DOCSLIB.ORG

Regional Implications of an Independent Kurdistan

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Regional Implications of an Independent Kurdistan Regional Implications of an Independent Kurdistan Alireza Nader, Larry Hanauer, Brenna Allen, Ali G. Scotten C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR1452 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9569-5 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2016 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover: Beneath the Kurdistan flag, Kurdish Peshmerga troops keep watch in northern Iraq near the border with Syria (Azad Lashkari/Reuters). Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface In this report, we examine the potential regional implications of an independent Kurdistan in Northern Iraq. Specifically, we examine the possible reactions of the three key neighbors: the rest of Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. We closely analyze scenarios in which an independent Kurd- istan might emerge and various policy options available to Baghdad, Ankara, and Tehran. However, we do not predict that an independent Kurdistan will emerge, nor do we advocate for an independent Kurd- istan. Rather, we examine the implications of such a possibility for the region. Funding for this study was provided, in part, by donors and by the independent research and development provisions of RAND’s con- tracts for the operation of its U.S. Department of Defense federally funded research and development centers. The research was conducted within the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD) of the RAND Corporation. NSRD conducts research and analysis on defense and national security topics for the U.S. and allied defense, foreign policy, homeland security, and intelligence communities and foundations and other nongovernmental organizations that support defense and national security analysis. For more information on the RAND National Security Research Division, see www.rand.org/nsrd/ or contact the director (contact information is provided on the web page). iii Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures .............................................................................vii Summary .......................................................................... ix Acknowledgments .............................................................. xix CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 Scenarios ............................................................................ 5 Influence of Kurdish Nationalism ............................................... 9 CHAPTER TWO Background .......................................................................11 The Kurds and the Emergence of the Modern Middle East .................13 The Kurds in Pre-Saddam Iraq ..................................................16 The Kurds Under Saddam .......................................................18 KRG-Iraqi Relations After Saddam............................................ 22 The Current State of Intra-Kurdish Politics ................................... 23 Conclusions ....................................................................... 27 CHAPTER THREE Iraq’s Reaction to an Independent Kurdistan ..............................29 KRG-Baghdad Relations, 2003–Present ...................................... 30 Baghdad’s Response to Kurdish Independence ............................... 43 The Influence of Kurdish Nationalism .........................................53 Conclusion .........................................................................55 v vi Regional Implications of an Independent Kurdistan CHAPTER FOUR Turkey’s Reaction to an Independent Kurdistan ..........................57 Turkey’s Long Opposition to Kurdish Independence .........................61 Turkey’s Change of Heart ........................................................62 Turkish Policies Promote KRG Autonomy and Eventual Independence ...76 Turkey’s Reaction to Various Scenarios ....................................... 90 The Influence of Kurdish Nationalism ........................................ 96 Conclusions ....................................................................... 97 CHAPTER FIVE Iran’s Reaction to an Independent Kurdistan ............................ 101 Iran’s Kurds ...................................................................... 103 Iran’s Ties to the KRG .......................................................... 116 Geopolitical Considerations ................................................... 121 Iranian Reactions to Kurdish Independence ................................. 124 The Influence of Kurdish Nationalism ....................................... 130 Conclusion ....................................................................... 131 CHAPTER SIX Conclusion ...................................................................... 133 Abbreviations ................................................................... 139 References ....................................................................... 141 Figures 2.1. Predominantly Kurdish Areas Overlaying Modern-Day State Borders ..........................................................12 2.2. Map of Sykes-Picot Agreement .....................................14 2.3. Post-2003 Iraq and the Disputed Territories .................... 