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Home , Dmytro Bulatov, European Square (Kyiv), Government of Ukraine, Impeachment in Ukraine, Inna Bohoslovska, Kuchma Government

Graduate School of Social Sciences MSc Political Science – Track Master Thesis

The and the Revolution of Dignity in comparison Why some resistance movements turn violent, whereas others do not

Name: Brian Pieneman

Student ID: 10535365

Mail: [email protected]

Research Project: Violence, resistance and restraint in war and

Supervisor: Dr. Jana Krause

Second Reader: Dr. Dimitris Bouris

Submission Date: June 22, 2018

Words: 23,810 Abstract According to Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), movements are more successful in accomplishing political and social change than their violent counterparts. And yet, some nonviolent resistance movements turn to violent strategies in their endeavour to establish political and social change. This decision seems counterproductive and is worth studying. This thesis argues that mass mobilization is a double-edged sword – i.e. on the one hand, mass mobilization is required to accomplish the objectives of a nonviolent resistance movement, but mass mobilization appeals to people with different motives to participate in a nonviolent resistance movement, on the other hand. To elaborate this argument, the (nonviolent) and the (violent) Revolution of Dignity are extensively studied and compared. These case studies indicate that different motivations for participation in a nonviolent resistance movement can be problematic in case of a lack of leadership and unity within the resistance movement. ~ Nonviolence, Social Movements, Orange Revolution, Revolution of Dignity ~

Acknowledgements First and foremost, I would like to thank my thesis supervisor Dr. Jana Krause for her moral guidance and encouraging words during the thesis process. I admit that my process was far from flawless, it has been a true struggle and without the help of my supervisor I would, in all probability, not have been able to write this thesis and to submit this thesis today. Thank you very much for your never-ending efforts to keep me on track. Herzlichen Dank für ihre Mühe. I also grateful to Dr. Dimitris Bouris for the time and consideration he will put in reading my thesis as a second reader. I am happy to have such a well-known academic in the field of and Ukrainian affairs like Dr. Bouris as my second reader. I cannot leave without mentioning my fellow students, my fellow students contributed to a great in-class atmosphere that inspired me to work hard. I express my gratitude to my friends who encouraged me to keep on working, even during the night, and who have helped me with proofreading my thesis.

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Table of Contents The Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity in comparison ...... 1 1. Introduction ...... 4 2. Theoretical Framework ...... 7 § 2.1 Literature Review ...... 7 § 2.2 Literature Gaps ...... 9 § 2.3 Pattern of Violence ...... 9 § 2.4 Social Movement Theory ...... 13 § 2.4.1 Group identification ...... 15 § 2.4.2 Cognition ...... 16 § 2.4.3 Emotions ...... 17 § 2.4.4 Motivation ...... 18 3. Methodology ...... 21 § 3.1 Case studies ...... 21 § 3.2 Process tracing ...... 22 § 3.3 Discourse analysis ...... 22 § 3.4 Policy documents ...... 23 4. Case Studies ...... 23 § 4.1 The Orange Revolution ...... 23 § 4.1.1 Timeline ...... 24 § 4.1.2 Interviews with Participants in the Orange Revolution ...... 27 § 4.1.3 Focus group ...... 32 § 4.1.4 Speeches on Nezalezhnosti ...... 35 § 4.2 The Revolution of Dignity ...... 39 § 4.2.1 Timeline ...... 39 § 4.2.2 Focus Group, Interviews, and Surveys ...... 43 § 4.2.3 Speeches on ...... 46 5. Discussion ...... 54 § 5.1 Orange Revolution ...... 55 § 5.2 Revolution of Dignity ...... 56 § 5.3 The turn to violence ...... 57 6. Conclusion ...... 59 7. Bibliography ...... 61 § 7.1 Media Coverage Revolution of Dignity ...... 65

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1. Introduction Whereas some people attempt to adjust themselves to the circumstances that flow from a political or social system and others may envision a gradual change of this system, only a few are actually prepared to challenge either a political or social system, or both, in order to achieve change. This preparedness to bring about change is what could be considered resistance. Throughout space and time, people have challenged political systems and social systems alike in different ways through divergent methods. This challenging of either the political system or the social system, or both, could occur as both the performance of a single act – e.g. non- obedience to authorities – and a persistent campaign of . The ultimate objective of such a campaign is either to accomplish concessions of the political system and social system or, more drastically, regime change. As resistance, intrinsically, is an extensive concept, this thesis will explicitly focus on resistance movements that initially intended to accomplish political and social change or regime change through the use of nonviolent strategies. These nonviolent resistance movements are worth studying because Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) observe that nonviolent resistance movements are, in general, more successful in achieving their objectives than their violent counterparts. This observation leads to the inference that nonviolent resistance movements are more common than their violent counterparts and to the reasoning that it would be counterproductive for nonviolent resistance movements to resort to the use of violence. Nevertheless, there are numerous examples of nonviolent resistance movements that resorted to the use of violence in their strive to accomplish political and social change. An explanation for this change in strategy could be the decreasing effectiveness of nonviolent resistance methods. Chenoweth (2017: p. 89) does neither observe data that points to an increase of violent resistance nor to a greater effectiveness of violent strategies between 2010 and 2016; on the contrary, nonviolent resistance strategies prevail over violent strategies. Therefore, the research puzzle that is identified in this thesis is the decision of resistance movements to resort to violent means, whereas these resistance movements initially attempted to achieve political and social change through the use of nonviolent resistance methods. The decision to resort to violent means could be affected by different factors. These factors could, for example, be disagreement about the objectives of the resistance movement, discontent with the progress which is being made in achieving these objectives, and state repression. I will discuss two campaigns in order to develop a deeper and greater comprehension of the factors that are determinant in the decision of actors in a nonviolent

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resistance movement to resort to violent means. These campaigns are the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity in . Both were a series of protests which focused on rapprochement with the and the promotion of civil and human rights. These series of protests were given force through the mass mobilization of people who demonstrated in favour of these demands. The mass mobilization of people in such protests is, however, a double-edged sword – i.e. on the one hand mass mobilization is required to accomplish the objectives of a nonviolent resistance movement, but mass mobilization appeals to people with different motives to participate in a nonviolent resistance movement, on the other hand. These motives could differ to such an extent that the demands of the various collective and individual actors which participate in such a nonviolent resistance movement are incompatible and will eventually conflict. Such internal conflict in nonviolent resistance movements could be an indicator for the shift to violence of an initially nonviolent resistance movement. Thus, the topics that will be discussed in this thesis are, first and foremost, violence and nonviolence. Furthermore, this thesis will examine motivations for social mobilization and the diversity within resistance movements. These theoretical concepts will be studied in the cases of the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity. The objectives of this thesis, therefore, are to (1) identify the roles of various collective and individual actors within a nonviolent resistance movement, (2) to determine which factor(s) contributed to the decision of a nonviolent resistance movement to resort to the use of violence, and (3) to compare the presence of these factors in order to discover either the existence or the nonexistence of a pattern of factors which may be determinant for the decision to resort to the use of violence. The central question that is derived from these objectives is: “Why do nonviolent resistance movements turn violent?” This question can be divided in three subquestions. These questions are: “What collective and individual actors participate in a nonviolent resistance movement?”, “What kind of violence emerges when a movement turns violent?”, and “Why does violence emerge?” According to Cunningham (2013) and Butcher and Svensson (2016), nonviolent resistance movements require mass mobilization to achieve social change. I argue that mass mobilization causes dissent within a resistance movement. In other words: collective and individual actors that participate in a nonviolent resistance movement may have different motives to participate in this movement. Furthermore, these collective and individual actors may expect, or even demand, distinct objectives. Therefore, the leadership of a nonviolent resistance movement may be satisfied with the objectives achieved, while collective and individual actors that participated within the nonviolent resistance movement, are not satisfied with either the proposed or reached

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objectives, or both. This could lead to the decision of a part of the movement to resort to the use of violence in order to achieve different objectives. The central question of this thesis and the additional subquestions encompass a set of essential concepts that need to be defined first. Therefore, in the first section of this thesis, I will define concepts such as “violence” and “nonviolence”. These concepts are an essential component of the theoretical framework of this thesis. Furthermore, I will elaborate on four motivations for participation in a social movement. Moreover, this theoretical framework includes a literature review on the knowledge that is already gathered about these concepts and attempts to contribute to the understanding of the gaps that still exist in our understanding of these concepts. For example, the different roles of collective and individual actors in a nonviolent resistance movement. In the second section of the thesis, I will discuss the methods that are used in order to write this thesis. These methods include, inter alia, case studies and process tracing. The case studies that are examined and analyzed in this thesis are the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity. Besides case studies and process tracing, this thesis will also include document and media coverage analysis in order to gain a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the cases. The third section of the thesis presents the actual case studies. These case studies will involve an extensive description and analysis of the events and developments that occurred prior to, during, and after the resistance campaigns. In particular, the preexisting conditions of each case will be taken into account, as these conditions provide an explanation for the resort to the use of violence of particular collective and individual actors within the resistance movements. In the fourth section of this thesis, I will attempt to make a comparison between the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity in order to explore whether there is a pattern of factors that may have contributed to the decision of several actors in the nonviolent resistance movements to resort to the use of violence. In the final section of this thesis, I will recapture and critically analyse my findings in order to formulate a comprehensive, yet concise, answer to the central question, and the additional subquestions. In this thesis, I endeavour to contribute to the academic understanding of the decision on the behalf of collective and individual actors within a nonviolent resistance movement to resort to the use of violence. This decision seems rather counterproductive, as Chenoweth (2017) argues that nonviolent resistance is twice as likely to succeed as its violent counterpart. Furthermore, Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang (2017) argue that the diversity of participants in both

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nonviolent resistance movements is still under-researched. Therefore, I will attempt to identify various roles within a nonviolent resistance movement. This thesis is of societal interest, as this thesis will attempt to identify and categorize the factors that cause the use of violence. As violent resistance is less likely to successfully accomplish social change than nonviolent resistance, violent resistance will, in all probability, instigate and inflame state repression which, in turn, could lead to mental and physical suffering of citizens. As this thesis is supposed to identify and categorize factors that could trigger the resort to the use of violence, nonviolent resistance movements, as well as state authorities, will possibly be able to prevent these factors to become dominant in a nonviolent resistance movement.

2. Theoretical Framework § 2.1 Literature Review The question why some nonviolent campaigns turn violent, whilst other campaigns do not, has received particular attention over the last decade, but an accurate answer to the question is still lacking. Erica Chenoweth – a prominent scholar in political violence and studies – argues that the reasons for a sudden turn in resistance strategies are manifold. To clarify, the strategies that are employed in a resistance campaign depend, among others, on features such as “intracampaign unity, intergroup competition, the presence of radical flanks, and regime responses (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013: p. 416).” In an attempt to gain a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the change of resistance strategies, Chenoweth and Lewis identify and categorize 250 resistance campaigns of which 100 could be labelled as nonviolent and 150 as violent. A campaign is defined as “a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics in pursuit of a political objective” (idem). Furthermore, campaigns are coordinated in such a way that at least 1,000 individual actors participate in a protest that has an evident political objective. These objectives are (1) the overturn of an existing regime, (2) the expel of foreign occupying forces, and (3) the achievement of self-determination. Chenoweth and Lewis study campaigns rather than particular events, as events are not always independent of one another. In other words, a campaign requires intelligence, planning, recruiting, and training of participants. Although the database of Chenoweth and Lewis offers a good basis, the database also has various limitations. Examples of these limitations are the missing data on unsuccessful and post-2013 resistance campaigns as well as the lack of event-specific data. To elucidate, developments during a particular event could be an essential reason for the use of violence by

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a previously nonviolent resistance movement. Moreover, violence does not necessarily have to be inflicted by the radical flanks of a nonviolent resistance group. The resort to violence seems to be counterproductive. Chenoweth (2017), Cunningham (2013), Jackson (2015), and King (2018) argue that nonviolent resistance has been more successful in the establishment of political and social change over time. However, these academics provide a different explanation for the shift to the use of violence by actors that participate in a nonviolent resistance campaign. Chenoweth (2017: pp. 86-88) argues that the decision to use violence against the regime that is being challenged is triggered by state repression. To illustrate this argument, Chenoweth gives the example of protests in Ankara and Istanbul that opposed the decision of Turkish President Erdogan to strengthen laws regarding terrorism. These protests were initially peaceful, but severe violence erupted after police and security forces attempted to beat down the protests. This police violence caused the call for the removal from office of President Erdogan. However, the question can be posed, if the police actions were the sole factor that inflamed the resort to violence and the call for the removal of the President. Cunningham (2013) argues that, in case of self-determination disputes, the resort to violence is a rational choice. In other words, nonviolent resistance movements base their decision of whether or not to use force on both the costs of such strategies and the anticipation of achieving success through these strategies. The use of violent is more likely if a movement is of a large extent, has limited or no access to conventional politics, and receives external support. The potential access to conventional politics is an important component of Cunningham’s argument, as such access would allow a resistance movement to operate while limiting their operational costs. However, this does not mean that if a resistance movement has such access that this movement will limit its actions to conventional politics – i.e. a resistance movement may apply additional tactics in order to accomplish their political objective of self- determination. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that these alternative means to attain specific political objectives include the use of violence, as the use of violence would lead to the exclusion of a resistance movement from the political arena. Hence, according to Cunningham, political and social change are most likely to be accomplished through conventional politics. Factors, other than the access to conventional politics, that also may encourage a resistance movement to resort to violence is the capability to mass-mobilize people for their cause and the external support of this movement. However, it has to be noted that mass mobilization and possibly external support for a resistance movement are also predominant in nonviolent resistance movements.

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Jackson (2015) and King (2018) argue that resistance movements tend to achieve external support for their cause. This cause could, inter alia, be regime change, self-determination, or anti-occupation. Resistance movements tend to use (social) media in order to mobilize participants for a resistance campaign and to gain international attention. A regime that is being challenged could impose a countrywide ban on these (social) media in order to prevent the opposition from gaining influence. This repression of a regime could, in turn, cause a resistance movement to decide to turn to violence in order to receive international attention for their cause. The mass mobilization of people is a recurring element in nonviolent resistance campaigns. Butcher and Svensson (2016) argue that “nonviolence is most effective (and feasible) when dissidents can induce mass mobilization quickly and from across broad sectors of society” (idem: p. 314). The mobilization of potential dissidents is supposed to be quick and from across sectors of society because this enables a resistance movement to impose costs on the regime which is being challenged. These costs include not only real financial costs but also moral costs – i.e. mass mobilization is able to weaken a particular regime’s legitimacy. Contrary to nonviolent resistance, violent insurgencies have an advantage in small-scale mobilization. Small-scale mobilization is an advantage for violent movements, as these movements are supposed to coordinate its members. This coordination involves the equipment, motivation, payment, and training of individuals that are prepared to fight for a political or social objective.

