and his Spies Skyin the Eisenhower, Fearing a Surprise Soviet Attack, Pushed for Better Intelligence, Approved U­2 Flights

By David Haight

s Supreme Allied Commander in in World It was important to pierce the Soviets’ curtain of A II, Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered one of , but information about their capabili­ the biggest surprise attacks in world history—the D­ ties was proving elusive to the techniques of tradi­ day landing on the coast of on June 6, 1944, tional . which marked the beginning of the end for the Ger­ Records in the holdings of the Eisenhower Presi­ man Third Reich. But before making the final decision dential Library in Abilene, Kansas, reveal how the 34th to launch the attack, he wanted the best intelligence President dealt with his desire for quality intelligence available, and he got it. about the Soviets’ military activities while balancing Nearly a decade later, as President of the United the risks involved in getting that information against States, Eisenhower was still concerned about surprise those of setting off a full­scale war with the former attacks—but this time he was worried about a Pearl World War II ally. Harbor–style attack on the by a nuclear­ Balancing those risks presented him with a armed . And again, Eisenhower wanted dilemma, as depicted by the record of the 157th meet­ the best available intelligence. But getting it and man­ ing of the Council on July 31, 1953, aging it proved to be more difficult than it had been just over six months after he took office. the decade before. The director of the Central Intelligence Agency,Allen Eisenhower understood that knowledge based on Dulles, reported that the Soviet Union had recently reliable intelligence is power and that the Soviet developed a new heavy with an estimated Union posed a grave threat to America’s security. He range of 6,000 miles and capable of reaching any point knew that the Soviets were testing nuclear weapons in the United States and returning to the USSR.At this and developing long­range to deliver them. same meeting, Gen. Omar Bradley, chairman of the

14 Prologue Winer 2009 President Dwight D. Eisenhower appreciated the importance of aerial intelligence­ gathering. U­ 2 aircraft (opposite page) began flying over the USSR in 1956.

Title Prologue 15 , briefed the President Nevertheless, through varying levels of 1953, included an expansion of U.S. intel­ and the council on the loss of a U.S. Air archival processing and researcher­gener­ ligence collection and analysis. Force plane, an RB­50, in the Sea of Japan. ated declassification requests, a large vol­ The President placed top priority on The ensuing discussion revealed that the ume of the historical record of Eisen­ this, and to drive home a sense of urgency, United States also shot down Russian planes hower’s management and employment of he told the military service chiefs in late that approached U.S. ships too closely.The intelligence has been made available to 1954 that for the first time the United President said that both the Americans and researchers at the Eisenhower Library. States had reason to be frightened for its the Russians knew that if U.S. planes flew Anyone familiar with 20th­centur y safety because an enemy armed with the toward Vladivostok, they were not on train­ records is aware that declassifying intel­ new (nuclear) weapons could knock out ing missions. As Eisenhower said, this shoot­ ligence information is often difficult and the nation within 30 days. down was not as unprovoked as it might time consuming. Despite the fact that cer­ Eisenhower authorized aerial intelligence­ have seemed. In this case, the former five­ tain intelligence­related documents in the collecting programs in order to better assess star general could see the matter from the library are likely to remain security clas­ the military capability of the Soviet Union, Soviet viewpoint and appeared to play it sified for years to come, significant , and other Communist­bloc nations to down not only to avoid public discussion of progress has been achieved in releasing launch a surprise attack on the United States. sensitive intelligence operations but also to information on many intelligence topics. He approved overflights of the Soviet Union avoid domestic to retaliate against The declassified records, in their original by in a highly compartmen­ the Soviets. context, are dependent upon historians talized intelligence program labeled Were these aerial missions worth the to give narrative perspective to their SENSINT (Sensitive Intelligence).Despite the risk, loss, and expense invested in them? archival existence. risks of Soviet retaliation,U.S. military aircraft Many writers have attempted to answer flew directly over the Soviet territory from • • • this question by studying the available evi­ early 1954 until late 1956. dence. These f lights were hidden in a To counter the menace of Soviet mili­ The U.S. developed balloons cloak of secrecy, and even now many tary might, the Eisenhower administration equipped with cameras and f lew them details are unclear either because of con­ developed a strategic posture policy, over Soviet bloc countries under the guise tinuing security protection or because of known as the “New Look.” This basic of meteorological research. The the lack of written documentation. national security policy, approved in late program, which Eisenhower approved with misgivings in 1955, yielded more protests from the Kremlin than it did use­ ful intelligence information. Eisenhower ordered balloon f lights over Russia stopped in 1956, but various schemes for launching balloons floated as late as 1958. When the President at Geneva in 1955 sought Soviet agreement to a mutual exchange of military information with the United States, First Secretary of the Com­ munist Party Nikita Khrushchev and the Soviet delegation rejected his initiative. Eisenhower, therefore, relied on covert or black operations, emphasizing overhead intelligence collection as a major part of the United States’ effort to meet this threat of surprise attack. Meanwhile, in 1956, U­2 aircraft began f lying over the Soviet Union. Unlike the SENSINT program, the U­2 program was directed by the CIA, a civilian agency, and piloted by civilians. Eisenhower, while real­ izing the provocative nature of military air­ craft f lown by military personnel over or James R. Killian, being sworn in here as special assistant to the President for science and technology, was a around the Soviet Union, continued key adviser to the President on organizing and developing U.S. intelligence capabilities to warn of a possible throughout his administration to approve Soviet surprise attack.

