British Major-General Charles George Gordon and His Legacies, 1885-1960 Stephanie Laffer

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COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

GORDON‘S GHOSTS: BRITISH MAJOR-GENERAL CHARLES GEORGE

GORDON AND HIS LEGACIES, 1885-1960

STEPHANIE LAFFER

A Dissertation submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Awarded: Spring Semester, 2010

The members of the committee approve the dissertation of Stephanie Laffer defended on February 5, 2010.

______Charles Upchurch Professor Directing Dissertation

______Barry Faulk University Representative

______Max Paul Friedman Committee Member

______Peter Garretson Committee Member

______Jonathan Grant Committee Member

The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members.

For my parents, who always encouraged me…

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation has been a multi-year project, with research in multiple states and countries. It would not have been possible without the generous assistance of the libraries and archives I visited, in both the United States and the United Kingdom. However, without the support of the history department and Florida State University, I would not have been able to complete the project. My advisor, Charles Upchurch encouraged me to broaden my understanding of the British Empire, which led to my decision to study Charles Gordon. Dr. Upchurch‘s constant urging for me to push my writing and theoretical understanding of imperialism further, led to a much stronger dissertation than I could have ever produced on my own. I would also like to thank Peter Garretson for introducing me to Gordon in the first place. Without Dr. Garretson‘s enthusiasm for my seminar paper on Gordon‘s death, it is unlikely that this entire project would have come to be. In addition to Dr. Upchurch and Dr. Garretson, I would also like to thank Jonathan Grant, who provided encouragement every step of the way, Max Friedman for stepping onto my committee and challenging my analysis, and finally, Will Hanely and Barry Faulk, for reading the entire manuscript and providing me with very helpful feedback. Outside of Florida State University, I must thank the staffs of the libraries and archives I visited. Wandering into sometimes empty libraries and asking to look at all of the papers that they had regarding Charles Gordon, often led to new insights into Gordon and the people he encountered. In Boston, at the Boston Public Library and the Athenaeum, I was able to see how Gordon was perceived in the publishing world. In the United Kingdom, the staffs of the British Library, Hove Library, the Sudan Archive at Durham University and the National Archives all helped me to find every document relating to Gordon held by the institutions. Additionally, I must thank anyone who read any of the drafts, especially Amy Carney, who edited the entire dissertation, and Christopher Black, who re-edited and proof-read it, and my father, Elliott Laffer, who spent a portion of his Christmas vacation reading the entire draft, and composing the chapter titles. Finally, I need to thank my family. My parents have encouraged me to feel like I could do anything, including write a dissertation. This support has meant more to me than they could ever know, and the trip to Istanbul was a perfect way to end the project.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures ...... vi

Abstract ...... vii

1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

2. THE LIFE, DEATH AND ‗CULT‘ OF GORDON ...... 15

3. DEATH AND ITS AFTERMATH ...... 36

4. THE ―GREAT HERO‖ MEMORIALIZED ...... 56

5. PUTTING GORDON‘S MEMORY TO WORK ...... 76

6. BACK TO KHARTOUM ...... 96

7. STILL A SYMBOL ...... 116

8. FADING INTO THE BACKGROUND ...... 142

APPENDICES ...... 167

A. THE GORDON STATUE ...... 167 B. THE GORDON STATUE—THE WREATHS...... 168

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 169

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...... 193

LIST OF FIGURES

A.1: Contemporary Photograph of the Gordon Statue, Victoria Embankment Gardens 168

A.2: Annual Wreaths on the Gordon Pedestal, January 2008 ...... 169

A.3: Wreath from the Gordon Foundation, Gordon School (left) and Old Gordonians (right) 169

ABSTRACT

―Gordon‘s Ghosts: British Major-General Charles George Gordon and his Legacies, 1885-1960,‖ examines the various ways that Gordon and his memory have been used in the British Empire following his death in Sudan in 1885. After his death, Gordon became a symbol of Britain‘s imperial project, with his name and legacy featured in debates concerning multiple aspects of the British Empire, including areas where his connection was tangential at best. My study spans a period of about seventy-five years, beginning with the height of British imperialism and concluding with decolonization. Over the course of these decades, Britain‘s imperial commitments stretched all over the globe, as did the projections of Gordon‘s legacy.

In British domestic politics, Gordon‘s legacy was often synonymous with the failures of Liberal Imperialism and its strongest advocate, Prime Minister William Gladstone. As long as the Liberal Party remained committed to the ideas of Gladstone, Gordon‘s memory was employed both explicitly and implicitly by the Conservative Party as a way of reminding the British voting public of its opponent‘s shortcomings. For the Conservatives, Gordon became a political tool; he needed to be commemorated to serve as a reminder of the consequences for not following a strong imperial policy, and my work traces these politics of commemoration.

Gordon‘s legacy was present in other areas of the British Empire than Britain and Sudan. My dissertation also traces how Gordon‘s memory was used in these other regions. The first area where Gordon‘s legacy was employed was not in Africa, where it may have been expected, or even in China, where he earned his nickname, ―Chinese Gordon,‖ but instead in Ireland, where his name was regularly invoked in the arguments against approving Irish Home Rule in 1886. Following the successful defeat of this proposed policy, the Conservative Party continued to invoke Gordon‘s name throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most notably in response to other imperial projects that would, in its opinion, weaken the British Empire. Fittingly, my work concludes with a discussion of how Gordon slowly becomes less important to British imperialism and how his representations changed as the needs of empire changed.

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

On Saturday May 14, 1960 at 12:30 in the afternoon, a statue of Major-General Charles George Gordon was re-erected in the grounds of The Gordon Boys‘ School in Surrey, England. This statue had been sent back from now-independent Sudan to its home country and claimed by the Boys‘ School as a way to honor its namesake, General Gordon.1 This statue and one other were the only two statues ever sent back to Britain by formerly-occupied countries—and by the time it was mounted at the school, it had lost most of its importance. In fact, the re-positing of the statue only received a solitary picture in The Times of that day.2 The statue and the man whom it honored no longer had the same importance as they once did. Eighty-six years earlier, when Gordon was sent to Khartoum, the papers were full of stories of his valor, and one year later, full of his sacrifice; now they relegated his contributions and the statue that honored him to the back pages of the paper. The statue, the last tangible reminder of the British time in the Sudan, and the country where Gordon had sacrificed his life for the imperial project, had returned home to England.3 Charles Gordon‘s role in British history and its imperial project have been a question for debate since his untimely death in 1885. He has been seen in various roles: as a martyr, as a drunk, as an inspirational figure, as an imperial hero, and as an imperial folly. He is remembered not for what he himself did, but rather for the fact that he was perceived as abandoned by his government in an unfortunate situation. Gordon was a career military man. He distinguished himself early, first coming to public attention as a young man during his service in the Crimean War.4 However, the first major actions leading to military prominence would come slightly later, after he was sent to China in 1859 to help Emperor Li-Hung Chang quash the Taiping Rebellion. In this position, Gordon demonstrated two qualities that would come to define his military career: his loyalty to the men under his command and his ability to command large groups,

1Letter and press release announcing ―The unveiling of the Gordon Statue,‖ sent to alumni and supporters of the Gordon Boys‘ School, April 1960 found in the collection of M.S. Lush at the Sudan Archive Durham University; SAD 874/45. 2 Times (London) May 14, 1960, p. 14 3 For the purposes of this work, the terms Khartoum, Khartum, Sudan, and Soudan are used interchangeably, according to whatever convention was used at the time discussed. Titles and place names will follow the same pattern. 4 A. Egmont Hake, Gordon in China and the Soudan (London: John MacQueen, 1896), 7.

1 qualities valued by his class. His success at working for a foreign government was also recognized by the emperor; Gordon was awarded the highest distinction ever granted to a foreigner by the Chinese Army, the Yellow Jacket.5 Following Gordon‘s time in China, his name was known for decades within military and popular circles as ―Chinese Gordon,‖ making him synonymous with Britain‘s benevolent involvement in the country. Following his time in China and his triumphant return to Britain, Gordon had only one wish—to sink into obscurity and be left alone by the British public. He was notoriously unwilling to meet members of the press or royalty in the fashionable drawing rooms of London, instead preferring to remain at his family‘s home.6 Gordon‘s next posting, in the British town of Gravesand, would allow him to live somewhat anonymously. At Gravesand, another side of Gordon‘s personality became paramount. As the Commander of the Royal Engineers at Gravesand, he was charged with directing the construction of new forts for the defense of the Thames estuary. During this time, the first reports of Gordon‘s Christian charity were published in both local newspapers and the memoirs of some of his closest friends. People report instances of Gordon providing food, comfort, and guidance to wayward souls in the town—a practice he would continue throughout his entire career.7 After his posting to Gravesand, Gordon traveled to Africa for the first time. In 1873, the British government allowed him to go to Sudan under the aegis of the Khedive of Egypt, Ismail. This period of service lasted until 1879. In Sudan, Gordon acted as Governor General; his duties included reforming the finances of the country and at least partially eradicating the slave trade.8 This first mission to Sudan was mostly successful; Gordon was regarded favorably in Sudan for both his financial and his moral leadership. Following his first time in Sudan, Gordon returned to Britain and service in the Royal Engineers, and in 1882, he was promoted to Major-General.9 However, he was not employed in direct service for very long; in early 1884 events in Sudan necessitated that the British send him back to the region, originally as a government representative. Before Gordon left London, he was

5 Anthony Nutting, Gordon of Khartoum: martyr and misfit. (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, Inc, 1966), 73. 6 Nutting, 81. 7 Eva Hope, Life of General Gordon (London: Walter Scott, 1885), 110-115. Gordon‘s experiences at Gravesand are told in the form of an imaginary dialogue between a ―stranger‖, which was meant to represent Gordon, although he was not identified by name, and some ill members of the community who he had come to visit and aid. 8 John H. Waller, Gordon of Khartoum: The Saga of a Victorian Hero (New York: Atheneum, 1988), 159. 9 Richard Garret, General Gordon (London: Arthur Baker, Ltd., 1974), 173.

2 given the impression that his orders would come directly from the Prime Minister and his cabinet. Once he arrived in Cairo, however, his mission had changed. At the beginning of that year, the Egyptian puppet government collapsed and Sudan was given over to the Mahdi, the Islamic spiritual leader. After the Mahdi‘s rise to power, British officials in Egypt were forced to act in more than just an advisory capacity regarding Sudan. Although Egypt was not actually a British colony or protectorate in 1884, British interests controlled the country‘s economy and governmental decisions. In Egypt, the British consul general, Sir Evelyn Baring, decided to change Gordon‘s assignment and make him directly responsible to the Egyptian government, not the British government, due to the hostile climate in Sudan. His orders would be relayed to him not by the government in London, but instead by Baring, their highest ranking officer in Egypt.10 Baring was now technically in charge of Gordon and his mission to Sudan. Gordon was displeased with this development: he did not want to be under the command of Egypt again and disputed the chain of command. His wishes as he had explained them in meetings and letters before he left for Sudan in 1884 were fundamentally ignored by the powers in both Britain and in Egypt.11 This dispute would later have devastating consequences for him.12 Gordon reached Khartoum in early 1884 not as a representative of the British government as he wanted, but instead as an Egyptian civil servant. In this capacity, Gordon would be able to protect Egyptian interests, especially those of the business sector. He would be loyal to Cairo and not to London, thus allowing him to face the Mahdi as a private individual and allowing the British government a measure of deniability should he fail in his task.13 Gordon spent his final days in Sudan as a military officer charged with reporting on the affairs of the country. He was not supposed to be militarily involved; he was only ordered to watch and advise the government. Gordon‘s previous experience in the region was cited as a main factor why this oftentimes distrusted man was sent into the delicate situation there.14

10 Baron Godfrey Elton, Gordon of Khartoum; the life of General Charles George Gordon (New York: Knopf, 1955), 287. 11 ―The Cabinet and the Soudan,‖ Pall Mall Gazette, February 13, 1884; clipping found in the Supplemental Papers of William Gladstone, BL, Add Ms. 56452, 12-13. Gladstone‘s own comment on the reporting of the scuffle in the cabinet over what Gordon‘s mission to Sudan should consist of is favorable—and shows his disdain for both the situation and Gordon. 12 Ibid., 291. 13 Ibid., 157. 14 Roy MacGregor-Hastie, Never to be Taken Alive: A Biography of General Gordon (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1985), 152-153.

Ironically, his actions during his final year in Sudan and the actions which directly preceded his death would cement his memory in the minds of people in Britain and Sudan for the next century. The actual manner of his death is in dispute; however, the perceived circumstances of his demise had profound and political implications. It will be addressed in detail in the following chapter.15 Since his death, Charles Gordon has been the subject of countless biographies and tributes. He has also been represented in larger works on imperialism, the British in Africa, and even works on the decolonization process and its impact on British perceptions of masculinity. As he was a man of acclaim at the time of his death and his death was tragic and unexpected, a veritable trove of biographies regarding different aspects of Gordon‘s life and death has been published in the years since he died, many of which are in contradiction on key elements like his Christianity, the possibility of his alcoholism, and the caliber of his military service. As historian and Sudan Civil Service veteran Richard Hill‘s research showed, these biographies run the gamut from laudatory eulogies to much more critical works.16 From these disparate views, a complicated and consistent image emerges: Gordon as a complex and conflicted figure. Even as the authors‘ views on Gordon changed, all seemed to agree on the trope of Gordon‘s innate contradictions. The earliest biographies of Charles Gordon—some prepared at the time he left for his second trip to Sudan and others published as soon as the news of his death reached London— reflect the feelings and perceptions of the general‘s contemporaries. His life and military career have been analyzed by these contemporaries, as demonstrated by Demetrious Boulger‘s two volume work.17 This work, which examines Gordon‘s career from the view of a man who actually met and previously wrote about him, attempts to explain what the author referred to as ―Gordon‘s two sided character.‖ Boulger analyzed this ―character‖ in relation to Gordon‘s achievements; he is the first of Gordon‘s biographers to realize that to understand the man, it was

15 Gordon‘s experiences in Khartoum, and the circumstances which directly led to his death will be discussed in the next chapter; the purpose of this introduction is to provide sufficient background to Gordon as he was seen upon undertaking what would become his final mission. 16 Richard Hill, Gordon: Yet Another Assessment (Durham, UK: Sudan Studies Association of the United Kingdom Press, 1987), 3. Hill also includes an appendix with a chart showing exactly how many biographies were published in each year since Gordon‘s death to the time of publication. 17 Demetrious Boulger, The Life of Gordon: Major-General, R.E., C.B.,: Turkish Field-Marshal, Grand Gordon Medijidieh, and Pasha; Chinese Titu (Field Marshal), Yellow Jacket Order (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1896) Volumes 1 and 2, v.

4 also necessary to understand the man‘s character in relation to his achievements. 18 The biography, although uneven at times, is also the first to give a more realistic image of Gordon; his foibles receive an equal amount of attention. It is the end of his analysis of Gordon‘s life, however, that indicates the most problematic detail in using biographies as sources: ―The tragic end of Khartoum was not an inappropriate conclusion for the career of Charles Gordon, whose life had been far removed from the ordinary experiences of mankind.‖ 19 Biographies from this time period seem to depend on exaggeration and hyperbole to make their subjects seem almost superhuman.20 This trend is further evidenced in two other early works on Gordon‘s life and death, both written by female admirers of the man whom they saw as a martyred hero. The first, by Eva Hope, was published soon after word reached London of Gordon‘s demise. She aimed to educate her readers about the country Gordon died for, and more significantly, about the Christian undertones of Gordon‘s life.21 Hope felt that in order for her readers to understand the circumstances of Gordon‘s death, they must also have knowledge about the region where he died. She addressed this deficiency in her readers‘ knowledge with a discussion about the ―natives‖ who live in Sudan, including their customs, appearance, and dress.22 By analyzing the habits of the ―natives,‖ Hope drew a dichotomy between her Christian hero, Gordon, and the ―natives‖ he came to save. Gordon‘s role as a Christian is the most important facet of his personality for Hope—a theme which she discussed throughout her work. In fact, her survey of Gordon ends not with the public reaction to his death, but instead with a chapter entitled, ―A Christian Hero,‖ in which she compared him to Jesus Christ.23 The second biography also addresses the theme of religion in his life. Gordon is one of the three Christian martyrs profiled by Elizabeth Rundle Charles in Three Martyrs of the Nineteenth Century.24 The introduction to her entire study opens with the following quote:

18 Boulger, vol. 1., 17. 19 Boulger, vol. 2, 172 20 Kenneth Silverman, ―Biography and Pseudobiography‖ Common-Place vol. 3 no. 2, January 2003; Silverman references the idea of modern biographies following into the pattern of nineteenth century realistic fiction, which is an accurate description for these early forms of Gordon biographies. 21 Eva Hope, Life of General Gordon; Hope does not actually appear as the author of this work, instead the author is credited as ―by the author of ‗Our Queen,‘ ‗New World Heroes,‘ etc.,‖ a common practice in the late nineteenth century. 22 Ibid., 137-138. 23 Ibid., 361-369. 24 Elizabeth Rundle Charles, Three Martyrs of the Nineteenth Century: Studies from the Lives of Livingston, Gordon and Patterson. (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1889).

―Tidings of General Gordon‘s death fell suddenly like a stroke of personal bereavement on our English homes, and smote contending Christendom once more into a sense of its unity of ideal and worship in the common love and lamenting of this one man.‖25 Even allowing for the hyperbolic tendencies of the early biographers, Charles believed that Gordon‘s death was a unifying factor for Britain and the British Empire. His subsequent martyrdom should thus serve to unify Christians in Britain and to inspire more people to live an observant, Christian life so Gordon did not die in vain.26 These three works taken together show the general pattern of early Gordon biographies: each author chooses a particular aspect of his life and death to highlight, whether it is his military sacrifice, his character, or his Christianity.27 Before the First World War, at the height of the British imperial project, the British public embraced its imperial symbols and did not question them. As Gordon was one of the most well known imperial figures, not to mention a martyr to the cause, it is perhaps understandable that the first biographies that are directly critical of him do not appear until much later, with a chapter on Gordon appearing in Lytton Strachey‘s larger work, Eminent Victorians. This chapter is the first to depict Gordon in a negative light, and it is also the first biography to mention the less favorable aspects of his character.28 Eminent Victorians, first published in 1918, challenged the idea of imperial hero worship. Designed to be ironic, Strachey‘s title poked fun at the contemporary image of Victorian Britain. In the same vein, his use of biography was also slightly ironic.29 Gordon was one of the ―eminent Victorians‖ that Strachey profiled in a mocking tone. He did not receive the same amount of respect as he had in earlier studies; instead, Strachey used anecdotal evidence to declare that Gordon was a drunk and not worthy of the adulation he inspired.30 Strachey‘s study, although verging on satire, did help to remove some of the luster from Gordon, and almost every subsequent biographer cites Eminent Victorians. Truly critical biographies of Gordon were not published until much later, following the end of British imperialism in Africa. Around the centenary of his birth in 1933, there was a brief

25 Ibid., v. 26 Ibid., 284. 27 Although these are the three early biographies highlighted here, many more exist, including E A. Edgemont Hake, Gordon in China and the Soudan. (London: John MacQueen, 1896) and one by ―One who knew him well,‖ A pseudonym for a woman that he knew at Gravesend. Mrs. F, More about Gordon (London: Richard Bentley and Son, 1894). 28 Lytton Strachey, Eminent Victorians: Cardinal Manning, Florence Nightingale, Dr. Arnold, General Gordon (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1969). 29 Ibid., vii. 30 Ibid., 264-265.

6 resurgence in laudatory biographies, but the biographies of Gordon did not turn critical until after Egypt became independent in 1952 and Sudan subsequently attained independence in 1956.31 One of the early examples of this new trend in Gordon biographies is by Anthony Nutting. Written in 1966, this biography introduces the idea of re-assessing Gordon and challenging long- held assumptions about his death—especially regarding his actions undertaken in his final days at Khartoum and his ultimate decision to remain in the city after British policy makers in London decided to abandon it.32 Nutting was also the first biographer to turn the traditional narrative of biography around. He began his work with Gordon‘s death, indicating the main goal of his narrative would not be to discuss Gordon‘s lifetime, but rather his death. He was also the first biographer to include the idea that Gordon‘s death was his own fault, which was a significant departure from traditional biographies of the general. Ending his work with a call for a reassessment of Gordon and Gordon biographies, Nutting‘s work heralded a new focus for future works.33 The historians who followed Nutting, including Charles Chenevix Trench, have heeded this call to reassess Gordon‘s life and death. Trench‘s work tries to place Gordon into history—in effect de-mythologizing him—which follows the general trends occurring in historiography during the 1970s.34 Taking a more socio-cultural approach to biography, Trench ignored the conflict over whether Gordon can be considered a martyr and instead looks at the actual events of his life and his fabled eccentricities. Following this methodology, Trench does not describe Gordon as a perfect individual or even a hero; instead, he chooses to show Gordon‘s flaws, and all of the general‘s character quirks.35 Trench‘s lack of concern for the ―martyr of Khartoum‖ aspect of his personality shows in his decision to address the death only at the very beginning of his epilogue, a direct departure from the strategies of the historians who preceded him, and as well as those who succeeded him.36

31 Biographies published around the centenary of his birth are almost all laudatory—one example will be provided here, Hugh Evelyn Wortham, Gordon: An Intimate Portrait (London: George G. Harap & Co. Ltd., 1933), is among the better researched documents—Wortham was allowed access to the Gordon family files by Gordon‘s heirs. There are other biographical attempts to be critical of Gordon which predate independence, but since most are ultimately regarded as more praise than criticism, they are not included here. 32 Anthony Nutting, Gordon of Khartoum, martyr and misfit. 33 Ibid., 314-323. 34 Charles Chenevix Trench, Charley Gordon: An Eminent Victorian Reassessed. (London: Allen Lane, 1978). 35 Ibid., 9. 36 Ibid., 293-294.

Trench‘s successors, Roy MacGregor-Hastie and John Waller, have the benefit of writing a century after the events in Khartoum. Each of them used a wealth of primary and secondary sources; by the 1980s several public archives held all of Gordon‘s letters and papers. MacGregor-Hastie and Waller are both trying to solve the mystery of Gordon and how his mystique pervades history.37 MacGregor-Hastie, who begins his book with a dedication to then- Prime Minister of Britain Margaret Thatcher, advocates a strong foreign policy and uses his nineteenth-century example as a metaphor for the contemporary foreign policy issues of his country. He thus made Gordon into a symbol rather than an actual subject of a serious biography. Although not ultimately persuasive, MacGregor-Hastie‘s use of Gordon as a metaphor was a new way of addressing the quandary of Gordon—using the past to advocate for change in the present. Finally, John H. Waller once again brought the idea of a straight biography back to the historiography of Gordon biographies. His work, undertaken over a century after Gordon died, is the most comprehensive biography written to date. He was also the only biographer to tackle the subject of the Mahdi in a non-biased way, treating the religious leader as a figure of history and not solely as the man who most other biographers claim is responsible for Gordon‘s death. Waller does not demonize the Mahdi. Instead, he provides his readers with a thorough description of his life and his rise to power, describing the Mahdi in the same way he did other major foreign figures that Gordon encountered during his life. To allow his readers to come to their own understanding of Gordon‘s demise, Waller does not make a definitive statement on the exact cause of Gordon‘s death, but merely analyzes all of the different reports of it.38 As one of the most recent and the most definitive biographies on Gordon, Waller‘s work is quite important, and it has begun to reshape the Gordon biographies‘ canon once more. Most of Gordon‘s biographers understandably end their studies of Gordon with his death. However, his importance as a figure in the imperial history of Britain is really only solidified by his ultimate sacrifice. Since all of the biographies above only focus on Gordon the man, they can be credited with perpetuating the fame of the general, but they are simply biographies. They fail to develop a complex picture of Gordon because they are designed to detail the events of a man‘s life. Nevertheless, as the scholarship of the last century has clearly demonstrated, Gordon‘s

37 Roy MacGregor-Hastie, Never to be Taken Alive: A Biography of General Gordon; and John H. Waller, Gordon of Khartoum: The Saga of a Victorian Hero; the full titles are provided here to illustrate the type of treatment each author gave Gordon. 38 Ibid., 441-443; For the most definitive work on the exact causes of Gordon‘s death, see Doug Johnson, ―The Death of Gordon: A Victorian Myth,‖ The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 10 (1982) 285-310.

8 importance to empire and the British imperial project intensified after his death, almost to the point of rendering all of the other achievements of his lifetime before his final mission to Khartoum insignificant. Thus, any study of Gordon‘s impact on the imperial process would clearly have to employ a new methodology to understand the puzzle that was Charles Gordon. This new methodology makes use of the concept of the ―imperial hero,‖ an idea that has been explained in John MacKenzie‘s studies on imperialism and popular culture. One major focus of MacKenzie's overall work is the link between propaganda and imperialism and their impact on material culture. Although MacKenzie does not study Gordon, he does examine some other contemporary figures from the British imperial project, including another British martyr, Dr. David Livingstone.39 As Livingstone also died while serving in Africa, there are some obvious parallels between these two men, such as their Christianity and their choice to live among the ―natives‖ rather than among their contemporaries. Livingstone has received much attention as the first martyred imperial hero, and the myth surrounding his death has been developed much more fully than that of Gordon.40 Although the situations leading to the two men‘s martyrdom were very different, the methodology to examine the resulting myths is not. By using MacKenzie‘s concept of the ―imperial hero‖ as a lens into perceptions of Gordon‘s death and the beginnings of the myth, a much more nuanced picture of British imperialism emerges. This multifaceted approach to the British Empire is reflected in how the martyred hero was commemorated in a myriad of different ways. Soon after news of his death reached London, Gordon was memorialized not only in print, but also in statue and even in edifice, with the building of the Gordon Boys‘ Home in England and Gordon Memorial College in Khartoum. A thorough examination of these tangible reminders provides another facet into understanding the public perceptions of Gordon‘s death. Many historians have done work on the role of commemoration. Recently, Berny Sèbe has undertaken a study partially quantitative in nature that discusses the volumes of tributes and engravings of imperial heroes—further demonstrating

39 Mackenzie‘s publications include several edited volumes. The one where he outlines the idea of an imperial hero the most fully in is: John MacKenzie, ―Heroic Myths of Empire,‖ in his Popular Imperialism and the Military (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986). 40 In addition to the John MacKenzie work, there have been other attempts at explaining the Livingstone legacy including the catalogue to the National Portrait Gallery exhibit on Livingstone: National Portrait Gallery, David Livingstone and the Victorian Encounter with Africa (London: National Portrait Gallery, 1996) and Dorothy Helly, Livingstone’s Legacy: Horace Waller and Victorian Mythmaking (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1987).

9 the effect that imperial heroes had on the metropole.41 His work demonstrates the type of hero that the British people most admired, described by historian Andrew Thompson as ―…the heroism…of the ordinary soldier who guarded distant colonial outposts, fought against all the odds and was sometimes rescued but more often overpowered by the enemy ranged against him.‖42 Both of these historians have contributed new dimensions to understanding the impact of material culture, but neither has shown how these material items create a myth in the way that Maya Jasanoff‘s work on a slightly earlier phase of the British Empire presents. She examines material culture and imperialism as a type of collecting, an approach which also has merit in examining the life and ―afterlife‖ of Gordon. 43 It is this ―afterlife‖ of Gordon where his true value as an imperial hero in British culture is revealed. Without the continual emphasis of his sacrifice made by the British media, it is unlikely that his name and mystique would have had the same level of significance. Many studies on British imperialism and imperial heroes mention Gordon. They do not, however, examine how a man who disobeyed orders by remaining in Khartoum after he was told to evacuate was not vilified in the press, but instead became a popular and cultural hero. For example, David de Cavalho‘s article ―General Charles Gordon: The Making and Meaning of a Cultural Hero,‖ examines the role of Gordon in British culture in the years directly following his death, but does not examine how the myth of Gordon was perpetuated after 1885.44 The concept of ―myth‖ as it is used by de Cavalho is closer to the literary definition of the term as exhibited in Andrea White‘s work on Joseph Conrad, another European imperial figure with contemporary service in Africa.45 Charles Gordon also makes for a compelling imperial symbol. His depiction as a hero can be useful for discerning the way an imperial symbol was perceived both in the metropole and in

41 Berny Sèbe, ‗Celebrating’ British and French Imperialism: The Making of Colonial Heroes Acting in Africa, 1870-1939. D.Phil Thesis, Oxford University, 2007. 42 Andrew Thompson, The Empire Strikes Back?: The Impact of Imperialism on Britain from the Mid-Nineteenth Century (Edinburgh: Pearson Education, Ltd., 2005). 43 Maya Jassanoff, Edge of Empire: Lives, Culture, and Conquest in the East, 1750-1850 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005). Cynthia Behrman originally coined the terminology in her article, ―The After-Life of General Gordon‖ which focuses on how the general was portrayed in literary sources. Cynthia Behrman, ―The After-Life of General Gordon‖ in Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies, volume 3, number 2 (Summer 1971). 44 David de Cavalho, ―General Charles Gordon: The Making and Meaning of a Cultural Hero,‖ Melbourne Historical Journal 20 (1980), 2-24. 45 Andrea White, Joseph Conrad and the Adventure Tradition: constructing and deconstructing the imperial subject (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

10 the colonies. However, as with all other aspects of imperialism, the connotations of these symbols can often be mixed. These imperial figures have a dual role in British culture as they can be perceived as heroes by their supporters and villains by their detractors. In addition to their service to the Empire, ―imperial heroes‖ can also be manipulated to suit the demands of the government and private interests, as shown in Bernard Porter‘s The Absent-Minded Imperialists.46 Porter includes Gordon in his discussion of imperial sacrifices, using him as an example of someone willing to make the ultimate sacrifice in service to his country. Porter does not analyze the implications of his death in a larger imperial context, but relegates further discussion of the matter to an endnote.47 Porter‘s book aims to describe the entire imperial project undertaken by Britain. Gordon is merely mentioned as one example of an imperial hero who was used to encourage continued public support. Although Gordon was used to engender further public support for imperial projects, he was not embraced equally by all segments of the British population. As a symbol, he was used in debates over a variety of imperial situations throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The idea of Gordon, the ―imperial hero‖ became politically charged, as discussed by Martin Pugh in his The Tories and the People: 1880-1935.48 Thus, the general became a tool of opposition: his memory was manipulated to ensure the continuation of the Conservative Party‘s imperial goals. These goals would, as has been discussed in the edited compilation, The Conservatives: A History from their Origins to 1965, undergo a drastic change over the course of the twentieth century.49 Gordon‘s role and the role of all ―imperial heroes‖ would by necessity become diminished, especially as the British Empire began to decolonize. As decolonization progressed, the role of ―imperial heroes‖ changed. Heroes became more important for what their lives symbolized than for their actions on the ground. Although their actions in life were quite different, parallels can be seen between Gordon‘s myth and the treatment of another imperial figure in Africa, Jan Smuts. Bill Schwarz examines the conflicting

46 Bernard Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 47 Porter, 171, n21 48 Martin Pugh, The Tories and the People: 1880-1935 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 1985). 49 Norman Gash, Donald Southgate, David Dilkes and John Ramsden, The Conservatives: A History from their Origins to1965 (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1977).

11 views of Jan Smuts in Britain at the time of Smuts‘ death in 1950.50 In his work, Schwarz analyzes the use of Smuts, a man who was seen as both an imperial hero and an imperial menace during his lifetime, by the British Government. Instead of commemorating Smuts actual policies, and what he actually achieved during his lifetime, the British Government transformed him into an imperial symbol, and manipulated his memory to suit the needs of the current government. The controversy discussed by Schwarz, over whether or not he deserved a lasting memorial, adds another dimension to the impact that ―imperial heroes‖ had on British culture. By the time Jan Smuts was eventually commemorated, imperialism had ceased to be the driving force of British politics; however, his role as a hero of the Empire was important enough for his statue to be included in Parliament Square, and further shows the malleability of the term ―imperial hero.‖51 Schwarz is not the only historian who discussed the changing needs for heroes as the empire ended. In the edited compilation British Culture and the End of Empire, the diminished need for heroes is examined in detail, as the volume‘s contributors seek to understand the end of empire and its impact on the culture of Britain.52 Some of the contributors to this work— including MacKenzie, Kathryn Castle and Jeffrey Richards—aim to redefine imperialism as the British Empire transformed into a Commonwealth. Castle, who works on juvenile literature, charts the change from imperial heroes to native heroes, thus providing children with a more complete history of now-independent nations.53 Literature was not the only medium that faced a change as imperial heroes lost their importance: heroes were no longer depicted in the same manner in music and film, but they were relegated to becoming mere figures of history once more—no longer the standard bearers for imperialism.54 These changes are only one example of the crossroads that Britain faced as the country could no longer be linked with empire. Britons likewise needed to form a new identity, one which was not linked to regions it no longer possessed, and the countries which had been a part of the empire now needed to be re-embraced as independent nations with their own histories. An examination of Charles Gordon and his impact on the colonial process must also examine how

50 Bill Schwarz, ―Reveries of Race: The Closing of the Imperial Movement‖ in Becky Conekin, Frank Mort, and Chris Waters, editors, Moments of Modernity: Reconstructing Britain, 1945-1964 (London: Rivers Oram Press, 1999). 51 Ibid., 200. 52 Stuart Ward, ed. British Culture and the End of Empire (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001). 53 Kathryn Castle, ―Imperial Legacies, New Frontiers: Children‘s Popular Literature and the Demise of Empire‖ in Ward, ed., 156-157 . 54 Jeffrey Richards, ―Imperial Heroes for a Post-Imperial Age: Films and the End of Empire,‖ in Ward, ed., 135.

12 he is portrayed in histories of the British in Africa and whether the hero in the metropole is also the hero in the colony. Many histories of the British in Africa focus more on actual British colonies, not areas that were only tangentially British. As Sudan was only under Britain as part of a condominium with Egypt, it does not receive the same level of attention as other British colonies. Sudan does, however, factor into these studies due to the British involvement there in 1885 and 1898. Histories of the British in Africa written during and directly following decolonization do mention Gordon and his time in Sudan, but once again, Gordon is only seen as the archetype of the imperial hero. Historians of Britain in Africa do include the tragic story of his demise, but they do not focus on the role that Gordon may have played in influencing British perceptions of Africa and Sudan following his death. Instead, if historians mention Gordon in their discussions of British Africa following his death in 1885, it is merely to mention how he was ―avenged‖ by the British mission into the country in 1898, a mission which is typically described as the Re-conquest of the Sudan. Little mention is made of other reasons why the British would remain involved in the region. It is more important that the heroic Gordon, whose sacrifice had become a part of the English imperial lexicon by 1898, be remembered and honored by another expedition to the country. Traditional studies of the British in Africa written before decolonization, such as work by Edgar Sanderson, focus on this theme of avenging Gordon. Sanderson‘s work on Sudan concludes with the following quote: ―Gordon was at the last avenged, in a way that would be dearest to the hero‘s heart, by the inauguration of a new era in the Sudan.‖55 This concept of avenging Gordon would continue to be a theme in the historiography of Africa as part of the British Empire. By 1968, when Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher with Alice Deny wrote about the role of Victorians in Africa, public perception had clearly shifted away from Gordon. In this work, he is referred to as an archetypal hero—but only described as a ―hero of the hour,‖ indicating that the need for imperial heroes had come to an end.56 British colonization in Africa varied by region, leading to a lack of specific works covering the entirety of British Africa. Instead, most authors focus on one in particular—such as work by Eve Troutt Powell. In her

55 Edgar Sanderson, Great Britain in Modern Africa (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1970 reprint of 1907 edition), 365-366. 56 Ronald Robinson, John Gallagher with Anne Deny, Africa and the Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism (New York: Anchor Books, 1968), 24.

13 study, A Different Shade of Colonialism, Troutt Powell only examines Egypt, Great Britain and Sudan, paying attention to Gordon‘s time in the area. However, like other works on Britain and Sudan, Troutt Powell does not focus on what she terms a ―propaganda campaign‖ which was waged by the British officials to convince the public to support Britain‘s 1898 actions in Sudan.57 A more thorough analysis of this campaign will shed a greater light on to the formative years of the Gordon ―myth,‖ since after 1898 Gordon‘s martyrdom had become completely shrouded in the myth created by his supporters. The other way that historians currently tackle the problem of Britain‘s involvement in Africa is by focusing specifically on only one aspect of its imperial project. Zine Magubane, for example, has worked on the colonial project in South Africa. Her work, which focuses on life in Africa and how Africans are perceived in England, provides another lens to examine the Gordon myth. Magubane‘s studies on the Anglo-Boer War show the way that a historical event in Africa, in this case the Boer War, was used to rally support for granting suffrage to women in London.58 Gordon‘s supporters and the creators of the Gordon myth used his sacrifice in much the same way. They argued for the continued British presence in the region by highlighting his sacrifice. Magubane‘s work can thus be used as a template for a more detailed analysis of the Gordon myth and adds a new form of analysis for understanding the meanings placed on his death by the British public. Finally, studies on British masculinity are the last area of historiography where a greater understanding of the perpetuation of the Gordon myth adds new dimension. Gordon is a military figure whose sacrifice inspired many and whose actions were met with great praise. He is also regarded as a prototypical figure of British masculinity within its African Empire. Charles Gordon was perceived to have sacrificed himself for the greater good, an idea which directly correlated with the changing perception of British masculinity described by Paul Deslandes in Oxbridge Men. Gordon was the epitome of this new man, a man who possessed ―physical strength, muscular development, the stiff upper lip, adventure, fortitude, and [a desire for]

57 Eve M. Troutt Powell, A Different Shade of Colonialism: Egypt, Great Brtiain, and the Mastery of the Sudan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 149 58 Zine Magubane, Bringing the Empire Home: Race, Class and Gender in Britain and Colonial South Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

14 action.‖59 Although he himself did not attend university, Gordon was still a member of this class of men who felt a calling to serve the empire, even if it meant his death. This new trend in British perceptions of masculinity is further examined by John Tosh, whose study of manliness and masculinity mentions Gordon‘s death. Tosh sees his death as evidence for the public perception of the empire being in danger and singles out his demise as the one imperial event of the time period which ―occasioned more soul searching‖ by the British public.60 Gordon‘s death is seen as a failure of the British system, and by extension a failure of the imperial man. Like Deslandes, Tosh also links the idea of service to the empire with the new imperial man—a man who, like Gordon, was willing to make the absolute sacrifice. This new imperial figure would also be from the upper and middle classes; he would be an honorable man who chose to serve his country. Gordon was the epitome of these men and a fuller examination of the public perceptions of his death adds additional dimension to this conceptualization of masculinity that was created at the apex of the British Empire. One agreed-upon fact by every historian who has ever studied Major General Charles George Gordon is that he is a complex figure, but the nature of his death made him something more, an empty signifier. Without a body, there was never a sense of finality about the life of Gordon— which allowed different people with different political agendas to project what they wished into the void he left behind. As such, he has been the subject of hundreds of works. However, the questions still remain: how much of people‘s perceptions of Gordon have colored scholarly analysis of the man himself; how did Gordon‘s own life impact how he was seen in death; and how did his death impact how his life is remembered? Gordon‘s biographers have tried one tactic to answer this question, but they are lacking in an analysis of the overall impact that Gordon had on the entire colonization process. Historians who discuss imperial figures are able to see the overall influence of Gordon, but they are not able to see beyond the myth which shrouds Gordon‘s actions. Gordon‘s death in 1885 and the 1898 re-conquest which ―avenged‖ him were events that were too important to the public not to be mentioned in contemporary histories of Africa, but they are not necessarily the most important events in this history of British interaction with the continent, and thus do not receive much attention in such large scale

59 Paul Deslandes, Oxbridge Men: British Masculinity and the Undergraduate Experience, 1850-1920 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005), 5. 60 John Tosh, Manliness and Masculinities in Nineteenth Century Britain: Essays on Gender, Family and Empire (London: Pearson Education Ltd, 2005), 194.

15 works. Finally, Gordon can be seen as an archetype of the new masculinity embraced by the imperial project, but he himself was not the prototypical imperial man. In short, Gordon and the study of Gordon is a n exercise in contradictions. These contradictions were present throughout his life, and his death, and without them, his memory would not have been so cherished, manipulated, and abused.

CHAPTER 2 THE LIFE, DEATH, AND „CULT‟ OF GORDON

Spanning thirty-plus years and three continents, the military career of Major General Charles George Gordon defined his life. Even before he was sent to Sudan on his fateful final mission, Gordon‘s military exploits working for other governments had brought him a measure of fame, but he was never the most famous military figure in his own country. It would be his death that would enshrine him in the memory of the British public, but Gordon was far more than an ordinary soldier, or even an ordinary man, during his lifetime. To those who lived when he did, Gordon was in some ways an enigma. His personal life was never much discussed in the press at the time; instead, he was only known for his professional career. By the time he died, the British public had long been aware of his military service, especially in China, in addition his charitable works. However, to comprehend fully the role that Gordon would occupy in British imperial politics, it is important to have the same understanding of the major events in his life as did his contemporaries. The General‘s first real introduction to the public came because of his service in China. As ―Chinese Gordon,‖ he was a figure of interest. Before he became ―Chinese Gordon,‖ Charles Gordon was just a member of the Royal Engineers; as Chinese Gordon, he became an almost exaggerated figure. His military duties over the next twenty years would only add to his legend. There were times in the late 1860s and 1870s when he would fall from prominence, yet he never quite disappeared from the British consciousness. Every time there was a military or diplomatic matter that involved any area where Gordon had served, he would once again emerge to the forefront of any discussion. In essence, Gordon was seen as the consummate imperial soldier from his time in China through his service in Sudan. As his earliest biographers, who wrote while and directly after Gordon lived, liked to state, the Gordons were a military family.1 Gordon‘s older brother and father also served their

1This section of biography summarizes the work and research of many authors, including: Eva Hope, Life of General Gordon, A. Egmont Hake, Gordon in China and the Soudan, Hugh Wortham, Gordon: An Intimate Portrait, Lord Godfrey Elton, Gordon of Khartoum: The Life of General Charles George Gordon, Charles Chenevix Trench, Charley Gordon, Roy MacGregor-Hastie, Never to be Taken Alive: A biography of General Gordon, Demetrius Boulger, Life of Gordon, 2 volumes, C. Brad Faught, Gordon: Victorian Hero, (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2008), John Waller, Gordon of Khartoum: The Saga of a Victorian Hero, and Anthony Nutting, Gordon of Khartoum: martyr and misfit. These biographers all focus on different aspects of Gordon‘s career, for the purposes

17 country, and each achieved a rank higher than Gordon ever earned. He first experienced military life as a child during the 1830s living in Woolwich, a military town outside London. As a young man Gordon attended the Royal Military Academy in his hometown, and at the age of nineteen was commissioned into the Royal Engineers branch of the army as a second lieutenant. By this time, Britain was involved in the Crimean War, which was the first place young Lieutenant Gordon was sent in December 1854, and where he participated in the siege of Sebastopol. It was here where Gordon came to the attention of his fellow officers, including men who would later have an important role in his tenure at Khartoum, such as Lord Garnet Wolseley and General Gerald Graham.2 The Crimean War was also where Gordon got his first experience with diplomacy. He was involved in the peace settlement, which eventually led to the 1856 Treaty of Paris. Gordon was not a principal member of any major decision-making delegation, but he was a part of the Boundary Commission that set the borders of Bessarabia between Russia and the newly independent provinces of Romania, Moldavia, and Wallachia. As a part of his duties on the commission, Gordon remained in the region for the next year, surveying the region to prepare for the implementation of the Treaty of Paris.3 His time in Bessarabia, which was generally unsatisfying to him as he saw himself more as a man of action rather than as a ―peacemaker,‖ was followed by a further posting in the region—this time to Armenia. While in Armenia, ostensibly as a part of another border commission, Gordon found time to travel around the region and meet the inhabitants, a practice which he would continue throughout the rest of his career. Armenia was also the place where Gordon, only 24, was exposed to the slave trade for the first time. Later in his career, Gordon would use this knowledge during his attempts to eradicate slavery while stationed in Africa.4 While in Armenia, Gordon also encountered people who lived within a tribal dynamic and he had his interest piqued in a non-traditional military career. It was here where Gordon slept in tents, lived among men who had no allegiance to official authority, and even developed his later taste for living outside the civilized habits and social conventions

of this discussion, only the pages which give the most relevant information are included, i.e.: Hope, 3-4 and Hake, 3- 4. 2 For some further events from Gordon‘s career during the Crimean War, see: Hope, 4-8, Hake, 8-15, Wortham, 39- 47, and Elton, 14-25. 3 Gordon‘s participation on the Boundary Commission is discussed in Waller, 37 and MacGregor-Hastie, 41. 4 Waller, 39.

18 that he grew up following.5 From Armenia, Gordon was sent to Constantinople, where he met Ferdinand de Lesseps, who would later be the President of the Suez Canal Company, and renewed contact with the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire as a member of the Boundary Commission. Both of these contacts would later prove important to Gordon‘s military service in Africa, where for some of the time he indirectly served the Sultan.6 Gordon completed his military service in Asia Minor in December 1858 with a greater understanding of the life of a soldier and of working as a British soldier for foreign governments. He came back to Woolwich with the first of many honors awarded to him by foreign governments, including becoming a member of the French Legion of Honour and receiving a Turkish War Medal.7 Ironically for a man who often claimed not to want recognition for his work, Gordon would receive many more over the course of his life. Like most young officers who had served abroad, Gordon did not take to living at home. He was no longer content to be a peacetime soldier and disliked living in the barracks. Gordon got his opportunity to return to the type of soldiering at which he excelled in July 1860 when a joint Anglo-French force was sent to China to impel the imperial government to ratify the Treaty of Tientsen.8 China was in the midst of the Taiping Rebellion, and the treaty was designed to safeguard British and French economic interests there. It also had a specific provision, Article X, which guaranteed British ships the right to trade on the Yangtzee River.9 In order to convince the Chinese to sign the treaty, the force began by attacking smaller towns outside the capital, but by September, when Gordon reached China, an attack on the capital, Peking, was imminent. As second-in-command of a company of the Royal Engineers in China, Gordon was directly involved in this operation. Although the original plan was to take the capital quickly with a modicum of effort, it proved to be more difficult, with the first British emissaries being thrown in jail. However, by October, Peking had surrendered, the summer palace of the Emperor had been burned to the ground by the British expedition, and Britain had forced the emperor to ratify the treaty. The most important aspect of this treaty from the British perspective was the provisions in Article X allowing them access to the Yangtze River. However, this access would only be

5 Nutting,12. 6 MacGregor-Hastie, 50 and Wortham, 51. 7 For a further discussion of Gordon‘s medals, see Hope, 8, MacGregor-Hastie, 51, Elton, 22, and Nutting, 11. 8 Boulger, volume I, 47 and C. Brad Faught, Gordon: Victorian Hero, 24. 9 J. S. Gregory, Great Britain and the Taipings (New York: Frederick Praeger, Publishers, 1969), 79.

19 granted after peace had been achieved: ―So soon as Peace shall have been restored, British vessels shall also be admitted to trade…‖10 Under the terms of the treaty, the British also believed that they would have immunity from paying the Taiping any duties for using the river, a position which led to further friction between the Taiping, who disagreed with this claim, and the British, who wished to take advantage of the new ports opened to them. To ensure that they would have this access, the British Empire joined what had previously been an intra-Chinese struggle, using the flimsy justification that the Taiping were abandoning both the treaty and the concept of free trade in general—and thus needed to be stopped militarily.11 As a member of the Royal Engineers, Gordon was tasked with constructing new living quarters for the troops who were left behind at Tientsen to reinforce the now-ratified treaty. He remained in the city for the next eighteen months.12 After his time at Tientsen, during which he suffered a brief case of smallpox, Gordon was sent to Shanghai, where he again had a chance to join the fighting. In Shanghai, Gordon was in charge of a detachment of Engineers that in 1863 fought the Taiping, who continued to threaten the tenuous peace and economic stability achieved in China with the signing of the treaty.13 Gordon really came to national prominence in Britain during this struggle against the Taiping. His actions as a part of the Chinese Ever Victorious Army would also earn him more international recognition. However, the question still remains: how did a British Royal Engineer find himself a part of a Chinese Army? The answer to this question lies in the British attitude towards the Chinese and their intra-Chinese conflict. The Ever Victorious Army was actually founded in 1861 as a conglomeration of French, Indian, and Chinese troops serving the Emperor. Originally, this army was led by an American adventurer named Frederick Ward. It was quite small and unorganized, only consisting of two regiments of 1000 men each, but it was effective and soon proved its competence by capturing several Chinese cities. 14 With the justification of the Treaty of Tientsen, combined with pressure from British officials serving in China and the

10 Gregory, quoting the terms of the treaty found on p. 79 fn. 24. He quotes Treaties, Conventions, etc. between China and Foreign States, volume i, 408. 11 Jen Yu-wen, The Taiping Revolutionary Movement (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 148-149. The British use of the Treaty of Tientsen as a justification for intervention is also discussed in Gregory, 81-82. 12 Boulger, volume I, 49. 13 Elton, 32. The Taiping rebellion technically lasted from 1850-1864 and was a radical religious and political upheaval that impacted all of China. The major goal of the movement was to introduce an anti-Confucianist world view into China, which was reflected in new ideas about democracy, property, and proper behavior. Although the rebellion would eventually fail, China would never be the same. 14 Elton, 35 and Boulger, volume I, 56.

20 knowledge in London that their trade interests needed to be safeguarded, the decision was made to allow British military and naval officers the right to accept Chinese military commissions at half pay.15 This decision was in keeping with the policies of the British Army following the Crimean War. After these two encounters, Britain would not be involved in any European warfare for the next half-century, leading to a new attitude towards the army. Over this same period, the British Empire expanded greatly, necessitating more troops. In essence, the army transformed from being a standing, fighting force to one of a more mercenary nature, with soldiers being deployed solely in areas of colonial interest.16 Gordon‘s deployment while still serving as a British officer to China and the Ever Victorious Army is merely one example of this practice. As it was an organization founded and commanded by foreign officers, the Ever Victorious Army, was never popular with the Chinese population it was supposedly assisting and in non-Western works on Taiping it receives the added title of ―so-called.‖17 In fact, Chinese historians are dubious about the claims of the army‘s success, as historian William Hail argues. In his work on the Taiping Rebellion, Hail states that ―it would be rash to assert or assume that ‗Chinese‘ Gordon put down the Taiping Rebellion….he was always strengthened by large Chinese armies to whom a share of praise is due for the victories which their absence might have turned into defeats.‖18 Clearly, although Gordon and the Ever Victorious Army have been granted most of the praise for their involvement in the conflict in Western sources, this is not the Chinese perspective. However, regardless of historical opinion on the merits of this army, it was the one that the British joined once they entered into the conflict. Gordon was dispatched to this army when he was sent to Shanghai. As a part of the Army, Gordon proved valuable: his insistence on reconnaissance before striking targets, including an outlying pagoda outside of Shanghai, led to a great victory—and his rise to prominence in the army. When Ward was wounded in September

15 Ibid., 510, ff. 53. Jen includes the citation to Papers Relating to the Affairs of China (Blue Book 1864), p. 199 which has the Council in Order, March 1, 1864 that revoked two earlier orders, one of August, 13, 1862 and the other from Janaury 9, 1863 that had granted this permission. 16 Correlli Barnett, Britain and Her Army 1509-1970: A Military, Political and Social Survey (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1970), 273. The changing attitude of the British Army is also discussed in Stephen Badsey‘s article, ―New Wars, New Press, New Country?‖ in Victorians at War: New Perspectives. Society for Army Historical Research, edited by Ian F.W. Beckett, number 16 (2007): 34-46, and 40-41. 17 William James Hail, Tsêng Kuo-fan and the Taiping Rebellion: with a sketch of his later career, second edition (New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1964), reprinted from the 1927 edition, 262. 18 Ibid., 268-269.