§ 2.2 Literature Gaps Four years after the introduction of the NAVCO 2.0 dataset, Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang (2017) propose several future research directions. They emphasize that we need to take into account (1) the effect of external actors, (2) the diversity of actors in both a resistance movement and the regime that is being challenged, (3) interactions, patterns, and sequences in a resistance movement, and (4) the potential relation between various forms of nonviolent and violent resistance.

§ 2.3 Pattern of Violence To understand the complex composition of a nonviolent resistance movement, a scholar should first distinguish between violence and nonviolence. This distinction between violence and nonviolence is a complicated one due to the broad sense in which the word violence is used. This broad interpretation causes circumstances in which a particular actor perceives the use of violence, while another actor does not notice any kind of violence. Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan (2011: p. 143) discuss the example of rock-throwing among Palestinian protesters in Israel. Whereas Palestinian protesters consider this act to be nonviolent, especially in

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comparison to the force which is used by Israeli militaries and settlers, the majority of Israeli citizens regard rock-throwing as an act of violence. Accordingly, an identical action may be interpreted in different ways by various actors. This diversity of interpretations and perceptions of what concerns the use of violence is related to the definition of violence which an actor uses. These interpretations and perceptions may also differ among cultures – i.e. whereas a particular act may be conceived as offensive or even violent in one culture, this act may be seen as acceptable behaviour, and by no means harmful, in another culture. Thus, it depends on which definition of violence is used and on what the context of a particular act is, to determine whether or not something could be considered as violence. As mentioned, violence is a complex concept to conceptualize and operationalize. According to Gene Sharp (1994: p. 45) – who is a renown academic in the study of violence and non- violence – an act can be considered violent when “physical weapons are used to intimidate, injure, kill, and destroy”, while a nonviolent strategy is described as a “struggle [that] is fought by psychological, social, economic, and political weapons.” The distinction that Sharp makes is between the threatening with and the use of either physical or nonphysical means in order to accomplish an objective. Physical force could inflict instant harm to a given victim of violence, while nonphysical means do not, necessarily, cause harm to an individual actor, in the short term. These nonphysical means can, however, harm a target audience in the long term. Consequently, the question can be posed if the use of nonphysical means – such as psychological weapons – is not a kind of deferred violence which aims at causing harm to individual actors. Douglas Bond (1988: pp. 86-87) would categorize Gene Sharp’s definitions as principled pacifistic thinking rather than absolute pacifistic thinking. Bond distinguishes absolute pacifism from principled and pragmatic pacifism. Whereas absolute pacifists would endure suffering, eventually to death, principled and pragmatic pacifists reject the use of violence, either because of their principles or the pursuit of an ethic objective. The relevance of this distinction between communities of pacifists is that it may have explanatory power regarding a turn from nonviolent strategies to the use of violence amongst a resistance movement. Although both Gene Sharp and Douglas Bond have made fine attempts to conceptualize violence and nonviolence, the dividing line between violence and nonviolence remains unclear and the exact interpretation of nonviolence remains unspecified. The World Health Organization endeavoured to take cultural differences into account in order to develop a definition of violence. The World Health Organization states that violence could be defined as “the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself,

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another person, or against a group or community, which either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation” (WHO 2002). Despite the extensive character of this definition, the inclusion of power in this definition leaves ambiguity, as power itself is a contested concept. This makes the definition of the World Health Organization only suboptimal. Another aspect which makes the definition of the World Health Organization suboptimal is the fact that the World Health Organization classifies the relationship of violence between the victim and the perpetrator within one of three categories. These categories are self-harm or suicide, interpersonal harm, and collective harm. As this thesis focuses on nonviolent resistance movements and the question whether or not these groups turn violent, this thesis will particularly concentrate on collective harm. Collective harm – i.e. collective violence – is the use of violence by members of a particular group against individuals or a group of individuals who do not belong to the ingroup. The World Health Organization identifies three categories of motives for the use of collective violence: (1) economic motives, (2) political motives, and (3) social motives. With regard to political motives, Ted Gurr (1970) argues that violent strategies are “collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors – including political groups as well as incumbents – or its policies”, while nonviolent resistance could be defined as an “organized popular resistance to government authority which – either consciously or by necessity – eschews the use of weapons of modern warfare”. This definition of nonviolence fails to address the question of whether or not the rock-throwing among Palestinian protesters could be regarded as violent behaviour. Therefore, this definition is inadequate. Dudouet (2013) describes nonviolent resistance as “an active and sustained collective engagement in resisting violence in all its forms (whether behavioural, structural or cultural)”. As comprehensive as Dudouet’s definition might be, the problem of calling whether a particular act is violent or not preserves. Sociologist Kurt Schock (2003: p. 705) provides a more narrow definition of nonviolence. Schock defines nonviolent action as the active collective pursuit of political and social objectives without the use of physical force or the threat therewith against human beings. Norman Geras (1990: pp. 21-58) reflects on Schock definition by claiming that violence is “the exercise of physical force so as to kill or injure, inflict direct harm or pain on, human beings.” Both Geras and Schock would recall violence in terms of intentionally causing physical harm and nonviolence in terms of refraining from physical harm to another human being. These definitions are, like Gene Sharp’s conceptualization of violence and nonviolence, limited in the sense that these definitions do not take psychological harm into consideration.

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The definition of Richard Audi (1971: p. 58) has the advantage of including intentionally caused psychological trauma. Audi argues that: “violence is the physical attack upon, or the vigorous physical of, or vigorous physical struggle against, a person or animal; or the highly vigorous psychological abuse of, or the sharp, caustic psychological attack upon, a person or animal; or the highly vigorous, or incendiary, or malicious and vigorous, destruction or damaging or property or potential property”. Although the offense is perspicuously included in Audi’s concept of violence, the result(s) of such an act remain(s) unidentified. Guiliano Pontara attempts to not only identify the physical and psychological attack against another living organism but also discusses the result(s) of such an act with reference to the victim of the act, which is harm and suffering. Pontara (1978: p. 19) states that violence is “an action, a, performed by an agent P (person or group) as part of a method of struggle M in a situation of conflict S, is an act of violence [if] 1) there is at least one human being, Q, such that (i), P's performance of a, in S as part of M, causes that Q dies, suffers or is injured, and (ii), it is in S against Q's will to be killed or made to suffer; and 2) P, in S, believes 1) to be the case.” This analytical concept of violence includes notions of intention, and immediate harm and (psychological) suffering. The problem which this definition poses is the notion of (psychological) suffering, as this notion complicates the definition of nonviolence. Nonviolent resistance is generally seen as a struggle of a particular individual or group of individuals against an opponent. The act of resistance will, in all probability, lead to some sort of suffering of both the perpetrator and the victim. Pontara describes this as the nonviolence dilemma. According to Pontara (1978: p. 28), “the difficulty is still more aggravated by the fact that if methods of nonviolent struggle shall have a chance of being put forth as credible alternatives to the traditional methods of violence there must be some good reason to believe that they are efficacious means for the attainment of at least some desirable ends (which violence in certain situations undoubtedly has been). But here lies the dilemma of nonviolence, as the demand of efficacy and the demand of non- violence would seem to clash. Or are there efficacious methods of nonviolent struggle?” As a consequence, the use of either less violent or violent strategies seems to be more successful in comparison to nonviolent struggle. This makes nonviolent struggle rather impossible. Pontara provides the example of the of British cotton by the Indian people under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi. The rejection to buy and use British cotton caused collateral damage to the British economy, whereby labourers in the United Kingdom lost their jobs and suffered the consequences of this boycott. The point Pontara makes is that certain nonviolent strategies cause unintentional risks which could be explained as violent behaviour. Therefore, Pontara argues that truly nonviolent

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strategies do not exist. In order to organize effective protests, a minimum degree of violence within a nonviolent resistance movement is supposed to be tolerated. The question is where does one draw the line with regard to this minimum degree of violence. John Smith (1969) states that “the advocate of nonviolence is torn between the conviction that nonviolence is “right” come what may and the thesis that it is in fact the most effective instrument for achieving some desired results.” The minimum degree of violence that is justified to use in order to accomplish political and societal change is hard to define. To put it differently, the threshold in the suffering caused by nonviolent struggle remains up to debate. This threshold is up to debate because there is no single moral justification for the use of even limited violence. For this reason, the distinction between nonviolence and violence is still a topic to contemporary debate and discourse. The relationship between nonviolent resistance movements and opposition struggle is troublesome in essence. Therefore, the definitions of nonviolence and violence are imperfect in this thesis. In this dissertation, violence is regarded as a comprehensive concept that refers to either the use, or threatening with the use, of physical force which either results in, or has a high likelihood of resulting in, injury, death, or psychological harm. Nonviolent resistance movements eschew the intentional and unintentional use of, or threat with, violence against individuals that are, or a group of individuals which is, not a part of the movement. Our understanding of physical force is not limited to the actual killing of people, but also includes targeted and indiscriminate acts of violence that could cause emotional and psychological injury and disability.

§ 2.4 Social Movement Theory According to Cunningham (2013) and Butcher and Svensson (2016), nonviolent resistance will only be effective in accomplishing social change in case a movement manages to mass mobilize people that support their cause. This mobilization process attracts participants due to various reasons. These reasons can be explained through the use of social movement theories. Therefore, I will discuss several social movement theories in order to elaborate on the mobilization process that can [potentially] explain nonviolent resistance. Participation in a nonviolent resistance movement is participation in collective action. Generally, an individual actor is believed to participate in such collective action if this actor shares an identity with a collective. According to Stephen Wright (2001: p. 413), “it is simply obvious that in order to engage in collective action the individual must recognize his or her membership in the relevant collective.” Although group membership may be an essential motive to participate in collective action, an individual who adheres to a particular collective

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does not necessarily act collectively. Whereas group identification plays an important role in collective action, cognition and consciousness of, and emotions and motivations related to, this group identification are decisive in the decision of an individual actor whether or not to participate in collective action. Besides, identity is subject to change. A – sometimes sudden – change of identity can be explained by both collective actions and collective experiences. Richard Jenkins (2004) argues that identity is something active – i.e. identity is not just there as a constant factor, but as a dynamic factor, continuously in motion. The trade-off between collective action and collective identity was first emphasized by sociologists. These sociologists argued that collective identity was at the basis of the emergence of a social movement. Alberto Melucci (1995) states that “collective identity is an interactive, shared definition produced by several individuals that must be conceived as a process because it is constructed and negotiated by repeated activation of the relationships that link individuals to groups.” Individual actors engage in collective action “any time that they are acting as a representative of the group and the action is directed at improving the conditions of the entire group” (Wright 2001). Collective action is, therefore, the decision of an individual actor to act on behalf of a collective due to shared interpretations and perceptions considering the outside world. These common interpretations and perceptions foster the establishment and preservation of a social cognition, emotion, and motivation. These three aspects could, when in interaction, shape a feeling of group identification. This group identification, in turn, limits the importance of personal identity. Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013) refer to this phenomenon as depersonalization. They argue that individuals “think, act, and feel like group members because they incorporate elements of a collective identity into their social identity” (p. 12). Although group identification is not as strong as depersonalization, group identification does affect the way people feel, think, and act, often in relation to the group to which individual actors belong. The question should be posed when group identification leads to collective action, as group identification does, despite shared ideas, feelings, and interests, not necessarily imply a readiness to undertake action. According to Gurin, Miller, and Gurin (1980: p. 30), group members will experience an increasing consciousness of shared grievances and will have an unequivocal idea about who is responsible for those grievances. This process could be referred to as ‘we-versus-them thinking’ in which the ‘them’ group is perceived to be intentionally and willfully disadvantaging the ‘we’ group. This thinking process triggers cognitive reinterpretations of the surrounding world. The surrounding world is conceived to be hostile towards the ingroup and should, therefore, be challenged through collective action. Thus, a greater collective consciousness could initiate a transformation of social categorization – i.e.

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instigate ‘we-versus-them thinking’, which, in turn, could cause a change of political beliefs and action orientations of the ingroup. The above theory particularly enhances the idea that individuals participate in a particular collective due to perceived or real deprivation. The reason for an individual to participate in a non-violent resistance movement, which aims at the establishment of political and social change, can, however, be two-fold. On the one hand, a particular individual may weigh the potential advantages and disadvantages of participating in such a movement to decide whether to or not to participate in this movement, while, on the other hand, another individual may actually feel emotional attachment to the movement due to its position in society. The shortly discussed theory is related to the idea of relative deprivation, while the theory in which an individual actor accumulates the advantages and disadvantages of participation in a resistance movement could be referred to as the rational choice model. This thesis will provide an in-depth discussion of both theories.

§ 2.4.1 Group identification Group identification plays a fundamental role in how the relative deprivation theory accounts for the differences in individual engagement in collective action. Such group identification can be based on ideology, socioeconomic position, personal preferences, physical characteristics, and sexual orientation. These characteristics are part of an individual actor’s self-concept and determine the potential emotional significance that an individual actor attaches to her or his belonging to a particular group. According to Tajfel (1978), the concept of identity contains a cognitive aspect (awareness of membership), an evaluative element (the values associated with the membership), and an emotional element (feelings towards one’s group membership as well as others standing in relation to the group). In other words, identity is a self-imposed concept that not only defines a particular individual but which also defines this individual’s standing toward other individuals (Jenkins 2004). This concept is subject to change; identity is a continuous process rather than a constant factor (idem). Identity consists of two aspects: (1) the personal identity and (2) the social identity. Whereas the personal identity determines the personal attributes of an individual, social identity refers to the group membership(s) of a person. Personal identity is what makes an individual different from other individuals, while the social identity defines the self in relation to a collective that an individual adheres to due to shared characteristics. As individual actors endeavour to improve their position in society, individual actors align themselves with collectives that provide them with a greater status in society. Tajfel and Turner (1979) describe this

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phenomenon as controlling intergroup behaviour. They argue that individual actors either attempt to attain a higher position in society through gaining relevance in the group they have membership of, or seek membership of a group that enjoys higher respect and more prestige in society. This leads to the situation in which individual actors participate in collective action in order to improve their group status if they perceive their current low status as illegitimate, and if they are unable to associate with another group (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013). The transition of group membership indicates a rather weak collective identity. To put it differently, the shared cognitions which a group member shares with other group members is not strong if an individual actor easily switches from one group to another. According to Huddy (2001), the strength or weakness of collective identity and social identity may make a difference in an individual actor’s decision to participate in collective action. This preparedness to participate is considerably strong if a group identification is acquired, as this signifies the willingness of an individual to be a member of a particular collective (Huddy 2003). Polletta and Jasper (2001: p. 415) would argue that emotion attached to group membership comes into play if an individual actor voluntary associates with a collective. Another aspect which may influence the decision of an individual actor whether or not to participate in collective action is related to salience. Individual actors may feel attached to more than a single group at a time, which can raises the question at what moment self-categorization into a collective identity occurs. Turner (1987: p. 118) states that a particular identity is salient if it is “functioning psychologically to increase the influence of one’s membership in that group on perception and behaviour.” The salience of group membership strengthens if there is an explicit delineated ingroup and outgroup. This delineation generates a perception of intragroup grievances and problems. These grievances and problems are, in turn, translated into common interests, needs, and objectives. Although these interests, needs, and objectives are not considered to be equally important by all group members, the translation into these demands is a crucial first step towards the politicization of a group’s collective identity (Simon and Klandermans, 2001).

