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Under Eisenhower, Strategic Airpower Became the Centerpiece of US Military Strategy. the “New Look”

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Under Eisenhower, Strategic Airpower Became the Centerpiece of US Military Strategy. the “New Look” Under Eisenhower, strategic airpower became the centerpiece of US military strategy. The “New Look” URING the early 1950s, the DEisenhower Administration ushered in what came to be called the “New Look” in US strategic affairs. It was a major transition, one that pushed strategic airpower—and thus the United States Air Force—to the fore- front of the nation’s Cold War de- fense policies. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, World War II’s Supreme Commander, Al- lied Expeditionary Force, had won the 1952 Presidential election and took office in early 1953, just as the trauma of the Korean War was headed toward an armistice. The hard-fought Early in his presidency, Dwight Eisenhower speaks with Boeing officials and war marked a major turning point in members of his Cabinet after inspecting the YB-52 prototype of the B-52 bomber. US security affairs. Its aftermath To his left are George Humphrey, secretary of the treasury, and Harold Talbott, would see a rise in the importance of Secretary of the Air Force. Eisenhower’s “New Look” defense policy bolstered a large nuclear deterrent force. the airpower cause and placed more emphasis on Strategic Air Command. The Korean War had sparked a huge US buildup, and there would the parts, balance, and composition By Herman S. Wolk be no going back to the status quo of this force. The emphasis would be ante. Unlike in other postwar peri- on countering Soviet power and gen- ods, the US did not dismantle its eral war. Korea had generated a military strength. strong distaste for regional conflict. The US had repeatedly slashed its post-World War II force. On the eve Investing in Airpower of the Korean War, which erupted The result of the Eisenhower re- June 25, 1950, its size had bottomed view was the emergence of a deeper out at fewer than 1.5 million airmen, dependence on nuclear weapons and soldiers, sailors, and Marines. The long-range airpower to deter war. Communist attack jolted the US into Eisenhower chose not to maintain a new buildup. Within a year, Amer- all of the very large Army and Navy ica had 3.3 million troops under arms, that had fought the Korean War. He and the wartime force peaked in 1953 chose, rather, to invest more heavily at more than 3.6 million. Between in airpower, especially Strategic Air the end of the Korean War in 1953 Command, in large part because that and the start of the Vietnam War kind of defense could be built for buildup in 1965, US end strength lower cost. The planned USAF build- never fell below 2.5 million and av- up to 143 wings had been imperiled eraged 2.8 million in any given year. by the Truman Administration’s fi- Under Eisenhower, however, there nal fiscal plan, which provided was to be a major re-examination of USAF less money than expected. 80 AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2003 Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, argued that the pro- posed funding would support only 79 wings. “Once again the growth of Ameri- can airpower is threatened with start- and-stop planning and at a time when we face an enemy who has more modern jet fighters than we have and enough long-range bombers to at- tack this country in a sudden all-out effort. Rather than reduce our ef- forts to attain air superiority, we should now increase those efforts,” said Vandenberg. In 1953, the experience of the Korean War was uppermost in the minds of Eisenhower Administra- tion officials. Coming on the heels of World War II, this first conflict of the nuclear era was enormously The B-47 Stratojet could could carry either conventional or nuclear bombs. It unpopular with the American pub- was a major element in the New Look policy, which called for a national lic. airpower force superior to that of any other nation in the world. American policy-makers had little doubt that the Soviet Union was be- reliance on airpower was appropri- Chairman. After a tour of the war hind the war and that it might well ate. theater, the group headed home consider making a move in western In June 1952, the Air Force Coun- aboard USS Helena. Secretary of Europe. The idea that the Soviet cil, representing the top echelon of State-designate John Foster Dulles Union could tie down US forces in the Air Staff, took a position offi- and George M. Humphrey, soon to out-of-the-way locales fueled im- cially supporting long-range air- become secretary of the treasury, mense frustration in Washington. power as the major deterrent to So- came aboard at Guam. Moreover, the fact that the Russians viet military power. In the summer At this meeting, Eisenhower em- now possessed nuclear weapons gave of 1952, Secretary of the Air Force phasized that the United States impetus to the US military buildup Thomas K. Finletter, Gen. Nathan F. needed to maintain a strong de- that Truman had launched in mid- Twining, vice chief of staff (in lieu fense posture that would see to the 1950. of