of impartiality... As the East African Commission state in their report it is clearly the duty of Government to develop agricultural efficiency in the

462 For one assessment of the value of the Labor Department, see OO 691/158/5,42191/5,9 Sep. 1937, minutes by MA Greenhill and F.G. Lee. 463 Cameron also wanted to avoid any comparison with Kenya, where detention camps were used to imprison labor deserters. See OO 691/88/3, X18085, Cameron to OO, 17 Dec. 1926. 464 OO 691/95/11, 29045, Cameron, Scon to 00, no date (1928). 183

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. native areas throughout East Africa... we cannot afford to waste any labour. [It is being wasted] by teaching a native to grow exportable produce in a locality so remote from rail and water transport that the crop can hardly be regarded as profitable.465

He and the Colonial Office spent considerable effort creating a balanced labor policy that

gave local administrators the freedom to encourage Africans to migrate for work, or allow

them to stay in their tribal area and produce locally.466 Cameron needed to balance

indirect rule with setder demands; the Colonial Office was motivated by concern over

parliamentary criticism of an “unbalanced” policy and the possibility of PMC questions

about African labor conditions.467

Like the British, who adapted the Masters and Servants Ordinances of other

colonies to Tanganyika, the French applied AOF’s labor legislation to French Togo, and

AEF’s to Cameroun.468 These codes relied on the prestatian for labor. The British

understood that the complete abolition of forced labor would make development

impossible, but sharply limited its use.469 The French, on the other hand, centered their

labor policy in the mandates on the prestatian and thus spent much of the mandate period

465 OO 691/78, 35486,14 July 1925, Cameron, “Draft Instructions to Administrative Officers re: Labour. Cameron concluded with a quotation from the East Africa Commission: “In order to be pro-native it is not necessary to be anti-white. To be in favor of white settlement in such portions of Africa as are climactically suitable for European homes, it is not necessary to be anti-native.” 446 CO 691/84, X4561, Cameron to CO, 29 Apr. 1926, minutes by Green, Strachey, HP. Downie; see also GO 691/82,26303, Cameron to CO, 18 May 1925, minutes by Green, Strachey, Ormsby-Gore. 447 See for one example CO 691/83 X2971, Cameron to CO, 25 Feb. 1926. See also CO 691/79,46556, Cameron to CO, 13 Sep. 1924. Cameron altered the Masters and Servants Ordinance to permit labor contracts of up to twelve months, even though this kept laborers away from home for over a year due to travel time. The Colonial Office questioned this change of policy, but allowed it because it was recommended by the East Africa Commission. 468 AE, Serie K, Dossier 102, No. 2479, MC to MF, DAPCA, no date (Autumn 1922). 469 See for instance, AE, Serie K, No. 2, MC to MF, SFSDN, 11 Sep. 1925. 184

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. defending the legality and fairness of the labor tax to the PMC As Conklin argues, the

French justified the prestatian as a civilizing method.470

This labor policy was expensive for the French, as indicated by their persistent

labor problems. For example, in French Togo the loss of the labor supply to neighboring

British Togo was a serious and chronic problem. As Chapter 3 demonstrates, this was due

in large part to low wages and the prestatian. Gommissaire Bonnecarrere admitted in

dispatches to the Colonial Ministry that high Gold Coast wages profited African laborers

despite high French taxes. Since he could not raise wages in French Togo without

compromising the French economic system, he searched for an alternative solution. By

1926, Bonnecarrere promulgated a decree stating that “no native can leave the territory of

Togo without authorization from the Commissaire or his representative.”471 This did not

solve the migration problem, but it was the only way for France to husband its labor

supply without threatening the prestatian. However, in his reports to the PMQ

Bonnecarrere minimized the importance of the migrations.

French authorities in Cameroun also attempted in 1925 to proscribe migration to a

neighboring territory but were unable to control the traffic into the British Cameroons.472

A year later Commissaire Marchand admitted that the desire to avoid prestatian labor on

the railroads was the primary reason Africans fled to British Cameroons and the island of

Femando-Po. Moreover, he blamed the territory's prosperity for limiting its labor supply,

since Cameroun’s low wages and high prices encouraged Africans to grow their own crops

47c Conklin 215. “The French justified this particular alienation of liberty on the grounds that it served the community’s immediate interests ... in addition, jm sta ticn still existed in France and did not constitute an exorbitant infringement of the individual’s rights." 471 ANSOM, FM 66, Carton 610, Dossier 2, Arraeof 1 March 1927. Permissions to leave for 10 days were 15 ffr, longer 25 ffr. Each African recruited by a British recruiter was subject to a 300 ffr fee, paid by the recruiter. 185

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. instead of migrating to work.473 The Colonial Ministry decided not to interfere in

Marchand’s futile attempts to keep wages down but prevent labor from fleeing the

prestatian.*7*

Although the prestatian created enormous difficulties for Paris, the French

protected it and defended it before the League. In Cameroun, where the French never

consistently commuted it to a cash payment, there is little doubt that it violated the terms

of the mandate. Even African chiefs exploited it for private, commercial purposes on

their farms.473 To avoid questions from the PMC, the French withheld detailed reports on

the working of the prestation 476 When, in the mid-1920s, the League debated a convention

against slavery and forced labor, France demanded the exclusion of the prestatian.*77 Paris

nevertheless recognized the need to prepare careful responses to questions regarding

forced labor.478 The Colonial Ministry instructed all colonial governors, including the

472 ANSOM, FM 66, Carton 2689, Dossier 5, Cameroun A rrae of 9 July, 1925. 473 ANSOM FM 66, Carton 2689, Dossier 5, No. 73, Marchand to MC, 16 Feb. 1926. 474 ANSOM FM 66, Carton 2689, Dossier 5, No. 5916, MC, DAE to Marchand, 17 Nov. 1928. Marchand did follow the suggestions of the Colonial Ministry to the extent of assigning doctors to public works areas to make bi-monthly visits. However, he rejected the suggestion of the Colonial Ministry that he create a central labor office. See ANSOM FM 66, Canon 2689, Dossier 5, No. 297, Marchand to Chefs de conscription, 10 Dec. 1925, and No. 112, Marchand to MC, 2 July 1927. 475 Guyer, “The Food Economy and French Colonial Rule in Central Cameroun,” 587; Mbapndah, passim 476 AE, Serie K, No. 2, MC to MF, 25 June 1926. 477 The Colonial Ministry adamandy maintained that the pm taden was a fiscal tax, not forced labor. In 1926 the Sixth Commission of the League General Assembly adopted the “Convention on Slavery'’ and the French refused to consider a British proposal to expand slavery and forced labor protocols in their colonial empires because they did not want the prestadan compared to British tax and labor regulations. The French insisted that the pmtaden was used only for public works, and could not therefore be considered slavery or forced labor. The Sixth Commission agreed, and the pmtadan was not considered in the Convenuon. See AE, Serie K, Dossier 2, “Acte de Bruxelles, Traite de esclavage et travail force, 1925-29.” PMC criticism of the pmtadan did not end, but became more difficult after 1926. 478 AE, Serie K, No. 430, MC (Maginot) to Gouvemeurs Generaux, Gouvemeurs, et Gommissaires de la Republique au Togo et au Cameroun, 19 Sep. 1929, “Questionnaire relatif au projet de Convention intemationale sur le travail force." He proposed that all answers to the International Labor Organization’s questionnaire: “Pour vous permettre de me donner d’utiles elements et pour eviter de vous laisser envisager les reponses sous un angle qui ne serait pas conforme aux discussions soulevees a Geneve et a la position, aussi bien intemationale que nationale qua pris desormais, vis-a-vis le probleme du travail force, le gouvemement frangais, je crois necessaire de vous apporter certaines precisions qui faciliteront votre tache.” Some of the advice was to avoid discussing the labor policies of the French, and emphasizing that the 186

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. commissaires of French Togo and Cameroun to emphasize the fiscal aspect of the

prestatian and never to describe it as forced labor.479

The world depression affected labor in the B mandates very differently. In the

French mandates the depression changed very little. The mandate governments raised the

prestatian to compensate for diminished taxes from the tapuatian, reinforced the

prohibitions against referring to it as forced labor, and changed none of their recruiting

practices.480 In Tanganyika, however, the later governors abandoned many protections for

the labor supply, ostensibly because of the expense, but tacidy to help plantation owners

reduce the costs of labor. Governor Stewart Symes quickly eliminated the Labor

Department, closed the migration camps, and removed most of the early protective

regulations established by Cameron and Orde-Browne.481 The Colonial Office, distant and

confused by the colonial consequences of the depression, did litde to retain Cameron’s

reforms, especially when faced with the collapsing plantations.482 As the crisis deepened,

pmtadan was only for public works. The Colonial Ministry also advised French administrators not to rely on the British, who accepted the validity of the questionnaire and would not help the French defend the pmtadan. 479 ANSOM, FM 18, Carton 4, Dossier 43, no number, Memorandum by Commissaire of Cameroun, 15 March 1933. The memo was an admonition not to discuss any form of labor in Cameroun as “travail force.' Administrator Bertaut of the Ebolowa subdivision subsequendy referred to laborers as “travailleurs volontaires benevoles" who worked for free. It is unclear whether this was an actual case or an application of the warning that labor was never to be referred to as “forced.” 480 ibid. (ANSOM, FM 18, Canon 4, Dossier 43, Commissaire of Cameroun, no subject, 15 March 1933.) 481 The Labor Department was not resurrected before Worid War II. Its elimination saved Tanganyika less than £ 20,000/year. 482 The Tanganyika government even included in the draft report for 1930 that “This general [economic] fall was in one way beneficial, since it prevented any particularly industry being in a position to compete in the labour market to the disadvantage of others. It also lessened the tendency on the part of the native population to resort to the otherwise obvious measure of remaining at home to grow economic crops rather than going out to earn wages." This passage was later eliminated from the final report. See CD 691/117/18, 30117, OAG Jardine to OO, 7 March 1931. 187

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the Colonial Office and the governors found no solutions, even after African wages in

Tanganyika dropped over 20% between 1931-1932.483

According to British records falling labor costs in Tanganyika on the sisal and

cotton plantations weighed heavily on the Africans working on them. Regulations, still in

place, were no longer enforced. Child labor rose during the 1930s.484 Additionally, poor

nutrition, unpaid wages, and the physical abuse of migrant laborers reemerged as

problems. Because laborers were increasingly reluctant to travel to the coasts for work

because of the low wages and poor conditions, by 1935 there were serious labor

shortages.485 In 1936, 119 laborers died on plantations in the Morogoro district.486 They

had been forbidden food on days they did not work, and there were no medical personnel,

no latrines, and no other sanitary measures. Conditions on the Lupa goldflelds were also

horrific; the working zones were “awash” in liquor, scurvy was prevalent because of the

lack of green foods, and smaller European diggers paid African laborers inconsistendy.487

413 Seeders demanded identity cards for Africans and ‘effective measures to prevent desertions* as well as restrictions on “crimping,” the practice of stealing labor with promises of better food, wages, and working conditions. One official called the situation “incredible.” OO 691/125/14 31232, Symes to OO, 12 August 1932. 484 Children’s wages in ginneries averaged 10 cents a day, with poor rations and a 10-12 hour shift. Liquor was also sold around the ginneries, a clear violation of Tanganyika’s stria prohibition against alcohol sales to Africans. This information was omitted from the mandate reports. See GO 158/6,42191/8 Direaor of Agriculture (E. Harrison) to OO, 5 May 1937. 485 OO 691/166/8,42121, MacMichael to OO, 24 Dec. 1937, “Report of the Tanganyika Labor Committee.” 486 OO 691/167/2,42191/9, OAG to OO, 27 Oa. 1937. Morogoro was just west of Dar-es-Salaam. The deaths equaled the number of deaths in the entire territory due to labor conditions over the previous three years. 487 Tanganyika’s deput}’ governor, H.G Mackenzie-Kennedy, “[did] not hesitate to speak of the “disgusting conditions” which have persisted ... one cannot help thinking that the government rather allowed themselves to be taken by surprise in this matter and that until recendy they were so anxious to see gold production going ahead on the Lupa that they took too litde account of labour difficulties. Personally, I have always regarded the abolition of the Labour department in 1931 as a serious mistake and I wish Sir H. MacMichael were not so set against the re-establishment of this department.” See OO 691/152/3,42191/4, Charles Weaver (ILO) to OO, 15 Jan. 1936. See particularly minute by [first name] Lee. See also OO 691/156,42110/6, MacMichael to OO, 15 Apr. 1937, “Conditions at the Lupa Goldfield,” and OO 691/158/4,42191/4, OAG to OO, 15 Jan. 1937, “Gondirions in Goldfields.” 188

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Nevertheless the Tanganyika government was far more interested in correcting the

labor shortage than improving labor conditions. This was reflected in the official

regulations. In 1935 Governor MacMichael attempted to restore desertion as a penal

offense.488 When the Colonial Office recommended the revival of a labor inspection

system, MacMichael initially resisted. He then brought out of retirement Kenyan and

Southern Rhodesian officials too old to visit plantations, but who had “mellowness,” and

refused to replace them with younger men.489 He argued: “I think that it might be

injudicious to start enforcing a new labour regime with a band of “bright young men” who

would probably be regarded with some suspicion by the older planters and employers of

labour.” 490 MacMichael also refused to prosecute anyone for the 1936 Morogoro

deaths.491 The Colonial Office disliked Tanganyika’s policies, but could not easily change

them, and it ignored parliamentary questions about the decline in wages after the abolition

of the Labor Department.492 A senior official reluctantly acquiesced, writing “we shall, no

doubt, have criticism from Geneva [on child labor in cotton ginneries]... I would much

rather the children were picking coffee, but with the demand for cheap labor... I see no

way out. At least it teaches them to do something.”493

Still, some Colonial Office officials agreed with Governor MacMichael that

Tanganyika’s labor problem had originated in Cameron’s emphasis on African production:

“those engaged in the production of native-grown crops are in many areas working at low

pressure and that young men in certain areas are not taking their proper place in the life of

488 The Colonial Office did not approve this legislation. See OO 691/141/9,25259,1935. 489 CO 691/166/8, 42191, MacMichael to CO, 24 Dec. 1937. 490 The two inspectors hired in 1935 were eliminated in 1937. See CO 691/166. 491 CO 691/167/2, 42191/9, MacMichael to CO (Ormsby-Gore), 24 Jan. 1938. 493 Mandates Section files, S1660, PMC distribution 1935, extract from House of Commons debate, 5 Dec. 1935, Hansard (1935) 298. 189

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the people as they must live it in a competitive world.”494 The government complained of

“parasitic inertia” in areas where women grew food for the plantations and sold it to

Europeans. Male family members could depend on that income, and did not need to

work. This “wastage” was to be fixed by forcing men in the coastal provinces to work for

Europeans. MacMichael established a Tanganyika Labor Committee in 1936, not to

protect African workers, but to “coordinate the demand and supply of labour and make

sure it flows freely.”495 Under this rhetorical cover, it attempted to justify driving labor to

the plantations, even if it meant moving entire families from their farms to the coast. This

new Labor Committee requested that local district officers put themselves in the

compromising position of exhorting Africans to migrate, to “adopt some form of active

work,” even when they would make more money farming.496 It considered low wages and

plantation labor more important than allowing Africans to make informed economic

decisions about their own income. The committee recommended the removal of almost

all restrictions on professional labor recruiters and child labor, the elimination of medical

testing on migrant laborers, and censoring public criticism of sisal plantation conditions.