§ 2.4.2 Cognition Cognition implies the awareness of shared grievances and group belonging. Cognition is, according to Carlston (2001: p. 2), essential for our understanding of collective (political) action, as “cognition emphasizes the cognitive processes that mediate between environmental stimuli and interpersonal responses and […] links cognition to action.” In other words, an individual actor that is conscious of her or his group membership will interpret and evaluate the

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political and social environment accordingly, which, in turn, will affect the individual’s preparedness to participate in collective (political) action (McGraw 2000). There still remains some obscurity with regard to the transition of cognition into participation in collective action. Shweder and Bourne (1984) state that the knowledge of an individual about certain political and social situations cannot be separated easily from the way this individual processes new information. This cognition process, in particular in relation to movements, requires further study. The cognition process of an individual actor is limited in the sense that a human being is unable to process all information that exists. As a consequence, an individual actor has to limit her or his absorption of information. Individuals tend to focus on negative information, or information that approves the self-concept, and information that is provided by either people or institutions that the individual trusts (Stangor and Ruble 1989; Sears and Funk 1991; Brewer and Steenbergen 2002). This limited processing of information could lead to circumstances of uncertainty in which an individual either prefers to stick to the interpretation and perception of the collective or to withdraw from the political and social environment (Schank and Abelson 1977). This decision to adjust to a collective or to withdraw in solitude, likewise social- cognitive learning, are necessary for human survival. These acts provide essential benefits to both self- and social-regulation. The principle of social-cognitive learning also comes with costs. These costs are engendered through biases in memory, judgements, and decision-making (Higgins 2000). With regard to the limited information processing of humans, Gamson (1992) poses an intriguing question by asking why so many people do participate in social movements while they are either uninterested in or ill-informed about political and social issues. After having conducted research on this question, Gamson argues that a combination of experiential knowledge, media discourse, and popular knowledge contribute to the decision of an individual actor whether or not to participate in a collective action. As these forms of knowledge input differ for each individual, the reasons to participate in a social movement are manifold. Gamson notes that these reasons could be brought back to three essential components: (1) agency – i.e. the awareness of the possibility to alter conditions, (2) identity, which refers to the definition of the in-group and the out-group based on interests and values, and (3) injustice or moral indignation.

§ 2.4.3 Emotions Emotions are closely related to the decision of an individual whether or not to participate in collective action, as emotions are a determining factor in how an individual perceives the

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political and social environment. Emotions structure the way that individuals think and act. Therefore, we need to understand what emotions are, how emotions work, and how emotions interact with cognition, identification, and motivation in order to grasp a deeper comprehension of participation in collective action. According to Jasper (1998), emotions influence all stages of protests like the recruitment phase, persistent participation, and the decision to no longer take part in protests. As emotions are socially constructed, some emotions are stronger than other emotions. These emotions are, frequently, related to cultural and historical perceptions of the surrounding world. For example, the affects protesters in their beliefs that change could be accomplished through protesting. For this reason, a social movement takes cultural and historical accounts into consideration when encouraging potential demonstrators to participate in collective action. These social movements endeavour to create feelings of arousal and avoidance within their target audience in order to motivate potential demonstrators to participate in collective action and to prevent authorities from attempting to repress protests. Besides anticipating on the feelings of potential demonstrators, social movements provide an environment in which individual actors are able to exchange their experiences and to express their feelings with regard to the political and societal environment. This opportunity to express feelings could strengthen the relationship within a group.

§ 2.4.4 Motivation Demands for political and social change stem from an idea of belonging (identification), and an experienced grievance (cognition) combined with feelings related to this grievance. The consciousness of belonging to a group could turn an experienced individual grievance into a collective grievance. Gurin et al. (1980: p. 31) state that motivation underlies the transition from collective grievance to collective action. Motivation can be defined as the desire of either an individual or a group, or both, to achieve an objective through action. Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013) identified four types of motivation: (1) group-based anger, (2) identity, (3) ideology, and (4) instrumentality. Firstly, Van Zomeren et al. (2004) discussed non-instrumental motives for participation in collective action. These motives relate to emotions such as group-based anger. This anger could be based on both emotions and problems. Lazarus (1991: p. 48) argues that group-based anger could trigger a mindset in which an individual actor actively copes with perceived problems. The individual actor defines the surrounding world based on the information it obtains from fellow group members. This information will convince an individual actor to mobilize and to

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act, on behalf of the group, with the purpose of changing reality. Whereas, according to Smith (1993), dealing with problem-based issues is related to the instrumental pathway of collective action; coping with in emotions grounded issues provides the basic of group-based anger. This group-based anger engenders feelings of perceived and real unfairness considering a group’s position in society. These feelings and emotions are related to the disadvantaged position of an individual actor and will function as accelerators in the willingness of both individuals and collective actors to undertake action in order to establish political and social change. In their study, Van Zomeren et al. (2008) find that efficacy, identity, and injustice – both separately and in combination – have an effect on potential participation in collective action. Furthermore, feelings of injustice more likely lead to participation in collective action than awareness of injustice. Finally, politicized actions reach a greater audience than non-politicized actions. Thus, feelings of injustice with reference to either an individual actor or a group, or both, are more likely to motivate people to participate in collective actions that aim to accomplish political and social change. Secondly, the chance that an individual actor will participate in collective action due to identity motives increases in case this individual has a strong connection with the identity of a group and tight relations with other group members (Huddy 2003). Individuals who act out of identity motives are more likely to define themselves in terms of “we” rather than “I” (Brewer and Gardner 1996). These individual actor have the perception that they are personally responsible for the emulation of group aims, objectives, and values and that shared grievances affect the person they are (Simon et al. 1998). An individual actor does, in this case, no longer distinguish between individual costs and benefits and group advantages and disadvantages, but will in any circumstances advocate what is in the interest of the broader collective. Simon and Klandermans (2001) suggest that individual actors that value their collective identification are more willing to participate in collective action and to politicize their activist identification when they are connected to a disadvantaged group. Thus, the level of commitment to a collective identity of an individual actor affects the willingness of this individual to participate in collective action. Thirdly, the ideology of a particular movement may motivate its members whether or not to participate in collective action. This ideological aspect could, for example, refer to the political or religious orientation of a social movement or to explicit rights within society such as citizenship rights and civil rights. Although ideological motives seemed to have been primarily relevant throughout the 20th century, ideological motives have recently regained attention in social movement literature. This literature focuses on the platforms provided to individual

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actors to express their political and societal views. Although these individual actors actively use the platforms which they are given to perform on, they do not, necessarily, advocate political or social change. Frequently, these individual actors are already satisfied with a platform on which they could express their emotions and share their ideas and narratives about how the political and social environment could improve through gradual, rather than thorough, changes. A kind of change that could be established through discourse rather than through collective action. This kind of participation in a social movement is rather about the assessment of an individual actor’s feelings and values, which possibly were violated, rather than the enforcement of political change. Although these individual actors do not aim at the organization of, or participation in, collective action, the values that these individual actors share may generate the belief in a social movement that collective action should actually be undertaken. In short, participating in collective action is one of many possible reactions to a perceived violation of an individual actor’s values, but this action will not necessarily occur (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013). Fourthly, instrumental motives refer to the mobilization of resources and to the access to the political process. With regard to instrumental motives, movement participation is generally considered to be a rational choice in the sense that participants take potential outcomes and the costs of these outcomes into account. Klandermans (1984: p. 584) claims that individual actors take reactions of other individuals and groups into consideration while accumulating the potential advantages and disadvantages of their participation in a collective action. As a consequence, individual actors are never entirely rational in their decision-making. Therefore, Klandermans disagrees with the rational choice theory and instead discusses what he calls an expectancy value theory. This theory does not concentrate on the real outcome of social behaviour, as real-life outcomes are unpredictable, but focuses on the expected outcome of social behaviour. This expectancy-value theory assumes individual rational thinking. The problem with individual rational thinking is that individual actors tend to free ride, as they expect to achieve an identical outcome without participating in collective action. This freeriding problem could cause a vast majority of potential demonstrators to decide not to participate in collective action which inhibits the possibility of bringing about political and social change. Klandermans argues that individual actors will only participate in collective action if they possess information regarding the decision to participate in collective action of other individuals. Whereas the access to this information remained limited in the time that Klandermans first developed his argument, social media have drastically changed this situation, as nowadays people are able to freely and easily communicate about their decision whether or

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not to take part in collective action and are able to reach a large audience when doing so. For this reason, social media are often used by the organizers of protests to encourage people to participate in protests, and to convince people that their participation is of importance. The decision whether or not to participate in collective action, thus, depends on the expected collective benefits and social and non-social selective incentives. The value of an individual actor’s participation in collective action greatly determines her or his willingness to do so.

3. Methodology In this thesis, several research methods are employed in order to gain a deeper and greater comprehension of the structure of resistance movements and the strategies applied by these movements. This thesis contains two case studies: (1) the Orange Revolution and a study of (2) the Revolution of Dignity, which both occurred in Ukraine. These cases are selected for the reason that the preconditions of both series of protests are, more or less, the same – i.e. in both series of protests people demonstrated for more and a shift in focus of foreign policy toward the European Union. Furthermore, these series of protests are interesting as the Revolution of Dignity turned violent, whereas the Orange Revolution remained its nonviolent character throughout the demonstrations process.

§ 3.1 Case studies As this thesis particularly studies the resort to violent strategies of a resistance movement a comparison between the (nonviolent) Orange Revolution and the (violent) Revolution of Dignity is required. This comparison can only be made based on extensive studies of each case. Therefore, this thesis incorporates cases studies of the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity. According to Gerring (2004: p. 342) a case study is “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units”. A unit is understood as a spatially bounded phenomenon which is observed at a single point in time or over a delimited period of time (idem). In general, case studies are supposed to be descriptive, explanatory, and focused. This focus involves the in-depth description of a single or small number of units. The shortcomings of a case study are the limited breadth and confirmatory power of a study (idem: pp. 346-352). In order to subtract explanatory power as of why one series of protests turned violent, while the other series of protests remained nonviolent, several research methods will be employed. These methods are: (1) process tracing, (2) discourse analysis, and (3) document analysis. Process analysis will be used in order to identify a certain point in time during which the

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Revolution of Dignity turned violent, while discourse and document analysis will be employed in order to explore and identify the personal motivation of individual actors and sub-group actors to participate in the collective actions described. While public and private discourse in the form of interviews may provide insight in the motivations and objectives of individual actors during both series of protests, document analysis provides information about developments within the resistance movements and the response of the government to the resistance movement.

§ 3.2 Process tracing Process tracing is an essential qualitative research instrument that advances the systematic analysis of political and social phenomena, as well as causal claims, at a particular point in space and time. Snapshots of these phenomena and claims are taken in order to study these over time. An advantage of these snapshots is that these phenomena and claims can be contrasted against each other in order to investigate whether or not there are indications of a consecutive and interlinked campaign. Furthermore, the study of particular phenomena and claims as well as the relation between these could provide an academic with an inferential leverage. This kind of leverage is often lacking in quantitative analysis (Collier 2011: pp. 823-824). Process tracing consist of two research tools: these tools are description and sequence. Description is used in order to identify and characterize events at a particular point in time, while sequence is used in order to identify and characterize a process. This process is composed of a series of events that are potentially related to one another. A combination of description and sequence can contribute to, among others, (1) the identification of novel political and social phenomena, (2) the evaluation of existing hypotheses as well as the formulation of new hypotheses, (3) the comprehension of causal mechanisms, and (4) the addressing of research problems such as reciprocal causation, spuriousness, and selection bias (idem: p. 824).

§ 3.3 Discourse analysis Discourse analysis is a research method which focuses on the use of sign, written, and vocal language (Van Dijk 1993: pp. 249-281). An essential component of discourse analysis is the study of the way in which language is used in order to cover a particular message to a target audience. This coverage could take place through, for example, the repetition of a particular word or sentence (Wilson 2015: p. 787). Therefore, discourse analysis focuses its research on the structure of sentences, the propositions which are used in a speech, and the explicit and implicit meaning of words. As Ornatowski (2012: p. 7) argues: "words, actions, and events work together; words interpret events or actions, as well as constitute political facts, while

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actions in various ways help words gain their political efficacy." For this reason, Jonathan Charteris-Black (2004: pp. 30-31) states that it is of great importance to be aware of, and to critically consider, the way politicians use language in order to convince their audience of their argument. In other words, messages will be addressed in such a way as to appeal to the audience.

§ 3.4 Policy documents Documentary analysis is a qualitative research method in which a wide range of different kinds of sources are analyzed. These sources include, among others, autobiographies, diaries, letters, mass-media outputs, virtual objects, and official documents that either derive from private sources or from the state. In this thesis, official documents will be used in order to gain a greater comprehension of internal state affairs in Ukraine. These official documents are supposed to provide information concerning state policies and statistics. The policies that are interesting for this [piece of] research are those that depict the position of national minority groups throughout time, while statistics could provide an overview of the economic position of these groups within the central state. An advantage of documentary analysis is that documents have not explicitly been developed for the purposes of social research. Therefore, “the possibility of a reactive effect can be largely discounted as a limitation on the validity of data” (Bryman 2012: p. 543) An disadvantage of documentary analysis is that the researcher is biased in its interpretation of these documents. In other words: the researcher, who is analyzing a diversity of documents, could already have an opinion on a particular topic. This opinion could affect the interpretation of the documents that are being analyzed. Therefore, the researcher is supposed to present the original content of documents as much as possible (Idem: pp. 543-551).

4. Case Studies § 4.1 The Orange Revolution The Orange Revolution was a series of demonstrations and protests which challenged , , and voter intimidation in Ukraine after the presidential elections of 2004. The initiators of these demonstrations and protests attempted to fight corruption and endeavoured to declare free and fair presidential elections. These objectives were supposed to be achieved through , civil resistance, and strikes throughout Ukraine. Although fraudulent elections and the lack of economic and political reforms led to the mass mobilization of people which, in turn, caused the demonstrations and protests during the Orange Revolution, public unrest already dated back to the kidnapping and murder of Internet-based opposition journalist, , in September 2000. The Ukrainian authorities

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supposedly targeted Gongadze for reporting about the corruption and unethical behaviour of politicians in the . Gongadze also accused the government of suppressing the freedom of speech (Goldstein 2007). The perception that the Ukrainian authorities were responsible for the kidnapping and murder of Gongadze and the lack of economic and political reforms caused discontent with the political and social elite of Ukraine in the post-Soviet era. This dissatisfaction and the rise of , who was believed to be able to challenge corruption and to pursue economic and political reforms, provided the population of Ukraine with an opportunity to organize a resistance movement which was capable of challenging the political and social elite. This movement endeavoured to mobilize through the use of the Internet, as the Internet provided the movement and aligned opposition journalists with the opportunity to criticize the Kuchma-led government and to freely spread information about demonstrations and protests. An obstacle to the use of the Internet as a recruitment tool was the limited Internet access in the early 2000s in Ukraine. As a consequence, Andriy Igantov – who was one of the pioneers of the Internet-based media and founder of Maidan (public square) – stated that “in order to cover a larger audience, we had to attract our target audience from people who are usually better networked than the rest. We strived to reach investigative journalists, human rights lawyers, entrepreneurs, and students. In short, we wanted to reach the most networked people in Ukraine (Kyj 2006: pp. 71-80).” Despite the limited Internet access, the Internet was at the basis of the Orange Revolution. In other words, the Internet was actively used in order to spread jokes, to raise political awareness, to provide training regarding the observation of elections, and to report about demonstrations and protests during the Orange Revolution. This kept participants in the Orange Revolution informed about developments elsewhere in Ukraine (Goldstein 2007: pp. 1-10). Although the Internet was a factor in the mass mobilization of people during the Orange Revolution, it is an immense step from reading something on the Internet to participating in collective action on the street. To develop a deeper understanding of this transformation, I will develop a timeline which indicates essential events in the Orange Revolution, research interviews and a focus group, and analyze the discourse of speeches given by opposition leaders on Independence Square.

