A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts And
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ISOLATING THE ENEMY: US-PRC RELATIONS, 1953-56 A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History By Tao Wang, M.A. Washington, DC December 20, 2011 Copyright 2011 by Tao Wang All Rights Reserved ii ISOLATING THE ENEMY: US-PRC RELATIONS, 1953-56 Tao Wang, M.A. Thesis Advisor: Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Ph.D. ABSTRACT Sino-American relations from 1953 to 1956 were marked by two contradictory tendencies. China and the United States adopted very confrontational policies toward each other, but at the same time, they took conciliatory actions even as they were confronting each other. Based on the new sources from China, Russia, Vietnam, as well as government documents from archives in the US, Britain and Taiwan, this dissertation assesses the interaction between China and the US from 1953 to 1956 from a multilateral perspective. It puts the two states’ policy- making into the broader context of their relations with friends and allies, and concentrates on their perceptions/misperceptions of and actions/reactions to each other. Focusing on the Geneva Conference on Indochina, the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, and the Bandung Conference, this dissertation highlights the PRC’s often-neglected peace initiatives at the Geneva and Bandung Conferences. It delves into the causes, the PRC leaders’ motives, the influence of the Soviet Union and Vietnam, the shift to the Taiwan Strait Crisis, and as importantly, the US leaders’ perceptions and reactions. This dissertation finds that although the Eisenhower administration had kept alive the idea of exploiting the divisions between the PRC and the Soviets, their policy concentrated more on containment of China rather than pressuring it in order to split the Sino-Soviet alliance. The US policy was undermined by its reliance on cooperation with allies and using nuclear weapons to iii deter the PRC. While US dependence on allies gave American friends opportunities to influence its policy, US leaders’ rhetoric about using atomic bombs strained their relations with friends as well as neutral states in Asia. China’s policy in this period aimed to break US containment. Sensitive to US relations with its allies, Chinese leaders strived to exploit the differences between the US and its friends in order to build a buffer area in Indochina at the Geneva Conference, preclude a US-ROC alliance during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, and exclude the US from Asia at the Bandung Conference by building an “Area of Peace” on the basis of a united front with Asian states. Meanwhile, the Chinese were aware of the US intention to split their alliance with the Soviet Union, and tried to strengthen the unity with the Soviet Union, which for its own reasons, provided China with substantial material as well as advisory assistance. On the US side, although leaders also knew of the PRC’s intentions to alienate them, they were less successful meeting this challenge, because US allies often held different positions toward China, and moreover, the PRC leaders’ consistent efforts to play off the US against its allies and Asian states added to the tensions in US relations with these countries. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation is truly a product of the joint efforts of many individuals. First and foremost, I am deeply indebted to my dissertation committee members. Through her encouragement and patience, my advisor Professor Nancy Bernkopf Tucker has guided me throughout my Ph.D. education. I will never forget the numerous chapter drafts she has read and hundreds of recommendation letters she has written for me, often at inconsiderately short notice. I would also like to extend my gratitude to other members on my dissertation committee: Professor Carol Benedict advised me how to fine-tune my teaching and English writing skills; Professor Chen Jian was willing to accommodate my schedule and gave generous praise to encourage a young scholar; and Professor David S. Painter called my attention to many useful works and told funny jokes, which made the demanding graduate life more enjoyable. I also want to thank the many other scholars who offered me precious assistance: Professors Pierre Asselin, Chang Li, Chang Su-ya, Warren Cohen, Christopher Goscha, James Hershburg, Steven Levine, James Millward, Micah Muscolino, Niu Jun, Adam Rothman, Wang Jisi, Yang Kuisong, Zhang Baijia, and Doctor Christian Ostermann. My special thanks to Professors Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui, who shared with me the invaluable Soviet documents they collected from Moscow. My colleagues and friends Julia Famularo, Ben Francis-Fallon, Toshihiro Higuchi, Lin Mao, Lu Jie, Ma Haiyun, Barry McCarron, Meredith Oyen, Qiu Wenpin, Shen Yubin, Anand Toprani, Chichu Tschang, and Zhu Hongbo have provided support, encouragement and collegiality in the past years̶and in some cases, decade. Finally, I am v particularly grateful for my former advisor, Professor and Ambassador Xue Mouhong, who introduced me to this completely different world. I was also lucky enough to get financial support for my education. The Department of History at Georgetown University supported me throughout my graduate years, offering me fellowships, teaching assistantships, and travel grants. A generous Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation doctoral fellowship enabled me to concentrate on my research and visit archives in Taipei and the Hoover Institution of Stanford University. A research travel grant from Georgetown Graduate School funded my trips to the National Archives of Great Britain and the Universities Service Centre for China Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. The Eisenhower Foundation paid for my trip to the Eisenhower Presidential Library. A Bou Family Foundation special grant enabled me to pay more visits to my family in China and the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives in Beijing. Ms. Nancy Tschen provided tuition for my study at the Johns Hopkins University-Nanjing University Center for Chinese and American Studies, which prepared me for my Ph.D. education at Georgetown. Finally, my dissertation is also a family project. My wife Qiao Lei first encouraged me to pursue a Ph.D. in the United States, subsequently raising our infant son by herself so that I could concentrate on my work. My parents, Wang Ruji and Zhu Fengying, as well as my father and mother-in-law, Qiao Delin and Xue Yin’e, supported my family and helped take care of my son during the years when I was absent. My son Allen missed out on so many childhood pleasures because of my dissertation, but I feel fortunate that he is now here with me in the United States during the last phase of my writing. Without support from my family, this dissertation would have been impossible. I thus dedicate my manuscript to all my family members. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction............................................................................................................................ 1 Prologue Hostility and Confrontation: US-China Relations after the Korean War ............................ 11 Chapter 1 Neutralizing Indochina: The Geneva Conference and China’s Efforts to Isolate the US........................................... 25 Chapter 2 Seeking United Action: Geneva Conference on Indochina and US Policy toward the PRC ..................................... 77 Chapter 3 “We Must Liberate Taiwan”? —The First Taiwan Strait Crisis and PRC’s Attempts to Prevent US-ROC Alliance ..... 119 Chapter 4 “A Horrible Dilemma” —United States Efforts to Defuse the Taiwan Strait Crisis............................................... 166 Chapter 5 Isolating the Enemy: The Bandung Conference and Sino-American Relations .................................................. 208 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 247 Bibliography ...................................................................................................................... 250 vii Introduction Sino-American relations from 1953 to 1956 were marked by two contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) and the United States adopted very confrontational policies toward each other. PRC leaders viewed the US as their archenemy, which refused to recognize China and militarily encircled the People’s Republic. They initiated the so-called First Taiwan Strait Crisis in July 1954, claiming that they intended to liberate Taiwan from the US-supported Chiang Kai-shek. The crisis brought the US and China to the “edge of war.”1 Meanwhile, US leaders saw China as “the primary problem” for the US in Asia and tried to contain China. During the crisis, they sent aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait several times, publicly threatened to use nuclear weapons against the PRC, and concluded a Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) with Chiang Kai-shek’s Republic of China (ROC or GMD/KMT/the Nationalist Government) in December 1954, providing security protection to the ROC regime, which the PRC considered illegitimate. On the other hand, both the PRC and the US took conciliatory actions even as they were confronting each other. The PRC advocated “peaceful coexistence” with the US, and its flexibility at the Geneva Conference on Indochina (from April to July 1954) led to the end of the eight-year war between its Communist comrades the Vietminh and US ally France. At the Bandung Conference in April 1955, during the Taiwan