21 of 1862, Gordon was proposed as the next long-term commander of the makeshift army.19 Following a bit of diplomatic dithering, Gordon was confirmed as its commander in January 1863. For the first time, he was in command of an army, but his influence was tempered by having a co-commander, a Chinese Governor named Li Hung Chang. Thus, Gordon did not have free reign over decision making. He also had one further restriction; due to an agreement made with Li, he was only allowed to operate in an area comprising Shanghai and a thirty-mile radius surrounding the city. Nevertheless, upon taking command, he promised to eradicate the rebels and free China from the Taiping within eighteen months.20 Among his first actions were to introduce discipline, to standardize pay and uniforms in the ragtag army, and to ensure that his soldiers would both respect and fear him, thereby creating a unified fighting force.21 These modifications led to a series of victories occurring soon after Gordon took command. By the end of April, 1863, the Army had won several battles and retaken many cities and towns, proving his military expertise.22 Although partially hampered by intra-army intrigue, his success would continue until October when he began to prepare to take the rebels‘ last remaining stronghold, the city of Soochow. To capture Soochow, Gordon organized a two- month siege, punctuated by several smaller battles, from which he would emerge victorious, and on December 5, he captured the city. 23 However, the capture of Soochow led to a multitude of other problems for Gordon. He and his co-commander, Li Hung Chang, had a difference of opinion over the treatment of the surrendered Taiping leaders. Gordon wanted them to be treated fairly and spared, but Chang wanted them to be executed; the leaders eventually fell to the fate that Chang wanted. This decision appalled Gordon, and he even argued strenuously against it; ironically, the British press blamed him for the massacre.24

19 Elton, 36-37 and Boulger, volume I, 57-59. Although Gordon was the next to serve as commander of the army for any stretch of time, another American, Henry Burgevine, had a disastrous and short-lived term before him. 20 Elton, 39. 21 Hope, 30-31. 22 Elton, 43. 23 Elton, 54, Hope, 42-43, and Boulger, volume I, 97. 24 Elton, 65 and Hake, 72-87. The ―true‖ story of Gordon and the murder of these Taiping leaders was first laid before the British public in an earlier edition of Hake‘s work on Gordon in China, reprinted at length in this later volume. The original, entitled The Story of Chinese Gordon was published in 1884 and went through 12 editions, further proving the ubiquity of this story. Although Gordon was blamed for the action in the first reports, following an erroneous letter that was received in London from an ―English Gentleman,‖ he was quickly exonerated, and the story reported in the press changed to that of Gordon forcibly chasing Li Hung Chang with a revolver to with the intent of killing him as justice for his massacre. This letter was reprinted in a variety newspapers including The

Following the capture of Soochow, only one other area was still in the hands of the Taiping—Changchow. Changchow was the final city that had to fall to the Ever Victorious Army in order to ensure the victory of Imperial China. It was also the first place where Gordon was wounded in battle; he was shot in the leg.25 After allowing his wound to heal, the general led the final push of the army into Changchow. They were met by the threat of cannon fire and large artillery, but luckily for the Ever Victorious Army, the Taiping powder was wet, and they were unable to fire, lending credence to a rumor in the Army that Gordon was capable of extraordinary things.26 This imagined ability to perform magic would be a frequent theme in British analysis of and reporting on Gordon‘s time in China, especially when his contemporaries referred to his ―magic wand,‖ or the swagger stick that Gordon used to conduct his troops.27 Thus, following the traditional British interpretation of the events—like those presented in Lord Godfrey Elton and A. Edgmont Hake‘s biographies of Gordon—using his skills, a bit of luck, and his perceived magic, Gordon was able to lead the army into the city and to victory. However, from the Chinese perspective, Gordon‘s role in these events was quite different, as has been shown by William Hail‘s work. Hail is not the only historian who believes that Gordon‘s role in the events and even his ―mystical‖ qualities were, if not complete fabrications, certainly over-exaggerated. Hail‘s work, which has been cited by the bibliographer of the Taiping Rebellion, Ssu-Yü Teng, as ―an epoch-making book which marked a significant departure from the attitude of uncritical admiration for Gordon and the view that the Ever Victorious Army was entirely responsible for quelling the Taiping Rebellion,‖ was the first to introduce Chinese sources into discussions on Gordon.28 It would not be the last. More recent scholarship has even asserted that following the end of Gordon‘s time as commander, he left behind an army that had clearly outlived any usefulness and was even seen as, in the words of

Caledonian Mercury and the Newcastle Courant, etc. [―Wholesale Slaughter in China,‖ Caledonian Mercury, 1 February 1864; ―Imperial Atrocities in China,‖ Newcastle Courant, etc., 5 February 1864]. The Times also had a correspondent in China; the letter which ran in the paper was reprinted in several other papers including the Derby Mercury and the Glasgow Herald. [―China,‖ Derby Mercury, 3 February 1864; ―How Soochow was Captured,‖ Glasgow Herald, 5 February 1864]. 25 Elton, 67, Hope 80-81, and Hake, 94. 26 Elton, 69 and Nutting, 67. 27 Hope, 52-53, Chenevix Trench, 37, and Waller, 108. The authors refer to the Chinese terms for the stick: ―wand of victory‖ or ―magic wand.‖ Gordon‘s swagger stick was a part of his Royal Engineer‘s uniform. 28 Ssu-Yü Teng Historiography of the Taiping Rebellion (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 124.

23 historian R.J. Smith, ―unruly, unpredictable, ineffective and even dangerous.‖29 That the original concept behind the army, of having foreign trained Chinese officers, was also not effective thus eliminated any real need of even having the army, although its dissolution proved to be more problematic in Western policy making.30 Even before the Ever Victorious Army disbanded at the end of May, 1864, Gordon‘s time as commander was complete. He had accomplished his stated task: China was under control of the Imperial Emperor once more. This was not a campaign where Gordon grew rich—he refused most of his pay and spent the rest on his troops—but China was the place where his international reputation was solidified. Although Gordon detested receiving praise and honors, he did accept the two highest awards in the Imperial Army from the Chinese Emperor: the Order of the Yellow Jacket and the Peacock‘s Feather. Furthermore, he became a heroic figure back home, where his exploits at the head of the Ever Victorious Army were featured in the daily newspapers.31 In the contemporary British press, Gordon was portrayed as the sole figure responsible for the restoration of China to full imperial control; as a result, Gordon would never be completely anonymous again. However, it was his lost anonymity that Charles Gordon sought when he traveled back to London, leaving China with as little ceremony as possible, in late 1864. At first, he was asked to attend many different events, offered honors and promotions, but because he declined all of them, he eventually faded in the public‘s memory.32 After a brief period of leave at home with his family, Gordon reapplied to the Royal Engineers for a new posting. He was appointed to be the officer in command at Gravesend, where he was responsible for the erection of new forts to defend the Thames River from a possible French attack.33 In Gravesend, where he spent the next two years, Gordon was able to regain a measure of his anonymity. It was also the place where his spiritual side first became known to the public.

29 Richard J. Smith, ―Foreign-Training and China‘s Self-Strengthening: The Case of Feng-Huang-Shan, 1864- 1873‖ Modern Asian Studies, Volume 10, Number 2 (1976): 198. Franz Michael also addresses misconceptions about the Army in his comprehensive three volume work on the rebellion: Franz Michael (in collaboration with Chung-li Chang), The Taiping Rebellion History and Documents: Volume I: History (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966), 171-173. 30 The Ever Victorious Army was finally disbanded at the end of May 1864, following intense diplomatic discussions between the British and the Chinese. See Smith, 199-200 for more information. 31 Elton, 71-72 and Nutting, 73. 32 Waller, 119. 33 Elton, 78, and Waller, 121-122. Waller makes the claim that these forts were basically a Parliamentary extravagance to assure the British public that although France once again seemed to threaten an invasion, they would be well protected.

Gordon had always had his own personal religious beliefs; he quoted scripture and wrote D.V. (the Latin abbreviation for God willing) in the margins of his personal correspondence, but these beliefs had remained private.34 Charitable deeds were another aspect of his religious fervor, and they were an important part of Gordon‘s activities at Gravesend. He worked almost exclusively with very poor, young boys who lived on the streets. He provided food, clothing, and education to these children, and by the end of his posting, he was caring for hundreds of boys out of his own pocket.35 Out of this commitment to education, Gordon began writing and distributing his own religious tracts and teaching in the local Ragged School, which catered to boys who had nowhere else to go nor money of their own, and the Holy Trinity Church Night School.36 He regularly visited invalids and the sick and was willing to risk his own personal safety if it would benefit another. Although Gordon‘s devotion to charitable causes is commendable, he was certainly not the only person who was involved in philanthropic causes during this time period. In fact, it was common for members of the upper and middle classes in mid-Victorian England to participate in philanthropy.37 For instance, Gordon was only one of many famous supporters of the ―ragged‖ schools. However, since Gordon was already a public figure in Britain, his support became well known.38 While involved in his charitable works at Gravesend, Gordon also became acquainted with another religious family, the Freese family. Their beliefs and friendship would provide solace to Gordon even after he had moved on to other stations.39 His experiences there remained a defining influence throughout the rest of his life, though Gordon never again had a place in England that he called home following the end of this posting. After Gravesend, the British Government sent Gordon back to Romania in 1871 as a part of the Danubian Commission; instead of merely being a member of the boundary commission as

34 Elton, 33 and Wortham, 120. 35 Elton, 85 and Wortham, 150. 36 Waller, 130 and MacGregor-Hastie, 82. 37 A.F. Young and E.T. Ashton, British Social Work: In the Nineteenth Century (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956), 15. 38 David Owen, English Philanthropy: 1660-1960 (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1964), 151. Owen includes an extensive list of other public supporters of the schools. 39 During his lifetime, not much was published or known to the public about the Freese family and their influence on Gordon, but Mrs. Octavia Freese published a work in 1894 discussing their relationship and adding to Gordon‘s mystique with more reports on his good deeds in Gravesend. Octavia Freese, More about Gordon (London: Richard Bentley and Son, 1894).

25 he had been almost two decades earlier, Gordon was sent as the British Commissioner.40 He viewed the work as stultifying; he began to agitate to be posted elsewhere. Gordon got his wish and was sent back to Crimea to survey British cemeteries remaining from the war. During this second time in Crimea, he was invited to a dinner hosted by the British Ambassador to Turkey where he met Nubar Pasha.41 Pasha served as an advisor to Khedive Ismail, the ruler of Egypt and Sudan under the Ottoman Empire. Meeting Nubar Pasha ultimately changed Gordon‘s career and his life. In the fall of 1873, the Khedive was looking for a new person to replace the current Governor of Equatoria, a British adventurer named Sir Samuel Baker.42 Following the advice of Nubar Pasha, Ismail wanted Gordon to replace Baker in Equatoria, a province in Southern Sudan. By October of that year, Gordon was released from active service in Britain, allowing him to work for a foreign government and officially accept the post of Governor of Equatoria. On his forty-first birthday, January 28, 1874, the new Governor left for Egypt, en route to Sudan and his new posting.43 Equatoria was a particularly inhospitable place when Gordon first reached it. Egypt‘s rule over the territory was tenuous at best and would not have been possible without the tacit support of both the French and the British. The reason for their support was its location, on the Nile River, which was important to each country‘s economic investment in the region: the Suez Canal. In order to safeguard their economic interests, Equatoria needed to be under firm control. This was not the only challenge Gordon had in ruling the territory; he also had to contend with a rival for control of Equatoria, a native leader known as Zubair Pasha who controlled the Darfur region. In addition, Gordon was not an autonomous ruler. He had to work with his immediate supervisor Ismail Pasha Aiyub, the Governor-General of Sudan at the time, who had his palace in Khartoum and controlled the amount of supplies that could come up the river to Gordon‘s own palace at Gondokoro, the capital of Equatoria.44 Gordon was not bothered by the lack of supplies or by the primitive quarters he found in Equatoria. Instead, he began his tenure as Governor-General by focusing on the infrastructure of

40 For more information on Gordon‘s mission and goals as a part of the commission, see E.D. Tappe, ―General Gordon in Rumania‖ The Slavonic and East European Review, Volume 35, Number 85 (June 1957): 566-572. 41 Elton, 112 and Boulger, volume I, 139-140. 42 Elton, 117 and Faught, 42-43. For more on Baker and his role as Governor see P.M. Holt and M.W. Daly, A History of the Sudan: From the Coming of Islam to the Present Day, fifth Edition (London: Pearson Education, 2000), 67-70. 43 Elton, 119. 44 Faught, 46-47and Nutting, 101.

26 the province, including building new forts. When he arrived, the entire province only had two forts; Gordon, with his experience in the Royal Engineers, quickly had several more built. The primary aims of these forts were twofold. One was to show Gordon‘s intention to have an active role in the province, and the second was to prevent the further spread of the slave trade, a major source of income in the province. The eradication of the slave trade in Equatoria was one of Gordon‘s main goals as Governor-General. Another major goal was to survey the rest of the route of the Nile. Although he did not completely achieve both of these goals, he was somewhat successful. Gordon was able to reduce the slave trade, though he was not able to eradicate it completely because his rival, Zubair, continued to support and offer succor to slavers in Darfur. Under Gordon, the major course of the Nile was mapped out, an achievement which would later be used by Egypt (and Britain, by extension) to justify further projects in the region. Furthermore, Gordon‘s men charted Lake Victoria and several new falls.45 However, by the end of 1876, he had grown disenchanted with his work in Equatoria, the conditions he was living in, and the lack of success he had made in possibly annexing more territory for the Khedive. Returning home to England on Christmas Eve, 1876—ostensibly for a vacation—Gordon vowed that he would no longer serve the Khedive as Governor of Equatoria.46 When Gordon returned to Africa in early 1877, his wishes were granted and he was appointed Governor-General of the Sudan by the Khedive, replacing Ismail Pasha Aiyub, whom he accused of participating in the slave trade he was trying to eradicate.47 In addition to giving Khartoum to Gordon, the Khedive also made him a Marshal in his army, which gave him a larger purview, including the entirety of the Red Sea. Gordon now had the opportunity to try to end the slave trade completely. He began by going on several expeditions into the desert, where the power base of the slave trade was located, and forcing the slavers into agreeing to give up their trade. At the same time, he continued his efforts to denude Zubair‘s power base in Darfur.48 However, Gordon also had diplomatic affairs to attend to, including a power struggle in Abyssinia, which he settled. Overall, his second tenure as Governor-General for Khedive Ismail was successful. Nevertheless, there were some failures in his reign, especially in his finances. By the time Gordon left Sudan, the area that had been under him was almost completely bankrupt,

45 Chenevix Trench, 91. 46 Faught, 53. 47 Elton, 194. 48 Ibid., 204 and Nutting, 149-150.

27 partially as a result of Gordon‘s policies, as he was never known to be the most careful about money, instead preferring to earn and spend as little money as possible and giving the rest away to others, but most of the blame belonged to the Khedive and his poor financial management skills. Gordon was not the only person to fall victim to problems with finances during this time period. Egypt was essentially bankrupt, and Khedive Ismail was deposed, with the support of the British, in 1879 and replaced by his son, Tawfik, who governed with a strong Anglo-French influence.49 During this upheaval, Gordon had officially resigned his commission, but his resignation was not accepted and he was forced to remain Governor-General. Following Ismail‘s overthrow, Gordon once again offered his resignation, this time in an act of protest against Ismail‘s treatment.50 It was accepted, and by the end of the year, he was further disenchanted with the British and Egyptian governments, but was nonetheless happy with his continued success at eradicating the slave trade. By 1880, Gordon had returned home to England a changed man. He wanted to resign his commission in the Royal Engineers, but he was prevented from doing so.51 Instead, he was told to take a year‘s leave, but this hiatus was shortened due to a change in government in London from the Conservative Party under Benjamin Disraeli to the Liberal Party under William Ewart Gladstone. Soon after this transition, Gordon was recalled to be the private secretary to the new Viceroy in India, Lord Frederick Ripon. He did not last long in the position, partly because his appointment was purely political. By making him private secretary, Gladstone and Ripon used Gordon‘s personal history of philanthropy to add a veneer of respectability to the Viceroy‘s programs of reform. 52 Gordon regretted accepting the commission almost immediately and resigned it as soon as possible, after which he traveled briefly to China at the behest of his old compatriot, Li Hung Chang. Li wanted Gordon to serve again as an advisor to his old army, the Ever Victorious Army. This time, although the War Office was inclined to allow him to work for the Chinese, the Foreign Office was not, as there was a threat of war between China and Russia,

49 Holt and Daly, 70. 50 Nutting, 181. 51 Elton, 225. 52 Faught, 66 and Boulger, volume II, 43-44.

28 and Britain did not want to become involved in the possible conflict.53 Without government approval of a long-term stay in China, Gordon was forced to return to England once more. It was early 1881 by the time Gordon returned. He spent the next few years based in England, although he did leave the country from time to time on insignificant military matters, including an undistinguished spell at the Cape Colony in Southern Africa. During a brief tour of duty in Mauritius, he was promoted to his highest rank, Major-General.54 Gordon also found time during these fairly quiet years to visit Palestine—a visit which lasted for almost a year. However, by late 1883, Gordon was restless and looking for a new challenge. He thought that he had found this challenge when he was approached by King Leopold of Belgium. Leopold controlled the Congo and wanted Gordon to go there as his personal representative. Unfortunately for Leopold, Gordon was not allowed to resign his commission in the British Army to work for another sovereign government. Disappointed, Gordon returned from Brussels in early 1884.55 At the same time Leopold had approached Gordon to work for him, problems had arisen in Sudan, which was still controlled by Egypt. Both Egypt, a de facto British protectorate, and Sudan had nationalist uprisings in late 1883 and the government was worried about the possibility of a nationalist movement taking control of the countries. In Sudan, this nationalist movement was led by a Muslim religious figure called the Mahdi, which was a name for the Messiah. The Mahdi, whose real name was Mohammed Ahmad ibn Abdullah, believed that he was divinely ordered to bring justice to the world and to return Islam to its original religious beliefs. As the Mahdi, he was seen as a saint and a successor to the Prophet Muhammad. The Mahdi became an inspiration for people who either followed his beliefs or who wished to escape from Egyptian, i.e. British, rule. Originally, the Mahdi built his support from people who were disenchanted with the current government in Sudan. His early supporters included people who were associated with the slave trade and those who lived in Darfur. Later, he would also be joined by other Sudanese groups who did not like living under Egyptian control, but his army of followers lacked unity.

53 Boulger, volume II, 60; Immanuel C. Y. Hsu‘s article builds off of Boulger‘s version of the events leading to Gordon‘s mission to China and adds further analysis to the discussion. Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, ―Gordon in China, 1880,‖ The Pacific Historical Review, volume 33, number 2 (May, 1964): 147-166. Hsu‘s discussion on the reason Gordon was invited to China is found on pp. 148-153. 54 For more on Gordon‘s activities and promotion during this lull in active service, see Elton, 256, Nutting, 192-193, and Boulger, volume II, 95. 55 Nutting, 221, Elton, 271-272, and Faught 75.

This unity would come later, once the Mahdi had cemented his reputation and created a new, more fundamentalist version of Islam.56 His version of Islam, which differed greatly from the more secular version practiced by the Khedive in Egypt, was one of the major reasons why many more Sudanese joined his army and were willing to fight and even die for their beliefs. Thus, it follows that one of the Mahdi‘s main goals was to create a place where his version of Islam could be practiced in a Sudan that was free from the corrupting foreign influences he was rallying against.57 One of these influences that he was determined to eradicate was the British government, which had a large stake in keeping both Sudan and Egypt under control and defeating any nationalist movement in the two countries. In the eyes of the government, the best solution was to evacuate Sudan and abandon it to the Mahdi. However, as Gordon was considered to be an expert on the area, his expertise was thought to be needed, and thus the War Office denied his request to work for Leopold. This denial would lead to a fateful decision—to send the general back to Sudan. The idea of returning Gordon to Sudan did not originate with the War Office or the Gladstone Cabinet. Instead, the decision was motivated by public outcry and the pressure of the press, particularly The Pall Mall Gazette and its editor, W.T. Stead. After knocking on Gordon‘s door on January 8, 1884 and being greeted by the general himself, Stead was granted an interview. They spoke about the deepening crisis in Egypt and Sudan. This interview was published the next day on the front page of the Gazette as ―Chinese Gordon for the Sudan.‖ In his article, Stead claimed that he was presenting Gordon‘s opinion on evacuating Sudan to the public for the first time. He stated that Gordon believed that abandoning the territory was condemning the population to death by massacre at the hands of the Mahdi and his forces. Stead continued his article by calling for a reversal of the government‘s policy of evacuating Sudan and for the government to send in the one man who he felt was qualified, General Gordon.58 If the story had remained simply one article in The Pall Mall Gazette, perhaps Gordon‘s ultimate fate may have been different. Gordon did not give many interviews, and this interview with Stead was the first time that he had spoken to the press about Sudan. Inevitably this

56 P.M. Holt, The Mahdist State in the Sudan: 1881-1898: A Study of its Origins Development and Overthrow (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), see 42-44 and 53. 57 Waller, 301-314. The exact details of the Mahdi‘s rise to power and even when Mohammed Ahmad became the Mahdi are not known to historians. For more on the Mahdi‘s rise to power, see Holt and Daly, 75-80. 58 The headline and information in the article are reprinted in Elton, 273; the entire statement that Stead claimed was made by Gordon is reprinted in Boulger, volume II, 111-115. The original article appeared on the front page of The Pall Mall Gazette on 9 January 1884.

30 distinction led all of the other major newspapers in Britain to pick up the story. The next day‘s papers featured excerpts of the interview. By the end of the week, these papers were calling for Gordon to be sent to Khartoum, not to evacuate it, but to save it.59 The final decision to send Gordon back to Sudan, however, was not undertaken lightly. The general had never been a favorite of the powers at the War Office; he was regarded as too much of a loose cannon, a man who could not be counted on to perform his duties as they were intended. The government feared sending Gordon to Sudan for this reason, and even resisted asking him for advice, but the situation on the ground continued to deteriorate. On January 18, 1884, following a meeting at the War Office, he was officially sent back to the country in what was then termed to be an advisory and executive capacity, both to look into the situation on the ground and to evacuate it. The British government had effectively decided at this point to abandon any interests it had in Sudan, and Gordon was sent to ensure that the decision would be enforced. Although the decision to send Gordon to what would ultimately be his death was finally reached in 1884, the terms of his mission when he left London remain unclear.60 Gordon was sent to Sudan by a government that did not have full trust in him, and he was to report to the Egyptian Government before undertaking any major decisions. These conditions, imposed by the War Office, would lead to frustrations between Gordon and the metropole, especially when it came to whether or not he was to evacuate the country. On January 26, exactly one year before his death, Gordon arrived in Cairo. His departure from London had been made in haste—he had left the meeting at the War Office and headed directly to the rail station at Charing Cross, his first stop on the way out of England. The story of his departure has been told many times: on his final trip out of London, the man who would be hailed as a hero had little money in his pockets and received the loose cash, pocket change, and pocket watch of his old friend, Lord Garnet Wolseley.61 The rest of his journey was uneventful; the next year would not be.

59 Ibid. This is also an example of an editor influencing governmental policy a subject which will be analyzed in Chapter Three. 60 Bernard M. Allen, Gordon and the Sudan (London: Macmillan & Co., 1931), 234, Faught, 79-80, and Elton, 283. 61 This story has been repeated many times, thus it seems to be more than apocryphal. Early authors who cite it include Strachey, 295, Hope, 260-261, Wortham, 279, and Boulger, volume II, 122. Since these early authors included the tale, it is not surprising that it features in many later biographies of Gordon such as Elton, 290-291, Nutting, 228, Waller, 330, Faught, 80, and Chenevix Trench, 206.

Once Gordon arrived in Cairo and presented himself to Sir Evelyn Baring, the British consul in Egypt, he was told there had been a change in plans in his mission. The Cabinet, which had agreed in London a month previously that Gordon would serve in both an advisory and executive position, had now decided that he was just to evacuate the country. The members of the Cabinet had acceded to public pressure to send him to Sudan, but they were not going to allow him to remain an advisor. The situation with the Mahdi remained dire, there was a greater perceived need to evacuate the country, and Gordon‘s personal beliefs about abandoning it, as evidenced by his Pall Mall Gazette interview, no longer mattered. This change in focus and Gordon‘s impressions on the change were illustrated in a private memo written by Gladstone. This memo was the first time that the difference of opinion between the two men on how to solve the problem in Sudan was explored, and it clearly demonstrates this tension: the ‗irrevocable decision‘ [to evacuate] of which he [Gordon] speaks is…the decision ‗to evacuate the territory‘ and ‗not to incur the very onerous duty of securing to the people‘s of the Soudan a just future Government.‘ This decision ‗as far as possible involves the avoidance of any fighting…‘62

As Gladstone‘s memo demonstrates, the British government wanted to quit the region, but it was equally clear from other sources that Gordon was still unwilling to evacuate the country. In fact, another dimension of the problem between Gordon and the Gladstone Cabinet was over the transition of power within Sudan. When Gordon left Egypt for Sudan, he wanted to bring his old rival from his time as Governor of Equatoria, Zubair, back with him and leave Zubair as Governor of Sudan, not himself. However, this solution was not acceptable to Baring as it would not result in the evacuation of British interests in the territory if they propped up a new ruler. Instead, conventional thought in London was to abandon the territory to the Mahdi and, in the words of Gladstone ―[put] an end to this most perplexing and distressing affair.‖63 The difference of opinion between Gordon in Khartoum and Gladstone in London was not easily resolved. As the Mahdi grew stronger, Gordon became more isolated in Khartoum and getting messages through to him became much harder, leaving him to work in a more autonomous fashion. Before the Mahdi took the area directly surrounding Gordon, there was communication between Khartoum and London, even if it was infrequent. Afterwards, Gordon

62 British Library Add Ms. 44147, ff 25. 63 Ibid., ff.102-103.

32 was essentially alone in Khartoum with his Egyptian troops. He had no idea what his home government wished him to do and no idea if any help or reinforcements were coming to his aid. Soon, Gordon and his few troops were under siege in Khartoum and his local government was effectively out of money, but he was unwilling to leave the country to the Mahdi.64 This state of siege would last until the end of Gordon‘s life. He would not receive much meaningful communication from the British government, nor would he know whether an expedition to aid him would reach him in time.65 By December 1884, he realized that the relief expedition he had long sought, which would be led by Lord Garnet Wolsely with the assistance of General Gerald Graham, would probably not reach him in time. At the close of the journal he kept during his solitary occupation, he wrote his farewells to his fellow officers, acknowledging his frustration with not knowing if he would be rescued, and finally closing with an acceptance that there was nothing he could do about it: ―but this is ‗spilt milk,‘‖ he wrote, ―Good bye.‖66 Charles George Gordon would be dead a month later, still attempting to hold Khartoum. The actual details of Gordon‘s last days and death are the subject of much conjecture. All of his contemporaries, biographers, and historians agree that he was killed two days before the relief expedition reached Khartoum. The first news of his death emerged from reports which described the failure of the relief expedition, as did the first accounts of what may or may not have happened in Khartoum. Therefore, the details of Gordon‘s death are still open to debate. The stories include: Gordon being run through with a spear, either in his bed or while running down the stairs; Gordon being stabbed; Gordon being shot while attempting to run for safety; or, the most sensational of them all, Gordon being decapitated while still alive.67 The most prevalent story of the time was that of Gordon being speared. It is also the description referenced in most biographies and in the official account provided in the comprehensive history of the war.68 When the scouts from the relief expedition arrived two days before the main force, they refused to believe that Gordon had died. Instead, they discounted the fantastic stories about his death and set out to find him, looking for signs of Gordon and his Egyptian troops, hoping to see

64 Gordon himself invented his own paper currency to allow the government to function, but the only thing backing his money was his own reputation. For more information on the currency, see Elton, 327. 65 The details and political decisions leading to the relief expedition will be discussed in the next chapter. 66 British Library Add Ms 34479, ff. 130. 67 In the confusion following the death, various accounts were sent to newspapers. The Manchester Guardian reprinted an account that was published in the Morning Post which claimed of the live decapitation, although a correction was later issued. ―The Soudan Campaign,‖ Manchester Guardian (February 12, 1885), 8. 68 The Blue Book on Egypt, which was included with Gordon‘s last journals in British Library Add Ms 34479, was the official documentation of his death.

33 the flag that he always flew from his palace at Khartoum. The soldiers of the relief expedition conducted an ―eager search…but no sign of it [the flag] could be observed.‖69 It was obvious to those who came to rescue Gordon that he was no longer in command of Khartoum, but his death had still not been confirmed as an absolute certainty. Gordon‘s death would not be confirmed by the British until their steamers drew closer to Khartoum and messengers were sent into the city. They returned and through eyewitness testimony confirmed that his death had occurred two days prior to the scouts‘ arrival.70 The confusion surrounding Gordon‘s death was reflected in the official account of the fall of Khartoum. Written by Major Horatio Kitchener, it indicates a desire to address the circumstances: ―It is difficult, from the confused accounts, to make out exactly how General Gordon was killed. All the evidence tends to prove it happened at, or near the palace, where his body was subsequently seen by several witnesses.‖71 Gordon‘s death remains a mystery, partially because of the problems that the British had with those who witnessed it and the fact that these witnesses were known to change their stories. For example, Kitchener referenced one witness who claimed that the general wore light colored clothing and then later changed his mind and stated that Gordon wore dark clothing.72 Another problem with any discussion of Gordon‘s death and the manner in which he died was the fact that the accounts published in Britain, including the official history, did not take into account the information that could be gleaned from the Mahdi. When these sources are examined, as done by historian Douglas Johnson, a more complete account of the death is possible.73 He reached his conclusions by examining what happened to the general according to people who claimed to have witnessed the actual killing and death and left their records solely in Arabic. These records, which historians had never previously examined, provide clarification. Although Gordon served in the region for almost a decade overall, he never became familiar with Arabic, the language predominantly spoken in Khartoum and by the Mahdi. Similarly, most of the men sent to relieve him and the people who wrote the first accounts also lacked familiarity with the language. The official account of Gordon‘s death in Arabic sources mentions Gordon being speared by

69 H.E. Colville, History of the Sudan Campaign, originally published 1889, reprinted (Nashville: The Battery Press in association with the Imperial War Museum Department of Printed Books, 1996),36. 70 Ibid., 38. 71 Ibid., Appendix 47, pg. 274. 72 Ibid. 73 Douglas H. Johnson, ―The Death of Gordon: A Victorian Myth,‖ The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, volume 10 (1982): 285-310.

―natives‖ while dressed in white and standing at the top of the palace stairs. This version is supported by other Arabic sources, all of which mention the spear being thrown at the general as he stood at the top of the stairs.74 There are no direct eyewitness accounts of Gordon‘s actual death, leading all official accounts—regardless of language—to rest solely on supposition. The Arabic accounts cited above adhere to the official description and are similar to Kitchener‘s English version of events. There have been some challenges to the official story espoused by both sides of the conflict. In his article, Johnson cites the example of Karl Neufeld, a fellow European, who was held in captivity by the Mahdi, as one of these departures. In his memoir, Neufeld claimed that Gordon was wearing a dark suit and he was shot, not stabbed or speared. This account, published at the end of the nineteenth century, also includes the recollections of Khalil Agha Orphali, the man who was on guard in Khartoum palace the night Gordon was killed. 75 According to Neufeld, Orphali claimed that he saw, ―a bullet [strike] the Pasha [Gordon] in the right breast…[and] the Pasha was getting weak from loss of blood…a native of Khatimeh speared the Pasha in the right hip, but I shot him, and the Pasha fell down on the cavasses‘ [servants‘] mat at the door, and was dead.‖76 This retelling is one of the first to introduce the idea of being shot into the lore surrounding the circumstances of Gordon‘s death and is generally discounted, partially because it came from a non-British source, making the information suspect at the time. Following his discussion of how Gordon may have died, Johnson incorporated what happened to Gordon‘s body after his death and the fact that his head was severed postmortem. Although the sources mention that Gordon was decapitated and his head was placed in a leather bag following the act, they do not mention what later happened to it.77 Later it was recorded in the official records and several contemporary biographies that Gordon‘s head was, ―for many days mounted on a tall pole in front of the Mahdi‘s tent, [serving] as a macabre flagstaff to remind the ‗faithful‘ that Islam had triumphed.‖78 Gordon‘s body was never recovered from Khartoum. His head, the subject of much consternation, was never returned to England. Unlike other fallen heroes, there was no public

74 Ibid., 286-287. 75 Ibid., 293. 76 Karl Neufeld, A Prisoner of the Khalifa (London, 1899), 336-337, cited in Ibid., 294-295. 77 Ibid., 296. 78 Waller, 439.

35 funeral held at Westminster Abbey and he never received last rites.79 Instead, the public found other outlets to commemorate the fallen hero, a subject which will be discussed in later chapters. However, without a body and without a ceremony, there was no closure for Gordon, his death, and what he meant to British culture and the British Empire. This lack of closure, combined with the fact that Gordon was already considered a hero before he left for Sudan, is partially reflected in the way that the British public strove to comprehend his death. Without a funeral, and without a consensus on exactly how he died, Gordon‘s sacrifice remained open to interpretation.80 His death could be co-opted by different groups for diverse reasons. As will be fully discussed in later chapters, these interpretations helped shape the so- called myth of Gordon. One popular view on Gordon was to portray him as a Christian martyr, a view aided by the lack of a body. Those who supported Gordon as a Christian martyr took their evidence from his life, especially his time spent at Gravesend and the beliefs he held, comparing the struggles in Gordon‘s life to that of another martyr, Jesus Christ.81 These comparisons were strengthened with Gordon‘s death at the hands of a Muslim enemy. Beyond his portrayal as a Christian martyr, he was also remembered as a second type of martyr: an imperial martyr, whose death served his country. This concept of martyrdom was compounded by the public‘s belief that his death could have been avoided. This argument places the blame and responsibility for Gordon‘s martyrdom on the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, making Gordon a martyr to politics, rather than to religion.82 As these discussions on two different categories of martyrdom show, Gordon‘s death was able to be interpreted in many different fashions. These interpretations are just two of the reasons why the ‗cult of Gordon‘ began. Gordon‘s real significance was born out of his death— in death he could become an imperial symbol. Even in life he had been associated with Britain‘s various foreign involvements in Asia and Africa. His significance in these areas would only be increased because of how he died.

79 The countryman who was most compared to Gordon, David Livingstone, another man killed in Africa, did receive a public funeral at Westminster Abbey. For more information see John Wolffe, Great Deaths: Grieving, Religion and Nationhood in Victorian and Edwardian Britain (London: Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press, 2000), 137-138. 80 This concept, the idea of an empty signifier, is examined in Page Dubois, Sappho is Burining (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995). Dubois examines the poetry of Sappho through the lens of the unknown; people can project into the poetry because the words have not existed, much the same way that Gordon‘s absent body functioned. See pp. 82-83 for Dubois‘ treatment of the subject. 81 Hope, 361-369. 82 John Wolffe‘s work neatly summarizes the major points in the political martyrdom question. Wolffe, 147.

Although the concept of martyrdom was one of the most significant tropes to emerge from Gordon‘s death, it was not the only one. His death was also seen as a commentary on the situation that Britain was facing with Egypt in particular and its empire in Africa in general. By 1885, British imperialism was approaching its zenith. Anti-imperialist forces were quick to use the death of Gordon to support their claims against extending the empire further. As such, Gordon‘s death can be examined as another way to see the imperial project and as a way of understanding British public opinion on its empire.83 Within this argument, the outpouring of grief and support for Gordon clearly demonstrates that the public was dismayed with how its hero was killed and even sacrificed to the cause of imperialism. The circumstances of Gordon‘s death can never be determined with absolute certainty. As discussed above, this uncertainty has allowed for a wealth of differing opinions about where he died and the manner in which he died. The 1885 publication of his journals, which demonstrate his feelings of abandonment in his final months, allowed for public speculation on the way in which he himself would have liked to have been remembered. However, what has not yet been addressed is the effect that Gordon‘s death had on the people who knew him, the people who knew of him, and the people who were sent to relieve him. Charles George Gordon was born an ordinary, average man, but his experiences would change the way that some Britons viewed their empire: either with a renewed sense of pride or with the beginnings of distaste for the imperial project. His public acclaim came from his participation in imperial projects throughout the world. The General‘s service in Europe, Asia, and Africa was emblematic of the then-character of the British Empire, giving him the necessary background to aid in his transformation to an imperial symbol. Without the press‘ influence, Gordon‘s role as an imperial figurehead would have been diminished. It is possible that the circumstances of Gordon‘s death would not have occurred without the press‘ direct agitation for his return to Khartoum. The press was primarily responsible for the creation of this imperial figure and hero, not the general‘s own actions. From November 1884, Gordon was unable to communicate with anyone outside of Khartoum; yet his story and circumstances were still being presented to the public by the press on a daily basis. Thus, the press was responsible for shaping public opinion in Britain regarding Gordon‘s time at

83 Andrew Thompson, The Empire Strikes Back?: The Impact of Imperialism on Britain from the Mid-Nineteenth Century (Edinburgh: Pearson Education Ltd., 2005), 181-182.

Khartoum. The only way that the public knew about his struggles with the British and Egyptian governments was because the press told them. Gordon‘s perceived abandonment at Khartoum led to an increase in people‘s desire to learn as much as possible about the circumstances. In turn, his death would lead to a sense of outrage felt throughout British society as exemplified by its coverage in the press. From the Queen and her ministers, to Gordon‘s friends, acquaintances, and those who only knew him through the press, people felt the need to express their anger, sadness and dismay at what was perceived to be a senseless death. Gordon‘s death was unexpected. He was simply expected to go into Sudan and resolve an unfortunate situation, not to die. The level of reaction and grief which accompanied the news of Gordon‘s death changed the way that Britain regarded its imperial ambitions in Sudan, and partly changed the course of imperial history in that region. It also led to a new conception of Gordon from a much decorated (at least by foreign powers) general to an imperial martyr, the figurehead of British imperialism and the sacrifices it required.

CHAPTER 3 DEATH AND ITS AFTERMATH

The failure of the Gordon relief expedition added another dimension to General Charles Gordon‘s death. As the relief expedition had been cobbled together solely to appease the public and was never a popular undertaking at the War Office, its failure was generally seen as the fault of men not only in London and but in Egypt and Sudan. The fact that the expedition almost succeeded—arriving in Khartoum two days too late—only added to that perception. Once the events of the expedition, including the delays that befell it and the official hindrances, became known to the public, outrage against the government and Prime Minister William Gladstone intensified. Popular opinion at the time believed that without these obstacles, the expedition would have succeeded and Gordon, who by this time had become an even greater figure of national interest, would have been saved. In order to examine the political ramifications that the expedition‘s failure would have, it is necessary to understand the events of the actual expedition, beginning with the discussions over whether it was even going to be launched. Perhaps, if the expedition had been sent to Africa in a more expedient fashion, then its outcome might have been different. Gordon‘s arrival and subsequent actions at Khartoum had remained a topic in the press through 1884. As long as news could be received from Sudan, he would continue to be featured in the newspapers. Once news from him could no longer be received, the questions over his mission began. These questions only intensified at the first reports of his death. After Gordon‘s death was confirmed, people turned to the government for answers to all of their questions. These answers were sought by all different levels of society—from men who were fighting to reach the general to the Queen herself. However, the person who would be forced to answer all of these questions, and the man who would be held personally accountable for the failure of the relief expedition, was the Prime Minister. Gladstone never wanted to send an expedition to Sudan to save Gordon; now he would be the person whose political career would be forever linked to that same expedition‘s failure. National politics certainly had a role in any decisions to send a relief expedition. In 1880, the Gladstone government had come back into power following an election in which the Liberal Party defeated the seated Conservative Party and its leader, Lord Beaconsfield. Under the Conservatives, Britain had followed a virulently imperialist course of action, leading to its

39 involvement in a variety of small, insignificant wars. The country was also struggling with the question of continued involvement in Ireland.1 Even a history of the Conservative Party, compiled with its assistance, recognized that one of the primary ways that the Liberal Party returned to office was on the basis of arguing against all of the imperial decisions made by Beaconsfield.2 However, even with the change of party, the British Empire was too large to ignore. Thus, as Prime Minister, Gladstone advocated a new tactic—Liberal Imperialism. This concept of limited autonomous self-rule for provinces within the British Empire was partially implemented in the policies he chose regarding Sudan. It led to his decision not to send an expedition to relieve Gordon, a decision he would be forced to rescind due to political and public considerations. Gladstone was not the only government official who did not want to send in an expedition, but he received the largest share of the blame.3 The public reaction to the perceived abandonment of Gordon—,who was portrayed in the press as being alone at Khartoum, completely cut off from the world—did not help the Gladstone government‘s choice not to aid him. The Prime Minister was attacked for his delay in sending any help by some members of his cabinet and by some of his military officials, including Lord Wolseley. He was also attacked, once again by the press, whose involvement had forced Gordon‘s original mission.4 Gladstone‘s decision to delay the mission was much criticized at the time, but he was not vilified until later, when the mission failed. Following the failure of the relief mission, the vitriol against Gladstone turned personal: he went from being perceived as one of the most important political figures in his country to being seen as the man who condemned Gordon to his death. As a result of his policies, Gladstone‘s party went from having a large victory in the 1880 election to barely winning re-election in 1885. The reasons why he barely retained control of the government were considerably more complicated than his actions in Sudan. For example,

1 Gladstone and Beaconsfield as the leaders of the Liberal and Conservative Parities respectively held the position of Prime Minister from 1865 to roughly 1895. Martin Pugh has advanced the argument that economics was more important than imperial considerations in the election of 1880, see his The Making of Modern British Politics: 1867- 1945 Third Edition (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 67. 2 Norman Gash, Donald Southgate, David Dilkes and John Ramsden, The Conservatives: A History from their Origins to1965 (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1977), 193-195. 3 Gladstone was not the only member of the Cabinet who wanted to delay sending help to the general. In addition to Gladstone, the Colonial Secretary, Lord Derby, Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville, and Hugh Childers, the Secretary of State for War. 4 See previous chapter‘s discussion on W.T. Stead and Gordon; Stead‘s true imperial role will be addressed in more detail in the following chapter.

40 historian Martin Pugh references both domestic and foreign problems that resulted in the close election.5 However, regardless of all the other reasons why Gladstone‘s political power was lessened, events in Sudan led to his being personally blamed by the Queen and his actions being questioned by Parliament. Gordon‘s death did not end Gladstone‘s political career, but it certainly changed the way that large segments of the British public perceived their prime minister. The failure of the expedition and Gordon‘s death even changed the sobriquet applied to the formerly popular politician: he went from having a reputation as the Grand Old Man (a reference to his long public service career) to instead being known as the Murderer of Gordon.6 The fallout from the failure of the expedition to relieve Gordon was felt in other areas besides Parliament and 10 Downing Street. It was an arduous expedition; many members did not return, and those who did felt guilty about failing in their mission. Men in the War Office in London and in government in Egypt also took the failure of the mission personally, even if they themselves had not committed any actions leading to its unfortunate end. Originally, the War Office did not want to send an expedition into Sudan to relieve Gordon; it believed he had chosen to ignore his orders and stay in the territory even after he had been told to evacuate it. However, by the summer of 1884, the government was forced, following months of barely any communication with Sudan, to act. Gladstone, who had always refused to send troops to the territory, had tried for months to delay the sending of any expedition, but was finally persuaded that he must by his Secretary of State for War, Lord Hartington. An agreement was made to send an expedition in August 1884, when Parliament voted to put aside £300,000 for the expedition, if it proved to be necessary; however, it still took another month for preparations to be complete.7 One of the most important decisions that the War Office faced in relation to its relief effort was who was to be its commander. This question, which was settled with the appointment of Lord Wolseley, was directly linked with the actual goal of the mission. Wolseley had long been a supporter of sending a mission to Khartoum specifically to save Gordon, but Gladstone

5 In his analysis of the election, Pugh states the following: ―The election of 1885 appears more complicated. That it was less of a victory for the Liberals than 1880 was due primarily to [Charles Stewart] Parnell‘s decision to withhold the Irish vote in England, to the unpopularity of Gladstone‘s imperial policies culminating in the death of General Gordon at Khartoum in 1885, and to renewed alarm among the urban middle classes at the radical tone of [Joseph] Chamberlain‘s ‗Unauthorized Programme.‘‖, 67. 6 Gladstone‘s transformation in the public opinion will be fully discussed in the next chapter. 7 Julian Symons, England’s Pride: The Story of the Gordon Relief Expedition (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1965) 84- 85.

41 had been unwilling to categorize the mission as such. Instead, it was given a much more innocuous name: The Nile Expedition. Regardless of the name, everyone in the government knew exactly what the purpose of the expedition was—to reach Gordon at Khartoum before his supplies ran out. Even before the expedition was formed or even approved, Wolseley believed, based on the scant information available, that the latest date Gordon could remain in Khartoum was the fifteenth of November, 1884. This belief, which was later recorded in the official history of the Nile Expedition, was among the considerations which led him to push the government to approve sending a force to Sudan.8 On September 9, 1884, Wolseley arrived in Cairo to lead the Nile Expedition. Prior to him leaving London, there had been a great deal of discussion about what route to use to reach Gordon, which added to the overall sense of delay. The War Office considered two routes; one was to sail up the Nile River, and the other was to go through the desert from Suakin to Berber. Neither route was perfect, and the Office was undecided on which to take, though Wolseley himself supported the former. Sailing the Nile River was a particularly daunting task, which was one of the reasons why many at the War Office felt that it was the wrong route. However, Wolseley did not see the Nile River as insurmountable. He relied on information gained from commanding the Red River Expedition, which had been sent to investigate a settlement in Canada. On this expedition, he used birch-bark canoes to traverse the Winnipeg River, whose flow coincidentally happened to resemble that of the Nile.9 Wolseley transferred this knowledge to the Nile and reconfigured whale boats to resemble the canoes he had used on the Red River Expedition.10 His prior experiences solved the problem of how to reach Gordon, but the problem of who was going to crew these boats remained. Wolseley needed men who were familiar with these boats, and the only men who were familiar with them happened to be in Canada. Before leaving for Cairo, Wolseley solved this problem by requesting approximately three hundred Canadian Voyageurs as a part of his expedition. These Voyageurs, who were divided into Europeans and members of the Caughnawaga nation, were only some of the nationalities that were included in the expedition. He also included West African crewmen, and

8 H.E. Colville, History of the Sudan Campaign: compiled in the intelligence division of the War Office (Nashville, The Battery Press in association with The Imperial War Museum Department of Printed Books and Articles of War, Ltd., 1996), reprinted from the 1889 edition, part I, 31. Colville served as a Colonel during the expedition, any editorial remarks made are his. 9 Symons, 101-102. 10 British Library, Add Ms 44148 ff. 140-141.

42 by the end of the expedition, even Australia had contributed a force. The makeup of the expedition was significant: it was the first time that any of Britain‘s colonial dominions had contributed troops to an overseas imperial project, further cementing the importance of the expedition‘s success.11 Although the relief effort had a time limit and a great amount of press coverage, the Gladstone government still continued its obstructionist efforts against it. Beginning in April, 1884, Gladstone worked to defeat any efforts to relieve Gordon. In a long memorandum dated April 19, he outlined his perceptions of Gordon‘s role and the likelihood of ever sending additional troops to Khartoum. In it, he expressed his dislike of the fact that Gordon had remained against orders and still dared to request assistance, writing, ―If he remains by choice at Khartoum what hopes does he entertain of useful actions?...are the views he entertains well founded on the original design of evacuation?...If he asks for 3000 Turkish troops…what motive would he have for such a course?‖12 This memorandum, which was set aside in a volume of papers that Gladstone marked as ―D.W. Gordon Mission, papers to be kept apart for reference in case of dispute,‖ showed that Gladstone already had cause to believe that Gordon had exceeded his mission and thus was not to be rescued or helped. By keeping these papers aside, he also indicated that he understood that his decision was controversial and open to questioning should his tactics be blamed for a less than favorable outcome.13 Unfortunately for Gladstone, his grudgingly given permission resulted in an expedition that reached Khartoum too late. Part of the reason why the final expedition failed to save Gordon was not specifically his fault. There were problems with the Nile route that resulted in slower progress than anticipated, but had the expedition been authorized and planned earlier, then these problems may have been easily surmounted. Wolseley even condemned Gladstone‘s delaying tactics in his journal of the expedition, where he wrote: ―I hate to think we shall have to pay

11 There have been entire books written on the contributions of dominion troops to the Nile Expedition. For more information on Canada, see: C.P. Stacey, ed. Records of the Nile Voyageurs 1884-1885: The Canadian Voyageur Contingent in the Gordon Relief Expedition (Toronto: The Publications of the Champlain Society 37, 1959), 5. For more on Australia see: Ralph Sutton, Soldiers of the Queen: War in the Soudan (Sydney: New South Wales Military History Society and The Royal New South Wales Regiment, 1985), 38-39. The unique character of the expedition is also addressed in Symons, 106-107 and Colville, part I, 66-67. 12 British Library, Add Ms 56452 ff. 42-43. 13 Ibid., ff.2. D.W. stands for Department of War. Altogether, two full Add Ms collections (56451 and 56452) were kept separate to refute any claims that might be made against Gladstone regarding the failure of the mission.

43 many, many, valuable lives lost from the prolonging our operations into the hot weather for the folly and ignorance of Mr. Gladstone.‖14 Although the Nile approach was considered the most effective route, it was not very passable, even in the whale boats. Traveling up the Nile, the whaleboats and their crewmen had to contend with six major cataracts. In each of these areas, the sailors were forced into the slow and cumbersome process of partially dissembling and carrying their boats around the rapids.15 The difficulties in moving the boats meant the expedition needed to be headquartered in a central place. The location chosen was Wadi Halfa, located between the first and second major cataracts of the Nile. It was also far enough north that there still was unimpeded communication with Cairo via telegraph, but as it was further up the Nile, it was closer to Khartoum. However, even with headquarters at Wadi Halfa nearer to Gordon, the Nile still remained an obstacle, as many more cataracts needed to be passed before the expedition could reach Khartoum, and in addition to these physical difficulties, the expedition also had to contend with the fact that they were entering what was, in effect, a war zone. The fact that they were crossing through a war zone necessitated other side missions to ensure that the boats would be able to progress up the Nile without encountering hostility. One of the most important of these side trips involved the Mudir, or the local leader, of Dongola, who was allied with the Egyptian government. Wolseley sent Brigadier-General Sir Herbert Stewart to the Mudir to negotiate his cooperation with the relief efforts. This side mission indicated that the British were not solely counting on the troops and supplies that they brought to the region, but instead were also relying on the people who were nominally in the territory under their control.16 While at Dongola on his mission, in late September 1884, Stewart received two messages that had been sent from Gordon in Khartoum. One of these missives, dated July 31, indicated that there was only food for two more months in the city.17 However, it was the second missive, dated about a month later, on August 24, which added a further sense of urgency to the expedition. This second telegram stated that Gordon and some of his men, including a Lieutenant

14 NA WO 147/8, p. 145 15 Stacey, 17. 16 Eve M. Trout Powell expands on the relationship between the Nubians, who lived in Dongola and foreigners (which was any European, including those working for the Egyptian government as Pashas) in her A Different Shade of Colonialism: Egypt, Great Britain and the Mastery of the Sudan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 70. 17 Colville, part I, 92.

Colonel named D.H. Stewart, were attempting to take Berber back from the Mahdi using several steamers that Gordon had at his disposal in Khartoum.18 Shortly after receiving this telegram, Sir Stewart was informed that the attempt had failed, Gordon was back in Khartoum, and Colonel Stewart‘s steamer had been delayed while trying to head north and reach other troops and was caught on a rock, preventing any forward movement. Two days later, on October 4, news reached Dongola that Colonel Stewart and all of his men had been murdered on board their disabled steamer.19 Not only did the incident cost the British one of their steamers, but it also caused the Mudir to rethink his support for the expedition and to claim that he did not have the proper resources necessary.20 Wolseley eventually traveled to Dongola himself at the end of October to secure the Mudir‘s cooperation with the expedition. By going to Dongola from Wadi Halfa, where he had previously been stationed, Wolseley believed that he would have more success in communicating with Gordon. Even though the telegraph lines between Dongola and Khartoum had been cut, native messengers, who were in the pay of the Mudir, were still able to travel between the cities.21 With this partially reinstated communication, more messages could reach Gordon, and Wolseley was able to inform him of the relief expedition‘s progress. By November 30, 1884, Wolseley issued a general order to his troops reminding them that ―the relief of General Gordon and his garrison, so long besieged in Khartum, is the glorious mission that the Queen has entrusted to us…We can, and with God‘s help, we will, save Gordon from such a death [as the one that befell Colonel Stewart].‖22 Wolseley‘s conviction that they would be able to save Gordon was one of the driving forces behind his decision to move to Korti, which was located even further up the river. Furthermore, it was the location where the final stage of the expedition, the advance to Khartoum, would be launched at the end of December. The advance force sent from Korti was smaller than Wolseley had hoped to send. As a result of circumstances in the region, the British were unable to gain the number of camels that they required, forcing some men to stay behind.23 However, a Desert Column under the

18 These steamers had already made the treacherous trip up the Nile to Khartoum, and were among the resources that Gordon had to use for his ostensible evacuation of the city. 19 Ibid., 92-93; There is also a detailed description of the way Colonel Stewart and his crew were trapped and murdered on pages of part I, 97-100. 20 Symonds, 135-136. 21 Colville, part I, 109. 22 NA, WO 147/8; p. 137-138. 23 Symonds, 173-177.