16 Prologue Winter 2009 dangers posed by aircraft flying over and advice and oversight on U.S. intelligence around the Soviet Union. programs. In creating the board, the Presi­ Although Killian and Land helped con­ dent sought advice from selected citizens vince the President to embark on many with experience in government service, sci­ technologically advanced programs, the ence and technology, or other executive man primarily responsible for assisting the responsibilities. Eisenhower picked Killian President manage these programs was as the first chairman of PBCFIA, which also Andrew Jackson Goodpaster. included World War II hero Gen. James Upon assuming the post of White House Doolittle, another of the President’s key staff secretary in the fall of 1954, Colonel advisers on intelligence. Goodpaster served as the President’s liaison While Eisenhower continued to use aer­ with the executive agencies responsible for ial reconnaissance to acquire strategic intel­ intelligence, military, and international ligence aimed at reducing the threat of a affairs. He was the President’s “go­to” man, Soviet surprise attack on the United States, Andrew Goodpaster,White House staff secretary, was the person Eisenhower counted on to help he endeavored, with only limited success, to the President’s right­hand man in managing overhead oversee the implement the PBCFIA’s recommendations intelligence collection programs. programs. His records contain a treasure for better administrative control of these trove of documentation pertaining to high­ diverse intelligence operations. missions conducted on the periphery of altitude balloons, the U­2 aircraft and its mis­ On August 22, 1956, the Chinese shot the Soviet Union and mainland China. sions, other aerial missions flown along the down a Navy plane in the Sea of Japan, These flights, begun under President periphery of the USSR, and plans for the resulting in the loss of the entire 16­man Harry S. Truman, increased tensions development of reconnaissance . crew. In an August 30 meeting with Adm. between the United States and the Soviet In November 1954, the President acted Arthur Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs Union and led to many attacks on these on one of the TCP proposals by approving of Staff, Eisenhower, the man who had planes with the loss of planes and person­ funding for“thirty special high performance ordered tens of thousands of men to storm nel. Nevertheless, Eisenhower permitted aircraft”as described by Goodpaster’s mem­ the beaches of Normandy, talked not about such missions to collect communications orandum of a conference with the Presi­ the lost personnel but instead about the fail­ and electronic intelligence and photograph dent. The first successful mission of these ure of the involved U.S. agencies to develop Soviet air and naval facilities while ferreting “special high performance aircraft,” also a cover plan for such situations. He went on out the Soviet radar systems. known as the U­2, flew over the Soviet to state his concern over the apparent lack The Eisenhower administration’s over­ Union in July 1956. From the outset of the of control by the military agencies of such head intelligence, or aerial reconnaissance, U­2 missions, Soviet radar spotted the missions, but after further discussion, he programs were inspired in large part by the planes.This vulnerability spurred the devel­ agreed to allow further missions provided recommendations of James R. Killian, presi­ opment of another TCP panel proposal, the they were done with great care and follow­ dent of Massachusetts Institute of Technol­ reconnaissance . ing strict requirements.Thus we see a Presi­ ogy, and Edwin “Din” Land, president of In February 1958, Eisenhower officially dent concerned over tight control, manage­ Polaroid Corporation, both serving on the approved the program code­named ment, and plausible cover for provocative President’s Technological Capabilities Panel CORONA, which eventually produced intelligence­gathering missions. (TCP), appointed by the President in 1954. photographic images taken in outer space In October 1957 the PBCFIA affirmed The panel, with Killian as chairman and and recovered from satellite capsules. its support of overhead reconnaissance Land an active member, conducted an efforts because of their potential for col­ • • • extensive study of the surprise attack prob­ lecting valuable intelligence on Soviet mil­ lem and passed on to the President recom­ Many U.S. government civilian and mili­ itary facilities, including missile­launching mendations concerning intelligence collec­ tary agencies collected intelligence on the sites and air bases. At the same time, the tion. The TCP described the periphery of Soviet Union and other potential adver­ PBCFIA conveyed to the President the the Soviet Union as a fruitful area for col­ saries during the years of intense Cold War urgent need to expedite reconnaissance lecting intelligence. In addition to recom­ activities. Eisenhower attempted through­ satellite development. mending risky aerial reconnaissance flights, out his administration to establish better On February 7, 1958, Killian and Land the TCP also pointed out the intelligence control and coordination of these agen­ briefed the President on reconnaissance potential of reconnaissance satellites. More­ cies’ intelligence activities. satellite activities. Since 1956 the Air Force over, the panel saw space­based satellite In 1956 he established the President’s had conducted plans to design and build operations as a way to establish the legal Board of Consultants on Foreign Intel­ reconnaissance satellites under a program right to operate in space while avoiding the ligence Activities (PBCFIA) to provide termed WS (Weapons System) 117L. At