20 3.1. Post-2003 Iraq and the Disputed Territories .....................32 4.1. Areas Controlled by Syrian Kurds and Other Factions (as of August 2015) ..................................................72 vii Summary In this report, we examine the potential regional implications of an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq. Specifically, we analyze the interests of key three regional neighbors—the Iraqi central govern- ment, Turkey, and Iran—and explore policies each actor may pursue in response to Kurdish independence. However, we do not recommend an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq or anywhere else. The question of Kurdish independence has been raised—by aca- demics, by third countries, and by Kurdish leaders themselves—since the Kurds established a semi-autonomous region in the wake of the first Gulf War. Since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Iraqi Kurdish leaders worked diligently to maximize their control over affairs in the north, and tensions between Baghdad and the Kurdish Regional Gov- ernment (KRG) in Erbil—particularly regarding the distribution of resources and control over oil and disputed territories—have led many Kurdish officials to take steps that further distance the KRG from the central Iraqi government. Kurdish officials have long complained that the KRG does not get its fair share of resources from Baghdad, and several senior Kurdish leaders have stated bluntly that independence is their eventual goal. As a result, the question of whether Iraqi Kurdistan may someday become a sovereign country is not merely theoretical; it is a very real possibility whose impact on regional dynamics should be assessed. In this report, we do not predict that an independent Kurdish state will actually emerge, either in northern Iraq or elsewhere, nor do we advo- cate for an independent Kurdish state. Rather, we examine the likely ix x Regional Implications of an Independent Kurdistan implications for the region if the KRG were at some point to declare its secession from Iraq. U.S. policy toward the Middle East is currently focused on the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the humanitarian crisis in Syria. Not as much attention is paid to the relatively stable KRG of northern Iraq, which one day could emerge as an independent Kurd- istan, with important consequences for regional stability and U.S. national security. The KRG has in some ways operated as a de facto Kurdish state since the implementation of a U.S.-led no-fly zone in 1991 curtailed Baghdad’s influence in the north. Iraq’s post-Saddam constitution institutionalized the Kurdistan Region’s political and economic auton- omy. The emergence of an independent Kurdistan has been strongly opposed by the Iraqi central government and has been seen as a threat to the interests of major regional states, including Iran and Turkey, both of which have sizable Kurdish populations that have advocated for greater political and cultural rights. Recent regional developments, however, have led to some major changes in attitudes toward the Iraqi Kurds. Although Baghdad has vigorously objected to an independent Kurdistan, it may not have enough leverage to prevent
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Iraq: Opposition to the Government in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)
    Country Policy and Information Note Iraq: Opposition to the government in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) Version 2.0 June 2021 Preface Purpose This note provides country of origin information (COI) and analysis of COI for use by Home Office decision makers handling particular types of protection and human rights claims (as set out in the Introduction section). It is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of a particular subject or theme. It is split into two main sections: (1) analysis and assessment of COI and other evidence; and (2) COI. These are explained in more detail below. Assessment This section analyses the evidence relevant to this note – i.e. the COI section; refugee/human rights laws and policies; and applicable caselaw – by describing this and its inter-relationships, and provides an assessment of, in general, whether one or more of the following applies: • A person is reasonably likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm • The general humanitarian situation is so severe as to breach Article 15(b) of European Council Directive 2004/83/EC (the Qualification Directive) / Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights as transposed in paragraph 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules • The security situation presents a real risk to a civilian’s life or person such that it would breach Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive as transposed in paragraph 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules • A person is able to obtain protection from the state (or quasi state bodies) • A person is reasonably able to relocate within a country or territory • A claim is likely to justify granting asylum, humanitarian protection or other form of leave, and • If a claim is refused, it is likely or unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
    [Show full text]
  • The Last Piece of the Puzzle: Achieving Lasting Stability in Post
    AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF IRAQ SULAIMANI Institute of Regional and International Studies TheChallenges Last Piece and ofOpportunities the Puzzle: Achievingin post-ISIS LastingTerritories: Stability in PostThe Case ISIS ofJalawla Rabia By Christine McCaffray van den Toorn andBy ChristineAhmed Ali M. van den Toorn What is the IRIS Iraq Report (IIR)? The IRIS Iraq Report (IIR) provides “on-the-ground” is aimed at providing decision-makers and experts with solid research and analysis of Iraq policy. The Report is unique because it is produced in Iraq, and is based on in- brainchild of Ahmed Ali and Christine van den Toorn, both of whom have years of experience researching and writing on Iraq and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. [email protected] American University of Iraq, Sulaimani /IRISmideast Sulaimani – Kirkuk Main Road, Raparin /IRISmideast Sulaimani, Iraq Jalawla Bazar, May 2015 Jalawla Bazar, April 2016 What will it take to restore peace and stability to areas liberated from ISIS? How can Iraq deal with the challenges of disputed territories? These are two of the biggest questions facing authorities in the country at present. Jalawla, a subdistrict of Khanaqin in Diyala province, may provide some important answers for how to handle these challenges in the future. The town is a microcosm of some of the wider political, territorial and economic challenges facing Iraqi authorities, and the measures taken there to restore stability after it was liberated from ISIS in November 2014 offer salutary lessons for Iraqi authorities, both in terms of how to achieve success, and the longer-term obstacles that will need to be overcome in order to consolidate it areas of the country that are disputed between the federal government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
    [Show full text]
  • The Functioning of Democratic Institutions in Turkey
    http://assembly.coe.int Doc. 15272 21 April 2021 The functioning of democratic institutions in Turkey Report1 Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee) Co-rapporteurs: Mr Thomas HAMMARBERG, Sweden, Socialists, Democrats and Greens Group, and Mr John HOWELL, United Kingdom, European Conservatives Group and Democratic Alliance Summary The Monitoring Committee is deeply concerned about recent developments in Turkey which have further undermined democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Procedures seeking to lift the parliamentary immunity of a third of the parliamentarians (overwhelmingly from opposition parties), the attempt to close the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) and the continued crackdown on its members put political pluralism and the functioning of democratic institutions at risk. The presidential decision of 20 March 2021 to withdraw from the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (CETS No.210, the Istanbul Convention) to combat violence against women and domestic violence is a regrettable step backwards, made without any parliamentary debate, which raises the question of the modalities of denunciation of conventions in democratic societies. The committee also urges the immediate release of Selahattin Demirtaş and Osman Kavala following the final judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. In order to reverse these worrying trends, the Turkish authorities should seize the opportunity of implementing the Human Rights Action Plan and revising the legislation on elections and political parties to take meaningful steps, put an end to the judicial harassment of opposition and dissenting voices, improve freedom of expression and media and restore the independence of the judiciary, in co-operation with the Council of Europe 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Centre for Kurdish Studies
    Centre for Kurdish Studies Centre for Kurdish Studies anks to Professor Michael M Gunter of Tennessee Technological University for permission to use this image. Living over a territory divided between Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria and the former Soviet Union, and with an active international diaspora, the Kurds are the largest stateless nation in the world, and the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East. They inhabit a strategic area, once a region of contact between the Ottoman, Persian and Russian empires, and later a contested border zone between modern nation-states. Although they are ethnically, linguistically, and culturally distinct from the majority populations of the nation-states where they live, they are often consigned to a peripheral role in Turkish, Arab or Iranian studies. Our focus on Kurdish Studies places the Kurds at the centre of our research and offers a chance to consider Kurdish society, culture and politics holistically in all its complexity and variation, across and within established nation- states and the global diaspora community. Exeter is the only British university to have developed a strong research focus in the field of Kurdish Studies. As such, we are the leading centre of research in the field in the UK, and one of the global centres of excellence. The Centre for Kurdish Studies has recently benefited from generous donations from the Ibrahim Ahmed Foundation, the Prime Minister’s Office of the Kurdistan Regional Government, and the President’s Office of Iraq. These gifts have enabled us to expand our staff base and our research and teaching activities. We now offer the following degrees: • PhD in Kurdish Studies A multi-discplinary programme covering Social Science, Political Science, and Humanities and Arts disciplines.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran: Ethnic and Religious Minorities