45 leadership of Brigadier-General Herbert Stewart was dispatched to the town of Metemmeh, where Gordon had sent his remaining steamers. Attached to this column was another officer, Sir Charles Wilson, who was ordered to travel directly to Khartoum from Metemmeh and meet with Gordon.24 On December 30, the Desert Column left from Korti, heading to Metemmeh, but they did not get there without incident; on January 16, they encountered a large group, later estimated to be between eight and fourteen thousand, of the Mahdi‘s men at Abu Klea. Following procedure, Stewart had his men form a zereba, or an enclosure that was made of stones and thorns to resist attack, and wait for the Mahdi‘s troops to attack. The Mahdi‘s troops did not, and because time was of the essence, Stewart was forced to continue his progress and attack them instead, using the defensive square he had had his troops form as an offensive tool. His attack was successful, and a day later he and his troops were able to continue to Metemmeh.25 By January 19, Stewart and his men had reached Metemmeh. There they were greeted by further opposition and were once again forced to fight their way to the river where Gordon‘s steamers were anchored. In the ensuing battle, Stewart received a wound to his groin that would later prove fatal, and command of the column passed to Sir Charles Wilson.26 Wilson was ill- prepared for the command, but he decided to continue the advance and finally reached the steamers on January 21. On them, Wilson found several pieces of correspondence, all dated from December 14 or before. In these communiqués, which included the final volume of his journal, Gordon described the desperate situation that he found himself in and the need for a relief expedition to reach him as soon as possible.27 Unfortunately for Gordon, there was more delay before the expedition would leave Metemmeh and head to Khartoum. Although the general had urged haste, Wilson believed that it was more important that the troops be safe and rested following the eventful trip to Metemmah and that, because Gordon had falsely predicted in his letters that the city would fall on Christmas Day, he could wait a day or two before launching the final stage of his advance. He believed, as he later wrote, that ― the crisis at Khartum which had been deferred from the 25th December to

24 Colville, part II, 8-9. He includes the full text of Wolselely‘s orders to Wilson, including the object of his mission: ―you will confer with him [Gordon] both upon the military and upon the political position.‖ 25 Ibid., 15-22. He even includes battle sketches and a description of the famous battle square. For more on the individual parts of the battle, see Symonds, 190-204. 26 Symonds, 208 and Colville, part II, 25. 27 Symonds, 217, 219, Colville, part II, 30.

46 the 19th January would be hurried on, or that a delay of a couple of days would make much difference.‖28 As history has proven, this delay made a significant difference. Wilson chose to wait for three days, leaving Metemmeh by steamers on the morning of January 24. The journey to Khartoum was treacherous. On the first day, the steamers made significant progress up the Nile, but the second day was not as fortuitous. One of the steamers struck a rock on the second day, completely disabling it. After trying for six hours to free the steamer, the expedition was forced to stop for the night. They did manage to free the steamer on the third day, but by the night of January 26, the steamers had only moved three miles farther away from where they had been the night before. On the next day, the steamers made further progress, but they also encountered gunfire from the Mahdi‘s positions along the Nile. By January 28, the steamers were within sight of Khartoum; the men on them could see that the flag was no longer flying from the roof of Gordon‘s palace, and they assumed that the city had been lost.29 That night, after fending off attacks from the Mahdi all day, Wilson ordered the steamers to anchor at an island near Khartoum and sent scouts to the city to ascertain the fate of Gordon. When the scouts returned, they confirmed that the city had fallen and that Gordon was presumed dead. The next day, Wilson received a message from the Mahdi stating that the city had fallen and asking that he send an envoy to find the truth about Gordon‘s fate. Wilson refused to send an envoy, but Gordon‘s death was all but confirmed by the Mahdi‘s actions. In the letter, the Mahdi specifically said that Khartoum had been destroyed and made reference to a ―killing of Khartum,‖ which, according to the translation could only be a reference to Gordon‘s death. Hence, the only task that remained for Wilson was to get word back to Korti of his expedition‘s ultimate failure.30 However, reaching Wolseley at Korti would prove to be just as difficult for Wilson as the trip up the Nile to Khartoum. His steamers were attacked on the voyage back to Metemmeh; two of them would be wrecked on the river‘s cataracts and Wilson himself would have to be rescued by the troops he had left behind at Metemmeh. Once he reached the town on February 1, he

28 Colville, part II, 30, quotes Sir Charles R.Wilson‘s From Korti to Khartum,, p. 112 in his official report. Colville also includes Wilson‘s official report to Wolseley on his delay as Appendix 46, part II, 267-269. 29 Symonds, 232-235; Colville, part II, 34-38. 30 Colville, part II, 39-40. He includes a full translation of the Mahdi‘s letter to Wilson.

47 forwarded his tragic news to Wolseley, who received it on February 4. By the fifth, the news had reached London. The men who had valiantly struggled to reach Khartoum in time were only two days too late to save him. Two days was less than the length of Wilson‘s delay at Metemmeh, so his actions received particular scrutiny, and he himself was vilified for what was perceived to be an error in judgment. Yet the expedition itself did not end with Gordon‘s death. Instead, it was transformed into an expedition to avenge him and to guarantee that his death had not been in vain. Instead of abandoning Sudan, the Gladstone government bowed to overwhelming public and political pressure and ordered that the Mahdi would have to be overthrown by British forces.31 Wolseley received telegraphic orders to that effect on February 7. According to these orders, he would continue to be in charge of the expedition, which would receive more troops and supplies, and a contract would be awarded to build a railroad in the region, which would make troop movement easier. For the first time since Wolseley entered Sudan, it seemed as though a British presence in Sudan would replace that of the Mahdi. Unfortunately, circumstances outside of the region caused an entirely different ending. In April 1885, Sudan was superseded as the utmost area of imperial concern to the British government. Instead, there was an incident in Afghanistan, which was under limited autonomous rule and regarded as a buffer-zone by the British and the Russians. Gladstone feared that this incident, in the border town of Pandjeh, would lead to a full-scale military engagement between the two empires and recalled the troops from Wolseley‘s expedition back to Egypt in anticipation of their having to be sent to Afghanistan. The situation would not lead to war, as it was quickly diffused by the Afghan leader, but the troop recall remained in effect.32 Some historians, like Julian Symonds, claim that Gladstone was aware that the situation in Afghanistan would probably be settled without British involvement, but he used the excuse of war as a way to end the Sudanese relief expedition.33 However, these claims have never been proven. There was a war supply vote that paid for both, but Gladstone‘s possible speculation that the war might not break out is unrecorded. Regardless of his motives, Britain would not become involved in Sudan

31 Symonds, 248 and Colville, part II, 57-60. The efforts by the press and the influence that their machinations had on the government‘s policies will be discussed more fully in the following chapter. 32 For more on this situation, see Stephanie Laffer, ―From ‗Masterly Inactivity‘ to Limited Autonomy: Afghanistan as a Catalyst for Liberal Imperialism,‖ (masters thesis, Florida State University, 2005), 47-48. 33 Symonds, 268-269.

48 again under Gladstone. The Mahdi‘s death in June 1885, which led to an internal crisis in the country, only cemented the region‘s lack of importance.34 Although Sudan‘s imperial significance waned, the events that preceded the politically expedient evacuation of the region were not as hastily forgotten by the British public. Their government had been willing to abandon the region, but people were not willing to abandon Gordon, or what they believed to be his sacrifice for the preservation of their empire. His perceived abandonment combined with the still uncertain, although definitely violent, circumstances of his death led to a new role for Gordon: that of a martyr. He was seen by some of his contemporaries, especially those who were already critical of Gladstone and the Liberal Party, as having been condemned to his death by his government, a government that should have been able to save him, but that chose not to do so.35 The lack of support by the government angered both Gordon‘s friends and those people who had only heard of him in passing, but it also allowed those individuals who saw Gordon‘s sacrifice as a gateway to his martyrdom, to add to their argument. As Gordon was already seen in England as a hero due to his years in China and as a Christian man, especially following his posting at Gravesend, it followed that his actions were designed for the good of those who he was trying to serve and not for himself. Using these characteristics, Gordon quickly received an additional appellation; he was now characterized by some as a Christian martyr.36 According to these individuals, Gordon‘s decision to stay in Khartoum, against the direct orders of his superiors, could be seen as divinely motivated. He chose to remain despite the real possibility of losing his own life, following the traditional definition of Christian martyrdom, which required courage in the face of adversity, to be declared a martyr, as Jean Porter argues.37 Following the definition of martyrdom that T.S. Eliot used to describe Thomas Becket in his Murder in the Cathedral, Gordon‘s actions can be said to be those of a man acting as an ―instrument of god.‖

34 Holt, 135. 35 Various reactions to Gladstone‘s decision to abandon Gordon in Sudan are detailed in the following chapter. 36 The reasons why Gordon‘s contemporaries characterized him as a martyr are discussed later in the chapter. 37 This definition of Christian martyrdom comes from the Oxford English Dictionary, which calls a Christian martyr a ―person who chooses to suffer death rather than renounce faith in Christ or obedience to his teachings, a Christian way of life, or adherence to a law or tenet of the Church; (also) a person who chooses to suffer death rather than renounce the beliefs or tenets of a particular Christian denomination, sect, etc.‖ The OED also defines non-Christian martyrdom as the following, ―a person who undergoes death or great suffering for a faith, belief, or cause, or (usu. with to; also with of, for) through devotion to some object.‖ These definitions were common in the nineteenth century. Accessed 19 April 2009. The traditional definition of martyrdom is expanded in Jean Porter, ―Mere History: The Place of Historical Studies in Theological Ethics‖ in The Journal of Religious Ethics volume 25, number 3 (25th anniversary supplement), 1997: 103-126.

Eliot‘s play built on the example of Alfred, Lord Tennyson‘s play Becket, which was published in November 1884, only two months before Gordon died.38 As Tennyson was the Poet Laureate of Britain, his play was well read and the idea of Becket‘s sacrifice was present in the public consciousness when Gordon was killed. While the situations that led to each man‘s martyrdom were quite different, what they had in common was their respective decisions to follow what they believed to be God‘s will rather than that of their corporeal masters: Gladstone and his government in the case of Gordon, and Henry II in the case of Becket.39 Both men were also the subject of long-running cults that resulted from their martyrdoms. These cults were different in nature; nevertheless, each served to illustrate national feelings regarding the circumstances of its hero‘s death and the government‘s direct involvement in it.40 One of the places where Gordon‘s death was widely felt was in Egypt‘s large Anglo- Egyptian community. As he had served in Africa for many years, including under the auspices of the Khedive, he was personally acquainted with many prominent and average Egyptian citizens. The man whom he knew best—and the one who in some ways sealed his fate—was Sir Evelyn Baring, who at the time was the highest ranking British official in Egypt. As discussed previously, Baring disagreed with the government about the character of Gordon‘s mission to evacuate Sudan and over whether or not Gordon was to report directly to him. He was also involved in the discussions about the relief expedition and in its failures. Baring himself, writing about the time period in his later years, acknowledged the role he played in both events. His defense of his actions began with a discussion of whether Gordon should have been sent to Sudan in the first place and concluded with an indictment against Gladstone and his cabinet for acceding to the will of the press and the public and making the mistake of sending Gordon to the region.41 Baring‘s reaction to Gordon‘s return was not necessarily a personal slight; he rather felt that sending in Gordon, ―one who had attracted to himself a greater degree of public sympathy

38 Gerald B. Kauver and Gerald C. Sorenson, eds., Nineteenth Century English Verse Drama (Rutherford: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 1973), 256. The full connection between Tennyson and Gordon will be explored in the next chapter. 39 Ruth M. Roth‘s article contains a discussion comparing the martyrdom of Beckett, as portrayed in Eliot‘s play. However, her more modern comparative is with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Ruth M. Roth, ―Martyrdom‖ The English Journal volume 57, number 8, November 1968. 40 Becket‘s cult, and his resulting elevation to sainthood are discussed in detail in Frank Barlow, Thomas Becket (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 267-268. The idea of cults is also addressed in Anne J. Duggan‘s collection of articles, Thomas Becket: Friends, Networks, Texts and Cults (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007). The third section is devoted entirely to reprinted articles concerning the formation of Becket‘s cult all throughout Europe. 41 The Earl of Cromer, Modern Egypt: Two Volumes in One (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1908); the pages are from the 1916 reprint: vol. I, 427-429.

50 than almost any Englishman of modern times,‖ would only complicate a delicate situation.42 This complication, which proved to be rather prophetic on the part of Baring, was intensified by the failure of the relief expedition. Professionally, Baring did not agree with the decision to send the general back to Africa. Gordon, who was already considered a hero and called a ―national treasure‖ in the House of Lords‘ speeches which lauded the decision to send him to Khartoum, was, according to Baring, not the best person to send there; he did not want to send any British officials at all to Sudan.43 Personally, Baring‘s reaction to Gordon‘s death was one of shock, echoing a common trope found throughout most personal correspondence during the period. Even writing nearly twenty years after the event, in the unpublished drafts of his memoirs, Baring clearly demonstrated the impact that Gordon‘s death had on him and his country. As he wrote in his draft, ―well do I remember the blank feeling of grief and disappointment with which I received the news of his death, and then now at this distance of time I cannot pen the record of those last few sad days at Khartoum without emotion.‖44 Baring had fought to prevent Gordon‘s appointment; nevertheless, he was still very affected by his actual death. He was not the only person who personally knew Gordon to express the same level of shock and dismay upon hearing about his death. Another man who knew both Baring and Gordon well and even considered Gordon to be one of his close friends was the leader of the failed relief effort, Lord Wolseley. Wolseley, who had been instrumental in first sending Gordon to Khartoum in 1884—it was his pocket watch and loose change that Gordon received on the railroad platform—was also devastated by the death of his friend, especially because it was his expedition that arrived too late. As the leader of the expedition, Wolseley did receive a share of the blame that was placed on the government following the confirmation of Gordon‘s death. Through no direct fault of his own, his expedition did fail, finalizing Gordon‘s abandonment. Wolseley himself acknowledged this failure in the letters that he wrote home to his wife. In these letters, he was willing to express his feelings on Gordon and on Gladstone, and his strong sense of personal guilt is also quite clear. Like Baring, Wolseley blamed Gladstone for the expedition‘s failure and his friend‘s death. However, unlike Baring, he did not choose to accuse Gladstone in print. Instead, he had

42 Ibid., 428. 43 Ibid., 428. Cromer quotes the words from a speech by Lord Cairns on February 14, 1884. 44 National Archives, Cromer Papers, FO 633/86 ff 632-633.

51 some sympathy for Gladstone‘s position, which he showed when he wrote to his wife before Gordon‘s death had been confirmed as an absolute certainty: ―I should think this blow will kill poor old Gladstone. He alone is to blame. Had he been a statesman, this misfortune could never have fallen upon us: but he is neither.‖ In the same letter, Wolseley also included his belief that Gordon was willing to die for his mission to Sudan and would be happy with the circumstances of his death, as he always looked forward to it.45 However, although Wolseley acknowledged that he was unable to change the circumstances that led to Gordon‘s death, he did worry over the reception that would greet him when he returned to London and whether the public blamed him for Gordon‘s death. In a later letter, he expressed this fear, although his wife had already told him that, ―you have them [i.e. the public‘s support] with you,‖ in regards to the fate of the expedition.46 He was not specifically to blame. Wolseley only joined the expedition because of Gordon, and the personal relationship that the two men had: ―as you know I have never liked this desert venture and only embarked on it because I thought I might by my rashness save Gordon, a hero for whom I had the deepest reverence.‖47 He did not save Gordon, but it was not for a lack of trying. Although Wolseley was the leader of the relief expedition, he was not the only member who felt a distinct sense of loss at the news of Gordon‘s death. Horatio Kitchener, then a major on the expedition and the writer tasked with the official report of Gordon‘s death, indicated his personal feelings of grief. In the Blue Book on the situation in Khartoum, Kitchener wrote, ―The memorable siege of Khartoum lasted 317 days, and it is not too much to say that such a noble resistance was due to the indomitable resolution and resource of one Englishman. Never was a garrison so nearly rescued, never was a commander so sincerely lamented.‖48 Kitchener was the only person whose grief became a part of the official record of the incident, but he was not the only man who served on the relief expedition to express his sorrow. Other expressions mostly followed in the same pattern, with all members first expressing disbelief that the man they had

45 Letter from Lord Wolseley to Lady Wolseley, February 4, 1885. Hove Library, Wolseley Papers, W/P 14/3, i. Regarding Gordon‘s feelings on death, Wolseley wrote the following: ―. Poor Gordon! For his sake I sincerely hope he is dead. Death was always looked forward to by him in the beginning of life—one of my family‘s mottoes ‗MORS MIHI VITA EST‘! [death is life to me]‖ 46 Letter from Lord Wolseley to Lady Wolseley, February 22, 1885, Hove Library, Wolseley Papers, W/P 14/5, i-ii. Letter from Lady Wolseley to Lord Wolseley, February 20, 1885, Hove Library, Lady Wolseley Papers, LW/P 11/8, iv. 47 Lord Wolseley to Lady Wolseley, February 22, 1885, iv. 48 British Library, Add. Ms. 34479, ff 133. Kitchener‘s report can be found at the back of the sixth volume of the journals.

52 come to rescue was dead, and then continuing by mourning his passing. As one letter from an anonymous writer stated, ―if the news is true [of Gordon‘s death] it is sad, sad, news.‖49 A further example shows just how important Gordon was to the average soldier. In his weekly letter home sent from Korti, John ―Jack‖ Dalison made specific mention of the fact that Gordon was presumed dead: ―if anything happens to poor Gordon, the heart will go out of the Expedition, but we will revenge ourselves for his life before we leave the country.‖50 The idea of revenge was certainly not confined to this one letter; in later discussions of the expedition‘s future, avenging Gordon by defeating the Mahdi emerged as the new goal once the death was confirmed. Obviously, many other letters were written home from soldiers of all ranks who served on the expedition; highlighting the thoughts of the man in charge (Wolseley), a high ranking officer (Kitchener), and an ordinary soldier (Dalison), shows the overall impact of Gordon‘s death. Reactions to the news from Sudan did not just take the form of correspondence. The general‘s death was felt all throughout the British Empire, from London to her colonies, including Canada and Australia. Both of these dominions sent more troops to join the expedition once they heard about it. In some ways, the death of Gordon and the failure of the expedition‘s original goal motivated participation in the expedition‘s new goal: to continue, as the late general had put it, to ―smash the Mahdi.‖ The contributions of the Canadian Voyageurs were particularly important to the expedition‘s new goals. As an article in the Ottawa Free Press explains, Wolseley addressed the Voyageurs at the end of their contribution to the mission and extolled the ―great skill and courage [they] manifested in making the ascent and descent of the treacherous current and felt that but for the experience and assistance of [them] the expedition would not have reached [Berber].‖51 Even if the Voyageurs‘ assistance in Sudan was unable to save Gordon, their contributions were clearly important to continued British involvement in the region. However, they were not the only imperial force who played a vital role in the expedition. Joining the Canadian Voyageurs in Sudan was a regiment from Australia. Many prominent Australians, including retired military officials, advocated sending an Australian

49 Sudan Archives Durham, Durham University Library, Sir William Goodenough collection, Letter from February 1, 1885, 73/2/35. 50 SAD, Rotach Collection, Letter from 8 February 1885, 866/6/1. 51 ―Soldier Suffering in Sudan: How Stewart Was Betrayed…,‖ Ottawa Free Press, April 25, 1885, reprinted in Stacey 202-203.

53 presence to Sudan, following the Canadian example. One official, Sir Edward Strickland, wrote an editorial in the Sunday Morning Herald of February 12 calling for the new force both for the glory of Australia and in memory of the ―gallant Christian hero,‖ Gordon. He believed that ―every Christian-born subject…has lost a friend in Gordon; therefore all Christendom [would] ring with praises of the gallantry of Australia in not losing a moment in tendering aid.‖52 Strickland‘s suggestion was quickly followed, and by the end of February, an Australian force was headed to Sudan as described in Ralph Sutton‘s work on the subject. In Sudan, the expedition continued until the already-discussed international developments forced the end of it in May 1885. This end, which was marked by one final transmission from Wolseley, had a mixed result at best. The Mahdi had not been smashed. The British withdrew to save face, and Wolseley‘s previous reputation for military excellence was diminished. His final dispatch also highlighted the hard work of the men who participated in his expedition and the fact that the failure was not their fault. As the concluding lines of his telegram state, ―No one can regret more than I do the fall of that place, but in common with all my countrymen I look back with pride to the gallant struggle made by our troops to save Khartum and its heroic defender.‖53 Like Kitchener, Wolseley was also able to express his personal feelings in the official report of the expedition—and thus, was able to salute his troops as well as express his own discomfort with the way his mission was ended. If Gordon had not been a well-known citizen of the British Empire, discussions about the expedition would have probably ended with the Wolseley dispatch quoted above, but he was not an average man. In London, his death was greeted with an outpouring of grief in all levels of society. Furthermore, it was a contentious issue in Parliament and even in Gladstone‘s own cabinet. Although Gordon‘s death did not directly bring down the government, it can be credited with turning the public opinion away from the Liberal Party in general and Gladstone in particular. The long shadow of Gordon‘s death would still be present in imperial decisions until the end of Britain‘s involvement in Sudan, which did not occur until almost a century later. He would be invoked by those who supported continued imperial expansion; however, his death would also be used by those who wished to curtail the empire. In discussions of the final

52 The editorial is excerpted in Ralph Sutton, 39. 53 Colville, part II, 231.

54 withdrawal, Gordon‘s sacrifice is referenced, nearly sixty years after the original events occurred.54 Regardless of the reasons why Gordon was not rescued in time, disbelief followed by grief was the dominant emotion among members of the British government. Even Gladstone, whose actions had directly led to delays in the expedition reaching Gordon, was dismayed to hear that he had died. Some members of the government were more vocal about the death than others; some took more accountability for their actions than others; but all felt the need to acknowledge Gordon‘s passing. Like her ministers, the Queen was very distraught over Gordon‘s passing. Her attitude towards Gordon, a man whom she would later commemorate by having his bible occupy a place of honor in her home, comes through in the letter that she wrote to various members of the government about his all-too-preventable death.55 To show this anger publicly, the Queen took the extraordinary step of telegraphing both her Prime Minister and Secretary of War en clair. By sending her feelings on the matter in a non-ciphered telegram, the Queen basically announced to anyone who was reading the telegrams, including members of the press, that she blamed the government and was displeased with how her ministers had handled the crisis.56 This displeasure is also seen in the Queen‘s other correspondence. Her letter to Spencer Cavendish, the Marquess of Hartington and the Secretary of State for War, is only one example of her feelings about the conditions that led to the fall of Khartoum: ―to think that all this might have been prevented & many precious lives saved by earlier action is too fearful.‖57 This letter to Hartington is only one example of Victoria‘s grief, anger, and dismay, but she did not excoriate Gladstone for his role in the crisis. Her more vitriolic comments were reserved for the eyes of her Private Secretary, Sir Henry Ponsonby, with whom she had reams of daily correspondence. In these notes, Victoria did not temper her anger against the Prime Minister whom she only grudgingly accepted, nor did she shy away from placing all of the blame for the situation on Gladstone and his government. To Ponsonby she wrote, ―Mr. Gladstone and the Government have—the Queen feels it dreadfully—

54 Gordon‘s role in these discussions will be discussed in the concluding chapters. 55 Gordon‘s sister Augusta sent the Queen her brother‘s bible as an acknowledgement of the Queen‘s condolence note and kind words about Gordon. See Giles St. Aubyn, Queen Victoria: A Portrait (New York: Atheneum, 1992), 456. The queen‘s letter to the Gordon‘s is reprinted in Barbara Harlow and Mia Carter, editors Archives of Empire, Volume II: The Scramble for Africa (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 579. 56 Gladstone‘s reply to the Queen following the telegram can be found in Philip Guedalla, The Queen and Mr. Gladstone (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1934), 638-639. 57 National Archives, War Office 32/6121, Letter from Victoria to Hartington, February 5, 1885.

Gordon‘s innocent, noble, heroic blood on their consciences. No one who reflects on how he was sent out, how he was refused, can deny it! It is awful!‖58 Like most of her subjects, their Queen blamed the government for Gordon‘s abandonment; unlike most of her subjects, however, she was able to reach out directly to the government and demand accountability regarding its actions. She did so in a direct note to Gladstone the day after the news of Khartoum‘s fall reached London. In this note, Victoria outlined the two courses of action that the government must take. Logically, the first was to ascertain if Gordon was alive or dead. The second contained a barely-veiled reference to Gladstone‘s indecision regarding the relief expedition: ―the Cabinet will promptly agree to a bold and decided course. Hesitation and half measures would be disastrous.‖59 From these selections, it is evident that the Queen was personally affected by Gordon‘s death. It is also clear that she was not willing to believe that his death was merely a result of a bad policy action. As her letter of condolence to the Gordon family stated, the Queen keenly felt Gordon‘s death, a death that she felt left a permanent ―stain upon England.‖60 The Queen‘s feelings on Gordon are reflected in her desire to memorialize Gordon in her personal journals, where she was able to express her unedited anger about the situation. In her personal journal she wrote about the government and Gladstone, using much stronger language than she did in the letters discussed above. Instead, in her own private musings, the Queen reflected, ―The Government alone is to blame, by refusing to send the expedition till it was too late.‖61 This note is the only occurrence in her journals where she specifically blamed and vilified the government for its inaction. The Queen also wrote about wanting to have a bust of Gordon made and even directed one of her secretaries to send a letter to Gordon‘s sister, requesting a photograph to give to a sculptor to make a marble representation of the departed general for her personal collection.62 The man at whom most of Victoria‘s anger was directed, Gladstone, also had his own feelings of grief relating to the failure of the relief expedition. Although his actions have been blamed for its eventual failure, Gladstone himself was less willing to take the direct blame for

58 Letter from Victoria to Ponsonby, February 17, 1885 in Christopher Hibbert, ed. Queen Victoria in Her Letters and Journals (New York: Viking, 1985), 290. 59 Letter from Victoria to Gladstone, February 6, 1885 in Ibid., 289-290. 60 Aubyn, 456. 61 Victoria‘s Journal entry from February 5, 1885 in Hibbert, 289. 62 British Library Additional Ms. 51299, ff. 155-157.

Gordon‘s abandonment. In his letter of condolence to the Gordon family, Gladstone attempted to acquit himself while still apologizing for the situation. Instead of acknowledging the circumstances, the Prime Minster, after spending several lines praising Gordon‘s qualities—such as his enthusiasm, military skill, and even his ―inexhaustible strength of will‖—then concludes by almost blaming Gordon, the man he had called a ―hero‖ earlier in the same letter. As Gladstone wrote to the bereaved family, ―…yet I reflect with pain now that the catastrophe has come, how ill his generous confidence was requited by some of those for whose welfare, though they were of a foreign race, it was his desire to live or die.‖63 This frequent desire to die for the Sudanese people was one of the points that Gladstone in particular, and the government in general, was quick to use to justify their decision. The War Office and Cabinet‘s opinion of Gordon, already discussed, indicated that the official feeling on Gordon‘s choice to remain in Khartoum was that as it was his decision not to leave with the last steamers, the final result was at least partially his fault. The fact that the relief expedition did not reach him in time was really just a failure of planning and hence not a direct decision to abandon him to his fate. Following this line of argument, it is understandable that Gladstone, when the news about the fall of Khartoum reached London, still chose to attend a play that night. His journal entry for that night, February 10, does not mention Gordon. Instead, he merely commented on the play, ―The Candidate,‖ which Gladstone noted was ―capitally acted.‖64 At the time, he was vilified in the press for continuing to enjoy himself when the fate of Gordon was not yet known to the public. However, following the logic that the government was employing, Gladstone did not consider his actions to be inappropriate, especially as he was already aware that Gordon‘s death was almost a certainty because he had already stated as much in a letter to Hartington three days previously.65 Many other members of the government were dismayed about the death of Gordon. In the official memorandum of the government and in their personal papers, members of Gladstone‘s Cabinet, including Hartington and Lord Granville, the Foreign Secretary, expressed their sadness at the expedition‘s failure. Gordon‘s death was not anticipated. There were no contingency plans

63 British Library Add Ms 52400 ff. 155-156 [Henry William Gordon‘s copy] and Add Ms 51300 ff. 82-83 [Augusta Gordon‘s copy] Letter from Gladstone to the Gordon family, February 22,1885. 64 Gladstone‘s journal entry for 10 February 1885 in H.C.G Matthew, ed., The Gladstone Diaries with Cabinet Minutes and Prime Ministerial Correspondence volume xi July 1883-December 1886 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 293. Matthew also has a footnote recognizing the press coverage of Gladstone‘s decision to attend the play. 65 7 February 1885 Letter from Gladstone to Hartington, Matthew, ed., 292.

57 for what the government was going to do if he was killed in Sudan, nor was there a plan for how to replace Gordon at Khartoum. When the government was faced with having to solve these problems, the utter failure to take any of these details into account became known, leading many members of the government to turn further against Gladstone and his administration. Perhaps the most telling sign that not all members of the government agreed with Gladstone and his policies can be seen in the vote of no confidence that was proposed by Sir Henry Northcote, a Member of Parliament. The vote, ―Motion: Want of Confidence in the Government with relation to the policy in Egypt and the Soudan,‖ failed, but it was only defeated by fourteen votes.66 Gladstone‘s government did not fall over Gordon, but it came close. What Parliament was able to pass in acknowledgment of Gordon‘s sacrifice was the granting of an annuity to the Gordon family. As his earlier experiences in Egypt and Sudan proved, General Gordon was not the most skilled financial administrator. Unsurprisingly, given his hasty departure from London in January 1884, he did not leave his financial affairs in good order; in fact, some of his last letters to his brother, in his role as executor of Gordon‘s will, included instructions to pay people on his behalf.67 Members of Parliament who were aware of Gordon‘s habits wished to grant his family an annuity as a way of expressing their gratitude for his service and for his ultimate sacrifice. The first time an annuity was mentioned was at the end of February when the House of Commons voted in favor of it. By March, a grant of £20,000 had already been factored into the budget. The Gordon family received the money by royal warrant in August.68 The grant to the Gordon family was extremely large and unconventional. He was not the only general to die while serving the British in Sudan. Two years before Gordon died, another general, William Hicks, was also killed by the Mahdi‘s forces. Hicks did not receive any parliamentary recognition, nor was his family granted any special monetary recognition. The treatment of Hicks‘ family was in keeping with the customs of the British army at the time. Following the Cardwell reforms of 1869, the army did not make sufficient provisions for the

66 British Library Add Ms 56452, ff. 131. A February 27, 1885 note about the motion is found in Gladstone‘s supplemental papers 67 British Library Add Ms 52401 Henry Gordon Correspondence on Charles Gordon‘s death, ff. 119. Henry Gordon included the text of the will in a letter regarding the publishing of Gordon‘s diaries, Richard Garret, General Gordon (London: Arthur Barker, Ltd., 1974), 181. 68 British Library Add Ms. 52402 Henry Gordon Correspondence on Charles Gordon‘s death, ff. 129-131; 108. (1884-1885) House of Commons, Civil Services and Revenue Department. ―Further Supplementary Estimate : Grant to the Family of General Gordon, estimate of the amount required in the year ending 31st March 1885 for a grant to the family of the late General Charles George Gordon‖ 10 March 1885.

58 widows and orphans of its soldiers, nor did it grant an adequate amount of money to its former soldiers.69 Thus, Gordon‘s grant was unique. The circumstances of his death, combined with his notoriety, provided an opportunity to acknowledge all of his contributions, at the same time, it was also a perfect opportunity for the Queen and her government to express their sympathy with his dependents publicly. In the text of the supplemental budgetary assessment necessary to pay this large sum, the fact that the Queen had direct input into the bill was acknowledged: ―this sum will be paid to trustees…in such a manner as Her Majesty may direct.‖70 The grant was not the only way that the government recognized Gordon‘s service, but it was the first official response to his death. The Gladstone government never really recovered from the loss of Gordon in Sudan. Its failure to send an expedition to rescue him in a timely manner led to the common cry of ―too late!‖ and to Gladstone‘s new appellation as the man who murdered Gordon.71 However, the failure of the government to rescue Gordon cannot be placed solely on one man. The relief expedition faced many difficulties and delays; even if it had been launched earlier, it is still not certain that it would have reached Gordon in time. Wolseley, who escaped most of the blame for the failure, was also partly responsible, but Wolseley was not the leader of the Liberal Party and therefore escaped mostly unscathed.72 The fact that Gladstone was personally blamed for the death of Gordon not only indicates the politicization of it, but also showed the profound rift existing between the two political parties over matters of Imperial policy. Many men die heroic deaths; however, to create a martyr, it takes an organized movement invested in bringing about a particular agenda. Thus, Gordon‘s death transcended his activities during his life and he became a symbol. He stopped being seen as one man who was a bit of a maverick—a ―loose cannon‖ in the words of the War Office—and instead became the personification of the ills of the Liberal government.

69 Alan Ramsey Skelley, The Victorian Army at Home: The Recruitment and Terms and Conditions of the British Regular, 1859-1899 (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 216. 70 Supplementary Estimate 71 Although this will later be discussed in detail, Bernard Porter examines the transformation of Gordon in The Absent Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society and Culture in Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 166- 167. 72 Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 97.

CHAPTER 4 THE “GREAT HERO” MEMORIALIZED

Even though General Charles Gordon died in Khartoum, the place where his death had its largest significance was not Sudan, but London. The loss of an imperial figure and a man to whom leading members of government referred as a ―national treasure‖ was more than a political loss. People from all levels of society, from the nobility to the working class, were united in their grief and their wish to find a proper way to express it. Newspapers throughout the United Kingdom presented the public with the details of Gordon‘s final days, preserving his last hours for posterity. They also carried letters written by those who wanted to commemorate the general. A thorough examination of contemporary media helps to further an understanding of the full impact of Gordon‘s final mission and subsequent death. Some of their reporting veered towards using the event as a none-too-subtle way of undermining the Gladstone government and its policies. Regardless of the ulterior motives of the editors of these publications, Gordon‘s final year was clearly an event that received a significant amount of press coverage. Thus, with the level of press coverage, it is hardly surprising that the general public would become personally invested in the news from Sudan. One of the ways the people of Britain demonstrated their personal involvement was through the reams of correspondence sent to the Gordon family. The writers all felt a distinct urge to reach out to the Gordon family and mourn the general‘s passing. These letters were sent to the nominal head of the family, Charles‘ brother, Sir Henry Gordon, from all across the British Empire. They ranged from personal recollections by people who considered themselves friends of the general to simple sympathy notes from ones who did not know him but were inspired by the coverage in the press and the general knowledge of what transpired in Sudan. This public outcry helped to preserve the popularity of Gordon and his abandonment for a significant period of time; the death of Gordon was still a popular story in November 1885, nearly a year after the events had occurred.1

1 Both the Daily News and the Western Mail featured articles entitled ―Mr. Gladstone and the Death of General Gordon‖ in early November 1885. ―Mr. Gladstone and the Death of General Gordon,‖ Daily News 10 November 1885 and ―Mr. Gladstone and the Death of General Gordon,‖ Western Mail 11 November 1885. Although both articles had the same title, these were two distinct news items.

The most influential members of the public to acknowledge the loss of Gordon were the members of the aristocracy. Like the Queen, they too had at least a passing acquaintance with the general and thus had a personal drive to memorialize him. However, it is important to note that several members of the aristocracy and the royal family itself were noted supporters of the Conservative Party and its goals. Gladstone and the Liberal Party were, during this time period, advocating policies that threatened the upper classes, from the idea of Irish Home Rule to the Franchise Bill which extended the vote.2 As discussed in the previous chapter, Gordon‘s death and Gladstone were intertwined. Thus, by memorializing Gordon, these people were also able to demonize Gladstone. Hence, it was the interest of these groups—the people in the Empire with the most clout—that further spurred the continuing newspaper coverage of Gordon. Perhaps the most important was the poet laureate of Britain, Alfred, Lord Tennyson. Tennyson would be responsible for some of the best-known verses honoring Gordon, and due to a brief conversation he and Gordon had in 1883 would provide the lasting idea for the national memorial to him. Although Tennyson was not the only member of the aristocracy to honor Gordon, his contribution was probably the most vital. Certain individuals at all levels of British society wanted to honor the fallen general, not just the upper-most one. Their tributes may have received the most coverage because of who they were, but similar sentiments can be found in many tributes written by members of the British public who lacked their social standing. It is these letters, written by ―ordinary‖ people, church vicars, and school children that reveal the importance of Gordon. Furthermore, these letters reveal the depth of the press coverage of all events, as all of the correspondents referenced the same details in their tributes. As has already been shown, the press played a large role in sending Gordon to Sudan. Hence, it should not be surprising that the major drive to acknowledge Gordon‘s sacrifice came not from the government, but the press. It stands to follow that if the general had not sat for the interview with W.T. Stead at the beginning of January 1884, and thus had not allowed his feelings on the situation to become public knowledge, he may have had a much more anonymous death.3 Certainly, he would not have been sent back to Sudan, as that decision by the War Office was greatly influenced by the ensuing press fervor caused by the interview. Thus, in addition to Gladstone, Wolseley, and other members of the government, the contemporary media must also

2 Martin Pugh, The Tories and the People, 1880-1935 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 74-75. 3 W.T. Stead, ―Chinese Gordon on the Soudan,‖ Pall Mall Gazette 9 January 1884, accessed through the W.T. Stead Resource Site http://www.attackingthedevil.co.uk/pmg/time.php, 25 June 2009.

61 share some of the blame for Gordon‘s fate. The case of Gordon was not the only time that the popular press has been accused, by historian John Mackenzie, of exploiting the public‘s ―spectatorial fascination with colonial warfare‖ to its own benefit.4 After the initial coverage that accompanied Gordon back to Sudan, the press‘ treatment of his time in the country was occasional at best. His time at Khartoum did not become an important story again until the details of his abandonment and the government‘s continued indecision to send him any assistance became known. Gordon‘s fate became a newsworthy topic once more when Wolseley‘s relief mission was in its planning stages. The march to save Gordon took on, in the words of historian John O. Springfield, ―an almost crusade-like appearance to the British press.‖5 This crusading attitude only served to enhance the general‘s struggle further in the eyes of the British public. His survival thus took on another dimension—it became a national fascination. As Rudyard Kipling described in his novel, The Light that Failed, which was published six years later, ―it was above all things necessary that England at breakfast should be amused and thrilled and interested, whether Gordon lived or died.‖6 Writing after the events at Khartoum had unfolded, Kipling‘s somewhat satirical sentiment showed the level of interest that the public had in Gordon. His struggle was constantly on their minds, and checking to see if any news of the stranded man had arrived was a priority. The source that everyone would check was the morning newspapers. By the time Gordon‘s final saga began, the press was undergoing a transformation and embracing a new audience: the lower-middle and working classes. In his book, The Absent-Minded Imperialists, historian Bernard Porter claims that Gordon‘s mission, abandonment, and eventual death were the type of story that newer newspapers thrived upon. The ―Gordon affair‖ was exactly the form of sensation that this medium needed to increase its market share. By the end of the nineteenth century, as explained in Mackenzie‘s Propaganda and Empire, newspapers as varied as the Conservative-Party-supporting Daily Mail and the Liberal-leaning Reynold’s News were covering imperial events, including Queen Victoria‘s jubilee and several smaller imperial wars in

4 John Mackenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 6. 5 John O. Springfield, ―‗Up Guards and At Them!‘: British imperialism and popular art, 1880-1914,‖ in Imperialism and Popular Culture, ed. John Mackenzie, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), 56. 6 Rudyard Kipling, The Light that Failed (New York: R.F. Fenno & Co., 1899), 28. The novel was originally published in 1891.

Africa. However, this coverage would reach its peak with the ultimate sensational event of the time period: the Boer War.7 Gordon‘s death was only one sensationalistic imperial event during this time, but it was among the earliest to appeal to this new type of ―yellow journalism.‖8 If the press in general and W.T. Stead in particular, share the blame for the decision to send Gordon to his death, neither can be held culpable for a lack of commemoration once it occurred. Instead, the press was among the first to memorialize the fallen general. He was featured in large sections of the pages set aside for foreign news. For example, in the edition of the Times published the day after confirmed reports of Gordon‘s death reached London, an entire page was devoted to re-telling the story of his life and reminding the public of the figure that they had just lost.9 Instead of placing blame, the newspaper chose to commemorate Gordon‘s remarkable life. His exploits in Crimea, China, and his other foreign postings all served to illustrate his long record of service to the empire, thus reinforcing the idea that the general died while fulfilling his imperial duty. The idea that the press was at least partially responsible for Gordon‘s death is not one that was popular at the time. Although there was plenty of vitriol directed at the government, the same could not be said for the press. Even W.T. Stead, who was directly responsible for providing Gordon the opportunity to express his displeasure with the tactics used in Sudan before his re-involvement, was able to deflect any possible public ill-will with the pages of his newspaper. However, Stead‘s first telegrams sent to Gordon‘s family after his newspaper‘s correspondents had reported on the fall of Khartoum demonstrate a level of personal bereavement and grief. They also display that he himself felt guilty for Gordon‘s fate. Stead‘s original telegram, sent at 10:53 in the morning of February 5, was the first news that the Gordon family received about the fall of the city; he indicated that Khartoum had fallen, but that there was no news about Gordon.10 Approximately twenty minutes later, the Gordon family received a second telegram from Stead. This telegram did not contain any new information—but what it did contain was a warning to regard the first telegram as unofficial.11 Thirty minutes after the second telegram came a third one which introduced the idea of Gordon

7 Mackenzie, 6-7. 8 Bernard Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 170-171. 9 ―General Gordon,‖ Times (London) 12 January 1885. 10 British Library Add Ms 51300 Correspondence to Augusta Gordon regarding Gordon‘s death. 5 February 1885 telegram from W.T. Stead, ff. 64-65. 11 Ibid., 66.

63 being held as a prisoner.12 When taken together, these first three telegrams show the amount of confusion that was present in London as news was slowly received from Egypt and Sudan. Stead‘s fourth telegram of the day, sent in the late afternoon, only contributed to the sense of uncertainty. In his final telegram of that day, Stead cited what he claimed to be ―authentic news‖ from the Mahdi; unfortunately, his authentic news was that Gordon was still alive and wearing the uniform of the Mahdi‘s supporters.13 The news was false. By the next day, when Stead was able to pen an actual letter to the Gordon family, his tone had turned from one of hope to one of despair. In Stead‘s letter to Gordon‘s sister Augusta, he references a letter that he received from her regarding his 1884 articles and interview with Gordon. He then refers to them as ―perhaps the best [work he] shall ever be permitted to do.‖14 With this phrase, Stead accepts the responsibility for bringing Gordon into discussions on Sudan, and he accepts it with pride. He also introduces another element into discussions of Gordon‘s death, which at the time was still only a possibility, allowing Stead to use terminology such as ―if your brother is dead‖ and ―the thought of her loss‖ rather than definite terms. He was able to continue to hope that Gordon was not dead because of the lack of fast communication from Khartoum. Communication had been cut off completely from the city in November 1884. Wolseley‘s men needed to restore it before they could send the conflicting reports received at Khartoum regarding the general back to London. When the British troops took Khartoum, they did not know that Gordon was dead— there was only supposition until it was confirmed by the Mahdi two days later. Thus, when Stead was writing his letter, Gordon‘s fate still remained unknown. The hopeful tone contrasts with the editorial and articles that Stead would be forced to write in the days ahead as his hopes were unfortunately dashed. Although the first news from Sudan was received, as the above telegrams demonstrate, in London on February 5, Gordon‘s death was not confirmed until days later. On February 10, Stead was no longer able to believe the ―authentic news‖ from his earlier telegram—Gordon‘s death had been confirmed. The next day‘s Pall Mall Gazette featured several articles about Gordon. Some were laudatory while others indicted the government or outlined the actual events

12 Ibid., 67. 13 Ibid., 68. 14 Ibid., 6 February letter from Stead, 69.

64 as they were known.15 Stead‘s ―In Memoriam‖ served as a eulogy; in this laudatory article, Stead was not above using his piece to justify sending Gordon to Sudan and even to use his death as an example of patriotic faith. The section of his ―In Memoriam‖ that is devoted to this aim begins with the idea that Khartoum was evacuated by massacre—a subtle way of reminding his readers that Gordon was originally sent to the region to evacuate the city—and then continues with the idea that the general was now confirmed to be dead. Only after laying out the exact circumstances of Gordon‘s death and calling him a martyr does Stead continue with the following statements: Even with that terrible telegram of massacre and treachery before their eyes there is not one of his friends who for a moment regrets that General GORDON was sent to the Soudan [sic] to suffer and die in the defence of Khartoum. Looking back over the whole of the dark, confused welter of bloodshed and blunder that filled last year, the mission of General GORDON stands out distinct and clear as the one great achievement of England for which everyone has indeed good cause to thank GOD and take courage. 16

These comments indicate the depth of feeling present in London about Gordon‘s death. They also show that Stead believed Gordon‘s death was to be in service of a higher cause, hence his discussion of Gordon as a martyr. Interestingly, once he finished his discussion of Gordon and the circumstances leading to ―that stainless life now crowned with the aureole of martyrdom,‖ Stead focused more on the ideas of the second sentence quoted above, or Gordon‘s similarities to other people who achieved greatness for England: Kings Arthur and Alfred and Oliver Cromwell.17 The ―In Memoriam‖ piece also served to set the tone for the rest of the day‘s coverage of Gordon. Two other articles from the same edition were not presented as editorials; instead, they were news items. The first, ―Let Us Cut and Run‖ was an indictment against the government consisting of reprinted speeches given by members of Parliament who opposed the government‘s decision not to ―smash the Mahdi.‖ Stead chose to publish these speeches in full to indicate his agreement with the speakers and to show his disagreement with the government. The other article, ―The Death of General Gordon‖ is similarly factual. These articles were solely to inform

15 These three articles are only a sampling of the Pall Mall Gazette‘s focus on the death of Gordon in the February 11, 1885 issue. W.T. Stead, ―In Memoriam,‖ ―Let Us Cut and Run,‖ and ―The Death of General Gordon,‖ Pall Mall Gazette 11 February 1885. 16 W.T. Stead, ―In Memoriam,‖ Pall Mall Gazette 11 February 1885. 17 Ibid. The figures mentioned above are discussed in the article as examples of England‘s greatness.

65 the public about the events and the speeches, or in other words, to show the less emotional side of the debate. Professor Laurel Brake discusses this aspect of press coverage in her article ―Government by Journalism and the Silence of the Star: Victorian Encounters, 1885-90.‖18 In it, she analyzes W.T. Stead‘s use of his newspaper as a way of influencing public perceptions, such as his decision to feature Gordon‘s 1884 interview on Sudan on the front page. By doing so, Brake argues, Stead was contradicting the role that journalism played at the time and instead was creating a more active form of ―higher journalism.‖ This form of journalism would become predominant, partially as a result of the way in which government decisions were covered. Imperial issues were not the only ones that Stead advocated in the pages of his newspaper. Brake focuses more of her attention on domestic ones, such as Stead‘s series of articles ―The Maiden Tribute of Modern Babylon‖ which exposed child prostitution in London. As a result of his articles, the government passed a law that, among other provisions, raised the age of consent for girls from 13 to 16, which indicates the impact that Stead‘s series had on the public. The predominance of this form of journalism was further proven by the ―Cleveland Street scandal‖ which was created to test the law referenced above.19 Thus, it followed that a government decision, like that of the Gladstone government concerning Gordon at Khartoum, which did not have a positive outcome, was a clear instance where this new and more investigative journalism would be vital to the public‘s understanding of a situation. The death of Gordon was a major press event. It received multiple pages of coverage in all the daily newspapers. Some focused on his remarkable life, others on the known circumstances of his death, and some even chose to include what policy towards Sudan would be like given how he died. Much attention has been paid to the news stories directly following the report of his death and on his obituaries. In fact, most early biographies and all the later biographies of Gordon include the details of these papers in their final pages.20 However, the

18 Laurel Brake, ―Government by Journalism and the Silence of the Star: Victorian Encounters, 1885-1890‖ in Encounters in the Victorian Press: Editors, Authors, Readers eds. Laurel Brake and Julie F. Codell, (New York: Palgrave, 2005). 19 Ibid., 213-218 Brake‘s argument centers around domestic events which occurred in 1885 (i.e. ―The Maiden Tribute of Modern Babylon,‖ but there are striking similarities to Stead‘s actions over sending Gordon to Sudan. ―The Maiden Tribute‖ and ―Cleveland Street scandal‖ were both related to different provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act. Cleveland street focused on another aspect than the girls, instead it regarded male homosexuals and proved the extent of this journalistic advocacy. 20 For a complete discussion on the merits of Gordon‘s biographies and biographers, see the introduction.

Gordon story did not die in the press with the final report of his death. For the next ten months, Gordon‘s final days remained a significant news story. Although the Pall Mall Gazette was an important newspaper to the story of Gordon because of Stead‘s original interview, it was not the only one to keep his story alive. Newspapers all over the United Kingdom, from the major city papers in London, Manchester, Cardiff, Leeds, and Glasgow to more regional papers like those in Ipswitch, Bristol, and Derby all focused on Gordon. He was mentioned in multiple contexts over this time period, too. Only days after his death was confirmed, the political ramifications of it were already being discussed. One of the first publications to do so was the liberal-leaning Reynold’s Newspaper. The article which ran in the newspaper included a comparison between Gladstone and Lord Palmerston. Almost thirty years before, Palmerston had been forced to call for new elections following a situation in China that had some parallels to the one that resulted in Gordon‘s death. In 1857, the Chinese had seized a ship flying the British flag and the British government resorted to force to end the conflict.21 Like Gladstone‘s indecision regarding a relief expedition, Palmerston‘s decision to use force was unpopular. However, in China, the situation only involved the loss of prestige and not life—especially not the life of a man regarded as a national hero. The difficulties faced by Palmerston that led to his decision were included in the article, which set out its objectives in its title: ―The political side of Khartoum.‖ Unlike the Pall Mall Gazette, Reynold’s Newspaper advocated for no further involvement in Khartoum. Its editors were more focused on how the problems in Sudan could be used by those who disagreed with Gladstone to move for another election, even noting that the movement which led Palmerston to call for early elections had been begun by a member of his own party. They also believed that the British government should be more focused on problems existing within its borders, such as the Franchise Bill and Irish Home Rule, and should not have gotten involved in Egypt, and by extension in Sudan, in the first place.22 As the article indicated, there was clearly a distinct possibility that Gordon‘s death would be used to force an election and possible change of government. By the end of February, it seemed that their prediction would come true. Gordon‘s death was featured in the discussions

21 Palmerston was forced to call a new general election in 1857 after he lost a vote of censure in Parliament over his handling of a crisis in China. In the resulting election, Palmerston had a large victory and his status as Prime Minister was reaffirmed. For further details on the 1857 election including its causes and impacts, see E.D. Steele, Palmerston and Liberalism, 1855-1865 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 57-58. 22 ―The Political Side of Khartoum,‖ Reynold’s Newspaper 15 February 1885.

67 over Conservative Member of Parliament Sir Stafford Northcote‘s vote of censure against the government. This vote, which has already been discussed, occurred less than a month after Gordon‘s death was confirmed, and thus it was only natural for the press at least to mention him in their coverage of the events leading to the vote.23 Following the vote of censure (which Gladstone survived) and with the exception of one day‘s worth of press coverage that his funeral services and national day of mourning received in early March, the news coverage devoted to Gordon slowed but did not disappear. The next time he was used as a political instrument was in the coverage of Gladstone‘s decision to call new elections in June; following those elections, which led to a change in government, he would be used again in political discussions in the general elections in October of that same year.24 Newspapers were not the only type of medium that covered Gordon‘s death. The publication of pamphlets, especially political tracts, also flourished in the months following his death. One of the most vitriolic of these pamphlets was entitled ―The Egyptian Red Book.‖25 Designed by its authors, anti-Gladstonians George Stronach and George R. Hackett, to serve as an indictment of his government, the pamphlet was a satirical take on the government‘s traditional Blue Books. This ―Red Book‖ even included extracts from the official Blue Books on one page and on the facing page, famous quotations and purpose-drawn cartoons that directly contradicted the official language. For example, on the page entitled ―The Salvation (?) Army,‖ the illustration is of Gladstone and other cabinet members dressed as members of a marching band. Each man has a badge on his chest which reads ―Too late.‖ At the top of the page, the authors have included a quote from the first act of Shakespeare‘s Henry VI: ―‗What noise is this? What traitors have we here?‘‖26 By placing this quote over the cartoon just described, the authors of the ―Egyptian Red Book‖ were able to accuse the government of its betrayal without actually making a direct accusation.