It also recommended that the government enforce wage limits to help plantation owners

hold wages down.497 Although all of the Labor Committee’s recommendations were not

implemented by the outbreak of World War II, practically all of Cameron’s system had

been dismanded.498 Many serious problems were omitted in Britain’s mandate reports,

493 OO 691/166/8,42191/5, MacMichael to OO, 24 Dec. 1937, minute by Bottomley. 494 o q 691/168/8,42191, MacMichael to OO, 24 Dec. 1937, minute by Boyd. 493 OO 691/152/4,42191/5 Circular 1 of 1936 (MacMichael), 2 Jan 1936. 496 OO 691/152/4,42191/5, “Circular 1 of 1936: Labour.” 497 OO 691/166/8,42121, MacMichael to OO, 24 Dec. 1937, “Report of the Tanganyika Labor Committee.” 498 OO 691/166/8,42121, MacMichael to OO, 24 Dec. 1937, “Report of the Tanganyika Labor Committee.” Major Orde-Browne commented on the report of the Labor Committee for the Colonial Office. He wrote that “I was under the impression that the points referred to in sections 4,6,7,10,11,14, and 15 [of the report, 190

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. including, for example, Onde-Browne’s comment on the enormous increase in the late

1930s of compulsory labor by the Tanganyika government, illustrated below.499

Year Men Days of Labor 1928 400 12,000 1929 0 0 1930 1800 25,200 1931 136 } 1932 0 0

1937 32,056 340,533 1938 40,871 451,464

Table 5.1: Days of Forced Labor in Tanganyika Territory, 1928-38

The PMC was well-equipped to make cogent statements on labor policy. It

received a great deal of material including both the mandate reports and those of the

Intemarional Labor Organization (ILO) as well as petitions from organizations such as the

BIPDI and memoranda from other outside organizations such as the American Foreign

Policy Association.500 A representative of the ILO sat on the commission. Harold

the sections on unscrupulous labor recruiters, the poor conditions on sisal plantations, camps for migrating labors, the practice of putting labor violators in prison, and other serious issues] had been clearly setded by Sir Donald Cameron in 1926; it is depressing to find them still in doubt.” He also commented on the disastrous Morogoro incident and commenting that in 1931 there had been 18 registered labor recruiters, all supervised by the Labor Department. In 1936 there were over 100, with little to prevent them from encouraging labor to migrate to plantations under false pretenses. “The threat of scandal was apparendy necessary to secure any attention for labourers... I cannot see what other dudes can be considered as more important than those whose neglect involves the deaths of numerous workers... much criucized Kenya can show nothing to equal [the problems of labor in Tanganyika].” See also CD 691/167/2,42191/2, OAG to GO, 27 Oct. 1937, minute by Orde-Browne. 499 o q 691/172/3,42078, Young to GO, 18 March 1939, “Annual Report for 1938.” The implicauon was that the depression had encouraged the “inexplicable" but widespread use of forced labor. 500 Hie last labor-related CPM document was filed in 18 Dec. 1939, noting that child labor on plantations in Tanganyika was still typical. CPM 2173. The FPA, founded in 1918, published an extensive memoranda on forced labor in 1930, which noted the limitations of the mandates system; “There is nothing in the text of the mandates which expressly prohibits compulsory labor on the part of women or children... the mandates are silent, moreover, as to the term for which forced labor may be exacted.” The memo then went into the case of the Miadbahn in Cameroun (where it concluded that “the Mandates Commission did not exercise any 191

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Grimshaw, the first ILO member, his successor, Charles Weaver, and several other

members of the PMC, including Freire d’Andrade, Lugard, and Van Rees, concerned

themselves particularly with labor questions. They frequently insisted that the B mandates

forbade unpaid forced labor, and all forced labor except on “essential public works [or]

services.”

The PMC agreed with the need for Africans to work, but it did attempt to defend

Africans from poor conditions and forced labor, with little success.501 In the mid- 1920s

the PMC attempted to define labor’s place in the social development of the mandates.

Portugal’s Freire d’Andrade argued that the African must work in order to be civilized,

and periodically proposed that “vagrancy'’ (not working for a wage) should be forbidden

and criminalized.502 He argued that development and the well-being of Africans went

hand in hand. However

the native must not be called upon to work beyond the limits of his physical capacity. He must be encouraged by a knowledge of the demands he supplies by his labor, and byan insight into the advantages of civilization, to do his share of the common work; for in doing so he will contribute to the “well-being and development of the peoples.” If he fails

effective supervision over labor conditions; but its influence may have prevented conditions from becoming worse),” the failure of the mandatory powers to pay competitive wages for compulsory labor and raised the question of the prestatiat It concluded that the PMC was “reluctant... to interpret the compulsory labor provisions of the mandates" by refusing to determine the legality of practices like the prestation. See Mandates Section Files, S300, Divers, “Information Service: Forced Labor,” 8 Jan. 1930. See also CPM 520, 15 Nov. 1926, and CPM 604,27 June. 1927: “The Commission would be glad to find in the next report some information on the principles on which the administration exercises its right of requisitioning labour for public works.” Finally, see CPM 95 for one example of the questions the PMC put to the mandatory powers asking for more information on labor. 501 Article 22 did not mention labor. Article 23: “The Members of the League a) will endeavor to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women, and children, both in their countries and in all countries to which tehir commercial and industrial relations extend... b) undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control.” Each of the mandates included, as part of Article 5, that “The Mandatory: 3) shall prohibit all forms of forced or compulsory labor, except for essential public works and services (French: public works and essential services) and then only in return for adequate remuneration 4) shall protea the natives from abuse and measures of fraud and force by the careful supervision of labor contracts and the recruiting of labor.” See Wright 591-611. 502 See for one example that reached the mandatory powers FO 371/5850,0400/11/18, “Mandates Questions” 6 Jan. 1921. 192

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. to do so and attempts to go on living under his present conditions, if he prefers his former habits of ease and idleness, then the mandatory must intervene and give him to understand that work is a law of nature, and that, in communities which hope to prosper, idleness is a punishable offence, since all must contribute as far as in them lies to the progress of the country in which they live.503

In other words, wage labor was more civilizing because it benefited both Africans and the

government. Other commentators, such as the British missionary J. H. Oldham, warned

the PMC about the perils of labor migration. In his commentary on the Report of the

East Africa Commission in 1925, Oldham wrote that the mandatory power was entided to

the labor of its African subjects, but “the disturbance of native life as a result of contact

with a more advanced civilization” must be kept to a minimum.504 In general, however,

the PMC agreed with Freire d’Andrade. This had the effect of limiting the willingness of

commission members to protect African economic interests if they conflicted with

European interests or government priorities.

Although it accepted labor as a civilizing force, the PMC did not accept the

legitimacy of the pm tadan. Lugard raised the question in 1925, calling it a “pretext used to

gain labor.”505 Van Rees agreed that the pm tadan was forced labor, and argued that “all

compulsory non-remunerated labor, whatever be its form or object and whatever be the

authority imposing such compulsion, must be prohibited by the Mandatory.”506 However,

he proposed revising the mandates to reflect the need for cheap labor, which amounted to

503 CPM 281, Freire d’Andrade, July 1925. Mandates Registry Files R.40, LON document 1.44130.15313, J.H. Oldham, “A Note on the Report of the East African Commission, 25 Nov. 1925. 505 CPM 275, Lugard, July 1925. The PMC did not complain or question the mandatory practice of imposing taxes in order to compel Africans to join the labor market to pay them. But it had persistent questions about the pnstaritn because of the similarity between the French labor tax and forced labor. The PMC, in other words, accepted that Africans should work for a wage, but it did question the use of older imperialist methods like forced labor. For criticism, see the Fortie petitions, Chapter 3.

193

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. legalizing the pm tadan. Grimshaw disagreed, bluntly observing that “on two points

[unpaid forced labor and the pm tadan] the terms of the mandates do not appear to be

strictly applied.”507 One of his main complaints was that some compulsory labor was

remunerated while other labor was not, without a clear definition of an “essential public

work” or “service.” One example was unpaid labor exacted by African chiefs. For

Grimshaw, “the problem... is to modify the conditions existing in the various territories

in order to bring them into accord with the provisions of the mandate.”505 Both

Grimshaw and Van Rees agreed that it was impossible to reconcile the pm tadan with any

interpretation of the mandate, especially since it was neither fiscally necessary nor

unreasonable to convert it into a fiscal tax.

The PMC also had the opportunity to confront the French through petitions.

Raymond Buell’s The Nadrue Problem in Africa and the related petitions from the BIPDI

were largely concerned with the labor problem.509 Buell attacked both British and French

labor practices, for instance insisting that the pm tadan was forced labor. The commission

energetically questioned French representatives in order to clarify the situation. The

French insisted that Africans had no qualms about the pm tadan, which created “no

difficulties and no abuses,” but they also stressed their efforts to improve the system of

labor.510 Paris also manipulated the PMC, first demanding specific questions related to

506 Minutes of the 7th Session (1927), 154-6. See also CPM 481, Van Rees, June, 1926 “Reply by M. Van Rees to the Report of Mr. H. A. Grimshaw.” 507 CPM 450, Grimshaw, June, 1926, “What is the forced or compulsory labor which is allowed in territories under B and C mandates and under what conditions is it allowed there? Report by Mr. H. A. Grimshaw on the Memorandum byM. Van Rees." 508 CPM 450. Grimshaw concluded that it was too difficult to define “forced labor" with sufficient precision to justify revising the mandate in a complicated and contradictory analysis that was probably intended to justify doing nothing. 509 CPM 733, “Petition en date du 20 Mai 1928, presentee par le Bureau international pour la defense des indigenes.” 510 AE, Serie SDN, Dossier 621, MC to MF, Service Fran^ais de la SDN, No. 504,22 Sep. 1928. 194

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Buell’s allegations, then denying having made this request.511 France’s strong response to

Buell’s criticisms convinced the PMC to do nothing.

Paris nevertheless fretted over the PMCs questions about the prestatian. It

considered the BIPDI petition a threat to its authority, especially if it became widely

known among literate African communities. It also feared German propaganda. The

French labeled the PMCs criticisms “tacdess” because German propagandists used them

to attack French administration and propagandize among African populations. A secret

French memorandum stated that “German propaganda understands perfecdy that the

commissions at Geneva naturally have some doubt about the competence [of the

mandatory powers]; it profits from this by exciting it and taking advantage.”512 The

French stand against defining the prestation as forced labor thus accomplished two goals.

First, it defended French labor practices against damaging changes. Second, it tried to

stymie the PMC in order to eliminate at least one channel of German propaganda.

Buell also attacked British labor policies in Tanganyika, but Governor Cameron

issued an anodyne response to the resulting BIPDI petition. Buell had cited the use of

forced labor in Tanganyika for commercial (i.e. non-public works) purposes, the use of

whipping as a disciplinary measure, and the jailing of laborers for deserting their contracts.

Cameron explained that the compulsory labor had been for public road construction, that

whipping, although legal, was never used, and that the Masters and Servants Ordinance

had been amended in 1926 to make desertion a civil, rather than a police, matter.515

511 AE, Serie SDN, Dossier 621, no number, MCto MF, Service Francois de la SDN, 4 Oct. 1928. See also Minutes of the 19th Session of the PMC, (1929) 20-21. 512 AE, Serie SDN, Dossier 545, “Note sur les Revendications Cbloniales Allemandes, Etat actuel de la question, Secret, no date (Autumn 1925)." 513 CO 691/100/4, 29191, CO to FO, 31 July 1928. 195

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. British representatives therefore had little difficulty placating the P M C and minimizing the

effects of Buell’s book.

Even during the depression the PMC, relying on the work of the ILO, tried to

limit the use of forced labor. In the early 1930s the ILO sponsored a forced labor

committee including Orde-Browne, Marchand, Merlin, and Lugard, which concluded that

“development should not come before social organization and harmony.”514 The ILO and

the PMC were particularly disturbed over the terrible conditions on the Lupa goldfields in

Tanganyika. Charles Weaver, Grimshaw’s successor, questioned the British accredited

representative closely on labor conditions at Lupa, and demanded the British justify the

elimination of the Labor Department when there was such clear evidence that it was

needed.515 However, using the mandate reports, the British were successful in deflecting

much of this criticism. Even though the harmful conditions persisted at Lupa, they

emphasized improvements and anticipated future progress.

