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News & Analysis Shia Militias Cannot Ensure Security of Iraq

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News & Analysis Shia Militias Cannot Ensure Security of Iraq October 2, 2016 5 News & Analysis Iraq Iraq woes deepen amid charges of Maliki comeback plot Harvey Morris analyst with the Washington Insti- tute for Near East Policy who had recently returned from Baghdad, London commented on Twitter: “I know a guerrilla war when I see one and uri al-Maliki, Iraq’s for- Maliki is mounting a very effective mer prime minister, has political insurgency, back on his been accused of under- clandestine home turf.” mining his successor, Both Zebari and Obeidi, who Haider al-Abadi, after have dismissed corruption allega- Nallegedly engineering the dismiss- tions levelled against them, were al of a second senior government removed by a simple rather than an minister in the space of a month. absolute majority of the parliament Hoshyar Zebari, who held the Fi- in secret votes, contrary to the con- nance portfolio, was dismissed in a stitution. parliamentary no-confidence vote in September that he claims was The hiatus both unconstitutional and political- automatically ly motivated. Zebari, a Kurd, said he believed the vote was part of a hid- complicates plans for den political agenda “carried out the retaking of Mosul. by the State of Law parliamentary bloc, headed by Nuri al-Maliki”. Zebari said he planned to chal- He said in a statement that parlia- lenge the vote in the courts. He mentary Speaker Salim al-Jabouri said his removal would jeopardise had been complicit in what Zebari efforts to reintegrate Iraq into the described as a “vindictive, short- world financial system, including sighted” decision that was clearly implementing a $5 billion loan from intended to narrow political agen- the International Monetary Fund das. (IMF). The removal of Zebari, one of The IMF has said it was commit- Iraq’s most experienced political ted to the deal with Baghdad, with Sacked Finance minister Hoshyar Zebari speaks during a news conference in Erbil, on September leaders, came weeks after a similar or without Zebari. 22nd. (Reuters) parliamentary vote ousted Iraq’s Maliki’s opponents claim he has Sunni Defence minister Khalid al- exploited divisions within both Maliki’s parliamentary power by the ousted Obeidi makes its way Fuad Hussein, Barzani’s chief of Obeidi. Kurdish and Sunni factions in par- base is the State of Law bloc but through the courts. Any nominee staff, underlined the current po- liament to undermine his rivals. he is also widely seen as the mas- for a replacement must win the litical perils when he told Voice of Zebari is linked to the Kurdistan termind of the shadowy ad hoc Re- support of parliament and there is America’s Kurdish service: “Now The removal of Zebari Democratic Party (KDP), the ruling form Front that groups opposition- a fear that sectarian elements will there is no Finance minister, no came weeks after a party in Erbil that is at odds with ists from a number of parties. The try to play politics with an appoint- Defence minister, no Interior min- similar parliamentary the opposition Gorran Movement Reform Front exploited rivalries ment that would normally, but not ister.” He said the Foreign minister vote ousted Iraq’s and elements of the rival Patriotic within the Sunni block to target automatically, go to a Sunni. might be the next to go. Sunni Defence Union of Kurdistan. Obeidi and generate enough parlia- The hiatus automatically compli- “If the policy is to bring down the minister Khalid Observers have speculated that mentary support to remove him. cates plans for the retaking of Mo- Iraqi government, this will desta- al-Obeidi. Maliki’s ultimate target is Abadi The latest political manoeuvrings sul, which explains why the United bilise the situation because the himself, although it might take come at a time of intense specula- States lobbied so intensively but question is, if this government is more than a simple majority to re- tion about when Iraq will launch a unsuccessfully, to retain Obeidi. to go, who’s going to form the next Both men were central to the Ab- move the prime minister. long-awaited military offensive to The situation could be further government?” Hussein said. “How adi cabinet — Zebari as the official in Abadi took over in 2014 after retake Mosul from ISIS. It is an is- complicated if a pro-Iranian, a would you form it? When will it ma- charge of overseeing a major inter- vigorous efforts by Maliki to cling sue that is likely to be at the top of nominee of the Reform Front or a terialise? This is a dangerous thing.” national loan to salvage the coun- to power despite presiding over the agenda when Masoud Barzani, non-professional ends up with the try’s ailing