23 ―The Vote of Censure,‖ Daily News 24 February 1885. 24 Examples of the type of coverage and usage of Gordon can be found in: ―The Parliamentary Election,‖ Ipswich Journal 2 June 1885 and ―Reported Settlement of the Political Crisis,‖ 23 June 1885; and for the general election: ―General Gordon and the Liberal Defeat,‖ 8 October 1885. 25 ―The Egyptian Red Book‖ illustrated and published by William Blackwood & sons, Edinburgh and London, 1885. Found in British Library Add Ms. 51302 Correspondence to M.A. Gordon on Gordon‘s death. The pamphlet is included in full and runs ff. 76-92. Stronach was a noted Shakespearean scholar, so perhaps that explains why there are several Shakespearean quotes. The two men would also collaborate on the ―The Irish Green Book‖ which satirizes Gladstone and his policies as well. 26 Ibid., 80.

Pamphlets such as the ―Red Book‖ transcended the realm of just delivering news and opinions. With their clever satirical writings, these pamphlets almost crossed over into a form of entertainment. Although they did serve as an indictment against the sitting government, they were also quite funny; their readers would be able to have a laugh while still being able to condemn governmental policies. Nonetheless, pamphlets such as these are not quite traditional satire, as had been seen in the novels of authors like Jonathan Swift. Instead, they are more similar to the work of William Hogarth, where the illustration provides the main argument. As Frank Palmeri argues, these pamphlets are a more modern invention, a type of ―hybrid‖ satire that combines the written word with illustrations.27 As the editorials, newspapers, and pamphlets show, Gordon‘s death was easily manipulated by the media to support a variety of political agendas. In the examples cited above, both liberal and conservative publications capitalized on the events. However, Gordon‘s death was also a cultural phenomenon. Gordon‘s name can be found not only in the news pages, but also in the advertisements, where full color portraits of him were on sale, and in the arts and entertainment pages.28 His death had such a large reach that it was even mentioned in Glasgow Herald‘s ―Music and the Drama‖ section. Writing just days after it occurred, the reviewer of the ―Valentine‖ concert at the Royal Albert Hall in London makes special mention of a tribute to Gordon that was played, writing that the only notable feature of the concert was ―the reception by the audience of the Dead March in ‗Saul,‘ which, with questionable taste, was played in memory of General Gordon. There were cries from the gallery of ‗Too soon.‘‖29 This particular decision to honor the general may have been a bit too soon in the feelings of the reviewer, but nonetheless, his death was being treated as a national event by the British people. Another indication of the esteem in which Gordon was held can be found by the amount of attention a simple letter to the poet laureate, Alfred, Lord Tennyson, received. The letter was from another poet, the American Quaker John Greenleaf Whittier who had been asked to write a commemorative poem about Gordon. Whittier chose not to pen the lines himself, but instead sent

27 Frank Palmeri, ―Cruikshank, Thackery, and the Victorian eclipse of satire,‖ Studies in English Literature, 1500- 1900, volume 44 number 4 (Autumn 2004): 772. 28 There are hundreds of advertisements selling ephemera connected to Gordon. For illustrative purposes, see the advertising pages of The Penny Illustrated Paper and Illustrated Times 7 March 1885, p. 154. 29 ―Music and the Drama,‖ Glasgow Herald 16 February 1885.

69 a letter to Tennyson recommending that he write the commemoration instead.30 Tennyson responded by writing the famous lines that can be found on Gordon‘s cenotaph at Westminster Abbey: Warrior of God, man‘s friend, not here below, But somewhere dead far in the waste Soudan; Thou livest in all hearts, for all men know This earth hath borne no simpler, nobler man.31

The fact that Tennyson penned these lines is not much of a surprise. Gordon was a long-time fan of the poet, even asking Lady Cardwell, who knew both men, to send him a small volume of Tennyson‘s work during his first stint as Governor-General of Sudan. In the letter he wrote thanking her for finding a small enough volume, the general makes special mention of the fact that, ―reading Tennyson was [his] great relief.‖32 Following Gordon‘s return from his first time in Africa, Tennyson and Gordon became personally acquainted; the general even attended a luncheon at the poet‘s home in 1883. At this luncheon, a conversation between the two men, later recorded by Tennyson‘s son, Hallam, took place. In his two-volume memoir of his father, Hallam included what he claimed was the exact wording of a request by the general. He wrote that Gordon approached his father and said ―in a solemn voice: ‗Mr. Tennyson, I want you to do something for our young soldiers. You alone are the man who can do it. We want training homes for them all over England.‘‖33 Although it is likely that Hallam, who served as his father‘s factotum, may have embellished the actual words, the sentiment behind them is accurate. Once word of Gordon‘s death reached Tennyson, he not only penned the verse above but also remembered the conversation that he had with Gordon about the possibility of army camps. While Tennyson‘s words which adorn the cenotaph that honors Gordon are still present, it is the second impulse that the poet had once he was informed of Gordon‘s demise that has had longer- lasting repercussions. When the Queen and other prominent Britons were trying to decide the shape of the national memorial to Gordon, Tennyson suggested, according to his biographers,

30 A full discussion on the reasons why Whittier chose not to write his own lines at the time can be found in John C. Helper, ―‗Gordon‘—A New Whittier Poem,‖ The New England Quarterly volume 34, number 1 (March 1961): 93- 95. 31 The poem has been widely published. It can be found in Tennyson‘s collected works among other places, but for the purposes of this discussion, the version occurred in the letter Tennyson sent in reply to Whittier which was published in several newspapers including The Graphic. ―Scraps,‖ The Graphic (London) 9 May 1885. 32 9 April 1878 Letter from Lady Cardwell to Alfred Tennyson published in Hallam Tennyson, Alfred Lord Tennyson: A Memoir by his son, Volume II (London: Macmillan & Co., 1897), 225. 33 Ibid., 224.

70 that it should be a boys‘ home, in the same vein as the homes that the general had suggested he create two years earlier.34 The actual process of creating the homes will be discussed in the following chapter, but Tennyson‘s input—when combined with the lines he wrote—helped to keep Gordon in the public consciousness. Tennyson believed that this memorial to the man he called ―our great simple soldier hero‖ would be a fitting way to remember all of the facets of Gordon‘s character.35 Gordon‘s character, and the circumstances surrounding his death which led to many of his contemporaries characterizing him as a martyr, also had a particular resonance with Tennyson. In 1879 he had written a play that was devoted to England‘s most well-known martyr, Thomas à Becket. In his play, which was discussed in the preceding chapter, Tennyson depicted Becket as ―a really great and impulsive man, with a firm sense of duty;‖ this description can certainly also be applied to Gordon, whose impulsiveness and sense of duty were a matter of public record.36 In proposing the Gordon Boys‘ Home to be the national memorial, Tennyson especially wanted to honor that sense of duty present in both men, but especially within his late acquaintance. As Tennyson was both the poet laureate and a peer of the realm by the time of Gordon‘s death, his interest in a national memorial to the general was a matter of public record. Newspapers quickly discovered the story of Gordon lunching at the Tennyson home and discussion of the boys‘ home idea and reports mentioned Hallam telling the story he printed in his memoir of his father.37 Although the Gordon Boys‘ Home was to be the national memorial to Gordon, its construction was not the only way that members of the aristocracy, who felt a kinship with Gordon, were able to memorialize their fallen comrade. Even before the first stones were laid for the new building, another type of memorial was being put together. This memorial was in the form of a beautifully bound and illuminated book of condolences given to General Gordon‘s sisters by the wives of several of the most powerful men in Britain. As they wrote at the beginning of their book, these women saw themselves as representatives of all women in the United Kingdom, and they themselves were ―the Princesses of Great Britain and Ireland, the Peeresses of the Realm, and the Wives of Bishops and Members

34 Hallam Tennyson‘s two volume memoir of his father was followed by Charles Tennyson, the poet‘s grandson‘s , treatment on the same subject. Charles Tennyson, Alfred Tennyson (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1949). 35 Princess Louise‘s copy of a 10 July 1885 letter from Tennyson to Queen Victoria, printed in Hope Dyson and Charles Tennyson, ed. Dear and Honoured Lady: The Correspondence between Queen Victoria and Alfred Tennyson (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1969), 119. 36 Hallam Tennyson, 193. 37 The Gordon Boys‘ Camp in ―This Evening‘s News,‖ Pall Mall Gazette 15 May 1885.

71 of the House of Commons.‖38 The book itself was about forty-five pages long, and forty of those pages were filled with signature cards from some of the most well-known women in Britain, ranging from the Princess of Wales, who was the first signature, to Florence Nightingale, the last. The aim of the book was simple. The women wanted to express their sympathy with Gordon‘s family and honor the sacrifice of the general. At the time, the idea of women‘s suffrage was little more than a discussion point, and a memorial book was one of the ways that prominent women, such as those who signed it, could influence politics. Women‘s use of their own sphere to influence politics is examined in Historian Jonathan Schneer‘s Imperial London.39 As in the cases Scheer examines in his work, these women were extending out of their own sphere in a way which was acceptable to their class; at the same time, their contributions could not be overlooked, unlike those of less-fortunate women. Hence, as they were speaking for all of England, these ―wives‖ also chose to put Gordon‘s importance into a more nation-wide context. They referenced the idea that all mothers would tell their children about General Gordon in the coming decades and that he would be held as an example to ―inspire them to great and noble deeds.‖ The commemoration then calls Gordon one of the ―heroes of whom [England] is most proud.‖ These sentiments are followed by what is probably the most telling portion of the inscription, ―England will evermore hold in honour the name of Charles Gordon, the Brave Soldier, the Loyal Subject, the Faithful Christian, the Loving friend of the poor, the desolate, and the oppressed.‖40 This one quote sums up the feeling present in Britain, especially at the highest levels of society, about Gordon. By November, when the book was presented, the personal foibles of Gordon had been forgotten and he was beginning his transformation into a symbol of everything good and heroic. Some of the women who presented this book to Gordon, like Viscountess Wolseley, were personally acquainted with him and felt a particular need to acknowledge what was not only a national loss, but a personal one. However, not everyone who knew Gordon was included in this prestigious memorial. One of the citizens who could claim to know Gordon as intimately as he

38 British Library Add Ms 34482 (restricted collection) Condolence Book presented to M.A. Gordon, 4 November 1885, ff. 1-43. 39 Schneer‘s analysis is more focused on the way that this class of women served as hostesses, however the idea that women were able to extend out of the domestic sphere has parallels with the presentation of the memorial book. Jonathan Schneer, London 1900: The Imperial Metropolis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 122-123. 40 Ibid., 3.

72 allowed was Mrs. Octavia Freese. Following their initial meeting when the general was posted to Gravesend, Freese became one of Gordon‘s confidantes. She participated in his charitable endeavors there, including his visits to the sick and teaching in the ―Ragged School.‖ Even after Gordon left England, her family continued to correspond regularly with the general when he was sent to Sudan for his first term as Governor-General, and her husband even joined him on some of his travels after he resigned the post. After the general‘s sister Augusta, she was his closest confidante. Thus, in the years after his death, when almost anyone who ever knew the general was preparing reminiscences, the fact that she too published a book on Gordon was hardly surprising. Freeses‘s book, which was not published under her name originally, tried to reveal a different side to General Gordon than the one which was presented to the public in the first biographies and tributes following his death. Her work, which was simply called More About Gordon, was published almost a decade following his death. In her introductory note that explains why she chose to publish her work when she did, Freese specifically mentions that she will not apologize for ―bringing before the public a few reminiscences of a man so remarkable in every way as the late General Gordon.‖ 41 Her memories were carefully chosen to serve two purposes. One was to humanize Gordon and the other was to emphasize his Christian character. By 1894, when Freese‘s book was published, Gordon‘s memory was no longer paramount in the minds of the public. For this reason, she chose to remind her readers that ―his memory [was] still green; he is by no means forgotten; therefore I have thought that many might be interested to read a few personal reminiscences of Gordon as I knew him.‖42 The introductory note makes clear that, when the book was published, sections, such as her impressions of the circumstances leading to Gordon‘s death, were written much earlier, when the news was still fresh. Of Gordon‘s closest friends and family, Freese was the only one to publish this type of book. Not quite a biography, but also not a memoir, it did achieve her stated goal of showing a different side of Gordon to the public. The appendix, which is mostly concerned with her second purpose—emphasizing Gordon‘s Christian nature—is also the most telling of her own feelings. Within the appendix, she adds to the martyrdom debate that had begun around Gordon, citing a personal conversation that the two had at Gravesend in which he told her that one of his daily

41 One who knew him well [Mrs. Octavia Freese], More About Gordon (London: Richard Bentley and Son, 1894), 1. 42 Ibid., 2.

73 prayers was that he ―might have ‗fellowship with Christ‘s sufferings.‘‖43 Her inclusion of this sentiment, combined with the emphasis that she and all of his contemporaries placed on his sense of duty, shows that Freese was clearly one who believed that Gordon had been martyred. Freese was not the only person who knew Gordon who chose to express his or her grief. Other ―ordinary‖ people reached out to members of his family—his sister Augusta and brother Henry received letters from many of them. The people sending these letters were from all over the world; they were from people Gordon had met and influenced in varied postings, from China to Equatoria and Egypt, from Gravesend to London. Some of them were from people in influential positions, but others were from those who had met the general as they went about their daily lives. All of this correspondence had some attributes in common. Each person expressed his sympathy with Gordon‘s family and his outrage with the circumstances of his death. The letters often contained mentions of Gordon as an inspiration to all other Englishmen and some even specifically referenced his sacrifice to his country. These personal snapshots reveal much more about how his death and life were perceived by his contemporaries.44 By early March, enough time had passed since the news of Gordon‘s death reached the other countries where he had served, and his family began to receive correspondence from farther-flung locations. One of the earliest examples of this correspondence came from China, the place where Gordon‘s nickname was earned. Sir Harry Parkes, the British Minister to China, and several members of his staff sent telegrams as soon as they heard the news. These telegrams were filled with personal remembrances of Gordon‘s time in China and of course included their sympathies with the family. This early correspondence was followed by a letter sent to his brother Henry from Tseng, the Chinese Minister to Britain. In his letter, Tseng refers to Gordon‘s sacrifice, but it is not in the terms that most of the other correspondents used. Instead, Tseng said that he was sending this ―tribute of sympathy, sorrow, and admiration, as the minister of a country for which your brother fought and bled and in which his name will be forever honoured.‖45 The terminology of fighting and bleeding is not any different from that which was

43 Ibid., 236. 44 These letters can also be seen as evidence of what James Stevens Curl has termed the ―Victorian Celebration of Death,‖ or the particular need of these individuals to have a public form of mourning. Although the letters were privately sent to the Gordon family, they are still evidence of the desire felt by Gordon‘s friends and acquaintances to participate in the spectacle of mourning. James Stevens Curl, The Victorian Celebration of Death (Stroud, Gloustershire: Sutton Publishing, Ltd., 2001), 194-195. 45 British Library Add Ms 52400, ff. 214-233 26 February 1885 telegrams from Sir Harry Parkes, et al, to Sir Henry Gordon and 5 March 1885 letter from Tseng to Sir Henry Gordon, British Library Add Ms. 52401 Correspondence

74 used in letters from Gordon‘s countrymen; however, it is interesting to see this particular terminology used not to describe his sacrifice in British terms, but instead as a reference to earlier events. Most of the correspondence received by his family members in the time following his death only mentioned one place if any: Khartoum. Letters from people who knew Gordon in all of his major military postings also poured in to the Gordon family as news of his death spread. Those who knew him when they had served together in Crimea, in China, in Equatoria and in Egypt are all well represented in the volumes of letters that have been preserved by the family.46 These letters ranged from simple statements of sympathy to longer letters that reminisced about the times that the writer spent with Gordon and even to long screeds filled with vitriol against the government that allowed the general to die. A letter to Gordon‘s sister from Earnest A. Floyer, who was the inspector-general of Egyptian telegraphs, is illustrative of this final type of correspondence. There had been several letters between Miss Gordon and Floyer, but this one letter is noteworthy. Floyer was not a soldier, yet he was in consultation with members of the army, including Kitchener. As a result, he felt a personal responsibility for abandoning Gordon. His guilt is evident, especially in lines such as, ―I was not proud of myself. I was one of the Englishmen that had abandoned him and I could not but feel it.‖ Yes, Floyer was writing to the sister of the man whom he had encouraged abandoning; nevertheless, his personal frustration at the policy is still clear. His chastisement of Gladstone in the paragraph before the one where he expressed his personal grief is also telling. In direct contrast to the measured tones Floyer used while taking responsibility for his own actions, his criticism of the former Prime Minister could not be considered neutral: ―Surely if that old man Gladstone could read but a glimpse of the thoughts of our hearts he would sicken and die from the intensity of unexpressed contempt.‖47 Floyer‘s letter, written nearly nine months following Gordon‘s death, showed that time had not diminished his personal anger at the British government, thus indicating the continued influence that Gordon‘s abandonment retained among those who knew him.

to Sir Henry Gordon on the death of Gordon, ff. 22-23. Both Henry and his sister Mary kept enough of these letters (approximately 1000) to fill ten volumes (consisting of at least 150 folios each) at the British Library. 46 For the purpose of clarity, one telegram from each engagement has been selected. For Crimea: Letter of 18 February 1885 from a fellow cadet, Add Ms. 52400, ff. 39; China: Letter of 18 February 1885 from Lt. Col.. W. Hill James, Ibid., ff.61-63; Equatoria: Letter of 8 July 1885 from Emir Bey, Add. Ms. 51300, ff. 140; and Egypt: Letter of 22 February 1885 from C.M. Watson at the War Office in Cairo, Ibid., ff. 149-150. 47 8 October 1885 Letter from Earnest A. Floyer to Augusta Gordon, Add Ms. 51300, ff. 147-152.

The letters that were received from Gordon‘s friends—and even, in one case, a distant relative—within Britain also follow the patterns laid out above. These ones were sent earlier— often written as soon as their authors heard the news—and each writer‘s grief is still fresh and evident. Almost all of the letters specifically reference the patriotic aspect of Gordon‘s death; interestingly, most do not specifically mention the idea of Gordon as a martyr. It seems that the people who were most apt to refer to him as such during the time directly following his death were those who did not know him, or even those who wanted to use his death purely for political purposes. His friends were not looking to make a political point when they sent their letters; they wanted only to comfort the Gordons and to express their support for his final endeavor. One of the earliest letters of this sort received by Henry Gordon came even before the final news from Khartoum was confirmed. The letter, from a man named Thom Ower Jones, was sent on the seventh, which was after Khartoum‘s fall was confirmed, but three days before Gordon was officially declared dead. Jones refers to Gordon as ―Charley‖ throughout his letter, and emphasizes how those who loved Charley could not possibly be saddened by the manner in which he died, concluding that if they ―had to select the time and manner of the closing of his life of sacrifice and great deeds when & how could he have left behind him a more glorious memory?‖48 In Jones‘ opinion, Gordon and his sacrifice should be feted, not mourned. This sentiment was shared by a distant relative of the Gordon‘s. The connection was tenuous at best— the writer, J. Stanley Oldham, claimed to be the cousin of the general‘s sister-in-law. His letter included ideas like those quoted above, but also took the argument further and cited the patriotic aspect of his death or the idea that it ―would seem to be a national loss in which all Englishmen have a common share.‖49 Even though the author is trying to ingratiate himself with a family that he clearly does not belong to, his contribution to the reams of letters is significant, as it is one of the first to include the idea of a national loss in addition to a personal one, marking one of the earlier moments that the Gordon family‘s loss transformed from a private sorrow to a public one. Gordon‘s death certainly can be called a nation-wide event. The correspondence that the Gordon family received from the general public following the general‘s death can be divided into three distinct groups: from people who drew creative inspiration from the events and their personal need to memorialize the fallen general, from those who wished to express their

48 7 February 1885 Letter from Thom Ower Jones to Henry Gordon, Add Ms. 52399, ff. 44-45. 49 17 February 1885 Letter from J. Stanley Oldham to Henry Gordon, Add Ms. 52400, f. 10.

76 sympathy with the family about the loss of their patriotic inspiration and hero, and from those who wished to market items associated with Gordon.50 As Gordon was already perceived as a national hero due to his actions in China two decades earlier, a market existed for products relating to him. His first biographies—or at least the first editions—had been published before Gordon ever went to Sudan.51 The ―Chinese Gordon‖ story had been told, but with his re-appointment to Sudan, new biographies went into print. These newer biographies were joined, in the months following his death, by countless other volumes. As can be expected considering the public interest in Gordon‘s death, his family was besieged by correspondents asking to write new biographies, or seeking to advise the family on how to publish any of Gordon‘s writing, including his journals.52 These letters were not limited to English-speaking audiences; the Gordon family received requests from abroad asking their cooperation in telling the story of their deceased brother.53 In addition to the letters asking the Gordon family for permission and cooperation regarding biographies, the family was beset with another type of letter from those seeking to profit from his death: those asking for color portraits of the general. The people who were sending this type of letter wanted to create various forms of ephemera, such as medals, to honor him. The seller of one these medals, Raphael Tuck & Sons, wrote a letter to Henry explaining that they wanted to make the medal available to all of Britain, so they offered it at ―a price that will bring it within the reach of all classes, & amongst whom the name of Gordon has become a household word.‖54 This letter, which was sent only seven days after Gordon‘s death had been confirmed and six days after the news had reached the general public in London, demonstrates the impulse that existed to profit from events in the Sudan as quickly as possible. The public‘s appetite for Gordon-related goods would continue to grow. Eventually it would even include

50 For reasons why people chose to write letters of ―personal bereavement‖ to the family of a man they never met see John Wolffe‘s discussion on the death of Gladstone and the letter-writing that accompanied it in his: Great Deaths: Grieving, Religion, and Nationhood in Victorian and Edwardian Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 2000), 170-171. 51 For example, Samuel Mossman‘s General Gordon in China was published in 1875, nearly a decade before the events in Sudan. Samuel Mossman, General Gordon in China: the story of the every victorious army (London: Griffith, 1875). 52 The question of who had the right to publish the Gordon journals and who actually controlled them is quite complicated and thus will be addressed in the next chapter. 53 Among these requests was a letter from Copenhagen and one from a German magazine publisher. Both letters can be found in the same volume of Henry Gordon‘s correspondence: Add Ms. 52399. Copenhagen: f. 194, German magazine: ff. 136-137. 54 17 February 1885 letter from Raphael Tuck & Sons to Henry Gordon, Add Ms 52400, f. 30.

77 commemorative mugs and plates and in the years after the general‘s death, his likeness would be used to sell a variety of items to people who were seeking to keep his memory and deeds alive.55 Fortunately for the Gordon family, most people who chose to intrude on their time of grief did not do so with the intention of making money from their loss. Instead, a great number of people only wished to include their personal tributes to Gordon—a man whom they had never met. This fact did not stop people from writing to the Gordon family, as evidenced by a letter sent by Mr. W. Youngman. His letter is brief but succinct; in it Youngman references the fact that he, and thousands like him, who did not have the privilege of meeting Gordon, still did love him and were unwilling to forget him. Instead, he claims that he and the many thousands he believes to represent will ―continue to revere his name, and hold in tender regard those deeds of heroism and Christian love which so unspeakably adorned his character.‖56 This Christian aspect of Gordon‘s character was an idea which featured prominently in the letters which were sent to the family from people who did not know him. By referencing his Christianity, these correspondents were able to feel a spiritual kinship with Gordon that was able to supersede the fact that they never knew him. The majority of letters like the one discussed above followed the same pattern. It was also the established method—referencing Gordon‘s final days, his patriotic sacrifice, and his Christian character—employed by the letter writers who fell into the last group of the Gordon family‘s correspondents: those who took creative inspiration from the saga. These correspondents were also from all over; Gordon‘s story was well-covered throughout Europe and the rest of the English-speaking world. By late 1885, with a significant uptick around Christmastime, the Gordon family had received dozens of verses, poems, musical compositions, and even acrostics honoring their dead brother.57 Some of these works had been published; others had been composed—in one case while the correspondent was lying in bed—especially for the family, but what they all had in common was the desire to memorialize Gordon.58 Although these works lacked the lyrical intensity of Tennyson‘s lines, they are still significant as the events in Khartoum inspired average, everyday men, women, and children to

55 In addition to the items mentioned above, Gordon was also featured prominently in popular music, especially ballads, and in prints that could be easily bought from magazines and newspapers. Bernard Porter‘s Absent Minded Imperialists further explores the uses of these types of memorabilia. Porter, 178. 56 2 March 1885 letter from W. Youngman to Henry Gordon, Add Ms 52401, ff. 5-6. 57 British Library Add Ms. 52404 and 52405 solely consist of letters filled with this type of tribute. The musical verses referenced above can be found in Add Ms 52404, ff. 181-183. 58 Add Ms 52404 ff. 18-19, undated later from G.R. Blackbee.

78 pick up a pen and write what they were feeling about the general‘s death. The simplest of these lines were the acrostics. Henry Gordon received several of these poems, but the most striking was one by S.C. Clarke. Clarke sent the acrostic in both English and French, with different wording for both to make the poems work, but it is the English version that best captures the spirit that the lines were written in: Grief for her son the nation feels, for worth so peerless O‘er him a grateful Senate mourns its Chieftan fearless Rare-noble souls like his of lofty moral beauty Dead to all love of self, forsaking all for duty! On names so great there rests a halo bright with glory. Ne‘er may Posterity forget his wondrous story.59

These six lines epitomize the public reaction to Gordon‘s death. The major elements of the story—his patriotism, his morality and his sense of duty—are all covered. What is not mentioned in these particular lines is the other side of the debate over Gordon‘s death: the role played by the Gladstone government. A poem by J.H. Hodges, ―What will they say in England under a Liberal Government‖ which was based on an 1832 poem ―What will they say in England under a Conservative Government,‖ was designed to address the government‘s culpability in the matter. It is quite a long poem, with the author making the case for Gladstone‘s personal guilt in its last lines, ―they‘ll say of Gordon‘s glory that it liveth evermore, they‘ll say of Gordon‘s murder that it lies at Gladstone‘s door!‖60 The idea of Gladstone as the murderer of Gordon was not the invention of Hodges. The sobriquet was liberally applied in the press of the time period, and it was also referenced in other correspondence sent to the Gordon family. As discussed previously, prior to Gordon‘s death, Gladstone was seen as the ―Grand Old Man‖ or G.O.M. of the Liberal Party.61 His nickname, which was earned after decades of service to the party he helped to bring to prominence, conveniently flipped around—the G.O.M. became the M.O.G., or ―Murderer of Gordon.‖62

59 In the original, the first letters are in red to further symbolize the acrostic. Undated letter from S.C. Clarke, Add Ms. 52404, f. 36. 60 Undated letter from J.H. Hodges, Ibid., ff. 69-70. 61 For a discussion on the Gladstone myth, including the cult of the ―Grand Old Man‖ see D.A. Hamer, ―Gladstone: The Making of a Political Myth‖ Victorian Studies volume 22, number 1 (Autumn 1978): 47-50. 62 Some of the earliest instances of the use of the term can be found in the previously discussed Pall Mall Gazette articles of 11 February 1885. The idea of Gladstone‘s treachery towards Gordon is also evident in the Egyptian Red Book [Add Ms. 51302, ff. 76-92]. The terminology exists to the present day. Even Gladstone‘s official biography on the Number 10 Downing Street website, the official site of the Prime Minister‘s office, includes both nicknames for

William Ewart Gladstone‘s personal reputation and prestige would remain sullied for the rest of his political career. Even if the events in Sudan were not enough to topple the government, they were enough to spur the public to action. In the months after Gordon‘s death, people were already writing to the family to tell them of their renaming organizations after the general. For example, the Oddfellows Scottish Order No. IV of Glasgow wrote to Henry Gordon in November to tell him of their name change to the ―General Gordon Lodge.‖ They justified their name change as ―expressive of our hearty admiration for his personal character, and as a neutral ground on which we can all meet, irrespective of political bias or religious creed.‖63 The idea of Gordon was one that came without bias—everyone could acknowledge his actions and thus they could honor him and his memory. The Oddfellows were not the only organization that informed the Gordon family about a name change honoring the general, but it was the only one to provide such a specific reason why it chose to adopt his name. As the varied examples of different ways that people chose to memorialize Charles Gordon show, people of all classes in Britain strove to process and understand the death of a national hero. Their expressions of grief ranged from newspaper editorials, like W.T. Stead‘s ―In Memoriam‖ to bound condolence books, like that presented to Augusta Gordon, from simple poetry inspired by his death, including Tennyson‘s cenotaph inscription, to more vitriolic condemnations of the Gladstone government. They questioned their government and proposed votes of censure, they praised Gordon‘s actions and denounced those of Gladstone and his cabinet, but the most important thing that these individuals did was air their shared grief. Without this outpouring of grief and support, it is unlikely that Gordon would have retained the same level of prominence in the months following his death—and his death would not have had the same impact on his country. However, even after expressing their grief, sorrow, and at times, outrage, the people of Britain still did not have the complete story of Gordon‘s death at Khartoum. The complete story would only be provided to them once the journals he kept there were published, an endeavor that did not occur without serious political dithering. Another goal of those who wanted to memorialize Gordon was to have some sort of a national memorial to him. This national the Prime Minister. http://www.number10.gov.uk/history-and-tour/prime-ministers-in-history/william-ewart- gladstone, accessed 30 July 2009. 6312 November 1885 Letter from the Oddfellows to Henry Gordon, Add Ms. 52403, ff. 44-45.

80 memorial, the shape of which would be derived from the idea that Tennyson and Gordon discussed in 1883, would come to fruition in the year after the general‘s death. Finally, there would be a drive for an even more prominent monument to Gordon‘s memory: a statue. All of these future memorials and monuments would contribute to the lasting memory of Gordon, a memory that would be preserved for decades to come.

CHAPTER 5 PUTTING GORDON‟S MEMORY TO WORK

For the first months after Gordon died in Sudan, his achievements were celebrated and he was mourned. When the shocking news first reached London, the immediate reaction to his death was not to discuss its political ramifications; instead, it was much more visceral. The larger political repercussions of Gordon‘s abandonment and death would come later. As has been previously discussed, in death, Gordon became a symbol: in essence, an imperial figurehead. He was transformed—first by those who knew him, then by those who wished to benefit from his experiences—into a political figure as well. Gordon was never a politician, yet his death had a large impact in the political sphere.1 William Gladstone faced and defeated a no-confidence vote over his perceived abandonment of Gordon. However, several months later, his government fell, partially as a result of the outcry that accompanied the general‘s death. Clearly, the Liberal party lost support over the fiasco in Africa. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the real reason why the Liberal Party lost its government was much more complicated, involving a variety of domestic causes, such as the Franchise Bill. By the time the Gladstone government fell and was replaced by a Conservative one led by the new Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, Gordon‘s transformation had begun. After the fall of Gladstone‘s government in 1886, Britain was dominated politically for the next twenty years by Conservative governments. As Gladstone had been the longtime face of the Liberal Party, even out of government, he and his shortcomings remained a popular subject for Conservative politicians. The Liberal Party was Gladstone‘s party. As such, most political attacks on the party were also perceived to be personal attacks on him. For example, one of the areas where this vitriol was the most apparent was in electoral speeches. The election of 1885 represented a further expansion of the vote; thus politicians had to alter their strategies to appeal to a wider spectrum, as for the first time all working-class men were enfranchised. The Liberal Party used domestic issues to lure more voters, but the Conservative Party had a different

1 John Greer was one person who has argued that the reaction to Gordon‘s death was simply one of a ―mood reaction‖ and his significance was rendered moot by the end of the relief expedition. John Nelson Greer, ―The ‗Great Oracle‘: British Public Opinion on the Fall of Khartoum and the death of Gordon‖ (master‘s thesis, Cornell University, 1979).

82 approach; it used imperialism and national pride. One of the most significant figures who was referenced in an attempt to reach as broad a base as possible was the hero of Khartoum. The Conservative Party more effectively mobilized Gordon‘s death politically. This mobilization was aided by the foundation of a new organization within the Conservative Party, the Primrose League. Named after former Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli‘s favorite flower (at least according to myth), the League was originally founded to bring the working class to the Conservative Party. Technically, the League, which was founded in 1883, was not officially affiliated with the Conservative Party until the twentieth century, but for all intents and purposes it functioned as the mass organization of the Party from its inception. It was not a policy making (or even determining) body; it was more social and designed to bridge barriers between sexes, ages, and classes. As the first Prime Minister who made use of the League, Lord Salisbury remarked about its composition: ―it brings more classes together, and I think its greatest achievement of all is that it has brought the influence of women to bear on politics in a way that has never before been the case.‖2 The Primrose League served its purpose of bringing people together to further Conservative goals. However, regarding policy, the League had only broad goals, including the defense of Empire, monarchy, and religion. In terms of its goals, the connection to Disraeli becomes more apparent; he was widely acknowledged to be Queen Victoria‘s favorite Prime Minister. Like Gordon, Disraeli, who was often ridiculed in life, became sanctified in death, and he and the general both served the same type of political purpose to this new organization. 3 The most important function for the Primrose League as it concerned Gordon is the first of the three goals mentioned above: Empire. Acknowledged as an imperial symbol by both parties, Gordon became co-opted to a great extent by the League. As historian Martin Pugh explained, while the League was a ―very large imperial organization it remained vague, amorphous and sentimental in its imperialism, hardly ever venturing an opinion on a specific colonial question.‖4 Instead, the League looked to imperial figures to further its goals— specifically men like Gordon, and Colonel Fred Burnaby, a League member, who had been a part

2 Constance Rover, Women’s Suffrage and Party Politics in Britain: 1866-1914 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), 105. Rover includes this excerpt from Salisbury‘s November 29, 1886 speech in her discussion on the role that women played in the Primrose League and the Conservative Party. 3 Martin Pugh, The Tories and the People: 1880-1935 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 1985), 16-17. The name of the League and its relation to Disraeli are discussed on page 20. 4 Ibid., 88.

83 of his rescue mission. Choosing to use these men, Gordon as the acknowledged national hero, and Burnaby as the ideal of a Primrose League member, the League was able to reinforce another one of its tenets: the idea of equating the nation with the Empire. Since 1880 the Conservatives had attempted to co-opt the idea of patriotism as solely theirs. This hero-worship was merely another way to continue to assure their prestige in the public‘s eyes.5 The Primrose League was not the only new organization affiliated with the Conservative Party founded during this time period. Another solidly anti-Gladstonian organization was the National Union of Conservative and Constitutional Associations, commonly known as the National Union. The National Union was founded in 1868 at the same time as the previous Franchise Bill. As such, it was the first mass organization of the Conservative Party. However, it did not rise to the same level of popular prominence as the Primrose League. Instead, it functioned more to spread the message of the Conservative Party to the rank-and-file of the party.6 Like the League, it was also a mass-politics arm of the Conservative Party. Yet, the two differed as the National Union was always under the auspices of the party without even a veneer of independence. Together, these two organizations served to help the Conservative Party achieve its goals, especially the goal of a continued, strong imperial Britain.7 The Conservative theme of pride in the Empire was not a new one. It had been adopted by Disraeli after the Franchise vote of 1868 as a way of embracing newly enabled voters. Pride in the Empire was a quality that people of all strata of society could understand. As a part of a history of the Conservatives, historian Donald Southgate analyzed the impact of these new ideas, first presented to the public in Disraeli‘s 1872 Crystal Palace speech. Southgate wrote that Disraeli explained that the ―great body of the people were ‗Conservative,‘‖ by which he meant that ―‗the people of England and especially the working-classes are proud of belonging to a great country and wish to maintain its greatness…‘‖ 8 Southgate continued after discussing the first part of Disraeli‘s speech to analyze the second, which focused on the negative impact that the Liberal Party had on the Empire and its wish to disband the Empire completely—a constant theme throughout the nineteenth century.

5 Ibid., 91-92. 6 Andrew Gamble, The Conservative Nation (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), 12. 7 Disraeli first introduced these ideas in the 1870s, but they still had prominence in the 1880s. 8 Norman Gash, Donald Southgate, David Dilkes, and John Ramsden, The Conservatives: A History from their Origins to 1965 (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1977), 180-181.

The ideas outlined in the Crystal Palace speech in 1872 continued to be the guiding principles of the Conservative Party through the end of Lord Salisbury‘s terms in office over twenty years later.9 The biggest challenge to Empire that Salisbury was forced to contend with during his tenure was the question of Ireland. Although geographically close to England, Ireland was seen, by the late nineteenth century, as within the same frame of empire. This sentiment was best expressed in a letter to Salisbury from a Conservative Peer which referred to events in Ireland being seen in England as if ―they happened in China or another planet.‖10 To Salisbury, the issue of Ireland came to be emblematic of the Empire as a whole; to give it any sort of autonomy would weaken the entire imperial state. The question of Ireland was also the first time that the Conservative Party used General Gordon as a political symbol. In the speeches and discussions over Home Rule in Ireland, Gordon‘s abandonment was frequently referenced and even juxtaposed with a supposed abandonment of Ireland. In the months leading toward the elections of 1886, these speeches featured phrases such as ―the anniversary of the death of GENERAL GORDON has given the enemies of England to exult, and the deep-rooted differences in the Liberal Party are once more made manifest,‖ and others that are even more political, with speakers mentioning Gladstone as ―the decimator of the struggling Soudan [sic] tribes, the betrayer of Khartoum, [and] the person guilty of the death of Gordon.‖11 In addition to these strictly political views, many articles included Gordon‘s own views on the subject, ―General Gordon, a Home Ruler by the light of those days [1880].‖12 By including Gordon in the discussion, the politicians further enhanced the connection between Africa and Ireland discussed above. The connection between events in Africa and Ireland was one that Salisbury exploited quite often, most famously in his ―Hottentots‖ speech of 1886. As the letter expressed, Ireland was perceived to be exotic, hence his decision to equate its desire for independence with events occurring on the ―dark continent‖ is hardly surprising. These feelings directly influenced

9 The question of Home Rule, which was not begun in the electoral cycle of 1886, was one which would have long- lasting repercussions for Britain. It was already an issue when Disraeli made his Crystal Palace speech, and would continue to be an area of discontent until well into the twentieth century. Home Rule for Ireland would not be approved until 1914. The fight over Home Rule would come to define domestic politics until it was decided. 10 Michael Bentley, Lord Salisbury’s World: Conservative Environments in Late-Victorian Britain (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001), 56, Fn 63 contains a quote from a June 14, 1882 letter from Lord Cranbrook, a Conservative Peer, to Salisbury. 11 The first quote is from ―Three Acres and a Cow,‖ North Wales Chronicle, 6 February 1886; the second is from ―The General Election: Lord R. Churchill‘s Address,‖ Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper, 27 June 1886. 12 ―General Gordon‘s Plan of Home Rule,‖ Pall Mall Gazette, 1 January 1886.

Salisbury‘s speech, which is unique for the high level of disdain toward the Irish. It featured passages describing them as a separate race and comparing them to the Hottentots, a native people in South Africa. By linking the two, Salisbury attempted to exoticize the Irish further and marginalize their demands for Home Rule. By equating them with an African tribe which was perceived to be barbaric, Salisbury was attempting to convince the public that a situation similar to the one which resulted in Gordon‘s death could occur in their closest neighbor. He then continued by making it clear that the Irish could not be considered as the same ―Teutonic‖ race as the English and that they were therefore incapable of self government.13 Although the speech did not specifically reference Gordon, it still can be useful to historians by providing views on the people who would be linked with him in future speeches. Furthermore, this speech and those similar to it added another dimension to the Conservative Party‘s mobilization of Gordon as an imperial figure. The party‘s decision to fight against Gladstone‘s plans for Home Rule was more than just one of political expediency. Home Rule went directly against the tenets of the party laid out by Disraeli and it threatened the imperial functions of the government. It had to be defeated, and the best way that the party saw to defeat it was to remind the public of other imperialist blunders by the Liberals. Party members used two different techniques in their anti-Home Rule speeches to achieve their goals. First, they specifically referenced Gordon by name. Second, they employed terms like ―the Soudan,‖ as synonyms. For example, a speech by Salisbury cited Gladstone and his government‘s failures ―which led to the death of the heroic General Gordon‖ as proof that they would fail in their attempt to implement a system as complicated as Home Rule. He reflected that the ―same baneful system which has been tried and has been found to fall‖ was now to be applied to Ireland.14 This speech is one of the earliest ones to juxtapose the two situations. A fellow member of the party, Lord Randolph Churchill, also used the idea of Gladstone‘s policies in other parts of the Empire as a way to indict him about his Irish goals, citing the government‘s decision to ―scuttle,‖ or abandon, territories such as Afghanistan, South Africa, and Sudan as the precursor to what he wished to do in Ireland.15 Churchill‘s use of the

13 ―Lord Salisbury‘s Alternative to Home Rule,‖ Pall Mall Gazette May 17, 1886. 14 ―Lord Salisbury on the Irish Question,‖ Pall Mall Gazette, February 18, 1886. 15 ―Monday, June 28th 1886,‖ The Leeds Mercury, June 28, 1886.

86 word scuttle was particularly damning to Gladstone and his goals, because the connotation was that Gladstone intentionally decided to abdicate responsibility in these areas. Gladstone‘s lack of responsibility was a theme that other members of the Conservative Party also sought to use against him. In a speech given at Old Sneed Park, the Hon. John Plunkett, campaigning for the House of Commons, mocked Gladstone‘s claim that he never spoke against Home Rule—which was considered baseless as Gladstone himself did not come to agree with the concept until 1885.16 In his speech, Plunkett accused Gladstone of deserting the loyalists (people who wanted Ireland to remain in the Empire) in a similar way to how he had deserted General Gordon: ―He was guilty of a baseless desertion of the loyalists of Ireland as he had deserted…General Gordon.‖17 Plunkett‘s assertions against Gladstone on the basis of his coming to the cause of Home Rule late showed another way that Gordon could be used against Gladstone, invoking the deceased general was Plunkett‘s way of reminding his audience of Gladstone‘s other missteps concerning imperial policy, including the current debate. Whether the speeches actually included the words ―General Gordon‖ or just used terms like ―the Soudan‖ to represent his death, clearly Ireland and Gordon became linked in the public‘s mind. The evidence of this linkage can also be seen in editorials written by newspapers during the same time. These editorials and other articles referenced the death of Gordon in their discussions of the Home Rule question. In a January, 1886, editorial in the North Wales Chronicle, the paper questioned whether the outcome of the 1885 general election was really based on people‘s anger regarding the fate of Gordon rather than other issues. The editors go as far as to call the people who thought that Gordon‘s death would have a large impact on working class men, ―some enthusiastic dreamers.‖18 The idea that Gordon had been useful in the electoral cycle for the last time was refuted at a Primrose League meeting in the same month. At this meeting, a great deal of time was devoted to honoring the memory of Gordon and his sacrifice. In his closing remarks, Mr. A. H. Poyser tied the general‘s death into the idea of voting for the Conservative Party. He believed that a lesson ―must be learnt from his [Gordon‘s] life, and whether [a person] voted Radical or Conservative they would recognize their responsibility and

16 Gladstone has also been accused of deciding to support Home Rule for purely selfish reasons such as retaining control of the Liberal Party. However, in David Steele‘s chapter in Recovering Power, these ideas are disproven. Steele claims that there is no proof for the spurious supposition. David Steele, ―A New Style and Content: 1880- 1885 and 1886‖ in Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon, editors, Recovering Power: The Conservatives in Opposition since 1867 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 67. 17 ―Mr. Plunkett at Old Sneed Park,‖ Bristol Mercury and Daily Post, July 8, 1886. 18 ―The Political Situation,‖ North Wales Chronicle, January 23, 1886.

87 would do before everything else that which God and their country demanded.‖ The article then continued by referencing the ongoing situation over Home Rule in Ireland, further emphasizing the link between the two groups.19 As all of the newspaper coverage of speeches, editorials, and articles show, Gordon could not be ignored by the parties as they discussed Home Rule. In 1886, the Conservative Party swept into office for the next six years as a result of their defeat of Home Rule. It was a victory for anyone who opposed the Liberal Party and its concepts of imperialism, including the Queen, who strongly supported Salisbury and his opposition to Home Rule.20 Home Rule was defeated by a large margin, with several members of Gladstone‘s own party voting against his bill. It was a huge loss for Gladstone and the party he helped to found. Home Rule was defeated not just because the Conservative Party crafted more creative speeches and convinced more members of Parliament to support them. The Conservatives owed their victory more to dissent within the Liberal Party as the members who chose to vote against it demonstrated. Following this vote, it took two full decades for the Liberal Party to recover; some of its members permanently left by 1895 to join the Unionist coalition, a group of members who were in favor of continued British rule in Ireland.21 Whether the presence of General Gordon in the arguments helped to defeat Home Rule cannot be known, but as the side which prevailed used him often, the conclusion that his abandonment at least helped color the debate can be logically drawn. Part of the reason why Gordon was used as an illustrative example in the Home Rule fight was because he remained in the public eye. As discussed in the last chapter, by the end of 1885, Gordon‘s death ceased to be a frequent news story, but that did not mean the general had been removed from the public consciousness. Instead, his memory was transferred to a more cultural sphere as people began to purchase books, pictures, and other mementos and to attend music shows about him. Those who wished to understand his last mission further also had another resource: by summer, 1885, Gordon‘s six journals left from the siege of Khartoum were published.

19 ―The Primrose League,‖ Ipswich Journal, January 28, 1886. 20 Pugh, 75. 21 Mitzi Auchterlonie, Conservative Suffragists: The Women’s Vote and the Tory Party (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007), 14-15. The Conservative Party‘s ability to take advantage of the Liberal dissent is also discussed in Stuart Ball‘s chapter in his edited work. Stuart Ball, ―Factors in Opposition Performance: The Conservative Experience since 1867,‖ in Ball and Seldon, eds. Recovering Power, 13.

The road to publishing his journals was anything but smooth. Controversy ranged from who actually had the right to the journals to what content could be made public. The first five volumes of Gordon‘s journals had reached the outside world, sent from Khartoum before the Mahdi‘s forces managed to seal the city off, but the last was not recovered until after Gordon had died. Thus, the first major question surrounding the journals was one of ownership. Sir Henry Gordon, the late general‘s brother, argued that the journals should be considered his property, as executor of the estate. His view was not popular with the embattled Gladstone government. The government in general and the War Office in particular believed that the journals were, according to a minute paper on the situation by Lord Hartington, the Secretary of State for War, ―a public document—addressed to the Commander of the Expedition for the information of the Govt.‖22 As such, the content of the journals would need to be vetted in order for them to be published. Sir Henry, agreed in principle with the idea of vetting the journal; the major disagreement was over who would own the originals. It is that controversy which provides a valuable insight into both the transformation of Gordon and into attempts by the sitting government to avoid as much recrimination and blame as possible for its handling of the situation. When the journals were returned to London, they were sent to the War Office. The Gordon family was only sent facsimiles of them and was asked to remove any information from them that they did not want made public. The fact that some of their brother‘s final thoughts were withheld from them led to a heated exchange of words which eventually reached the Prime Minister‘s office. Over a series of letters sent between March and April 1885, the two sides eventually came to an agreement on publishing the journals. The Gordon family was sent the originals; in turn, they edited them and then sent them back to the War Office. At the beginning of the controversy, Sir Henry wrote to Lard Hartington about why he wished to publish the journals (which are also referred to as diaries). He stated that he had already received offers to publish the journals, including one for the not-inconsequential sum of £5,000. He was also careful to stress the fact that he was not intending to profit from the journals, instead planning on donating the profits ―to form a fund to rescue children.‖ At the conclusion of this early letter, Sir Henry further emphasized that publishing the journals would

22 National Archives War Office WO 32/6132, April 9, 1885 minute paper.

89 honor his late brother‘s wishes.23 The importance of this letter to understanding the situation is twofold. First, the fact that needy children would profit from the publishing of the journals indicates a desire on the part of the Gordon family to continue the good works for which their brother was renowned; and second, it demonstrates that there was a significant market for Gordon‘s journals. Unfortunately, the publication of the journals would be a bit more complicated than this letter indicated. In his letter, Sir Henry indicated a willingness to work with officials to make sure that the published journals did not contain any information that the government did not wish to make public. He was assisted in this task by Sir Ralph Thompson, who was assigned to help excise the undesired information, transforming the journals from their original state—which included negative criticisms about the government and its policies—to a bland, apolitical listing of what Gordon was doing during his final months. Sir Henry found the number of revisions, which were clearly done to benefit the government, unacceptable, triggering the next phase in the controversy. Thompson removed, according to Hartington‘s summary of their correspondence, ―all criticisms & suggestions about the policy of the Govt (irrespectively of their horrible character), and also all allusions to Government officials.‖ 24 In life, Gordon had known members of both political parties, but he himself had not been affiliated with either. His personal journals reflected his feelings of frustration with party politics. In them, he illustrated some of his observations with derogatory sketches of the policy-makers in London.25 Hartington feared that these omissions may have gone too far, and as he wrote to Gladstone‘s private secretary, Lord Hamilton, he feared that he might have overstepped his authority as dictated by the Cabinet regarding the journals in

23 WO 32/6132 copy of a March 20, 1885 letter from Sir Henry Gordon to Lord Hartington. 24 British Library Add Ms 44148 William Ewart Gladstone Papers, volume 63, April 23, 1885 letter with enclosures from Hartington to Gladstone, ff. 30-35. The cited portion comes from the précis section on April 17, ff.34-35. 25 Gordon‘s Journal volume VI, British Library Add Ms. 34479. There are several cartoons throughout the journals, but the one referred to appears in his entry for November 6, 1884, ff. 17. In the cartoon, Gordon has drawn caricatures of three Lords: Granville, Northbrooke and Lord ____ in consultation about what strategy to use next in Sudan. Above their caricatures he wrote: ―They remained in consultation for nearly a couple of hours,‖ indicating his perceptions of the amount of attention paid to his situation in London. Although this cartoon is not included in the published copy, the authors do make a reference to its possible existence, ―At this point General Gordon refers to the newspaper cuttings he has made and pasted in on the opposite page... In an account in a London paper of the departure of Lords Northbrook and Wolseley, General Gordon has marked certain penny-a-line passages, and in all cases where ―Gordon Relief Expedition‖ occurs, he has drawn his pen through this and all expressions indicating that the Expeditionary Force comes to his relief—ED.,‖ A. Egmont Hake, ed., The Journals of Major-Gen C. G. Gordon, C.B. At Khartoum, printed from the original mss (London: Kegan Paul, Trench and Co., 1885), 293-294, fn 13.

90 authorizing Thompson. In this correspondence, he also sought to remind Sir Henry that if he did not accept the government‘s edits, then he could still publish the journals without government approval. The government sought to control the message that would be presented to the public through the journals. By publishing Gordon‘s final thoughts, his family would be adding to the already-substantial supply of Gordon-related works available to the public. The publisher‘s willingness to pay a substantial sum to his family shows that a great deal of attention would be paid to what would be a more accurate account of Gordon‘s final year. When Sir Henry received the revisions, according to Hartington‘s summary once again, he felt ―in a regular fix & did not know what to do.‖ Instead, ―he thought it was much better to tell him to publish it & trust him not to reflect on the Govt.‖ Finally, Sir Henry felt that ―the eliminations made by Sir R. Thompson would deprive the publication of all interest.‖26 The eliminations would also deprive it of any harsh criticism. The solution to the problem was finally found with a third party suggesting revisions that were acceptable to both the family and the government.27 As their editor, A. Egmont Hake, suggested, the journals were Gordon‘s ―last words to the world as much as they are instruction and information to his Government, and Englishmen who value England‘s honour may well read them with a heavy heart—with eyes dimmed by tears.‖28 The controversy over whether the government should allow this criticism to be published is illuminating. In the end, there was a compromise and the information presented to the public was not as critical as Gordon had intended or as bland as the government wanted. However, the journals themselves cannot be overlooked as a form of imperial propaganda. The mere act of publishing the journals, regardless of what was contained within them, was enough to remind the British about his abandonment once more. Even if people did not buy the journals, they still saw advertisements for them and observed their brightly colored covers.29 In June, 1885, the journals,

26 Ibid., section from April 18, ff. 34-35. 27 In his preface, the final editors of the journal, A. Egmont Hake and Godfrey Thrupp, indicate how quickly the journals were edited: ―The work of editing these Journals is at an end; it only remains now for me to thank one of my oldest and most valued friends, whose assistance in every way I wish most thoroughly to acknowledge: this is Mr. Godfrey Thrupp. When it became obvious that the public demand for the work made its completion in so short a time impossible—as the conscientious achievement of one man—he generously came forward.‖ A. Egmont Hake, ed., The Journals of Major-Gen C. G. Gordon, preface. 28 Ibid., x. 29 John Mackenzie discusses these trends in publishing, including the origination of eye-catching covers and dust jackets in his work on imperial propaganda. John M. Mackenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 18.

