Cold War Under the Ice

WeissCold War Under the Ice Cold War Under the Ice: The Army’s Bid for a Long-Range Nuclear Role, 1959–1963 ✣ Erik D. Weiss ilitary preparations for the Cold War extended to even the most frigidM environments on earth. The Arctic holds both fascination and fear in its stark expanses and unforgiving climate. In the superpower contest, the harsh, icy wastelands of the north presented an intriguing, barren region that technology could seek to conquer. Although the new ability to harness nuclear energy revolutionized arctic research, the North Greenland ice cap also held more challenging options for U.S. Cold War strategists. Ice could be molded and carved. Ice tunnels could facilitate transport and offer seclusion, isolation, and a hidden presence. No weapon would have required more mo- bility and concealment than a system of intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) armed with nuclear warheads. The U.S. Army’s proposal to deploy “Iceworm” mobile IRBMs came to light in a recently declassiªed set of documents obtained by the Danish Insti- tute of International Affairs in connection with a larger study in 1997 on Greenland during the Cold War.1 Because scholars have not yet studied the Iceworm concept per se, this article seeks to place it within the context of the Cold War. Iceworm ªlled the perceived need for IRBM forces after the Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957, an event that threatened the United States and the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with destruction by intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and eroded European conªdence in NATO’s deterrent posture. It is interesting to note, however, that the U.S. Army proposed Iceworm at a time when the U.S. Navy’s Polaris submarine- 1. Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut, Grønland under den kolde krig: Dansk og amerikansk sikkerhedspolitik 1945–68 (Copenhagen: Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut, 1997). Documents relating to U.S.-Denmark relations and U.S. strategic planning in Denmark are compiled in this collection of primary sources used in the Danish Institute of International Affairs study of Greenland during the Cold War, (hereinafter referred to as Grønland under den kolde krig). For an English summary of that study, see Paul Villaume, Allied With Reservations: Denmark, NATO, and the Cold War (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1995). Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 3, No. 3, Fall 2001, pp. 31–58 © 2001 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 31 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/152039701750419501 by guest on 30 September 2021 Weiss launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and the U.S. Air Force’s Minuteman ICBMs were already on line. The Army’s proposal was motivated in large part by interservice rivalry, the competition for research and development funding, and the Army’s desire for a role in the U.S. long-range nuclear arsenal, which had come to occupy a dominant place in the U.S. military establishment under Dwight Eisenhower’s “New Look” policy.2 The Arctic as a Basing Area The Arctic regions held an important geographical position in the Cold War. Weather conditions prohibited the Arctic’s emergence as a populated area, but proximity to both North America and Eurasia made it a vital route for attack in either direction. Greenland, in particular, could serve as a well-situated half-way point for an assault on North America from Europe.3 When German forces occupied Denmark on 9 April 1940, the U.S. government became concerned about the security of Greenland. Although the United States accepted the continued sovereignty of Denmark over the island, U.S. ofªcials agreed to protect it, as stipulated in the April 1941 Agreement Relating to the Defense of Greenland, which “recognized that as a result of the present European war there is danger that Greenland may be converted into a point of aggression against nations of the American continent.”4 The air route to North America was too important to risk losing. In a note from U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull to Danish minister Henrik de Kauffmann, which accompanied the 1941 Agreement for the Defense of Greenland, Hull made clear U.S. concerns: “Greenland,” he wrote, “is within the area embraced by the Monroe Doctrine,” an area essential to the preserva- tion of U.S. continental security.5 Following the end of the war with Germany, the United States sought to acquire bases as close to the Soviet Union as possible, but in areas in which 2. On the concept of NATO IRBM deployments, see Philip Nash, “Jumping Jupiters: The U.S. Search for IRBM Host Countries in NATO, 1957–9,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Novem- ber 1995), pp. 753–786; Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957–1963 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); and David N. Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1983). For a thorough look at interservice rivalry in technological and weapons development, see Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York: Columbia Uni- versity, 1969). 3. William W. Jeffries, ed., Geography and National Power (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Insti- tute, 1962), pp. 173–174. 4. “Agreement Relating to the Defense of Greenland,” 9 April 1941, in Grønland under den kolde krig. 5. Ibid. 32 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/152039701750419501 by guest on 30 September 2021 Cold War Under the Ice political opposition to their use would be minimal. Along with Iceland, Greenland’s support of air and communication lines to Europe seemed to ªt this objective perfectly.6 Sovereignty over Greenland was a sensitive issue, however, and U.S. plans aroused Danish objections to a continued U.S. presence in Greenland. As soon as the war ended, the Danish government expressed interest in terminating the 1941 agreement. Of particular concern was the possibility that U.S. bases in Greenland and Iceland might give the Soviet Union an excuse to ob- tain base rights on the Danish island of Bornholm, which Soviet forces had occupied at the end of World War II.7 By April 1948 the Danish government was discouraging any proposals that would lead to a tighter military alliance with the United States. Eventually, though, the Danes agreed to continue dis- cussions without threat of terminating the treaty.8 Soon after the United States obtained basing rights, the question of stor- ing nuclear weapons in Greenland, particularly at the new Air Force base at Thule, was raised by both the Defense Department and the State Depart- ment. A Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) memorandum of December 1950 for the Secretary of Defense made mention of “the right for storage and stockpiling of supplies and material including ammunition and atomic explosives.”9 The Military Liaison Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission argued in January 1951 that diplomats should not seek the right to store nuclear weapons in Greenland since this would slow or even halt the process of securing other base requirements. The Secretary of Defense agreed, stressing to the JCS the need to avoid discussion of nuclear weapons with the Danes.10 The agreement signed on 27 April 1951, which renewed the 1941 Defense of Green- land treaty, made no mention of nuclear materials.11 6. Joint Strategic Plans Committee, “Military Requirements for Base Rights,” 23 March 1949, De- partment of the Air Force, Ofªce of the Secretary, Memorandum for the Acting Chief of Staff, 2 Oc- tober 1950, in Grønland under den kolde krig. 7. William C. Trimble, Department of State Memorandum of Conversation with Carl A. C. Brun and Povl Bang-Jensen, 15 October 1945, in Grønland under den kolde krig. 8. Josiah Marvel Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Denmark, Memorandum of Conversation, April 1948, in Grønland under den kolde krig. 9. Quoted in Memorandum of Robert LeBaron, Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission for General Burns, 5 January 1951, in Grønland under den kolde krig. 10. Memorandum of Robert LeBaron, Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commis- sion for General Burns, 5 January 1951, in Grønland under den kolde krig; Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on U.S. Requirements for Military Rights in NATO Countries, 15 January 1951, in Grønland under den kolde krig; and Secretary of Defense Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff with Regard to U.S. Requirements for Military Rights in NATO Countries and Selected Terri- tories, 11 January 1951, in Grønland under den kolde krig. 11. “Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, Concerning the Defense of Green- land,” 27 April 1951, in Grønland under den kolde krig. 33 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/152039701750419501 by guest on 30 September 2021 Weiss Once the 1951 agreement was in effect and the base at Thule was opera- tional, the absence of any clause prohibiting the storage of nuclear weapons in Greenland created a sense of opportunity among military planners. By mid-1957 concern arose at the State Department about the appropriate way to broach this issue with a Danish government that was reluctant to accept nuclear weapons on its territory. Although State Department ofªcials assured their counterparts at the Department of Defense (DoD) that the 1951 agreement was broad enough to permit “the use of such facilities in Greenland for the introduction and storage of such weapons,” the U.S. ambassador in Co- penhagen, Val Peterson, proposed asking the Danes whether they wished to be informed at all.

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