§ 4.1.1 Timeline The months prior to the Orange Revolution were dominated by a race for the Presidency of Ukraine in 2004. The two dominant candidates which struggled to acquire the Presidency were Viktor Yushchenko and . Yushchenko was the essential opposition

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candidate, while Yanukovych was received support from resigning President Kuchma. During the political campaigns, there was an attempted murder on Viktor Yushchenko through the use of dioxin poisoning. Despite the poisoning having dramatic consequences to the health and well-being of Yushchenko, Yushchenko decided to continue his campaign and to compete for the Presidency. The first round which was held on October 31, 2004 resulted in a slight win for Yushchenko. Yushchenko gathered 39.87 percent of the votes, while Yanukovych obtained 39.32 percent of the electoral support. Since no candidate gained over 50 percent of the votes, the Ukrainian law mandated a run-off vote between the two leading candidates; Viktor Yanukovych and Viktor Yushchenko. This second voting round was supposed to take place on . Whereas research organizations estimated that Yushchenko would eventually win the second voting round, the exit polls turned out to be different i.e. the exit polls provided Yanukovych with a 3.6 percent lead over Yushchenko. Responding to the outcome of the exit polls, Yushchenko announced that he did not trust the accountability of the Central Election Commission. Moreover, Yushchenko encouraged his supporters to gather in Kiev on Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in order to protect their freedom. According to the supporters of Yushchenko, the presidential elections were nothing less than a complete falsification. The supporters of Yushchenko, among whom members of Pora1 (It is time), initiated building encampments in Kiev on Independence Square. Later that night, Yushchenko announced that: “We have received information that authorities want to destroy our tent city at 3 a.m. … At two o’clock there should be more of us than now. We must defend every chestnut tree, every tent. We must show to the authorities we are here for a long time… There must be more and more of us here every hour.” This statement of Yushchenko initiated the occupation of the Independence Square in Kiev (Copsey 2010; Kuzio 2010). On November 22, 2004, between 100 and 150 thousand people gathered on Independence Square to listen to a speech by the opposition leaders. While Yushchenko called upon all to participate in the resistance movement which challenged the election results, called for the start of mass strikes in both industrial sectors and educational institutions throughout Ukraine. Furthermore, Tymoshenko asked the Ukrainian population to block airports, railways, and roads. While the demonstrations and protests against the proclaimed illegitimate voting results continued to take place in both Kiev and throughout Ukraine, the international community responded to the voting results. President of the Russian Federation congratulated Viktor Yanukovych with winning the presidential

1 A student organization which espoused nonviolent resistance and advocated an increased national democracy.

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elections, whereas officials of the US Senate and the EU Parliament either demanded clarification regarding the accused falsification of the presidential elections or condemned this falsification for which the Ukrainian government was held responsible. On November 23, 2004, the supporters of the opposition organized rallies in which between 100 thousand and 500 thousand people participated throughout Ukraine. The supporters of opposition candidates distinguished themselves from other demonstrators through exposing an orange color. This color was used by the campaign team of Yushchenko during his run for the presidency. The city administrations of, among others, Kiev and L’viv refused to acknowledge the election results, instead, these administrations claimed that Viktor Yushchenko had won the presidential elections. On November 24, 2004, the negotiations between the opposition – led by Viktor Yushchenko – and incumbent President Yanukovych are in a deadlock. Yushchenko calls for a nationwide strike in order to paralyze the government and to force the authorities not to recognize the results of the presidential elections. The following three days were of crucial importance to the decision of the Orange Revolution protesters to remain nonviolent. Firstly, the of Ukraine prohibited the publishing of the elections results until the charges of falsification and infringement had been addressed. This decision was essentially in favor of the opposition, as this decision effectively rejected the recognition of the official presidential election results. Secondly, the international community got involved in the ongoing conflict through delegating mediators from , , and the Russian Federation. The attempt of the international community to accomplish a settlement, however, failed, as Yanukovych was unwilling to make concessions which could be explained in favor of the opposition. As a consequence, Yushchenko refused further negotiations with Yanukovych if these negotiations were not about new presidential elections. Yushchenko announced his decision in front of his supporters on Independence Square. In a speech, he asked those who demonstrated and protested for the sake of a brighter future for their children neither to disassociate, nor to use force or seize power. He endeavoured to convince the protesters that their actions should remain peaceful because only true power can afford to be correct, intelligent, and worthy of self-esteem. Yushchenko does not oppose the seizing of the presidential administration, and the (Ukrainian Parliament) as long as the presidential administration and the Ukrainian Parliament would themselves decide to resign. On November 28, 2004, the mobilization of 10 thousand forces of the Internal Ministry in Kiev could have turned the tide. However, the secret service and military prevented a bloodshed

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by warning the opposition leaders about the preparations of the forces of the Internal Ministry and exerting pressure on the commanders of these forces not to use violence against the resistance movement. The consultation of Eastern and Southern Ukrainian delegates with Yanukovych about a potential federalization of Ukraine caused public distrust towards Yanukovych, whereby a against the Yanukovych government was passed on the first of December. On December 3, the Supreme Court declared the presidential election results to be invalid. For this reason, the Supreme Court ordered that the second voting round would be repeated within three weeks. Although President Kuchma and Yanukovych preferred to redo the whole election process, there was no evidence found which could challenge the outcome of the first election round. International reactions, ranging from the President of the to the President of the Russian Federation, all agreed that the new presidential elections should be fair, free, and open and that there should be no interference from abroad which could possibly affect the results in the elections.

§ 4.1.2 Interviews with Participants in the Orange Revolution Although it is complicated to retrieve the authentic reasons of an individual actor to participate in collective action, due to the positive or negative connotation that is related to this collective action over time, surveys and focus groups are, to some extent, able to recapture the initial motives of an individual actor to participate in collective action. Surveys which could provide a deeper understanding of the motives of individual actors to participate in protests and strikes during the Orange Revolution are the project “Ukrainian Society: Monitoring of Social Changes” (Monitoring Survey)2 and a survey that was nationwide conducted the International Institute of Sociology (KIIS). Stephen White and Ian McAllister conducted, in addition to the Monitoring Survey, eight focus groups throughout Ukraine in which respondents were able to discuss their opinions considering the Orange Revolution and the aftermath of the Orange Revolution. I will first discuss the methods which were used in order to conduct the surveys and the focus group. Thereafter, I will attempt to account for the decision of individual actors whether or not to participate in the Orange Revolution. The Monitor Survey has a sample size of approximately 1.800 respondents which are aged eighteen years and older. The survey consists of three sampling strategies; (1) random, (2) stratified, and (3) quota screening. In the first phase of the sample, the places of residence – i.e.

2 A survey which is yearly conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) of Ukraine.

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the geographical locations – were selected. The second phase of the sample focused on specific postal addresses. The third phase was the actual selection of respondents. The quota screening was conducted in order to accomplish an equal proportion of respondents in each oblast, size of settlement, age, education level, and sex of each particular oblast and type of settlement. This approach was selected in order to allow for “the regrouping of regions in relation to each region’s specific features and preferences when addressing different problems in the course of analysis, without misrepresentation of any region (Reznik 2016: p. 757).” In order to determine whether or not an individual actor participated in the Orange Revolution, the researchers posed the dichotomous question: “Did you participate in protest actions during the Orange Revolution?” The Monitoring Survey researched differences based on: (1) socio-demographic characteristics such as age, gender, settlement type, and subjective social status, (2) macroregional division, (3) linguistic identity, (4) foreign policy orientation, (5) support for entrepreneurship, and (6) support for a multi-party system. Furthermore, the respondents were asked “to identify the candidate for whom they voted in each of the three rounds of the 2004 presidential election, whether they had participated in any demonstrations during the Orange Revolution and in what manner, their beliefs about why people participated in the Orange Revolution protests, and their attitudes about what these events represented and whether they had improved conditions in Ukraine (Beissinger 2013: p. 578).” The KIIS Survey was a nationwide survey which was conducted in December 2004 among 2.044 adult respondents. These respondents were asked whether or not they had participated in protests during the Orange Revolution and on which candidate they were planning to vote during the third voting round of the presidential (Idem: p. 579). White and McAllister conducted eight focus groups between August and October 2006 in Ukraine. These focus groups took place in (east), Kharkov (east), Kherson (south), Kyiv, L’viv (west), (south), (east), and (west). The number of respondents in these focus groups varied between eight and ten participants. These respondents were drawn from the working-age population (18 to 63 years) and selected based on their gender. The respondents were supplied with open-ended questions by the researchers and Vladimir Korobov of the Kherson National Technical University acted as moderator of the focus groups. White and McAllister analyzed the complete transcript of the focus groups i.e. a videotaped record of the proceedings and a commentary by the moderator. With regard to the Orange Revolution, the population of Ukraine can roughly be divided into five categories; (1) , (2) revolution supporters, (3) revolution opponents, (4) counterrevolutionaries, and (5) inactive and undecided individuals. Revolutionaries are those

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who participated in collective action in favour of the Orange Revolution and who voted for Viktor Yushchenko during the third voting round. Individual actors can be considered as revolution supporters if they voted in favour of Viktor Yushchenko, but if they did not take part in the demonstrations and protests of the Orange Revolution. Revolution opponents either voted for Viktor Yanukovych or against all candidates during the third voting round and were not involved in any demonstrations or protests. Counterrevolutionaries can be regarded as individual actors whom participated in contra-demonstrations and protests and voted for Viktor Yanukovych or against all candidates. Inactive and undecided individual actors neither voted in the presidential election nor participated in any demonstration or protest which was related to the Orange Revolution (Beissinger 2013: pp. 578-580).

Table 1: Political Collective in the Orange Revolution 40 35 30 36,3 35,7 25 31,5 26,9 20 15 18,6 18,6 10 13,6 5 8,6 2 4 0

Monitoring Survey KIIS Survey

A problem with retrospective surveys about activities such as the Monitoring Survey is that respondents tend to adjust their attitudes and beliefs to the outcome of a revolutionary process. In other words, individual actors may claim to have behaved and voted differently than they actually did. The KIIS Survey which was conducted just prior to the third voting round could provide an alternative picture of individual actor participation in collective action and of their voting behaviour. The discrepancy between the KIIS Survey and Monitoring Survey as well as the difference between the election results and the outcome of these surveys complicate the call of which survey was right. The Orange Revolution resulted in a victory of Viktor Yushchenko in the third voting round of the presidential elections. As a consequence, supporters of the presidential campaign of Viktor Yanukovych may have described their protesting and voting behaviour differently in the Monitoring Survey, which was conducted in

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2005. This could be a possible explanation for the increasing numbers of revolutionaries and revolution supporters as well as for the decreasing numbers of revolution opponents and counterrevolutionaries in the Monitoring Survey in comparison to the KIIS Survey. Nevertheless, both surveys demonstrate that more Ukrainians supported than opposed the Orange Revolution. Furthermore, the Monitoring Survey, in particular, presents a detailed portrait of the Ukrainian society, as this survey discussed 357 questions covering a wide scale of topics. The response to these questions provides a greater insight into who the revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries of the Orange Revolution were.

Table 2: Identity Markers across Orange Revolution Groups

Participate Support Inactive Oppose

Proud to be Ukrainian 100 Primarily local or regional Lives in City Center 80 Identity 60 40 Identifies primarily as Lives in 20 citizen of Ukraine 0

Ukrainian as Native Greek Catholic of Catholic Language Speaks primarily Russian at Speaks primarily Ukrainian Home at Home

The Monitoring Survey shows that revolutionaries frequently are from Western Ukraine, are more likely to have access to the Internet, and attend church more often than the average population of Ukraine, while counterrevolutionaries are predominantly Russian-speaking males from who engage in physical exercise (Beissinger 2013: p. 581). Besides these characteristics, the Monitoring Survey and KIIS Survey also indicate the possible motives of individual actors to participate in collective actions either in favor of or against the Orange Revolution. Potential motives include, among others, political self-identification, opinion considering the incumbent regime, foreign policy orientation, national affiliation, regional affiliation, primary language, place of residence, national pride, and church attendance. The pro-democratic narrative of the Orange Revolution did, according to data from the Monitoring Survey, not seem to be the main motivation of participants in demonstrations and protests of the Orange Revolution; on the contrary only 34 percent of the revolutionaries supported a multi-party system, whereas 38 percent of the revolutionaries opposed this kind of

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system. Actually, more revolutionaries were in favour of the argument that “several strong leaders can do more for the country than laws and discussion” than in favour of a multi-party system. The KIIS Survey also concluded the limited importance of democratic values, as only 40 percent of the proclaimed revolutionaries provided the defense of a just and democratic society as one of their main motivations to participate in collective action during the Orange Revolution. Although Viktor Yushchenko’s political party, Our Ukraine, advocated a pro- Western foreign policy, a social liberal market plan, the redistribution of wealth, and an inclusive civic in which Ukrainian was the , the supporters of Yushchenko were divided over several of these topics as can be seen in the table below.

Table 3: Support by Participants of the Orange Revolution Pro-market Nationalist Anti-market Nationalist Socialist

90 82 80 72 70 62 61 60 53 50 41 39 38 39 40 40 25 24 30 21 17 20 12 108 10 8 8 10 3 0 Multi-Party Private Large Privatization of For Central For NATO Official Status System Enterprises Land Planning Orientation Membership Russian West

The diversity of the revolutionaries of the Orange Revolution became even more apparent when asked after their political orientation.