91 edited by Alfred Egmont Hake, were released.30 In addition to the first biographies of Gordon, the journals kept his name and appearance in the public consciousness. At the same time as the journals were released, the Gladstone government also fell. The minority government that replaced it was the first to be led by Salisbury, who was willing to use Gordon to further Conservative imperial goals. The Primrose League was also interested in the publication of these journals. Like Salisbury, the League sought to preserve Gordon‘s memory as an imperial hero. The journals only served to reinforce this perception. They also, when combined with other pro-Gordon and anti-Gladstone propaganda like the Egyptian Red Book, served to remind the public about Gordon and the circumstances under which he died. Following the fall of the Gladstone government, they additionally served as a model of policies that the new government should try to avoid, as could be seen in letters received by the Gordon family following the publication of the journals.31 As can be shown by the number of copies of the journals still in existence today, the public was quite interested in Gordon‘s experiences in Khartoum.32 Three years later, the Primrose League, in a bid to cement its adoption of Gordon as one of its imperial heroes, chose to publish a selection of his letters to his sister, Mary Augusta Gordon. In publishing these letters, the Primrose League wanted to ensure that the public was unable to forget the general‘s death and his royal connections. The published letters included the one that was written to Mary Augusta by the Queen, who showed her dismay at hearing the news that the general had been killed. Hence, the publication achieved two of the major goals of the Primrose League: it reminded people of the price of being ambivalent about imperialism and of the strong connection between the Queen and its goals.33

30 Hake‘s note at the front of the journals has the date of June 11, 1885. A. Egmont Hake, ed., The Journals of Major-Gen C. G. Gordon, C.B, iii. By mid-June, Sir Henry Gordon was receiving notes from people who read the journals. These letters occupied several pages in his correspondence: Add Ms 52402, ff. 93-100. 31 For one example, see the letter from Floyer discussed in the last chapter. In it, Floyer specifically references a letter he wrote to Gordon that appeared in the diary and criticizes Gladstone. Add Ms. 51300 Correspondence to Mary Gordon, October 8, 1885 letter from Ernest Floyer, ff. 147. 32 There are over 500 copies of Gordon‘s journals available at libraries today, over 100 years after it was first published. This indicates that there was a significant amount of interest in the journals. They were also reprinted multiple times in the twentieth century. Worldcat search for ―The Journals of Major-Gen. C.G. Gordon at Khartoum‖ accessed on September 4, 2009: http://newfirstsearch.oclc.org.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/WebZ/FSQUERY?format=BI:next=html/records.html:bad=html/rec ords.html:numrecs=10:sessionid=fsapp1-48952-fz7fu1pd-msv6b9:entitypagenum=24:0:searchtype=advanced 33 Pugh, 78-79. He also included a portion of the text of the letter referenced above.

In fact, due to projects like those of the Primrose League, it was almost impossible to forget the general in the years directly following his death. Besides the publication of his written words, Gordon‘s legacy was kept alive with several building projects, including his national memorial, the Gordon Boys‘ Home, and the statue at Trafalgar Square. These monuments helped to cement the late general‘s role at home in England and raise his prestige even further. The first memorial to Gordon was the Gordon Boys‘ Home. Founded in 1885 and based on the idea proposed by Gordon to Tennyson during their 1883 lunch, this home, which today remains in existence as the Gordon School, was seen by many of his contemporaries, both in government and out, as the most fitting way of remembering the general.34 The attention paid to his work at Gravesend, combined with Gordon‘s reputation for charity, certainly contributed to this sentiment. However, it is unlikely that the memorial would have been perceived as a national one without the support of the Queen and her family. Queen Victoria‘s feelings regarding Gordon and the manner in which he died were instrumental in raising public support for his memorial. It was also illustrative of the Queen‘s role in imperial politics in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Instead of being perceived as holding political power, the Queen, like Gordon, was transformed into more of a symbol. She, too, became more than just her own person; with her crowning as Empress of India in 1877, Victoria became an imperial figurehead. Therefore, supporting the Gordon Boys‘ Home was another expression of this change of the role of the monarchy. The Prince of Wales continued to support the Home, thus further embracing this new form of royal tradition.35 The product of this royal support, The Gordon Boys‘ Home, was founded in 1885 with— in the words of Field-Marshal J.M.A. Simmons, a Chairman of the school‘s Executive Committee—the ―purpose of carrying on a charitable work which was dear to his [Gordon‘s] heart, and in which he had laboured with such marked success.‖ The statement continued by praising the Queen, the Prince of Wales, and the Lord Mayor of London for their support in founding the Home, which provided a place for needy boys admitted at the age of 14. The goal of the home was to see that they were ―clothed, educated, and instructed in trades or occupations,

34 The connection between Tennyson and the Gordon Boys‘ Home is discussed in the previous chapter. 35 David Cannadine explores the changing role of the monarchy, in his article ―The British Monarchy, c. 1820-1977‖ in Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger, editors, The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). An assessment of the changes in England as compared with other European monarchies is on page 133.

93 which [gave] them a fair prospect of earning honest livelihoods in after-life.‖36 The idea of providing boys with an opportunity to better themselves and not fall into the life of being a criminal was another important aim of the Boys‘ Home. This aim was probably the one that was best suited to Gordon‘s own wishes, as demonstrated by his participation in Gravesend‘s Ragged School. The home itself was quite small, with only 20 boys housed there in the first year, but by 1887, the number had grown to 100.37 The fact that the Home, which was financed entirely through public subscriptions, was opened the same year as Gordon died indicated the high level of public support for the scheme. However, the Gordon Boys‘ Home was not the only organization devoted to his memory. Ministry of Education files show several other schools that chose to change their names to include General Gordon‘s. These schools were co-educational, showing a broader level of support for the general. In addition to these Gordon Memorial Schools, as they became known, the Ministry of Education also has a file on the foundation of other ―Gordon Memorial Homes for Destitute Boys‖ that were founded throughout the country.38 Neither the homes nor the schools were directly involved with the Gordon Boys‘ Home, the official memorial, but they still served the same purpose—to keep the general‘s memory alive and to honor him. This goal is best elucidated in the yearly sermons which were preached in commemoration of the anniversary of Gordon‘s death. These sermons, which until the death of Queen Victoria were always given in front of the Gordon Boys‘ Home‘s royal patrons, the Prince and Princess of Wales, emphasized the Christian nature of the general, his willingness to help others less fortunate, and, most importantly for the continued nature of his work, the need for people to continue to support the Home through donations.39 This support was forthcoming at

36 The statement appeared as the frontispiece, ―National Memorial to General Gordon,‖ to a published sermon preached in commemoration of the anniversary of Gordon‘s death in 1897. The sermon is seventh in a series of bound published sermons at the British Library. Alexander T. Llyod, ―Enthusiasm, Confidence, Determination—A sermon preached before their royal highnesses the prince and princess of Wales, in Sandringham Church on Sunday Morning, January 24th, 1897 in commemoration of the death of General Gordon,‖ (London: Skeffington & Son, 1897). 37 Ibid., 14. 38 For a full enumeration of these schools, see the National Archives, Ministry of Education Files, ED 21/12611 (Gordon Memorial Schools) and ED 49/6061 (Gordon Memorial Homes for Destitute Boys). 39 The bound collection mentioned above contains the annual sermons preached in honor of the Gordon Boys‘ Home. Sermons include those by Llyod and William Boyd Carpenter (1898 and 1899). In addition to the bound collection referenced above, several other years‘ speeches, including 1890 and ‗91, in honor of the anniversary can be found in the bound political tracts BL 1578/3 483.

94 least through the end of the nineteenth century, and the Home grew to hold over 200 boys by 1900.40 The role of the Gordon Boys‘ Home as one of the primary national memorials to Gordon is a bit surprising. The only mention of his imperial endeavors at the Home is in the inscription in the Recreation Hall. The inscription references his efforts in China and Sudan, but those passages come after the opening lines. The entire opening stanza focuses on Gordon the man, with lines like ―a man simple and heroic, loving righteousness and hating iniquity,‖ not on Gordon the imperial figure. His final sacrifice at Khartoum is a part of the inscription, which ends as follows: ―in Khartoum, called at a memorial crisis, to a task of mercy beyond human strength, for eleven months he held out alone, drawing to himself in the beleaguered city, the wonder and reverence of the world, and then fell at his post, ‗faithful unto death.‘‖41 Thus, the inscription ended with the same sort of focus as the beginning, a focus on the man himself. Perhaps the reason why the Gordon Boys‘ Home did not focus on Gordon‘s imperial duties was because another memorial to him was proposed at the same time. This memorial took the form of a statue placed in London‘s Trafalgar Square. The placement of Gordon‘s statue was not without controversy; the family of one of the other imperial figures honored in the square, Lord Napier, wrote to the Works department about the possibility of moving his statue to make room for the new one in late 1885. The statue was not moved; a large gas light was removed to accommodate the new statue to General Gordon.42

40 Llyod, 14. 41 The full inscription appears in Lt.-Col. Graham Seton Hutchinson, Gordon and the Gordon Boys—Charles George Gordon—The Man, The Gordon Boys’ School—1885-1945 (Woking, Surrey: The Gordon Boys‘ School, 1944, reprinted 1950), 54-55. The entire text of the inscription is as follows: ―This home was founded/in memory of/Charles George Gordon, C.B./A man simple and heroic,/loving righteousness and hating iniquity,/born to be a soldier and a ruler/he gave his heart/to the young, the poor and the outcast./Accepting the hardest duties/but refusing wealth and honours/and counting his life as nothing/if by any means he might lesson the miseries of mankind,/in all loneliness, danger and perplexity/‘he endured as seeing him who is invisible.‘ In China/by inspiring a disheartened army/with his own dauntless resolution/he delivered the most populous of empires/from the horrors of civil war. In the Soudan/he strove to suppress slavery/and by his just and fatherly rule/won the love of hapless multitudes. In Khartoum/called at a memorial crisis/to a task of mercy beyond human strength/for eleven months he held out alone/drawing to himself in the beleaguered city/the wonder and reverence of the world/and then fell at his post/‘faithful unto death.‘ Born at Woolwich, January 28, 1833/died at Khartoum, January 26, 1885.‖

42 Correspondence between the Napier family and the Works office is in the National Archives WORK 20/50 A6481 and A 6549 Letters from December 7 and 5 1885 (respectively); the final decision to move the light is found in B 3116, May 19, 1888.

The statue itself did not differ greatly from the statues of other, lesser military heroes of the time.43 Cast in bronze and standing about ten and half feet tall, it represented Gordon as a staff-officer, with his head inclined forward and his chin resting on his right hand, while he is holding a bible in his left. His ―wand of victory‖ from the China campaign is tucked under his arm, while his left foot stands on a broken cannon. This action was, in the words of The Graphic‘s article from the day it was unveiled in 1888, ―intended to symbolize his moral attitude as a soldier. Although he hated war and bloodshed, he seemed bound by fate to be ever fighting.‖44 Gordon‘s experiences as a soldier are represented further on the pedestal. In addition to a simple side that bears his name, rank, and date of death, the pedestal features two large bronze allegories which once again made reference to his character. The first of these allegories is titled ―Fortitude and Faith‖ and the second is ―Charity and Justice.‖ Above the allegories at the top of the pedestal is a series of locations important to Gordon‘s life and career. The names ranged from Crimea to Khartoum.45 Together, the pedestal and statue represent a particular view of Gordon: the imperial hero. The design was approved by Parliament under a Conservative government. The statue itself was quite expensive; the final cost was over £4000 and was not paid for by private funds.46 As a government project, the successful completion of the statue and its unveiling can be seen as imperial propaganda. However, it is important to note that the Gordon statue, like so many of the other military imperial monuments that had preceded it for centuries, was meant to inspire future actions as well as commemorate past ones. Matt Matsuda examined this phenomenon through a discussion on Trajan‘s column in Rome in The Memory of the Modern. Trajan‘s column was not meant to glorify Rome‘s brutal conquest over the Dacians, but instead ―to illustrate grand lessons in politics and morality deserving of respect and emulation.‖ Matsuda continued his analysis by referencing the source of Trajan‘s success: ―success was inextricable from worthiness and the exercise of the virtues of ‗courage, clemency, justice, piety.‘‖47 As the names on the friezes

43 The statue can still be viewed in London today in its new location at the gardens on the Victoria Embankment. The reason why the statue is now located there will be discussed in the concluding chapters. See Appendix A for a contemporary photograph of the Gordon Statue. 44 ―Statue of General Gordon,‖ The Graphic, October 13, 1888. 45 The names on the pedestal are as follows: Crimea 1855, China 1864; Quinsan, Soochow [above Fortitude and Faith]; Gravesend, Equator [above Charity and Justice] and finally Soudan and Khartoum. 46 WORK 20/50 contains a final tallying of the expenses, including the budget years that they were broken down into. 47 Matt K. Matsuda, The Memory of the Modern (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 30.

96 above the allegories on the pedestal to his statue demonstrate, over a millennium later, a hero of another empire, Charles Gordon, would be similarly hailed by his contemporaries. The statue at Trafalgar Square was not the only statue of Gordon commissioned during this time; and by 1888, when the statue was completed, it was joined by several other ones throughout the British Empire, in places as disparate as Canada and Australia.48 There was one other Gordon statue of note erected in 1890. This statue, which served as the model for the later one which would be at Khartoum following its re-conquest, featured an equestrian Gordon, with the general seated astride a camel. It sits at the entrance to the Royal Engineers Barracks at Chatham as a tribute to their famous fallen colleague.49 Gordon‘s transformation from man to symbol was thus effectively cemented. In the years following his death, organizations like the Primrose League, his friends and associates, and the royal family itself ensured that Gordon was not going to be forgotten. As a symbol and figurehead, the general was an invaluable asset to either side of the imperial question. Those who supported further imperial involvement could use the Gladstone administration‘s lack of decisive action regarding Sudan as a cautionary episode that must not be repeated. The political connection between Gladstone and Gordon as already discussed was not one that was broken with the fall of the Liberal Party from government in 1885 and 1886. Instead, it remained a viable political strategy which linked the two until Gladstone‘s death in 1898, the same year that Britain found itself re-engaged in Sudan. Even without the immediate threat of re-involvement in Sudan, Gordon‘s name was still invoked in other imperial situations following his death. Between 1885 and the re-conquest in 1898, there were several other imperial squabbles involving the British government. While none of these problems had a significant impact on the Empire as a whole, the fact that Gordon‘s name and abandonment were cited in discussions of them indicates his continued importance to the British public. The most common place where Gordon‘s name was employed to serve as a reminder was in political speeches, similar to the ones made over Home Rule. This usage of Gordon‘s legacy is best exemplified by two imperial crises which occurred in the 1890s. The less important of these situations involved the actions of the Great Powers concerning Crete. In 1897, the Great Powers agreed to grant autonomy to Crete under a Greek

48 WORK 20/50 A5293. 49 WORK 20/182. The statue at Khartoum will be discussed at length in the concluding chapters.

97 prince following a brief rebellion. Although seemingly insignificant, this rebellion spelled the end of Britain‘s ‗Eastern Question,‘ dating back to the mid-1870s. With the British agreement to the Great Power‘s plan for Crete, the government signaled an acceptance of a loss of this sphere of influence as the Greek prince was firmly under German influence.50 The event may have gone without much notice except for the fact that the ‗Eastern Question‘ had first grown to prominence under William Gladstone and his outspokenness against the Bulgarian atrocities beginning in 1876.51 Now, twenty years later, it seemed as if Britain was finally coming to end of its deliberations on the question. In speeches regarding the situation, both Gladstone and Gordon were invoked. In one speech from 1896, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, urged that the government should not heed Gladstone‘s advice, who argued for further British involvement in the region on the grounds of human rights. This advice could be disregarded because Gladstone was, according to Hicks-Beach, responsible for ―abandon[ing] the peaceful population of the Sudan to the rule of the Mahdi. [He] deserted General Gordon, and therefore by the direct action of the Government…we have incurred no small responsibility for the condition of the population of the Soudan.‖52 Hicks-Beach felt that the human rights basis that Gladstone cited was not very important given his previous decisions. In this case, Gordon was not used to further the empire; his death was used as an argument against continued involvement. At the same time as Hicks-Beach made his argument, one of his colleagues, Under- Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs George Nathaniel Curzon, was still invoking Gordon‘s death as a reason for a continued imperial presence in Sudan. In a long speech given to the Glasgow Conservative Association, Curzon detailed some of the government‘s foreign policy goals. In the space of one sentence, he switched from stating that the government would not be satisfied until ―we have avenged, on the very spot where he fell, the memory of General Gordon‖ to the major foreign affairs topic of the day, Eastern Europe or ―the topic that occupies the

50 Richard Shannon, The Crisis of Imperialism: 1865-1915 (London: Hart-Davis Macgibbon, 1974), 317. Margaret Jefferson explains the reasons why Britain chose to accept this decision in her article ―Lord Salisbury and the Eastern Question, 1890-1898‖ in The Slavonic and East European Review volume 39, number 92 (Dec., 1960), 57. Gladstone himself also argued firmly against this solution as can be seen in a letter he sent to the Aberdeen Weekly Journal on April 3, 1897. 51 Gladstone wrote a famous series of articles against the atrocities in The Nineteenth Century in 1878. William Gladstone, ―England‘s Mission‖ in volume 3, number 16; ―The Paths of Honour and Shame,‖ in volume 3, number 18, and ―Liberty in the East and West‖ in volume 4, number 19. 52 ―Sir Michael Hicks-Beach at Darlington,‖ Leeds Mercury, October 14, 1896. The human rights basis was on the treatment of the Armenians by the Turks in the Ottoman Empire.

98 universal attention.‖53 Gordon was still important enough to occupy at least a portion of a long speech that was otherwise focused on the events in the East. These two contrasting speeches delivered on October 14 and 15, 1896 respectively, highlighted the ways that Gordon could still be used by the Conservative Party. In the first, he and Gladstone are used as an anti-imperial argument, while conversely, Curzon employed his death as a reason to re-enter Sudan. What the two speeches do have in common was a desire to discredit Gladstone, the Liberal Party, and their views on imperialism. Like the Conservative party, other people were also unwilling to overlook Gladstone‘s actions from 1885 in discussions about policy in the late 1890s. Gladstone was not in favor of the Great Power‘s proposal to give Crete its autonomy under a Greek Prince. In an editorial against the former Prime Minister, the Glasgow Herald chose to remind its readers that Gladstone‘s attempt to use the mere authority of his name as a way to argue against something was ironic as he was the man who ―acted at the wrong in the Transvaal…he did not act soon enough in the case of General Gordon.‖54 His perceived authority was, if not completely discredited, at least tempered by his previous actions. The case of Crete was not the only one in which the memory of Gordon was invoked. The second crisis where Gordon was employed in an imperial context concerned the building of a railroad in Uganda. Uganda had first become an imperial issue in 1890 with the signing of the Mackinnon Agreement. Under this agreement, the Imperial British East Africa Company received the rights to a strip of territory that stretched from Uganda to Lake Tanganyika. By holding this territory, the company was able to unite the northern and southern spheres of British influence as a part of the ―Cape to Cairo‖ scheme of Sir William Mackinnon, the director of the company.55 By 1894, the British presence in Uganda had grown in the way of several other British imperial schemes to be more than just a commercial issue. The government in London became involved in the area when Mackinnon, knowing Uganda‘s significance to Salisbury‘s imperial plans, threatened to withdraw from the area if the government did not help to fund the company‘s efforts to build a railroad. As Uganda had significant strategic importance, these guarantees were made, leading to its becoming a British protectorate in part to safeguard the

53 ―Political Situation,‖ Glasgow Herald, October 15, 1896. 54 ―Friday, March, 19th,‖ Glasgow Herald, March 19, 1897. 55 The full details of the scheme and the way that the area eventually wound up a defacto British protectorate are discussed in Wm. Roger Louis, ―Sir Percy Anderson‘s Grand African Strategy, 1883-1896,‖ The English Historical Review volume 81, number 319 (Apr. 1966) : 302-304.

99 sources of the Nile, which was considered integral to ensuring Egypt‘s protection.56 The idea of Uganda becoming a protectorate of Britain was well received. For example, an article in The North American Review from June 1894 explained the public take on the news that Uganda had become a part of the British imperial sphere. From this decision, the author, Conservative MP Sir Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, wrote, ―British influence will stretch from end to end of the dark continent, from Alexandria to Cape Town. That will be a splendid day for England. The fruition of the work of men like Livingstone and Baker, Gordon and Stanley…will then be finally concluded [through commercial means].‖ 57 These commercial means certainly included the question of the railroad, which was first brought to the government‘s attention in 1891, but was not settled before the Salisbury government fell in the elections of 1892. However, Salisbury‘s replacement, the Liberal Roseberry, kept the scheme alive; when Salisbury returned to office in 1895, the Uganda railway project was still viable.58 As its completion was directly linked to British goals in Africa, the presence of Gordon in discussions about it is hardly surprising. In this particular fight, Gordon was used as an expert on Africa—which was one of the reasons why he had been sent back to Sudan originally. Interestingly, his expertise was used by people seeking to defeat the bill, who in some cases, were members of the government that had abandoned him to his fate eleven years earlier. The question of funding the Uganda Railway came up for a vote in the House of Commons in June 1895. This vote, which resulted in the granting of £80,000 for the administration of East Africa (including the railway), received overwhelming support from both the Liberals and the Conservatives. Yet, it was hardly a unanimous vote, with 249 in favor and 51 opposed.59 One of the most prominent of those who opposed the vote was Sir Charles Dilke. Dilke was a member of the Gladstone Cabinet that had sent Gordon to Khartoum in 1884. He was part of the group within the Cabinet that was instrumental in convincing Gladstone that he

56 Further analysis on the political motivations behind the British decision to become involved in Uganda, including foreign policy decisions, see M.P. Hornik, ―The Anglo-Belgian agreement of 12 May 1894‖ The English Historical Review volume 57 number 226 (Apr., 1942) : 227-243. For the actual decisions that led to Uganda becoming a protectorate see P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000, second edition (Longman: London, 2001), 334-335. 57 Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, ―The Political Outlook in England,‖ The North American Review volume 158, number 451 (Jun., 1890): 670. 58 Gash et al, 228. 59 ―The Time of the House,‖ Leeds Mercury, June 14, 1895. Of the £80,000, £50,000 was set aside specifically for the railway.

100 needed to act proactively in terms of Sudan, and he strongly supported sending the general back to Africa.60 Thus, Dilke‘s citation of Gordon‘s views on another African-related issue, especially one that was linked to the fate of Egypt and Sudan, is understandable. His views, which were expressed during the debates, received press coverage from multiple newspapers including the Glasgow Herald and the Leeds Mercury. Both of these papers covered the entirety of the railway fight. However, the tones that two papers took differed. The Glasgow Herald article provided a straightforward analysis of the debate. The reporting was not colored by political bias, and both sides of the question were fully explained. In the article, Dilke was presented as ―vigorously oppos[ing] the policy of constructing a railway‖ for two reasons. The first was on the basis of the idea that ―General Gordon had said there could be no trade, as the natives had nothing to exchange for goods.‖ The second was a more practical concern; Dilke believed that the ―proposed line was not the natural route to Uganda at all.‖ 61 To support his claims against the wishes of the seated government and Lord Salisbury, Dilke used the figure of Gordon he knew, not the one that was created after his death. The Leeds Mercury also carried news of the debate. It was included in a section that was written in a fairly satirical manner, with another issue referred not as the expected battle between the two sides, but instead as a ―polite conversation between a very stout gentleman [Sir William Harcourt, the Liberal Chancellor of the Exchequer]…and a very thin gentleman [Arthur Balfour, the leading Conservative voice in the House of Commons].‖ The topic of the polite conversation is wholly unnecessary. The example was merely to demonstrate the tone of the article. Dilke‘s comments on the bill were not considered to be very important; they came at the very end of the article, right before the final vote was taken. However, the way in which the writer described his comments shows the continued interest that people had in Gordon: ―Sir Charles Dilke subjected the Government scheme to serious criticism, declaring that the best route had not been selected for the railway, and that he had it on the authority of the late General Gordon that it would not be possible to develop markets in that part of the world.‖ The author felt that the statement was sufficient. There was not one word of analysis provided after it; the article moved to its next

60Add Ms 56452 Supplemental Papers of William Gladstone. In Gladstone‘s papers on the crisis, a clipping from the Pall Mall Gazette, ―The Cabinet and the Soudan,‖ February 13, 1884, with the names of people who supported and opposed sending Gordon to Sudan is saved. With the clipping is a note from Gladstone to his Colonial Secretary Derby asking if he saw it, ff. 12-13. 61 ―Our London Correspondence,‖ Glasgow Herald, June 14 1895.

101 featured point, ―The closure,‖ which reported the final tallies.62 Clearly, Gordon‘s status as an authority on Uganda, which he visited during his time in Equatoria, was unchallenged more than a decade after his death.63 The question of a railway in Uganda became paramount following a change in the Empire‘s goals in East Africa. This change was not based on the needs of Africa, or even the British people, but instead on European events. The Great Powers which had been referenced in the Crete debate were slowly giving way to more formalized alliances, like the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy.64 At the time, Italy was involved in imperial projects in Abyssinia. Following an Italian defeat in the spring of 1896, the British government decided to launch a counter-offensive in Sudan to try to draw attention away from the Italians.65 The original goal of this military endeavor was not to avenge the death of Gordon. Therefore, the plans did not make any mention of Khartoum, but only of sending an Anglo-Egyptian force as far into Sudan as Dongola. Khartoum would not be taken and until two years later. Before the decision was made to support Italy, Salisbury wished to postpone any intervention back into Sudan until the Uganda railway, which he strongly supported, had been built. Diplomatic need surpassed any commercial benefits that might have been derived from the railway and the incursion was launched before the railway had come even close to completion.66 Instead of launching any sort of incursion from the south, as would have been the case with a Uganda based assault, the expedition was sent from Egypt under the command of the Sirdar of the Egyptian army—Horatio Herbert Kitchener. During Kitchener‘s command, the purpose of the operation changed to include the avenging of Gordon and the re-taking of Khartoum. This change was partially to court public opinion. As this chapter has shown, General Gordon remained a popular subject in Britain. His death in 1885 did not completely derail the Liberal party‘s agenda, but it was a factor in it. As debates over Ireland and Crete later demonstrated, Gladstone‘s credibility in foreign affairs was

62 ―The Time of the House.‖ 63 John H. Waller, Gordon of Khartoum: The Saga of a Victorian Hero (New York: Atheneum, 1988), 154-155. 64 This alliance was formalized in 1882, while the idea of the Great Powers did not completely fall apart until the twentieth century. 65 The actual events that led to the re-conquest of the Sudan and the creation of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium, including the reasons why Britain wanted support the Italian efforts in Abyssinia (modern-day Ethiopia) will be discussed in the next chapter. For information on the relationship between Italy, Abyssinia, and Sudan, see Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia: 1855-1991 second edition (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press and Research Publication Office, 2001), 81-83. 66 The railway was finally completed, following some domestic issues in Uganda, in 1901.

102 irreparably damaged by Gordon‘s abandonment. His political foes were able to use it almost as a tangible reminder of what was perceived at the time to be one of his biggest failures. Thus, the fallen general was transformed into a national hero. Memorials to Gordon demonstrated this British pride, a sentiment that the Conservative Party was quick to exploit. His new role as an imperial symbol, especially as embraced by that party and the Primrose League, almost demanded that the government officially avenge him, which a Conservative government finally did in 1898.

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CHAPTER 6 BACK TO KHARTOUM

It international considerations led the British to launch a military offensive into Sudan beginning in 1896 with the campaign at Dongola and effectively concluding in 1898 with the re- taking of Khartoum. The British did not become re-involved in Sudan to avenge General Gordon‘s death, and the reasons why they recommitted to the region had nothing to do with the general. Instead, it was the balance of power in Europe that motivated the British government to reexamine its position in the region. By the mid-1890s, the balance was shifting towards Germany. Traditionally, Italy had served as a link between Britain and Germany. To help preserve this link, British assistance to Italy in Africa was crucial. If Britain had not wanted to aid Italy, then the original advance to Dongola would not have occurred in 1896, and furthermore, if Britain had not feared France‘s intentions towards controlling the Nile Valley, then there may not have been an extension of the British goals to include the re-conquest of Khartoum. General Gordon‘s name was not included in any of the military preparations for the operation. In fact, the offensive itself would not be considered a British operation. It was led by the Egyptian army, although the officers were British, so in truth, the army itself was more of an Anglo-Egyptian force. The Sirdar, or commander of the army, General Herbert Kitchener, had also participated in the effort to relieve Gordon. Thus, Kitchener provided the link between Gordon‘s death and the new offensive, a link which would be strengthened following the re- taking of Khartoum and Kitchener‘s memorial to Gordon in front of his former palace. Despite the real international imperatives initiating the British involvement in Sudan, the fact that Gordon‘s memory remained so strong in the popular imagination meant that public opinion would act on and shape the events once they were set in motion. According to Lord Cromer, ―the British public had evidently made up its mind that, sooner or later, Khartoum had to be recaptured.‖1 This sentiment was echoed in the press and in discussions of the offensive by the men who had served in it. It was also exploited by the Conservative government to ensure that there was significant public support for the undertaking. This public support was important to its success, as Britain acknowledged its presence in the area following the end of the offensive with the creation of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium.

1The Earl of Cromer, Modern Egypt volume II (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1916), 109.

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Anglo-Egyptian troops first returned to Sudan to begin their progress to Dongola in March 1896. In the beginning, the government only approved an abbreviated advance up the Nile; however, to intimidate the Khalifa, or leader, of Sudan, it was extended out to the city.2 The reason why these troops were sent to Dongola had little to do with events actually occurring in Sudan. Instead, they were sent to buttress British foreign policy goals in the region and, more importantly, in Europe. In 1896, the fragile alliance that had existed between Italy and Britain was crumbling as a result of Germany‘s growing power. Originally, the British and Italians had allied as a way of aiding Anglo-German relations. As these relations became more strained, Italy lost most of its importance to British foreign policy by March 1896. Nevertheless, according to historian Arthur Marsden, there were two main reasons why Salisbury decided to assist the Italians in Abyssinia. First, he was unwilling to ignore the Italian request for help; as Marsden commented, ―it is clear that a second refusal of help would have dealt a possibly fatal blow to what was left of Anglo-Italian cordiality.‖ 3 In 1896, the British still wanted to preserve this tenuous relationship. Regardless, the British decision to become re- involved in Sudan was already in the planning stages; to assist the Italians, Salisbury really only needed to speed up the preparations. The second reason was simple: the continued protection of Egypt, the Suez Canal, and the Nile River. Marsden cited the ―inevitability of relations with France being strained someday to near breaking point over the whole Egyptian question,‖ in his discussion of this goal.4 This fear of a French presence in the region was paramount to any foreign policy debates during the time period, and an Italian presence would help forestall any French encroachment.5 When, for the reasons discussed above, the decision was made to support the Italians, specific goals were sent to Kitchener and Cromer. At first, their orders were only to intimidate the Khalifa and provide a diversion for the Italian troops currently enmeshed in battle in

2 The Mahdi died in June 1885. He was succeeded by the Khalifa, which in Arabic means the successor. As the Mahdi‘s successor, he was also a religious and political leader. For more on the Khalifa and his duties see the final four chapters of P.M. Holt, The Mahdist State in the Sudan 1881-1898: a study of its origins development and overthrow (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970). 3 Arthur Marsden, ―Salisbury and the Italians in 1896‖ in The Journal of Modern History volume 40, number 1, (Mar., 1968): 111. 4 Ibid. 5 In addition to these foreign policy goals, two major works on the Mahdi had become bestsellers in England by 1896. These two books helped to remind the public about the events of 1885. Their significance is examined in John M. Mackenzie‘s ―Heroic Myths of Empire‖ in his edited Popular Imperialism and the military: 1850-1950 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 128.

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Abyssinia. These aims were met in September, 1896, when the Anglo-Egyptian force reached Dongola. There were two reasons why the force took nearly six months to reach the city. One was the fact that it was dependent on the Nile rising high enough to allow the gunboats to be used. The other was the extension of the old railway that had been created for the relief expedition in 1885. This extension was connected to Kitchener‘s personal goal for the region: the re-conquest of Khartoum.6 As Winston Churchill, one of the most famous correspondents of this offensive—or the ―River War‖ as he termed it—explained about re-taking Dongola: ―the first step had been taken…After ten years of defensive war the Dervishes [the Mahdi/Khalifa‘s supporters] had been attacked…a general desire was manifested in the country that the operations should continue.‖7 Operations did continue following the taking of Dongola. However, the preparations that were involved in continuing the offensive were extensive and occupied most of the army‘s time from the end of 1896 through 1897. Almost a year after Dongola fell, the Khalifa‘s troops decided to abandon Berber to the Anglo-Egyptian troops, which allowed the Sirdar to move to the next and final phase of his operations: defeating the Khalifa and re-conquering Khartoum. At the same time as Kitchener‘s troops were operating in Sudan, the government in London was debating what the final scope of his operation was going to entail. By February 1897, it was decided that Khartoum needed to be re-taken. As Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, stated, ―Egypt could never be held to be permanently secure so long as a hostile Power was in occupation of the Nile valley up to Khartoum.‖8 In his speech, the Chancellor of the Exchequer was not just referring to the Khalifa. There was another hostile power in the region for the British to worry about: France. In 1896, the French had launched an expedition whose goal was to take control of the Nile valley area. By 1898 the expedition had entered into the region and there were fears in Britain that British dominance over the Nile was going to be challenged.9 As a result, the Sirdar‘s goal would become a reality.

6 John O. Udal, The Nile in Darkness: A Flawed Unity 1863-1899 (Wilby, Norwich: Michael Russell, 2005), 513- 516. The reasons for the railroad are discussed in chapter two. 7 Winston S. Churchill, The River War: an account of the Reconquest of the Sudan (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1899 (1933 reprint)), 160. There have been many accounts of these continued operations, or the battles which led to these significant ones: however, as they are outside the scope of this project, their details have been omitted. For a full summation of these battles see Henry Keown-Boyd, A Good Dusting: a Centenary Review of the Sudan Campaigns 1883-1899 (London: Leo Cooper in association with Secker & Warburg, 1986). 8 ―Saturday February 6,‖ Glasgow Herald February 6, 1897. 9 This expedition was the Marchand Expedition. Jean-Baptiste Marchand did reach the area and took control of a fort at Fashoda. Although Marchand reached it first, the Nile valley would remain under British control following a

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Kitchener had personal aims for achieving these goals. He had served in Egypt during Gordon‘s final mission and was one of the last Europeans to have any contact with him because he had been in charge of the telegraph wires to Khartoum.10 After the city had fallen and Gordon killed, Kitchener had been tasked with writing the official account of the events. His feelings about Gordon, whom he regarded as a personal hero and an example to be followed, are evident in his final summation to the report, in which he noted that the only reason why Khartoum had not fallen earlier was ―due to the indomitable resolution and resource of one Englishman [Gordon].‖11 Although he did not advocate the return of Anglo-Egyptian forces to Sudan simply to avenge the general, Kitchener was very conscious of the symbolic significance of the renewed British presence in the region. This sentiment was evident in the orders that he issued before the battle over the Atbara River in April, 1898. This battle occurred on Good Friday and determined who controlled the river, which was essential to the re-taking of Khartoum. In fact, although Kitchener would gain glory and nobility from his subsequent defeat of the Khalifa at Omdurman, he himself considered this battle to be the turning point of his entire military career.12 The significance of the battle is reinforced by the orders he issued for it. They ended with the following: ―The Sirdar is absolutely confident that every officer and man will do his duty, he only wishes to impress upon them two words: ‗Remember Gordon.‘ The enemy before them are Gordon‘s murderers.‖13 Kitchener personally delivered these orders, adding to their importance. The idea of using a previous tragedy to motivate troops was a popular one in 1898. Kitchener‘s utterance of ―Remember Gordon‖ came only two months after the famous entreaty period of diplomatic tension between the two countries. The settling of the Fashoda Crisis in November 1898 would be one of the factors in the creation of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium which will be discussed later in this chapter. For a full account of the Marchand expedition see Darrell Bates, The Fashoda Incident of 1898: Encounter on the Nile (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). 10 Gordon even regarded Kitchener as ―the man whom [he] had always placed [his] hopes upon‖ in his diary of the siege. Volume VI of Gordon‘s Journals, British Library Add Ms 34479, ff. 75. 11 Kitchener‘s Blue Book is included in Add Ms 34479, the quote appears on f. 133. His relationship with Gordon including various aspects of his hero worship is explained in John Pollock, Kitchener: The Road to Omdurman (London: Constable, 1998), 66-67. 12 Udal, 520. 13 Kitchener‘s habit of giving his orders personally has led to them not being preserved in the official accounts of battles. These words were instead preserved by his staff officer, Baron Henry Rawlinson and are recorded in a biography of him by his close friend, General Sir Frederick Maurice based on his journals, letters and private papers (for details on the writing process see page x-xi in his preface). Frederick Maurice, Soldier, Artist, Sportsman: The Life of General Lord Rawlinson of Trent from his journals and letters edited by Major General Sir Frederick Maurice (London: Cassell, 1928) , 33. However, over the last fifteen years the recollection of Kitchener‘s quote has been wrongly attributed in several books to a fellow officer, Lieutenant Colonel Charles à Court Repington‘s memoirs. Charles Repington, Vestigia (London: Constable and Co., Ltd., 1919).

107 to ―Remember the Maine‖ which helped spark the Spanish-American War. Like Gordon‘s death a decade earlier, this war was also caused by the growth of yellow journalism. The U.S.S. Maine was also lost in suspicious circumstances and in a way that was an issue for national pride. Thus, the people who advocated a war were not above using it as a reason to raise popular support for an unpopular undertaking. The re-conquest of Sudan was more popular than the Spanish- American War, but it too was problematic. Using Gordon was a way to convince any potential detractors and to remind the forces why (at least in the perception of the public) they had entered the war. As Richard Fulton discussed in his article, ―The Sudan Sensation of 1898,‖ Kitchener used the memory of Gordon to rally support in a similar manner, with the same level of success.14 With Kitchener‘s personal entreaty motivating the troops, the Anglo-Egyptian forces won a decisive battle at Atbara and by the end of the day controlled the river and its banks. The next step was to re-take Khartoum. However, it would still be several more months before the Anglo- Egyptian forces (which had, by this time, been supplemented by several other British battalions) would be able to achieve their objective. The main reason for this delay was that the Nile had to rise to a level that would allow the gunboats to progress further south. By September 1898, the water had risen a sufficient amount and Kitchener‘s troops were preparing for their final offensive against the Khalifa. This offensive would not take place at Khartoum, but instead at his capital, Omdurman.15 When Gordon was alive, Omdurman was an old Egyptian fort that was built a short distance away from Khartoum. After his death, the Mahdi abandoned Gordon‘s capital, leaving his palace in ruins, and moved the seat of government to Omdurman where he built a new city. When he died, he was buried there in a magnificent tomb.16 Hence, Omdurman had symbolic importance to the Khalifa in addition to having strategic value.

14 Richard Fulton, ―The Sudan Sensation 1898,‖ Victorian Periodicals Review, volume 42, number 1 (Spring 2009): 44. 15 The Khalifa chose Omdurman as the location for his final stand for a variety of reasons, including the facts that most of his army was located there, it was his capital, and he controlled both communication and supply lines. For more on Omdurman, see Udal, 522-524. 16 The best descriptions of this tomb can be found in Bennet Burleigh, Khartoum Campaign of 1898 or the Re- conquest of the Sudan (London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1899, 1989 reprint), 130 and 237. Burleigh described the tomb before it was destroyed as a ―white, cone-shaped tomb, its dome girt with rings, and ornamented with brazen finials, globe and crescent, shone not six miles away…four arabesque finials rose, one from each corner of the supporting wall.‖ Later, when discussing the damage done to the tomb, he went into specifics about the interior, mentioning brass and iron grilles, black and red cloth covering a catafalque, ornate woodwork, yellow lettered panels with text from the Quran, and blue and yellow scroll work.

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The largest military encounter of the British campaign to re-conquer Sudan happened at Omdurman on September 2, 1898. It lasted a single day and proved the effectiveness of a new British weapon: the machine gun. As historian Daniel Headrick has discussed, the British feared a repeat of the Gordon relief expedition and its failure to defeat the Mahdi. This time, as Headrick wrote, ―Kitchener‘s expedition was therefore well supplied with the latest weapons: breechloading and repeating rifles, Maxim guns, field artillery, and six river gunboats firing high-explosive shells.‖17 With their overwhelming firepower advantage, the British won a decisive victory against the Khalifa‘s troops and much more antiquated weapons. Historian Henry Keown-Boyd described the Khalifa‘s troops, with a bit of poetic license, as ―a medieval host in full battle array with beating drums, blaring horns, armoured knights on prancing horses, a multitude of foot-soldiers…brandishing the traditional weapons with which men had done battle for centuries.‖ The differences between the two sides could not have been more stark.18 Omdurman was not only a battle for control of the Nile River and its valley, it was also a battle between old and new technologies. This fact was best explained by Churchill who was present at Omdurman and served as both a member of the 21st Lancers and a war correspondent for the Morning Post. He famously summed up the battle as ―the most signal triumph ever gained by the arms of science over barbarians.‖ Churchill then continued his analysis by referencing the fact that only it took five hours to destroy ―the strongest and best-armed savage army yet arrayed against a modern European Power‖ with comparatively little difficulty, risk or loss by the Anglo-Egyptian troops.19 Even if the battle of Omdurman was not a significant military struggle for the Anglo- Egyptian forces, it still was important in terms of British involvement in the region. Successful re-conquest had been a British imperial goal; it became a point of British pride. By 1898, advances in cheaper printing meant that an ever-widening British public was able to receive their news daily, in some cases more than once a day.20 With all of these new papers, there was also a growth in the numbers of reporters in the field covering events like those in Sudan. In addition to the Reuters correspondent, H. A. Gwynne, whom Kitchener would have preferred to be the only

17 Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 118. 18 Keown-Boyd, 220. 19 Churchill, 300; Headrick gives the numbers killed in the battle as follows: ―20 Britons, 20 of their Egyptian allies and 11000 Dervishes lay dead‖ on page 118. 20 Bernard Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society and Culture in Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 170-171.

109 war correspondent allowed with his troops, the Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail, and Morning Post all had their own reporters in Sudan.21 Most of these correspondents were attached to the military; in the case of Churchill, he served in the action at Omdurman. The British public‘s curiosity about these events was not satisfied with the publication of dispatches back from Sudan. Instead, over the next year, each of these correspondents also published accounts of the events. Written only months after the battles concluded, these books provide a view into how Gordon‘s ―avenging‖ was viewed in London while at the same time allowing their readers to gain more insight into events as they unfolded in the desert. Each author had a unique perspective about the events. Bennet Burleigh, the Daily Telegraph correspondent, had also been present for the Gordon Relief Expedition. In his coverage of the re-taking of Metemmeh on the way to Omdurman, he referenced his feelings of ―pain felt on the receipt of the evil news of Gordon‘s death…and of the slaughter at Khartoum,‖ even as he explained the victorious battle movements.22 He later worked Gordon into his coverage of the Battle of Omdurman‘s aftermath, using language such as ―At last! After fifteen vexatious years spent in trying to get here, an Anglo-Egyptian army has recovered Khartoum and occupied Omdurman. Gordon has been avenged and justified.‖23 To Burleigh, one of the major goals of this campaign was to avenge Gordon and he used the general‘s name liberally throughout his recollections. Like Burleigh, George Washington Steevens, the correspondent for the Daily Mail, was also a full-time war correspondent. However, unlike his counter-part, Steevens was at the beginning of his career and closer in age to the men who were fighting against the Khalifa. Instead of being in Sudan for the Gordon Relief Expedition, Steevens merely read about it—a fact mentioned in the beginning of his bestselling book on the re-conquest. He even referred to accounts of the people and events which took place as ―stories, so gallant, so futile,‖ indicating his youthful fascination with the topic.24 He began his work with an assumption of familiarity with the events of 1884-5, and in this way and many others, Steevens‘ account differs from that of Burleigh. There is a lack of personal remembrances and a focus on the events as they occurred

21 Kitchener‘s desire to only have a Reuter‘s presence is examined in Joseph J. Matthews, ―Heralds of the Imperialistic Wars,‖ Military Affairs, volume 19, number 3 (Autumn, 1955):149. For a full account of the correspondents present in 1898, see Hugh Cecil‘s ―British Correspondents and the Sudan Campaign of 1896-1898,‖ in Edward M. Spiers, editor, Sudan: the reconquest reappraised (London: Frank Cass, 1998). 22 Burleigh, 89. Control over Metemmeh had also been essential during the Gordon relief efforts of 1885, so it was familiar to him. 23 Ibid., 136. 24 G[eorge] W[arrinton] Steevens, With Kitchener to Khartuom (London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1898); this reprinted edition (London: Greenhill Books, 1990), 4.

110 on the ground in Sudan. He too mentioned the idea of ―avenging Gordon,‖ but his analysis of the avenging differs. To Steevens, Gordon is a symbol, interchangeable with other imperial figures, which allowed him to express the following sentiment: ―Gordon may die—other Gordons may die in the future—but the same clean-limbed brood will grow up and avenge them.‖25 For Steevens, the more important idea was not the avenging of one imperial hero, but rather the imperial spirit present in Britain. The Morning Post‘s Winston Churchill shared some of these sentiments. He was also a young man in 1885 and was just beginning his career when he went to Sudan in 1898. However, unlike Steevens, Churchill was personally invested in the outcome of the offensive because he was temporarily posted to the Lancers for the duration of his time in the region. His writing, especially regarding the battle movements, is quite vivid and at times slips into the first person— demonstrating the personal attachment that he had to the battle‘s outcome. In his description of the aftermath of the Lancers‘ charge, Churchill employed terminology like ―we‖ and ―our‖ in passages such as, ―With the experience of the past hour on our minds‖ and ―we had not gone far when individual Dervishes began to walk towards us.‖26 In a departure from the conventions employed by his fellow correspondents, Churchill did not use the idea of avenging Gordon as a major point in his analysis of Omdurman; he was more focused on why the Anglo-Egyptian forces succeeded in 1898 rather than failed in 1885. This analysis and the distinct lack of Gordon‘s name in any coverage of the battles show the difference in priorities between some of the men fighting on the ground and those who were responsible for an Anglo-Egyptian presence in the region. Most members of the governments in Cairo and London shared the idea that, at least to appease public opinion, Gordon needed to be avenged. These sentiments are best reflected in the correspondence that Sir Francis Reginald Wingate, the Director of Military Intelligence for the Anglo-Egyptian Army, received in the days following the battle. In these letters, Wingate was praised for his role in the Khalifa‘s downfall. His correspondents included fellow members of the Egyptian government, military officers in London and Sudan, and prominent citizens in London. All of the letters were effusive with

25 Ibid., 311. 26 Churchill, 301.

111 praise, with most referencing the idea that Khartoum was once again in British hands and thus, the object of the mission was achieved and Gordon had finally been avenged.27 The Sirdar‘s own report sent to Lieutenant-General Sir Francis Grenfell, who was in command of the British garrison in Egypt, fully explained the goals of his advance: ―the result…is the practical annihilation of the Khalifa‘s army, the consequent extinction of Mahdism in the Sudan, and the submission of the whole country formerly ruled under Egyptian Authority.‖ These achievements had therefore, ―reopened vast territories to the benefit of peace, civilisation and good Government.‖28 Cromer, who was involved in the both the 1885 and 1898 military endeavors in Sudan and was the boss of Grenfell and Kitchener, echoed these sentiments in his Modern Egypt. He focused not on the battle movements, but instead on the political importance of the fall of Omdurman and subsequent re-capturing of Khartoum. In his magnum opus, he demonstrated the manner in which news was received in London, writing that it ―was in direct proportion to the despondency which chilled the heart of the British nation when, thirteen years previously, it was known that Mahdism had triumphed and that General Gordon had been killed.‖29 To Cromer, the re-conquest of Sudan was about more than just avenging Gordon, a man with whom he had had personal and professional differences; it was about eliminating any vestiges of Mahdism still present and ―introducing the light of Western civilisation amongst the sorely tried people of the Soudan.‖30 However, none of Cromer‘s goals would have been achieved without the success of the Battle of Omdurman. The fall of Omdurman essentially ended any resistance to the re-conquest. It paved the way for the Anglo-Egyptian troops to re-take the ruined city of Khartoum and to finish Gordon‘s mission.31Furthermore, the conquest of Omdurman, the Mahdi‘s capital, represented the end of his influence in Sudan, a point that was demonstrated by Kitchener‘s decision to destroy his tomb. This decision, which Kitchener admitted in a letter to Cromer was ―taken after due

27Sudan Archive, Durham University Library (SAD) 266/9 F.R. Wingate‘s September 1898 Correspondence, contains examples of the people above in 4,7, 20-21, 22 respectively. 28 5 September 1898 report in the National Archives, Reports and Dispatches on the Nile Operation 1898-1899, WO 32/6143. 29 Cromer, volume II, 109. 30 Ibid., 110. 31 When Queen Victoria, who was so upset about the failures of the previous decade, was notified about the fall of Omdurman and re-taking of Khartoum, she was able to write in her journal with satisfaction that ―surely, he [Gordon] is avenged!‖ Pollock, 142.

112 deliberation and prompted solely by political considerations,‖ was extremely controversial.32 Kitchener‘s feelings on the situation are best reflected not in the letter quoted above, which was sent from Cromer to Salisbury following a negative article that appeared several months later in the Contemporary Review, but instead in a private telegram to Cromer. In the telegram, which Cromer later quoted to Salisbury, Kitchener elaborated on his decision: ―it was politically advisable that the Mahdi‘s tomb, which was the centre of pilgrimage and fanatical feeling, should be destroyed; the tomb was also in a dangerous condition owing to the damage done to it by shell-fire, and might have caused loss of life if left as it was.‖33 In addition to destroying the tomb, the Mahdi‘s bones were removed and thrown into the Nile River, with only his skull left untouched. The reasons for the desecration of the tomb were complicated. As Kitchener pointed out, the tomb itself was damaged; however, the political ramifications were clearly more important. The man assigned to destroy the tomb (probably because he was the only one capable of laying the explosives) happened to be General Gordon‘s nephew, Lieutenant-Colonel William Staveley Gordon, known as ―Monkey.‖ Monkey Gordon was also partially responsible for the decision, made in conjunction with other Anglo-Egyptian officers, to throw the bones into the Nile and keep the head, perhaps in retaliation for one of the popular Gordon myths at the time which stated that the general‘s head had been transformed into a drinking vessel by the Mahdi.34 The decision to blow up the Mahdi‘s tomb was thought to be necessary for the reasons that Kitchener gave Cromer. However, desecrating his grave and destroying his bones was not perceived as a necessity by the British government. Kitchener was not present in Omdurman, or even Khartoum, when the bones were cast into the Nile, yet he was the person who took the brunt of the blame for the offense.35 Ironically, only months earlier, Kitchener had been compared favorably to the Mahdi, which in Arabic means the ―expected one.‖ Steevens wrote,

32 National Archives Public Records Office Kitchener Papers, 30/57/14, 1 February 1899 letter from Kitchener to Cromer. 33 NA 30/57/14 12 March 1899 letter from Cromer to Salisbury. 34 Pollock, 149-151. Janice Boddy presented a different, more unsympathetic view of the controversy in Civilizing Women: British Crusades in Colonial Sudan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 21. She asserts that ―Like his adversary, the Mahdi was denied the religious burial required to ensure his resurrection at the end of human time.‖ This statement leads to the argument that Gordon had failed to recognize the amount of passion that his followers had for the Mahdi and that the British were not going to underestimate this passion again. The various myths about Gordon‘s death (and his remains) are discussed in chapter one. 35 At the time, Kitchener was involved in solving the Fashoda Crisis caused by the French under Marchand. The crisis, which brought the two sides to the brink of war, was successfully defused by November 1898. For more information see Bates‘ The Fashoda Incident.