Although the PMC did not receive complete information on labor conditions in

the B mandates at all times, it received sufficient information to make general observations

throughout the mandate period. The commission was well-informed about the

connections between labor and social development by the issue of the prestatian, the British

Labor Department, and the petitions that developed from Buell’s The Native Problem in

A frica. TTie PMC took the Buell allegations seriously, but it was unwilling to defy the

observations of the mandatory powers and rejected the petition. More significandy, the

514 Mandates Section Files S283, Committee des Experts en matiere travail indigene (CETI), C E U /V /1.1934, 30 Apr. 1934. The committee recommended that recruiting be replaced by a free offer of labor, that chiefs not be able to pressure individuals to work for their private interests, that laborers be provided with land and housing at their place of employment, and that employers provide laborers with contracts.

196

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. PMC was unable to affect the prestaticn's use and the French successfully defended it until

after World W arn.

In a general sense, the PMC, while intimately concerned with the labor question,

was unable to affect the ideology and practices of the mandatory powers. It was

constrained by the views of its members and the realities of Depression-era fiscal

circumstances. Even the experiment of the Labor Department in Tanganyika, while the

closest approach to a labor policy strictly conforming to the mandate, was designed to

maximize production and compromise with settlers rather than ensure the welfare of

Africans. The economic crisis of the 1930s removed this limited progress, and reinforced

traditional imperial labor practices.

515 OO 691/152/3,42191/4, Weaver, ILO, to OO (Paskin), 15 Jan. 1936. Weaver actually warned the British that there were to be serious questions in Geneva about Lupa. 197

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Part III: Health Policy

Judging by die number of people seen passing through the country limping along or wrapped in pus-soaked clothes, one can conclude that the majority of the inhabitants are diseased.

-- omitted sentence from the Mandate Report for the British sphere of Togo, 1925516

Public health and medicine were critical aspects of imperialist ideology. They

helped to define the vast gulf between civilization and the uncivilized African, and

between superior and inferior cultures.517 Public health policy was also a visible sign of

European wealth and power and a critical component of economic development policies,

since labor supplies, food supplies, and markets depended on the condition of the African

population. Even without the mandates system, public health would have been an integral

part of British and French colonial administration and a critical indicator of their

commitment to African social development. As in other colonies, public health

organizations in the B mandates were often without resources, undermanned, and

subordinated to financial considerations.

The mandates system injected significant complications into the question of public

health. The League’s stipulations demanded that social development in the mandates

ensure the well-being of the African population. This was also an area of great concern to

groups such as temperance organizations interested in the moral improvement of

Africans. Their involvement in African health issues helped make it a clear area of PMC

activity Tlie three largest problems were the PMCs desire for larger, better-equipped

medical services, the problem of tsetse fly infestation and sleeping sickness, and the

516 GO 724/4, XF4518, OAG, Gold Coast (Maxwell), to OO, 26 May 1926, “Report on Administration of Togoland, 1925.” 198

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. problem of alcohol and the liquor trade in the mandates. The medical service and tsetse

questions were symptomatic of the general paucity of resources devoted to social services

that did not produce a direct economic return. The alcohol question was both an

indication of the slowly evolving idea of imperialism’s ultimate goals in Africa and the

realities of finance and power. The PMC and outside organizations, as well as some

within the British colonial establishment, wanted alcohol prohibited in Africa. The

mandatory powers, even if they supported the regulation of alcohol, depended on its sale

for a significant part of territorial revenues and simply refused to consider its prohibition.

None of the B mandate governments provided much money for health spending.

The French administration in Togo did the most to establish a comprehensive hygiene

system Several inspectors traveled to each of the urban areas to supervise the gnde

sarntam or gnrie d’bygene, in most areas one or two Africans, which revealed the presence of

endemic malaria, syphilis, yaws, and leprosy, which were treated by clinics in the urban

areas.518 In both of the British mandates sanitation cam paigns encouraged Africans to

construct latrines, separate drinking from washing water, and bury wastes. Because these

campaigns were temporary, their benefits were limited.519 In British Togo, there were only

four government doctors in the Gold Coast health service operating in the mandated area

for 188,000 people. Expansion, the British explained, was expensive and difficult.520 In

Tanganyika, there were fewer than 100 doctors in the entire territory, the vast majority in

private practice in Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar, catering to the European, Arab, and

51' See Megan Vaughan, Gmr% Their Ills: Colonial Parser and Afriam Iliness (Cambridge: 1991), 7-10. 518 ANSOM, FM 66, Carton 3060, Dossier “Mission of Inspection 1927 by Picanon to Cameroun and Togo," No. 88, Picanon, Chef de Mission, to MC, Direction du Controle, 26 May 1927. 519 In British Togo, the infant mortality rate in 1931 was 187.6 per thousand, hardly improved from that in 1925 (and disregarded as “inaccurate” by the British). See LONMR for British Togo, 1925, 86; LONMR for British Togo, 1931,51; LONMR for British Togo, 1932, 62. 199

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Indian populations.521 Universities rarely encouraged new doctors to post there, the

territory had a high infant mortality rate, and epidemic and venereal diseases were

common.522

520 LONMR for British Togo, 1923. 521 There were 85 in Tanganyika in 1928, 54 in government service and 31 privately practicing. Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the 15th session, 128. For several years it was even lower than this. In 1920 only six doctors were present in Tanganyika, with 23 more willing to accept a posting there. See QO 691/32, 36094, Byart to OO, 12 June 1920. 522 Mandates Section Files, S246, PMC Distribution, 1925-26, excerpt from House of Commons Debate on the East African Medical Services, 21 Dec. 1925. 200

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Tanganyika Cameroun French Togo Year Revenue (£) Public Revenue Public Revenue Public Health (francs)523 Health (francs) Health Spending Spending 524 Spending 525 1919 669,097 48,807 1920 946,844 90,787 16,035,000 740,631 2356322 90326 1921 978,192 101,918 15246,000 889,015 3388300 351,897 1922 1228,586 89,999 18,792,000 1,452,121 3,629,000 334780 1923 1315,188 91341 25357381 1,435,446 5,860,000 617,017 1924 1387300 106,127 34,449228 2211,000 8,000,000 (est.) 732,484 1925 1,614,530 146300 37,041,974 2,381,000 33,632,515 818,053 1926 1,691,762 180,172 75,000,000 3,597301 28,094,000 1,776,412 1927 1,904,107 194,719 66,045202 7,601,963 33,585,000 4,497,786 1928 1,918,740 225,825 83277,435 10290,868 32,882,505 5368,891 1929 1,916,052 245,774 83,059,771 10,845,649 31310,000 5364,858 1930 1,650329 256,459 87,953,060 13,738316 34,561,000 5,911,985 1931 1,476,000 222343 95,564,146 13,482286 33,395,000 5338,068 1932 1,624,918 221264 56,159,956 11,822210 23,883,096 4341,000 1933 1,567,795 (est.) 200,000 (est.) 9,162335 23,615,000 3,763,000 1934 1,672320 (est.) 190,000 (est.) 62352,053 13,508,150 29,176,000 5302395 1935 69,618,131 14,628301 26,730287 6,068254 1936 2,002,435 (est.) 78,549,091 15,189291 29,884376 6,065,000 1937 1,990,914 (est.) 106,469,180 17,881,750 39,786,000 7,150,000 1938 2,137,000 (est.) 121,471227 22,722,084 43,990,914 5,572,000 1939 180,773389 28,000,000 (est.) (est.)

Table 5.2: Public Health Spending in the B Mandates, 1919* 1939526

523 Figures are in unadjusted francs. The franc was officially depreciated in 1926 and again in 1936 during the financial crisis of the Popular Front Government. 524 From 1926-32 there was a separate health budget and these figures are only public health spending. The later budgets include “social services, personnel” and “social services, material" expenditures, which include education spending. In the case of Cameroun, this would lower the posted figures by 13 million francs per year, on average. See below, “Total Education Expenditure in the B Mandates.” 525 Togo also had a separate health budget from 1927-1933. The Togo budgets before and after separate education from public health expenditure; the figures below do not include both. 526 The following figures are compiled from CPM 1387, the British and French budgets, and where necessary, from the LONMRs for Tanganyika, Cameroun, and French Togo. These figures are as exact as possible. The LONMR budget and expense figures do not always conform even approximately to British and French budgets. Where great discrepancy exists, I have taken the figure provided to the League of Nations. 201

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. As the table indicates, public health spending in the B mandates steadily increased

with improving revenues through the 1920s. In 1925, Tanganyika’s health spending was

approximately 9% of revenue, in Cameroun it was 6%, and in French Togo 2.5%. By

1929 Tanganyika and Cameroun’s health spending had risen to 13% of revenue, French

Togo’s to 17%. During the depression health spending in each mandate did not decline at

the same rate as revenue.527 In 1934 Tanganyika’s health service was still budgeted for

11% of revenue, Cameroun approximately 21%, and French Togo 18%. Even with these

relatively robust budgets, however, the administrations of the B mandates did not provide

even the most basic care to the majority of the African population; considerable funds, for

instance, in Tanganyika and Cameroun were spent on European health care.528 Further,

the mandatory powers recognized the inadequacy of their limited public health

institutions.529 They had only fragmentary sources of information on epidemics and

endemic disease, sleeping sickness incidence, and sanitary conditions. Until 1923 there

were still major epidemics in Tanganyika, Cameroun, and Togo, and there were many

endemic diseases that were hard to track without more resources.530

527 Salaries, other emoluments, and construction expenses were cut, and positions were eliminated by attntion, but in none of the B mandates were health officials removed. 528 The largest government hospital in Tanganyika was for whites only. Most Africans in both Tanganyika and Cameroun were only able to reach loci dispensaries manned by Africans. White doctors came into the bush and countryside only as part of large inoculation or research campaigns. See Vaughn Chapters 4 and 6. 529 CO 691/80, 53680, Cameron to CO, 19 Oct. 1925. “The total increase, £43,500, recommended is large but it is quite evident that adequate efforts have not so far been made to bring the staff and equipment of the Medical and Sanitation Department up to the pressing requirements of the Territory.’ 53: Several endemic diseases included leprosy, bubonic plague, smallpox, yaws, and syphilis. LONMR for Tanganyika, 1921,12-13. LONMR for British Togo, 1923, paragraph 193. Yaws (French piarij was a mild form of syphilis endemic in most of sub-Saharan Africa. On the difficulty of tracking diseases, see OO 691/32, 32802, Byatt to CO, 25 May, 1920, in which the governor complained that there was no way to tell how- many Africans had syphilis. The cause of this inadequate tracking was that most European clinics, hospitals, and dispensaries were located in urban areas; the rural incidence of disease was largely an unknown quantity until after World War II. 202

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Some PMC members used the issue of a shortage of medical personnel to press

for increased supervision, hoping to make international control a reality. However, the

French and British responded defensively to the idea. Their official reports blended

hopeful rhetoric and uniformly positive statistics to disguise grim conditions. They

regularly excised or downplayed information on epidemic disease incidence, high infant

mortality, and other negative information from reports.531 They also glossed over negative

developments or stagnant policy initiatives and presented a constandy improving situation,

even when health departments were undermanned or uninformed.

The mandatory powers firmly resisted the PMCs controversial suggestion that the

solution for the personnel shortage lay with accepting foreign doctors as government

employees in the mandates’ health services. Its control at stake, France immediately

drafted an arrke making a French diploma mandatory for any doctor practicing in

Cameroun and Togo; the only exception was the American missionaryorganization

operating in Cameroun.532 The British also refused to consider the possibility of foreign

personnel, insisting that despite the low number of doctors in their mandates, “no

difficulty now exists in recruiting properly qualified medical men of British nationality, and

the question of accepting qualified doctors of foreign nationality as officers has therefore

not arisen.”533

531 For one example see GO 724/3, 16783, Governor of Gold Coast (Guggisberg) to GO, 20 March 1925, “Annual report on the British Sphere of Togoland for 1924.” Damaging infant mortality figures (approaching 50%) were excised. 532 ANSOM, FM 18, Carton 29, Dossier 252. 533 Mandates Registry Files, R2343, LON document 6a.18478.5430 (copy of FO 371 document W1739/10/98, 6 March 1930.) The British had serious difficulties recruiting doctors for the B mandates, and were already targets of German criticism in 1922. See GO 691/45,60305, Byatt to GO, 2 Nov. 1922, and 0 0 691/81. 203

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The German members of the PMQ the main advocates of employing foreign

doctors, led a struggle against the majority. In 1928 Kastl wrote that “the situation of

public health especially in tropical Africa - in spite of very considerable efforts made by

the mandatory powers - cannot be called satisfactory.”534 The PMC representatives from

the mandatory powers, supported by Lugard, Merlin and Orts, blocked Kasd’s

proposals.535 Rappard offered a moderate compromise: “while the principle of economic

equality... could not be legitimately invoked in order to compel the mandatory powers to

employ foreign doctors as public officials, it should, nevertheless, guarantee all duly

qualified nationals of countries which are members of the League the right to exercise the

medical profession in those territories.” This was not Kasd’s aim, which was in fact to

enable foreign doctors to apply for positions in the mandate administrations and so

“internationalize” them, but Rappard’s moderate view still represented the thin edge of the

wedge as far as the mandatory powers were concerned.536 Rappard nevertheless drafted

questions for the mandatory powers seemingly designed to embarrass them into allowing

German doctors into the mandates, or failing that, to increasing funding for health

534 CPM 760, Kastl, 27 June 1928. 535 CPM 883, Rappard, 2 July 1929, and CPM 814, Lugard, 9 Nov. 1928. 536 CPM 790, by Rappard, “Public Health in the Mandated Territories.”

