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Eisenhower and the Gaither Report: the Influence of a Committee of Experts on National Security Policy in the Late 19501

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Eisenhower and the Gaither Report: the Influence of a Committee of Experts on National Security Policy in the Late 19501 Eisenhower and the Gaither Report: The Influence of a Committee of Experts on National Security Policy in the Late 19501 David Lindsey Snead Richmond, Virginia B.A., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Univenity, 1990 M.A., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Uuivenity, 1991 A Dissertation presented to the Graduate Faculty of the Univenity of Virginia in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of History Univenity of Virginia January 1997 ii (c) Copyright by David Lindsey Snead All Rights Reserved January 1997 iii Eisenhower and the Gaither Report: The Influence of a Committee of Experts on National Security Policy in the Late 19505 by David Lindsey Snead Melvyn P. Leffler, Chairman (ABSTRACT) As the United States reeled from the Soviet Union's launch of Sputnik in late 1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower received a top secret report prepared by a committee of leading scientific, business, and military experts. The panel, called the Gaither committee in recognition of its first chairman, H. Rowan Gaither, Jr., emphasized both the inadequacy of U.S. defense measures designed to protect the civil population and the vulnerability of the country's strategic nuclear forces in the event of a Soviet attack. The Gaither committee viewed these defense measures--ranging from a missile system to defend the continental United States to the construction of shelters to protect the population from radioactive fallout-and the maintenance of sufficient strategic forces to launch military strikes against Soviet targets as essential for the preservation of U.S. security. It concluded that in the case of a surprise Soviet nuclear attack the United States would be unable to defend itselfwith any degree of success. The committee emphasized the urgent need for the Eisenhower administration to strengthen the country's continental and civil defenses and to accelerate the development of its strategic striking power. iv This study examines the history of the Gaither committee: Why was it created? What were the backgrounds of its members? What evidence did it examine in performing its study? Why did it reach the conclusions it did? How influential was it on the Eisenhower administration? This manuscript illuminates the significance of the Gaither committee in shaping changes in Eisenhower's national security policies and in the development of President Kennedy's. It demonstrates that Eisenhower followed a consistent set of values and used an established decision making system to evaluate the Gaither committee's findings and to make changes in his national security policies. It reveals that Eisenhower sought the assistance of experts from a variety of professions to supplement the advice he received from his official advisers. Finally, it shows that the Gaither committee reached its conclusions based as much on the preconceptions of its members as on the evidence it examined. v Acknowledgments As with any study of this magnitude, I am deeply indebted to many individuals for their assistance. The staffs of the Alderman Library at the University ofVrrginia, the Eisenhower Library, the Library of Congress, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Archives, the National Archives, and the United States Military Academy Archives provided invaluable assistance in my research visits. In particular, I would like to thank Tom Branigar, Dawn Crumpler, and Helen Samuels. Various scholars provided assistance and support at various stages of this project. lowe great deal to my close friend and compatriot, Robert Hopkins, for his great knowledge of intelligence operations in the 1950s. Robert Bowie, Gregg Herken, and Robert Watson provided insight into specific areas of the manuscript. Brian Balogh, Nelson Lichtenstein, and Allen Lynch served as readers on my dissertation committee and offered invaluable advice that helped sharpen my arguments. Last, but not least, Melvyn Lefller guided this entire project with the precision and alacrity with which he is well known. I cannot begin to thank him enough. I would also like to thank the Eisenhower Library for the award of travel grant which allowed me to make an extra research trip to its wonderful facility in Abilene, Kansas. I would like to thank my family and friends who supported me throughout this study. Lynn and Parker Fretwell and Keith and Cindy Patterson provided unsurpassed friendships through many trying times. D.C. and Carolyn Hughes followed this project closely and offered tremendous encouragement. My brothers and sister--Rucker, Billy, vi Mac, and Lynne-constantly supported my efforts to complete this study. I cannot express the appreciation I have for my mom, Marilyn Snead, nearly enough. She provided financial support, and more importantly, love and encouragement. Finally, my wife, Lori, endured many long years of study and research trips. She supported me on the many nights and weekends when I had to work. She provided