economy and Obeidi as the loss of Mosul and a large area the Kurdish leader and head of the Defence portfolio. Some analysts Harvey Morris has written the one in charge of spearheading of Iraqi territory to ISIS forces. He KDP, makes an anticipated visit to see it as improbable that an autumn several books on the Middle East, the military campaign against the secured the country’s shared vice- Baghdad for talks with Abadi. offensive against ISIS could go including No Friends but the Islamic State (ISIS). presidency for a year until the post The Defence post is likely to re- ahead without a Defence minister Mountains: The Tragic History of Michael Knights, a veteran Iraq was abolished in 2015. main vacant at least until an appeal in place. the Kurds published in 1993. Shia militias cannot ensure security of Iraq Viewpoint hen the Iraqi al-Kaabi spends more time in Iran areas are liberated by the Iraqi all of Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation militia Asa’ib than in his own country. He sent Army, not abusive militias. The militias Forces (PMF). Ahl al-Haq, led about 1,000 militiamen to fight in What do the militias want from have their Maliki’s influence behind the by Qais al- Aleppo alongside forces loyal to this expanding control of Iraqi scenes is already challenging Ab- Khazali offers Syrian President Bashar Assad. territories? sights on adi. Imagine how little power the — instead of This indicates that the militias We can expect the militias to be more than prime minister would have left. Wgovernment forces — to be in have their sights on more than transformed into an Iraqi version Three months ago, representa- just ruling charge of the security of Bagh- just ruling Iraq. They also seem of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary tives from Jurf al-Sakhar, in north- dad’s belt areas, we must stop to think they have a regional role Guards Corps, which answers to Iraq. ern Babil province, asked if they — and think of its implications. to play, starting with Syria and Iran’s supreme leader. It is just a along with other residents — could Haroun The residents of Baghdad are reaching Saudi Arabia and other matter of time. return to their homes, which were Mohammed suffering from attacks, robber- Gulf states. It is rumoured in Iraq’s political liberated from ISIS more than a ies, kidnappings and killings at Inside Iraq, Shia militias are ex- corridors that Iranian Major-Gen- year ago. the hands of unknown gunmen, panding into Arab Sunni-majority eral Qassem Soleimani, who has These were people who had although some blame militiamen. areas, despite the displeasure of much to say in Iraqi and Syrian in- fought against ISIS and against al- Now the Asa’ib militia wants to the locals. Residents would be ternal affairs, is proposing a lead- Qaeda before that, yet they remain replace Baghdad’s police, army happy to see the back of the Islam- ing role for former prime minister prevented from returning home and security apparatus. ic State (ISIS), provided that their Nuri al-Maliki in the oversight of by the PMF. The militia would not only be The displaced Arab Sunnis legitimising its fighters with of- sought the help of Grand Ayatol- ficial cover from the government lah Ali al-Sistani to return home of Iraqi Prime Minister Haider but his office replied that the Shia al-Abadi, it would also mean that imam was ill and could not see Asa’ib would have effective con- them. Sistani’s aides also added trol of Baghdad’s gates. that the ayatollah does not inter- We must also take note when fere in administrative affairs. Hadi al-Amiri, head of the Badr They were advised to mediate militia, boasts that his militiamen with the leaders of the militias are superior to the country’s army. instead. So they went to meet the It means at some point militia official head of the PMF, Faleh leaders would be calling the shots Fayyad. in Iraq’s political decisions, leav- Fayyad, however, directed them ing Abadi and his ministers with to his deputy, Abu Mahdi al- nothing more than mere talk — the Muhandis, who is in charge of the way citizens discuss politics in a field operations of the PMF. Mu- café. handis told them to petition the Another militia to pay atten- government as this case is not the tion to is Harakat Hezbollah purview of the PMF, leaving the al-Nujaba, whose leader Akram displaced lost in a vicious circle. The residents of Jurf al-Sakhar understood the message, howev- We can expect the militias to er. The power of the government is diminishing. The militias are in be transformed into an Iraqi Iraq to rule — on behalf of Iran. version of Iran’s Islamic Shia militiamen from Popular Mobilisation Forces on the border between Anbar Haroun Mohammed is an Iraqi Revolutionary Guards Corps.
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