    Order Code RL34021 Iran: Ethnic and Religious Minorities Updated November 25, 2008 Hussein D. Hassan Information Research Specialist Knowledge Services Group Iran: Ethnic and Religious Minorities Summary Iran is home to approximately 70.5 million people who are ethnically, religiously, and linguistically diverse. The central authority is dominated by Persians who constitute 51% of Iran’s population. Iranians speak diverse Indo-Iranian, Semitic, Armenian, and Turkic languages. The state religion is Shia, Islam. After installation by Ayatollah Khomeini of an Islamic regime in February 1979, treatment of ethnic and religious minorities grew worse. By summer of 1979, initial violent conflicts erupted between the central authority and members of several tribal, regional, and ethnic minority groups. This initial conflict dashed the hope and expectation of these minorities who were hoping for greater cultural autonomy under the newly created Islamic State. The U.S. State Department’s 2008 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, released September 19, 2008, cited Iran for widespread serious abuses, including unjust executions, politically motivated abductions by security forces, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, and arrests of women’s rights activists. According to the State Department’s 2007 Country Report on Human Rights (released on March 11, 2008), Iran’s poor human rights record worsened, and it continued to commit numerous, serious abuses. The government placed severe restrictions on freedom of religion. The report also cited violence and legal and societal discrimination against women, ethnic and religious minorities. Incitement to anti-Semitism also remained a problem. Members of the country’s non-Muslim religious minorities, particularly Baha’is, reported imprisonment, harassment, and intimidation based on their religious beliefs.
    [Show full text]
  • DELIVERED on 23RD SEPTEMBER Dear President Barzani
    THE LAST WRITTEN DRAFT – DELIVERED ON 23RD SEPTEMBER Dear President Barzani, I am writing on behalf of the United States to express our profound respect for you and for the people of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. Together, over decades, we have forged a historic relationship, and it is our intention and commitment that this relationship continues to strengthen over the decades to come. Over the past three years, in particular, our strong partnership and your brave decisions to cooperate fully with the Iraqi Security Forces turned the tide against ISIS. We honor and we will never forget the sacrifice of the Peshmerga during our common struggle against terrorism. Before us at this moment is the question of a referendum on the future of the Kurdistan Region, scheduled to be held on September 25. We have expressed our concerns. These concerns include the ongoing campaign against ISIS, including upcoming operations in Hawija, the uncertain regional environment, and the need to focus intensively on stabilizing liberated areas to ensure ISIS can never return. Accordingly, we respectfully request that you accept an alternative, which we believe will better help achieve your objectives and ensure stability and peace in the wake of this necessary war against ISIS. This alternative proposal establishes a new and accelerated framework for negotiation with the central Government of Iraq led by Prime Minister Abadi. This accelerated framework for negotiation carries an open agenda and should last no longer than one year, with the possibility of renewal. Its objective is to resolve all issues outstanding between Baghdad and Erbil and the nature of the future relationship between the two.
    [Show full text]
  • View/Print Page As PDF
    MENU Policy Analysis / Articles & Op-Eds In the Regional Power Struggle, has Erbil Decided to Join the Sunni Bloc? by Frzand Sherko Jan 29, 2016 Also available in Arabic ABOUT THE AUTHORS Frzand Sherko Frzand Sherko is an Iraq based strategic scholar and political analyst specializing in the intelligence and security affairs of the Kurdistan region of Iraq, greater Iraq, and the wider Islamic Middle East. Articles & Testimony he security of the Kurdistan Region-Iraq (KRI) depends more on agreements between Erbil and Kurdistan’s T neighbors than the KRI’s own security and intelligence capabilities. Whenever the regional powers surrounding the KRI have suspected that their interests are at risk, they have not hesitated to put the KRI’s security and stability in jeopardy to secure their interests. However, these regional power’s interests, increasingly at odds with one another, have begun to exacerbate the KRI’s security and internal political challenges. Since 1992, the KRI has worked to maintain a strategic relationship with Iran. When Iraqi Kurdistan’s civil war began in late 1993, Iran played a significant role, initially by directing the Islamic Movement in Kurdistan and later through its support of both sides in the conflict – the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Iran maintained its dual support until 1996, when it leveraged its relations to encourage both parties to maintain a political balance. Such an arrangement created stability, allowing Tehran to benefit from its economic ties with both parties and to avoid any possible threats the conflict could pose to Iranian national security.