113 regarding the beginning of Kitchener‘s campaign: ―For Anglo-Egypt he is the Mahdi, the expected; the man who has sifted experience and corrected error; who has worked at small things and waited for great; marble to sit still and fire to smite; steadfast, cold, and inflexible…‖36 Now, only months later, he was accused of allowing the remains of a ―man of certain importance‖ as the queen referred to the Mahdi, to be desecrated. 37 Regardless of his personal intentions towards the Mahdi, Kitchener‘s troops were responsible for this blatant desecration and destruction. His personal reputation would be maligned, leading John Pollock, who authored biographies of both Kitchener and Gordon, to compare the two men. He wrote that Kitchener is remembered by Sudanese ―chiefly for the slaughter at Omdurman, the destruction of the tomb (since rebuilt) and the indignity done to the bones, whereas Gordon continued to be venerated as a saint.‖38 Kitchener‘s non-participation in the decision became known to his contemporaries the following March, but the damage to his reputation had already occurred. Perhaps part of the reason that the destruction of the Mahdi‘s tomb received the level of attention that it did was because of Kitchener‘s actions at the re-taking of Khartoum. Only two days after Omdurman was shelled and essentially destroyed, Kitchener and the Anglo-Egyptian troops held a ceremony at Khartoum in front of Gordon‘s former palace. Full of pomp and circumstance, the ceremony served both as an acknowledgment of the formal Anglo-Egyptian regaining of the city, but more importantly to the Sirdar, it was also a memorial service for the general who had famously died there. Gordon‘s memorial service took place on Sunday, September 4, 1898. For a ceremony that would officially represent the beginning of a new type of rule in Sudan, it was remarkably brief, lasting from 10am until approximately noon. The event was well attended, with, in the words of G.W. Steevens: ―detachment[s] of every corps, white, black or yellow…[and] every white officer that could be spared from duty‖ in addition to fifty men selected from each British battalion that participated in the re-conquest and one or two representatives from each Egyptian battalion.39 The participants ranged from the general‘s friends and colleagues to those who had barely been born in 1885, further highlighting Gordon‘s continued impact in the region.

36 Steevens, 51-52. 37 NA 30/57/16, 24 March 1899 letter from Queen Victoria to Kitchener. 38 Pollock, 151. 39 Steevens, 311. There are numerous descriptions of the events of this ceremony; however, most historians feel that the most complete description is found in Steeven‘s work.

114

As Khartoum was still in ruins, the preparations for the ceremony began when a fleet of steamers brought the soldiers up the Nile to the city. Once there, they disembarked and were placed into formation facing the ruins of Gordon‘s palace. On one side of the rectangle were the Egyptian troops, on the other were the British; in the middle, between the troops and facing the palace, were the Sirdar, his generals, and his staff.40 In a ceremony laden with symbolism, the placement of each of these groups was important. The center of all attention was not the Sirdar who had just won a significant battle, but instead the roof of the ruined palace—the place where Gordon himself was believed to have been killed. The reason for this placement soon became evident: atop the ruins stood two flags poles with staff officers standing beside them. At a signal from Kitchener, the Union Flag was run up the first; while that flag was unfurling, the Khedive‘s flag was also hoisted.41 The hoisting of both flags was accompanied by ―God Save the Queen‖ and the ―Khedival Hymn,‖ respectively, in addition to salutes from the cannon aboard the steamers. Finally, when both flags had been hoisted, three cheers tributes were given for the Queen, Khedive, and Sirdar, followed by a twenty-one gun salute.42 The actual hoisting of the flags was a simple and symbolic act. By having the Union Flag raised first (even if it was only a second earlier), Kitchener asserted the prominence of Britain in Sudan. Nevertheless, by allowing the same level of pomp to the Khedive‘s flag, he also indicated that the two would be partners in Sudan, even if Britain was the senior one.43 This portion of the ceremony was joyous, a celebration of a completed task with patriotic music and blaring guns. It was also a moment to look towards the future, to the rebuilding of Khartoum, and to a new start for Sudan. However, the ceremony did not end with the hoisting of the flags. As soon as the guns had stopped firing, the second object of the ceremony began. Described as either a memorial or ―funeral‖ for Gordon, this section began with the military band playing the Dead March from ―Saul,‖ followed by the march from ―Scipio.‖ In his account of the ceremony, Steevens went into detail about the choice of ―Scipio‖ for the memorial, as ―in England [it] generally goes with ‗Toll for the Brave;‘ this was in memory of those loyal men among the Khedive‘s subjects who could

40 Burleigh, 254 discusses the exact composition of each side of the rectangle. 41 Egypt was technically ruled by the Khedive under a firman from the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, Egypt and Khedival state are used interchangeably, as are their adjectives. 42 Steevens, 313 and Burleigh, 257. This edition of Burleigh includes a grainy photograph of the flags being lifted on 259. 43 This idea would be officially enshrined with the creation of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium in the January 19, 1899 agreement, which will be discussed in full later in this chapter.

115 have saved themselves by treachery, but preferred to die with Gordon,‖ referring to the Egyptian garrison that was stranded in Khartoum with Gordon.44 Robert Giddings analyzed this choice of language by Steevens, accusing the war correspondent of ―go[ing] to great lengths to work up as much emotional charge as he can to convey the moving solemnity of the ceremony…in which military music plays an important part.‖45 Even if Steevens was taking license with his language, he did manage to convey the depth of feeling present as the men were standing and listening to the music honoring the men who had died at Khartoum. These musical selections were followed by a brief memorial service designed to be as ecumenical as possible, with chaplains from each of the Christian denominations represented, perhaps as a nod to Gordon‘s well-known and fairly non-denominational Christianity. Each chaplain read a prayer and the service concluded with bagpipers playing a funeral dirge and the Khedive‘s band played the final hymn, either ―Abide with Me‖ as Steevens claimed, or ―Thy Will Be Done‖ as Burleigh remembered it.46 This difference is notable for the simple reason that Steevens‘ analysis of the ceremony made specific reference to the choice of ―Abide with Me,‖ writing that ―perhaps lips did twitch just a little to see the ebony heathens fervently blowing out Gordon‘s favorite hymn; but the most irresistible incongruity would hardly have made us laugh at that moment.‖47 Regardless of which hymn was played, the ceremony concluded with another blast of guns from the steamers. Every description of the ceremony ended with a note about the normally stoic, ―cold‖ Kitchener and his unexpected reaction to finally being able to memorialize and honor his hero. Kitchener was described as overcome with emotion and unable to speak or see as people walked up to him to congratulate him on re-taking Sudan.48 An officer serving with him at the time, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles à Court Repington, remembered speaking to him about Gordon that day while they walked in the garden planted by the late general at his palace and recollected that Kitchener ―spoke in affecting words about Gordon, and of the long years which had been spent

44 Steevens, 313-314. 45 Robert Giddings, ―Delusive Seduction: pride, pomp, circumstance and military music‖ in John M. Mackenzie, editor, Popular Imperialism and the Military, 44. 46 No one is sure what hymn was actually played. Repington remembers it as ―Lead, Kindly Light,‖ and refers to it as ―Gordon‘s favourite hymn‖ in his Vestigia, 170. 47 Steevens, 314. 48 Ibid., Burleigh, 261. Rawlinson‘s reminiscences are the only specific mention of the idea that Kitchener was actually crying during the ceremony. He wrote that the ―Sirdar, who is, as a rule, absolutely unmoved, had great round tears on his cheeks.‖ Maurice, 42.

116 in recovering the lost Sudan and all he owed to those who had assisted him.‖49 Repington and Kitchener were joined by many other troops who had participated in the ceremony; the gardens were perceived to be a connection to Gordon the man, rather than the legend they had just honored. Kitchener‘s staff officer, Sir Henry Rawlinson, recorded his feelings on the ceremony in his journal, writing that ―what it meant to me, and I think to most of us, was not that we had added so many thousand square miles to the British Empire, but that we had pledged ourselves to complete the work for which Gordon died thirteen years ago, and to free this land from brutality and tyranny.‖50 Bennet Burleigh, as an observer and not a participant, contributed a different perspective to the time spent in Khartoum by describing the level of emotion present among the men as they ―scrambled‖ over the ruins and walked in the gardens, ―I was surprised to find that even the youngest, most callow soldiers knew their Khartoum and the story of Gordon‘s fight and death. So deep and far had the tale travelled.‖51 Some of the soldiers had a particular reason to be moved by their time spent in Gordon‘s garden. Special permission had been granted to any ‗Gordon Boy‘ or graduate of the Gordon Boys‘ Home, who was involved in the re-conquest to participate in the ceremony.52 All of the men were given about an hour to walk through the remains and then the entire contingent traveled back to Omdurman. The ceremony was concluded. Gordon had been laid to rest in Khartoum. However, even though the idea of Gordon now being avenged was prevalent throughout all of the Empire, not all of its citizens agreed with the level of celebration afforded to the late general by Kitchener. Irish newspapers, in particular, sought to minimize the importance of the ceremony. Their coverage falls into three categories: strict reports on the events as they occurred, factual descriptions with some editorial commentary, and editorials. The coverage in the Southern Star is an example of the first method; it only briefly mentioned the ceremony and did not go into detail about its aspects, merely reporting that ―a memorial service to General Gordon was held yesterday, both British and Egyptian armies taking part in it.‖53 Other Irish papers mentioned the Battle of Omdurman, and the idea that ―the death of Gordon has at last been

49 Reptington, 170-171. 50 Maurice, 42. 51 Burleigh, 262. 52 ―Gordon Boys at the Battle of Omdurman,‖ The New Penny Magazine illustrated, November 26, 1898, p. 247. Also included is the story of one ‗boy‘ who missed the ceremony, but was given a leaf from Gordon‘s garden further illustrating its significance. 53 ―Flight of the Khalifa,‖ Southern Star, 10 September 1898.

117 avenged‖ but not the ceremony itself, thus falling into the second type.54 It is the final method of coverage, the editorial, where the Irish papers were the most critical about events in Sudan. In an editorial which ran in the Anglo-Celt, the author reacts to statements which had been made to the Times in London. The paper reprinted some of the most explosive statements from that Times letter to the editor, such as when the writer refers to Kitchener ―step[ping] to fame and glory‖ over the corpses of ―20,000 murdered African warriors.‖ The writer believes that the ceremony was more of a self-aggrandizing move for Kitchener than a fitting memorial for Gordon, who, he believes, would have been angered by the idea that thousands of Sudanese had been killed to ―avenge‖ him, in the words of the writer, these warriors were ―‗butchered to ease the conscience of the English nation and make an English holiday‘‖55 Clearly, the author of the letter did not believe that Kitchener‘s ceremony was appropriate, or that Gordon himself would have wanted to be commemorated in such a manner. In spite of these sentiments expressed in the Irish newspapers of the time, Kitchener was unwilling to let Gordon‘s memory fade from Sudan following this ceremony. Instead, he proposed a memorial similar in idea to that of the Gordon Boys‘ Home. Designed originally ―to propagate Gordon‘s distinctive combination of morality, technical skills, official loyalty and military virtue,‖ this memorial would be in the shape of a college (although, originally it was no more than an elementary school).56 According to Burleigh, who claimed to have had several conversations with him on the subject, Kitchener conceived of the scheme while still in Sudan and believed that his new college at Khartoum would ―become a centre of light and guidance for the new nation being born to rule Central Africa.‖57 In order to make this vision a reality, the Sirdar, who would soon become the new territory‘s first Governor-General, needed to raise a substantial amount of money. To achieve his goal, he looked to the British people. By November 1898, Kitchener‘s peerage had been officially conferred, but more importantly, he had become Kitchener of Khartoum.58 As ―K of K,‖ as he became known, he

54 For example, see ―Notes and Comments,‖ Westmeath Examiner, 10 September 1898, the Southern Star also ran other articles on September 10 concerning events in Sudan. 55 ‗Spex,‘ ―Idle Moments‘ Pars: Indicted by an Englishman,‖ Anglo-Celt, (Cavan) 17 September 1898. 56 Mackenzie, ―Heroic myths of Empire,‖ 130. In a speech given at the inauguration of the new Gordon Memorial College in 1945, the then-governor-general of the Sudan referred to its humble beginnings as an elementary school. SAD 673/7/45. 57 Burleigh, 270. 58 Kitchener wanted to call the September 2, 1898 battle the Battle of Khartoum; he was overruled by the War Office who insisted on naming it the Battle of Omdurman, but he was allowed to use the name of the city in his new title when he became a peer.

118 wrote a letter to the press in England asking for public support for the college. His reason for building it was simple: the college would ―be a pledge that the memory of Gordon is still alive among us.‖ Appearing in a variety of newspapers throughout the United Kingdom, the appeal asked for the specific sum of £100,000 to found the college, with £10,000 to build it and the remaining £90,000 for its maintenance. It continued by asking for the money on ―behalf of a race dependent upon our mercy, in the name of Gordon, and in the cause of that civilisation which is the life of the Empire of Britain.‖ 59 In the letter that Kitchener sent to the press asking them to run the appeal, he also listed the prominent supporters of the college, including the Queen, Lord Salisbury, the Lord Mayor of Liverpool and the Lords Provost of Glasgow and Edinburgh.60 As he expected, the college received overwhelming support. By January, 1899, the full sum had been raised and construction on the building began. On January 5, 1899, Cromer laid the foundation stone, making Kitchener‘s dream a reality.61 The college opened to students in November, 1902. By then, Khartoum had been rebuilt into a completely modern city, much in the way Burleigh reported that Kitchener had desired. In her analysis of the perpetuation of the ―Gordon cult‖ in Khartoum, historian Janice Boddy focused on Kitchener‘s attempts to create this new Khartoum as quickly as possible, even including his private instructions to Wingate which ordered him to loot the city of any ―‗marble stairs, marble pavings, iron railings, looking glasses and fittings; doors, windows, furniture of all sorts,‘‖ in order to fill the new buildings. Kitchener was so devoted to the project that by February, 1899, he had five thousand men working on building new government buildings and infrastructure.62 Thus, this Khartoum was a creation of the British, complete with a story—which may have been spurious—that the entire city was laid out in the shape of the Union Flag, with Gordon‘s statue in the center.63 Regardless of whether there was an intentional decision to lay a new city out in the shape of the British flag, the placement of Gordon‘s statue at the point where the most roads—which were of course named after the imperial figures of the day including the late general himself—intersected was a fact.

59 Kitchener‘s letter to the press was printed on November 30, 1898 in the Pall Mall Gazette, the Daily Telegraph, the Daily Mail, and the Times, and in the Belfast News Letter. It also appeared in many other publications, but these were among the most significant. 60 The full text of Kitchener‘s letter appears in Burleigh, 272-274, including the sections that were not published for general reading. 61 WO 32/6143 Report on the Nile Expedition from the General Officer Commanding the Force in Egypt. 62 Boddy, 21 quoting Kitchener to Wingate, January 26, 1899. The quote is taken from Philip Magnus‘ 1958 biography of Kitchener, Kitchener, Portrait of an Imperialist (London: Murray, 1958), 148. 63 Boddy, 22.

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The statue standing on Gordon Avenue, an exact copy of the equestrian statue that stands at the front of the Royal Engineers Barracks at Chatham, was erected in 1903 and remained in Khartoum as long as there was a British presence.64 In contrast to the statue in Trafalgar Square, the Khartoum and Chatham statues depicted Gordon riding a camel, dressed not in a traditional British uniform, but in the uniform and tarboosh (hat) of an Egyptian general. This depiction, which was much more imposing than the one in London, stood over two feet higher on a taller plinth. Gordon was not holding a bible; all he held was his traditional ―wand of victory‖ and the reigns of the camel. Unlike the national statue, the Khartoum statue was not one designed to celebrate all of the general‘s characteristics; instead, the equestrian statue celebrated only his final posting. The statue and college were not the only memorials to Gordon in Khartoum. A third memorial was perhaps the most fitting to the Christian side of his character. In 1904, under the supervision of the late Queen Victoria‘s daughter, Princess Henry of Battenburg, the foundation stone for the Cathedral Church of All Saints Khartoum was laid. The dedication was led by members of the newly formed Gordon Memorial Mission, whose goal was to continue the work of Gordon‘s anti-slavery activities in the late 1870s as a sort of living memorial to the general.65 Fittingly for the Mission, the cathedral included a separate memorial chapel in ―memory of the servants of Great Britain who have laid down their lives in the discharge of their duty in the Sudan.‖ According to a newspaper article about and seeking contributions for the chapel, ―will be fittingly identified with the hero of Khartoum and called the ‗Gordon Memorial Chapel.‘…it is thought that there may be many in the Sudan who hold Gordon‘s name in reverence and would like to help in some way.‖66 There were many people in Sudan who held Gordon‘s name in reverence. However, most of them were not Sudanese or even Egyptian—they were British. To the people of Sudan (and Egypt) Gordon was a more controversial figure. Although Gordon was the only European who was killed at Khartoum in 1885, he was accompanied by an Egyptian garrison and they, too,

64 The Khartoum statue is an exact replica of the one at Chatham. The Chatham statue was fully described in a 1937 pamphlet ―The Royal Engineers in Egypt and the Sudan‖ by Lt. Col E.W.C. Sands, on page 144. The pamphlet is found in the D.M.H. Evans collection, SAD 714/24. The full details about the removal of the statue from Khartoum will be discussed in the final chapter. 65 A handwritten account of the history of the Gordon Memorial Sudan Mission can be found in the papers of O. Allison at Durham, SAD 804/11/31. 66 ―Twenty-Five Years Ago: Khartoum Fallen: Gordon Dead,‖ The Sudan Times January 26, 1910. The clipping was saved in the collection of R.O. Collins at Durham. SAD 946/7.

120 were killed by the Mahdi‘s forces. Eve M. Troutt Powell examined Egyptian responses to the commemoration of Gordon, quoting from a speech made by the founder of Egyptian nationalism, Mustafa Kamil. In the speech, Kamil was annoyed at the British for their subjugation of any Egyptian efforts in the region, but he was also annoyed at his fellow Egyptians for allowing it to happen. He was not satisfied by what Steevens believed to be an acknowledgment of the Egyptian garrison and felt that they needed much more. Thus, Kamil referenced the British ceremony at the palace for Gordon, and then continued by asking a question of his Egyptian listeners: ―‗Did not our heroic soldiers die before the recovery of the Sudan, for its recovery, and no one mentions a thing about them? Instead, there are those among us who congratulate the British for reclaiming Gordon‘s remains…‘‖ He concluded his accusation with a question: ―Is the blood of one Englishman of higher price, while the blood of thousands of Egyptians has no price and gets nothing but oblivion?‖67 For Kamil, the answer to the question was obviously no. Gordon‘s death was not the only death that mattered in Sudan. To Kamil, then, Gordon was a symbol of the continued British effort to reform both Sudan and Egypt into its own image. For the British, however, the answer was quite different: by using Gordon as their symbol, they were able to ―[wipe] away the names and memory of the Egyptian dead in the Sudan‖ while at the same time they could ―[engrave] their own mark on the region with the letters of Gordon‘s name,‖ which would make the Egyptian role anonymous.68 Mustafa Kamil was not the only detractor of British efforts in Sudan, but his objections and the opinions of those who agreed with him were overlooked while Britain remained in control of both territories.69 When the British government decided in 1896 that it needed to become involved in the region again, it became almost inevitable that Sudan was going to become part of the Empire. How Sudan would be classified under it was still in question.

67 A selection of Kamil‘s speech from December 23, 1898 is reprinted from his Al-khutub edited by ‗Abd al‘Azim Ramadan (Cairo: Matba‘a al-misriya al-‗amma l-il-kitab, 1986) and translated in Eve M. Troutt Powell, A Different Shade of Colonialism: Egypt, Great Britain and the mastery of the Sudan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 161. 68 Ibid. 69For other objections to the British conception of events in Sudan, see Mekki Abbas, The Sudan Question: The Dispute over the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 1884-1951 (London: Faber and Faber, 1952) and L.A. Fabunmi, The Sudan in Anglo-Egyptian Relations: A Case Study in Power Politics 1800-1956 (London: Longmans, 1960). Both authors focus on the economic benefits that the British Empire gained from the re-conquest, with particular attention on the Nile river and its uses, especially in irrigation. Fabunmi‘s work is more detailed, and builds upon the ideas laid out by Abbas.

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This question would not be answered until the conclusion of any military obstacles present in the Nile Valley. With their loss at the Battle of Omdurman, the Khalifa‘s forces no longer obstructed Anglo-Egyptian interests, but a foreign threat still remained in the form of France, represented by the Marchand expedition. At the same time as Kitchener‘s forces were moving towards their confrontation at Omdurman, Marchand and his troops arrived at Fashoda, where they took over an abandoned Egyptian fort. The fact that the French arrived there first was worrisome to the British—but Marchand‘s force was quite small, and it was considered a lesser threat than the Khalifa. Hence, as soon as the Battle of Omdurman, re-taking of Khartoum, and memorialization of Gordon were concluded, the next major priority for the British was to handle the situation in Fashoda. Kitchener went up the Nile to the fort just days after the memorial; by the end of September, he had reported back to the British government on conditions there and the size of the French force. To add to the tension between the two empires, at the same time as Kitchener was meeting with Marchand at Fashoda, in London, Salisbury had proclaimed that the territories that had been captured during the re-conquest were officially Anglo-Egyptian owing to the ―right of conquest,‖ and thus the British would not negotiate with the French over Fashoda.70 For approximately one month, the situation in Sudan, instead of being almost resolved, appeared as if it were on the brink of causing warfare between Britain and France. For a variety of reasons, both domestic and foreign, the French backed down from the confrontation in late October.71 By December, the Marchand expedition had abandoned Fashoda and returned home. Sudan was now left solely in British (or technically Anglo-Egyptian) control. The Fashoda incident demonstrated to the British government that it needed to create a form of government to eliminate any questions of who controlled Sudan. At the time, it was considered to be a ―primitive country‖ whose inhabitants were incapable of complicated international laws, courts, and customs, and thus needed a European overseer. The idea of making Sudan at least semi-autonomous was not considered, nor was the idea of handing the

70 Udal, 569-570. 71 France depended on a legal justification of res nullius, or the idea that the land belonged to no one, to explain its presence in the region; however, to press this claim, it would have needed international support. Without international support, especially from the Russians, this reason for invasion was discounted in France. While the lack of support for its international goals was partially responsible for the end of the expedition, a domestic problem, the Dreyfus affair, resulted in a lack of public attention to the expedition in Fashoda and provided a convenient excuse for the French government to decide that it could not possibly go to war against Britain. For more on these problems, see Bates, 151-154.

122 territory over to Egypt completely. 72 Its re-conquest was not under the British flag, but that of the Khedive, so to justify a continued presence in the region, Britain needed to maintain the idea of an Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Remarkably, Britain had never before claimed control of Sudan; even General Gordon had worked for the Khedive, who was technically under the Ottoman Empire. Although realistically, Britain controlled all of the territory‘s policies and interests by 1900, Egypt was not a British colony; Sudan therefore could also not be one.73 The solution to the problem was to create a new, sometimes awkward governmental scheme: the Anglo- Egyptian condominium. Winston Churchill described the resulting state as free ―from the curse of internationalism‖ and said that it was ―neither British nor Ottoman, nor anything else so far known to the law of Europe.‖ Instead, he termed it a diplomatic ―Fourth Dimension.‖74 This unique form of government was officially enshrined into law with the signing of the Sudan Agreement on January 19, 1899, which declared that Sudan was officially under both the Queen‘s and the Khedive‘s authority. For the purposes of government, it was to be ruled by a governor-general, who would be ―appointed by Khedival Decree on the recommendation of Her Britannic Majesty‘s Government, and shall be removed only by Khedival Decree with the consent of Her Britannic Majesty‘s Government.‖75 This statement, the entirety of Act III of the agreement, is only one of many asserting that Britain was actually the controlling power, regardless of the legal niceties which established both as ―equals.‖ With the January 19 agreement, the question of Sudan was ended. From 1899 onwards, it was enshrined as a part of the British sphere of influence, and in essence, the British Empire. But what of the man whose death there in 1885 gave the region greater significance for foreign policy? Charles Gordon was not erased from the British memory as soon as he was avenged in September 1898. Instead, his role of imperial symbol was increased. His continued presence in the public eye was helped by the actions of the first two governor-generals of Sudan. Both Kitchener and his successor, Wingate, held Gordon in high esteem as was evident by the

72 John Marlowe, A History of Modern Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations 1800-1956 second edition (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1965), 156-157. 73 Cromer also discussed the reasons why he advocated the condominium, including the policy reasons for Egypt‘s continued involvement in his Modern Egypt, volume II, 112-119. 74 Churchill, 325-326. 75 Churchill included the entire text of the agreement as his Appendix B, 371-373. Act III is on page 372.

123 rebuilding of Khartoum discussed in this chapter.76 Kitchener remained governor-general for only a short time; by late 1899 he had been pressed into another African imperial conflict, the Boer War. He left Sudan‘s government in the hands of Wingate, who is credited with creating the new Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Wingate served as governor-general until after the end of World War I, and his policies truly enshrined Gordon into Sudanese history. Perhaps his actions are unsurprising, as the final words of his Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan indicated his hopeful opinion ―that a new and better Sudan will be raised over the ashes of Gordon, and all those brave officers and men who have perished in the loyal performance of their duty.‖77 As Wingate would be responsible for its foundation, a new and better Sudan that still held Gordon in high esteem did, in fact, result. By 1900, Gordon had been avenged. The lack of a response to his death was no longer a blight on British pride to be used to rally support for a continued presence in Africa or Sudan— this presence was now guaranteed by the condominium. If the real object of the offensive was not Gordon but instead British foreign policy goals, these too had been met. Khartoum was under British control, rebuilt in a more European image, to serve as a counterpoint to the nearby ruins of Omdurman.78 Plans for Gordon memorials were underway, and it seemed as though, finally, the general‘s memory had been assured. He had received a type of funeral, young boys were learning about him as a figure of history, and, for the time being, he was no longer perceived as important at the turn of the century. However, this perception would change as the demands of British imperialism warranted in the early twentieth century. As a symbol, Gordon‘s work for the British Empire was not finished. Politics over the next decades would see him used in new debates, but it was not the same Gordon who had been used in the earlier debates. The Charles Gordon who was cited in debates on Ireland, on Uganda, on Crete, was no more. What replaced him was an idealized figure, not a real person.

76 With the publication of his famous Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan in 1891, Wingate had already become well known as a supporter of Gordon. He is even credited by his son and biographer, Ronald, with helping to advocate the re-conquest in his writings. Sir Ronald Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan: The Life and Times of General Sir Reginald Wingate, Maker of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (London: John Murray, 1955), 88. 77 F.R. Wingate, Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan: being an account of the rise and progress of Mahdiism and of subsequent events in the Sudan to the present time (London: Macmillan and Co., 1891), 491. 78 In her section on the ―Gordon cult,‖ Boddy examines this use of modern Khartoum juxtaposed with the exotic, ―Oriental‖ Omdurman, Boddy, 22.

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CHAPTER 7 STILL A SYMBOL

With the ceremony at the palace in Khartoum, Charles Gordon‘s transformation into a symbol was complete. What he had actually achieved during his lifetime became less important, as the focus shifted to how people perceived his accomplishments. This shift resulted in a metamorphosis of the use of Gordon, his name, and his memory. As the Empire reacted to world-wide events in the first four decades of the twentieth century, Gordon would be an imperial figure, a religious hero, a figure of controversy, and, finally, a beacon of British pride. At the turn of the century, Britain was faced with imperial crises in two areas of its influence: China and South Africa. Two events in these regions, the Boxer Rebellion and the Boer War, provided the first opportunity for this symbolic Gordon to be invoked by his supporters and his detractors. His memory was also important to Edwardian Britain. His death was commemorated yearly, with newspaper coverage of ceremonies held at his statue in Trafalgar Square and memorial sermons. In addition to the annual commemorations, Gordon was the subject of a variety of entertainment forms, as he had been since 1885. However, when the country became engaged in World War I, these ceremonies lessened. With Britain enmeshed in a global conflict, the memory of one man‘s death in Sudan no longer seemed significant. This assumption was confirmed with the publication of the first critical biography of Gordon in 1918.1 The imperial symbol was being questioned; the existence of the Empire was no longer seen as inevitable. Although the importance of Gordon‘s imperial experience had been reduced by the 1920s, he became a vital figure in Britain again as celebrations of the centenary of his birth demonstrated. These celebrations ushered in a resurgence of popularity, culminating in what amounted to a renaissance for the general. During the Great Depression, Charles Gordon was used as once more as a symbol, but this time he was a symbol of patriotic strength, rather than of the Empire itself. The first opportunities for Gordon to be invoked symbolically occurred almost simultaneously. In 1899, the British were forced to contend with two major imperial threats: the

1 Lytton Strachey, Eminent Victorians: Cardinal Manning, Florence Nightingale, Dr. Arnold, General Gordon (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1969 reprint).

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Boers in South Africa and the Boxers in China. 2 Military concerns in the two circumstances were radically different, as were the forces sent to the areas and encountered by the British. In South Africa, the situation was between the Boers or the Afrikaners, who were primarily descendants of early Dutch settlers, and the British. The Boxer Rebellion eventually became perceived as a Western versus Eastern conflict, with the killing of Westerners in China. Both imperial conflicts occurred at the end of Queen Victoria‘s long reign and had economic repercussions for the Empire. The Boer War lasted from 1899 until 1902. Never a very popular war, it was ostensibly begun, to guarantee the rights of British citizens in South Africa, but it was really over who would control the massive gold deposits discovered in the territory over a decade earlier.3 Like the Boer War, the Boxer Rebellion also concerned who would control economic resources. However, unlike the situation in South Africa, this conflict was over who would control the Chinese concessions for more than just mineral rights: railway concessions were also hotly contested by a variety of foreign enterprises, including British companies. Thus, responses to the rebellion were international, involving several foreign countries. This rebellion reached its peak in the summer of 1900, but was not completely concluded until 1901.4 Regardless of duration, each event had a lasting effect on the Empire. The Boer War began only months after the successful re-conquest of Khartoum. Not surprisingly, the same major military figures who had prominent roles in the re-conquest were also deployed in South Africa. Salisbury remained the Prime Minister, Wolseley was still in command of the Army, and Kitchener played a vital role in the offensive, this time serving as second-in-command. The situation in South Africa was different from the one they had encountered in Sudan. Unlike the Battle of Omdurman, which in the course of several hours had proven British superiority over the Khalifa‘s forces, the offensives of this war were much more complicated due to the Boers‘ use of guerilla warfare tactics. Used particularly effectively in the opening battles of the war in October 1899, these tactics were not new to the Boers, who had employed it against the British before. The first time the British encountered this guerilla war

2 Historians have referred to both incidents in a variety of ways. The Boxer Rebellion is also known as the Boxer War and the Boxer Movement, and the Boer War is known as the Anglo-Boer War or the Second South African War. I have chosen to use the terminology that has been employed the most frequently. 3 For more on the origins of the conflict, see Bernard Porter, The Lion’s Share: A Short History of British Imperialism: 1850-2004 (London: Pearson Longman, 2004), 171-176. 4 For more on the origins, including the foreign concessions and the Boxer response to them (including the taking over of embassies) see L.K. Young, British Policy in China: 1895-1902 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 75-130.

126 was in 1881, at the Battle of Majuba Hill.5 They were unprepared for it and were quickly defeated. Majuba Hill motivated Gordon to comment on the use of irregular warfare and the army‘s need to find a strategy to combat it. Gordon‘s provisions were reprinted with editorial asides by the Times in November 1899. Their unnamed correspondent focused on Gordon‘s ideas and claimed that ―in this hour of trial for the courage and still more for the capacity of the British nation‖ the military officials needed to ―listen to the wise words written by General Gordon in 1881.‖6 In Gordon‘s old piece, originally published in the Army and Navy Gazette, he argued that instead of hastily defeating the Boers, the military needed to take its time and learn from its mistakes, believing that, ―the inordinate haste which exists to finish off these wars throws away many valuable aids which would inevitably accrue to the regular army if time was taken to do the work; and far greater expense is caused by the hurry than otherwise would be necessary.‖ The correspondent continued to praise Gordon‘s words, quoting liberally from his paper. Perhaps the most pointed comment by the Times‘ correspondent came after a long segment of Gordon‘s thoughts on irregular warfare that concludes with a warning, ―the regular forces are at a very great disadvantage until by bitter experience in the field they are taught to fight in the same irregular way as their foes, and this lesson may be learnt at a great cost.‖7 The correspondent then repeated the wording of ―bitter experience‖ and ―great cost‖ to pressure the government into finding a solution for fighting the Boers. Gordon‘s advice, coming from his years of experience in Africa, was considered, at least by the press, to be worthy of further comment. A month after the article appeared in the Times, a similar story appeared in the Leeds Mercury. In the time between the first instance and the second, the British forces had to contend with what became known at the time as ―Black Week.‖ During this week, the British forces lost three important battles all due to their inability to

5 The Battle of Majuba Hill occurred in February 1881. For more information on the actual events of the battle see Byron Farwel, Queen Victoria’s Little Wars (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1972), 247-251. 6 ―General Gordon on Irregular Warfare,‖ The Times (London), November 6, 1899. The article was also reprinted the next day in several papers including the Western Mail, indicating that the article spread beyond the Times’ circulation. Over a month later, the Army and Navy Gazette would be quoted in a Derby Mercury piece with the same title, but the Times was not credited in this article. ―General Gordon on Irregular Warfare,‖ Derby Mercury, 27 December 1899. 7 Ibid.

127 confront the Boers‘ guerilla tactics.8 Reflecting this frustration with the army and its attempts to come up with a spectacular victory against the Boers, the editors of the Leeds Mercury concluded their article on Gordon and irregular warfare with a somber passage: ―We have had to pay dearly for pursuing [spectacular victory] against an enemy whose numbers, equipment and skill in the field have been woefully underrated.‖ 9 They advised their readers that Gordon‘s ideas would have to be followed in order to achieve a victory. These articles, which invoked Gordon as an authority, date from the very beginning of what was to become a long and costly war. Historian Donal Lowry, in his introduction to a modern reassessment of the war, recounted how many journalists in London‘s Fleet Street had assumed that the conflict would just be a ―teatime war,‖ and over quickly. Instead, the war lasted for three years, cost over £200 million, and used between 250,000 and 450,000 British and colonial troops. Instead of being a minor war, this struggle ―became the largest and costliest war waged by Britain between the Napoleonic Wars and the Great War of 1914-1918.‖10 Unsurprisingly, articles like the ones discussed above, which were openly critical of the war‘s direction, were common as early as the second month of the fighting. To these critics, the war should have been completed with a quick British victory, not continuing into what seemed certain to be a complete British defeat. Also common were efforts by politicians to place blame for the war. In a speech given to the Primrose League, the speaker, Mr. Chaplin, sought to blame the Liberal Party in general and former Prime Minister William Gladstone in particular for the current state of events in South Africa. He achieved this goal by tying the happenings in South Africa into another of Gladstone‘s perceived failures: Gordon‘s death in Khartoum. Speaking to an admittedly favorable audience, Chaplin suggested that the two wars were legacies of Gladstone‘s ―mistaken and disastrous policy.‖ He claimed that the need for a re-conquest in Sudan was ―the natural and inevitable outcome of the wickedness of the abandonment of Gordon and Khartum,‖ a statement that was met with cheers. This argument was then followed by Chaplin‘s claim that the Boer War was ―no less the inevitable outcome of the dishonourable and

8 These three battles, Stromberg, Magersfontien, and Colenso, all occurred between December 9-12, 1899. A summary of ―Black Week‖ tactics can be found in Denis Judd and Keith Surridge, The Boer War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 122-129. 9 ―How War Should be Waged in the Transvaal: The Advice of General Gordon,‖ Leeds Mercury, 28 December 1899. 10 Donal Lowry, ―Introduction: not just a ‗teatime war,‘ in his edited The South African War reappraised (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 2.

128 cowardly surrender after Majuba.‖11 Gladstone was Prime Minister during both of these events, but he would not be the one blamed for the British failures in South Africa. Instead, that blame would fall squarely on the sitting Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury. Like Gladstone, Salisbury also wanted to avoid a possibly unpopular war in Africa. However, war seemed inevitable; the conditions in South Africa were too unstable, and the only variable left for the government to be concerned about was the public‘s opinion about a potentially unpopular war. This situation was solved when the Boers declared war with an ultimatum demanding their independence, facilitating Salisbury‘s contention that the Boers‘ action had ―‗liberated us [the British government] from the necessity of explaining to the people of England why we are at war.‘‖ Yes, the British were the instigators of the war, but the Boers‘ actions allowed Salisbury‘s government to claim they had a casus belli (or justifiable claim for war). 12 Of course, this statement was made at the very beginning of the war; had Salisbury known how the war would have concluded, perhaps he would not have been so happy that he had not begun it. In fact, as historian David Steele argued, ―the end of Lord Salisbury‘s brilliant career was marred by the blows which the Boers dealt to British self-esteem…he could not escape his share of responsibility for the military failures and all that they implied.‖13 The beginning of the war was definitely one of those military failures. The Boers laid siege to the British outpost of Mafeking beginning in October 1899. Although the British citizens were never in any immediate danger, inept attempts by the army to relieve the city were telling. When the city was finally relieved 217 days later, the response in Britain was tremendous.14 As opposed to the outpouring of grief and anger that had resulted from the British failure to relieve Khartoum in 1885, the successful relief of Mafeking was greeted with huge celebrations throughout the Empire. The success of the British at Mafeking was transformed into a celebration of British imperial strength and pride, as Cynthia Behrman described in her article, ―The Creation of Social Myth; Journalism and the Empire.‖ In this piece, she outlined the four heroic qualities that created the personal-heroic imperial myth. These four characteristics,

11 ―Mr. Chaplin in Lincolnshire,‖ Times (London), 16 July 1900. 12 Salisbury‘s parliamentary remarks from 16 October 1899, quoted in John Benyon, ―‗Intermediate‘ imperialism and the test of Empire: Milner‘s ‗excentric‘ High Commission in South Africa‖ in Lowry, 88. The idea of Britain having a casus belli is discussed in Bernard Porter‘s section on South Africa in Lion’s Share, 177. Porter also includes the Salisbury quote, n.65. 13 David Steele, ―Salisbury and the Soldiers,‖ in John Gooch, editor, The Boer War: Direction, Experience and Image (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 3. 14 Farwell, 350-351.

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―courage or ‗pluck,‘ honor, modesty, and resourcefulness,‖ were all present in the hero of the siege, General Robert Baden-Powell. Following her discussion on Baden-Powell‘s characteristics, she cited another example of an imperial hero: General Gordon. To emphasize her point, Behrman continued by comparing the news coverage of Baden-Powell and Gordon, even citing a contemporary newspaper‘s depiction of the victory at Mafeking, which stated that the victory was due solely to ―‗the dominant factor of pluck‘‖ as every other advantage was on the Boers‘ side.15 News articles and stories about Mafeking served to boost British morale and patriotic pride, both of which had been severely diminished with the disastrous stories from South Africa. The relief of Mafeking was the turning point in a badly mismanaged war, yet the British press was still dissatisfied with the war effort. In the summer of 1900, the editors at Reynold’s Newspaper effectively summed up this feeling by listing ―humiliation after humiliation for England, owing to the loss of prestige through the gross incompetence of her commanding officers in South Africa.‖16 Even though the British would eventually ―win‖ the war, these humiliations continued for the Salisbury government as it struggled and later as it tried to reincorporate the two formerly autonomous free regions of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State into the British Empire. They were also highlighted in political speeches given by the Conservative Party as a part of the electoral season of 1900. The Conservatives were not in power when the war began. Thus, in the build-up to the ―Khaki Election‖ of 1901, they were able to use the failures of the war to attack the Liberal Party, which was fractured due to differences in opinion over the war. This weakness provided a convenient target for the Conservatives who would win a sweeping victory in the election. Therefore, in direct contrast to speeches made about the war by the Liberal Party where the speakers were careful to avoid the appearance of exploiting the war to their party‘s benefit, the Conservatives did not hesitate.17 The leader of the

15 Cynthia F. Behrman and Michael Wolff, ―The Creation of Social Myth; Journalism and the Empire [with comments],‖ Victorian Periodicals Newsletter, number 11, volume 4, number 1, (February 1971): 12. Following her discussion of these characteristics, Behrman continues, in her next sentence, by adding Gordon to her argument: ―Probably a large share of the motivation for heroic behavior came again from the games ethos, which, of course, stressed fair play and honorable dealing, qualities which the imperial heroes had in large measure, people like General Gordon, for example, whose death in 1885 sent a spasm of remorse and idolatry through Britain.‖ 16 ―Up to date,‖ Reynold’s Newspaper, 19 August 1900. 17 The changing dynamics in England which allowed for a Conservative victory in the ―khaki election‖ are discussed in Andrew Porter‘s article in Writing a Wider War: Rethinking Gender, Race, and Identity in the South African War, 1899-1902. Andrew Porter, ―The South African War and Imperial Britain: A Question of Significance?‖ in Greg Cutherberson, Albert Grundlingh, and Mary-Lynn Suttie, editors, Writing a Wider War: Rethinking Gender, Race, and Identity in the South African War (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2002), 290-293.

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Liberals, Joseph Chamberlain, believed at the beginning of the war in November, 1899, that ―nothing could be more unfortunate for this country than that at any time we should be forced into a war in which the two great parties took absolutely opposite sides and in which one party had to use its party majority in order to prosecute the war.‖18 Six months later, with the tide turning towards a probable British victory, his opposition did not agree. Their speeches followed the pattern discussed above in that of Mr. Chaplain, with a concerted effort to place all of the blame for a British army presence in South Africa on the Liberal Party. However, as the war was reaching its conclusion, the focus in these speeches shifted, as is demonstrated best by a speech given by the Duke of Marlborough. Speaking at Bournemouth, the Duke once again reverted to the traditional tactics employed by the party. Thus, he claimed that if the Liberal Party, composed of many members ―who opposed the war at the beginning, and who…opposed the Soudan campaign and the avenging of General Gordon‖ was returned to power, their perceived military weakness would ―impel them [the Boers] to continue fighting,‖ a result that could only be avoided by the electorate returning the Conservative Party to power.19 These speeches served two goals. The first was to ensure that the Conservatives remained in control of the peace process, and the second was to serve as a morale boost for the imperialist segment of the British public. By invoking Gordon, the Duke was reminding the audience of their old patriotic hero, and, by extension, the continued greatness of the British people even as they were limping to the end of a hard-fought war. The Boer War ended in May 1902. It was an expensive war for Britain in a variety of ways. It cost men and material, but most importantly, it cost the British pride. The Boers were not defeated militarily; the peace was negotiated, and if the Empire ―won‖ the war, it certainly did not ―win‖ the peace. Yes, the republics were incorporated back into the Empire, but the Boers won significant financial assistance and the British acceded to all of their demands, including agreeing not to enfranchise non-Europeans.20 In addition, Britain faced international condemnation for its actions during the course of the war. As a part of its war strategy, Britain employed ―a scorched earth policy against civilians as a means of forcing the Boer commandos

18 ―Speeches on the War,‖ The Manchester Guardian, 30 November 1899. 19 ―The Settlement After the War: A Speech by the Duke of Marlborough,‖ Birmingham Daily Post, 20 September 1900. 20 Judd and Surridge, 298. This point was especially important to the Boers and one which the British strongly advocated.

131 to lay down their arms.‖21 This resulted in thousands of Boer elderly, women, and children having no place to live other than the concentration camps hastily erected for them. These camps were ill-suited for the number of people forced to live there; the situation quickly deteriorated to the point that the government was criticized at home and abroad. Thus, Britain lost more than its pride as a result of the war; it lost some of its international prestige.22 Furthermore, peace was only temporary. By 1907, the two former states had regained their autonomy. At the same time as the Boer War was occurring in South Africa, the British were forced to contend with another imperial problem on a different continent, Asia. Coverage of this crisis, the Boxer Rebellion, also featured Gordon‘s name prominently. As in the Boer War, the general‘s name and expertise were employed in discussions of this incident; however, there was one other factor present in news coverage of the Boxer Rebellion that was not present in the Boer War: Gordon‘s personal connection. Newspapers often referenced Gordon‘s service in China and his co-commandership of the ‗Ever Victorious Army‘ with Li Hung Chang. The Boxer Rebellion occurred for a variety of reasons which are still debated by historians. These range from longer historic causes, such as the Opium War, to financial and religious concerns. However, the one fact that is not in dispute is the distinct anti-foreigner—or more specifically, anti-European—character of the rebellion.23 What the Boxers wanted, in essence, was to reduce, if not completely eliminate, any European presence in China.24 In order to achieve their goal, they needed to eliminate anyone who had close personal ties with the West. Gordon‘s co-commander and friend, Li Hung Chang, fit into this category. The two men had continued to be close after Gordon left China; the general returned to China at Li Hung Chang‘s

21 Elizabeth van Heyningen, ―Women and Disease: The Clash of Medical Cultures in the Concentration Camps of the South African War‖ in Cutherberson et al, Writing a Wider War, 187. 22 Hew Strachan discusses the international repercussions of Britain‘s decision in his ―Essay and Reflection: On Total War and Modern War,‖ in The International History Review, volume 22, number 2, (Jun., 2000): 353-354. 23 The preface to one of the standard background studies of the rebellion gives these reasons in more detail. Victor Purcell, The Boxer Uprising: A Background Study (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), vii-ix. For more on current scholarship from the Chinese perspective of the rebellion see the special edition of Chinese Studies in History also published as an edited volume. David D. Buck, ed. Recent Chinese Studies of the Boxer Movement (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1987). 24 There are a variety of reasons why people became Boxers. However, their goals are best stated by the Austro- Hungarian legion‘s Chargé d‘Affairs, Dr. Arthur von Rosthorn. He believed that there were two major reasons why people were inspired to become Boxers: their dissatisfaction at ―the European attempts at partitioning China [and] their efforts to force upon China through treaties or through the use of gunboats, if necessary, the missionary activities.‖ This statement, translated from the German work [Gerd Kaminiski and E. Unterrieder, Wäre ich Chinese, So Wäre ich Boxer. Das Lebens an der K. und K. Gesandtschaft in Peking in Tagebüchern, Briefen und Dokumenten Wien-Zurich: Europa, 1989, 45] is quoted in Lanxin Xiang, The Origins of the Boxer War: A Multinational Study (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 104.

132 request in 1880. Chang even sent his condolences to the Gordon family after he learned of the general‘s death, further indicating their closeness.25 Therefore, as Li Hung Chang was one of the major figures involved in the rebellion, Gordon‘s name was frequently invoked in all of the press coverage. The earliest stories mentioning Gordon in connection with events unfolding in China appeared in May, 1899. These stories were concerned with the growth of a reform movement advocating the overthrow of the Manchu government. In a commentary in the Pall Mall Gazette, the editors mentioned the idea that Gordon had proposed ―the overthrow of the Manchus and the establishment of a native dynasty. His proposal (one who reads it now regrets) was not well supported.‖ The Gazette, which had long been supportive of Gordon and his memory, concluded their editorial with the following wistful remark: ―O! That Gordon were alive!‖26 By reminding its readers of Gordon‘s past deeds, the Gazette re-established Gordon as an authority on China and his experiences would be cited until the resolution of the crisis. It was not just newspaper editors who remembered that Gordon had been against the current Chinese government. His opinions were also expressed on the floor of the House of Commons. In a speech by a Member of Parliament, Mr. Pritchard Morgan, Gordon‘s belief that the Chinese would have been better served by having a different emperor on the throne was employed in support of a motion in favor of having the British government suggest to the Chinese that they appoint a regent. The regent that Morgan favored was Gordon‘s old comrade, Li Hung Chang. To stress his point, Morgan used the idea that Chang was the man ―whom General Gordon himself picked out for the Throne‖ forty years earlier. Thus, he believed that the British government should trust Gordon as an authority and appoint Li to the position.27 Morgan was not alone in wanting to understand the situation in China by viewing it through the ideas of Gordon. A month after his speech, the Times printed what it claimed (with a bit of controversy) to be diary entries written by Gordon during his time in China. The article containing the entry is titled: ―General Gordon‘s Diary in 1860.‖28 The diary entry itself was fairly basic, merely consisting of a list of events occurring between August 9 and November 12,

25 For the full story of Gordon‘s second time in China and his inability to serve as a military advisor, see chapter one. A variety of telegrams from China to the Gordon family can be found in the British Library Add. Ms 52400 correspondence to Sir Henry Gordon, ff. 214-233. Several mention the general‘s career in China. 26 ―The Reform Party in China,‖ Pall Mall Gazette, 5 May 1899. The comment was in reference to another article which ran in the Gazette. The unnamed article was a discussion on reform in China by Mrs. Archibald Little. 27 ―The Crisis in China,‖ Western Mail, 4 July 1900. 28 ―General Gordon‘s Diary in 1860,‖ Times (London) 30 August 1900.

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1860, with editorial comments by then-Captain Gordon. There was no germane information about the new crisis, just a re-stating of facts relating to the last time British forces had been involved in a Chinese military action. It was printed without any explanation of who Gordon was or what his role in China had been—these facts were still considered to be common knowledge. In reality, the entry would not have been important enough for inclusion in the paper except for the fact that it mentioned the terms Gordon, China, and Li Hung Chang. However, the provenance of the entry itself was in doubt: the week after the entry was featured, the Times ran a response to criticisms raised in a letter, ―A Spurious Gordon Diary,‖ written to the Daily Chronicle and signed ―Accuracy.‖ In that letter, it was claimed that Gordon did not write the entry and ―‗two facts are clear: It is not a diary and it is valueless.‘‖ In the response, the Times defended running the diary and ended the argument by saying that its editors had the original manuscript in Gordon‘s own distinctive handwriting.29 Following this statement, the matter was considered closed. The fact that the mere publication of a new work attributed to Gordon in the climate of the Boxer Rebellion was afforded this level of attention indicates that there was still a good deal of public fascination about the general and his views. This public curiosity would be exploited as the crisis continued. Even an anti-Manchu organization, the Triad, understood that using Gordon‘s name would help give its cause more attention in the West. Thus, it invoked Gordon‘s personal feelings in a letter sent to major Hong Kong newspapers in support of the Boxers. The letter was reprinted as a part of an article that restated part of a report filed by the Reuters correspondent in China when the negotiations which would end the conflict began. In it, the correspondent quoted liberally from the Triad‘s letter. After relating a very brief history of Anglo-Chinese relations, this document stated the following: ―In 1862 Great Britain frustrated our aims by lending the services of General Gordon to the Manchu Government. The great and chivalrous General Gordon bitterly regretted his connection with the barbarous and ungrateful Manchus…‖ Following this passage, the letter continued by stating that Gordon‘s sentiments had support ―amongst the great politicians of his country‖; his views on the matter should still be followed. However, the most controversial idea in this letter penned by the leader of the Triads, a group who did not claim to be Boxers but who also supported the anti-foreigner movement, is a simple statement: ―General Gordon even longed to shoot that base traitor Li Hung Chang.‖ By concluding the argument with this information, the

29 Response to the above article, also titled ―General Gordon‘s Diary in 1860,‖ Times (London) 6 September 1900.

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Triad indicated that it also supported this aim.30 Clearly, the group‘s view of Gordon and Li Hung Chang was in direct contrast to that espoused by most Western sources, but it is interesting to note that this anti-Manchu organization was willing to employ Gordon in support of its goals. This willingness was even more remarkable when Gordon‘s own actions in China are discussed in this context. According to Demetrius Boulger, one of Gordon‘s contemporaries and early biographers, the general is credited with two specific changes to China. The first was his suggestion that the capital be moved to Nanjing. The second is more aligned with the problems seen by the Boxers. After discussing the background of the crisis in an article published in The North American Review, Boulger continued by stating that the only reason why China survived the Taiping Rebellion was because of ―the active intervention of the Europeans and the military genius of General Gordon.‖31 While Boulger simplified the problem, he was correct in that the military support provided by the British and co-commanded by Gordon and Li Hung Chang did stave off the problems faced in the Boxer Rebellion for another forty years. Gordon was not the only Englishman whose name was dragged into this inter-Chinese conflict. Another prominent Englishman often mentioned in the same context was Sir Robert Hart, the Inspector General of the Chinese Maritime Customs. Hart and Gordon were in China concurrently, and they both contributed to the perceived ―westernization‖ of China that the Boxers wanted to expunge. This sentiment was seen in a report issued by the Associated Chambers of Commerce‘s Special Commissioner to China, Lord Charles Beresford. In his report, according to a pithily titled review, ―Broken China,‖ Beresford quoted sources on both men. As he said about the importance of Hart‘s opinion to financial matters, ―‗during the interviews and many other conversations which I had with Viceroys and other high Mandarins they invariably asked me if I knew Sir Robert Hart‘s opinion on the question which we were discussing.‘‖32 Modern historian Lianxin Xiang described the impact that Hart had on China by saying that ―he was able to use his effective control of China‘s external economic relations to

30 ―The Chinese Crisis,‖ The Belfast News Letter, 12 November 1900. The Reuters letter was also reprinted in the next day‘s Daily News. ―The Revolt in South China,‖ Daily News, 13 November 1900. In the Daily News letter, more attention is devoted to the Triad‘s self-description: ―We are not ‗Boxers.‘ We are members of that great Political Society of Masons, commonly known as Triads, whose senior and junior leaders at home and abroad have sworn to oust the barbarous Manchu usurpers from the Throne of our Fatherland and reinstate a Chinese ruler.‖ 31 Demetrius C. Boulger, ―The Dissolution of the Chinese Empire,‖ The North American Review, volume 168, number 508 (Mar., 1899): 265. 32 ―Broken China,‖ Bristol Mercury and Daily Post, 15 May 1899.