Ike and His Spies in the Sky Prologue 17 this meeting the President agreed that a which will be employed in the operation reporting on the progress of DISCOV­ plan for film recovery be separated from of space vehicles. . . .The initial launchings ERER. In reality, however, they were actu­ the WS 117L in expectation of acquiring primarily will be to test the vehicle itself, ally covering for the highly secret Project intelligence data sooner. especially its propulsion and guidance. CORONA. This cover plan succeeded in The administration established the Ad­ Later, the satellites will contain biomed­ hiding CORONA from public or Soviet vanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) ical specimens to seek data on environ­ scrutiny until 1995, more than a quarter­ within the Department of Defense, which mental conditions which will be useful to century after Eisenhower’s death, when would run the military aspects of the satel­ the man­in­space program being carried the United States officially acknowledged lite recovery program, but ARPA would be out jointly by ARPA and the National Aero­ its existence. answerable to the CIA because the Presi­ nautics and Space Administration. As part • • • dent insisted on civilian control and tight of this program, live animals also will be Until reconnaissance satellites could secrecy for this program. Goodpaster made carried aloft and their recovery become operational, however, the admin­ sure that Killian and Land understood the attempted in order to develop the tech­ istration felt compelled to rely on the President’s intention that the CIA would niques involved. provocative peripheral and overflight mis­ direct the intelligence phases of the pro­ sions to collect data on Soviet air and mis­ gram, which Eisenhower formally approved A memorandum anticipating press sile bases and to seek evidence of any on April 21 as Project CORONA. inquiries listed a number of questions and Soviet war preparations. By 1958 the press was speculating pub­ the answers to be given. Question #1 “Is From the time the first U­2 f light licly concerning reconnaissance aspects of the Discoverer a ?” appeared over the Soviet Union in July the WS 117L program. To avoid this The answer to be given was “No.” Other 1956, the Soviets tracked almost ever y unwanted public scrutiny, the administra­ questions and recommended answers mission, particularly those f lown west of tion separated this new black or covert were designed to steer media inquiry the Urals. In a December 16, 1958, meet­ satellite program from WS 117L.The admin­ away from any connection with military ing with the President’s Foreign Intell­ istration hid it by concocting a biomedical programs involving reconnaissance satel­ igence Advisory Board, Eisenhower reit­ space research project termed DISCOV­ lites (WS 117L). erated the one question that mattered:“Is ERER. The Department of Defense guidance (Eisenhower, in his insistence on the intelligence which we receive from for responding to public inquiries concern­ secrecy for space­based intelligence pro­ this source [overf lights] worth the exac­ ing the DISCOVERER satellite launchings grams, undoubtedly agreed with Winston erbation of international tensions which contained the following language: Churchill’s statement to Joseph Stalin at results?” the Tehran Conference in November Eisenhower believed the f lights had The purpose of ARPA’s PROJECT DIS­ 1943, “Truth deserves a bodyguard of located adequate targets for intelligence COVERER is to continue development of lies.”) collection. But he also realized that the U­2 a number of systems and techniques ARPA generated numerous documents f lights did not solve the problem of sur­ prise attack. The PBCFIA, after hearing the President express his concerns, concluded that the intelligence thus obtained was worthwhile and recommended that the f lights continue. The President continued to worr y about international tensions and retained firm control, saying “yea” or “nay” over each proposed f light. Goodpaster’s mem­ oranda recorded these affirmative and negative presidential actions, each inf lu­