204

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. services.537 Forewarned, the mandatory powers denied any inadequacies in their health

services.* S I S

The medical situation and the shortage of doctors became more acute during the

depression. In the British mandates the health budget fell by 10% between 1931-34 and

only recovered in the years immediately preceding the war. The number of Africans and

Europeans involved in health services dropped yearly (there were only about 20 positions

total in Tanganyika, more in Gold Coast Colony, but attriuon took place in both). The

only travelling dispensary in Togo was eliminated in 1933. In the French mandates the

social services budget plummeted, but recovered in accounting terms by 1935-6, although

the number of medical personnel in both mandates never fully recovered.539 The human

costs were considerable. In Tanganyika in 1935 the government found a high incidence of

nutriuonal diseases.540

Julius Ruppel, Kasd’s successor, used the financial crisis to reopen the quesdon of

foreign doctors. He pointed out the contradiction between French and British assurances

to the commission and what their reports on public health:

The shortage of doctors and public health specialists is frequendy referred to by the mandatory powers as one of the factors which hamper their efforts towards reform in the matter of public health, and [the PMC]

537 CPM 790. “ 1. Is public health entirely satisfactory in jour territory? 2. If not, could more doctors and specialists help? 3. Any difficulties obtaining them from your own country? 4. Would higher salaries help? 5. Do you use foreign doctors? If not, would you be prepared to do so? 6. If you don’t have enough doctors, and find it impossible to use foreign ones, would you consider increasing the subsidies of missions? These questions were later revised slightly and presented to the mandatory powers in CPM 883, Rappard, “Public Health in the mandated territories,” 2 July 1929. 538 CPM 1001,1001(1), “Responses from the Mandatory Powers regarding CPM 883, “Public Health in the Mandated Territories." 539 LONMR for Cimeroun, 1936,125, LONMR for Cameroun, 1938,105. 540 LONMR for Tanganyika, 1935, 88. 205

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. expressed the opinion that this shortage appears to be due as much to the insufficient number of qualified candidates prepared to go abroad, who can be found in the home territory of the mandatory powers as to financial causes.541

While acknowledging that the mandatory powers were within their rights in employing

their own nationals, he suggested: “in view of the great importance of an adequate supply

of medical staff in the mandated territories, this principle should take second place ... The

interests of the natives must here, as in other respects, be placed before any other

considerations.”542 However, the mandatory powers could still block Ruppel’s advice,

providing that funds for additional personnel were not available. After the German

departure from the League, this issue disappeared.

Sleeping Sickness and Tsetse Fly Control

Anglo-French administrators and medical personnel, while familiar with sleeping

sickness in their other African colonies, were ignorant of the disease in their new B

mandates.543 It was a serious public health problem for both humans and livestock, and it

was difficult to control the fly’s spread. It was also hard to diagnose and treat the disease

effectively.544 Initially the mandate governments neglected to investigate the disease and

the threat it represented to the population, livestock, and the prospects for economic

development. This reluctance was caused by financial concerns. A concerted campaign to

mi CPM 1096, Ruppel, 30 Oct. 1930. M2 CPM 1096. Ruppel concluded that “All possible steps should be taken by the mandatory powers, within the limits of the financial resources available for purposes of public health, to increase the number of doctors." 543 Sleeping sickness (trypanosomiasis) is carried by several species of the tsetse fly. Between one week and one month after infection, the disease causes severe flu-like symptoms leading to lethargy, coma, and an almost universal incidence of death in untreated cases, with a high (over 10%) incidence of death even when treated. It can be transmitted both to animals and humans, making it a great scourge in most of sub-Saharan Africa. Each of the mandate governments hoped sleeping sickness did not exist in the new mandates, and it took several years for them to acknowledge the spread of the tsetse fly. See Kjekshus 168. 206

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. eradicate tsetse in an area the size of Tanganyika would have taken years and cost millions

of pounds using the technology then available, as the later unsuccessful attempts to

eradicate tsetse flies demonstrated. The halfhearted attempts made to control the disease,

especially in Tanganyika, indicate the reluctance of the mandatory powers to spend

resources on African well-being without the promise of a rapid economic return.

After the discovery of tsetse in Tanganyika, the British attempted to control

sleeping sickness as inexpensively as possible. In 1919 and 1920 British officials wrote

that they found no evidence of sleeping sickness in Tanganyika.5*5 A year later, officials

discovered infestations in Mwanza and near Dar-es-Salaam. In 1922 CF.M. Swynnerton

became the game warden of Tanganyika and established a laboratory, experimental farm,

and reclaimed zone at Shinyanga, in Mwanza.546 Between 1923 and 1934 he attempted to

control sleeping sickness by concentrating the population in afflicted areas and burning

the bush, destroying the fly's habitat.547 Concentrating the population was expensive and

disruptive, but it was the only way to provide the labor needed to bum the fly's habitat

and make the area safe for livestock. In Kahama district (north of Tabora district) nearly

half the population was relocated.548 The British achieved indifferent results, largely

because the government provided inadequate funds to control such a widespread

problem.

In Tanganyika the tsetse infestation was severe, but the budget could not bear the

large cost of a prolonged territory-wide campaign. Outside money enabled Swynnerton’s

544 Vaughan 33-39. 545 GO 691/22, 50615, OAG (Hollis) to GO, 29 Apr. 1919. 546 GO 691/55, 27013, OAG (Hollis) to GO, 12 May 1922; GO 691/109/8,29656E, Cameron to GO, 3 Jan. 1930. 547 OO 691/68, 7116, Swynnerton, 7 Feb. 1923, “Sleeping Sickness.” 548 Kjekshus 171. 207

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. projects to continue, but was not enough for them to expand. Initial money came from

the £ 10,000,000 East African Guaranteed Loan fund.549 By 1929 the Colonial

Development Fund (CDF) assisted efforts with £5,000 a year, but this was a fraction of

what the fund contributed to more lucrative projects.550

Since much of the money came from outside sources rather than the territorial

budget, tsetse reclamation was protected during the early years of the Great Depression.

There was also additional funding from the CDF, but these loans added to the territory’s

debt burden.551 When the depression began, Cameron, followed by his successor, Stewart

Symes, reduced Tanganyika’s contribution to the experimental work and anti-fly

campaigns to virtually nothing.552 With only the limited CDF funds, Swynnerton was

reduced to experiments using volunteer labor.553 In the late 1930s the situation became

even worse: adequate funding for large scale work was estimated at £30,000 a year, funds

Governor MacMichael would not provide, even if the CDF renewed its matching grant.554

Nevertheless, the mandate reports always showed a constant, if grudging, progress against

the fly, even in years when only 3 square miles per district were cleared.555

549 OO 691/84, X8351, Cameron to CO, 13 Nov. 1926. Cameron initially received £70,000 spent over five years, and argued that the budget could not produce similar sums itself. 550 For instance, in 1925 Swynnerton hired four reclamation officers and 160 African laborers for £7,500, which the government only reluctandy accepted. See OO 691/72, 52765, OAG Scon to OO, 17 Oct. 1926. The tsetse reclamation budget for Tanganyika varied from £2400 a year to nearly£ 10,000, depending on the prosperity of the territory. By the depression, the budget depended almost exclusively on outside money. See OO 691/109/6, 29656, Cameron to CO, 31 Dec. 1929 and 3 Jan. 1930. 551 Hie Colonial Development Fund provided £10,000 matching funds for the territory's £5,000 budget allocation, 1931-36. See CO 691/115/3, 30035,30035Apart II, OAG Jardine to OO, 23 April 1931. Interest on these loans was more than £4,000 a year. 552 GO 691/128/10, 5043/2, Symes to OO, 24 March 1933. 553 OO 691/126/9,21271, Symes to CO, 17 Nov. 1932; OO 691/136/9,25088, MacMichael to OO, 21 Aug. 1934. 554 OO 691/149/9,42095 part 1, Deputy Governor, Tanganyika to CO, 18 Jan. 1936. Hie war prevented the fulfillment of any further tsetse work. 555 See LONMRs for Tanganyika, 1929-33, particularly LONMR for Tanganyika, 1929,112. See also Minutes of the 18th session, 16-17. Kjekshus indicates that relocation was an unsuccessful policy. Hie ‘strategic retreats’ away from areas of tsetse infestation caused the bush to grow, where land lay unused. 208

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In 1926 tsetse flies were discovered in northern British Togo, which had been

thought free of sleeping sickness despite the prevalence of the disease in the neighboring

Northern Territories of the Gold Coast. In the next year’s report it became known that

tsetse flies had been discovered to be widely distributed all over the northern part of the

mandate. Gold Coast inspectors stated that there was not enough labor to undertake

Tanganyika-style clearing and relocation programs, and the organization set up in the Gold

Coast Northern Territories (and Northern British Togo) in 1926 was small and largely

experimental.556 In the combined Gold Coast-Togo, there were 27 cases in 1925-6, but

during the depression there was a sudden explosion in cases before any measures had

been taken, resulting in 3,885 cases in 1935.557 Health officials did little and argued that

better economic times would fix the problem, an excuse to reduce expenditure.55*

The French attacked the tsetse fly problem differently from the British in

Tanganyika, electing to treat sleeping sickness as a human disease. The tsetse fly was

present all over Cameroun, and the French established prophylaxis centers to treat human

patients. These centers cleared brush and riverbeds around villages, but emphasized

diagnosis and treatment over a widespread campaign of bush-burning.559 The extent of

the disease surprised and unnerved French officials. In 1926 one colonial journal asserted

Tsetse continually spread behind and around the existing concentrations. Africans had to divide their time between clearing and farming new land and defending the concentrations. Cultivation in the new concentrations was often difficult and the soil was exhausted too quickly for intensive methods to be fully appreciated by the African population. During the depression, famine and near-famine struck areas of the Western and Lake Provinces (Bukoba district in particular), areas which had been subject to large-scare relocations to concentrated areas. Kjekshus 174-5. » CO 96/671/13, X4417, OAG (Maxwell), Gold Coast, to OO (Ameiy), 30 May 1927. 557 CO 96/730/3, 31215, Medical Report, 1935,18 Aug. 1936; Minutes of the 24th session, 51. 558 CO 96/747/1,31109, Gov. of Gold Coast to CO, 30 Dec. 1937. Africans were unable to buy gunpowder and shoot game, which caused the fly to spread; when the depression ended, Africans would bring sleeping sickness under control themselves, without the need for government intervention in the meantime. 559 ANSOM, FM 18, Carton 30, Dossier 261. 209

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. that 282,943 people in Cameroun were infected with sleeping sickness and pleaded for

additional doctors.560 In 1930 the territory received three million francs to expand its

diagnostic and prophylactic efforts.561 That year in French Togo, Gommissaire

Bonnecarrere demanded a series of grants to fight sleeping sickness in conjunction with

Dahomey, and the Colonial Ministry loaned French Togo 8 million francs over 10 years,

which allowed the territory to set up dispensaries and restrictions on travel in and out of

infested areas.562

1931 1,620,430 1932 1,885,749 1933 0 1934 151,059 1935 987,596 1936 632,468 1937 224,263

Table 5.3: Loan funds spent on disease control, including sleeping sickness, Cameroun (francs)563

As table 5.3 indicates, French efforts to control sleeping sickness and improve the

public health infrastructure declined during the world depression. Colonial Ministry

officials decried the necessity to limit health, particularly sleeping sickness, treatments, but

562 Mandates Section Files, S246, PMC distribution 1925-26, excerpt from “L A frique Franpase,’ “11 fa u t sower I'A frique noire,’’ April 1926. L 'Afrique Franquse was the magazine of the Committee of French Africa (a colonial organization). In the mandate reports Cameroun’s government presented figures indicating about 30,000 cases a year. See LONMR for Cameroun, 1925-1938, Chapitre IV, “Sante publique.” 561 ANSOM, FM 66, Carton 610, Dossier 7. 562 ANSOM, FM 66, Carton 610, Dossier 7, No. 485, Bonnecarrere to MC, DAP, 20 Sep. 1929; MC to Bonnecarrere, No. 25,30 Oct. 1929; DAP, Note pour l’inspection Generale du Service de Sante des Colonies, No. 151,7 April 1930, and Bonnecarrere to MC, Inspection Generale du Service de Sante, and DAP, No. 399, 26 May 1931.

210

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. successive Colonial Ministers refused to expand the budget.364 The grants provided in the

early 1930s to help defend the mandates against sleeping sickness were not renewed and

the territories themselves did not perpetuate the same level of spending. Cameroun spent

only 360,000 francs on sleeping sickness prevention and treatment in 1937, with another

224,000 francs provided from leftover loan funds.

The Liquor Trade and Alcohol Policy

Alcohol was a different health issue than medical personnel or combating sleeping

sickness; rather than consuming resources for an indirect economic benefit, alcohol was a

health problem that profited colonial governments. Before the war alcohol importation

was enormous. There was a decline in alcohol importation to West Africa during the war,

but before the end of 1919 importadon was increasing again. By 1922, French Togo

imported 338,489 liters worth 740,767 francs.565 By 1925 importation was approaching

pre-war levels in both of the French B mandates, as well as neighboring Dahomey.566

Both the British and French refused to prohibit alcohol sales in their West African

mandates.567 They regulated it, but welcomed the customs revenue it generated. Because

of the different economic levels in each of the colonies on the West African coast, there

563 LONMR for Cameroun, 1938,24. 564 Inspector General Sorel of the Colonial Health Service (Service de Same des Colonies) wrote that “personally it appears to me that passive obedience to the budget rules [is ridiculous] when time is being wasted in assuring the execution of sought after funds to save numerous human lives and in the present case, is furthermore the obligation of France vis-a-vis the SDN to assure the protection of the public health in the mandated territories.” ANSOM, FM 66, Carton 2705, Dossier 7, No. 7098, Sorel to MC, 16 Oct. 1937. 565 See AE, Serie K, Dossier 122, No. 69, MC to MF, DAPCA, 17 May 1922. 566 AE, Serie K, Dossier 123, No. 54, Colonial Minister (?) to MF, DAPCA, 5 May 1926, “Tableaux indiquant le trafic des spiritueux dans les territoires sous mandat en Afrique et lest territoires limitrophes pour 1925.” In Dahomey, the importation of liquor was over 10,000 hi in 1925, along with 7,400 hi of wine and 1,207 hi of beer. 567 FO 371/13449, A4867/397/60, CO to FO, 19 July 1929, “Liquor Traffic in mandated territories.” Hie farthest toward prohibition the British were willing to go was to prohibit the sale of spirits to African without a license. 211

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. were many smuggling opportunities, especially after 1918, when the value of the franc

began to sink.568

Alcohol sales in the African mandates were a vital source of revenue.569 Indirect

taxation was critical to development plans, and alcohol imports were a steady source of

hard currency, whereas enforcing prohibition would be difficult and expensive.570 A Gold

