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This Is Not a Textual Record. This Is Used As an Administrative Marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff Case Number: 2009-0528-F-2. FOIA MARKER This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff. Folder Title: Korea, January-June, 1994 [5] Staff Office-Individual: Asian Affairs-Roth, Stanley Original OA/ID Number: 1405 Row: Section: Shelf: Position: Stack: 30 3 3 3 v Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet Clinton Library DOCUMENT NO. SllB.IECTfflTLE DA TE RESTRICTION AND TYPE OOla. memo action, Daniel Poneman for Anthony Lake re North Korean Food 05/16/1994 Pl/b(I) Shortages (I page) OOlb. memo information, Anthony Lake to POTUS re North Korea (I page) c 05/ 1994 PI lb( I) 00 le. note handwritten, Berger to Poneman and Roth, cc Lake re food shortages 05/11/1994 Pllb(I) (I page) 002. cable Chinese Message (5 pages) 0510911994 PI lb( I) 003. letter Minister Kang to Ambassador Gallucci re third round of talks (3 05/12/1994 Pllb(I) pages) 004. cable IAEA Inspections (3 pages) 05/0711994 PI /b( I) 005. notes re Summary of Conclusions for Meeting ofNSC Principals' 05/07/1994 Pl/b(I) Committee (2 pages) 006. fax cover sheet, re Notice of Meeting (parital) (I page) 05/0711994 b(7)(C) 007. cable IAEA Response (2 pages) 04/29/1994 PI /b( I) 008. letter Minister Kang to Ambassador Gallucci re talks (3 pages) 05/05/1994 PI lb( I) 009. letter Ambassador Gallucci to Minister Kang re negotiated resolution (3 0510211994 PI lb( I) pages) 0 I 0. cable Proposed reply to Kang letter (4 pages) 04/20/ 1994 PI lb( I) COLLECTION: Clinton Presidential Records National Security Council Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs) OA/13ox Numb1:r: 405 FOLDER TITLE: Korea, January-June, 1994 [5] 2009-0528-F kcl335 RESTRICTION CODES Presidential Records Act - 144 ll.S.C. 2204(a)I Freedom of Information Act - 15 ll.S.C. 552(b)I Pl National Security Classified Information l(a)(l) of the PRAI h( I) National security classified information l(b)( I) of the FOl..\I Pl Relating to the appointment to Federal office l(a)(2) of the PRAI b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of P3 Release would violate a Fcdernl statute l(a)(3) of the PRAI an agency ((h)(l) of the FOIAI P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute l(b)(3) of the FOIAI financial information l(a)(4) of the PRAI h(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial PS Release would disclose confidential advice between the President information ((b)(4) of the FOIA( and his advisors, or between such advisors la)(5) of the PRAI b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy l(b)(6) of the FOIAI personal privacy l(a)(6) of the PRAI h(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes l(h)(7) of the FOIAI C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of of gift. financial institutions i(b)(8) of the FOIAI PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 ll.S.C. h(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information 2201(3). concerning wells l(b)(9) of the FOIAI RR. Document will he reviewed upon request. Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet Clinton Library DOCUMENT NO. SlllUECTfflTLE DATE RESTRICTION AND TYPE 011. cable Instructions for Discussions (4 pages) 04/13/1994 Pl/b(I) COLLECTION: Clinton Presidential Records National Security Council Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs) ONl3ox Number: 405 FOLDER TITLE: Korea, January-June, 1994 [5] 2009-0528-F kc1335 RESTRICTION CODES Presidential Records Act - 144 ll.S.C. 2204(a)I Freedom of Information Act - 15 ll.S.C. 552(b)I Pl National Security Classified Information l(a)( I) of the PRAI h(I) National security classified information l(h)( I) of the FOIAI P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal oflice i(a)(2) of the PRAI h(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of PJ Release would violate a Federal statute l(a)(J) of the PRAI an agency l(h)(2) of the FOIAI P4 Release would disclose trade serrets or confidential commercial or b(J) Release would violate a Federal statute l(h)(J) of the FOIAI financial information l(a)(4) of the PRAI b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President information l(b)(4) of the FOIAI and his advisors, or between such advisors la)(5) of the PRAI h(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of 1'6 Release would constitute 11 clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy l(b)(6) of the FOIAI personal privacy l(a)(6) of the PRAI h(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes l(h)(7) of the FOIAI C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of of gift. financial institutions i(b)(!I) of the FOIAI PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 l l.S.C. h(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information 2201(3). concerning wells l(h)(9) of the FOIAI RR. Document will he reviewed upon request. Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library DOCllMENT NO. SllB,JECTfflTLE DATE RESTRICTION AND TYPE OOla. memo action, Daniel Poneman for Anthony Lake re North Korean Food 05/16/1994 Pl/b(I) Shortages (I page) COLLECTION: Clinton Presidential Records National Security Council Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs) ONBox Number: 405 FOLDER TITLE: Korea, January-June, 1994 [5] 2009-0528-F kc1335 RESTRICTION CODES Presidential Records Act - 144 lJ.S.C. 2204(a)I Freedom of Information Act - 15 lJ.S.C. 552(b)I Pl National Security Classified Information l(a)( I) of the PRAI b(I) National security classified information l(b)(I) of the FOIAI P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office l(a)(2) of the PRAI b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of PJ Release would violate a Federal statute l(a)(J) of the PRAI an agency l(b)(2) of the FOIAI P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commcrcial or h(J) Release would violate a Federal statute l(h)(J) of the FOIAI financial information l(a)(4) of the PRAI b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial 1'5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President information l(b)(4) of the FOIAI and his advisors, or between such advisors la)(5) of the PRAI h(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy l(b)(6) of the FOIAI personal privacy l(a)(6) of the PRAI h(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes l(b)(7) of the FOIAI C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed h(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of of gift. financial institutions l(h)(8) of the FOIAI PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 l l.S.C. b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information 2201(3). concerning wells l(b)(9) of the FOIAI RR. Document will he reviewed upon request. Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library DOCUMENT NO. SllB.JECTfflTLE DATE RESTRICTION AND T\'PE OOlb. memo information, Anthony Lake to POTUS re North Korea (I page) c 05/1994 PI lb( I) COLLECTION: Clinton Presidential Records National Security Council Stanley Roth (Asian Affairs) OA/Box Number: 405 FOLDER TITLE: Korea, January-June, 1994 [5] 2009-0528-F kc 1335 RESTRICTION CODES Presidential Records Act - 144 ll.S.C. 2204(a)I Freedom of Information Act - 15 ll.S.C. 552(b)I Pl National Security Classilied Information J(a)(I) of the PRAI h( I) National security classilied information l(b)( I) of the FOIAI P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal oflice l(a)(2) of the PRAI h(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of PJ Release would violate a Federal statute l(a)(J) of the PRAI an agency )(b)(2) of the FOIAI P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or conlidential commercial or h(J) Release would violate a Federal statute J(b)(J) of the FOIAI linancial information l(a)(4) of the PRAI b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or conlidential or linancial P5 Release would disclose conlidential advice between the President information l(h)(4) of the FOIAI and his advisors, or between such advisors la)(5) of the PRAI b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy J(b)(6) of the FOIAI personal privacy l(a)(6) of the PRAI h(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes l(b)(7) of the FOIAI C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed h(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of of gift. linancial institutions l(b)(8) of the FOIAI PRM. Personal record mislile delined in accordance with 44 ll.S.C. h(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information 2201(3). concerning wells l(b)(9) of the FOIAI RR. Document will he reviewed upon request.
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