Table 4: Political Orientation

2%11% 29% 11% 1%3% 4% 5% 7% 27%

Communist Socialist Social-Democrat Greens Liberal Christian-Democrat National-Democrat Nationalist Other No Identification

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The group of revolutionaries seems above all diverse and divided over several topics. Therefore, the question should be posed what united the revolutionaries and the supporters of the Orange Revolution. What were the determining motives whether or not to participate in collective action? All revolutionaries showed intense dissatisfaction with the performance of the incumbent Kuchma government. One of the reasons that the Kuchma government mismanaged to mobilize individual actors who were willing to defend the regime was the fact that the majority of counterrevolutionaries were also dissatisfied with the regime. According to the KIIS Survey, a mere 43 percent of the counterrevolutionaries indicated support for this regime. Despite the crucial role protest against the authorities played in uniting the revolutionaries, the revolutionaries stated that there were several more reasons for their challenging of the regime; these reasons involved “an awakening of national consciousness” (41%), “hope for improved living standards” (39%), “concern for the future of one’s children” (33%), “an emotional protest against injustice” (33%), “dislike of one of the candidates” (30%), and “a choice between good and evil” (22%) (Beissinger 2013: p. 585).

§ 4.1.3 Focus group According to White and McAllister (2009: pp. 231-232), the vast majority of the population of Ukraine believes that the Orange Revolution was not a spontaneous event. This means that the Orange Revolution was either a putsch which was orchestrated by pro-Western forces inside Ukraine or by the supporters of Viktor Yushchenko. The respondents, in the focus groups of White and McAllister, who affiliated with the Ukrainian nationality and who declared that Ukrainian was their primary language were more likely to consider the Orange Revolution ‘a deliberate struggle of citizens united in the struggle to defend their rights’ than their Russian-speaking counterparts who regarded the Orange Revolution a coup d’état which was orchestrated by the West. The national affiliation and the primary language of the respondents were in close relation with the place of residence of these respondents. Whereas the vast majority of Ukrainians that spoke Ukrainian were from Western Ukraine, Russian-speaking were predominantly from Eastern and , especially from and the Donetsk Oblast (Idem: p. 233).

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Table 5: Views of the Orange Revolution: Identity, Language and Region

National Identity: Ukrainian National Identity: : : Russian Central East Kyiv North West South 70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 Western Coup Opposition Coup Spontaneous Deliberate Struggle National Identity: Ukrainian 28 17 21 34 National Identity: Russian 53 16 16 15 Language: Ukrainian 19 12 26 43 Language: Russian 45 22 15 18 Central 21 14 32 33 East 47 22 14 17 Kyiv 13 2 19 66 North 14 22 27 37 West 14 9 24 53 South 57 18 15 10

Although the Orange Revolution was firmly supported in Western Ukraine, the change and progress which the participants in demonstrations and protests hoped for remained confined. This caused disappointment among participants. Bogdan, a 60-year-old factory worker from L’viv, compared the Orange Revolution with the French Revolution of 1789 in the sense that both revolutions were initially a spontaneous movement against corruption and humiliation. Ol’ga, a 30-year-old public administrator from L’viv, argued that the Orange Revolution was a “euphoria of friendship and revolution” in the beginning, but that as time progressed it “gave the clans a chance to settle old scores, share out the winnings, and sort things out the way they wanted.” (White and McAllister 2009: p. 237). Whereas Aleksei – a student in his early twenties from L’viv – had participated in protests in hope for change, Alexandra – a lawyer of twenty- something years old – and Yekaterina – a thirty-year-old telephonist – expected from the very beginning that there would not change a lot. Other residents from L’viv mentioned that the

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police would take fewer bribes and that there was some element of freedom to life after the Orange Revolution. Contrary to their fellow Western Ukrainians from L’viv, residents of Rivne expressed themselves more positively about the results of the Orange Revolution. Residents of Rive called national consciousness and social cohesion, particularly among youngsters, and the freedom of expression as positive developments which were made possible due to the Orange Revolution. According to Rivne residents, individual actors were not forced to participate in collective actions, instead, they participated in collective action because they felt like participating. Although the respondents from L’viv and Rivne had different opinions on the results of the Orange Revolution, the contrast between the opinions of respondents from these relative cities and respondents from Eastern and Southern Ukraine is more far-reaching. The – overwhelmingly Russian-speaking and Yanukovych-voting – respondents from Donetsk Oblast, for example, did not see the Orange Revolution as spontaneous; on the contrary, as Sergei – an almost forty years old salesman – states: “the whole thing had been carried out with American money.” Konstantin approved the statement of his compatriot while arguing that only the Soros-foundation could be behind the “” due to the well-rehearsed political technology which was used during the demonstrations and protests. Nikolai – a senior factory worker – argued that ordinary Ukrainians were “absolutely not prepared for such a revolution” […] “people had just managed to stir them up with a variety of monetary and other inducements.” Viktoriya – a twenty-eight-year-old economist – believed that everything had been planned, prepared, and practiced in advance. Some respondents, however, saw the Orange Revolution as a popular uprising; an uprising which threatened the existence of the Russian language and the Donbass region (Nikolai). Some respondents claimed to have participated in counterrevolutionary demonstrations and protests; Irina (a housewife in her mid-thirties) was motivated to support her presidential candidate and Viktoriya protected her freedom to vote. The dominant results of the Orange Revolution were, according to the respondents from Donetsk, an economic crisis and worse political relations with the Russian Federation. The respondents from Poltava (east-) were also sardonic considering the motivations of Orange Revolution supporters. For example, Stanislav – a pensioner in his early sixties – argued that the Orange Revolution began as sincere protests of youth movements which hoped for a better life, but these protests were soon hijacked by opposition politicians whom only cared about seizing political power. These politicians offered demonstrators and protesters money in order to continue their protests. Daniil – a 20-year-old student – approved this view by stating that what started off as genuine protests against Kuchmism transformed

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into paid demonstrations and protests. Yelena – a university teacher of forty-something years old – was more nuanced, she argued that despite some participants in protests related to the Orange Revolution had earned money, there were also citizens who supported the protests through providing food and medicines to the people who slept in tents on the Independence Square in Kiev. Respondents from Kharkov predominantly thought that the Orange Revolution was American-funded. Andrei, for example, argued that the Orange Revolution by no means was a popular revolution; while some individuals may have stood up for their ideals during this revolution, the majority of the participants in the Orange Revolution were intrinsically motivated by money that was offered. Arkadii – a writer from Mykolaiv – stated about the Orange Revolution that “in the end, it was just the ousting of one group from power and its replacement by another.” However, Marina – a twenty-year-old student – had rather different thoughts. She participated in the protests at the Independence Square in Kiev because “she felt she had to do so, and to be honest, got a lot of satisfaction out of it, even inspiration. Nobody had put any pressure on her, although there obviously had to be someone who could organize the crowd and make sure there were no disorders.” Bogdan – who was a fellow student in his mid-twenties – also stated that the organizers definitely possessed money, but “all the same it had been a genuine people’s revolution; not everyone was there for the money.” Svetlana – a librarian in her late forties – described her participation in the sense that she had herself experienced a kind of feeling she had never experienced before, and which she couldn’t explain. There was something of the same elusive, mystical quality in the kinds of changes that were reported.

§ 4.1.4 Speeches on Maidan Nezalezhnosti Although the motives of individual actors which participated in the series of demonstrations and protests during the Orange Revolution provide insight into the differences within the resistance movement, the actions and speeches of the opposition leaders – that received great support of the resistance movement – may also hold essential explanatory power for the acting of the resistance movement. In this subsection of the thesis, I will study speeches of both Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko. The resistance movement which challenged Kuchma’s government and his intended successor through nonviolent strategies lacked an evident demographic statistic. This lack of a single determining demographic statistic resulted in the decision of the resistance movement to adopt “narod” – i.e. the Ukrainian nation – as a signifier of the movement. Participants in

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demonstrations and protests identified themselves as part of the Ukrainian Nation which had risen to challenge “vlada” – i.e. the authorities and supporters of the authorities. Viktor Yushchenko responded to these sentiments of belonging to the Ukrainian nation by stating that his presidential campaign was associated with Ukrainian nation and that he identified a potential victory during the presidential elections as a victory of the Ukrainian nation. The first time that Viktor Yushchenko expressed his connection to the Ukrainian nation was during his TV debates with Viktor Yanukovych prior to the second voting round. Viktor Yushchenko argued that: “on this election the authorities have opposed not the opposition; the authorities have opposed the nation. Nevertheless, I have defeated in the first round the candidate from the authorities. And most important is not my victory - it is the victory of Ukrainian democracy, the victory of the Ukrainian nation” (Zherebkin 2005: p. 18). This statement of Viktor Yushchenko connected his presidential campaign to the feelings of belonging of participants in the resistance movement. This connection caused Yushchenko’s presidential campaign to be an appealing object of identification throughout, in particular, northern and western, Ukraine. This identification process was particularly strong due to the lack of a national identity in Ukraine. Ukraine was, first and foremost, a divided nation with, inter alia, Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking areas which both had longstanding historical ties to the land they were living. The inability of Ukrainians to develop a national narrative which was related to their nation and state led to uncertainty and feelings of defeat. For this reason, the presidential campaign of Viktor Yushchenko gained great support. Yulia Tymoshenko, a prominent opposition politician and supporter of Viktor Yushchenko, called during the first day of the Orange Revolution to overcome the defeats and the failures of the past, Tymoshenko stated: “There will be no negotiations with these criminal authorities! There will be no mercy for they have ruined the choice of Ukraine. And I know: for the first time in thirteen years we will not leave Kiev without a victory. Is this right? – Yes!!!” (Zherebkin 2005: p. 19). This speech of Yulia Tymoshenko was supposed to unify demonstrators and protesters of various backgrounds behind one signifier i.e. the victory of the nation. This idea of the Ukrainian nation was both an appealing and fixed object of identification to the participants in the Orange Revolution. The term victory, however, was rather vague and could involve several, sometimes clashing, desires of demonstrators and protesters. Yulia Tymoshenko continued her speech by claiming that: “The people will have their say. I don’t believe in what Kuchma said about how the Ukrainian nation hasn’t been born. I want to ask you, do we exist? – (the crowd) Yes! – In

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this case, the victory will be ours! I believe in you. All the politicians, present here, believe in you! I want to ask you, will we be able to secure the victory?! – (the crowd) Yes!!! - I know that! I want to ask you, do you understand that a single person must not leave this square, except as a victor? – Yes!!!”(idem). Yulia Tymoshenko attempted to unify the participants in the Orange Revolution through promising them a victory if they would challenge and oppose the authorities through civil disobedience and strikes. The authorities were considered as the competing out-group which threatened the preservation of the Ukrainian nation. To emphasize this threat Tymoshenko uses a statement of president Kuchma about the nonexistence of the Ukrainian nation. This statement is supposed to convince the crowds at Maidan in 2004 that the Kuchma government and that Viktor Yanukovych, the supposed successor of Kuchma, intentionally prevent the flourishing of the Ukrainian nation. The actions of the “vlada” – i.e. the authorities – is not supposed to be challenged through violence, as the participants of the Orange Revolution which have gathered on the Independence Square (Maidan) in Kiev are the best, most intellectual, and most active part of the resistance movement. This provides the demonstrators and protesters an exemplary role towards the rest of the Ukrainian nation. These demonstrators and protesters have to set an example of what the Ukrainian nation is supposed to be like. The use of the terminology enemy, to describe the authorities, leaves room for interpretation, of what this enemy actually is, open. Demonstrators and protesters with a nationalist orientation could define the enemy as “traitors of the Ukrainian nation”, socialist could refer to the enemy as “criminal oligarchs”, and liberals could describe the enemy as “the repressive state authorities”. Although the connotation of enemy was broad and appealed to the majority of participants in the Orange Revolution, Viktor Yushchenko did not flinch from using explicit rhetoric. Yushchenko used nationalistic anti-Russian rhetoric when he accused the authorities – i.e. Kuchma and Yanukovych – of betraying Ukrainian interests and obeying orders from the Russian Federation. Yushchenko claimed that he agreed with the demonstrators and protesters on one point: “It is time to stop electing the Ukrainian president in . And these visits either in the Crimea or Moscow humiliate any candidate from an independent Ukraine. This issue concerns Moscow, as well as and . I am sure that we have a country that is capable of electing its president by its own will” (Zherebkin 2005: p. 20). Besides nationalistic rhetoric, Viktor Yushchenko also applied liberal rhetoric in debates with Yanukovych. Yushchenko criticized the authorities of discouraging foreign investments in Ukraine. This lack of investments prevented Ukraine from developing an advanced free market.

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Yushchenko claimed that were only interested in the enlargement of their capital, whereby it was difficult to develop and to strengthen a socially just market. In other words, Ukrainian oligarchs complicated the redistribution of wealth which led to poverty amongst the population of Ukraine. Yushchenko emphasized this argument in a speech while stating: “I am speaking about the authorities, the people you do not want to live with, because they are criminal. Second, because they organized a shadow economy, which is working for 3-4 families. Under your guidance, the GDP growth was 12 %, but only 2 % reached the budget. Where was the difference going? And you are speaking about all these successes. During your leadership Ukrainian oligarchs became 2-3 times richer than they were 1.5 years ago. That is why, when we are talking about economic paths to growth, Viktor Fedorovych, these economic indicators have to do not with Ukraine, but with 2-3 families, and you should explain to the 47 million, how to use practically the 12 % of your economic wonder! Only a socially-just economy, an economy with a social orientation may raise the living standards of the people. If you want to raise the living standards, pensions, salaries of workers, officers, teachers, we have to remember one simple rule, we have to make politics honestly” (Zherebkin 2005: p. 21). This statement, the call for redistribution of wealth, and the blaming of Ukrainian oligarchs for poverty in Ukraine could be categorized as socialist thinking. The use of liberal, nationalistic, and socialist rhetoric and the use of the common label enemy provided Viktor Yushchenko with an ample support base. This support base was able to identify with Yushchenko his presidential campaign. The criminalization of the authorities was an important element in legitimizing the actions of the participants in the Orange Revolution, as these actions were concentrated on the ousting of an illegitimate regime which was not only against the demonstrators and protesters but also against the Ukrainian nation in general. According to the opposition, the criminal authorities had attempted to disturb the development and fostering of the national identity of Ukraine and thereby the identification process of the we-group. The Ukrainian national identity could, however, be secured through mass mobilization and peaceful protests and strikes. The participants in the Orange Revolution adopted a discourse of victimization to the Kuchma and Yanukovych regime. Yulia Tymoshenko who had lost her company and Viktor Yushchenko who was dismissed by President Kuchma were portrayed as the suffering of the Ukrainian population against the authorities. A suffering which was caused due to the loss of a national identity. Yulia Tymoshenko became the female symbol of the Orange Revolution which was supposed to be

38

protected against the criminal authorities and Viktor Yushchenko became known for his interest in Ukrainian folklore. This folklore would shape the foundation of the Ukrainian national identity.