Coast inquiry in 1930 indicated that until the mid- 1920s the revenue from liquor regularly

exceeded the revenue from cocoa, the territory's largest export crop.571 Both the French

and British aimed at limiting the amount of foreign liquor that entered their territories in

order to maximize their own profits. The French, in fact, attempted throughout the 1920s

to create a French monopoly of alcohol imports into French Togo and Cameroun; French

manufacturers would obtain the sales, and the French state the tax revenues.572 When

Britain protested the high French tariffs on foreign alcohol using the economic equality

568 See AE, Serie K, Dossier 123, “Regime des spiritueux en Afrique, 1918-1922." The French kept their tariffs lower than those of neighboring British colonies, and kept wine tariffs low to protect French producers. Generally, the low value of the franc compared to the pound allowed smugglers to import alcohol into French territory, and then ship it across the border for high profits. 569 In debating the issue with then Colonel Amery in the House of Commons, Ormsby-Gore was outraged by the possibility that liquor would be introduced to the mandates as a revenue measure: “I have been talking to various people on the subject, and the answer I have got is this ... the only way you will be able in the initial years to make your revenue and expenditure balance is by selling gin to the natives. That has been quite openly stated to me ... [prohibition and a public advocacy of it] are the sorts of questions which must he defined if the mandatory principle is to exist at all.” Amery, speaking then for the government, replied that “What we are aiming at there is effective control rather than complete prohibition” and insisted that no liquor would ever be sold to Africans in Tanganyika. See Mandates Section Files, S241, PMC distribution, 1920-21, Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons (Hansard), 24 March, 1921. In the French mandates, indirect taxes (of which alcohol was an important component reached a high of 27,961,000 francs in 1929 before falling to 13,353,000 francs in 1932-3 but recovering to 22,500,000 francs in 1935. In French Togo indirect taxes reached 21,400,000 francs in 1929, fell to 9,700,000 in 1934, and rose again to 23,050,000 francs in 1937. See LONMR for Cameroun, 1938, 81, and LONMR for French Togo, 1938, 81. 570 White setders hated the idea of prohibition, and it would be difficult to impose prohibition in British Togo but not in the Gold Coast. Liquor was not the only form of alcohol available to Africans. Both in Tanganyika and in Togo (and most other areas of sub-Saharan Africa) fermentation, if not distillation, was a common enough craft. Palm wine and several other fermented beverages, often quite potent (approaching 15-20% alcohol), could be brewed nearly anywhere. The British argued that gin and whiskey’ were in fact safer for the African to drink, as they were imported and subject to quality control; African drinks were not. 571 Mandates Registry Files, R2336, “Report of the Commission of Inquiry’regarding the Consumption of spirits in the Gold Coast, 1930.”

212

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. clauses of the mandates, the French responded by lowering tariffs on French wine and

beer, favoring French producers while conforming to the terms of the 1919 Convention

of St. Germain on alcohol and the mandate clauses.573

572 See AE, Serie K, Dossier 123. 573 See statistical tables below. 213

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. | Cameroun French Togo 1 Year Liquor Wine Beer Liquor Wine Beer (liters) (liters) 1921 44,167 218,318 61754 1922 72,154 201,834 68,982 185,870 78,058 23,566 1923 134,981 400,681 74751 139,586 108,650 47,956 1924 104,682 618,672 137,448 389,434 150,500 82,151 1925 80,120 1,165768 183700 556790 190700 76,955 1926 199,041 2,095,951 455734 685,821 306,900 136712 1927 111714 1,181,161 514770 696,836 242,600 203701 1928 491,788 244,500 227,307

1934 43,900 560,800 150,600 36,040 219,833 110718 1935 53,100 634,600 213700 38,033 255753 126,869 1936 58,911 782,708 388704 41,452 359,027 167,082 1937 92,997 361,600 340,680 1938 67,539 593,948 568,722 88,605 309,451 199,793

Table 5.4: Alcohol Importation in the French B Mandates, 1921-38574

The French insisted that they actively combated alcoholism in their colonies, but

at the same time they depended on it as revenue and a subsidized market for French wine

producers.57S Both French mandates imported considerable alcohol with low tariffs.576 As

this table shows, liquor sales in Cameroun were relatively stable, but wine imports (of up

to 20% alcohol) climbed steadily until 1927, after which they declined as beer imports

574 Figures for 1921-28 taken from CPM 1079. Figures for the 1930s taken from LONMRs for French Togo and Cameroun, 1934-38. 575 AE, Serie SDN, Dossier 620, No. 330, MC (Sarraut) to MF, 13 Dec. 1920. “La France poursuit assez energiquement la lutte contre l’alcoolisme dans ces regions pour n’avoir pas besoin d’etre stimulee a cet egard.” 576 The French maintained that duties on liquor between Nigeria and Cameroun were “approximately the same.” The British disagreed, computing that the French duties were actually less than 1/3 of the British. See Mandates Registry Files, R2335, LON document 6a.6945.2295, copy of CO (Qauson) to Mandates Section (Qtastini), 25 Sep. 1929. See also Catastini’s reply, Catastini to Qauson, 27 Sep. 1929. In French Togo, the duty for liquor in 1936 was still only 4,000 francs per hectoliter of pure alcohol, far lower than British duties. 214

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. increased.577 Smuggling was also lucrative as an indirect source of revenue. In French

Togo liquor importation in the 1920s was disproportionate to the size of the population.

French Togo’s population was less than a million; the large liquor sales support the

interpretation that low tariffs in French Togo led to the smuggling of alcohol into British

and neighboring French territories.578 Certainly the French understood this; high duties in

the Gold Coast prevented any liquor smuggling into French Togo.579 The depression

appears to have broken this trend toward high importation; neither Cameroun nor Togo

ever imported such high quantities again, even with low duties.

Year liquor (imp. gal.) wine and beer pure alcohol 1913 835,780 1922 398,383 253,656 114737 1923 612,591 269,994 246751 1924 680,503 472768 285,268 1925 943,487 636,541 387,848 1926 805,642 1,106,673 328,658 1927 1,312,258 1,756,077 537,402 1928 1,185,053 1,489,331 484,600 1929 592,659580 1930 535,688581

Table 5.5: Alcohol Importation in the Gold Coast Colony (British Togo), 1913- 1930582

577 CPM 820, Lugard, 12 Nov. 1928. 20% became the standard division between spirits and wine. 578 AE, Serie K, Dossier 102, Nos. 760-761, MC to Gommissaires of French Togo, Cameroun, 26 Oct. 1922. The French argued that most of the liquor flowing into British Togo came from Gold Coast; the British argued it came from French Togo. 579 ANSOM FM 66, Carton 1035, Dossier 6, Bonnecarrere to MC, DAP, No. 610,31 Oct. 1928. In the same memorandum he complained that if Togo’s duties were raised, it would have a similar problem with smuggling from Dahomey, and advised the Colonial Ministry that French wine and beer were preferable to African substitutes. OO 96/685/2, 6337, Gov. GCC (Slater) to OO, 23 Jan. 1929. 581 OO 96/692/6, 6571, Gov. GCC (Slater) to OO, 16 Dec. 1929. 58: Figures taken from CPM 1079, LON document G608M235.1930.VI, “Liquor Traffic in Territories under B and C mandate.” Unfortunately, no depression era survey was ever compiled. 215

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Alcohol was a critical component of the Gold Coast budget even after imports

began to decline in 1929.383 Liquor, wine, and beer import and sales taxes accounted for

nearly half of all indirect tax revenue in the Gold Coast budget. However, the British did

not accept the contention that the Gold Coast made alcohol too readily available to

Africans. Although imports declined, the British were still left with the problem of

explaining why Gold Coast smuggled so much alcohol through British Togo from the

neighboring French mandate. In this way British Togo’s position as a mandate forced the

British to defend alcohol as a source of revenue while arguing that the population of the

mandate was not in danger.

To convince the PMC that alcohol was not a problem in British Togo or the Gold

Coast, the British attempted to reconcile contradictory statements. British representatives

denied the significance of the smuggling problem in its mandate reports for British Togo

while at the same time describing measures taken to stop it. They also argued that British

Togo was unaffected by the issue. In the report for 1924, Britain stated that the Africans

in Togo were “very abstemious,” and that despite the difference in duty between French

and British Togo, the government was confident that no smuggling was taking place.584

The report for the following year noted that because there were substantial differences in

import duties in Gold Coast and French Togo, smuggling existed.585 With no customs

barrier between the Gold Coast and British Togo, there was undoubtedly “some” traffic in

alcohol from French Togo, across British Togo to the Gold Coast, but the British denied

533 FO 371/7154, A5692/79/60, GO to FO, 8 Sep. 1922. 5W LONMR for British Togo, 1924. 585 LONMR for Togo, 1925,106-108. Several other paragraphs on the ease of smuggling liquor from Palime and the “deterioration in the African race" due to alcohol and venereal disease were omitted. See GO 724/4, XF4518, OAG Maxwell to GO, 26 May 1926, “Report on Administration of Togoland, 1925." 216

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. that their mandate was the destination for most smuggled liquor. It did not then, or later,

give the PMC full information on the subject.586

Although the mandate agreements called for the elimination of the “liquor traffic”

and “trade spirits,” the PMC and even temperance organizations reluctandy concluded

that they did not demand total prohibition.587 Both the term “trade spirits” and “liquor

traffic” were jargon without recognized definitions; they were commonly applied to the

trade in pre-war liquor of indifferent quality and used as currency. In the B mandates this

type of liquor, variously defined, was eliminated, but most other forms of alcohol were

permitted. The St. Germain Convention prohibited trade spirits; but the mandatory

powers, claiming that without a definition the prohibition clause was meaningless, argued

that their own regulations were sufficient.588 Thus, the mandatory powers were under no

obligation to eliminate alcohol in the B mandates, although they periodically raised

duties.589 In fact, the French and British often attempted to deflect the League’s worries

about alcoholism with the rationale that alcohol sales measured prosperity.590 Privately,

colonial officials ridiculed commission members, such as Lugard, who advocated the

prohibition of liquor.591

See particularly minute by Ormsby-Gore. 586 For example, fearing a public scandal, the CD did not want the PMC to acquire the “Gold Coast Liquor Commission Report," which implied that liquor smuggling was a large problem and was essentially uncontrollable. CO 96/699/1, 6990, Governor of Gold Coast (Slater) to CO, 12 May 1931, “Togoland Report for 1930.” 587 Mandates Registry Files, R35, LON document 126206.11192, 21 Dec. 1922, copy of LONU report on “Liquor Traffic in Mandated Territories.” Hie LONU concluded that prohibition was not within the letter or the spirit of Article 22. 588 FO 371/4406, A5608/3505/60, LON to FO, Aug. 1920. See also AE, Serie K, Dossier 123. Hie St. Germain convention applied to Africa except for the northern coast and the Union of South Africa and prohibited all trade spirits, but left open the definition of trade spirits to the individual colonial powers. 589 FO 371/9498, A4893/144/60, CO to FO, no date (1924). 590 Minutes of the 4th session, 136-7. PMC members questioned Ormsby-Gore, speaking as the British accredited representative, on this argument in 1923. 591 CO 96/685/2, 6337, Gov. GCC (Slater) to CO, 23 Jan. 1929, see minute byJ.E.W. Flood: “Lord Lugard’s opinion is, I have no hesitation in saying, not worth the paper it is written on.” 217

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Nevertheless, the amount of alcohol entering the B manHares declined between

1927-1939, and this represents one of the few areas where the PMC had a significant

influence. Other organizations, however, shared credit for this development.592 After the

war, European public opinion became less accepting of alcohol sales to non-Europeans

and temperance advocates complained of violations of the pre-World War I Congo Basin

treaties.593 Several of the organizations associated with the work of the League, such as

the BIPDI, the Native Races and Liquor Traffic United Committee ([NRLTU), and the

AS APS, were created as temperance organizations and these groups also had links to anti

alcohol missionary groups.394 The League provided an indispensable international forum

for such organizations, which were among its most dedicated supporters. Hie PMC

questionnaires requested regular statistics on alcohol importation and consumption, and

with the cooperation of other Geneva-based organizations the League drafted a pair of

reports detailing the rising sale of alcohol in the mandates during the 1920s. The

mandatory powers quickly responded to the publication of the reports in order to avoid

additional criticism from temperance groups and the League. They attempted to protect

revenue while regulating liquor more tightly. This explains the post-1927 decline in liquor

sales.

592 There were frequent parliamentary questions on this subject. See FO 371/7049, W2573/1149/98, Parliamentary Question from Vicountess Astor, 7 March 1921, and FO 371/9498, A2885/144/60, Parliamentary Question from Mr. Leif Jones, 7 May 1924. 593 According to the 1884 Congo Basin Treaties, liquor, but not beer and wine, were prohibited to be sold to Africans in the basin of the Congo. This area included all of Tanganyika, the northern parts of French and British Togo, and the northern part of Cameroun. 594 Most of these groups stayed active during the interwar period and continued to demand complete prohibition. See, for one example, FO 371/13449, A7007/397/60, Native Races and Liquor Traffic United Committee to FO, 21 Oct. 1929: “[The Committee] deplores the fact that [the liquor] traffic still lives and thrives and though it was restricted for a short season during the war, it is being rapidly resuscitated. It is of the opinion that no question of high or low duties or restricting licenses in particular areas will meet the case... it therefore urges upon HMG the necessity for taking such steps as shall lead to its abolition." For earlier protests against the trade, see FO 371/11104, A375/215/60, NRLTU to FO, 18 Jan. 1926. 218

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The PMC considered many measures to interpret the terms of the mandates

regarding alcohol, and returned to the quesdon repeatedly because of the inexacutude of

the terms involved.595 If “liquor traffic” were taken literally, all liquor of any kind was

illegal. On the other hand, the importation of liquor into the mandates was not “traffic,”

in the 19th century sense that the liquor was not exchanged for goods, especially slaves.

