An Atmosphere of Growing Political and Societal Instability in Ukraine

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An Atmosphere of Growing Political and Societal Instability in Ukraine Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comment An Atmosphere of Growing Political and WP Societal Instability in Ukraine S Susan Stewart For some time now, both Ukrainians and foreign observers have been inquiring whether the time is right for a ‘Third Maidan’. The protests that took place on 17 October 2017 and in subsequent weeks were not the beginning of anything larger. Rather, they were initiated primarily by political actors and did not have the potential for mass mobili- zation. However, these protests convey important messages about the political and societal situation in the country. Against the backdrop of developments in recent years, they are a sign that the situation could heat up dangerously in the coming months. Four years on from the Euromaidan, the the milieu of these elites calls into question Ukrainian population has hardly benefited the reform progress accomplished thus far. from the reforms implemented so far. Elec- In addition, Ukrainians are still dying almost tricity and gas prices have increased con- daily in the Donbas. For all these reasons, siderably and, according to surveys, the dissatisfaction among the population is general social and economic situation has high. Even though many in the country rec- deteriorated rather than improved. There ognize that instability in Ukraine could are also no indications that those who easily be exploited by Russia, their patience plundered the country and violently at- with today’s elites has its limits. tacked Maidan protesters have been held accountable. While the ruling elite can point to significant progress on macro- Protests: not much stamina economic developments and relations with On 17 October 2017, several thousand pro- the EU, it is becoming increasingly clear testers marched in front of the Ukrainian that the fight against corruption stops when Parliament (Verkhovna Rada). They made it affects the key interests of political and three demands: the creation of an anti- economic leaders. This group includes the corruption court, electoral reform towards President, many ministers and influential a proportional representation system with parliamentarians, heads of key authorities, open party lists, and the abolition of parlia- as well as oligarchs and their confidants. mentary immunity. All these issues are at The inadequate fight against corruption in least indirectly related to the fight against Dr. Susan Stewart is a Senior Associate in the Eastern Europe and Eurasia Division at SWP SWP Comment 8 February 2018 1 corruption and have long been under dis- Politics: intrigue and weak decision- cussion. However, by 20 October, the total making number of protesters had fallen from around While the recent protests have not been 4,500 to only a few hundred, despite none key events for Ukraine, they have provided of the relevant laws having been adopted. important clues as to the political and soci- Two draft immunity bills were passed to etal situation in the country. Firstly, they the Constitutional Court for review and the show that many political forces are already first reading of legislation on changes to positioning themselves for the parliamen- the electoral system has now been adopted tary and presidential elections, which will by the Rada, although it is not yet binding. both take place in 2019. This not only ap- When President Poroshenko finally did table plies to Saakashvili but also to all political a draft bill on 22 December to establish an parties represented in parliament, to Presi- anti-corruption tribunal, it met with strong dent Petro Poroshenko and to other poten- criticism from some parts of Ukrainian civil tial presidential candidates. By and large, society. The President was accused of dis- Ukraine is currently experiencing a period regarding recommendations made by the of political intrigues in which forging tac- Venice Commission of the Council of Europe tical alliances and bartering deals are more when drafting the legislation and thus cre- important than political content and reform ating loopholes that would allow the court initiatives. to be controlled by political authorities. Secondly, the protests indicate a certain Respected civil society organizations (the fragmentation of opposition forces. Saakash- Reanimation Package of Reforms, the Anti- vili and his supporters, on the one hand, corruption Action Centre (AntAC) and the and civil society activists and reform-oriented Chesno movement) and some younger par- parliamentarians, on the other, do not liamentarians (including Mustafa Nayem always speak the same language. Saakash- and Yehor Sobolev) had called for the Octo- vili’s case is certainly special because of his ber protests. The former Georgian Presi- colourful personality, his past as the Presi- dent, Mikheil Saakashvili, and his Move- dent of Georgia and his outsider status in ment of New Forces also played a very the fabric of Ukrainian politics. However, prominent role. Saakashvili called for a law attempts by other Ukrainian