§ 4.2 The Revolution of Dignity § 4.2.1 Timeline3 The refusal of President Yanukovych to sign the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union as well as his decision to seek rapprochement with the Russian Federation on November 21, 2013, preluded the demonstrations and protests on Independence Square in Kiev. These demonstrations and protests which initially were supposed to be nonviolent became known as or the Revolution of Dignity. The sudden change of foreign policy orientation in combination with distrust in the government and state repression against those who had gathered at Independence Square caused the demonstrations and protests on Independence Square to gain momentum. In other words, the Yanukovych government lost its last credentials after it had commanded security forces to crush demonstrations and protests on Independence Square. This loss of confidence resulted in mass support for demonstrations and protests against the authorities. Despite the multi-faced character of the Revolution of Dignity demonstrations and protests, these demonstrations and protests can roughly be divided into four stages (Zelinska 2017: p. 4). An initial phase (November 21 to November 29) of demonstrations and protests that consisted of peaceful rallies in which people advocated rapprochement with the European Union. A second phase (November 30 to January 15) in which people peacefully demonstrated and protested against police violence and human rights . During the second phase, the demonstrators and protesters also demanded the suspension of President Yanukovych. This caused political opposition leaders to negotiate with President Yanukovych, but the crowds that had gathered on Independence Square did not feel represented by these opposition politicians. A third phase (January 16 to February 28) in which nonviolent strategies were abandoned and in which demonstrators and protesters resorted to the use of violence against the police and security forces of the Yanukovych government. Finally, a phase that led to armed confrontations between various nationalist militias. This concluding phase is signified by escalating tensions between the governments of the Russian Federation and Ukraine due to,

3 Reportings of demonstrations and protests by KyivPost have been used in order to deconstruct the events which happened each day.

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inter alia, the ousting of President Yanukovych, the signing of an Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union, the annexation of Crimea, and the War in Donbass. Hereinafter, the thesis provides for each phase of the Revolution of Dignity prominent events which influenced the course of the demonstrations and protests. The first phase of the Revolution of Dignity was characterized by the demand for European integration. The decision of President Yanukovych to delay the signing of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union was a catalyst for demonstrations and protests. #Euromaidan circulated on social media networks with the purpose of encouraging citizens of Kiev, especially students, to gather on Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in order to protest the decision of President Yanukovych. By the night of November 21 on November 22, thousands of individuals, among them community leaders, opposition politicians, and members of nationalist groups, had come to Independence Square to express their opinions. These individuals began building tent encampments as had happened during the Orange Revolution. The example which was set in Kyiv was soon followed-up in Ivano- Frankivsk, L’viv, and Kharkov. Despite efforts of authorities to drive out the demonstrators, the demonstrators intended to stay. The protesters, of whom the majority were students, demanded a return to European integration as the nation’s foreign policy. On November 23, hundreds of thousands of demonstrators and protesters had gathered in Kyiv in order to participate in a collective pro-European march on November 24. On November 26, the leaders of the political and popular Maidan combined forces in order to take a firmer stand against the authorities. This compatibility happened under the condition that opposition politicians would not join the public Maidan for the purpose of self-interest. As President Yanukovych seemed to concede the demands; the signing of the Association Agreement, the adoption of laws necessary for European integration, and the resignation of Azarov’s , many protesters returned home. This provided the Yanukovych government with the opportunity to decamp the remaining protesters through the use of severe force. This use of violence by security forces caused the second phase of the Revolution of Dignity (Portnov 2015: pp. 6-8; Zelinska 2017: p. 8). The second phase of the Revolution of Dignity signified a gradual change from pro- European motives to the challenging of the Yanukovych government, protesting against civil and human rights abuses, and opposing of police violence. The brute security police violence was answered by millions of people that gathered on November 30, 2013, on Independence Square in order to show their sympathy with the demonstrators and protesters who had been assaulted. The demonstrations and protests were no longer about a change in the foreign policy

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orientation of Ukraine, instead, the resignation of President Yanukovych and the prosecution of security police members was demanded. President Yanukovych was able to remain silent on the violent occasion, as the political opposition leaders lacked a strategy to challenge his position. Meanwhile, video coverage of the police violence led to an increased mobilization of people who believed that the security police had crossed a threshold of tolerable behaviour. In the afternoon of December 1, the demonstrators occupied the Kyiv City State Administration Office. Nine of the protesters who had, in a nonviolent manner, occupied the Administration Office were arrested. President Yanukovych was alarmed by several international political actors in order to prevent bloodshed through roundtable negotiations, but neglected this advice from delegates of the European Union and the United States. President Yanukovych was seemingly irritated with the international reactions to his policies. As a consequence, he commanded security forces to clear the Independence Square. However, the security police had underestimated the number of protesters and therefore had to retreat. President Yanukovych organized a roundtable discussion with opposition leaders in order to negotiate an end to the protests. The fact that this discussion was behind closed doors, and inaccessible to ordinary citizens by other means, caused resistance and devaluation of the position of the political opposition leaders. The demonstrations increasingly focused on the resignation of the authorities in general. President Yanukovych considered the division between Russian- speaking and Ukrainian-speaking Ukraine, between the east side and the west side of the , as his last resort. Yanukovych endeavoured to mobilize Ukrainian citizens with a Russian affiliation through stating that an ultranationalist threat would come after them if they would not support his status as an authority. This inflamed already existing grievances in Ukraine. Citizens of Eastern and Southern Ukraine publicly expressed their support of the authorities. This support was strengthened after Yanukovych negotiated an economic and political deal with the Russian Federation. This deal included the lowering of prices on gas and oil as well as a 15 billion dollar investment of the Russian Federation in Ukraine in order to foster the brotherhood between both nations. These deals, in combination with an attempt of opposition politicians, academics, journalists, and musicians to claim control over the resistance movement on Independence Square, were considered as an act of Russian absolutism. Elements of the resistance movement on Independence Square increasingly demonstrated nationalist expressions such as Glory to Ukraine – Glory to the Heroes and showed black-and-red banners. These black-and-red banners were a reference to the Ukrainian nationalist underground of the Second World War. Despite the majority of individuals on Independence Square being in favour of a pro-European policy course, radical Ukrainian nationalists gained a stronger position in the

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resistance movement. Individuals who identified themselves with this sub-group in the resistance movement on Independence Square did not recoil from enouncing anti-immigrant, homophobic, and pro-Ukrainian statements. The presence of these nationalists would in the course of January cause violent confrontations between forces which were aligned with the government – i.e. police, security police, and mercenaries – and the people at Independence Square (Portnov 2015: pp. 10-17; Zelinska 2017: p. 8). During the third phase of the Revolution of Dignity, the initial peaceful demonstrations and protests turned violent after a (Common Cause) activist called on the demonstrators and protesters to march to the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian Parliament). The question should be posed why this activist made this call. Although it is difficult to accurately indicate when the third phase of the Revolution of Dignity began, the ‘dictatorial laws’ of January 16, 2014, which were legislated by the Yanukovych government could be considered as the event that immediately led to violent clashes on January 22. These laws involved a limitation to the freedom of speech and a prohibition of outdoor assembly and demonstrations. The resistance movement on Independence Square responded to these laws by discrediting the authorities through establishing a People’s Council. The weak political performance of political opposition leaders in the Ukrainian parliament and on Independence Square caused dissatisfaction which swiftly turned into chaos. A Spilna Sprava activist took his opportunity to agitate individual protesters to march to and to occupy the Verkhovna Rada. This march caused bloody clashes between the security police and protesters at Hrushevskogo Street. Protesters threw rocks and Molotov cocktails at the security police, while the security police opened lethal gunfire on the protesters. This very act on January 22, 2014, signified the turn to violent strategies by, at least a part of, the resistance movement. The authorities’ attempt to intimidate the protesters did not succeed; on the contrary, protesters organized People’s Councils throughout Ukraine and, in some places, protesters resorted to the use of violence against government forces as well. The proposal of the European Union to host early presidential elections in December 2014 was rejected by the resistance movement, as they did not desire Yanukovych to be in office any longer. Clashes between the police, security police, and mercenaries on the one side and radical rightwing demonstrators and protesters on the other side continued. The city centre of Kyiv turned into a battlefield in which Molotov cocktails, pyrotechnics, stun grenades, and tear gas were repeatedly used. The previously nonviolent resistance movement supported resistance fighters through providing medical aid. The bloodiest clashes were, however, still to come. These clashes occurred from February 18 to February 21, 2014. The Yanukovych government commanded the security police and

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mercenaries to use severe force. During these four days, 88 participants of the Revolution of Dignity were brutally murdered. These 88 participants, together with other individuals who died in demonstrations and protests, are commemorated as the “Heavenly Hundred”. On , President Yanukovych fled Ukraine. This marked the beginning of the final phase of the Revolution of Dignity (Portnov 2015: pp. 17-25; Zelinska 2017: p. 8).

§ 4.2.2 Focus Group, Interviews, and Surveys The role of social media in the Revolution of Dignity is apparent, as an online message, of citizen journalist , immediately caused the onset of the series of protests. This message stated: “We are meeting at 22:30 under the Monument of Independence. Dress warm, bring umbrellas, tea, coffee, good mood and friends. Reposts are highly encouraged!” (Bohdanova 2014: p. 133). The online message of Mustafa Nayyem was spread over social media and encouraged a couple of thousands of people to participate in collective protests on Independence Square on November 21, 2013. This was not the only occasion in which social media was used during the Revolution of Dignity; on the contrary, posts, live streams, and tweets with the hashtag Euromaidan, in various languages, informed people throughout Ukraine, and around the world, about the developments in Kyiv and other municipalities in Ukraine. Individuals were able to access and inform themselves about the developments from home. As a consequence, the police violence in the night of November 30 on Independence Square did not only affect those who were beaten but also the people who watched from home. The independent Internet-based media actively contributed to demonstrations and protests through crowdfunding events and spreading essential information online. This information provided international media material to broadcast (Bohdanova 2014; Surzhko-Harned and Zahuranec 2017). Olga Onuch (2015) researched the impact of social media on mobilization during the Revolution of Dignity by conducting a focus group, interviews, and surveys. Three questions were central in this research: “who were the EuroMaidan protesters, what did they want, and how were they mobilized to join in?” As the collected data was consistent, representative, and conducted over multiple days, the data allowed to distinguish between early joiners and later joiners as well as between the level of experience with participating in protests of the respondents. The surveys and some semi-structured interviews were conducted by university students during the demonstrations and protests at Independence Square, while focus groups

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and unstructured interviews were conducted after the demonstrations and protests had ceased in 2014. To guarantee the consistency and representativeness of the surveys, canvassers entered Independence Square from distinct directions and conducted a survey with each sixth individual, who participated in protests, which they would encounter. In case canvassers did not follow the sampling rules or if canvassers did participate in demonstrations and protests themselves, canvassers were asked not to participate in the conduction of surveys that day. Moreover, the surveys of these canvassers were not included in the results of that day. The first part of the surveys focused on the date, frequency, and type of participation. The second part informed about “who the protester came with (if anyone), how they found out where to go to protest, and what sources of information they used more broadly.” The third section of the survey concentrated on the primary claims and demands of the protesters. The fourth part of the survey involved civic engagement in elections and protests, membership in organizations and parties, and past political behaviour. The last section of the survey regarded the demographic background of the respondent. The semi-structured interviews focused essentially on five different question, these questions were: (1) why are you here today, (2) why did you decide to protest, (3) why is your protesting important, (4) who did you come with, and (5) what source of information did you use to find out about the protest. The interviewer would ask for clarification so that the respondent was able to describe the reason for their participation in their own words. During the second wave of research, Onuch et al. (2015) conducted fifty unstructured interviews with both opposition and regime insider activists, journalists, and politicians as well as focus groups with activists and citizens. To understand why the Revolution of Dignity turned violent, a researcher is supposed to understand who the individual actors were that participated in collective action during the Revolution of Dignity and what had encouraged these individual actors to participate. Onuch (2015) establishes that 59 percent of the individual actors which participated in demonstrations and protests identified as man, 92 percent affirmed a Ukrainian national affiliation, while only 69 percent of the respondents claimed to speak Ukrainian at home. This indicates that the Revolution of Dignity was, in fact, not exclusively a Ukrainian affair. In other words, individual actors who identified as Belarussian, Georgian, or Russian and individual actors who were Russian-speaking also contributed to, and participated in, collective action during the Revolution of Dignity. As was the case with the Orange Revolution, the vast majority of the protesters resided from Central and Western Ukraine. The age of the participants in the Revolution of Dignity provides a greater contrast. Individual actors could roughly be divided into three generations. Each of these generations claimed distinct reasons to participate in the

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Revolution of Dignity. A similarity between the generations was that most individuals claimed to have participated in demonstrations and protests at, at least, three different occasions during the Revolution of Dignity. The first generation of participants considered students and youngsters (24 years old and younger). Individual actors who belonged to this category referred to themselves as the initiators and the leaders of demonstrations and protests. This generation was motivated to participate in collective action in order to accomplish “freedom” and “real democracy”. These terms involved among other the improvement of civil and human rights through European integration. The second generation was slightly older than the first generation. The second generation predominantly consisted of (young) professionals with families. Individual actors of this generation regarded themselves as crucial participants, as they were responsible for the election of the current politicians. Furthermore, this generation was the working force of Ukraine and, according to them, politicians had, therefore, to take their concerns into account. The motivations to participate in collective actions, for individual actors of this generation, differed from a brighter socioeconomic future to economic security to visa-liberalization with the European Union. After November 30, this generation was a voice against regime repression. The third generation was composed of elderly people who participated in the Revolution of Dignity. Individual actors who adhered to this generation described themselves as the guardians of democracy and the protectors of the legacy of the Orange Revolution. Individual actors of this generation mentioned experience and time as essential credentials which they could contribute to the demonstrations and protests. The elderly, generally, attempted to take care of fellow protesters and to assist the organization when possible with their knowledge and understanding of the Ukrainian society. Although each generation has different motives to participate in the Revolution of Dignity, these justifications do not provide a deeper understanding of the factors which mobilized individual actors. To put it differently, the general motivations – e.g. brighter future, European integration, infringement of rights, and violent repression – are evident, but these motivations do not immediately urge individual actors to participate in collective action. Motivations which could actually urge people to participate in collective action are group-based anger, identity, ideology, and instrumental benefits. In particular, group-based anger and identity motivated individual actors to participate in collective action. Individuals discussed the ongoing demonstrations and protests with friends, relatives, and colleagues. Social confirmation on the side of these friends, relatives, and colleagues encouraged individual actors to make the step

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from passive resistance to active resistance. In other words, conversations about the Revolution of Dignity caused the decision of individuals to participate in demonstrations and protests which were aligned with the Revolution of Dignity. Focus group participants confirmed the importance of having friends, relatives, and colleagues who either already participated or were planning to participate in demonstrations and protests. The knowledge that these people socially confirmed a potential participant’s ideas and concerns led to a feeling of safety. The conversations between these individuals about the Revolution of Dignity occurred, for example, due to messages on social media networks, coverage by mainstream media such as radio and television, and more directly through telephone calls and invitations to participate. The surveys of Onuch and et al. indicate that particularly traditional media and the Internet were great mobilizing factors:

Table 6: Mobilizing Factors

Vkontakte 12,8

Radio/TV 52,3

Phone Call 22,2

Letter 9,5

Internet TV 16,8

Facebook 37,2

E-mail 3,2

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Mobilizing Factors

§ 4.2.3 Speeches on Maidan Nezalezhnosti The public discourse during the first phase of the Revolution of Dignity predominantly focused on the peaceful character of the resistance movement and the movement’s aim to accomplish European Integration. This thesis particularly concentrates on the speeches of political opposition leaders (All-Ukrainian Union “Freedom”), (Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform), and (All-Ukrainian Union "Fatherland") as well as – who is a famous Ukrainian singer and winner of Eurovision that participated in demonstrations and protests – and EU-delegates such as Loreta Graužinienė. Although the Revolution of Dignity was initiated by call, of political activist Mustafa Nayyem, for supporters of the Association Agreement to gather in Independence Square on

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November 21, official political statements of opposition leaders and delegates of the European Union regarding European integration were only made several days after the onset of the Revolution of Dignity. During the pro-European march which was organized on November 24, political opposition leader Vitali Klitschko thanked the protesters personally for showing their support to European integration. Arseniy Yatsenyuk argued that rapprochement with the European Union would be achieved in one way or another. He stated that: “This [the pro-European March] is not a rally for one day, a gathering for one day, we must endure and come every day to demand our call to get closer to Europe” (Grytsenko 2013). Yatsenyuk continued arguing that if President Viktor Yanukovych would be incapable of implementing a political association and free trade agreement with the European Union, he should be removed from office. Participants in the pro-European march motivated their decision to participate in this collective action as their support for European values (29-years-- resident and service worker Oleksiy Zahumny), their way to show European politicians that Ukraine has chosen a European path (57-years old Kyiv-settled teacher Nina Pavliuk), their way to establish a brighter future in which people have access to normal education and the opportunity to freely travel throughout Europe (20-years-old history student from L’viv Uliana Kyrch). These participants received support from Jan Tombinski, the European Union Ambassador to Ukraine, who in an official Facebook-statement said about the pro-European March: “I notice massive mobilization of Ukrainian citizens in support of the signing of the association agreement between Ukraine and the European Union. After Cathy Ashton, the High Representative I wish to stress my believe that the future for Ukraine lies in a strong relationship with the EU. We stand firm in our commitment to the people of Ukraine who would have been the main beneficiaries of the agreement though the enhanced freedom and prosperity the agreement would have brought about” (Miller 2013). Hence, the participants of demonstrations and protests which were aligned with the Revolution of Dignity were supported by both political opposition leaders and the highest delegates of the European Union in their strive to accomplish a European integration process. The political opposition leaders showed a willingness to challenge the political regime of Viktor Yanukovych if President Yanukovych would not decide to adopt a pro-European course in his foreign policy orientation. The following days protesters and the political opposition leaders attempted to put greater pressure on President Yanukovych. Arseniy Yatsenkyuk went as far as to call for the of President Yanukovych i.e. impeachment through demonstrations and protests as the political opposition received too little support in the Verkhovna Rada in order to achieve

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political impeachment. During a speech on Independence Square, Loreta Graužinienė, the speaker of the Lithuanian parliament (), stated, in Russian, that Lithuania supported Ukraine in its endeavour to assume a European identity and that Lithuania is willing to assist Ukraine with its European integration through functioning as a bridge between the European Union and Ukraine. On November 27, 2013, the political opposition leaders – Chairman of the Political Council of the Association “Batkivschyna” Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Head of the UDAR Political Party Vitali Klitschko, and Head of “Svoboda” Oleh Tyahnybok – came with an official statement to the people who had gathered at Independence Square, they stated that: “Hundreds of thousands of our country’s citizens have joined together on and Maidan Nezalezhnosti [Independence Square] in Kyiv, on scores of other Euromaidans in other Ukrainian cities in order to support the concept of Ukraine’s European association. The squares and streets of our cities have become a common space of freedom in Ukraine, where everyone can express their opinions and demonstrate their own position on the actions of the Ukrainian authorities. […] Various people came out in support of Ukraine’s European integration – non- and members of opposition political parties, with party flags and without them, entrepreneurs, students, young people and our honoured veterans, residents of the east and south, centre, north and west of Ukraine. The idea of European integration has symbolically united two iconic places of the capital – Independence Square, which is a symbol of Ukraine and European Square, which symbolises Europe in Ukraine. It is a symbol of unity for the sake of European integration. […] Today attempts are being made to divide us, but this tactic will not work. We are different – but we are united because we share one ideal – at the summit President Viktor Yanukovych should sign the Association Agreement. […] We, politicians and community activists will jointly coordinate our actions and provide mutual support and protect those who have come out to support this ideal, and will issue daily reports on our plans. We express our sincere gratitude to public figures, writers, poets, musicians, journalists for their support and performances. We also thank the people of Kyiv for providing fantastic support to the rally with food, warm clothing, communication systems and so on. […] We appeal to residents and guests from other cities – come and stand on European Square and Maidan Nezalezhnosti, bring warm clothes and food, spread the message and report about what happens to those who do not have access to the Internet and objective information. […] We appeal to our supporters in other cities – takes to the streets of your cities, create your Euromaidans. Do not be indifferent! Ukraine’s destiny is in our hands!” (Miller 2013).

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The political opposition leaders emphasized the unity of Ukraine despite its diversity in national affiliation and socioeconomic class. People are united in their support for European values and European integration. Ukraine is portrayed as an independent state in which every individual is supposed to have the opportunity to freely express themselves. Furthermore, the participants in and contributors to demonstrations and protests are paid tribute to and encouraged to continue to support the cause of the demonstrations and protests. In another speech, Yatsenyuk accused the political regime of misleading its citizens through not signing the Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine. However, despite the decision of President Yanukovych, according to Yatsenyuk, Ukraine’s future is with Europe. In the evening of November 29, 2013, when the postponement of the Association Agreement is definite, Vitali Klitschko urged the protesters at Independence Square to remain united and not to “get goaded into provocations by the hired thugs” referring to pro-government forces (Rachkevych 2013). Ruslana also emphasized the importance of peaceful revolution and nonviolent demonstrations and protests. Thus, the discourse between November 21 and November 29 was predominantly focused on European integration, challenging the political regime of President Yanukovych, and supposed to be peaceful in order to obtain international support. This discourse gradually changed during December and early January. During the night of November 29 to November 30, special police and security forces used severe violence against protesters in order to clear Independence Square from demonstrators and protesters. These police actions increasingly gained attention in the political and public discourse during the Revolution of Dignity. In spite of the attention which was given to state repression and police violence, the political opposition leaders, among which had joined, urged the protesters to preserve their peaceful stance and not to fall for provocations of pro-government forces such as the riot police. On December 2, 2013, the demonstrators and protesters of the Revolution of Dignity began building a defensive perimeter around Independence Square in order to hold off the forces of the government. Several members, the political party of which President Yanukovych is the chairman, among whom , decide to leave the party and condemn the state repression against peaceful protesters. However, other party members remain faithful to the Party of Regions and condemn the demonstrators and protesters at Independence Square for endangering the public order. On December 6, 2013, the Ukrainian authorities and the political opposition agreed to a proposal of the to establish an expert advisory panel which is supposed to oversee the investigation into the violent incidents in Kyiv on November 30 and December 1. According to Secretary General Jagland of the Council of Europe, the

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involvement of the international community is supposed to guarantee the “transparency and acceptance of this investigation” and to set “the first step to rebuilding trust in Ukraine” (Gorchinskyaya 2013). December 7, 2013, was marked by the visit of former Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili to the demonstrators and protesters at Independence Square. In a speech, Saakashvili said that: “I am not here to interfere in (Ukraine’s) domestic affairs, Ukrainians are to agree on that. However, the fact that illegal takeover of sovereign European country is being made by (Vladimir) Putin’s is a subject to all Europe, the whole world and all of us” (Forina 2013). In short, Saakashvili warns the audience at Independence Square for Russian intervention in their politics. Vitali Klitschko adopted this discourse through emphasizing the failure to seek rapprochement with the European Union during the 22 years of Ukraine’s independent existence. Arseniy Yatsenyuk elaborated on this vision by adding the fact that “Ukrainians came out for values” while referring to European values. Oleh Tyahnybok stresses the importance to avoid violence by stating “we are going to block here, not fight.” The Ambassador of the United States to Ukraine, Geoffrey Pyatt, stated that: “Peaceful demonstrations must be allowed to continue. Dialogue and non-violence key, world watching. Opportunity must not be lost” (Miller 2013).

The participants in demonstrations and protests which are aligned with the Revolution of Dignity succeeded in remaining peaceful, whereby the international community and states such as the US supported their efforts. In particular, the statement of Oleksandr Sushko, the Research Director at Institute for -Atlantic Cooperation, is powerful. Sushko argued that although President Yanukovych is planning “to remove Maidan before (EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President Catherine) Ashton comes”, people will continue their nonviolent resistance, as “if we [the protesters] surrender, there will be [an autocratic state], if not – Yugoslavia [freedom]” (Miller 2013). The following day expressed her concerns with the forcible entry into the “Fatherland” party office in Kyiv on December 9. Diplomats of the European Union also expressed their concerns about the “excessive use of force against peaceful demonstrators who were making use of their right to peaceful assembly” (Miller 2013). Yuriy Lutsenko, an essential opposition leader, argued that the main objective of the political opposition leaders should be to determine who will be the leader of the revolution, as a single candidate was key to the success of the Orange Revolution. According to Lutsenko, the only way forward would

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be to strike and to block the whole of Kyiv in order to ensure the impeachment of President Yanukovych. While state repression and police violence against the demonstrators and protesters endured, Ruslana and the political opposition leaders encouraged the demonstrators and protesters not to resort to the use of violence, as this would signify the end of the Revolution of Dignity. The nonviolent intentions which are promoted by Ruslana and the political opposition leaders are acknowledged and recognized by US Senator John McCain, who stated that: “It is appalling that Ukrainian authorities have chosen to use violence and oppression against peaceful demonstrators in Maidan Square in Kyiv. Such despicable conduct violates the most basic universal rights – especially the freedom to speak and associate – that are owed to all people. […] If Ukraine’s government thinks that brute force and the politics of fear can see it through the current crisis, it is woefully mistaken. More and more Ukrainians are showing that they are no longer afraid. Those brave men and women should know that they are not alone. Their friends across the world stand in solidarity with them. We will keep the world’s attention on Ukraine’s struggle for freedom, justice, and opportunity, and we will demand consequences for any crimes perpetrated against Ukrainians who are peacefully exercising their fundamental human rights” (Official Website Senator McCain). The decision of President Yanukovych to seek rapprochement with the Russian Federation and the Customs Union is challenged by the political opposition leaders who state that this decision went against the will of the Ukrainian people. On December 14, 2013, opposition leaders at Independence Square decided to establish groups of activists which were supposed to defend demonstrators and protesters from state repression and police violence. The sole purpose of these groups was to defend the community at Independence Square. In particular, radical rightwing youngsters decided either to associate with or to join these defense groups. Meanwhile, the protesters received moral support from Simon Pánek, who led the Czech student movement in 1989, Linas Linkevicius, the Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Rebecca Harms, a German politician and Member of the for Alliance ’90/The Greens. During a speech on December 15, 2013, US Senators and John McCain expressed the support of the American nation with the peaceful protests. Senator McCain quoted Ukrainian bard : “Love your Ukraine, love her in cruel times, love her in tough moments, pray to god for her, thank you and god bless” (Rachkevych 2013), to show his engagement with the Ukrainian nation. Political opposition leader Vitali Klitschko and Oleh Tyahnybok underscored the importance of unity and the decision to oppose any orientation other than towards the European Union. The demands which the demonstrators and

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protesters are supposed to unite around are: (1) a new government, (2) a new parliament, and (3) a new president. In short, the second phase of the Revolution of Dignity, roughly occurring from November 30 until January 19, was an era in which the participants in demonstrations and protests aligned with the Revolution of Dignity actively sought European integration through the election of a new government, parliament, and president. Moreover, the Revolution of Dignity challenged state repression and police violence through peaceful means. These peaceful means were acclaimed by various diplomats of the European Union and the United States as well as US Senators. In particular, the forcible entry in the All-Ukrainian “Fatherland” political party office by secret police forces gained attention from the international community. The international community highly condemned this action. Although defense groups were organized on Independence Square, the demonstrations and protests preserved its nonviolent character. This resort to violence happened on January 19, when several protesters decided to attack riot police with flash bombs and smoke bombs. The discourse of speeches which were held during the resort to violent strategies and the days after the resort to violence will be outlined below. January 19, 2014 can be marked as the day that a nonviolent resistance movement consisting of individual participants with a great diversity of socioeconomic class, national affiliation, and political orientation turned to the use of violent strategies against forces of the government – including riot police, secret police, and mercenaries – which had employed state repression and police violence against peaceful demonstrators and protesters several times. During the early afternoon of January 19, , an activist and investigative journalist who had been severely beaten on December 25, 2013, by a group of men she believed were directly commanded by President Yanukovych, held a speech on Independence Square. Chornovol depicted President Yanukovych and his allies as brutal men who liked killing other human beings, including women, and living species. In her speech, Chornovol stated that: “Around 10 current Party of Regions lawmakers used to be professional killers. This government knows how to kill. […] Yanukovych himself gets entertained killing animals in his hunting mansion. […] This is war. On the one side there are people, on the other side those who rob us. Yanukovych will not give up power easily. But we have a legal weapon, 2015 presidential elections. […] As a journalist I was investigating the forming of Donetsk clan. I was sure they will try to kill me once. I never thought it will happen so soon” (Rudenko 2014). In response to the speech of Chornovol, Dmitry Bulatov, the leaders of the self-defense units at Independence Square, demanded that the political opposition leaders will select a single

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candidate which will challenge President Yanukovych, but not just a single candidate who will fight President Yanukovych in a political manner, instead, a candidate which will take responsibility and lead the participants in the Revolution of Dignity to victory. This statement leaves it up to one of the political opposition leaders to step forward. However, neither Vitali Klitschko, Oleh Tyahnybok, nor Arseniy Yatsenyuk claims this leadership. Although the political opposition leaders claim a plan, the demonstrators and protesters are unsatisfied with the lack of initiative. The speech of self-defense activist, Sergiy Koba, indicates the loss of patience with the political opposition leaders. In his speech, Koba announced that the political opposition leaders were “failing to give people one leader to follow” (Rudenko 2014). According to Koba, if the political opposition leaders are unwilling to handpick a leader, the demonstrators and protesters will move in the direction of the Verkhovna Rada even though the presence of police. Although Vitali Klitschko attempts to prevent clashes between the government forces and the protesters, the protesters demonstrate their thoroughness by initiating a march. This march soon leads to clashes between radical rightwing participants – who are associated with Pravyi Sektor () and Spilna Sprava (Common Cause) in the Revolution of Dignity and the riot police. Yatsenyuk, in vain, condemns the resort to violent strategies of a part of the demonstrators and protesters. He described the opposition plan which was presented earlier that day as peaceful and devoted to discipline, patience, unity, and wisdom. In an official statement, the Embassy of the United States to Ukraine calls for an end to ongoing violent confrontations between the protesters and police, the Embassy states: “We urge calm and call on all sides to cease any acts provoking or resulting in violence. We further urge the to immediately start negotiations with all sides to resolve the political standoff, address protesters’ concerns, and prevent violence from spreading. Violence only serves to foster fear and confusion, and distracts from the need for a political solution, which is the best way to carry out the will of the Ukrainian people” (Miller 2014). Despite efforts of , the political opposition leaders, the US Embassy, and the international community to encourage demonstrators and protesters of the Revolution of Dignity to retrieve peaceful assembly and resistance, components of the resistance movement, which resorted to the use of violence against police, secret police, and mercenaries, continued their violent struggles vouched the statement of Georgiy Uchaykin. Uchaykin calls for all legal arms-owners of Ukraine to gather at Independence Square in order to fight and challenge the incumbent political regime. According to EuoMaidanPR, the social media outlet of the Revolution of Dignity, the ‘dictatorship laws’ which were implemented on January 16 caused

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mass indignation and led to the radicalization of protests. The only way to restore the peaceful character of the demonstrations and protests was to recall these laws and provide the demonstrators and protesters with the freedom of assembly and peaceful protests again. The kidnapping and torturing of had also strongly affected the position of elements of the Revolution of Dignity. Thus, the failure of the political opposition leaders to handpick a single candidate to lead the demonstrations and protests as well as a candidate which is capable of politically challenging President Yanukovych in combination with the ‘dictatorship laws’ which were implemented on January 16 2014 in the Ukrainian Parliament and the kidnapping and torturing of Dmytro Bulatov had caused the alienation and radicalization of radical rightwing participants in the Revolution of Dignity. These participants, who were associated with “Common Cause” and “Right Sector” resorted to the use of violent strategies.