President Eisenhower holds an American flag taken from the capsule recovered from Discoverer XIII.This capsule, although not containing the KH­1 camera, was a trial run for Discoverer XIV launched on August 18, 1960, which contained the camera and collected the first photographic images recovered from a U.S. recon­ naissance satellite. Shown with the President are Dud­ ley C. Sharp; Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates; and Gen.Thomas White,August 15, 1960.

18 Prologue Winter 2009 Memorandum for the Record by Andrew Goodpaster recording the President’s Image of Mys Shmida airfield, USSR, CORONA mission 9009 (Discoverer XIV).This approval of Project CORONA. was the first successful recovery of imagery taken by a reconnaissance satellite. enced by the current international situa­ on January 17, 1961? flights to collect intelligence to the maxi­ tion. For example, on March 4, 1959, with At any rate, politicians such as Missouri mum degree possible, the President the Berlin situation heating up, Good­ Senator , a former secretary pointed out the “soul­searching” he paster recorded: of the Air Force who was running for Presi­ engaged in when he considered approval dent in 1960, raised allegations of a “missile for each flight. Gen. John Hull, chairman of At the President’s request, I advised Gen­ gap,” claiming the United States was falling the board, pointed out that a recent flight eral [Nathan] Twining [chairman of the behind the Soviet Union in missile produc­ disclosed military deployments that gave Joint Chiefs of Staff] that the President has tion and deployment. Information from the no sign of a slackening off of Soviet mili­ decided to disapprove any additional spe­ risky U­2 missions, however, helped confirm tary power as might have been suggested cial flights by the U­2 in the present abnor­ Eisenhower’s judgment that the so­called by the “spirit of .” (The Eisen­ mally tense circumstances. “missile gap” did not exist and allowed him hower­Khrushchev conversations at to more readily resist calls for massive Camp David in September 1959 had In a February 10, 1959, meeting, the increases in military spending that might encouraged hope in some quarters that President expressed hope in technological have accelerated a U.S.­Soviet arms race. tensions between the United States and advancements including the CORONA Throughout the spring and summer of the USSR might be easing.) project as well as the more advanced 1959, the President continued to express Eisenhower responded that while he plane, the SR­71. He continued to listen to concern over the risks of continuing these knew of no “spirit of Camp David,” these Killian and Land on such matters as the reconnaissance flights and to worry over talks had been a frank and respectful dis­ monitoring of Soviet missile firings and Soviet reactions to them. In a July 8, 1959, cussion of key issues and accomplished a the progress of CORONA. meeting with Secretary of State Christian mutual recognition by Eisenhower and Throughout the February 10 meeting, the Herter, CIA Director , and Khrushchev that it was critically impor­ President demonstrated his interest in Richard Bissell, the CIA’s deputy director tant to avoid general war. Eisenhower obtaining as much information on the Soviet for plans, he asked “whether we are get­ viewed the data on soviet missile sites he missiles as possible and also in details of mis­ ting to the point where we must decide if had seen as corroborating what sile production and acceleration. He also we are trying to prepare to fight a war or Khrushchev had told him at Camp David. commented on leaks by “irresponsible offi­ to prevent one.” Nevertheless, because of While Hull and the board continued to cials and demagogues.” He remarked that the unanimous recommendations by his focus on the intelligence value of over­ some senators seemed to be responsible for advisers, the President agreed to the flight f lights, the President said that he was the leaks, while at the same time munitions under consideration at that time. putting on the line his one in a sum­ makers were striving to get more contracts One of the best examples of the Presi­ mit meeting: his reputation for honesty. If and appeared to be exerting undue influ­ dent’s agonizing over these overf lights is one of these aircraft was lost while the ence over these senators. Did the President a memorandum for the record document­ United States was engaged in apparently sin­ have this kind of thing in mind when he ing his meeting with his PBCFIA on Feb­ cere deliberations, it could be put on display made his famous reference to the “military­ ruary 2, 1960. in Moscow and ruin the President’s effec­ industrial complex” in his farewell address As the board pushed for using over­ tiveness as a negotiator. Nevertheless, the

