Under Eisenhower, strategic airpower became the centerpiece of US . The “”

URING the early 1950s, the DEisenhower Administration ushered in what came to be called the “New Look” in US strategic affairs. It was a major transition, one that pushed strategic airpower—and thus the Air Force—to the fore- front of the nation’s de- fense policies. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, World War II’s Supreme Commander, Al- lied Expeditionary Force, had won the 1952 Presidential election and took office in early 1953, just as the trauma of the was headed toward an armistice. The hard-fought Early in his presidency, Dwight Eisenhower speaks with Boeing officials and war marked a major turning point in members of his Cabinet after inspecting the YB-52 prototype of the B-52 bomber. US security affairs. Its aftermath To his left are George Humphrey, secretary of the treasury, and Harold Talbott, would see a rise in the importance of Secretary of the Air Force. Eisenhower’s “New Look” defense policy bolstered a large nuclear deterrent force. the airpower cause and placed more emphasis on . The Korean War had sparked a huge US buildup, and there would the parts, balance, and composition By Herman S. Wolk be no going back to the status quo of this force. The emphasis would be ante. Unlike in other postwar peri- on countering Soviet power and gen- ods, the US did not dismantle its eral war. Korea had generated a military strength. strong distaste for regional conflict. The US had repeatedly slashed its post-World War II force. On the eve Investing in Airpower of the Korean War, which erupted The result of the Eisenhower re- June 25, 1950, its size had bottomed view was the emergence of a deeper out at fewer than 1.5 million airmen, dependence on nuclear weapons and soldiers, sailors, and Marines. The long-range airpower to deter war. Communist attack jolted the US into Eisenhower chose not to maintain a new buildup. Within a year, Amer- all of the very large Army and Navy ica had 3.3 million troops under arms, that had fought the Korean War. He and the wartime force peaked in 1953 chose, rather, to invest more heavily at more than 3.6 million. Between in airpower, especially Strategic Air the end of the Korean War in 1953 Command, in large part because that and the start of the Vietnam War kind of defense could be built for buildup in 1965, US end strength lower cost. The planned USAF build- never fell below 2.5 million and av- up to 143 wings had been imperiled eraged 2.8 million in any given year. by the Truman Administration’s fi- Under Eisenhower, however, there nal fiscal plan, which provided was to be a major re-examination of USAF less money than expected.

80 AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2003 Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, argued that the pro- posed funding would support only 79 wings. “Once again the growth of Ameri- can airpower is threatened with start- and-stop planning and at a time when we face an enemy who has more modern jet fighters than we have and enough long-range bombers to at- tack this country in a sudden all-out effort. Rather than reduce our ef- forts to attain air superiority, we should now increase those efforts,” said Vandenberg. In 1953, the experience of the Korean War was uppermost in the minds of Eisenhower Administra- tion officials. Coming on the heels of World War II, this first conflict of the nuclear era was enormously The B-47 Stratojet could could carry either conventional or nuclear bombs. It unpopular with the American pub- was a major element in the New Look policy, which called for a national lic. airpower force superior to that of any other nation in the world. American policy-makers had little doubt that the was be- reliance on airpower was appropri- Chairman. After a tour of the war hind the war and that it might well ate. theater, the group headed home consider making a move in western In June 1952, the Air Force Coun- aboard USS Helena. Secretary of Europe. The idea that the Soviet cil, representing the top echelon of State-designate Union could tie down US forces in the Air Staff, took a position offi- and George M. Humphrey, soon to out-of-the-way locales fueled im- cially supporting long-range air- become secretary of the treasury, mense frustration in Washington. power as the major deterrent to So- came aboard at Guam. Moreover, the fact that the Russians viet military power. In the summer At this meeting, Eisenhower em- now possessed nuclear weapons gave of 1952, Secretary of the Air Force phasized that the United States impetus to the US military buildup Thomas K. Finletter, Gen. Nathan F. needed to maintain a strong de- that Truman had launched in mid- Twining, vice chief of staff (in lieu fense posture that would see to the 1950. of Vandenberg, who was recuperat- security of the nation “for the long The New Look evolved throughout ing from cancer surgery), Roswell haul” while also staying within the 1953 and was geared to stave off an L. Gilpatric, undersecretary of the bounds of fiscal prudence. Radford open-ended commitment of US forces Air Force, and Lt. Gen. Laurence S. said US forces were overextended, worldwide, one that could drain the Kuter, deputy chief of staff for per- especially in Asia; he called for nation’s resources. The idea was that sonnel, convened at Finletter’s home the creation of a “mobile strategic the US would be the one to decide in Bar Harbor, Maine, where they reserve” of US conventional forces how and where any future wars would discussed future Air Force strategy. whose prime purpose would be to be fought. Here was a strategy that, in back up local, indigenous allies in the words of Secretary of State John “The New Phase” regional wars. Dulles, for his part, Foster Dulles, would allow the nation These officials drafted a paper was in favor of building up mas- to retaliate against Communist ag- titled, “The New Phase,” which re- sive strategic nuclear retaliatory gression “by means and at places of ferred to preparations to initiate the power capable of striking at the our own choosing.” 143-wing program. For the New sources of Communist power. The emphasis was to be on nuclear Phase, the conferees proposed the This rudimentary New Look mili- deterrence. The way to keep the peace establishment of a standing nuclear tary policy evolved considerably in was to persuade a potential enemy deterrent force. Subsequently, the the summer of 1953. The Adminis- not to start a war. This shift in em- Air Staff recommended that the JCS tration undertook , phasis from land and sea power to make a request to NATO’s Standing crafted by the top echelon of the airpower also owed a great deal to Group to designate the strategic air Eisenhower team during a series of the Administration’s fiscal conser- offensive as a crucial function of secretive meetings (held in the White vatism, meaning the desire to main- NATO strategy. House solarium). In June, military tain a balanced federal budget and After the November 1952 elec- and civilian officials conferred at lower tax rates. tion, Eisenhower left for a trip to the National War College and the In the early 1950s, the Joint Chiefs Korea. He took along Charles E. incoming JCS team also met to dis- of Staff developed the view that Wilson, who was to become the next cuss policy options. It was no secret hostility between the West and the Secretary of Defense, and linked up that the Administration was com- Soviet Union would continue in- on Iwo Jima with Adm. Arthur W. mitted, as Eisenhower emphasized, definitely and that, consequently, a Radford, who was to become JCS “to make a completely new, fresh

AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2003 81 survey of our military capability, in binger of decreasing missions and force by maintaining a strong security pos- the light of our global commitments.” structures for their own services. ture, with emphasis on adequate of- In July, Eisenhower directed Wil- Eisenhower insisted that the new fensive retaliatory strength and de- son to get the Chiefs working on a emphasis on strategic retaliatory power fensive strength. This must be based comprehensive defense review. This did not mean a diminution of the im- on massive atomic capability includ- reassessment, the President empha- portance of other missions and forces, ing necessary bases; an integrated sized, should include strategic con- particularly those of the Army and and effective continental defensive cepts and implementing plans, roles Navy. Moreover, the President noted, system; ready forces of the United and missions, composition of forces, the new program could not be put into States and its allies suitably deployed readiness of forces, development of place quickly. It would take time. and adequate to deter or initially new weapons, the resulting advances On one thing, however, the Presi- counter aggression and to discharge in tactics, and foreign military assis- dent was firm, and he said it in this required initial tasks in the event of tance programs. way: “No deterrent to war could com- a general war; and an adequate mo- Eisenhower declared, “I have in pare in importance with this [strategic bilization base; all supported by the mind elimination of overlapping in nuclear] retaliatory striking power.” determined spirit of the US people.” operations and administration and Dulles agreed that it would take This stated objective posture marked the urgent need for a really austere many years to fully implement the a significant change from the post- basis in military preparations and significant changes in policy and World War II doctrine operations.” The President wanted force structure that would be required which emphasized countermoves to provide guidance to the National by the New Look, but he added, “If against Soviet power at the place of Security Council so as “to ensure the we do not decide now on this change, aggression. Deterrence and retalia- defense of our country for the long no change will ever occur.” tion were at the heart of the New haul.” NSC 162/2, taking into account Look strategy, and it would hinge the scope and magnitude of the So- upon strategic nuclear weapons and Contentious Days viet military threat, stated, “The continental defense. Naval power The bureaucratic foundation of the United States must meet the neces- also would have a prominent place. New Look was soon laid down in sary costs of the policies essential Ground forces were to play a less- NSC 162/2, a document approved by for its security.” Since the outbreak prominent role. In the wake of the Eisenhower on Oct. 30, 1953. How- of war in Korea, a coalition of allies, Korean War, the New Look postu- ever, high-level meetings leading to with US help, had deterred addi- lated that, in limited wars overseas, the final approval of that document tional Communist aggression. The the United States would depend on had been marked by contentiousness. North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies to provide most ground forces, The man chosen by Eisenhower as now maintained sufficient strength in addition to bases for American the new Chief of Naval Operations, to make a Soviet move against west- airpower and expeditionary forces. Adm. Robert B. Carney, opposed the ern Europe costly. However, the stra- plan. So did the new Army Chief of tegic retaliatory power of the United Eisenhower’s Threat Staff, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway. States remained the major deterrent. Despite the unease in some quar- These service leaders and others per- “The risk of Soviet aggression,” ters, the Joint Chiefs on Dec. 9, 1953, ceived the new document to be a har- said NSC 162/2, “will be minimized formally declared that “policies stated in NSC 162/2 will adequately pro- vide for the security of the US.” At about the same time, Eisenhower as- serted that it was his firm intention to dispatch SAC nuclear retaliatory forces “immediately upon trustwor- thy evidence of a general attack against the West.” Meanwhile, SAC was building up to a force unmatched in striking power. By the close of 1953, SAC had fully equipped 11 of the 17 wings in the atomic strike force. The bomber force included 329 B-47s and 185 B-36s. These aircraft were supported by 137 RB-136s, 500 tankers, and more than 200 fighters. Strategic Air Command personnel numbered al- most 160,000 at 29 Stateside and 10 overseas bases. In December 1953, Radford, the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. Nathan Twining is sworn in as Chief of Staff by Secretary of the Air Force Talbott in 1953. Looking on are (left to right) Col. K.E. Thiebaud, air adjutant stated that the new defense policy general, and USAF’s just-retired Chief, Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg. Twining in 1952 was crafted for the “long pull, not a argued for creation of a standing nuclear deterrent force. year of crisis.” The United States,

