Ike and his Spies Skyin the Eisenhower, Fearing a Surprise Soviet Attack, Pushed for Better Intelligence, Approved U­2 Flights By David Haight s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe in World It was important to pierce the Soviets’ curtain of A War II, Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered one of secrecy, but information about their military capabili­ the biggest surprise attacks in world history—the D­ ties was proving elusive to the techniques of tradi­ day landing on the coast of France on June 6, 1944, tional espionage. which marked the beginning of the end for the Ger­ Records in the holdings of the Eisenhower Presi­ man Third Reich. But before making the final decision dential Library in Abilene, Kansas, reveal how the 34th to launch the attack, he wanted the best intelligence President dealt with his desire for quality intelligence available, and he got it. about the Soviets’ military activities while balancing Nearly a decade later, as President of the United the risks involved in getting that information against States, Eisenhower was still concerned about surprise those of setting off a full­scale war with the former attacks—but this time he was worried about a Pearl World War II ally. Harbor–style attack on the United States by a nuclear­ Balancing those risks presented him with a armed Soviet Union. And again, Eisenhower wanted dilemma, as depicted by the record of the 157th meet­ the best available intelligence. But getting it and man­ ing of the National Security Council on July 31, 1953, aging it proved to be more difficult than it had been just over six months after he took office. the decade before. The director of the Central Intelligence Agency,Allen Eisenhower understood that knowledge based on Dulles, reported that the Soviet Union had recently reliable intelligence is power and that the Soviet developed a new heavy bomber with an estimated Union posed a grave threat to America’s security. He range of 6,000 miles and capable of reaching any point knew that the Soviets were testing nuclear weapons in the United States and returning to the USSR.At this and developing long­range bombers to deliver them. same meeting, Gen. Omar Bradley, chairman of the 14 Prologue Winer 2009 President Dwight D. Eisenhower appreciated the importance of aerial intelligence­ gathering. U­ 2 reconnaissance aircraft (opposite page) began flying over the USSR in 1956. Title Prologue 15 Joint Chiefs of Staff, briefed the President Nevertheless, through varying levels of 1953, included an expansion of U.S. intel­ and the council on the loss of a U.S. Air archival processing and researcher­gener­ ligence collection and analysis. Force plane, an RB­50, in the Sea of Japan. ated declassification requests, a large vol­ The President placed top priority on The ensuing discussion revealed that the ume of the historical record of Eisen­ this, and to drive home a sense of urgency, United States also shot down Russian planes hower’s management and employment of he told the military service chiefs in late that approached U.S. ships too closely.The intelligence has been made available to 1954 that for the first time the United President said that both the Americans and researchers at the Eisenhower Library. States had reason to be frightened for its the Russians knew that if U.S. planes flew Anyone familiar with 20th­centur y safety because an enemy armed with the toward Vladivostok, they were not on train­ records is aware that declassifying intel­ new (nuclear) weapons could knock out ing missions. As Eisenhower said, this shoot­ ligence information is often difficult and the nation within 30 days. down was not as unprovoked as it might time consuming. Despite the fact that cer­ Eisenhower authorized aerial intelligence­ have seemed. In this case, the former five­ tain intelligence­related documents in the collecting programs in order to better assess star general could see the matter from the library are likely to remain security clas­ the military capability of the Soviet Union, Soviet viewpoint and appeared to play it sified for years to come, significant China, and other Communist­bloc nations to down not only to avoid public discussion of progress has been achieved in releasing launch a surprise attack on the United States. sensitive intelligence operations but also to information on many intelligence topics. He approved overflights of the Soviet Union avoid domestic pressure to retaliate against The declassified records, in their original by military aircraft in a highly compartmen­ the Soviets. context, are dependent upon historians talized intelligence program labeled Were these aerial missions worth the to give narrative perspective to their SENSINT (Sensitive Intelligence).Despite the risk, loss, and expense invested in them? archival existence. risks of Soviet retaliation,U.S. military aircraft Many writers have attempted to answer flew directly over the Soviet territory from • • • this question by studying the available evi­ early 1954 until