Ike and His Spies in the Sky Prologue 19 One might ask why the President sent a U­2 mission over the USSR only two weeks before the Paris summit conference. Eisen­ hower apparently accepted the need for as much data as possible on Soviet interconti­ nental ballistic missile deployment before talking to the Soviets at the Paris confer­ ence. He also knew of indications that the Soviets were about to develop the capabil­ ity to shoot down a U­2.Therefore the Pres­ ident appears to have believed that he had good intelligence on the Soviets’ military capabilities and intentions, but there was just enough doubt in his mind to motivate him to seek more. Although he knew the CORONA project was making progress, it still, as of May 1960, had not achieved suc­ cess. In fact, the first 12 DISCOVERER mis­ sions were failures. So he did not know when CORONA would produce the intelli­ gence he sought. Eisenhower lamented the results of the U­2 affair, and in a July 11, 1960, meeting dealing primarily with Cuba, he remarked that all of his advisers, including Secretary of State , missed badly on their estimates regarding the interna­ tional impact resulting from a U­2 failure. Eisenhower did not want to say “I told you so” but recalled he was the only one who had heavily weighted this aspect of these operations. The President had reason to be frus­ trated. The CIA had advised him that it was On March 31, 1959, the CIA sent the White House an intelligence note about possible ICBM launching sites highly unlikely that the Soviets could track in the Urals. U­2 f lights. In fact, almost from the begin­ board members insisted on continuing the ers. It was brought down, apparently by a ning, Soviet radar picked up and tracked overf lights while hoping that the SR­71, missile that damaged but did not destroy these flights.The CIA had also assured the much less vulnerable to tracking and the plane, thus enabling Powers to para­ President that it was almost a certainty attack than was the U­2, would soon be chute safely. Power’s plane was also appar­ that no pilot would survive a shootdown operational. ently the only plane downed deep within of a U­2 aircraft.Yet the Soviets captured The overflights continued, and on April the Soviet Union. Powers alive. 25, 1960, Goodpaster wrote a brief one­ The Soviets captured Powers and put Eisenhower vowed not to send U­2 paragraph memorandum stating: “After what was claimed to be the wreckage of his planes over the Soviet Union any more. checking with the President, I informed plane on display.The international furor cre­ This did not, however, mean the cessation Mr. Bissell that one additional operation ated by this incident forced Khrushchev, of all U.S. aerial reconnaissance programs [U­2 overflight of the USSR] may be under­ probably under pressure himself in the conducted on the periphery of the Soviet taken, provided it is carried out prior to Kremlin, to make demands on Eisenhower Union and other Communist territories. May 1. No operation is to be carried out at the beginning of the Paris summit confer­ On July 1, 1960—the day the Soviets shot after May 1.” ence on May 16, 1960. Khrushchev, not down a U.S. RB­47 plane conducting As is well known, that operation carried receiving the apologetic response from reconnaissance in the Barents Sea along out on May 1 was the U­2 f light over the Eisenhower he demanded, then walked out, the northern coast of the USSR—the Pres­ Soviet Union piloted by Francis Gary Pow­ effectively wrecking the summit. ident received a briefing on the status of