Vandenberg, who was recuperat- security of the nation “for the long The New Look evolved throughout ing from cancer surgery), Roswell haul” while also staying within the 1953 and was geared to stave off an L. Gilpatric, undersecretary of the bounds of fiscal prudence. Radford open-ended commitment of US forces Air Force, and Lt. Gen. Laurence S. said US forces were overextended, worldwide, one that could drain the Kuter, deputy chief of staff for per- especially in Asia; he called for nation’s resources. The idea was that sonnel, convened at Finletter’s home the creation of a “mobile strategic the US would be the one to decide in Bar Harbor, Maine, where they reserve” of US conventional forces how and where any future wars would discussed future Air Force strategy. whose prime purpose would be to be fought. Here was a strategy that, in back up local, indigenous allies in the words of Secretary of State John “The New Phase” regional wars. Dulles, for his part, Foster Dulles, would allow the nation These officials drafted a paper was in favor of building up mas- to retaliate against Communist ag- titled, “The New Phase,” which re- sive strategic nuclear retaliatory gression “by means and at places of ferred to preparations to initiate the power capable of striking at the our own choosing.” 143-wing program. For the New sources of Communist power. The emphasis was to be on nuclear Phase, the conferees proposed the This rudimentary New Look mili- deterrence. The way to keep the peace establishment of a standing nuclear tary policy evolved considerably in was to persuade a potential enemy deterrent force. Subsequently, the the summer of 1953. The Adminis- not to start a war. This shift in em- Air Staff recommended that the JCS tration undertook Project Solarium, phasis from land and sea power to make a request to NATO’s Standing crafted by the top echelon of the airpower also owed a great deal to Group to designate the strategic air Eisenhower team during a series of the Administration’s fiscal conser- offensive as a crucial function of secretive meetings (held in the White vatism, meaning the desire to main- NATO strategy. House solarium). In June, military tain a balanced federal budget and After the November 1952 elec- and civilian officials conferred at lower tax rates. tion, Eisenhower left for a trip to the National War College and the In the early 1950s, the Joint Chiefs Korea. He took along Charles E. incoming JCS team also met to dis- of Staff developed the view that Wilson, who was to become the next cuss policy options. It was no secret hostility between the West and the Secretary of Defense, and linked up that the Administration was com- Soviet Union would continue in- on Iwo Jima with Adm. Arthur W. mitted, as Eisenhower emphasized, definitely and that, consequently, a Radford, who was to become JCS “to make a completely new, fresh AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2003 81 survey of our military capability, in binger of decreasing missions and force by maintaining a strong security pos- the light of our global commitments.” structures for their own services. ture, with emphasis on adequate of- In July, Eisenhower directed Wil- Eisenhower insisted that the new fensive retaliatory strength and de- son to get the Chiefs working on a emphasis on strategic retaliatory power fensive strength. This must be based comprehensive defense review. This did not mean a diminution of the im- on massive atomic capability includ- reassessment, the President empha- portance of other missions and forces, ing necessary bases; an integrated sized, should include strategic con- particularly those of the Army and and effective continental defensive cepts and implementing plans, roles Navy. Moreover, the President noted, system; ready forces of the United and missions, composition of forces, the new program could not be put into States and its allies suitably deployed readiness of forces, development of place quickly. It would take time. and adequate to deter or initially new weapons, the resulting advances On one thing, however, the Presi- counter aggression and to discharge in tactics, and foreign military assis- dent was firm, and he said it in this required initial tasks in the event of tance programs. way: “No deterrent to war could com- a general war; and an adequate mo- Eisenhower declared, “I have in pare in importance with this [strategic bilization base; all supported by the mind elimination of overlapping in nuclear] retaliatory striking power.” determined spirit of the US people.” operations and administration and Dulles agreed that it would take This stated objective posture marked the urgent need for a really austere many years to fully implement the a significant change from the post- basis in military preparations and significant changes in policy and World War II containment doctrine operations.” The President wanted force structure that would be required which emphasized countermoves to provide guidance to the National by the New Look, but he added, “If against Soviet power at the place of Security Council so as “to ensure the we do not decide now on this change, aggression.
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