late 1956. dence. These f lights were hidden in a To counter the menace of Soviet mili­ The U.S. Air Force developed balloons cloak of secrecy, and even now many tary might, the Eisenhower administration equipped with cameras and f lew them details are unclear either because of con­ developed a strategic posture policy, over Soviet bloc countries under the guise tinuing security protection or because of known as the “New Look.” This basic of meteorological research. The balloon the lack of written documentation. national security policy, approved in late program, which Eisenhower approved with misgivings in 1955, yielded more protests from the Kremlin than it did use­ ful intelligence information. Eisenhower ordered balloon f lights over Russia stopped in 1956, but various schemes for launching balloons floated as late as 1958. When the President at Geneva in 1955 sought Soviet agreement to a mutual exchange of military information with the United States, First Secretary of the Com­ munist Party Nikita Khrushchev and the Soviet delegation rejected his initiative. Eisenhower, therefore, relied on covert or black operations, emphasizing overhead intelligence collection as a major part of the United States’ effort to meet this threat of surprise attack. Meanwhile, in 1956, U­2 aircraft began f lying over the Soviet Union. Unlike the SENSINT program, the U­2 program was directed by the CIA, a civilian agency, and piloted by civilians. Eisenhower, while real­ izing the provocative nature of military air­ craft f lown by military personnel over or James R. Killian, being sworn in here as special assistant to the President for science and technology, was a around the Soviet Union, continued key adviser to the President on organizing and developing U.S. intelligence capabilities to warn of a possible throughout his administration to approve Soviet surprise attack. 16 Prologue Winter 2009 dangers posed by aircraft flying over and advice and oversight on U.S. intelligence around the Soviet Union. programs. In creating the board, the Presi­ Although Killian and Land helped con­ dent sought advice from selected citizens vince the President to embark on many with experience in government service, sci­ technologically advanced programs, the ence and technology, or other executive man primarily responsible for assisting the responsibilities. Eisenhower picked Killian President manage these programs was as the first chairman of PBCFIA, which also Andrew Jackson Goodpaster. included World War II hero Gen. James Upon assuming the post of White House Doolittle, another of the President’s key staff secretary in the fall of 1954, Colonel advisers on intelligence. Goodpaster served as the President’s liaison While Eisenhower continued to use aer­ with the executive agencies responsible for ial reconnaissance to acquire strategic intel­ intelligence, military, and international ligence aimed at reducing the threat of a affairs. He was the President’s “go­to” man, Soviet surprise attack on the United States, Andrew Goodpaster,White House staff secretary, was the person Eisenhower counted on to help he endeavored, with only limited success, to the President’s right­hand man in managing overhead oversee the Cold War aerial reconnaissance implement the PBCFIA’s recommendations intelligence collection programs. programs. His records contain a treasure for better administrative control of these trove of documentation pertaining to high­ diverse intelligence operations. missions conducted on the periphery of altitude balloons, the U­2 aircraft and its mis­ On August 22, 1956, the Chinese shot the Soviet Union and mainland China. sions, other aerial missions flown along the down a Navy plane in the Sea of Japan, These flights, begun under President periphery of the USSR, and plans for the resulting in the loss of the entire 16­man Harry S. Truman, increased tensions development of reconnaissance satellites. crew. In an August 30 meeting with Adm. between the United States and the Soviet In November 1954, the President acted Arthur Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs Union and led to many attacks on these on one of the TCP proposals by approving of Staff, Eisenhower, the man who had planes with the loss of planes and person­ funding for“thirty special high performance ordered tens of thousands of men to storm nel. Nevertheless, Eisenhower permitted aircraft”as described by Goodpaster’s mem­ the beaches of Normandy, talked not about such missions to collect communications orandum of a conference with the Presi­ the lost personnel but instead about the fail­ and electronic intelligence and photograph dent. The first successful mission of these ure of the involved U.S. agencies to develop Soviet air and naval facilities while ferreting “special high performance aircraft,” also a cover plan for such situations. He went on out the Soviet radar systems. known as the U­2, flew over the Soviet to state his concern over the apparent lack The Eisenhower administration’s over­ Union in July 1956.