135 exercise enormous influence on China‘s ambitious modernization process.‖33 If Gordon was the acknowledged military expert in terms of China, then Hart was his financial counterpart. Both men‘s names were invoked in the months preceding the rebellion. When the anti- European sentiment grew violent and reprisals against the Western missionaries in China occurred, one of the bigger fears in Britain was that it would be forced to intervene militarily. There were other international actors in China with eleven countries represented, including the French, the Russians, the Japanese, the Americans, and the Germans. As all of these countries had missionaries who were affected by the Boxers, a consensus amongst them had to be reached before any action could be taken.34 None of these ―great powers‖ wanted to see a partitioned China, so they agreed to support the Manchus and put the rebellion down, creating ―an exercise in imperialism by co-operation‖ in which the British paid a relatively minor role.35 Therefore, the rebellion was crushed by a combined force of these Western empires. The end result for Britain was that it could continue to have its influence and its financial concessions in China.36 With this international support, the Manchu government survived, but it was left in a weakened state and collapsed only a decade later. Thus, with the close of the rebellion and the death of Li Hung Chang in 1901, Gordon‘s relevance to Britain‘s Chinese policies was significantly diminished. While these events were occurring in the farthest reaches of the Empire, life in Britain was changing, too. With the death of Queen Victoria on January 22, 1901, one of Gordon‘s most fervent supporters was silenced. Although her family continued memorializing Gordon and supporting his memorial, the Gordon Boys‘ Home, the personal connection was now lost. Even before Queen Victoria died, her place at the annual sermons commemorating the general had been filled by her son, the Prince of Wales, who also became the Home‘s official patron. These sermons, which were preached on the Sunday closest to January 26, strove to combine the memory of Gordon with current events. Once given, the sermons were often, ―printed by special desire of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, K.G., President of the Council of the Gordon Boy‘s Home‖ and sold for its benefit at six pence each.37

33 Xiang, 39. 34 Young, 236-240. The other countries represented were: Austria-Hungary, Italy, Belgium, Spain, and the Netherlands. 35 Porter, Lion’s Share, 160. 36 For a discussion of British financial concerns in China see P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism (London: Pearson Education, 2000), 371-379. 37Several years worth of these sermons are found in a bound volume held at the British library [BL 4476 ee17]. The pamphlet quoted above is the twenty-second in the volume. It is a sermon by William Boyd Carpenter, D.D., ―The

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The topics of the sermons ranged over the years, but all featured the idea of Gordon, the Christian hero. For example, the 1902 sermon—preached to the King, as the Prince of Wales continued his patronage once he had assumed the throne—featured references to the events in South Africa. In his sermon, the Right Reverend George Wyndham Kennion compared events in that country with those that occurred in Khartoum: ―Not in Ladysmith or Mafeking could the trial of faith have been so severe as of the Christian hero—who stood alone among all his Mahomedan troops waiting unflinchingly for the expected relief that never came.‖38 The sermon concluded in the usual manner, with a call for donations to the home, ―that consideration for others—I ask you for the sake of Gordon, for the nation‘s sake, and for the sake of the lads who do or may belong to it—to show to-day for the Gordon Boys‘ Home.‖39 Even though the Home was the national memorial to Gordon, it was clearly underfunded, as every year the chairman of the council of the Home ran an appeal in the Times on the anniversary of the general‘s death. As with the sermons, the appeals‘ content varied, with particular emphasis on political events occurring throughout the Empire. For example, the 1900 appeal made reference to the events unfolding in South Africa and the part played by the graduates of the Home, or the ―Gordon Boys.‖ At that year‘s sermon, the preacher even read portions of letters which had been written by Boys currently serving in South Africa.40 The idea of the appeal was to remind the public of the good work being done by the Home, but more importantly, the annual appeal, the sermons, and the stories about the ways that Gordon‘s death was commemorated, including the laying of wreaths on his statue in Trafalgar Square, kept the general‘s memory alive in the public consciousness. The laying of the wreath deserves special attention. It is a yearly tradition, continued to the present, by former Gordon Boys (or as they later termed themselves, old Gordonians). The ceremony itself is simple, and it still receives an annual mention in the Times.41 The location of

Hidden Life—A Sermon preached before their royal highnesses the Prince and Princess of Wales, in Sandringham Church on Sunday Morning January 29th, 1899, in commemoration of the death of General Gordon‖ (London: Skeffington and Sons, 1899). 38 There is a second collection of these sermons at the British Library [BL 4475 i. 20. 1-11]. The sermon above is the seventh. The Right Reverend George Wyndham Kennion, D.D., ―Courage. Sincerity. Faith: A sermon preached at Christ Church, Mayfair on Septuagesima Sunday, 1902, in commemoration of the death of General Gordon‖ (London: Skeffington and Sons, 1902), 10-11. 39 Ibid., 13. 40 ―Gordon Boys‘ Home,‖ The Times (London), 22 January, 1900. 41 This mention would sometimes be as few as three lines in the paper, but it guaranteed that the general‘s name would be mentioned at least once a year. The article is normally entitled ―wreaths placed on Gordon statue‖ and

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Gordon‘s statue was also important to this ceremony. Every year the Boys would visit Trafalgar Square and be reminded of more than just Gordon‘s sacrifice. The square, as it appeared in 1900, has been described by historian Jonathan Schneer as ―the very center of the imperial metropolis‖ with nationalist and imperialist preoccupations visible in the architecture.42 Commemorating Gordon in the square also reminded people of his sacrifice for their Empire. In the early twentieth century, Gordon was also memorialized outside of London, particularly in Khartoum. By the time the First World War began, Khartoum had both a Gordon Memorial College and a Gordon Memorial Chapel inside the Khartoum Cathedral. The opening of these buildings became news stories in London, partially because of the dignitaries present at both ceremonies. In 1902, soon after the conclusion of the Boer War, the Gordon Memorial College, for which Lord Kitchener had so passionately appealed, was opened, although at the time it was only a primary school.43 Both the Times and the Manchester Guardian covered the opening. However, although the Times published the entirety of Kitchener‘s speech, the Guardian only devoted space to the Reuters telegram concerning the events and chose not to editorialize on the significance of it.44 Only two years later, newspapers were referring to the school as ―the Eton of the Sudan,‖ and praising it as the most ―fitting memorial of that ungrudged sacrifice.‖45 By 1909, Kitchener‘s full vision for the college was realized when the lower branches of the school were jettisoned. At the same time, the Wellcome Research Laboratories were opened at the college, further elevating its status as a place where European- style research and education were taking place.46 Gordon‘s Sudanese memorials were not confined solely to Kitchener‘s vision. Instead, as befitted the man described as a ―Christian hero,‖ he was also the subject of the awkwardly occurs somewhere in the back pages of the paper, as it did in 1913, ―wreaths placed,‖ 27 January, 1913, pg. 9, col. a. See Appendix B for a photograph of contemporary wreaths on the statue. 42 Jonathan Schneer, London 1900: The Imperial Metropolis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 17 and 28. 43The Times has the full text of Kitchener‘s speech, where he references the fact that the school is not yet a college, ―but though great steps have been made, we must still look forward for the actual realization of the original scheme. This memorial to General Gordon has not been called a college without due consideration.‖ ―Lord Kitchener at Khartum: Opening of Gordon College,‖ Times (London), 10 November 1902. 44 ―Lord Kitchener at Khartoum,‖ Manchester Guardian, 10 November 1902. 45 Andrew Balfour, the first director of the Wellcome Research Laboratories at Gordon Memorial College, collected a scrapbook full of press clippings from the college‘s early years. This scrapbook is a part of his collection at the Sudan Archives, Durham University. SAD 724/14/3, ―The Eton of the Sudan: Gordon College at Khartoum,‖ The Sphere, 12 November 1904, and 724/14/7, ―Khartoum College,‖ The Graphic, 12 November 1904. 46 The annual reports from the Wellcome Laboratories are discussed yearly in The British Medical Journal. The 1909 report, which was the third report, was the one that first gained the most attention and is discussed in ―The Wellcome Research Libraries, Khartoum. Third Report‖ in The British Medical Journal, volume 1, number 2523 (May 8, 1909): 1130.

138 titled ―Gordon Memorial Sudan Mission‖ of the Church Missionary Society, as well as the Gordon Memorial Chapel. Both of these commemorations were discussed in London, even though they actually occurred in Sudan. In 1905, the Church Missionary Society wrote an appeal to establish a mission on ―the Upper Nile for the benefit of the Pagan tribes there.‖ In it, the Society mentioned that both Cromer and Sir Wingate supported its ―appeal from the heart of Africa.‖ In the text of the memorandum, the Society specifically referenced Gordon‘s ―heroic attempt to restore order [which] ended in his deeply lamented overthrow and death at Khartoum,‖ and continued its appeal to have able-bodied, Christian men come and serve the cause for which Gordon died.47 It is the second ―Christian‖ memorial to Gordon—his chapel—that received much more press coverage in London. As discussed in the previous chapter, the effort to raise funds for the new cathedral relied heavily on the idea of memorializing Gordon. The cathedral was consecrated on January 26, 1912, the twenty-seventh anniversary of his death. Its consecration was reported in the Times and the Manchester Guardian, with the former giving the event much more attention. Each newspaper featured depictions of the new cathedral; the Guardian had a photograph while the Times had an artistic rendering, but that is where the similarities between the two papers‘ coverage ended. For the Times, the event was a chance to remind its readers about Gordon‘s experiences in Sudan and of the general himself. Its goal was achieved by the printing of a letter to the editor concerning Gordon‘s family and background directly under the rendering of the new cathedral. The Guardian used a different approach; the sole mention of the general was in a dismissive comment with the picture‘s caption: ―Khartoum Cathedral…was originally conceived as a memorial to Gordon, and stands close to the gardens of the Palace, a stone‘s-throw from the spot where he was killed.‖48 Both newspapers indicated that the

47 A selection of the Church Missionary Society papers are held at SAD, SAD 930/13; these papers include the instructions given to those men who were going on the mission, which states that the Committee believed ―that the hand of God is manifest in the ordering of this new venture of faith.‖ The appeal itself was published in the Times. ―A New Call from the Heart of Africa,‖ Times (London), 21 January 1905. For a discussion on the content and the political ramifications of the missions themselves, see Richard Hill, ―Government and the Christian Missions in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1899-1914‖ Middle Eastern Studies volume 1, number 2 (Jan., 1965). 48 Both the Times and the Guardian featured the events for two days, with the illustration on the first day and a short description of the consecration on the second day. The Times featured two articles, ―The New Cathedral at Khartum‖ and ―Khartum Cathedral When Finished‖ and a letter to the editor ―The Founder of Khartum: General Gordon‘s Ancestry‖ on the first day, 26 January 1912; the Guardian only had the illustration and its caption, ―Khartoum Cathedral.‖ On 27 January, each had articles entitled ―Consecration of Khartum/Khartoum Cathedral.‖

139 foundation of a new cathedral, especially one which also honored Gordon, was clearly newsworthy. By the time the cathedral was consecrated, it seemed that Gordon‘s relevance to British politics was beginning to abate. With the exception of commemorative efforts, Gordon‘s name was no longer present in routine political discourse. A rare exception to this trend occurred in discussions that did not specifically involve the general, but rather the expedition that was sent to relieve him. In a parliamentary debate over the War Office‘s failure to reprimand a British citizen who chose to criticize the soldiers who took part in the expedition as ―mere murderers, the mongrel scum of thieves from Whitechapel and Seven Dials,‖ the level of feeling which still remained regarding both Gordon and the expedition itself was revealed.49 In passionate tones, a Member of Parliament, Mr. Rowland Hunt, implored the War Office to condemn the writer Wilfrid S. Blunt. Not coincidentally, Blunt had just published a new book on General Gordon, so perhaps some of his motivation was to incite controversy.50 Regardless of why Blunt chose to condemn the soldiers, the controversy was diffused with a representative from the War Office, Under-Secretary of State for War Colonel Seeley, agreeing that a form of censure was necessary, although he believed that ―the severer condemnation will be to leave this gentleman—or, at any rate, the writer of this slander—to the condemnation of all honourable men.‖51 With this statement, the brief debate in the House of Commons was ended. Yet the episode demonstrated that, even with the re-conquest and formation of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium, there was still unresolved sentiment about the expedition and Gordon‘s part in the debate. By 1915, when the thirtieth anniversary of Gordon‘s death occurred, Britain was much more concerned with the First World War than with commemorating Gordon. Unlike earlier significant anniversaries, this one was marked by the Times with a simple six-line article, mostly concerned with the laying of wreaths on his statue.52 The general‘s insignificance in the face of a world-wide war was never more apparent. In the years following, his death did not even receive

49 ―Mr. W.S. Blunt and the Gordon Relief Expedition,‖ Manchester Guardian, 15 November 1911. 50 Wilfrid S. Blunt, Gordon at Khartoum: being a personal narrative of events (London: S. Swift, 1911). In the preface, he references that the book was completed on the ―Twenty-ninth anniversary of Tel-el-Kabir‖ or September 13, 1911, indicating that the work was completed a little over a month before the controversy. 51 Parliamentary Debates, Commons, ―Charges Against British Troops‖ [Hansard], 5th ser., vol. 31, cols 332-335, 14 November 1911. The response from Colonel Seeley is in col. 335. 52 The article was too minor to receive a title, instead it can be found at the very bottom of the ―Wills and Bequests‖ column, Times, 26 January 1915. The Gordon anniversary sermon was only preached in Khartoum following the consecration of the cathedral, which lessened its newsworthiness.

140 a mention, save for a line in the day‘s happenings. For the first time since Gordon‘s death, there was no way to make him relevant to the political discussions or to the British public at large. There were three motivating factors contributing to Gordon‘s irrelevance. First, his memory had been employed most effectively by the Conservative Party. In May 1915, the often fractious Conservative Party officially joined the war-time coalition government. Although there continued to be tensions between the Liberals and Conservatives, these tensions were expressed in much more modern terms, focusing on the war currently being waged rather than a thirty-year- old conflict.53 The second was the death in 1916 of one of Gordon‘s remaining colleagues and supporters: Lord Kitchener. Kitchener‘s death, which coincidentally also occurred as a result of suspicious circumstances, resulted in the loss of a person who had been involved in establishing all of Sudan‘s memorials to Gordon. Without Kitchener, it is highly likely that there would not have been a Gordon Memorial College or an equestrian statue in Khartoum.54 The third reason, however, was the most compelling. Although Britain had been involved in a variety of smaller skirmishes and wars since Gordon died, including the Boer War and Boxer Rebellion, none of these wars produced anyone who filled the archetypal role of a national hero.55 This was not the case with the war which would come to be known as the Great War. As Paul Fussell has discussed in his landmark work The Great War and Modern Memory, this war was different. It was the last war to be waged with a sense of innocence and the idea that Britain would quickly defeat its adversaries. It was also a war in which heroes were made and myths were created. The Great War was the subject of reams of literature; it was where hundreds of thousands of young men went but did not return home. The heroic acts of these men, immortalized in their comrades‘ letters and poetry, supplanted the ideas of the ―hero‖ present in Britain before the war.56 In essence, Gordon‘s usefulness as a hero lessened with the growth of this new type of heroic figure. The way that Gordon was perceived at the conclusion of the war only helped to add to this assessment. In May, 1918, shortly before the war ended, Lytton Strachey published Eminent Victorians. This work aimed to ―present some Victorian visions to the modern eye‖ through

53 David Dutton, ―Conservatism in Crisis,‖ in Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon, editors, Recovering Power: The Conservatives in Opposition since 1867 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 128-131. 54 Kitchener was killed in June 1916 when a ship he was sailing on supposedly struck a German landmine and sank. 55 Although an argument regarding General Baden-Powell and the siege of Mafeking could be made in the years directly following 1899, by World War I, that too had faded from prominence. 56Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory, twenty-fifth anniversary edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 135-144.

141 biographies of four well-known Victorians: Cardinal Manning, Florence Nightingale, Dr. Arnold, and, most importantly to Strachey, General Gordon.57 His biographies of each subject were comprehensive and did result in the shattering of assumptions regarding these previously legendary figures. The merits of Strachey‘s actual contributions to literature and the field of biography have been discussed at length by academics, but the way he challenged and changed people‘s perceptions is uncontested.58 Strachey‘s treatment of Gordon is noteworthy. Although he claimed in his preface to give a complete biography of each of his subjects, his chapter on Gordon is actually called ―The End of Gordon‖ and focuses almost completely on the final year of the general‘s life. While his tone is quite witty and the work is well-written, the main reason why Strachey‘s work was important to changing views on Gordon was that it presented several new pieces of evidence regarding the general. Strachey claimed that he had been a drunk, ―seated at a table, upon which were an open bible and an open bottle of brandy,‖ believed that Gordon was interested in becoming a heroic figure and intended his own martyrdom, and highlighted the continuing question of Gordon‘s sexuality.59 The most damning of Strachey‘s assertions were attributed to people who had personal grudges against the general, and, as Anthony Nutting proved in the final chapter of his biography, Gordon of Khartoum: martyr and misfit, cannot be taken as strictly factual.60 Nevertheless, Eminent Victorians was a very popular and well-respected book. The review it received in the Times Literary Supplement was very positive; the only negative thoughts that the author had were in reference to Strachey‘s writing style, mentioning in an almost rueful tone, ―here we touch the only fault which one can really find with this book—a fault which in almost any other author would be a virtue: it is too amusing.‖61 If the literary supplement of a paper which had, over the past three decades, printed several articles and letters praising Gordon, did not find fault with the works‘ content, then it stands to reason that most contemporary readers took the information as correct.

57 Strachey, vii. 58 The most virulent challenges to Strachey occurred in the early twentieth century. Charles Richard Sanders synthesized these arguments and added to them in his piece ―Lytton Strachey‘s Conception of Biography‖ in PMLA, volume 66, number 4 (Jun., 1951): 295-315 . 59 Strachey, 264. Cynthia Behrman addressed the changes to the Gordon biography historiography in ―The After- Life of General Gordon,‖ Albion: A Quarterly Journal concerned with British Studies, volume 3, number 2 (Summer, 1971): 54-55. 60 Anthony Nutting, Gordon of Khartoum: martyr and misfit (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, publisher, 1966), 316- 321. 61 ―Megatheria,‖ Times Literary Supplement, 16 May 1918, p. 230.

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Regardless of whether the arguments made by Strachey were strictly factual, they certainly had an impact. From 1918 until almost a decade later, Gordon faded further from public discourse. Although there were infrequent mentions of his memorials, most notably in the yearly appeal published by the Gordon Boys‘ Home in 1920 which mentioned the Boys who had died in World War I, there were almost no references to Gordon himself. In the text of the 1920 appeal, published on the thirty-fifth anniversary of his death, the stark truth that Gordon was becoming irrelevant is revealed. There are two men who signed it, both of whom served with Gordon, but their ―roll of subscription is annually decreasing‖ as members of this new generation began asking ―Who was Gordon?‖ Ten years earlier, the name of Gordon had needed no explanation; now it was required.62 The trend of Gordon‘s lessening importance continued throughout the 1920s. Part of why this occurred is linked to the reason why he was an unimportant figure during the First World War: the Conservative Party‘s omission of his memory as an electoral tactic against the Liberal Party. The Liberal government, replaced by a wartime coalition in 1915, was the last true Liberal government; following the war the party was in a steady decline. With the rise of Labour and the fall of the Liberals, the Conservatives no longer had the need, or the opportunity, to use Gordon as a figure for political maneuvering.63 Instead, his name and experiences were sometimes invoked, but in a more limited way than in the past. Ironically, the best example of this new usage came in political speeches given by a Labour MP, Leslie Haden-Guest. In his speech, given as a partial justification for his Spring 1927 resignation, he railed against Ramsay MacDonald, the Labour Prime Minister, for his foreign policy decisions regarding the British military position in China. MacDonald had advocated recalling the British naval and military forces from Shanghai, which would have left British citizens living there in danger of being caught in the middle of inter-Chinese fighting between the nationalists and the communists.64 His plan failed. In his speech, Haden-Guest argued that had MacDonald succeeded, ―we might even now be witnessing a tragedy more awful than that of the massacre at Khartum when General

62 ―The Gordon Boys,‖ Times (London) 23 January 1920. 63 While the Liberal Party did not disintegrate until later in the twentieth century, the split in the party dated back to 1916, effectively ending its role as a major opposition party. For more on the split, see Martin Pugh, The Making of Modern British Politics, 1867-1945 third edition (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 153-156. 64 The circumstances in China which led to this state of affairs, including the takeover by Chiang Kai Shek, are discussed in Robert E. Bedeski,‖The Evolution of the Modern State in China: Nationalist and Communist Continuities,‖ World Politics, volume 27, number 4 (Jul., 1975): 547-550.

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Gordon was killed.‖65 Even if the actual circumstances of Gordon‘s life no longer had the same resonance to the British public that they formerly had, his abandonment and death still were a powerful image. This power was reaffirmed in an appeal launched by the governor-general of Sudan, Sir John Maffey, on the forty-fourth anniversary of the general‘s death. The appeal asked for contributions to help support the Christian work or ―work of the Church,‖ in Sudan. In addition to printing the appeal, the Times ran a letter in support for it from several men who had served during the re-conquest of Sudan. The names included Churchill, who had since risen to political prominence; Wingate, the now-retired governor-general of the Sudan; Lord David Beatty, the First Sea Lord and member of the Privy Council, two field marshals, and twelve generals of various ranks. In their letter, the men referenced their hope that ―before the generation passes away to which the tragedy of January, 1885, remains a vivid memory and the name of Gordon is half-forgotten with other ‗far off things and battles long ago‘‖ his memory would be honored through contributions to the governor-general‘s appeal.66 The presence of one or two of these names on the appeal would have been enough to garner significant attention. The fact that all of these well-known and respected men signed the letter, however, led the Times to publish an editorial on Gordon the same day. In the editorial, the Times recapped the events of Gordon‘s life, mentioned the controversies which led to his death, and gave a general indication of the feeling in Britain present at that time, including the idea of who was ultimately to blame for his death. Following the basic information, the editorial focused not on Gordon in the past, but instead on his memory as a Christian hero: But, on looking back over the forty-four years that have passed, it is not to thoughts of blame that the generous mind will betake itself. The storm has died away; and all may see, risen out of the turmoil, a shining figure. It is by no means the figure of a conventional hero. There is more than a little that is strange about it, willful, simple, impulsive, impatient. But, as it has the shifting lights and shades of genius, so it has the steady greatness of

65 ―North Southwark: Labour and China,‖ Times (London), 25 March 1927. 66 ―In Memory of Gordon: His Supreme Ideal,‖ Times (London) 26 January 1929. The full signatory list is as follows: ―Plumer, F.M.; Winston S. Churchill; Beatty; Reginald Wingate; Archibald Hunter, General; J.G. Maxwell, General; G.F. Milne, F.M.; H.S. Smith-Dorrien, General; Leslie Rundle, General; T.D. O‘Snow, Lieut.-General; Josceline Wodehouse, General; Edward Gleichen, Major-General; Fred W. Stoppard, Lieut.-General; W.E. Payton, General; E.P. Strickland, Lieut.-General; J.J. Asser, General; and R. Whigham, General.‖ The Guardian published a short article that contained most of the points of the letter and the appeal, but did not publish either in full: ―Anniversary of Gordon‘s Death: Memorial Appeal,‖ Manchester Guardian, 26 January 1929.

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genius: the utter unworldliness, the entire faith, the carelessness of all except the will of GOD.67

The editorial continued by imploring people to remember that Gordon gave his life ―that the Sudan might be freed from oppression and rapine: yet more so that it might be made Christian.‖68 These two sentiments, taken together, show a new manner in which Gordon was being employed. Instead of being seen more as an imperial symbol, as he had been regarded for the first forty years following his death, Gordon was now being portrayed as a Christian symbol and used as a fundraiser for purely Christian projects that were not related to British imperial goals. This tactic was not necessarily a new one. As has already been discussed, at the turn of the twentieth century, Gordon‘s name was used in conjunction with appeals by the Church Missionary Society and in support of the fundraising to build Khartoum Cathedral, but it was the first time that any sort of imperial-bettering mission was lacking from an appeal in his name. The editorial, letter, and appeal from January 26, 1929, marked a change in the way Gordon was presented. It was almost as if people were attempting to recast the memory of Gordon for a more contemporary purpose—so, in a way, the eminent names achieved their goal and Gordon was not forgotten. His name and his exploits became newsworthy again with the Times in particular printing several letters to the editor filled with remembrances of people who claimed to have known or were related to the general. Most of these letters were quite short, with correspondents just re-telling old stories about Gordon, but one of them is particularly significant as it inspired many others. In November of 1929, Gordon‘s nephew, Lieutenant-Colonel Moffitt, wrote a short article about his fallen uncle. In it, he recollected when he had first been told about his uncle and his reaction to meeting the general for the first time when he was about seven years old. Instead of discussing Gordon as symbol, his nephew recalled that the general had a ―bright side of his nature‖ and was willing to ―laugh and joke about his escapades.‖69 These comments were unique; no other printed remembrances of the general were quite so personal. Moffitt was not focused on the empire, politics, or religion; he was simply fondly recalling his famous uncle. By printing the appeal and editorial in addition to Lieutenant-Colonel Moffitt‘s decision to share his recollections in its pages, the Times became the newspaper which was most invested

67 ―In Memory of Gordon,‖ Times (London), 26 January 1929. 68 Ibid. 69 ―General Gordon: A Nephew‘s Recollections,‖ Times (London) 12 November 1929. Over the next two days, several letters to the editor told other Gordon stories, especially on November 14.

145 in preserving the Gordon myth. This status was confirmed in 1932 when the paper ran an article that featured the offense taken by the most senior officer in the Royal Engineers, General Sir Bindon Blood, to a British Broadcasting Company (BBC) radio program about Gordon that featured incorrect information from the Strachey biography. In the piece, which basically amounted to a formal demand for a retraction, the general strove to rehabilitate Gordon‘s reputation further, especially concerning the now disproven claims against his sobriety.70 Interestingly, although the piece discussed a BBC program that was available throughout the country, the Times was the only paper to mention the events or print an article based on Bindon Blood‘s comments. From 1932 onwards, it appeared as if the editors of the Times had decided that Gordon was again newsworthy. The most apparent indication of his change in status occurred with the celebrations of the centennial of Gordon‘s birth in January 1933. As Behrman discussed in the ―After-Life of General Gordon,‖ the Times Literary Supplement ―devoted its front page leader of January 26, 1933, to ‗General Gordon (1833-1885)‘ and reviewed four works.‖ These were biographies written by historians, not propagandists; Gordon was now treated as a ―remote figure from the past,‖ and any claims of immediacy were no longer valid.71 However, even as the editors of the Literary Supplement were striving to praise these new, ―historic‖ biographies, varying opinions about their validity were still present. These opinions are best exemplified in a book review written about one of the four works covered in the supplement, Bernard Allen‘s new study of Gordon and Sudan. The review, which ran in the Egyptian Gazette, specifically referenced the fact that the centennial would result in a spate of new biographies. As this article ran in the Egyptian Gazette, which was a paper for the English-speaking population in Egypt, the details of Gordon‘s life, career, and death were still considered common knowledge. Thus, this reviewer felt that the authors of the new books would not need to educate their readers on Gordon‘s basic information. By 1933, there were plenty of other biographies of the general available which told the story of his life in its typical tropes.72 However, the author of the review believed that these new biographies would only focus on one or another facet of Gordon, mentioning the ideas of ―Gordon the religious fanatic, Gordon the bellicose militarist, Gordon the mystic, and even Gordon the unconscious homosexualist with a

70 ―General Gordon: A Vindication by General Sir Bindon Blood,‖ Times (London), 7 January 1932. 71 Behrman, ―After-Life,‖ 55-56. The four reviewed books were: Bernard Allen‘s Gordon and the Sudan, H.E. (although she incorrectly attributes it to W.E.) Wortham‘s Gordon: An Intimate Portrait, Pierre Crabitès‘s Gordon, the Sudan and Slavery, and a reissue of Winston Churchill‘s The River War. 72 For example, the works by Boulger, Hake, or even the Blunt work discussed earlier in this chapter.

146 sister complex‖ but none of them would portray the ―gleaming, shifting opal that Gordon really was.‖73 In the celebrations of the centennial, all of the sides of Gordon were celebrated. Even the Manchester Guardian, whose editors were significantly more critical of Gordon than their counterparts at the Times, celebrated the centennial with a series of articles, photographs, and an editorial. These articles were published on January 28 (the actual centennial) and 30 (the date on which the memorial service in London had been held). In the editorial, published on the centennial, the editors encapsulated the problem with Gordon succinctly: National hero and very queer fish—the great man the centenary of whose birth we celebrate to-day was undeniably both, but ever since his death there has been some uncertainty where the emphasis should be placed. His immediate contemporaries were content to salute Gordon as a hero; his death made him that…Later the interest was not so much in his deeds as in his personality—in the queer fish rather than in the hero. The military genius who found even a casual discipline irksome, the Engineer officer much occupied with the Biblical speculations on the site of Garden of Eden and the rate of drift of the Ark, the saint who smoked too many cigarettes—all this was meat and drink to a number of writers who found in Gordon what they were looking for: a very queer fish indeed, a Victorian neurotic, a ‗character.‘74

The rest of the editorial continued in the same irreverent vein. The author did not have a final opinion on Gordon himself; he was really just repeating the same sort of speculation that had been present in the public consciousness since the publication of Eminent Victorians. Regardless of its final sentiments, the Guardian recognized the centennial as newsworthy. In addition to these sometimes scathing words, a simply captioned image of the Trafalgar Square statue also ran in that day‘s paper. Two days later, a photo of Gordon‘s defender, Sir Bindon Blood, receiving the Duke and Duchess of York at the Gordon memorial service held at St. Paul‘s Cathedral ran in the pages of the Guardian. This photo was accompanied by a short news article that focused not on the actual sermon, but rather on the prominent individuals who attended it.75

73 Like several other clippings, this review ―A Study in Contrasts: Viewpoints about Gordon,‖ which appeared in the Egyptian Gazette of 20 February 1933, is found in a collection held at SAD. E.G. Sarsfield-Hall collection, SAD 683/7/7. 74 ―Gordon,‖ Manchester Guardian, 28 January 1933. The un-titled photo appeared on the same day with the caption, ―The statue in Trafalgar Square of General Gordon who was born a hundred years ago.‖ 75 ―In Memory of Gordon,‖ Manchester Guardian, 30 January 1933. The photo ―The Gordon Centenary‖ ran the same day.

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With these articles, the Guardian honored Gordon while still managing to marginalize him. These pieces also represented the last time that he was mentioned in that paper in any significant capacity through the beginning of the Second World War. If the Guardian‘s editorial staff was satisfied with one editorial, two photographs, and an article that amounted to little more than a social listing to honor Gordon, the Times‘ staff was not. Like the Guardian, the Times featured an editorial on January 28, but it also included a multi-page ―familiar portrait‖ of Gordon by Major-General Sir Louis Jackson, who was related to the general by marriage. In addition to this material, the Times featured a notice about an exhibition of Gordon-related documents at the Public Record Office. Furthermore, it complimented this coverage with an entire column in the 30 January paper on the celebrations held in St. Paul‘s, in Trafalgar Square, and at Southampton. The Times also published a photograph of the ceremonies on the same day.76 All of these items had a much more respectful tone than those published in the Guardian. The Times editorial referenced the same ideas but was much more favorable towards the general. In it, the author mentioned the controversy, but said that it had helped Gordon and his memory. For the general was ―in some risk of being embalmed in the general acceptance.‖ The article continued by saying that ―there is little danger now that any of them [Gordon, the Queen, other ―eminent Victorians‖] will be taken for granted, but still less of their being explained or dissected away.‖77 According to the Times, by 1933 the furor created by the Strachey accusations had been quieted. Gordon was transformed back into a popular hero and his centennial sparked a ―Gordon Renaissance.‖ One of the most important aspects of this renaissance was to complete the rehabilitation of Gordon‘s character that had begun with the 1929 appeal. The Times‘ contribution to this effort was the publication of Major-General Sir Louis Jackson‘s long portrait, in which he claimed Gordon to be similar to one of Plutarch‘s famous heroes.78 In it, the author sought to re-educate the public about Gordon‘s deeds before his time in Sudan and to remind them about his heroic actions and self-sacrifice. It reads in a manner similar to the earliest biographies of Gordon, with

76 ―Gordon of Khartoum,‖ ―General Gordon: One of Plutarch‘s Men: A Familiar Portrait‖ and ―Documents of Gordon,‖ Times (London) 28 January 1933. ―In Memory of Gordon‖ and photo of St. Paul‘s Cathedral service Times (London) 30 January 1933. 77 ―Gordon of Khartoum.‖ 78 ―General Gordon: One of Plutarch‘s Men.‖ The title refers to Plutarch‘s Lives which featured almost mystical ―heroic‖ figures. For more on Plutarch‘s heroes see D.A. Russell, ―Plutarch and the Ancient Hero,‖ The Yearbook of English Studies, volume 12, Heroes and the Heroic Special Number, (1982).

148 little to no criticism for any of his actions. These two articles set the tone for all of the Times‘ future coverage of the general. Two days later, when the Times covered the centenary service at St. Paul‘s instead of merely including a social listing, the article quoted several passages from the sermon and featured a description of the service, in which the memory of Gordon was described as evoking ―sorrow as well as pride.‖ The other memorial events received similar, although shorter, mentions.79 All of the press coverage described above inspired a spate of letters to the editor discussing little known facts about Gordon. Like the letters that had accompanied the ―Nephew‘s Recollections‖ years earlier, these mostly repeated older stories about the general, although one in particular was on ―Gordon as a botanist.‖80 None of the letters shed much light on any new facets of the general‘s character, but, taken together, they represent the continued interest his name engendered. There were other reasons why Gordon became more popular in 1933 in addition to the centennial of his birth. A celebration of the general was also a celebration of the Empire. Following the First World War, traditional British imperialism underwent a transformation; even those who advocated imperialism understood that the goals of the imperial project needed to be transformed in order to assure the Empire‘s continued vitality. The ―moral‖ reasons for empire were no longer considered valid; now the empire needed to continue for other reasons, most notably its economic benefits. One of the ways that it was transformed was the introduction of a new term into discussions: the Commonwealth. In its new role, the Empire was portrayed as ―a great exercise in friendly, familial cooperation, and even ‗internationalism.‘‖81 Charles Gordon fit this new definition. His memory also fit with efforts to continue promoting the empire, referred to by Bernard Porter as consisting of ―Empire Days, Empire Songs, Empire Essay Competitions, ‗Empire Meals on Empire Day, and all the other ingenious ploys of the imperialists.‖82 Charles Gordon was still the perfect symbol for these imperialists to employ. However, there were outside factors contributing to Gordon‘s popularity in the year of his centennial. Nineteen thirty-three also marked the solidification of a new ideology in Europe, fascism. With the growth of fascism, especially in Germany, Italy, and Spain, Britain faced a

79 ―In Memory of Gordon.‖ 80 ―Gordon as Botanist,‖ Times (London) 7 February 1933. Other letters appeared on February 3, 4, and 18. 81 Porter, Lion’s Share, 288. 82 Ibid., 273.

149 new threat. Gordon—the archetype of the Victorian hero and a supreme example of imperial masculinity—provided an excellent counter to this new ideal.83 By celebrating him and all that he represented, the British were reaffirming their imperial culture and rejecting the ideas of fascism present throughout the continent. Fascism was present in Britain throughout the 1930s, but the country never became fascist. Celebrations of Gordon and other figures reminded the British people of their history and their national pride, factors which have been described by historian Keith Robbins as part of the reason why Britain did not succumb to fascism.84 Thus, while honoring Gordon was important, the timing of the centennial was beneficial to the imperial project. Gordon himself was not as significant for the rest of the 1930s. Throughout the rest of the decade, with a bit of an upswing around the fiftieth anniversary of his death, Gordon remained a figure of minor note. In January 1935, he was the subject of memorial stamps issued by the Sudanese Government (which at the time was still a part of the Anglo- Egyptian condominium) commemorating the anniversary.85 More biographies were released; Gordon was also the subject of several editions of popular boys‘ journals in the 1930s. These journals sought to increase the boys‘ patriotic feeling by featuring stories such as Gordon‘s final year.86 Literature was not the only area where interest in the general increased following his centenary. Interest was also piqued by the advent of a new form of media: cinema. Although there had been earlier films about Gordon, in 1938 a notice appeared about a new film to be made about the general‘s life.87 This film, the third cinematic version of A.E.W. Mason‘s The Four Feathers, was released in 1939. According to historian Jeffrey Richards, it was designed by its director, Alexander Korda, to ―stress the virtues of the British imperial system, the doctrines of fair play and moral authority at a time when the rise of fascism was threatening those ideals and offering a different sort of world government.‖88

83 For the connection between British fascists and the ideas of imperial masculinity, see Ina Zweiniger- Bargielowska, ―Building a British Superman: Physical Culture in Interwar Britain‖ Journal of Contemporary History, volume 41, number 4, (Oct., 2006): 597-598. 84 Keith Robbins, Britain and Europe: 1785-2005 (London: Hodder Education, 2005), 205-206. 85 ―Silver Jubilee Stamps,‖ Times (London) 13 December 1934. 86 John M. MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 219-220. 87 ―Gordon, gen, film based on life to be made,‖ Times (London) 25 October 1938. The earliest film featuring the general was a 1915 silent film adaptation of ―Four Feathers‖ it was remade in 1921 and 1929. 88 Jeffrey Richards, ―Boys Own Empire: feature films and imperialism in the 1930s‖ in John MacKenzie, editor Imperialism and Popular Culture (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), 149.

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By 1937, people in Britain were beginning to worry about Japan‘s actions in China, particularly its actions around the city of Nanjing. Paralleling the press coverage of the Boxer Rebellion, the British public sought an authority on China, and once again, ―Chinese Gordon‖ was the authority found. This time, however, Gordon was only mentioned in letters to the editor. The editorial boards of papers in the late 1930s did not consider him to be a worthy authority on a country which had completely changed in the eighty years since he had been there. Although the Times did not quote Gordon directly, it did run parts of two separate letters to the editor that referenced Gordon‘s views on China. The first of these letters appeared in August, 1937. In the letter, the author liberally quoted from Gordon‘s views on the Chinese army, drawing particular attention to his contention that ―China cannot have an army when generals keep 2,000 men and draw pay for 5,000. These generals ought to have their heads cut off.‖ Gordon‘s comments were about the army in 1880. The author, Mr. J.P. Donovan, extrapolated this idea out to the Chinese army in 1937 without any proof that the same situation existed. Regardless of the author‘s perhaps misguided attention, the letter is still notable for the attempt to keep Gordon‘s name in the discussion.89 The second appeared in July, 1939. By this time, war between Japan and China had begun in earnest. This letter, from Mr. George Lancing, is a brief discussion on Gordon‘s tactical views. His points have more merit than those of Mr. Donovan because the Chinese were using the guerilla tactics he had recommended in 1880. The letter included a passage from Gordon‘s discussion on the tactics. Some of the points, such as his idea that ―‗China should never engage in pitched battles. Her strength lies in quiet movements…,‘‖ were quite familiar.90 In fact, the same type of advice was used in a paper Gordon wrote the same year about the Boers. China was using the military tactics he had advocated, although the likelihood that these tactics were employed as a result of the general‘s recommendation is slim at best. With Gordon being used as an authority again (even in a limited capacity), and films, books, and journals featuring him being sold, his renaissance was complete. Although his name was no longer employed in a political capacity, Gordon was still important to Britain and its Empire. He may not have had the same level of relevance as he did in the first years of the twentieth century, and his reputation may have suffered in the years directly after the First World

89 ―Points from Letters: Chinese Armed Forces,‖ Times (London) 18 August 1937. 90 ―Points from Letters: Gordon on Chinese Tactics,‖ Times (London), 10 July 1939.

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War, but he himself was still a figure of interest. Perhaps the fascination that the British public had with the general was re-ignited as a result of Strachey‘s accusations or the stories printed about the general in the form of articles and letters to the editor in the early 1930s. Regardless, by 1939, the problems that had so worried his supporters in the 1920s, had been eliminated. In 1939, it was highly unlikely that the question of ―Who was Gordon?‖ needed to be asked. His name and reputation were well-known once more. However, with the onset of the Second World War, Gordon, as an imperial hero from the last century, was relegated to a minor figure, in much the same manner as accompanied his first time of irrelevance. This new status continued into post-war Britain as it was beginning to divest itself of its former territories. Thus, Gordon would be transformed yet again—this time into an imperial relic.

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CHAPTER 8 FADING INTO THE BACKGROUND

In 1939, Charles Gordon‘s name was again prominent in the public consciousness; he was honored yearly at Trafalgar Square and was even being referenced as an authority in imperial matters. However, this renaissance was to be short-lived. Similar to the effect of the First World War, the Second World War led to a permanent lessening of Gordon‘s importance to Britain and its Empire. By the time it had concluded, Gordon was no longer as present in the public consciousness; his statue had been removed from Trafalgar Square and the traits he had most strongly exemplified were no longer shaping the British self-image as they once had. Furthermore, following the war‘s conclusion, decolonization became a central concern, which led to the question of what kind of imperial figure was still needed, and whether it might be one that represented reconciliation rather than conquest. The great hero of the nineteenth century had become a problem in the twentieth, especially as discussions about decolonization began. As Gordon‘s place in British culture changed during the war, so too did his assorted memorials. In England, these memorials had, like the man they honored, undergone a transformation. In 1943, Gordon‘s annual recognition at Trafalgar Square ended. The Gordon Boys‘ Home became the Gordon Boys‘ School, a change in status which indicated a lessening of the original goals of the Home. As a school, other boys besides the less fortunate were eligible to attend it. At the same time, the London statue went into storage, where it would remain through the end of the war. In Sudan, his memorials also went through a metamorphosis following the Second World War. However, change in Khartoum would occur a bit later, once the imminent danger had subsided. In both capital cities, Gordon‘s statues were moved because of constraints on their locations. In Khartoum, anti-British sentiment led to the eventual move; in London, it was quite the opposite. Gordon‘s statue was moved to make way for a wartime pro-British demonstration. By 1943, the British people had been subjected to war for over four years. In London, the public was suffering through the blitz and its aftermath. The country and its troops needed a morale booster and a way to help the war effort. The solution was the establishment of a series of weeks between March and June 1943, known as the ―Wings for Victory‖ weeks. They served as a fundraiser and an extension of the larger War Savings Campaigns. As the advertisement for the

153 weeks read, ―The vital war work you‘re doing is backing up the men who fly—wonderfully. But back ‗em up still more—by seeing that your town gets its Victory Wings‖1 This campaign was nationwide; the first of these weeks was held in London, March 6-13, 1943 and was inaugurated in a large ceremony held in Trafalgar Square. At this ceremony, the head of the campaign, Lord Robert Kindersley, the president of the National Savings Committee, spoke on a purpose-built marquee erected underneath an Avro Lancaster bomber. The choice of the bomber was intentional. It was British built and the ―most successful four-engined aircraft‖ built during the war. The plane was also an essential part of British war strategy, participating in bombing raids over Germany.2 In essence, it was a symbol of the British war effort. However, the Lancaster bomber was quite large; it was described in contemporary news reports as ―perched between the fountains‖ located on either side of the square, hence a considerable amount of area needed to be cleared to accommodate it.3 Essentially, in order to have the bomber in the square, one of the statues had to be moved or placed in storage. The statue chosen was of General Gordon; perhaps this decision is unsurprising. Gordon‘s statue was never felt to be a good fit for the square; even before the 1943 decision to remove it, there had been other instances where, in discussing the square‘s long-term appearance, the statue‘s positioning was questioned. Even in 1936, at the height of the resurgence of popularity of Gordon, there was a growing consensus in the Works Department that his statue was out of place in the square. In the department‘s private documents, the idea of moving the statue in conjunction with ―a scheme for transforming Trafalgar Square into…a ‗naval piazza,‖ was discussed.4 However, there was no final decision about where Gordon would be moved, or if

1 Advertisement for ―Victory Weeks‖ in Flight and the Aircraft Engineer, 11 February 1943, pg. 9. Although the weeks were successful as a morale booster, historian Angus Calder has argued that they actually cost the government more than they raised. Angus Calder, The People’s War: Britain—1939-1945 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969), 356. 2 There is a compelling photograph of the ceremony in the 18, March, 1943 issue. ―England Expects…‖ Flight and the Aircraft Engineer, 18 March, 1943, pg. 272. The symbolism of the bomber is discussed in The Times‘ article on the ceremony. ―Savings For Victory: London makes a good start,‖ Times (London), 8 March, 1943. The Lancaster bomber had a wingspan of 102ft and was almost 70ft in length. For more on the bombers uses see Anthony Verrier, The Bomber Offensive (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1969), 119 and 162-169. 3 ―Our London Correspondence: Wings over Trafalgar Square,‖ Manchester Guardian, 8 March 1943. 4 This scheme was eventually realized after the war, with the remodeling of the fountains and the installation of solely naval busts. For more on the changing character of the square and its statues, see Sue Malvern, ―The Fourth Plinth or the Vicissitudes of Public Sculpture‖ in Alexandra Gerstein, editor, Display and Displacement: Sculpture and the Pedestal from Renaissance to Post-Modern (London: The Courtauld Institute of Art Research Forum in association with Paul Hoberton publishing, 2007), 132-137. The ―naval piazza‖ is described in an undated wartime memo on the Gordon statue with handwritten corrections from 17 December 1947 in National Archives WORK 20/215.

154 the statue was ultimately deemed inappropriate for the square in the years preceding the Second World War. The naval question was not the only time the idea of moving Gordon was raised in the 1930s. In the same undated memorandum, the idea of erecting a new statue in the square, to another imperial figure, Cecil Rhodes, was referenced. At the time, there was a vacant plinth at the northwest corner of the square. According to the memo, the Rhodes statue was to be placed on that plinth; however, the Department had decided that including a statue to Rhodes would have impeded the square‘s design aesthetic. By this point in Britain‘s history, imperial heroes were no longer considered to be as important as they had been under the Victorians, yet at the time, the board did not recommend the removal of Gordon.5 Therefore, when the decision was made in March, 1943, to have a wartime propaganda event at Trafalgar Square, the first step that the Works Department needed to take was to find a new home for the Gordon statue. The debates over where the statue was to be relocated demonstrated the lessening importance of Gordon as a figure and of his statue. In these debates, preserved in the files of the Works Department, a consensus was reached that the statue should not be placed on display, at least for the duration of the war. Instead, it was first to be kept in the Works storeyard at St. James and later moved to Lord Roseberry‘s country house, Mentmore, in Hertfordshire. By April, 1943, the statue was at Mentmore; it remained there until a more permanent solution was found.6 It was clear, at least in the view of the Works Department, that Gordon‘s statue would not be returned to Trafalgar Square after the war. In the undated memo written after the ―Wings for Victory‖ week concluded, the department enumerated a variety of concerns for the fate of the statue. These concerns included the possibility of wartime damage, the need for the space in the square to remain available for other war-related uses, and lastly, the possibility of who might register a complaint if the statue were to be moved permanently. The first concern was the easiest one addressed; the author of the memo believed that replacing the statue in the square would be, ―in view of the risk of its being damaged, unwise.‖ The need for available space in the

5 WORK 20/215 17 December 1947 memo. A vacant plinth without a permanent statue remains in the square to the present day. 6 WORK A.S. 23; 7472; 31 March 1943, with handwritten notes at the bottom from 19 and 20 April 1943. The Gordon statue was not the only one moved to the countryside as a result of the Blitz. This file contains the new locations of several other statues including William III from St. James‘ Square, George III from Cockspur St., the Burghers of Calais from Victoria Tower Gardens, Lord Wolseley‘s statue from the Horse Guards Parade, and Charles I.

155 square was a bigger concern for the Works Department, and the author believed that the statue ―might be ‗in the way‘ of further propaganda campaigns in the Square.‖ Yet, the people behind these campaigns have not pressed ―this suggestion to the extent of objecting to the reinstatement of the statue.‖ These two concerns were valid arguments in wartime Britain.7 However, the final concern, over who might have complained if the statue were permanently removed, received the least attention in this memo, further indicating the apathy felt by the Works Department towards Gordon and his statue.8 Although the board of works felt that the statue was not well located, there was a fear, expressed in this memo, that to move Gordon would potentially cause a large amount of backlash. In the memo, the thoughts of Sir Patrick Duff, the permanent secretary to the Ministry of Works, were cited: ―Sir Patrick Duff‘s view was that ‗we should bring a hornet‘s nest around our ears if we showed signs of ousting him.‖9 Clearly, there was resentment in the Works Department over the need for Gordon to remain in the square. The final lines of this lengthy memorandum reflected this apathy. On the possibility of reinstatement in the square, the author concluded, that if there was no request made, then ―it will leave our hands all the freer to re-erect the statue elsewhere after the war and thus contribute another installment to the ‗naval piazza‘ scheme. We can only hope that the hornet‘s nest envisaged by Sir Patrick Duff will not materialize.‖10 Unfortunately for the Ministry of Works, that hornet‘s nest did, in fact, materialize following the conclusion of the Second World War. It was not a question of whether there had been a significant wartime need to move the statue; no one could argue with concerns for the statues, and Gordon‘s was not the only one that the Department moved. Rather, it was a question of what Gordon now represented. During the Second World War, the Gordon statue did not serve a purpose. Britain did not need to honor its long-dead imperial symbol, but instead needed to look forward, as the propaganda associated with the ―Wings of Victory‖ week asserted.11 Gordon‘s role as an imperial symbol and even as a patriotic one was not as important as other symbols, like the Lancaster Bomber, to people surviving the blitz.

7 WORK 20/215 undated memo with corrections from 17 December 1947. 8 By this point, the two were basically perceived as synonymous. 9 WORK 20/215 undated memo with corrections from 17 December 1947; emphasis is the memo author‘s. 10 Ibid. 11 The advertisement in Flight was only one example of this propaganda. There were several other posters and newspaper advertisements for the program.

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There was still another aspect to the problems faced by the Ministry over the Gordon statue: a change in the British public‘s attitude towards their statues following the First World War. Charles Gordon‘s statue memorialized just one man, not a war or even a military endeavor. This type of statue as a national monument was increasingly uncommon in the twentieth century, especially with the advent of total war. Stephen Heathorn discussed this changing attitude in his article on another controversial London statue, the memorial to World War I Field-Marshal Earl Douglass Haig. He argued that Haig‘s memorial is a valid national memorial, because Haig epitomizes all of the men, those who lived and those who died, who fought for him. The same cannot be said for Gordon‘s memorial. As a product of the nineteenth century, his statue seemed, like others of the same ilk, to be ―atavistic and out of touch with the postwar [First World War] reality.‖12 Thus, while Britain was concerned with its survival, the survival of one statue, or one man‘s legacy, was unimportant. However, Gordon and the Gordon statue still had prominent supporters, as the debates over its future would soon demonstrate. The question of where the Gordon statue was to be relocated regained attention in April, 1947. At the Ministry of Works, it had long been decided that Gordon would not return to Trafalgar Square. This sentiment was reinforced by a letter sent from the First Commissioner of Works, Charles W. Key, to F.J. Bellenger, the Secretary of State for War. In his letter, Key informed the War Office of the permanent decision regarding Gordon.13 He referenced the naval scheme and the original plan by the Works department to remove all non-naval military figures, including Generals Sir Charles James Napier and Sir Henry Havelock, in addition to Gordon. However, the other generals remained in place and only Gordon, who ―has never really looked at home in Trafalgar Square in a surrounding of an alien period and character,‖ was moved.14 The public at large was unaware that the Ministry of Works reached this decision. The first indication that Gordon would not be returned to the square came with statements issued by the ministry. These statements were fairly vague at first, leading to reports that a decision on the statue‘s fate had not yet been reached, but ―will be reached shortly.‖15 The problem with Gordon‘s statue was not its removal, but its relocation. The Ministry believed that a suitable spot

12 Stephen Heathorn, ―A ‗matter for artists, and not for soldiers‘? The Cultural Politics of the Earl Haig National Memorial, 1928-1937,‖ Journal of British Studies, volume 44, number 3 (Jul., 2005): 358. 13 As Gordon had originally served under the War Office‘s auspices, their input was sought in all of the decisions regarding his statue. 14 18 April 1947 letter from Key to Bellenger, NA WORK 20/215. Napier and Havelock remain in the square to the present day. 15 ―Our London Correspondence: London‘s Statues,‖ Manchester Guardian, 22 April 1947.

