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Perceptions of Mutual Vulnerability Between Nuclear Rivals HOPE SPRINGS ETERNAL: PERCEPTIONS OF MUTUAL VULNERABILITY BETWEEN NUCLEAR RIVALS Caroline R. Milne A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY RECOMMENDED FOR ACCEPTANCE BY THE WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL Adviser: Christopher F. Chyba November 2017 ProQuest Number:10637413 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. ProQuest 10637413 Published by ProQuest LLC ( 2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, MI 48106 - 1346 © Copyright by Caroline Reilly Milne, 2017. All rights reserved. Abstract Do nuclear-armed rivals perceive a condition of “mutual vulnerability” to be inescapable? Such states generally have two long-term options when it comes to dealing with such a situation. On the one hand, they can accept that such a balance would likely endure, and seek only to maintain secure second-strike capabilities. On the other hand, they can reject the strategic circumstances as potentially robust, and pursue capabilities that promise to make nuclear war more tolerable. This dissertation examines two cases of nuclear rivalries in order to understand which position or approach tends to be adopted, and why. The bulk of the project uses archival evidence to illuminate how U.S. and Soviet decision-makers wrestled with mutual vulnerability as it emerged and deepened during the Cold War. Analysis of this case reveals that the superpowers were inclined to reject the idea that their strategic situation was inescapable. Though the technical basis for a highly durable nuclear balance was in place by the early-to-mid 1960s, there was never a clear or constant consensus within U.S. or Soviet policy circles that mutual vulnerability would persist. As a result, each side continuously tried to liberate itself from the strategic dilemma, either by building up capabilities or modifying nuclear strategy. Today the United States and the People’s Republic of China, which comprise the second nuclear rivalry examined by this study, risk falling into a similar pattern. Nuclear exchange calculations establish that while mutual vulnerability between these two countries exists, the United States might still be able to reduce its risk under certain conditions. Put another way, the quantitative disparity between U.S. and Chinese strategic forces implies that certain nuclear war outcomes could favor the United States. In-depth interviews with U.S. and Chinese experts and former officials demonstrate that perceptions of the balance partly confirm this picture. While iii both sides appear to believe that mutual vulnerability is a current strategic fact, there is much uncertainty about its persistence. Historical lessons are thus key to navigating the United States and China away from a Cold War-style relationship premised predominantly on competition. iv Table of Contents Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………...iii Table of Contents………………………………………………………………………….v Figures……………………………………………………………………………………vi Tables…………………………………………………………………………………..…vi Acknowledgments……………………………………………………………………….vii Chapter 1: Introduction……………………………………………………………………1 Chapter 2: Mutual vulnerability during the Truman Administration……………………24 Chapter 3: Mutual vulnerability during the Eisenhower Administration………………..43 Chapter 4: Mutual vulnerability during the Kennedy Administration…………...………66 Chapter 5: Mutual vulnerability during the Nixon, Carter, and Reagan Administrations…………………………………………………91 Chapter 6: Soviet perceptions of mutual vulnerability during the Cold War…………..122 Chapter 7: Contemporary perceptions of U.S.-China mutual vulnerability………...….162 Chapter 8: Conclusion…………………………………………………………………..191 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………….……206 v Figures Figure 1. U.S. and Soviet warhead levels during the Truman Administration…………..24 Figure 2. U.S. and Soviet warhead levels during the Eisenhower Administration………43 Figure 3. U.S. and Soviet warhead levels during the Kennedy Administration…………66 Figure 4. U.S. and Soviet warhead levels under Stalin and Malenkov…………………123 Figure 5. U.S. and Soviet warhead levels under Khrushchev…………………………..132 Figure 6. U.S. and Soviet warhead levels under Brezhnev……………………………..142 Figure 7. U.S. and Soviet warhead levels during the 1980s……………………………153 Figure 8. Chinese retaliatory ICBM forces, 2018………………………………………183 Figure 9. U.S. SLBM warheads needed to destroy a doubled Chinese mobile ICBM force………………………………………...186 Tables Table 1. Observable implications of mutual vulnerability……………………………….17 Table 2. Major strategic assessments during the Truman Administration……………….26 Table 3. Major strategic assessments during the Eisenhower Administration…………..45 Table 4. Major strategic assessments during the Kennedy Administration…………...…68 Table 5. Parameters of U.S. forces……………………………………………………..175 Table 6. Parameters of mobile Chinese assets (base case)……………………………..178 Table 7. Parameters of stationary Chinese assets (base case)…………………………..179 vi Acknowledgements This dissertation is the product of a communal effort, and thus I would like to draw attention to the criticality of several individuals. First and foremost I must thank my advisor, Chris Chyba, without whom this project would not have been possible. Chris was beyond exceptional as a mentor in this process. In addition to providing an immense amount of analytical clarity to my work, he both challenged and elevated my approach to nuclear issues throughout my time as a graduate student. Most importantly I am grateful for the value that Chris persistently saw in this project and in my skills as a scholar. His generosity of commitment and devotion to the dual crafts of research and teaching will affect my perspective for years to come, and likely much, much longer. The guidance of Aaron Friedberg was also invaluable. I want to thank him for the theoretical rigor he infused into this project, for teaching me how to ask big questions, and for mentoring my security studies training. To Tom Christensen’s credit I know more about deterrence now than I ever thought I would (or wanted to?), and I appreciate the repeated turning of his incisive focus to my research. I am also indebted to Mike Chase, whose insights I can only hope one day to approximate in quality and elegance; I thank him for working with me, from D.C. to New York! To my bosses’ bosses – Ann Lengyel, Karen McGuinness, Nancy Burnett, Geralyn McDermott, Cindy Ernst, and Grace Cooper – thank you for keeping me in line both academically and administratively and for your patience with my many questions. To my colleagues at the Program on Science and Global Security, thank you for welcoming this analyst (and perhaps advocate!) of the “dark side” into your cohort, I am a more thoughtful thinker (that was not a typo) because of the time I spent in your company. To Roger vii Molander and Dave Mosher, thank you for passing along the “nuclear albatross,” it turns out that the answer to the question, “nuclear war, what’s in it for you?” remains quite elusive! I also wish to recognize several institutions for providing generous financial support for this work, including the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, the Stanton Foundation, and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Last but quite the opposite of least is my family, whose confidence in my abilities never wavered along the way, even when my own did. To my mother Suze, and my father Tom, thank you for instilling in me the drive and courage to pursue something big(ger than myself), and for giving me so many opportunities to do so. I endured this process in large part due to your infinite levels of unconditional love and support (not to mention your strategically-located home!). To my sisters, Bevin and Abaigeal, I would not have gotten far (and still won’t!) without your companionship and attention to what matters. To my husband Jamie, the completion of this dissertation is equally your triumph. The central reason why I have my doctorate is because you created the space in our life for me to pursue this passion, and without hesitation. I thank you deeply for being my greatest champion and my perfect partner. To our beautiful son Trevor, thank you for bringing so much entertainment to this endeavor and for allowing me this extracurricular activity, for my most important and fulfilling purpose is being your mother. viii Chapter 1: Introduction Do nuclear-armed rivals perceive conditions of “mutual vulnerability” to be inescapable? Two states enter into such a situation when an exchange between their nuclear capabilities would cause extraordinary damage to both sides. Typically this occurs when neither state can guarantee a successful disarming attack against the nuclear forces of the other under likely conflict conditions.1 In general there are two types of approaches to mutual vulnerability that nuclear rivals can take over the long term. On the one hand, a state can accept that such a balance would likely endure, and seek only
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