financial support to our family as I pursued this study. She proved to be an invaluable critic of my work as she read page after page about the Gaither committee. For all of assistance, I am deeply grateful. Without her love, support, and patience, this manuscript would have never been completed. vii Table of Contents Abstract ill Acknowledgments v Introduction 1 Chapter I - Eisenhower's Core Values and Decision 18 Making Systems Chapter 2 - The Establishment and Background of 71 the Gaither Committee Chapter 3 - 1957: A Year ofTunnoil 119 Chapter 4 - The Activities and Conclusions of the 149 Gaither Committee Chapter 5 - The Influence of the Gaither Report on the 203 Eisenhower Administration in 1958 Chapter 6 - The Legacy of the Gaither Committee 248 Conclusion 281 Bibliography 297 1 Introduction Coming off a landslide victory over Adlai Stevenson in the November 1956 elec- tion, President Dwight D. Eisenhower began his second administration seemingly posed to continue the policies of his first term. Ironically, however. 1957 would become one of the longest and most difficult years of his presidency. Over the course of the year, he strug- gled with congressional cuts to his defense budget. faced a racial crisis over segregation in Little Rock, saw the Soviet Union launch the first satellite into space, and observed the country sinking into a recession. The results were dramatic. In less than a year his popu- larity in the polls had fallen over twenty percentage points. 1 The crises Eisenhower faced at the end of 1957 can be traced to both domestic and foreign policy issues. Without underemphasizing the widespread disenchantment with Eisenhower's handling of race relations and the economy, the concern of most Americans in late 1957 lay elsewhere. For the first time, the Soviet Union had made a significant technological advancement ahead of the Unittd States. On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union shocked the world with the launch of Sputnik. Coupled with the Kremlin's earlier claim of a successful test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the launch of - Sputnik II on November 3, and the embarrassing failure of the United States Vanguard rocket in December, the Soviet satellite represented a clear challenge to U.S. technological superiority. More importantly, it raised the possibility that the Soviet Union might be able to launch a surprise nuclear attack against the United States using this new missile tech- I In February 1957. a Gallup Poll revealed that 79 percent of those polled supported Eisenhower. By March 1958. only 52 percent supported Eisenhower. See Chester J. Pach. Jr., and Elmo Richardson. The Presidency ofDwight D. Eisenhower, revised edition (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991), 175. 2 nology. Eisenhower's attempts to minimize the implications of the Soviet accomplish- ments only inflated fears as many Americans assumed he was trying to conceal U.S. mili- tary weaknesses. 2 In the midst of this uproar, Eisenhower received a top secret report prepared by a blue ribbon committee ofleading scientific, engineering, economic, and military experts. The panel, called the Gaither committee in recognition of its first chairman, H. Rowan Gaither, Jr., emphasized both the inadequacy of U.S. defense measures designed to pro- teet the civil population and the vulnerability of the country's strategic nuclear forces in the event of a Soviet attack. The Gaither committee members viewed these defense measures-ranging from a missile system to defend the continental United States to the construction of shelters to proteet the population from radioactive fallout-and the mainte- nance of sufficient strategic forces to launch military strikes against Soviet targets as es- sential for the preservation of U.S. security. They concluded that in the case ofa surprise Soviet nuclear attack the United States would be unable to defend itself with any degree of success. The report emphasized the urgent need for the Eisenhower administration to strengthen the country's continental and civil defenses and to accelerate the development of its strategic striking power. It stressed that the United States either had to respond immediately to the expanding Soviet military capabilities or face potentially grave conse- quences. 2 For U.S. reaction to SPutnik. see Robert A. Divine. The Sputnik Challenge (New York: Oxford Uni­ versity Press. 1993); and Walter A. McDougall, ... the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History ofthe Space Age (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1985). 3 The Gaither committee recommended that the United States reduce the vulnerabil- ity of its strategic forces, strengthen and enlarge its nuclear ballistic missile capabilities, improve the ability of the armed forces to wage limited military operations, reorganize the Department of Defense, and construct failout shelters to protect the civilian population. These recommendations would cost $44.2 billion spread between 1959 and 1963. The price was high, but the committee concluded that the costs for not instituting them would be higher yet--the possible subjugation of the United States to the Soviet Union. It stressed that, "The next two years seem to us critical.
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