    [Show full text]
  • Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey's
    Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy Ayşegül Aydin Cem Emrence turkey project policy paper Number 10 • December 2016 policy paper Number 10, December 2016 About CUSE The Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings fosters high-level U.S.-Europe- an dialogue on the changes in Europe and the global challenges that affect transatlantic relations. As an integral part of the Foreign Policy Studies Program, the Center offers independent research and recommendations for U.S. and European officials and policymakers, and it convenes seminars and public forums on policy-relevant issues. CUSE’s research program focuses on the transforma- tion of the European Union (EU); strategies for engaging the countries and regions beyond the frontiers of the EU including the Balkans, Caucasus, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine; and broader European security issues such as the future of NATO and forging common strategies on energy security. The Center also houses specific programs on France, Germany, Italy, and Turkey. About the Turkey Project Given Turkey’s geopolitical, historical and cultural significance, and the high stakes posed by the foreign policy and domestic issues it faces, Brookings launched the Turkey Project in 2004 to foster informed public consideration, high‐level private debate, and policy recommendations focusing on developments in Turkey. In this context, Brookings has collaborated with the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD) to institute a U.S.-Turkey Forum at Brookings. The Forum organizes events in the form of conferences, sem- inars and workshops to discuss topics of relevance to U.S.-Turkish and transatlantic relations.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq Fact Sheet
    Iraq Fact Sheet Government The Iraqi government was created by a new constitution in 2005, after the fall of Saddam Hussein. The government is led by a Kurdish President, currently Fuad Masum, a Shia Prime Minister, currently Haider Abadi, and a Sunni Arab Vice President, currently, Khodair Khozaei. The Prime Minister is the dominant leader. The population of Iraq is estimated to be 38 million, with two official languages, Arabic and Kurdish. Ethnic and Religious Groups Sunni Arabs: Iraqi Sunni Arabs number about 20% of the population, or around 5-7 million people. Under Saddam Hussein, who was a Sunni Arab, they had a privileged place in Iraq. During the de- Ba’athification process post-2005, Sunni Arabs were largely excluded by the Shia elites, particularly under former Prime Minister Nouri Maliki. Sunnis, including those from the “Awakening Councils,” were also mostly excluded from joining the Iraqi Army, as it was feared that they could retake control. Shia Arabs: Shia Arabs are roughly 60% of the total population. Under Saddam, the Shiites were largely oppressed, shut off from their Shia neighbor Iran, and generally excluded from power in the country. In post-Saddam Iraq, the constitution gave Shias the most powerful position, that of Prime Minister. Nouri Maliki, the former Prime Minister, favored Shias. Maliki also took advantage of U.S. aid; it is reported that Iraq’s security forces received nearly $100 billion from 2006 to 2014. Maliki became increasingly authoritarian during his eight years as premier, and eventually was pushed out. The current Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, is also a Shia Arab from the same party – Dawa – as Maliki, but has been generally less biased, less corrupt, more pro-American, and less pro-Iranian.
