Regional Implications of an Independent Kurdistan Alireza Nader, Larry Hanauer, Brenna Allen, Ali G. Scotten C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR1452 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9569-5 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2016 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover: Beneath the Kurdistan flag, Kurdish Peshmerga troops keep watch in northern Iraq near the border with Syria (Azad Lashkari/Reuters). Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface In this report, we examine the potential regional implications of an independent Kurdistan in Northern Iraq. Specifically, we examine the possible reactions of the three key neighbors: the rest of Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. We closely analyze scenarios in which an independent Kurd- istan might emerge and various policy options available to Baghdad, Ankara, and Tehran. However, we do not predict that an independent Kurdistan will emerge, nor do we advocate for an independent Kurd- istan. Rather, we examine the implications of such a possibility for the region. Funding for this study was provided, in part, by donors and by the independent research and development provisions of RAND’s con- tracts for the operation of its U.S. Department of Defense federally funded research and development centers. The research was conducted within the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD) of the RAND Corporation. NSRD conducts research and analysis on defense and national security topics for the U.S. and allied defense, foreign policy, homeland security, and intelligence communities and foundations and other nongovernmental organizations that support defense and national security analysis. For more information on the RAND National Security Research Division, see www.rand.org/nsrd/ or contact the director (contact information is provided on the web page). iii Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures .............................................................................vii Summary .......................................................................... ix Acknowledgments .............................................................. xix CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 Scenarios ............................................................................ 5 Influence of Kurdish Nationalism ............................................... 9 CHAPTER TWO Background .......................................................................11 The Kurds and the Emergence of the Modern Middle East .................13 The Kurds in Pre-Saddam Iraq ..................................................16 The Kurds Under Saddam .......................................................18 KRG-Iraqi Relations After Saddam............................................ 22 The Current State of Intra-Kurdish Politics ................................... 23 Conclusions ....................................................................... 27 CHAPTER THREE Iraq’s Reaction to an Independent Kurdistan ..............................29 KRG-Baghdad Relations, 2003–Present ...................................... 30 Baghdad’s Response to Kurdish Independence ............................... 43 The Influence of Kurdish Nationalism .........................................53 Conclusion .........................................................................55 v vi Regional Implications of an Independent Kurdistan CHAPTER FOUR Turkey’s Reaction to an Independent Kurdistan ..........................57 Turkey’s Long Opposition to Kurdish Independence .........................61 Turkey’s Change of Heart ........................................................62 Turkish Policies Promote KRG Autonomy and Eventual Independence ...76 Turkey’s Reaction to Various Scenarios ....................................... 90 The Influence of Kurdish Nationalism ........................................ 96 Conclusions ....................................................................... 97 CHAPTER FIVE Iran’s Reaction to an Independent Kurdistan ............................ 101 Iran’s Kurds ...................................................................... 103 Iran’s Ties to the KRG .......................................................... 116 Geopolitical Considerations ................................................... 121 Iranian Reactions to Kurdish Independence ................................. 124 The Influence of Kurdish Nationalism ....................................... 130 Conclusion ....................................................................... 131 CHAPTER SIX Conclusion ...................................................................... 133 Abbreviations ................................................................... 139 References ....................................................................... 141 Figures 2.1. Predominantly Kurdish Areas Overlaying Modern-Day State Borders ..........................................................12 2.2. Map of Sykes-Picot Agreement .....................................14 2.3. Post-2003 Iraq and the Disputed Territories .................... 20 3.1. Post-2003 Iraq and the Disputed Territories .....................32 4.1. Areas Controlled by Syrian Kurds and Other Factions (as of August 2015) ..................................................72 vii Summary In this report, we examine the potential regional implications of an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq. Specifically, we analyze the interests of key three regional neighbors—the Iraqi central govern- ment, Turkey, and Iran—and explore policies each actor may pursue in response to Kurdish independence. However, we do not recommend an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq or anywhere else. The question of Kurdish independence has been raised—by aca- demics, by third countries, and by Kurdish leaders themselves—since the Kurds established a semi-autonomous region in the wake of the first Gulf War. Since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Iraqi Kurdish leaders worked diligently to maximize their control over affairs in the north, and tensions between Baghdad and the Kurdish Regional Gov- ernment (KRG) in Erbil—particularly regarding the distribution of resources and control over oil and disputed territories—have led many Kurdish officials to take steps that further distance the KRG from the central Iraqi government. Kurdish officials have long complained that the KRG does not get its fair share of resources from Baghdad, and several senior Kurdish leaders have stated bluntly that independence is their eventual goal. As a result, the question of whether Iraqi Kurdistan may someday become a sovereign country is not merely theoretical; it is a very real possibility whose impact on regional dynamics should be assessed. In this report, we do not predict that an independent Kurdish state will actually emerge, either in northern Iraq or elsewhere, nor do we advo- cate for an independent Kurdish state. Rather, we examine the likely ix x Regional Implications of an Independent Kurdistan implications for the region if the KRG were at some point to declare its secession from Iraq. U.S. policy toward the Middle East is currently focused on the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the humanitarian crisis in Syria. Not as much attention is paid to the relatively stable KRG of northern Iraq, which one day could emerge as an independent Kurd- istan, with important consequences for regional stability and U.S. national security. The KRG has in some ways operated as a de facto Kurdish state since the implementation of a U.S.-led no-fly zone in 1991 curtailed Baghdad’s influence in the north. Iraq’s post-Saddam constitution institutionalized the Kurdistan Region’s political and economic auton- omy. The emergence of an independent Kurdistan has been strongly opposed by the Iraqi central government and has been seen as a threat to the interests of major regional states, including Iran and Turkey, both of which have sizable Kurdish populations that have advocated for greater political and cultural rights. Recent regional developments, however, have led to some major changes in attitudes toward the Iraqi Kurds. Although Baghdad has vigorously objected to an independent Kurdistan, it may not have enough leverage to prevent