20 Prologue Winter 2009 these aerial peripheral reconnaissance to insure that the f lights are no more Bolstered by the success of CORONA missions. provocative than necessary.” Mission 9009, the President continued to The record of this briefing, a seven­page work on improving the U.S. government’s • • • memorandum, is currently partially declas­ intelligence collecting and analysis to the sified, with sizeable portions remaining The CORONA satellite reconnaissance end of his administration.In December1960, classified. Nevertheless, enough has been program experienced many failures before he received a report by the Joint Committee released to provide numerous details on Mission 9009, launched on August 18, on Foreign Intelligence Activities (often units, locations of missions, and their com­ 1960, resulted in the first successful recov­ called the Kirkpatrick report since Lyman mon purpose: to collect communications ery of satellite images taken of Soviet Kirkpatrick was the committee chairman). intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelli­ bases.These first images produced photo­ This report,declassified in part,made numer­ gence (ELINT), and photography.After this graphic coverage of the Mys Shmida air­ ous recommendations, some of which led to briefing, Eisenhower approved General field in extreme northeast Siberia. the eventual establishment of the National Twining’s request to resume these COMINT Thus, late in his administration, after hav­ Reconnaissance Office and the Defense Intel­ and ELINT collecting missions. The mem­ ing experienced a sharp deterioration in rela­ ligence Agency during the Kennedy admin­ orandum of this conversation points out tions with the Soviet Union following the istration. British performance of similar missions Soviets’ capture of Powers and his aircraft, The 473rd and 474th meetings of the and also mentions the concept of Soviet Eisenhower received a positive intelligence National Security Council on December and even Swedish fighters “pacing” these related accomplishment: readable imagery 28, 1960, and January 5, 1961, respectively, .While recognizing from a satellite orbiting the Earth in outer were devoted largely to discussing this the risks involved with these peripheral space. The first images were primitive and report’s recommendations. During the missions, the President insisted that they limited in information but indicated promises 474th meeting of the NSC, Eisenhower were legal. General Twining assured the of better things to come.This indeed was the expressed disappointment at his inability President that “great care would be taken case as the CORONA program lasted until to achieve the coordination within the U.S. 1972, with the quality of its imagery improv­ government’s intelligence community for Below: Maps of U­2 routes over Soviet missile areas ing with each successful mission. handling, using, and sharing intelligence and Ural railroad system, March 1959.

Ike and His Spies in the Sky Prologue 21 that he wanted to see. He therefore in frus­ 1972, when they were replaced with more supported Eisenhower’s conclusion that the tration commented that he would leave to advanced systems. CORONA and its suc­ United States possessed more long­range his successor “a legacy of ashes.” cessors have provided U.S. Presidents with missiles than did the Soviet Union and thus Eisenhower’s assessment of his efforts, accurate intelligence on the Soviet Union no missile gap existed.As Cargill Hall, emer­ however, seems too harsh. With the suc­ and China. itus chief historian of the National Recon­ cess of the CORONA missions at the end of Reconnaissance satellites were, in the naissance Office, has concluded, the Presi­ his administration, the President left a 1970s, recognized internationally as the dent, through his reconnaissance programs, legacy of technological advancement in means for policing international arms con­ particularly CORONA, had indeed achieved space­based intelligence collection. Impro­ trol agreements. Even the intelligence col­ his goal of opening the skies over the Soviet ved versions of CORONA were used until lected through the U­2 and other aircraft Union and China. P