Because the League Council never established a strict definition for “liquor traffic,” the

question was never resolved. Nevertheless, the PMC attempted to construct its own

working principles on alcohol sales in the mandates. At its third session in 1922 the

commission debated whether to encourage the mandatory powers to prohibit alcohol

entirely, just for Africans, or to regulate its importation.596 The next year, it anticipated

the smuggling between the Togos and Gold Coast, and recommended that duties in the

mandates and neighboring colonies be high, and uniform.597

In addition to the definitional problem, the commission found it difficult to

formulate recommendations because its members disagreed over alcohol policies. Some

members advocated total prohibition; others tried to protect alcohol as a source of

revenue while limiting its deleterious effect on the African population. Van Rees

recommended regulation, but not prohibition. Lugard recommended measures to license

liquor dealers, encourage native chiefs to prohibit alcohol consumption, and replace

African alcohol with imported wine and beer, which he argued were healthier for Africans,

595 Article 22, Qause 5: “the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee... the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic..." Each of the mandates contained: “The Mandatory... shall exercise a stria control over the traffic in arms and ammunition and the sale of spirituous liquors.” See Wright, 591-612. 596 Minutes of the 3rd session, 19. 597 FO 371/9425, W10012/70/98, 17 Dec. 1923, “Report of the Third Session of the PMC" Later, At the 6th session in 1924, the PMC noted the “enormous amount" of liquor imported into French Togo and the Gold Coast. Minutes of the 6th session, 108. 219

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. without mentioning their contribution to customs revenue.598 Freire d’Andrade argued for

complete prohibition. “Well-being,” he argued, meant that the African population had to

be shown that alcohol, in any form, was destructive, and the white officials and

populations of the mandates should be an example. He did not accept Lugard’s assertion

that the prohibition of “good gin” would result in “disgruntled natives drinking harmful

palm wine.”599

Despite its difficulty in drafting a policy and convincing the mandatory powers to

institute stricter controls, the PMC was not powerless. For example, it used the revised

questionnaire’s expanded alcohol section to prod French and British administrators.600

The original questionnaire had contained only a few questions on alcohol; but the 1925-

1939 version contained eight pointed queries beginning with “are the natives much

addicted to the use of alcohol and spirits?” and proceeded to ask for details on smuggling,

legislation, duties, statistics, and the local knowledge of distilling and fermenting

beverages.001 Nevertheless, even with its deeper inquiry, the PMC hesitated to criticize

French or British alcohol policy. In 1931 Penha Garcia advised the PMC merely to

reemphasize to the mandatory powers the need for “strict approaches to liquor

control”602

Both the British and French cooperated with the PMC and experimented with

different methods of regulation, as long as new practices perpetuated the status quo in

598 Minutes of the 3rd session (1922), 258. 599 Minutes of the 7th session (1924), 89. 600 The Colonial Office in fact, could not agree whether Dutch and German gin was a trade spirit. CO 692/6, 6571, Gov. GCC (Slater) to GO, 16 Dec. 1929. For the revised questionnaire, see Chapter 3. 601 CPM 711, “Liquor Traffic in Mandated Territories, Memorandum by the Secretariat,” 11 May 1928. 602 CPM 1268, 7 Nov. 1931, Penha Garcia. 220

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. order to preserve the financial benefits of alcohol.603 For instance, both rejected the idea

of high ad valorem tariffs on alcohol sales in Africa. Such a tax might increase the price of

liquor, wine, and beer to a prohibitive level for African consumers. The British argued

that the expense of calculating such a tax would also be prohibitive, and good alcohol

would be replaced by cheaper spirits, which would carry less tax, or by African drinks,

which were impossible to tax.604 Undoubtedly in response to public pressure, the

government of Gold Coast Colony in 1928 raised duties and the price of a liquor license

from 26 shillings to 97. Reluctandy bowing to the PMC, the British and French also

raised duties on alcohol imports in Gold Coast and French Togo in order to stem the

smuggling.605 When the result was to increase illicit distilling, the British pronounced the

experiment a failure, insisting that without modestly priced good liquor, Africans would

smuggle or produce their own substitutes.

The Great Depression, which led to the reduction of imported alcoholic beverages

into the B mandates, also indicated the limitations of alcohol regulation. During the world

financial crisis, liquor imports to Africa declined, but alcohol consumption did not. To

raise money, both mandatory powers increased their liquor duties, sharply lowering

imports, but not preventing Africans from obtaining lower grades of liquor or other forms

of alcohol, if not in the same quantities as before 1929. In fact, in 1934 the new governor

of Gold Coast complained that liquor was “too cheap.” That year, there was a rapid

603 AE, Serie SDN, MC to MF, No. 482,9 July 1925. 604 FO 371/9425, VC9475/70/98, CO to FO, 5 Dec. 1923. “One objection to the suggestion [of an adzuloi&n tax] is that it would be contrary to the spirit of the convention signed at St. Germain-en-Laye on 10 Sep. 1919, regarding the liquor traffic in Africa since, with the ad v d a a n duty the cheaper spirits, which are presumably the most harmful, would pay a lower rate of duty than the more expensive and better class spirits. A further and important objection is that an ad valorem duty would add gready to the difficulty of assessing duties on spirits.” 605 Minutes of the 16th Session, (1929). 221

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. increase in convictions for distilling alcohol, leading the accredited representative to

conclude that the rapidly deteriorating economic conditions would only put a limit on

what Africans could afford to drink, not whether they would drink.606 Colonial Secretary

Cunhffe-Lister expressed surprise that Africans were still able to obtain or produce liquor

as more expensive types were priced out of the market by the higher duties. In fact,

probably to protect revenues, the governor and Colonial Office had decided to combat

the illicit distilling with cheaper rum imports, which were at least taxable.607 Even in “dry*

Tanganyika, there was no drop in “drunkenness” convictions in the native courts.608 The

PMC concurred that the depression, rather than regulation, was the main cause of

declining alcohol imports, if not consumption. Penha Garcia commented that the “falling

off in the import of spirits and alcoholic beverages is due ... almost entirely to economic

causes.”609

The alcohol issue is an exceptional instance of the influence of the League, the

PMC, and outside organizations. It also, however, illustrates the essential problem with

social development in the mandates. The interests of the mandatory powers lay in

maintaining revenues, and at the same time their own visions of social development

involved reducing African alcohol production, rather than reducing African alcohol

consumption. Without an outright ban on alcohol sales, there were many ways for the

mandatory powers to fulfill their treaty requirements and placate the PMC without

606 Minutes of the 26th session, (1934) 38. 607 Rum would still provide revenue and support the economies of the British sugar islands, but the primary aim of the policy appears to have been to drive out illicit distilling by making at least one form of alcohol cheap enough for Africans to buy despite economic conditions. OO 96/715/10, Gov. of GCC (Thomas) to CO, 11 May 1934. There were six cases of illicit distilling in 1931, 558 in 1933. 608 Minutes of the 22nd session, 156. It is not clear how much liquor Africans drank in Tanganyika, where liquor was prohibited and Africans were generally only able to buy beer (or make their own alcohol.) 609 CPM 1268, “Liquor Traffic,” Report by Penha Garcia, 7 Nov. 1931. 222

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. eliminating one of their primary sources of revenue. The depression, rather than anti

alcohol policy, appears to have had the larger effect on conditions in the mandates. The

impact of customs reform and the repeated efforts to fight alcoholism in Africa appear to

have been limited, particularly since the two mandatory governments recognized that the

PMC would not demand prohibition.

The PMC did not have a large impact on health policy. In the B mandates the lack

of expenditure on sleeping sickness, health services, and the very limited success in

controlling alcohol consumption were aspects of policies in place in several other African

colonies such as the Gold Coast. The need for revenue trumped other considerations.

Moreover, as some scholars of imperialism have argued, the colonial powers may have had

no real interest in pursuing advances in public health policy because this would erode one

of the pillars of European supremacy in Africa.610

610 Vaughn, 192-199. For one comparative example, see David Arnold, “Touching the Body: Perspectives on the Indian Plague, 1896-1900," in Selected Subaltern S a d ie , (New York, 1988). 392-4,409,413-417. 223

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Part IV: E ducation

As Roman imperialism laid the foundations of modem civilisation, and led the wild barbarians of [Britain] along the path of progress, so in Africa today we are repaying the debt, and bringing to the dark places of the earth - the abode of barbarism and cruelty - the torch of culture and progress, while ministering to the material needs of our own civilisation ... we hold these countries because it is the genius of our race to colonise, to trade, and to govern.

--Sir Frederick Lugard, from The Dual Mandate m British Tropical Africa, 1922

From the point of view of facilitating independence in the B mandates, education

was the most important aspect of social development. It was an important indicator of

the overall commitment of the mandatory powers to self-government, defined by how

rapidly they prepared Africans to take part in public life. However, the mandatory powers

did not conceive of their administration in those terms. For France and England,

education was a critical tool for increasing their control over Africa.

Both British and French approaches to imperialism implied a place for educated

Africans. Their education policy defined the relationship between Africans and their

European administrators in several ways.611 The most important indicator of this

relationship was the type of education Africans received. Whether Africans were educated

in agricultural methods and industrial vocations or as clerks or administrators

demonstrated the goals of government. A second indicator was the amount of resources

devoted to education. The low priority of education in the B mandates is demonstrated

by the policies followed by both mandatory powers. Neither placed the necessary

resources at the mandates’ disposal to provide an education for even a sizeable proportion

611 The power relationship between Africans and Europeans was defined by the opportunities and quality of the education provided to Africans. For an older, Marxist analysis of the ideology of educational practice in the imperial sphere (particularly in French West Africa), see Martin Camoy, Education as Cultural Imperialism, (New York: 1974), Chapters 2 and 3. 224

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of Africans; given the limited wealth and infrastructure of the mandates, this was not

surprising. In most colonies the situation was similar. The mandatory powers also

refused to educate Africans as clerks, administrators, or professionals, even in small

numbers. Instead, in each of the B mandates education centered on language education

and agricultural or vocational training. This was similar to the practices followed in other

colonies; for the mandates, it indicated the potential permanence of Anglo-French rule.

Education was also a low priority for the PMC, which was dominated by former

colonial officials who shared this ideological framework.612 Even Article 22 did not

demand an immediate and universal education for all Africans. The PMCs refusal to

engage in meaningful discussion of education’s place in the mandates system indicates its

members’ reluctance to expand the terms of Article 22. This was especially true if a

discussion of education policies meant criticizing the mandatory powers’ woeful record.

612 Even outside commentators agreed. “The Mandates Commission has emphasized the importance of practical rather than literary education ... and devoted especially to character-training, agriculture, crafts and hygiene as the means by which the native will be led to wish for an economic development of the region.” Wright 560. 225

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Year Tanganyika Cameroun French Togo British Togo (£) (*) (bancs) (bancs) (Gold Coast Colony)

1919 174 - - -

1920 3,106 117,540 -- 1921 8,058 242700 247,550 2,880 1922 9,359 411,400 361,874 2,631 1923 11,024 387,655 502,939 4789 1924 15724 455,427 690,097 5722 1925 28,491 580,945 785,963 5,810 1926 45,923 916774 1,369,172 5,366 1927 59,682 1,011,695 1,701,577 5,618 1928 75,947 1,172778 1,992,636 5,004 1929 89,829 1,109,525 2761,500 7785 1930 111,302 1,525,471 9,697 1931 122,666 2,178,000 8,365 1932 98,768 (est.) 2,090,000 (est.) 1933 93,000 (est.) 1,900,000 (est.) 1934 87,500 (est.) 1,338,331 1,476,141 1935 84,641 (est.) 1,389,025 1749,571 1936 89,600 (est.) 1,414,338 997,989 1937 67,000 (est.) 1,487,878 1,399723 1938 100,000 (est.) 2,115,000 1,489,425 1939 2,574700 (est.)

Table 5.6: Education expenditure in die B mandates, 1919-1939613

613 Figures from 1919-1931 are taken from League documents C143M34.1928.VI 21 May 1928, and G5652vL272.1933.VI 5 Oct. 1933. See also CPM 698,1387. Later figures are taken from government budget estimates or LONMRs for Cameroun, French Togo, and Tanganyika. 226

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Tanganyika Cameroun i French Togo British Togo 2.4 2 I 2.2 n/a (1.3)

Table 5.7: Percentage of children educated by B mandate educational systems, 1926614

Tables 5.6 and 5.7 show the limited resources devoted to education in the B

mandates. Educational services in each territory were minimal. The Gold Coast absorbed

responsibility for education in British Togo, and took over the schools reopened by the

British between 1918-1921. In the southern section of the territory there were several

government schools, but in the northern section the one vocational boarding school at

Yendi was closed and its functions transferred to the Gold Coast school at Tamale. This

became the only school available to boys in the northern part of the mandate.615 The

Tamale school was chronically understaffed and despite glossy photographs of the school

sent to the PMC, it was “badly handicapped” by a lack of staff and funds.616

The Tanganyika education system was heavily reliant on missionary schools.