157 for the statue could not be found in central London and recommended in Key‘s letter to Bellenger that it should be moved to Woolwich, where Gordon was born and had attended school. The final location was not yet determined when Key wrote this letter. In August, the War Office recommended another location for Gordon: Sandhurst, the location of the Royal Military Academy. By September, it appeared as if the Works Office had a solution to its Gordon statue quandary, and by the end of November, the public had been informed of the plan to relocate the statue to Sandhurst.16 It was at this point that the plans of War Office and Ministry of Works hit a snag. When the news about the Gordon statue leaked, the hornet‘s nest that Sir Patrick Duff had predicted became a reality. The first reactions to the plan began to appear in editorials and letters to the editor in late November and December, 1947. The first letter to the editor appeared in the Spectator in which the author, who used the pseudonym ―Janus,‖ expressed his dismay at the removal of the Gordon statue, a situation that he termed ―most unsatisfactorily settled.‖ Janus continued, ―The expulsion of Thornycroft‘s Governor General from London is a much more serious matter [than the removal of James II‘s statue], and to send him to Sandhurst because he was once at Woolwhich seems a little inept. Gordon, with all his faults, was a great historic figure. That was why his statue was placed in Trafalgar Square.‖17 The letter demonstrated that Gordon‘s name and the reasons why he was memorialized were still important to at least some Britons after the Second World War. Shortly after this first letter appeared, a variety of letters on the subject were received at the Ministry of Works. All of these letters referenced the ideas set out in Janus‘ letter; not one received was in favor of the decision to remove Gordon from London. A handwritten letter from Wilson Harris, a Member of Parliament, referenced the other generals located in the square after first commenting on Gordon‘s banishment from the Square. In this letter, Harris questioned why Gordon was being moved as opposed to Napier, because he did not even ―know which Napier & [he] can‘t believe that anyone is much interested in him or would miss him if he were moved.‖18 The only conclusion which can be drawn from Harris‘ letter is that, in his opinion, Gordon was a

16 There are several letters regarding the possibility of the statue‘s move to Sandhurst. All are located in WORK 20/215. The first was sent on 27 August, 1947, another on 2 September, 1947 [Ext 1414] and finally a memo from the press office about announcing it to the public [P.I. 232-C]. 17 Janus‘ 28 November, 1947, editorial to the Spectator was retyped and included in the Works files, WORK 20/215. At the time, both the Gordon statue and a statue of James II had not been relocated in London; most editorials and letters on one statue mentioned the other one. 18WORK 20/215 326/0247 6 December, 1947 letter from Wilson Harris.

158 much more important general than the ones who were to be left in the square. As Harris was an MP, Key responded directly to him in a long letter, explaining the decisions made by Works to solve the problem of Gordon and concluding with his reasons for the proposed move to Sandhurst.19 This letter effectively silenced Harris‘ complaints, but he was not the only government official to question Works‘ decisions regarding the statue. Another was Mr. J.H.S. Burgess at the Ministry of Education, which had received comments regarding the situation. The Ministry sent a letter, written on behalf of Sir John Maud, the permanent secretary of Education, which did not detail his concerns, but rather those he had received in relation to the placement of the Christmas tree then standing in Gordon‘s former location. In the letter, the enquirer made the case for why Gordon should remain in London, feeling that ―there is every need ‗in the present state of world affairs that we should hold to every reminder and Memorial of men of integrity, courage and leadership—General Gordon being an exemplification of that which alone has made our country great.‘‖20 While the idea of Gordon as an exemplification of Britain‘s greatness was an older idea, in postwar Britain, exemplifying the past was becoming less important as the country strove to recover from the two world wars. Changing attitudes in Britain were best reflected in the sweeping electoral victory of the Labour Party over the Conservatives in the election of 1945. However, as Martin Pugh has argued, this sweeping transformation was linked to more than just new attitudes about the past; it was also intertwined with the coming of age of a new electorate which demanded a new social agenda. Portions of this agenda were present in the policies of the wartime coalition government, but it was not fully achieved until Labour came to power. The 1945 election was not a defeat of Churchill per se, but rather of the ―ghost of Chamberlain‖ and the older policies of the Conservative Party as they had existed before the Second World War. Churchill would remain personally popular (and even become Prime Minister again in a few

19 This letter appears in the same file as above. Other letters were received from newspapers [St. 1/7472] suggesting different locations for the statue, including outside the Gordon Hospital (a site which was deemed invalid by the Works Department) [29 December, 1947]. The Gordon Boys‘ School also supported the move to Sandhurst in a letter sent by Field Marshal Lord Chetwode the Chairman [A.S 23, 7 January 1948]. 20 29 December, 1947, letter from Mr. J.H.S. Burgess at the Ministry of Education to Key. Key replied on 5 January, 1948, in a similar manner to the reply to Harris. WORK 20/215

159 years), but his party was not the choice of a new Britain which had to contend with several problems including crises in health, housing, and unemployment.21 Thus, the voters chose the Labour Party. The policies enacted by this new government, led by Clement Atlee, would be, like their electoral victory, sweeping. This new attitude was best exemplified with the foundation of the National Health Service (NHS) in 1948. Providing health care free of charge, the NHS has, according to historian Arthur Marwick, ―been widely seen, both at the time and since, as the most significant and successful social innovation of the period.‖22 As such, it represented Britain‘s new priorities. With a government focused on the less elite and working class populations, honoring older imperial figures, such as Gordon, no longer seemed as vital. Newer memorials were turning towards remembering more than just the elite officers and white males who were the subject of nineteenth century (and earlier) memorials. As John Gillis explained in the introduction to his edited study on national identity, ―nineteenth century commemorations were largely for, but not of, the people.‖ Now, in the aftermath of the Second World War, ordinary people and their contributions were beginning to be honored—especially in mass commemorations.23 Gordon‘s statue was not one to which this label could be applied. Yet, his supporters tried to make his statue as important to the masses as possible. This point was emphasized in a letter sent to the Times in December, 1947. Its author, Charles Evans, expressed the need to have the statue remain in London; he felt that just relying on Gordon‘s memorial at St. Paul‘s Cathedral would not ―adequately preserve to London the memory of Gordon‘s services and heroic character.‖ The letter concluded with the suggestion that the Ministry of Works should remove the statue of ―some person with smaller claims upon the veneration of his country‖ to allow Gordon to stay in London.24 Days after the Evans letter appeared, another was published. This one referenced the same issues raised by Evans and Janus, but also brought an additional idea to the discussion: the artistic merit of Gordon‘s statue. The statue and its plinth were extremely well received and

21 Martin Pugh, The Making of Modern British Politics: 1867-1945 third edition (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 251-255. 22 Arthur Marwick, British Society since 1945 fourth edition (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 33. 23 John R. Gillis, ―Introduction,‖ in his edited Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 9-13. 24 ―Letters to the Editor: General Gordon,‖ Times (London), 6 December 1947.

160 hailed as a new type of British monumental sculpture when first produced.25 However, even while making a plea for Gordon‘s statue to remain in London based on its artistic merits, the author, W. Reid Dick, felt the need at least to mention the main reason why he believed Gordon‘s statue should remain, ―quite apart from the outstanding character and national importance of the hero whom it represents it is certainly one of the really fine portrait statues in our capital city.‖26 In all these letters, Gordon‘s name and his achievements have been transferred onto the statue: to marginalize the statue is to marginalize Gordon himself. Unfortunately for Gordon‘s supporters, it did not appear that these letters and sentiments were successful; by April, 1948, the Times ran an article on the forthcoming re-erection of Gordon‘s statue at Sandhurst. It did not contain a plea for the statue to remain in London, nor did the article reference any of Gordon‘s past history or deeds. Instead, it merely stated the reason of the Ministry of Works for moving the statue and the determination that Sandhurst would be the best location.27 Thus, it seemed like a foregone conclusion that the statue would go to Sandhurst. However, a great deal of public sentiment was stirred with the formal announcement of the statue‘s new home. This furor resulted in over a dozen letters to the editor printed in the Times between April 30 and May 11, 1948. In these letters, the decision to move the statue and the fitness of the new location were once again questioned. Many letters expressed shock, amazement, and regret that the statue was going to leave London permanently. Unlike the news article announcing the move, these letter writers also sought to remind the public of the reasons why Gordon‘s statue deserved to stay in London, and if the authors accepted that he could not remain in Trafalgar Square, they also tried to propose what they felt were other suitable locations in the city. The correspondents ranged from a person describing himself as a ―mere member of the public‖ to members of Parliament, to a Cambridge Don, public figures, and even the ―only surviving nephew of General Gordon.‖28 While the content of all the letters reads in a fairly similar vein, two stand out. These letters best exemplify the goals of the correspondents, goals

25 Malvern, 137. The statue and its plinth are discussed in detail in chapter four. 26 ―Letters to the Editor: The Gordon Statue,‖ Times (London), 11 December 1947. 27 ―Gordon‘s Statue: Forthcoming Erection at Sandhurst,‖ Times (London), 24 April 1948. The Times ran the entire content of the press release issued by the Ministry of Works [WORK 20/215, MOW/46/48, D.I. 232C] 28 All of these letters to the editor appeared in the Times, under the heading of ―Gordon‘s Statue.‖ Letters ran on 30 April, 1948, 3 May [the ―mere member‖ and Cambridge Don, G.M. Trevelyan], 7 May, 8 May [the chairman of Gordon Hospital and the man responsible for moving the statue to fit the Lancaster bomber], 10 May [the MP, Mr. Legge-Brooke] and 11 May [the letter from F. Moffit, Gordon‘s newphew]. Although this subject received a great deal of attention in the Times, the Manchester Guardian did not publish any letters to the editor on the subject.

161 which are quite similar to the earlier letters of November and December, 1947. The letters from historian G.M. Trevelyan and Gordon‘s nephew illustrate the continued need felt for a Gordon statue to remain in London. Trevelyan‘s appeared in the Times first, on May 3, 1948. In it, the famed historian wrote of his regret when he heard of the decision to move the statue and his hope that it could still be reversed. After these sentiments, he explained his belief as to why the statue should not be located at Sandhurst. Instead of focusing on the need for the statue to remain in London, Trevelyan took a different approach, including citing reasons why Gordon‘s character was not a good fit for the new location: ―his memory is not specially suited to inspire young officers with zeal for discipline and obedience to orders.‖ This statement is the only time that any of these correspondents ventured to criticize any part of Gordon; as a historian, Trevelyan wanted to remind people of Gordon the man—not just his statue. However, the next paragraph of his letter returned to the similar trope employed in these letters. ―He is a true national hero; his strange and tragic story is deeply written across our political and imperial annals; his personality and genius were unique and will always remain a source of pride to Englishmen.‖29 At the time he penned the letter, Trevelyan was probably the most well-known historian of Britain, appointed to the highest positions within Cambridge University. His thoughts on the statue thus held more weight than an ordinary correspondent. If Trevelyan was speaking as a conservative- leaning Whig historian, he was also speaking as an admirer of Gordon and as a contemporary, being born in 1876 and with a memory of Gordon and the uproar following his death.30 The letter writer who had the most definitive memory of Gordon the man was his nephew, Francis Moffitt. Ever since he had published his 1929 letter in the Times, Moffitt seemed to have become the family authority on Gordon. This status was confirmed by the publication of this second letter. Moffitt believed that ―as the only surviving nephew of General Gordon‖ it was his ―duty to protest against the proposal.‖ He then provided an impassioned plea for keeping the statue in London, citing not the specifics of Gordon‘s deeds but rather, ―his total abnegation of self and his sympathy for all who were in trouble or distress.‖ Hence, Moffitt felt that ―the story of his life has been an inspiration to many and his statue in Trafalgar Square has served to keep his memory warm.‖ For this reason he believed that, ―the place for the statue is

29 G.M. Trevelyan, ―Letters to the Editor: Gordon‘s Statue,‖ Times (London), 3 May, 1948. 30 For more on Trevelyan, including his personal history, connection with Winston Churchill, and political leanings, see Joseph M. Hernon, Jr., ―The Last Whig Historian and Consensus History: George Macaulay Trevelyan, 1876- 1962,‖ The American Historical Review volume 81, number 1, (Feb., 1976): 66-97.

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London, where it can be seen by thousands of the inhabitants of these islands and by many visitors from overseas.‖31 As the letters excerpted above show, a large number of Britons agreed with Moffitt‘s sentiments. Despite this support, the Ministry of Works still intended to ―banish‖ Gordon‘s statue to Sandhurst. However, only days before Moffitt‘s impassioned letter was printed in the Times, the statue earned a reprieve, in the form of a debate held in the House of Commons. The man responsible for the reprieve was one of Gordon‘s most vocal supporters, Winston Churchill. Like his friend Trevelyan, Churchill too was not pleased with the decision to move the statue to Sandhurst. He expressed this displeasure by sending a Private Notice Question to the House of Commons which was ―To ask the Prime Minister whether he has any statement to make about the removal of the statue of General Gordon from its place in Trafalgar Square.‖32 This was the question that appeared in the Works archives, but by the time that the question was actually asked (not read), it was to the Minister of Works, Charles Key, not to Clement Atlee, the Labour Prime Minister. However, Atlee did ask to be kept informed of the situation, writing a curt Prime Minister‘s Minute to Key, which simply contained the following: ―I have been informed that the statue of General Gordon which used to stand in Trafalgar Square has been sent to Sandhurst. I should like to know by whose orders and on what grounds this has been done.‖33 Regardless of why Key was sent to field questions, debate on Churchill‘s private notice question occurred on May 5, 1948. The debate itself was illuminating. Although Atlee expressed concern about the movement of the statue, it was only after the furor described above. No Labour Party members, with the exception of Key, participated in the brief debate, which merely consisted of Churchill laying out his point of view to Key and three other Conservative-leaning members who supported his claims. The only person to discuss any part of Gordon‘s character was Churchill. Following Key‘s opening answer to the question, which merely discussed the practical reasons for moving the statue and concluded by indicating that he and the Ministry still welcomed any other suggestions which would allow the statue to remain in London, Churchill began his argument for keeping the statue. The former Prime Minister started by asking Key if he could ask him a question of ―sentimental importance.‖ He continued by inquiring whether the Minister

31 F. Moffitt, ―Letters to the Editor: Gordon‘s Statue,‖ Times (London), 11 May, 1948. 32 WORK 20/215, 4 May 1948 note. 33 WORK 20/215, Serial M79/48 Prime Minister Minute from Clement Atlee.

163 was ―aware [that] the General Gordon was not only a military commander, who gave his life for his country, but, in addition, was considered very widely throughout this country as a model of a Christian hero, and that very many cherished ideals are associated with his name?‖ Thus, following in his logic, he wished to know if the statue ―might not receive special consideration...[as] General Gordon was a figure outside the military and naval commanders.‖34 In Churchill‘s mind, Gordon was more important for what he represented than what he achieved; therefore, he could still be included in a square which was being repurposed to honor naval achievements only. However, this opinion seemed to be his alone. The debate over Gordon‘s statue further revealed the differences between the Conservative Party and the Labour Party. Churchill, the great Conservative statesman, was arguing for what was, in some ways, a vestige of a bygone time. Following their defeat in the election of 1945, the Conservatives were forced to re-evaluate what they represented. This re- evaluation or ―re-thinking‖ of the Conservative Party would lead to a ―new Conservatism,‖ with a focus on a ―genuine process of modernisation and democratisation.‖35 As a part of this new commitment, the Conservative Party did embrace the idea of a mixed economy and a welfare state, but it retained some reservations. Churchill too was in favor of this new ethic, but as his support for keeping the Gordon statue in its original place of honor revealed, he was unwilling to distance himself and his party completely from their past agendas. While the Conservative Party was transforming itself to appear more similar to the Labour Party, the members of the Labour Party were forced to contend with the social issues of the day discussed earlier in this chapter. For the Labour Party, the answer was inclusive policies that have been described by Marwick as being ―hitched to the star of ‗universality.‘‖36 To continue to memorialize a single individual, regardless of his historical contributions, was a direct affront to the overarching goals of the Labour Party. As a party which was ―created to defend and celebrate the interests and values of male manual labour,‖ Labour had a difficult time

34 Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Oral Answers [Hansard], 5th ser., vol. 450, cols 1267-1269. In keeping with their practices concerning the Gordon statue, the Times ran a summary of the debate. ―House of Commons: The Gordon Statue,‖ Times (London), 6 May, 1948. In addition to Churchill,other conservative members participating were Sir Thomas Cecil Moore and Major Legge-Bourke. There was also an independent member, Mr. Wilson Harris. 35 Harold Macmillan quoted in Harriet Jones, ―‗New Conservatism‘? The Industrial Charter, Modernity and the Reconstruction of British Conservatism after the War‖ in Becky Conekin, Frank Mort, Chris Waters, editors Moments of Modernity: Reconstructing Britain 1945-1964 (London: Rivers Oram Press, 1999), 172. 36 Marwick, 28.

164 incorporating middle-class mores into its policies.37 Preserving the Gordon statue‘s location was an example of the tension between the two groups. All in all, even with its political implications, the debate was quite short. In the end, Key agreed to continue looking for a better solution to the question of where Gordon‘s statue would reside. He also remarked that he could ―put off the decision in regard to the new site for the statue for some time yet.‖38 For Key, the matter was not settled. He still had to appease other government agencies concerning the statue including the Royal Fine Arts Commission (RFAC), which had also expressed interest in the statue. As it did not want to see the statue leave London, the RFAC suggested the nineteenth-century Victoria Embankment garden as a solution, but the location had been previously ruled out by the London City Council (LCC) due to the fact that the garden was small and already ―equipped with a generous allotment of statues.‖ 39 RFAC‘s idea was valid; Gordon‘s statue would have been a good match to the character of the Embankment, which has been characterized by geographer Stuart Oliver as an important step in making London an imperial city. Gordon‘s service was certainly of an imperial nature.40 Nevertheless, with the denial by the LCC, debate over the Gordon statue remained at a standstill, without a satisfactory option for its relocation until later in 1948. In October, a solution was finally achieved, when the decision was made to construct a garden between the new Whitehall building and the Embankment proper. This new garden was in keeping with the LCC‘s stated post-war goals for the Thames riverside area: to make the entire area more in keeping with the national and imperial character of the city, thus removing the remnants of older economic functions of the area, and to provide more green space for the city.41 It would also provide the perfect space to re-erect Gordon‘s statue. As a letter sent to the Under-Secretary for Works, Mr.

37 Martin Frances, ―The Labour Party: Modernisation and the Politics of Restraint‖ in Conekin, Mort, and Waters, eds. Moments of Modernity, 154. 38 Hansard, 1268-9. 39 WORK 20/215 Ref. No. 604, 20 May, 1948. Although the RFAC controlled the design and placement of statues, and could suggest the location, it would have to be approved by the London City Council (LCC) which controlled the garden. The LCC indicated in March, 1948, that they were unwilling to consider the gardens as a possible solution [St. 1/7472, letters of 22 January, 1948 and 12 March, 1948]. 40 Stuart Oliver, ―The Thames Embankment and Disciplining of Nature in Modernity,‖ The Geographical Journal, volume 166, number 3, (Sep., 2000): 229. 41 Patricia L. Garside, ―Politics, ideology and the issue of open space in London, 1939-2000‖ in Peter Clark, editor, The European City and Green Space: London, Stockholm, Helsinki and St. Petersburg: 1850-2000 (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2006), 75-77.

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Root, stated, Mr. Key ―agreed that this [new garden] would be very suitable for Gordon and seemed quite prepared to keep Gordon in store until we are in a position to erect him there.‖42 After this decision was made, controversy over the statue seemed to abate, although the Ministry did receive one other letter from another Gordon relative inquiring when the statue was to be re-erected at its finally agreed upon new site. This letter, sent in December, 1951, after the Attlee government fell and was replaced by one headed by Winston Churchill, was quite political in nature. H.S. Blunt, Gordon‘s great-nephew, wrote to the new Minister, David Eccles, about the removal. ―The statue of my great uncle General Gordon of Khartoum was removed from Trafalgar Square by the Late Labour Govt & has not in spite of many letters been put up again.‖ He continued by lambasting Key: ―it is possible that your predecessor had no knowledge of history and did not know anything about General Gordon.‖43 Obviously, as the Key-Churchill debate showed, this was not the case, nor was the decision specifically politically motivated. Fittingly, when the statue was finally re-erected in October, 1953 (although it was not unveiled until further work was completed in November), Churchill was still Prime Minister.44 Following the Second World War, and the collapse of the Churchill-led wartime coalition government, Britain elected its first Labour Prime Minister, Clement Atlee. The postwar policies of the Atlee government were radically different from those advocated by the pre-war Conservatives; by the end of the 1940s, though, they were the standard template for postwar Britain. To remain a viable political option, the Conservative Party needed to change its perspective and embrace other political parties and their goals. Churchill spearheaded this transformation, as was evidenced in the work done by his second government, which was elected in 1951.45 Part of the reason why the Conservatives needed to change was because the process of decolonization had begun. The Empire, which had been so important to the party in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was in the process of collapsing. Although the Conservatives tried to stem the loss of territories, by the mid-1950s, following the Suez Crisis, its demise was regarded as fait accompli. This is not to say that the Empire was dismantled quickly;

42 WORK 20/215, 7 October, 1948, letter to Root. 43 NA WORK 20/280 5 December, 1951 letter from H.S. Blunt. 44 WORK 20/280 AS 23 October 23, 1953, Draft press statement. 45 John Ramsden discusses the variety of ways that Churchill helped the party in the post war years in his section of the Norman Gash, et al, edited The Conservatives. Norman Gash, et al, editors, The Conservatives: A History from their Origins to 1965 (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1977), 432-433.

166 the process of decolonization took decades, but after 1947, the Empire was never to be as strong again. After the Second World War, Britain‘s worldwide role was diminished; it no longer retained the type of resources which were needed to maintain a large empire similar to the one it had had in the nineteenth century.46 However, the strains on Britain‘s empire were apparent even before the Second World War. In 1936, Egypt and Britain signed a treaty with three major points: it officially ended the British military occupation of Egypt; a British military presence in the Suez Canal zone was approved for a twenty-year period; and, most importantly, Sudan‘s status as a condominium of the two countries was approved.47 A dual government would only function as long as Egypt and Britain remained in concert regarding their goals for the region, a precondition which was increasingly difficult to maintain in the years immediately following the war. The 1936 Treaty, although challenged by Egypt, remained in effect until 1951.48 That year, the Egyptian government voted unilaterally to abrogate the 1936 Anglo- Egyptian Treaty. A year later, in July, 1952, a new faction took power in Egypt, and, following a brief power struggle, Gamal ‗Abd al-Nasser emerged as the new leader. Under Nasser, the Egyptians and British worked out a new treaty which finally settled the question of Sudan. On February 12, 1953, the two governments signed an agreement on the fate of the territory. The agreement‘s main provision covered how Sudan would reach its freedom. This would be achieved through a three-stage process, as described by L.A. Fabunmi, consisting of ―country- wide elections for a Sudanese Parliament, the formation of a Sudanese Government, and a Sudanese decision within three years, whether to join Egypt or remain independent.‖49 With this new agreement, it was clear that the almost sixty years of joint rule over Sudan were coming to an end, which was quickened by the approaching Suez Crisis that would effectively provide the

46 Bernard Porter, The Lion’s Share: A Short History of British Imperialism 1850-2004, fourth edition (London: Pearson Longman, 2004), 310-312. Porter specifically argues that although in hindsight the demise of the Empire may be traced to the events of 1947 contemporary opinion was that the empire would continue, and survive the loss of India. This belief was not challenged until the aftermath of the Suez Crisis in 1956. 47 For the full text of the 1936 treaty, see Appendix III in John Marlowe, A History of Modern Egypt and Anglo- Egyptian Relations 1800-1956 second edition (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1965), 444-447. 48 Marlowe, 335-343. There were discussions to change the terms of the treaty in 1946, but these talks were ultimately unsuccessful. 49 L.A. Fabunmi, The Sudan in Anglo-Egyptian Relations: A Case Study in Power Politics (London: Longmans, 1960), 297. The text of the full agreement, Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Egyptian Government concerning Self-Government and Self-Determination for the Sudan is included in appendix 7, pages 437-440.

167 death knell to Britain‘s imperialist policies.50 The resolution of the crisis resulted in a diplomatic victory for Egypt and a military failure for Britain. For the first time since the nineteenth century, Britain‘s ―imperialist gunboat diplomacy‖ had failed.51 For Sudan, this failure meant an even faster journey towards independence. By the time the crisis devolved into a state of almost open warfare, the territory had completed its three steps towards its independence. The third of these steps, the vote to decide whether to rejoin Egypt or to remain independent, occurred in August 1955. The Sudanese chose to remain independent and so an independent Sudan was officially recognized, following a period of chaos which included a brief rebellion in the South, on January 1, 1956. On this day, a new flag was flown over Gordon‘s old palace at Khartoum—a Sudanese flag.52 For the first time since 1898, the Union Flag was nowhere to be seen. The removal of the British flag from the palace at Khartoum was only one action in a series undertaken by the Sudanese to remove the remnants of their occupiers. Some of these steps had begun before the country officially gained its independence. In 1951, the University College of Khartoum was formally established by combining the Gordon Memorial College with the Kitchener School of Medicine.53 What this new entity was to be called occasioned much debate. In 1950, the Principal of the college, L.C. Wilcher, wrote to the Inter-University Council for Higher Education in the Colonies. In his letter, Wilcher explained the problems of finding a suitable name for the new institution, explaining that the committee favored ―the more radical

50 In July, 1956, Nasser decided to nationalize the Suez Canal. Britain, which had long viewed free passage through the canal as a privilege of its imperial Empire, was outraged by this action. The British (and French, as the project was originally conceived as an Anglo-French exercise), threatened military intervention to ensure their continued un-restricted, free use of the canal. In fact, the Anglo-French forces did prepare to go to war in the Suez, but United Nations intervention and the threat of military action against the two countries prevented this from actually occurring. The end result of the crisis was that Nasser was able to keep the canal nationalized and all British and French property in the zone also became Egyptian. At the same time, all of this was occurring, an Israeli invasion into the area was launched. Britain and France were aware that Israel intended to invade in the fall of 1956; their actions were timed to the incursion. At the same time, the United Nations Security Council was working to keep from having a large scale war in the region. For more information see Marlowe, 424-432. 51 Rami Ginat and Meir Noema, ―The Egyptian Jewel in the British Imperialist Crown: An Overview,‖ in Zach Levey and Elie Podeh, editors., Britain and the Middle East: From Imperial Power to Junior Partner (Brighton, England: Sussex Academic Press, 2008), 193-194. 52 Fabunmi, 352-378. For more details on the rebellion, including why it was begun and the question of British participation in it, see Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars second edition (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 25-29. 53 NA British Council Records, BW 90/675 9 February, 1946, memo on Gordon Memorial College, Khartoum. Prior to 1945, there were two separate technical schools that were both a part of the Gordon Memorial College. They were joined in a new institution, the Gordon Memorial College discussed above in 1945. The actual process of combining the institutions and their accreditation with the University of London is described in P.M. Holt and M.W. Daly, A History of the Sudan: From the coming of Islam to the present day fifth edition (London: Longman, 2000), 124.

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University of Khartoum if the merger with the Kitchener School of Medicine takes place.‖ If the merger had not occurred, then the name that seemed to be favored was ―Gordon University College (Khartoum),‖ which would retain Gordon‘s name. He closed his note with a brief remark that ―all concerned are eager, although not perhaps to the same degree, to keep the name of Gordon well in the picture, and much thought and discussion will be necessary before a final decision can be reached.‖54 This sentiment is not surprising, given the opinions expressed in the speeches that greeted the 1945 reorganization of the college. In these speeches, particularly the one given by then-Governor-General of Sudan Major-General Sir Hubert Huddleston, the connection of Gordon and Kitchener to the college was the main focus. Huddleston gave brief descriptions of both men and their connection to Sudan. At the end of his section on Gordon, the highest-ranking British official in Sudan summed up the reason why the college should continue to bear Gordon‘s name: ―By the irony of fate he died fighting the people whom he loved and longed to save; and it is fitting that the College through which they may if God wills, achieve the ends, which he desired for them, should be named in memory of him.‖55 In 1945, the sentiment expressed by Huddleston was still the norm regarding British involvement in Sudan. Egypt had not yet achieved its independence, or even begun to renegotiate the 1936 treaty, and Sudan appeared to be under its condominium government for the foreseeable future. Six years later, the situation had changed, reflecting the undercurrent of tension present in the territory. In 1951, Egypt‘s official independence was only a year away, and Sudan‘s status as a condominium of two openly hostile governments was clearly coming to an end. The change in Britain‘s status in the region may have been reflected in the changed name of the institution; yet, the new University did retain the name of Gordon for the rest of the condominium, if in a lesser capacity. Furthermore, an analysis of the stationery of the new institution demonstrates the lessening importance of Gordon‘s name. In 1951, the stationery still mentioned the name Gordon Memorial College, although in a smaller font than the larger University College of Khartoum. Over the next few years, as Egypt and Sudan each went through periods of chaos related to the eventual separation from Britain, the name of Gordon was mentioned less frequently,

54 BW 90/696 16 February, 1950, Note from L.C. Wilcher, the quotation is from the third page. 55 SAD 673/7/45, Address by Huddleston in his role as Governor General and as the President of the Gordon Memorial College Council.‖ Found in the collections of Sir Christopher Cox.

169 permanently disappearing from the stationary in 1957.56 Yet the University College that grew out of the one originally founded to honor Gordon was important to the Sudanese. Ironically, several people instrumental in the discussions leading to Sudanese acceptance of the 1954 agreement between Britain and Egypt over its future were educated at the college, as were many of the people who voted to remain independent in 1955. Those who advocated a union would later be criticized by their countrymen as unionists who were subservient ―to the whims of the Egyptian bourgeoisie,‖ but at the time, their participation was necessary.57 Sudan did not want to retain a British presence, but the country was willing to continue to use the infrastructure gained from its seventy-year association with the British Empire. As a condominium, Sudan was unique. It had never been considered a British colony; the closest that it could be termed would be a protectorate. Its decisions upon reaching independence would therefore, also be unique, as would its process toward that goal. The suppressed rebellion in the south of the country sped up the timetable, creating a government that had to govern before it was prepared to do so. As historian Douglas Johnson explained about the process, or lack thereof, for Sudanese independence, ―The final paradox of Sudanese independence was that it was thrust upon the Sudan by a colonial power eager to extricate itself from its residual responsibilities. It was not achieved by national consensus expressed through constitutional means,‖ as the process proceeded in all of Britain‘s other former territories.58 Thus, Sudan was, in some ways, unprepared for the challenges of self-governance. Yet one of the first steps that a new Sudanese government decided to take was to continue the process of removing references to the old imperial regime begun with the change from the Gordon Memorial College to the University College of Khartoum. The next major step would be the removal of the most tangible reminder of Gordon: his statue. Gordon was not the only prominent figure to have his statue removed from Sudan. The statue of Lord Kitchener also suffered the same fate. By removing these statues, the newly independent Sudanese wanted to assert their own heroes and history, not that of the British. The

56 The observed stationery can be found in multiple years worth of letters sent to the British Council and its ancillary organizations. BW 90/691, the files of the Inter-University Council for Higher Education in the Colonies, 1949- 1959; 90/692, also files for the council, spanning the same years. 57 Eve M. Troutt Powell discusses the nationalists who were educated at the college in A Different Shade of Colonialism: Egypt, Great Britain, and the mastery of the Sudan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 207. The role of these unionists as perceived by their countrymen is discussed in the final part of Mohammed Nuri El-Almin‘s three part study on the Sudanese communist movement. Mohammed Nuri El-Almin, ―The Sudanese Communist Movement, the First Five Years-III,‖ Middle Eastern Studies, volume 33, number 1 (Jan., 1997), 133. 58 Johnson, 29.

170 statues represented the men who together brought a long-lasting British occupation to the region and ensured its longevity. However, the reasons why the statues were removed were much more complex than just eliminating anything which invoked the British, or even with Sudanese perceptions of Gordon. The reason why the statues were removed was first and foremost political. The government formed after independence was a nationalist one; removing the statues was an idea that appealed to its sensibilities and constituents. However, before the statues were actually veiled and pulled down from their plinths, Sudan went through a coup d‘etat which eliminated the parliamentary government and created a military one. This new military government proclaimed a ―democratic republic‖ with popular sovereignty, meaning that the government would be closer to the Marxist view espoused in China.59 Under this new government, the idea of honoring two foreign men who represented capitalist imperialism was even more of an anathema than it had been to the previous one. There was a great deal of consternation in London over the possibility of the statues being shipped back to Britain; Sudan was not the only former territory to have imperial statues, and there were fears, expressed in a letter to Mr. Cunliffe at the Ministry of Works, that if the government accepted the statues from one former possession it would have to prepare to accept ―a number, probably a large number, of statues of various historical, British personages, mainly generals, governors, and monarchs (Queen Victoria is a favourite), [from] countries now self- governing but formerly part of the Empire.‖ The letter continued by admitting, in a relieved tone, that only two statues have ever been returned to Britain, and both of these statues were returned by the Sudanese. 60 Therefore, Sudan was unique in this decision to try to eliminate the physical remains of seventy years of British influence and involvement in its country. Most other former members of the Empire chose to incorporate this history into their own, creating a situation similar to the one that has been described by Benedict Anderson in Imagined Communities. In his chapter, ―Census, Map, Museum,‖ Anderson discussed the tendency of what he termed, ―post- independence states,‖ to exhibit ―marked continuities with their colonial predecessors‖ to embrace the colonial relics left behind. These relics would, in turn, become a part of their new

59 For more on the two governments and the bloodless coup, see Holt and Daly, 145-150. 60NA WORK 20/259, A.S. 23, 12 November 1959 Letter to Mr. Cunliffe.

171 national consciousness which was in the process of being created.61 It could be argued that the statues themselves may have been re-imagined as well. As Kirk Savage‘s assessment of civil war monuments demonstrates, the aims of monuments and memorials were fluid; they could be manipulated to suit a particular time period, or even the needs of a government. For example, in Savage‘s discussion, the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C. was transformed from a nineteenth-century idea of a memorial honoring ―a founder of a new era in American history dedicated to the specific principle of racial equality‖ to a twentieth-century reality that ―side- step[ped] the question of what he stood for‖ and was designed as a civic beautification project.62 If Lincoln‘s memory could be adjusted to suit the time frame, then it followed, so could that of Gordon. Eliminating the statues also had ramifications for the future. It deprived future generations of Sudanese of the ability, as historian John Crowley argued regarding formerly overlooked memorials, to ―look at aspects of the past which have literally been buried or indeed obfuscated by time.‖63 Gordon‘s role in Sudanese history is not one which can simply be omitted from any official history, nor can the memory of Gordon be forgotten, even without a statue to remind people about his achievements. Instead, the decision to remove the statues caused the opposite to happen, and a great deal of attention was paid to Gordon, who had been relegated to a lesser status. This lessened importance is also reflected in Sudanese historian Ibrahim Muhammad Ali Abbas‘ history of the slave trade in Sudan. In his work, he asserted that no British official, Gordon included, really had any impact on the slave trade. Instead, he argued, their role has been ―exaggerated and the [goal of his] study is an essential corrective of this exaggeration.‖ Although Abbas believed that Gordon did deserve some credit for his actions regarding slavery in Sudan, ―it is to the credit of Gordon that he showed a fair understanding of the varied aspects of the slave question‖; his main conclusion regarding Gordon was that ―his attitude…remained essentially negative‖ towards Sudan and the possibility of solving its slave trade problem.64

61 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, revised edition (London: Verso, 1991), 183. 62 Savage, ―The Politics of Memory: Black Emancipation and the Civil War Monument‖ in Gillis, ed., 138-140. 63 John Crowley, ―Constructing Famine Memory: The Role of Monuments‖ in Naimh Moore and Yvonne Whelan, editors, Heritage, Memory and the Politics of Identity: New Perspectives on the Cultural Landscape (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2007), 57. 64 Ibrahim Muhammad Ali Abbas, The British, the Slave Trade and Slavery in the Sudan, 1820-1881 (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1972). The first quote is from the preface, the others are from page 88.

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This Sudanese ambivalence towards Gordon was confirmed in a letter sent by the British Ambassador in Khartoum, Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews, to J.H.A. Watson at the African Department in the Foreign Office. This letter laid out the entire situation concerning the statues as it appeared at the beginning of January, 1957. Chapman-Andrews specifically referenced that ―outside the newspapers, there has been no agitation whatever for the removal of these two statues,‖ and that the statues had been ignored during the nationalist demonstrations which had occurred the previous November. Thus, he explained in the confidential letter, there did not appear to be a large amount of public support for sending the statues back to London, and he believed, as he had been informed by the Sudanese Minister of Finance in January, 1957, that the entire solution would be solved by moving the statues to a soon to be built historical museum.65 In early 1957, it appeared that Sudan would follow the pattern laid out by Anderson as discussed above. Yet the success of coup and the resulting change of government reinforced the pressure for the statues to be returned. The new situation in Sudan was enumerated in a letter sent by Sir Chapman-Andrews to J.S. Okey at Barclay‘s Bank in Khartoum at the end of 1958. In the letter, Chapman-Andrews referenced a plan which had been raised in Sudan by the remaining British population to move Gordon‘s statue to the grounds of the cathedral at Khartoum as opposed to the now-defunct idea of building a museum.66 His response to the idea elucidates one of the problems that the statues posed regarding Sudanese attitudes towards the British. After defending colonialism (as he referred to the time under the condominium) as ―the best, most benevolent and most just system of Government these territories have ever seen or perhaps one ever likely to see,‖ Chapman- Andrews continued by explaining how this new generation regarded ―these statues as the symbols of ‗colonialism,‘ of government by foreigners, of government imposed originally by force of arms, of an inferior status from which their country has now emerged.‖67 Clearly, as the letter sent to Okey demonstrates, there had been a radical change in attitude towards the British over this two year time span. Yet despite this more negative view of the British in 1957,

65 NA Foreign Office (FO) 371/126017 Confidential 1851/ST, 15 January 1957 letter from Sir Edwin Chapman- Andrews to J.H.A. Watson. 66 With the new Marxist government, this project lost official support. 67 NA FO 371/131754 JS 1851/3 4 December 1958 Letter from Chapman-Andrews to J.S. Okey.

173 correspondents did not fear for the statues; in Sudan statues were left alone and not blown up like the one of Ferdinand de Lesseps, the chief promoter of the Suez Canal, in Egypt.68 Even in 1957, under the more moderate parliamentary government, there were concerns in Britain as to how the removal of the statues would be perceived both at home and in the remains of its empire. The uproar over the removal of Gordon‘s statue from Trafalgar Square a decade earlier gave some hint of the controversy that might ensue in the metropole. In addition to this sentiment, there were also fears that a returned statue would be perceived in Egypt and the Middle East as another sign of Britain‘s weaknesses as had been exposed in the Suez crisis two years previously. In an unsent, canceled draft of a letter, Colonial Secretary H.F. T. Smith worried about the statues‘ return, writing ―there is a danger that the removal of these statues to London would be exploited by Egyptian propaganda as symbolizing a further loss of British influence in the area.‖69 His sentiments were echoed in a letter sent at the same time by Watson, at the Foreign Office to Chapman-Andrews. In the letter, Watson expanded the Colonial Secretary‘s ideas from the canceled draft: ―it seems to me that the story that the British were being obliged to evacuate their statues from the Sudan would almost certainly be seized upon by our enemies in the Middle East and elsewhere.‖70 The solution to this problem was for the statues to remain in Sudan. In a subsequent letter to Chapman-Andrews from one of Watson‘s colleagues, I.W. Bell, the African Department indicated as much: ―although it would be distressing if anything happened to them and would lead to hot feelings here [in London].‖71 These ―hot feelings‖ would not be confined to London. When the British population in Sudan found out in January, 1957, of the decision to remove the statues, Bell‘s anticipated outrage was apparent. In early January, The Morning News ran two passionate letters to the

68 Confidential 1851/ST 15 January 1957. Chapman-Andrews devotes a great deal of attention to the news article on the de Lesseps statue that was published in The Sphere on 5 January, 1957. The article ―A sacrifice to Nasser‖ consisted of a page of photographs showing the dynamiting of the statue, and concludes with what Chapman- Andrews has deemed a ―pearl of political writing.‖ The editors wrote, in 1957, the following: ―The downfall of de Lesseps was paralleled by somewhat smaller manifestations of nationalism in the Sudan, where the statues of Kitchener and General Gordon have been removed.‖ The symbolism of the de Lesseps statue in Egypt before its dynamiting has some parallels with the Gordon case. For more on the statue and its role in how Egyptians perceived themselves see Wali S. Hassan, ―Arab-American Autobiography and the Reinvention of Identity: Two Egyptian Negotiations‖ Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics, number 22, The Language of the Self: Autobiographies and Testimonies (2002): 13-14. 69 FO 371/126017 Confidential draft of 9 January 1957, canceled 28 January, 1957. 70 FO 371/12601 JS 1851/1 5 January, 1957, letter from J.H.A. Watson to Chapman-Andrews. 71 Ibid., 29 January 1957 Confidential letter from I.W. Bell to Chapman –Andrews.

174 editor on the subject.72 The first, from B. Callard, allowed that it is not the writer‘s decision as to whether the statues should be removed from Sudan, a decision ―which should be made by the Sudanese alone.‖ Yet, he continued, the statues themselves were ―irreplaceable historical monuments‖ and therefore should not be destroyed. Instead, the author suggested that the solution may be to keep the statues but include them in a larger monument allowing them to be placed in their own historical context.73 The next letter, which came from J. Surer, agreed with the idea of keeping the statues for their historical merit, but also included an argument drawn from Britain‘s own past. Mr. Surer referenced the fact that there were still Roman statues in the United Kingdom dating from its occupation of the country; if Britain could accept its former occupiers, why was it impossible for the Sudanese to do the same? His argument was quite basic, ―Why is it that the Britons have not removed them after their Independence? Because they want to remember the history of the past not only in books but in statues.‖ The letter concluded with the simple statement: ―Sudan can progress, I am sure, without removing the two statues.‖74 These two correspondents demonstrate the importance of the statues to preserving the memory of a particular time in Sudanese history. As Matt Matsuda demonstrated in The Memory of the Modern, these statues could be used to help in understanding the past and in creating a lasting memory of it. As he argued, ―no history can be a pure event, pure evolution; each is rather a repetition, a return to a story which must be retold, distinguished from its previous tellings. The past is not a truth upon which to build, but a truth sought, a re-memorializing over which to struggle.‖75 Without the statues, there would be little in Sudan to trigger the memory to tell the story—thus leading to its eventually being forgotten. Unfortunately for Callard and Surer, their 1957 letters did not change any government policy. The statues were to be sent back to Britain. When the news that Gordon and Kitchener were to be returned first reached London, it was reported in a brief note in the Times. The note simply stated that the two statues were to be returned and that ―there are no detailed plans yet for the future disposal of the statues.‖76 The day before the article about the statues‘ fate appeared in

72 The Morning News was a daily newspaper printed in Khartoum for the English-speaking population. This copy of the paper is from the large collection of newspaper clippings amassed by Geoffrey Barter at SAD 425/4/83. 73 B. Callard, ―Letters to the Editor: Gordon and Kitchener,‖ Morning News (Sudan) 12 January, 1957. 74 J. Surer, ―Letters to the Editor: Gordon and Kitchener,‖ Morning News (Sudan) 12 January 1957. 75 Matt K. Matsuda, The Memory of the Modern (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 15. 76 ―Gordon and Kitchener to Return Home,‖ Times (London), 15 December 1958. Only a week earlier, another article appeared in the paper concerning the re-naming of streets formerly honoring the two men. Gordon Street

175 the newspaper, a longer article about the removal of the statues from their plinths in Khartoum ran. The article was from a correspondent in Khartoum who was present when the statues were veiled. In the article, the ceremony that accompanied the veiling was described: ―The guard of honour presented arms, a military band played ‗God Save the Queen‘; and then, as Retreat was sounded, engineers slowly lowered a tent-like covering over the statue—the reverse of the unveiling performed by Sir Reginald Wingate 54 years ago.‖ Once the statue was veiled, the Reveille was sounded, followed by the Sudanese national anthem, ending the ceremony.77 The ceremony described above is quite interesting. It not only acknowledges that Gordon still occupied an important role in Sudan, but also that this new Sudanese Marxist government understood that the removal of the statue was, in some ways, more symbolic than the lowering of the Union Flag two years earlier. Published in Khartoum on the same day, the Morning News featured the veiling of the statues, running two articles on the ceremony. The first article was a factual one, containing details similar to the one referenced above. The second article was an opinion piece. At the very end, after relating a brief summary of the reasons why the statues had been erected in Khartoum, the editors concluded with what the best case scenario of the removal could possibly entail: ―the removal of the statues should be an expression of the Sudan‘s genuine desire to start a new leaf in its history, and of its will to treat others on equal footing. Let us hope for the best.‖78 The first step in achieving this new history envisioned by the editors of the Morning Post was the return of the statues. Unfortunately, this return would not happen for another year. Part of the reason why the statues‘ return was delayed was because when they were first pulled down, it was unclear where in Britain they were eventually going to be re-erected. The solution to the Kitchener statue was easily found. His statue was eventually re-erected at the Royal Engineers Barracks at Chatham. Gordon‘s statue was more of a challenge; there already

became University Street and Kitchener Street was re-named Nile Street. The earlier article also mentioned the fact that the statues would be removed. ―Marxists Detained in Sudan,‖ Times (London), 29 November 1958. 77 ―Kitchener and Gordon Statues Shrouded: Plans for Removal in Darkness,‖ Times (London) 12 December, 1958. The parallel between the two ceremonies was intentional; the new government was in effect manipulating a very British (or even European) custom of raising a statue to a fallen hero and transforming it into a new, Sudanese (or African) idea of removing it. As such, it fit the description of manipulating of invented customs described in Terrence Ranger, ―The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa‖ in Ranger and Eric Hobsbawm, editors, The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 252-254. 78 ―Statues of General Gordon and Lord Kitchener Removed: A big crowd to see them veiled before removal,‖ and ―Morning View: Good-will,‖ Morning News (Sudan), 12 December 1958. These articles are also found in the Barter collection, SAD 425/4/99.

176 was a Gordon statue at Chatham, so it could not be sent there. Thus, determining where it would be sent involved a variety of governmental offices and private institutions. Just as with the earlier conflicts over where to move the Gordon statue formerly in Trafalgar Square, there was a lack of consensus over where the statue should be sent, especially because no branch of government wanted to pay for the statues to return home.79 Happily, a solution for the problem was quickly reached when the Gordon Boys‘ School offered to pay for all costs of transportation once the statue was back in the country and for its re-erection on the school‘s grounds. This suggestion was approved in a joint meeting between the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Works in January, 1959, two years after it was decided in Sudan to remove the statues.80 The statue arrived at the Gordon Boys‘ School in April 1959. A little more than a year later, the School welcomed people to a ceremony celebrating the unveiling of the statue on its new plinth on the school‘s grounds.81 The ceremony was well attended, with over 1500 people present. A speech was given by Lord Rugby, the senior surviving governor-general of Sudan, and the ―statue was unveiled by Lady Huddleston, who also presented the plinth in memory of her late husband, Major-General Sir Hubert J. Huddleston, Governor-General of Sudan from 1940 to 1947.‖82 For the school, this was a momentous event. For Britain at large, it was not considered to be very important; even in the Times, the unveiling of the statue did not rate an article; the paper only ran a photograph of it on its back pages.83 With the removal of his statue and the re-naming of his school, all physical traces of Gordon were removed from Sudan.84 In Sudan, Gordon‘s statue and college needed to be removed and renamed, respectively, to help facilitate the country‘s continued move towards asserting its own, newly granted, independence. Therefore, in Sudan, the story of Gordon ended

79 The War Office, Ministry of Works and the Foreign Office all disagreed about who was to be responsible for the statue. The correspondence between various officials can be found in the National Archives. NA FO 371/131754 JS 1851/5 and 6. Eventually, the treasury agreed to incur the costs of transporting the statues, NA WORK 20/259 AS 23 Note for Under-Secretary Mr. Root.‖ 80 NA FO 371/138710 JS 1851/9 Record of a Meeting at the Ministry of Works, 13 January, 1959, where it was decided that the statue will go to the GBS. Representatives from Works, the Foreign Office, Treasury and the War Office were all present. 81Letter and press release announcing ―The unveiling of the Gordon Statue,‖ sent to alumni and supporters of the Gordon Boys‘ School, April, 1960 found in the collection of M.S. Lush in SAD 874/45 82 From a story told by the Gordon School‘s librarian to Tim Dodds, a councilor on the Surrey Heath Borough Council, related on his blog, ―Lightwater.‖ The story, ―Friday Fact No.4: Statue of General Gordon‖ can be accessed at http://lightwater.wordpress.com/2009/04/24/friday-fact-no4/, accessed on December 16, 2009. 83 Times (London) May 14, 1960, p. 14 84 The one exception was the Gordon chapel inside Khartoum Cathedral. The Cathedral was the property of the Church of England, and, as private property, the new Sudanese government did not have any authority over it.

177 in 1960 with the return of his statue. Without the continued British governmental presence in Sudan, as had existed under the condominium, he was relegated to a much more insignificant role in the country, as one among many rulers who strove to improve the country, including the man cast by the British into the role of his foe, the Mahdi. In Britain, the situation was different. Gordon‘s death and memory in his home country were still celebrated, but his significance directly correlated with the needs of the country. The Britain which existed in 1960 resulted from the radical changes of the late 1940s. As such, the ceremony which honored Gordon as the Khartoum statue was re-erected was almost anachronistic. The Gordon School, the modern descendant of the Gordon Boys‘ Home, no longer had charitable connotations. In 1944, the Education Act introduced free and universal secondary education to Britain for all children until the age of 15.85 In essence, the act invalidated the original purpose of the School. In 1960s Britain, with the Education Act and the NHS, charitable organizations like the Home were no longer needed—nor was Gordon, the imperial hero. What mattered, though, was Gordon‘s memory. In Britain, his name was still important. Unlike in Sudan, where his college had been renamed, at home, the general‘s name remained on the school. Even if it no longer had the same purpose, the school still remained a tangible reminder of Gordon as the 1960 ceremony reiterated. Yet, this ceremony honoring Gordon as a national hero, in front of an audience composed of members of the aristocracy and the elite, would have been anathema to the Sudanese who strove to eliminate Gordon from their country. Nevertheless, both countries were changed by the presence of General Gordon, but by 1960 the time for imperial heroes had passed. In a sense, General Charles Gordon‘s life had come full circle. He had been a figure of controversy in life and in death; his memorials also suffered the same fate. Britain‘s once proud imperial symbol had completed its metamorphosis into something much less: a relic of a lost empire.

85 For more on the act, including the political maneuvering that led to its passing, see Michael Barber, ―Power and Control in Education 1944-2004‖ British Journal of Educational Studies, volume 42, number 4 (Dec., 1994): 352- 353.

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APPENDIX A

THE GORDON STATUE

Figure A.1: Contemporary Photograph of the Gordon Statue, Victoria Embankment Gardens

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APPENDIX B

THE GORDON STATUE—WREATHS

Figure A.2: Annual wreaths on the Gordon pedestal, January 2008

Figure A.3: Wreath from the Gordon Foundation, Gordon School (left) and Old Gordonians (right)

180

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Stephanie Laffer received her undergraduate degree from The George Washington University in Political Science and History in August 2002. In 2005, she wrote her Master‘s Thesis on the British in Afghanistan and the growth of Liberal Imperialism at Florida State University as a part of her MA degree, which she received in May 2005. This project grew out of an attempt to better understand the concept. She will receive her PhD in May 2010, ending her graduate career at FSU.

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