oppositionists on impeachment and continued the protest to generate a common political approach after 19 October, although most protesters in order to play a stronger role both inside had already left the camp by then. Saakash- and outside Parliament have also been vili remained at the camp in front of the largely unsuccessful so far. This applies to Rada until the beginning of December. both the ‘Eurooptimists’ in the Rada and After a failed attempt by law enforcement the supporters of the ‘Demalliance’ party authorities to detain him there, he was which was intended to unite these new finally arrested on 8 December after mas- forces. sive clashes between his supporters and Thirdly, the methods chosen to deal with the police. He is currently being prosecuted Saakashvili (and the protest phenomenon for supporting a criminal organization. as a whole) reveal the difficulties and fears He allegedly received $500,000 from Serhii of today’s Ukrainian leadership, whose Kurchenko, a Ukrainian oligarch currently actions are often contradictory. On the one living in Russia and a supporter of former hand, top political figures are aware that President Viktor Yanukovych, to finance – harsh treatment of demonstrators could among other things - the Rada protests. provoke further protests. This is a lesson Saakashvili denies the allegations. His ap- from the Euromaidan that today’s leader- plication for political asylum in Ukraine ship has taken to heart. On the other hand, has been rejected but is subject to appeal. Poroshenko, in particular, is not willing to tolerate serious competition. Even Saakash- SWP Comment 8 February 2018 2 vili seems to belong to this category be- At the same time, concern and even cause - although he does not legally qualify anger over the lack of positive reform as a presidential candidate - he stirs up anti- results are becoming ever more pronounced Poroshenko sentiment among the popula- in society. Ukrainian citizens do not per- tion. So the leadership is not adhering to ceive any improvement in their daily lives a consistent line with regard to its political and are increasingly aware that top-level opponents: Even though Saakashvili has corruption is not being tackled sustainably. had his citizenship revoked, he has not In addition, fraudsters and proponents of been expelled for illegally entering the coun- violence from the Yanukovych era have not try and is allowed to organize opposition been held accountable because they have protests. Such inconsistency is typical of accomplices among the ruling elite protect- the way the government generally deals ing them from prosecution. The combina- with protest, as the economic blockades tion of a poor economic and social situation of the Crimea (autumn 2015) and the occu- and an elite that enriches itself at the ex- pied territories of the Donbas (early 2017) pense of the population can lead to serious have shown. In both cases, the government consequences for the Ukrainian state, espe- initially criticized the protests but ended cially since Russian actors are more than up adopting the protesters’ demands by willing to exploit any instability in the banning much of the trade between the country in order to further weaken Kyiv. occupied and unoccupied territories. This Despite the low number of participants testifies to a certain weakness with regard in recent protests, anti-corruption is a key to decision-making and, furthermore, calls issue for large sections of the Ukrainian the state’s monopoly on the use of force population, as are conflict resolution in the seriously into question because the coun- Donbas and socio-economic issues such as try’s leadership was unable to put an end inflation, unemployment, social protection, to the protests without accepting the pro- etc. Earlier protests, including the trade testers’ agenda. This is especially dangerous blockade mentioned above, have shown in circumstances where there are many that the Donbas situation is a sensitive topic. weapons in circulation and people are Social problems have not usually led to becoming increasingly accustomed to the such intense protests, and if they have, idea of using violence to resolve conflicts. then primarily within the context of a par- ticular profession, such as doctors or miners. However, the amalgamation of socio-eco- Increasing dissatisfaction among nomic difficulties, insufficient anti-corrup- the populace tion measures and continuing violence in The recent demonstrations and other events the Donbas can be dangerous, particularly have shown that the need to protest is not in a situation where politicians resort to particularly widespread among Ukrainian populist slogans to discredit their oppo- citizens at the moment. The opinion that nents and gain greater support for them- such demonstrations cannot effectively selves and their parties in the upcoming influence political decisions is quite preva- elections. lent. Furthermore, many citizens are un- willing to support political forces by par- ticipating in actions the latter have called Acknowledging and for. This was already to some extent the protecting society case during the Euromaidan.
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