There were 100 government schools in the territory (including 89 elementary, 9 secondary,

and 7 technical schools), with 7,570 pupils, but the Roman Catholic Church, the largest

missionary organization in East Africa, ran over 2,000, with several Protestant

denominations operating another 1,300, including 31 secondary and 16 technical

614 See Wright, 561-2. See also CPM 46. The figure for Tanganyika indudes European children. Figures for British Togo are Gold Coast Colony figures. ^ Yendi was the only large population center in British Togo in the northern 2/3 of the territory. 616 CD 96/682/13, X6260.OAG, Gold Coast (Thomas) to QO, 5 Oct. 1928, “Report of the Education Department, 1927-8, Northern Territories.” 227

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. schools.617 The mandatory government granted a sizeable proportion of its budget to

grants for mission schools.618 Mission schools, however, could not form the entire

educational system. They taught Swahili and English, but the education Africans received

at mission schools was wildly variable and the missions often opened schools without

adequate personnel to staff them.619 Governor Byatt, who saw government schools as the

future of a loyal, educated African class, was alone in his conviction. He noted the

German accomplishments with respect: “one cannot help being struck at the very large

number of natives who are able to read and write Swahili the value of this to the

administration is hard to over-estimate.”625

During Governor Cameron’s tenure, the Tanganyika Education Department

emphasized industrial and vocational training rather than a more general education as an

investment in the economic development of the territory’s agriculture.621 Cameron

supported mission schools as partners in creating African agriculturists. The education of

girls, although “desirable” was not an immediate priority. Secondary education that

trained African teachers was vital, since the lack of teachers were the most important

017 OO 691/145/6,42114, “Tanganyika Territory: Map of Missionary Education." Roman Catholic missions were scattered over the entire territory. Church of England missions were limited to the Lake Nyasa shore. There were also Moravian, Lutheran, and Seventh Day Adventist missions in the Dar-es-Salaam area and along the Kenyan border. 618 Such sums were typically much smaller than the amount devoted to African education. See CO 691/95/13, 29050, Cameron to CO, 21 Jan 1928. The total amount granted in 1928 was £20,000. 619 Some “bush schools” might have one African mission worker as a teacher. Others, like the vocational schools run by Protestant missions, might have two European technical teachers and educate students who already spoke English or Swahili 620 CO 691/29, 24682, Byatt to CO, 15 Apr. 1920. Regarding the missions, Byatt wrote that “missions relegate secular teaching to a position of quite secondary importance... if education is not undertaken by the government it falls naturally into the hands of missions and, particularly at the coast, of proselytizing Mohommedans [sic] and I do not think that either alternative is desirable." 621 The goal was an adaptation of African society to European rule. See Dlife 338-9. Byatt wrote that “as agriculture develops, the necessity for skilled artisans will increase, and with the consequent increase in trade there will be a corresponding demand for the native possessing a literary and commercial education. Although there is already a great need for efficient clerks, their education would logically follow rather than

228

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. impediment to wider educational opportunities. The second was money, and Cameron

argued that agricultural training was the most effective use of the territory’s limited

financial resources.6” However, education often remained the privilege of chiefs and

notables, reinforced by the structures of indirect rule, which created an African aristocracy

in some parts of Tanganyika.623

The impact of the Great Depression illustrates the low priority of education in the

British mandates. Because of the economic crisis education budgets were cut immediately

and deeply. In the Gold Coast, the missions took up much of the financial burden of

education and at the same time government grants to the schools were slashed.624 In

Tanganyika the education policy of the mandates was even more sharply limited by

financial constraints. The Colonial Office, which reluctantly accepted the necessity for

these cutbacks, considered eliminating government schools and turning education over to

the missions.625 The Governor closed several secondary schools, thereby ending the

training of clerks and industrial craftsmen.626 Students were forced to go to Uganda for

secondary and medical training.627 Finally, the Education department proposed that the

£31,000 necessary to fund the school system be levied exclusively from new African poll

taxes instead of the Territory’s general revenue. This reduced the number of schools in

precede die production of a more enlightened native agriculturist." See OO 691/35,62434, Byatt to OO, 8 Nov. 1920. 022 CO 691/70, 31107, OAG Scott to OO, 6 June 1924. See particularly the comments of the Director of Education S. Rivers-Smith. 623 See Illife 328-9, who discusses the aristocratic and chiefly nature of several schools, generally omitted in the mandate reports. 624 OO 96/704/8, 7268, Gold Coast OAG (Northcote) to OO, “Committee on Education Expenditure” 6 Apr. 1932. 625 OO 691/122/11, 31083, Symes to OO, 27 Jan. 1932. 626 OO 691/138/16, 25162, MacMichael to OO, 26 Apr. 1934. Artisans were needed, in the estimation of the Cameron-era Education department, “to work for the senlers... the setders had refused to employ them.” See also OO 691/129/2, 5056, OAG Jardine to OO, 26 Jan. 1933, and minutes. The Advisory Committee on African Education disagreed with the rate plan. 229

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. poorer areas and sharply limited the quality of their teaching. At the same time, the state

continued to support European education. Governor MacMichael, who defended the

cutbacks, argued that education should only move forward as its products could be

absorbed by society. With failing plantations requiring little labor, he was unconcerned by

the collapse of Tanganyika’s educational system.62®

However, by the late 1930s, the Tanganyika Education Department came under

close scrutiny from the Colonial Office because of the enormous deficiencies revealed in

the government education reports for 1936 and 1937. The Colonial Advisory Committee

on Education (CACE) sharply criticized Tanganyika for the low number of Africans with

a secondary education, and also because local school boards and the territory’s African

Education Committee had not met in several years. Donald Cameron, then sitting on the

CACE, observed that the Depression was not the direct cause of the problem; “during the

last seven years revenue had increased by 40% but expenditure on African education from

general revenue had fallen by about 15%” to barely 3% of revenue.629 The CACE

provisionally concluded that the Territory itself was not doing enough for education - the

problem was not simple finance, but the lack of emphasis on educating Africans.

In the French colonial empire education was also of secondary importance and

generally left either to “recognized” mission schools which attempted to teach in French

627 CD 691/129/2,5056, Deputy Governor Jardine to GO, 26 Jan. 1933. 628 See for one example Mandates Registry Files, R4087, LON document 6a.18038.722 MacMichael’s “opening speech to the CPM.” 629 GO 691/175/3, “Extract from the draft minutes of the 95th meeting of the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies,” 15 June 1939, and minutes. G.L.M. Gauson, of the Tanganyika Department in the Colonial Office, wrote that “the real fact is that the Tanganyika Territory Education Department is rotten bad... the director... should be in the dock.” Others wrote that “it is not [the director] who ought to be “in the dock,” but the past two Governors of Tanganyika.” Governor Mark Young disagreed with the conclusions of the Advisory Committee, whose own report excised some of the caustic comments about the Tanganyika Education department. The conclusions that education in Tanganyika desperately needed

230

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and were thus subsidized, or “unrecognized” schools which were unregulated.630 The

“recognized” and government schools applied French educational theories to create

“assimilated” French students. However, because the French feared that highly educated

Africans would resist joining the French body politic and become agitators for

independence, government schools were rare.631 In all of AEF there were only four

government-run schools.632 The financial importance of education in the French colonies

had been low before World War I. In the decade before the War AOF had devoted less

than 2% of its budget to education, approximately two million francs. French Togo’s

neighbor Dahomey had only 3,000 pupils in 1914; in all of AOF in 1922 there were only

25,000.

The French approach to education reflected France’s larger development aims.

French schools did not educate a broad spectrum of Africans. Most schools were

intended for the children of chiefs and notables. Ordinary Africans rarely received

instruction, and when they did it was to encourage food production: the most common

subjects were agriculture, French, hygiene instruction, and animal husbandry.633 One

assessment of the French educational system in Africa concludes that despite the

principles of assimilation and association, “between 1890 and 1945 the purpose of French

overhauling, with a larger emphasis on African education, and the need for more money were included and were hard to ignore. However, the opening of war with Germany obviated the recommendations. 63C Prosser Gifford and Timothy Weiskel, “African Education in a Golonial Context: French and British styles,” in Gifford and Louis, eds., Frans and Braaxn in Africa, 674-5. 631 Several educated Africans, the ew lus, became noted critics of the French colonial system. The most famous example was Blaise Diagne, a Senegalese deputy to the Assembly. The French intended the ewlues to be the first generation of African Frenchmen. Governor General o f AOF Martial Merlin (later French PMC member), was a particular foe of wider African education and termed assimilation a “failure.” See Conklin 166-167. 633 Suret-Canale 374-5. 633 CPM 46. 231

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. educational policy was to avoid making Africans into Frenchmen.”634 Africans were

educated “to contribute to the economic development of the territory, and to guide the

people in the path of agricultural and industrial progress; and on the other hand, to

inculcate into the natives the idea that they can and should improve their conditions of

life.”635 Missionary schools were useful for increasing the scope of France’s influence, as

Joseph indicates, by “inculcating work discipline and establishing moral order suited to the

colonial enterprise... and fostering an ideological commitment to the “civilizing mission”

of Western colonialism.”636

In the French mandates the educational systems created in the 1920s were built on

the model of those in AOF and AEF. In French Togo, by 1922 the French reestablished

government schools and reopened mission schools, instructing a total of 6,500 students.

By 1930 the territory had 3,800 students in government schools and about 8,000 in

mission schools.637 In Cameroun, the year after the war ended the French reestablished

some 50 primary schools with about 4,000 students.638 The system hardly expanded

before the late 1920s; in 1924 there were still 51 government schools with 3,600 students

and 10 European teachers.639 By 1935 the government had expanded to its system to

8,500 students and added three vocational schools, a secondary school, and a training

academy for hygiene workers, with 136 students total.640 The missions educated far more

634 Gifford and Weiskel, 695. 635 LONMR, Cameroun, 1921,13-33. 636 Richard A. Joseph, “Church, State, and Society in Colonial Cameroun," The Irtemadonal Journal c f African Historical Sadie 13(1), 1980,13. (Hereafter Joseph (2)). 637 Suret-Canale 378. 638 DeLancey 30. *” LeVine 80. 640 Suret-Canale 379. See also LONMR for Cameroun, 1938,99-101. 232

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. students. In 1935 recognized mission schools held 6,600 students, and unrecognized

schools had 81750.641

French Togo’s, wealth and small population combined to give education its

highest priority in any of the B mandates.642 In 1924 there were nine government schools

with about 1,500 students out of a population of 800,000, a higher proportion than in any

other B mandate. TTiere were also 63 mission schools with 4,000 students.643

Nevertheless, the French admitted in their early mandate reports that the scale of

education in French Togo was “clearly insufficient.”644 Even so, during the Depression

the educational system in French Togo spent four times the amount the Germans had in

1914 and educated approximately 2% of children; a far higher percentage than in any

other French colony.645 In fact, a vocational school was established at Sokode in 1933,

one of the few schools established during the economic crisis.646

Both French mandates heavily emphasized the French language and devoted their

limited teaching personnel and resources to teach adults French. Mission schools were

also required to teach in French, including American missions.647 Language was an

instrument of control, with an economic and a political dimension.648 The French used

French as a tool for creating loyalty to France, a critical part of their political campaign to

641 Suret-Canale 378-9. 643 As a proportion of the annual budget, French Togo spent 5% on education in 1925,6% in 1926,8% in 1933, and 14% in 1938. It was even higher in 1936-7, when several schools were built or improved. See LONMR for French Togo, 1937, 89-93. 643 CPM 46, Bugge-Wicksell, 23 March 1923. A Catholic mission school at Lome provided vocational industrial courses. 644 CPM 46. See also LONMR for French Togo, 1922. 645 Wright 562. 046 LONMR for French Togo, 1936,90. 647 Joseph (2) 19. 648 As Joseph states: “For the French colonizers, teaching their colonial subjects the French language was never to take second place to getting them to honor French sovereignty over their territories or getting their

233

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. combat the German legacy and German propaganda. Africans who learned French also

held an economic advantage, especially if they were chiefs, and those who learned French

were more likely to be entrusted with political power. These results were, however,

subverted by other French policies such as high taxes and wage and price controls. The

Duala, the most literate and “Europeanized” of the African tribes in Cameroun, never

fully accepted French rule, as their numerous petitions to the PMC indicate. Several of

their protests were, in fact, written in German.

The effects of education in the French mandates were also ambiguous in other

ways. Africans often resisted French attempts to educate the populace, even when

education was limited to the children of local notables. Missionary education, in fact,

often undermined the basis of African life by encouraging a Francophonic oudookand

attempting to eradicate such African practices as female circumcision, polygamy, and

domestic slavery.649 In several parts of the French mandates, chiefs resisted education

because educated Africans represented a serious threat to their power.650 French and

African fears about the consequences of an educated population help explain why, in the

later mandate period, French educational spending in Cameroun hovered around 1% of

the territory’s revenue.

The PMC also deemphasized education, despite its centrality to the goals of the

mandate system. It periodically commented on French educational services, but with litde

labor to the service of Greater France.” French cultural imperialism was part of the quest for true sovereignty over Cameroun and Togo, just as much as rail links and trade. Joseph (2) 18-19. M9Joseph(2) 16. 650 Richard Joseph, “Church, State, and Society in Colonial Cameroun," Irtemtdontl Journal cf African Historical Studies. 13:1 (1980): 27-30. 234

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. effect.651 It also refused to address the importance of education in its own sessions. The

two members of the PMC most deeply concerned with education were Anna Bugge-

Wicksell, a legal scholar, and Valentine Dannevig, a high school principal. Neither was a

colonial official and neither contributed regularly to other PMC business.652 They

periodically attempted to draw the attention of the commission to education but were

ignored.653

Bugge-Wicksell and Dannevig did attempt to address the financial and ideological

aspects of education policy in the mandates. Both approved of the vocational character of

British and French schools, but neither accepted the meager resources devoted to

education.654 Wicksell’s attempt to commit the PMC to a discussion of education was

buried in the files of the Mandates Section because Rappard felt her analysis was

inadequate. Her report on education was watered down to a request for additional funds

and more complete information.655 In 1938 Dannevig attempted to begin a debate about

651 Richard A. Joseph, “The German Question in French Cameroun, 1919-1939, Conparatrie Studies in Society and History 17(1), Jan. 1975, 73. 652 Bugge-Wicksell sometimes complained of her confusion to Rappard. See Mandates Section Files, S243, Bugge-Wicksell (1921-26) file. Several other women were considered for the PMC but were rejected because of their political expertise, their aggressiveness, or their feminism. Hamilton Gilchrist summarized the prevailing view of one potential nominee, Emily Balch, an economist, sometime journalist for The Nation, and former international secretary for the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom: “I admire her independence of opinion, her fearlessness in expressing her views, and her genuine and earnest desire to do the very best for the improvement of the condition of backward peoples ... I am doubtful as to whether she has all the poise and judgment which it is desirable that members on the Commission should possess.” Undoubtedly Balch also was rejected because she had been a student of Gustav Schmoller, the German economist. 653 For instance, Mandates Registry Files, R.4087, LON document 6a28990.722,18 May 1937, “Annual Report for Tanganyika, 1936,” Minutes by Dannevig. Dannevig asked several questions about the education budget and the results of education in Tanganyika. Her questions were neglected and the report for that year on the work of the PMC, CPM 1900, “Notes with satisfaction that it is intended to increase expenditure on native education.” 654 CPM 151, by Bugge-Wicksell. 655 CPM 46, CPM 46(a), CPM 46(b), and CPM 151,2 July 1924. See also Mandates RegistryFiles, R68, 12799627995, 19 April 1923, 31 March 1924. 235

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the future of education in the B mandates. Her observations were lengthy and heated.