82 AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2003 Radford said, “must be ready for tremendous, vast, retaliatory, and counteroffensive blows in the event of a global war, and we must be ready for lesser military actions short of an all-out war.” By late 1953, Radford had become convinced that the top priority should be accorded to airpower. The nation should give its strongest effort, he said, to “the creation, the maintenance, and the exploitation of modern air- power—offensively, defensively, and in support of other forces.” Airpower, he said, “is a primary requirement.” On Jan. 12, 1954, Dulles gave public definition to the Administra- tion’s New Look. His “Massive Re- taliation” speech, delivered to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, warned that the Soviet Union Charles Wilson, Secretary of Defense and Adm. Arthur Radford, Chairman of the planned “gradually to divide and (shown here in 1955), were instrumental in crafting the New weaken the free nations by overex- Look strategy. Radford, especially, was an airpower advocate. tending them.” It was important not to exhaust the armed forces in nu- ated “on honorable terms.” It was the US—certainly foreshadowed the merous military actions. possible to do this, he went on, be- speech. Dulles argued that the unclear US cause the enemy in early 1953 “faced The Korean War finale, with its security policies in previous years the possibility that the fighting might, implied American threat to employ meant US military leaders “could to his own great peril, soon spread atomic weapons—propelled the United not be selective” in building Ameri- beyond the limits and methods which States into an era of strategic nuclear can forces. he had selected.” The Communists deterrence. The Dulles doctrine of “If an enemy could pick his time had been warned that now a response massive retaliation solidified the Air and place and method of warfare,” to aggression “would not necessar- Force as the lead service in the New said the secretary of state, “and if ily be confined to Korea.” Look defense policy. our policy was to remain the tradi- Dulles figured that in the long run, President Eisenhower himself tional one of meeting aggression by strategic nuclear deterrence offered sketched the contours of the New direct and local opposition, then we the best way for the United States to Look doctrine, and he said the mis- needed to be ready to fight in the deal with the threat of Communist sion of the military was to “get ready Arctic and in the tropics; in Asia, the aggression. His formulation was this: and stay ready.” It was, he added, a Near East and in Europe; by sea, by “Local defenses must be reinforced kind of “floating D-Day” strategy. land, and by air; with old weapons by the further deterrent of massive JCS Chairman Radford, who since and with new weapons.” retaliatory power.” And President the 1949 B-36 hearings and the Re- Eisenhower emphasized: “We shall volt of the Admirals had turned him- Security—At Reasonable Prices not be aggressors, but we and our self into an airpower apostle, in late No local defense, Dulles main- allies have and will maintain a mas- 1953 stated: “This nation will main- tained, could, by itself, contain Com- sive capability to strike back.” This tain a national airpower superior to munist land forces. Consequently, pronouncement was aimed directly that of any other nation in the world.” the Administration would “depend at the Soviet Union and . Twining, who had succeeded Van- primarily upon a great capacity to As a concept, “massive retalia- denberg as Air Force Chief of Staff, retaliate instantly, by means and at tion” was not entirely new. The described the New Look as a strat- places of our choosing. ... Instead of buildup in strategic airpower since egy of “preparedness for general war, having to try to be ready to meet the 1950 and the evolution of the “Air should one occur, and maintenance enemy’s many choices, ... it is now Concept” had been obscured by the of the capability to cope with lesser possible to get, and share, more ba- fighting in Korea and the periodic situations.” sic security at less cost.” calls for “balanced forces.” More- And Gen. Thomas D. White, Air Dulles believed that Korea offered over, Dulles’s communication to Force vice chief of staff, noting that an example for the future. There, he China via New Delhi—intimating a airpower took advantage of the nation’s said, a cease-fire had been negoti- potential use of nuclear weapons by technical skill, emphasized that with its ability to deliver nuclear weapons, Herman S. Wolk is senior historian in the Air Force History Support Office. He the Air Force “had been recognized as is the author of The Struggle for Air Force Independence, 1943-1947 (1997) an instrument of national policy.” and a coauthor of Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United Korea may have militarized the States Air Force (1997). His most recent article for Air Force Magazine, Cold War, but the New Look launched “Decision at Casablanca,” appeared in the January issue. the US fully into it. ■

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