    [Show full text]
  • Lament of Ahmad Khani: a Study of the Historical Struggle of the Kurds for an Independent Kurdistan
    Lament of Ahmad Khani: A Study of the Historical Struggle of the Kurds for an Independent Kurdistan Erik Novak Department of Political Science Villanova University The Kurdish poet Sheikmous Hasan, better known as Cigerxwin, wrote these words as part of his much larger work, Who Am I? while living in exile in Sweden. “I am the proud Kurd, the enemies’ enemy, the friend of peace-loving ones. I am of noble race, not wild as they claim. My mighty ancestors were free people. Like them I want to be free and that is why I fight, for the enemy won’t leave in peace and I don’t want to be forever oppressed.”1 Although Hasan, who died in 1984, was a modern voice for Kurdish nationalism, he is merely one of a chorus of Kurds reaching back centuries crying out for a free and independent Kurdish state, unofficially named Kurdistan. Although the concept of nationalism is common today, the cries of the Kurds for their own state reach back centuries, the first written example coming from the Kurdish poet Ahmad Khani in his national epic Mem-o-Zin in 1695. Mem-o-Zin actually predates the French Revolution of 1789, which is often thought to be the true beginning of the concept of a national state. Despite having conceived of nationalism for the Kurds nearly a century ahead of France and the rest of Western Europe, the Kurds lack a state of their own. What are the origins of Kurdish nationalist thought and how has it evolved over the years? To answer this question, we will track the evolution of Kurdish nationalist thought from its origins during the Ottoman Empire, 1 through World War I and up to the present by looking at the three successor states of the Ottoman Empire that contain the largest Kurdish populations: Turkey, Iran, and Iraq.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq: Buttressing Peace with the Iraqi Inter-Religious Congress
    Religion and Conflict Case Study Series Iraq: Buttressing Peace with the Iraqi Inter-Religious Congress August 2013 © Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/resources/classroom 4 Abstract 5 This case study shines a light on the sectarian violence that overtook Iraq after the 2003 US-led invasion that overthrew Saddam Hussein, and how religious 9 leaders gradually gained recognition as resources for the promotion of peace. This overview of the conflict addresses five main questions: What religious 11 factors contributed to insecurity in post-2003 Iraq? How did Coalition forces approach religious actors prior to 2006? How did governments interface with faith-based NGOs in pursuit of peace? What role did socioeconomic factors 14 play in exacerbating conflict? How did religious engagement intersect with the Sunni Awakening and the surge of Coalition troops in 2007? The case study includes a core text, a timeline of key events, a guide to relevant religious orga- nizations, and a list of further readings. 15 About this Case Study 17 This case study was crafted under the editorial direction of Eric Patterson, visiting assistant professor in the Department of Government and associate di- rector of the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at George- town University. This case study was made possible through the support of the Henry Luce Foundation and the Luce/SFS Program on Religion and International Affairs. 2 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CASE STUDY — IRAQ Contents Introduction 4 Historical Background 5 Domestic Factors 9 International Factors 11 Religion and Socioeconomic Factors 12 Conclusion 14 Resources Key Events 15 Religious Organizations 17 Further Reading 19 Discussion Questions 21 BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY CASE STUDY — IRAQ 3 Introduction While the US invasion of Iraq—and the insurgency that a shaky relationship with the United States.
    [Show full text]
  • Turkey-Kurdish Regional Government Relations After the US Withdrawal
    FOR THIS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS, VISIT US AT http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE Visit our website for other free publication downloads PRESS http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ Carlisle Barracks, PA and To rate this publication click here. TURKEY-KURDISH REGIONAL GOVERNMENT RELATIONS AFTER THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ: PUTTING THE KURDS ON THE MAP? U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE Bill Park This Publication SSI Website USAWC Website The United States Army War College The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application of Landpower. The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers. Concurrently, it is our duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a “think factory” for commanders and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage in discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving national security objectives. The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national security and strategic research and analysis to influence policy debate and bridge the gap between military and academia. The Center for Strategic Leadership and Development CENTER for contributes to the education of world class senior STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP and DEVELOPMENT leaders, develops expert knowledge, and provides U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE solutions to strategic Army issues affecting the national security community. The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute provides subject matter expertise, technical review, and writing expertise to agencies that develop stability operations concepts and doctrines.
    [Show full text]