She wrote:

the percentage of the revenue of the territories which is devoted to native education in most territories is very low. When discussing these questions with the accredited representative of the mandatory powers, one is frequendy given the answers: 1) that other social services are more important... 2) that the present state of development of most native races does not call for more expenditure on education, 3) that the educational work should most profitably at the present moment be left to the care of the missions; 4) that budgetary conditions do not allow more money to be devoted to native education; and 5) that even if more money were available, it would be impossible to erect more schools for want for a sufficient number of efficient teachers. While fully appreciating the weight of the first and last arguments, I cannot associate myself with the way of thinking which is represented by the other arguments... I have often wondered what must be the thoughts and feelings of thinking natives towards the European governments who come and make themselves masters of their land and its natural riches for their own benefit, and who have not yet found it possible to give the original owners of the land a fair share of the considerable profits, for instance, by erecting schools to help them to improve of life and further their intellectual development as to enable them... to take an effective part in the management of their own affairs and the development of their country, as is, in fact, implied by the mandate.656

She decried Tanganyika’s education budget of “3 cents a year per head.” She also attacked

the idea that teacher training was an insurmountable bottleneck; at some point, she argued,

teachers would have to be trained and equipped. Finally, she questioned why these things

had not happened in any of the mandates.657 Her views were ignored. Dannevig defended

her memorandum before the full commission, pointing out the extremely slow evolution

of education between Bugge-Wicksell’s first report and the present. The Dutch member,

Baron Van Asbeck, British member Sir William Hailey, and the commission’s president

656 Mandates Registry Files R.4138, CPM 2073, “memorandum on education” 21 June 1938, by Valentine Dannevig. 657 CPM 2073. 236

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Orts dismissed her arguments.658 Orts then deleted the entire discussion from the PMCs

minutes.

Conclusion: The PMC’s influence on social policy

The PMC did not successfully encourage social development in the B mandates on

a different basis than already existed in the French and British colonial empires. In some

areas of social policy, such as education, it only sporadically attempted to influence the

mandatory powers, and in others, such as labor, persistent effort failed to alter entrenched

colonial practices. Serious environmental problems, such as sleeping sickness, received

little attention during the mandate period. The PMCs greatest success, the reduction of

alcohol consumption, owed more to other factors than to the League’s involvement. The

practical effect of the mandates and Article 22 on the social development of the B

mandates is difficult to detect.

In the arena of social policy the commission members shared the ideological

framework of the colonial powers. They avoided controversial topics and drew back when

even one member objected. It is therefore not surprising that the PMC was not a more

successful institution; most of its membership held the same ideological views as the

colonial powers. To a large degree its members did not pressure the French and British to

explore methods of administration that would differentiate the mandates and bring them

closer to self-government than their African colonies. Members from the mandatory or

colonial powers also defended their country’s policies against criticism. Because the PMC

658 Mandates Registry Files R4138, “Exchange of views having taken place on Saturday, Nov. 5, on the memo of Mile. Dannevig concerning native education and the social services in the territories under mandate in African and the Pacific.” 237

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. protected the interests of the mandatory powers at the expense of the mandates

themselves, international supervision had little effect on the “material and moral well

being” of the African inhabitants of the mandates.

The PMC was encumbered by its dependence on the mandatory powers to define

the .erms of debate. Although the commission could call on outside sources of

information, it drew the bulk of its statistics and anecdotal evidence from the mandate

reports. These reports were often extensive, but the PMC frequently had to ask for

additional information, which it only occasionally received.659 Since most of its members

were part of their domestic colonial establishment, the body as a whole rarely strayed

outside the boundaries framed by the mandate reports and by established colonial

practices.

The mandatory powers set these ideological and policy boundaries to escape

potential criticism. They often interpreted their own statistics to create the impression of

progress even when this had not occurred. A statistically insignificant decrease in the

number of patients visiting hospitals could result in a satisfied statement that “this

reduction in disease is due to increased facilities afforded for early treatment, the inproved

conditions generally under which labor is employed, the expansion of sanitation, urban

and rural, and the gradual awakening of a health consciousness in the African population

at large.”660 Accredited representatives sometimes attempted to justify the lack of

659 This was especially the case because the mandatory powers did not collect or provide to the PMC comprehensive statistical information on most social development policies. For one example, see FO 371/8307, W7487/7487/94, Health Commission of the LON to FO, 29 Aug. 1922. “At its recent meeting the Permanent Mandates Commission felt that it would be necessary to secure fuller particulars and statistics regarding the prevention, incidence, and treatment of disease in the mandated areas, notably in Central Africa and the Pacific Islands.” 660 LONMR for Tanganyika, 1926. The actual drop in hospital attendance for that \ear was 950 people, a statistical fluke; hospital attendance had dropped from approximately 46,000 to 45,000. 238

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. resources devoted to social policies using African ignorance and childishness, or thrusting

social development into the far future.661 Often PMC questions simply met with dilatory

responses.602

The addition of a German member to the PMC further complicated the League’s

discussion of social development policies. Gustav Kastl was a shrewd examiner of the

accredited representatives. However, as the issue of foreign doctors revealed, the other

members of the PMC could muzzle German/s representatives in order to avoid

embarrassing the mandatory powers. The French and British were extremely wary of the

German representatives. Indeed, after Germany’s entry to the PMC, the British and

French became even more unwilling to admit to any deficiencies in their social services in

front of the commission.663

Without cooperation from the mandatory powers, a more dedicated commitment

to the mandates by PMC members, and long-term economic prosperity, a policy of social

development that fulfilled the mandate principle was an impractical goal. However, it was

not always futile. The decline in alcohol importation into the B mandates indicates the

PMCs potential to influence social development. With broad support from international

661 In 1925 OrmsbyGore, die British representative claimed that until, in the far future, when Africans had lost their ignorance and accepted European values, it was impossible to control venereal disease or lower infant mortality. At the same session Fre ire D’Andrade asked if venereal diseases, high mortality rates, and alcohol abuse might be caused by a general “intrusion of white civilization.” Ormsby-Gore’s reply, that there were few white settlers in the mandated territories, seems to have been a deliberate misunderstanding of the question. Minutes of the 6th session, 125-129. 663 Minutes of the 3rd session, 140. G rims haw asked OrmsbyGore about the health effects of labor migration, and OrmsbyGore replied that there were no serious side effects. In 1927 Rappard, characterized the health section of the British report on Togo as “vague, cursory, and insubstantial.” Minutes of the 12th session (1927), 86. 663 The British, while often acknowledging that the size of the department of health was inadequate, resisted all suggestions that additional resources were needed. Minutes of the 14th session, 34. At the following session in 1929 D.J. Jardine (Chief Secretary for Tanganyika) and W. Lunn (temporary Undersecretary of State for the Colonies) maintained that Tanganyika’s social development was making “remarkable progress" despite increases in venereal and endemic disease incidences and the understaffing of the health department.

239

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. organizations and public opinion, the PMC’s stand may have encouraged the mandatory

powers to alter their existing policies. In this sense the PMC reflected the new ideas

regarding the goals and practices of imperialism, but it did not create or shape them.

Minutes of the 15th session, 107,127. For a later example on labor conditions, see Minutes of the 34th Session of the PMC, (1938), and 0 0 691/164, Young to GO, 26 Jan. 1938. 240

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CONCLUSION

[Tanganyika] fell into Britain’s lap as a simple consequence of the wartime need to destroy German forces that happened to be there ... there was no reasonable alternative to British management once the Germans had gone. Although her role was the subject of an agreement with the League of Nations, Britain controlled the Territory before the League was bom and after it died, and her conduct of government in the interim was in no important way affected by the League.

-- Robert Heussler, “British Rule in Africa,” 1971

In 1925 the British accredited representative to the PMC attempted to convince

the commission that African welfare would not benefit from rapid economic and social

development. He used the language of indirect rule to argue that it was not truly in an

African’s interest to be educated and prepared for positions and circumstances that did

not yet exist. His aim was to convince the PMC that Africans educated and prepared for

self-government did not fit the long-term goals of the colonial state. In response to the

question “what is a good African?” he stated that

[to create a good African is] to develop the native on lines that will not Westernize him and turn him into a bad imitation of a European . .. [the PMQ was no doubt familiar with such a product - the half-educated African who considered himself quite as good as, if not better than, the white man who governed him. The idea of the Government of Tanganyika was that a ‘good African’ should be an African from the bottom, and that meant that he should not be cut away from his roots.664

The good African was one who worked the land and lived as his ancestors had, but

accepted European rule, obeyed European administrators, and adapted to European

values. The PMC did not question the British representative’s assertion, despite the

241

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. implication that any policy that encouraged self-government was at best, a distant

possibility.

This example demonstrates the basic conflict between the mandates system in

Africa and the imperialism of the French and British colonial establishment. Between

1922-1939 several events and issues changed the dynamic of the PMC and the mandates

system. These included Germany’s entry into the League, the Great Depression, Hitler’s

challenge, and Anglo-French appeasement, leading to another war in 1939. Within this

larger framework, there was an underlying tension between the expectation of

international supervision and the insistence on unfettered sovereignty. This tension,

which exists in the present-day relationship between the UN and its members, could never

successfully be resolved in the colonial world short of independence.

After World War II, the UN created a strong Trust Territories system. Like the

PMQ the Trust Territories Commission was able to hear petitions, interrogate

representatives from the trust territory holders, and receive reports on administrative

questions. It was also had privileges the PMC had not possessed, such as the right to

interview petitioners and make regular inspection tours of the territories. Moreover, the

UN did not divide Trust Territories into different categories on the basis of civilization

level, and the goal of independence was never in question. All of the Trust Territories

achieved independence through the system, although, like other parts of the former

colonial world, several remain desperately poor. Cameroun, French Togo, and

Tanganyika achieved independence in the early 1960s; British Togo and the British

Cameroons were incorporated into Ghana (Gold Coast) and Nigeria.

664 Minutes of the 9th session (1925), 140. 242

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The League and its mandates system officially ended in 1946, unheralded and

unmoumed. At the PMC’s last meetings in 1937-9, several members were unacquainted

with its workings and the truncated commission was in a state of somnolence. The PMC

was unable to stop Tanganyika from falling further under Kenya’s influence, French Togo

into AOF, and Cameroun into AEF. Meagerly informed by the two mandatory powers,

the PMC acted as a rubber stamp for French and British policy more than an advocate of

the Africans’ interests.

The PMC had only a limited influence in its lifetime. This is most evident at the

level of local administration. France made only token attempts to differentiate its

mandates from its colonies. Britain effectively joined Togo and the Cameroons to its

neighboring colonies. The exception was Tanganyika, by far the largest and most

important of the B mandates, which remained an autonomous territory. Its first two

governors, Horace Byatt and Donald Cameron, built an administration most closely

resembling the ideals of the mandates system. For six years, Governor Cameron

combined indirect rule with the mandate, opposed Closer Union, and fought for financial

and political measures that promoted African interests. However, his administration was

expensive. It constantly threatened the fiscal stability of the territory and set the stage for

the disastrous debt situation after 1929. White settlers agitated against the mandate and

threatened Cameron’s administration. When he left to become governor of Nigeria in

1931, his successors were neither financially able nor ideologically committed to

continuing his experiment. By the late 1930s, in fact, many officials in the Colonial Office

were unfamiliar with his administration.

243

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The links among Geneva, Paris, and London were more significant at the level of

policy formation. However, the PMCs influence eroded over time in the face of Anglo-

French resistance. This erosion developed out of the original inadequacies of the system,

which was built on a very loose foundation. The vague or contradictory wording in the

terms of the mandates themselves made it difficult for the League to enforce the Open

Door and to prevent administrative amalgamation or forced labor. British and French

resistance to the mandates system also evolved out of the continual tension between their

goals and those of the League. As the above example illustrates, imperialists manipulated

the terms of the mandates regularly to defend older policies, even if they violated the spirit

of the mandate. By 1939, the mandatory powers had concluded that cooperation with the

PMC was too expensive financially, diplomatically, and ideologically.

Whatever the reasons for the evolving distance between the mandatory powers

and the PMC, over the entire interwar period the commission was at a strong

disadvantage. It is easy, but incorrect, to conclude that it therefore made no contribution

to the history of twentieth-century imperialism; but it was largely a Eurocentric one,

reinforcing traditional views and practices. Even when the commission had the ability to

inquire and criticize, it often chose not to because its members were in agreement with the

mandatory powers, or it feared that the vague wording of the mandates gave the French or

British an effective rebuttal to any criticism.665

Even this evaluation is not complete. Despite the PMCs weakness, several of its

members were devoted to the new system and attempted to redefine imperialism. Their

665 Ralph Austen, “Varieties of Trusteeship,” 524. Austen writes that regarding the neglect of long term social and economic development, “The PMQ unlike its successor, the United Nauons Trusteeship Commission, did not direct its most strenuous inquiries toward this somewhat embarrassing subject.” 244

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. legacy survived after World War II and was m anifest in the new trusteeship system.

Although unable to alter very much itself, the PMC sparked changes such as the end of

the prestation. After 1946 European colonial administrators under the UN’s supervision

were under far greater official and public scrutiny on issues of social and economic

development than before.

Even before the First World War the French and British had begun to incorporate

African welfare into their principles and practices of colonial rule. However, as Conklin,

Suret-Canale, and other critical scholars of imperialism have noted, and as this dissertation

demonstrates, this ideological standpoint did not necessarily translate into policy actions.

During the interwar period the ideology of imperialism vied with the League’s mandates

system. There were two irreconcilable sides - one aspiring to prepare Africans for

independence, the other seeing them as permanent subjects of European empires. This

unequal conflict could only be resolved when independence became both sides’ shared

goal.

245

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