NOTE ON SOURCES

The author wishes to express his appreciation The role of the President’s Board of Consultants on ings (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, for the assistance provided by Chalsea Millner, Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA) in advising the National Reconnaissance Office, 2003).This sympo­ Michelle Kopfer,Tim Rives, and Kathy Struss of the President is documented in a body of folders under that sium was held at the Defense Intelligence Agency on Eisenhower Library staff and professor Judith board’s name in the Records of the White House Office February 22–23, 2001. Collins, Kansas State University, Salina. of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs as Other important secondary sources consulted The Records of White House Staff Secretary well as in some of Goodpaster’s memoranda of con­ include Michael Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Andrew Goodpaster constitute the most impor­ ferences with the President. These files contain the Khrushchev, and the U­2 Affair (New York: Harper tant source of documentation of the Eisenhower semiannual reports for the President prepared by PBC­ and Row, 1986); Richard M. Bissell, Jr., with Jonathan administration’s overhead intelligence­collecting FIA chairmen James Killian and his successor, John Hull. E. Lewis and Frances T. Pudlo, Reflections of a Cold programs.A file consisting of 20 folders entitled The Eisenhower Library therefore holds a reasonably Warrior ( New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, “Intelligence Matters” begins with material dated good declassified record of the recommendations 1996); Stephen Ambrose and Richard Immerman, December 1955 and continues through the end of passed on to the President by this high­level advisory Ike’s Spies: Eisenhower and the Intelligence Com­ the administration. Found here are memoranda of body, although portions remain security classified as of munity (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981); and Wil­ conferences with the President, and with James 2009. liam E. Burrows, By Any Means Necessary: Amer­ Killian,Allen Dulles, Richard Bissell, Edwin Land, As for secondary sources, Cargill Hall, former histo­ ica’s Secret Air War in the Cold War (New York: Nathan Twining, and many others involved in rian for the National Reconnaissance Office,has written Farrar, Straus and Giraux, 2001). these programs.This documentation covers bal­ numerous articles on the Eisenhower administration’s To encourage research in intelligence documents loons, U­2 missions, peripheral missions, data on overhead intelligence programs,which were the source at the Eisenhower Library, the archival staff devel­ intelligence targets within the Soviet Union, plans of information on the SENSINT programs approved oped an exercise intended to introduce participants and authorizations for the CORONA reconnais­ early in the Eisenhower administration before Good­ to high­level primary sources documenting Presi­ sance satellite program including developing paster became staff secretary.The library holds little on dent Eisenhower’s acquisition of aerial intelligence cover for this black operation, and a few items on these early aerial reconnaissance programs conducted capabilities. This exercise consists of a packet of the Galactic Radiation and Background (GRAB) from 1954 to 1956. Examples of Hall’s writings include selected documents spanning the period from electronic reconnaissance satellite (referenced in “The Truth About Overflights,”The Quarterly Journal November 1954 until September 1960 plus a glos­ Goodpaster’s records as Project CANES).This satel­ of , 9 (Spring 1997);“Origins of U.S. sary of terms, lists of key individuals, and suggested lite, intended to collect electronic intelligence Space Policy: Eisenhower, Open Skies, and Freedom of sources for background reading.This activity con­ from Soviet radars, was successfully launched on Space,” in John Logsdon et al., eds. Exploring the sists of reading and analyzing the packet of intelli­ June 22, 1960, two months before the first suc­ Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the gence documents and can be modified to fit groups cessful CORONA launch. However, CORONA pro­ U.S. Civil Space Program, Vol. I: Organizing for Explo­ ranging from secondary school classes to U.S gov­ duced the first photographic images from a recon­ ration (Washington, DC: NASA Sp­04407, 1995);“The ernment intelligence analysts. Unlike the Five Star naissance satellite. Portions of Goodpaster’s rich Eisenhower Administration and the Cold War: Framing Leaders Program, conducted largely by the Eisen­ intelligence file remain security classified as of American Astronautics to Serve National Security,”Pro­ hower Library’s Education Specialist, this intelli­ 2009. logue: Quarterly Journal of the National Archives, 27 gence document exercise is conducted entirely by In addition to the “Intelligence Matters” file, (Spring, 1995);“Postwar Strategic Reconnaissance and the library’s archives staff. the White House Staff Secretary Records contain the Genesis of Corona” in Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logs­ For further information about this exercise or other memoranda prepared or received by don, and Brian Latell, eds., Eye in the Sky: The Story of about documentation in the Eisenhower Library Goodpaster concerning intelligence including the Corona Spy Satellites (Washington, DC: Smithson­ relating to other intelligence topics, please con­ cover material for CORONA. As White House ian Institution, 1998); and “Clandestine Victory: Eisen­ tact the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library staff while staff secretary, Goodpaster prepared hundreds of hower and Overhead Reconnaissance in the Cold War,” also examining the Eisenhower Library’s web site memoranda of conferences with the President. in Dennis E. Showalter, ed., Forging the Shield: Eisen­ at www.eisenhower.archives.gov. Many of his memoranda pertaining to the sensi­ hower and National Security for the 21st Century tive intelligence matters covered in this article (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 2005). Gregory Pedlow are found only in the Intelligence file cited and Donald Welzenbach co­authored an official CIA his­ Author above. Most others of his memoranda, including tory entitled The CIA and the U­2 Program, some on intelligence can be found within 1954–1974 (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of David Haight was an archivist Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Papers as President Intelligence,Central Intelligence Agency,1998).An essen­ at the Eisenhower Library for tial source for studying the history of the CORONA pro­ (Ann Whitman File), particularly the ACW Diary 37 years before retiring in gram is Kevin C. Ruffner, ed., CORONA: America’s First Series and the DDE Diary Series. The Ann Whit­ August 2008. He continues to man File contains the richly detailed memoranda Satellite Program, Washington, DC: Government Print­ assist the library as a volunteer in security­ of National Security Council meetings. Certain ing Office,1995).Another key source is the two­volume intelligence­related portions remain security publication edited by R. Cargill Hall and Clayton D. Lau­ declassification matters and with other activ­ classified as of 2009. rie, Early Cold War Overflights: Symposium Proceed­ ities as needed.

22 Prologue Winter 2009