5. Discussion This dissertation discussed four research gaps that should be taken into consideration while researching the nature of resistance movements, these lacunae are: (1) the influence which external actors exercise on a resistance movement, (2) the diversity of individual actors that participate in a resistance movement, (3) the interactions, patterns, and sequences that take place within a resistance movement, and (4) the possible relation between different nonviolent and violent resistance strategies that are applied by individual actors that adhere to a resistance movement. The research that is conducted in order to write this thesis focused, to a greater or lesser extent, on these lacunae. More precisely, this thesis concentrated on the acting of political representatives from the European Union and the United States in order to account for the influence which external actors exercise on a resistance movement, elaborated on the demographic backgrounds and the motives to participate in collective action of individual actors, and developed a day-to-day developments and discourse analysis in order to gain a deeper and greater understanding of the interactions in and the strategies of the respective resistance movements. An extensive analysis of both the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity teaches us a principal difference between these revolutions. This difference is that individuals actors who participated in demonstrations and protests aligned with the Orange Revolution managed to remain peaceful, while an essential part of the resistance movement that contributed to the Revolution of Dignity resorted to violent strategies on January 19, 2014. This sudden turn to violent strategies can be explained by several factors. The discussion below succinctly

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recaptures the variety of motivations of individual actors to participate in demonstrations and protests during both revolutions. These motivations will be linked to the dominant discourse of opposition leaders and ordinary participants during these demonstrations and protests. After recapturing the motivations of individual actors to participate in collective action, this thesis discusses three possible explanations for the sudden turn to violent strategies, predominantly, by members of “Common Cause” and “Right Sector” in the afternoon of January 19, 2014.

§ 5.1 Orange Revolution Although the majority of individual actors that participated in demonstrations and protests related to the Orange Revolution originated from Central and Western Ukraine and were predominantly Ukrainian-speaking, the political orientations of these individual actors as well as their socioeconomic position in society sometimes strongly differed. Communists, liberals, and nationalists demonstrated and protested side by side for the purpose of a common cause – free and fair presidential elections as well as political and economic reforms. Students, factory workers, professors, and retirees endeavoured to accomplish a in which civil and human rights were better protected. These rights included the freedom of expression and the opportunity to vote without the fear of being intimidated. Although these rights were legally regulated during Kuchma’s Presidency, Ukrainian citizens were unable to turn these rights to good account due to electoral fraud and state repression. To exemplify, Georgiy Gongadze, an Internet-based opposition journalist, was kidnapped and murdered for reporting about the corruption and unethical behaviour of politicians in the Kuchma government. The demands of the demonstrators and protesters for economic and political reforms were unified in Viktor Yushchenko’s campaign for the Presidency of Ukraine in 2004. The call for gathering on Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) of, and the speeches on Independence Square by, Viktor Yushchenko encouraged the demonstrators and protesters to establish political and social change by peaceful [nonviolent] means. Viktor Yushchenko, and his ally Yulia Tymoshenko, emphasized the position of the state authorities against the Ukrainian nation. The Kuchma government was held responsible for the unfair election of Viktor Yanukovych as . Furthermore, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko stressed the importance of a foreign policy orientation toward the European Union rather than toward the Russian Federation. The division between the European Union and the United States on the one hand and the Russian Federation on the other hand became apparent when President Putin was among the first to congratulate Viktor Yanukovych with winning the presidential election, while the European Union and the United States demanded clarification regarding the proclaimed

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electoral fraud first. The involvement of the international community eventually led to a third voting round in January 2005 that was supposed to be fair and free. Whereas the motivations of the participants in demonstrations and protests initially seemed to be based on group-based anger and identity reasons – i.e. the state authorities against the Ukrainian nation, the focus groups indicate that, at least, some participants had instrumental motivations such as money as well. In the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, the opinions of respondents were divided on the question whether the demonstrations and protests were and expression of a deliberate struggle of citizens for freedom or that the political opposition or the West had orchestrated a coup d’état. Thus, the motivations of the participants in demonstrations and protests related to the Orange Revolution are threefold: (1) individual actors experienced group-based anger due to a perceived disadvantage by the state authorities, (2) individual actors participated in collective action as they were part of a suppressed Ukrainian nation, and (3) some individual actors participated in demonstrations and protests because they thought that they were able to make profits from their participation.

§ 5.2 Revolution of Dignity The Revolution of Dignity did not differ greatly from the Orange Revolution in the sense of the diverse backgrounds of individual actors that participated in demonstrations and protests. Whereas the vast majority of these participants resided in Central and Western Ukraine and were Ukrainian-speaking, there were also Russian-speakers and individuals from Belarus, , the Russian Federation that participated in the demonstrations and protests. Moreover, several generations participated and political ideologies were represented in demonstrations and protests related to the Revolution of Dignity. The Revolution of Dignity initially called on Kyiv residents to gather on Independence Square in order to demonstrate their support for European integration and to express their disappointment with the postponement of the signing of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union. In the initial phase of the Revolution of Dignity, individual actors motivated their participation in demonstrations and protests arguing that Ukraine is supposed to take the path of European integration. This European integration involves, among others, the adoption European values such as civil and human rights, trade and visa liberalization, and the improvement of all education. These values were supposed to contribute to a brighter future. President Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the Association Agreement in combination with brutal police violence against peaceful protesters caused a change in motives to participate in collective action among individual actors. Individual actors, political opposition leaders, and the international community gave particular

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attention to state repression. Motivations ranged from opposing state repression and political change. This political change focused on the government, parliament, and president which were held responsible for police violence against peaceful demonstrators and protesters. The decision of President Yanukovych to seek rapprochement with the Russian Federation and the Customs Union fostered discontent with his presidency. The main motivation to participate in the demonstrations and protests related to the Revolution of Dignity gradually changed from a pro- European identity towards group-based anger. Individual actors increasingly became frustrated with the political authorities and the weak performance of the political opposition leaders. Individual actors developed feelings that the political opposition leaders were either unwilling or unable to challenge the Yanukovych government. As a consequence, individual actors increasingly followed their own directions and at a certain moment a part of the resistance movement decided to overrule the political opposition leaders, as these leaders did not nominate a single candidate that would challenge President Yanukovych. In particular, members of “Common Cause” and “Right Sector” were alienated from these political opposition leaders. This signified a loss of unity and the dominance of distinct objectives in demonstrations and protests among individual actors. Motivations changed to seizing power and ousting the government, the parliament, and the president by all means available. Thus, the gradual slackening of a group identity caused a shift in motives to participate in collective action. Individual actors were more and more motivated by group-based anger and instrumental gains after the overthrowing of the Yanukovych regime.

§ 5.3 The turn to violence The resort to the use of violent strategies – including throwing rocks, Molotov cocktails, and flash and smoke bombs – could be explained by several factors. Academic literature, particularly, underscored international funding and state repression. Beneath, I will discuss a couple of arguments why the Orange Revolution remained its peaceful character, whereas the Revolution of Dignity ultimately turned into a violent resistance struggle. I will also elaborate on which argument I find most convincing. The first explanation why the Revolution of Dignity turned violent, whereas the Orange Revolution did not, could be the role of the international community – emphatically the role of the European Union, the United States, and the Russian Federation. The role of the European Union and the United States can be described as explicitly supportive of the demonstrators and protesters of the Revolution of Dignity. The diplomats of the European Union and the United States to Ukraine expressed their concerns about the state repression and police violence against

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the peaceful protesters on Independence Square. US Senators John McCain and Chris Murphy visited Independence Square in order to express the support of the American nation with the peaceful protests. During a speech on Independence Square, Loreta Graužinienė, the speaker of the Lithuanian parliament (Seimas), said that Lithuania supported Ukraine in its endeavour to assume a European identity and offered Lithuania’s assistance. The Russian Federation, meanwhile, endeavoured to strengthen its political relations with the Yanukovych government through offering financial benefits and membership of the Customs Union. Although the international community played a role in the Revolution of Dignity, this role does not account for the sudden shift to violence, as the European Union, the United States, and the Russian Federation were particularly involved in the domestic affairs of Ukraine in December 2013. The second reason for the turn to violence could be state repression. The ‘dictatorial laws’ that were implemented on and pursued since January 16, 2014 severely opposed the resistance movement. These laws prohibited essential civil and human rights such as the freedom of assembly and participation peaceful protests. The resistance movement found itself strongly challenged by the Yanukovych government due to these laws. However, it is unlikely that state repression was the immediate cause for the shift to violent means, as security the riot police and mercenaries had used brutal violence against demonstrators and protesters more than once before. This state repression and police violence did not lead to a turn to violent strategies by, a part of, the resistance movement that had gathered and stayed on Independence Square since the beginning of the Revolution of Dignity. A third elucidation could be that the demonstrators and protesters were unsatisfied with the results of the Orange Revolution and attempted to establish political and social change by alternative means. This elucidation would be plausible if the resistance movement resorted to violent strategies early on in the demonstrations and protests campaign. This was not the case. A final explanation why the Revolution of Dignity turned violent, while the Orange Revolution remained nonviolent, is the diversity of expectations amongst the participants in demonstrations and protests related to the Revolution of Dignity. Whereas this diversity initially attracted individual actors from different regions of Ukraine and from different countries to participate in collective action, this diversity turned the tide when the group identification of the resistance movement gradually weakened. This group identity was replaced by group-based anger that was pointed at the Yanukovych government. Individual actors were discontent with the decision of the government to seek rapprochement with the Russian Federation and the Customs Union. Furthermore, the state repression and police violence had developed an increasing distrust of the authorities. This distrust was not only towards the Yanukovych

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government but also towards the political opposition leaders, as these leaders showed to be unable to challenge the government. The political opposition leaders continuously discussed plans to oppose the government, but never acted decisively – i.e. the political opposition leaders time after time sought to establish political and social reforms through negotiations with the Yanukovych government. Although these negotiations were seemingly successful in the beginning, the Yanukovych government continually responded with fiercer measures against the peaceful demonstrators and protesters of the Revolution of Dignity. Whereas the run for Presidency of Viktor Yushchenko had unified people with diverse demographic backgrounds and political orientations, the political opposition failed to safeguard the unity within the resistance movement during the Revolution of Dignity. Individual actors who demonstrated and protested side by side had distinct perceptions about what was happening on and around Independence Square as well as throughout Ukraine. Radical rightwing movements such as “Common Cause” and “Right Sector” founded defense-units that were no longer under the control of the organizers of the Revolution of Dignity. In the end, it was an activist of “Common Cause” who, after a speech of Tetiana Chornovol, demanded for a political opposition leader to take leadership over the resistance movement. When this demand was neglected, the activist called for a march to the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian Parliament) where plenty of riot police and mercenaries had gathered. Thus, it was the very element that made the resistance movement strong at first that turned against the movement. The lack of a unifier of this diverse movement, as Viktor Yushchenko had been during the Orange Revolution, caused a part of the resistance movement to take matters in their own hands and to march against the police that had gathered in front of the Verkhovna Rada.

6. Conclusion Conclusion According to Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), nonviolent resistance movements are, in general, more successful in their attempt to accomplish political and social change than their violent counterpart. Yet, some nonviolent resistance movements shift to the use of violent strategies in their endeavour to achieve political and social change. As this turn seems rather counterproductive, this thesis is supposed to contribute to the academic understanding of why collective and individuals actors that participate in a nonviolent resistance movement decide to embrace violent strategies. The central question which is posed in this thesis is “Why do nonviolent resistance movements turn violent?” Although the reach of this thesis is not far enough to account for all nonviolent resistance movements that turned violent, this thesis

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contributes a potential explanation for why nonviolent resistance movements turn violent to the academic debate. This argument results from extensive case studies and a comparison of the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity. These cases were studied because the Orange Revolution remained nonviolent and the Revolution of Dignity turned violent, while the preconditions of both series of protests are, more or less, the same – i.e. in both series of protests people demonstrated for more democracy and a shift in focus of foreign policy toward the European Union. The comparison of these cases teaches us that diversity in the demographic background and the political orientation of individual actors that participate in a nonviolent resistance movement is both the strength and soft underbelly of a nonviolent resistance movement. To exemplify, this diversity is a strength because nonviolent resistance movements rely on mass mobilization of potential demonstrators and protesters, while this diversity is the soft underbelly of a nonviolent resistance movement due to the need of a unifying factor which is key to the group identification of such a movement. In case of the Orange Revolution, communists, liberals, and nationalists united behind the presidential campaign of Viktor Yushchenko, while, in case of the Revolution of Dignity the lack of a unifying element caused individual actors to pursue their self-interest. This indicates that nonviolent resistance movements should always take the unity within the movement into account, as a loss of unity would potentially signify the end of a movement’s nonviolent resistance. How and why individual actors decide to unify and what are effective unifying elements could be identified in future research. In this dissertation, three subquestions received considerable attention. These questions are: (1) “What collective and individual actors participate in a nonviolent resistance movement?” “With regard to the collective and individual actors that participate in a nonviolent resistance movement, it could be stated that these actors are as manifold as there are perceptions and interpretations of the surrounding world. Individual actors may decide to participate in a nonviolent resistance movement due to the fact that they read about ongoing demonstrations and protests on the Internet, are informed by family, friends, or colleagues, and even because they accidentally come in touch with demonstrations and protests on the streets. Some individual actors decide to join a nonviolent resistance movement all alone, while other individual actors join such a movement with acquaintances. The motivations for joining a nonviolent resistance movement could be group-based anger, identity, ideology, or instrumental benefits. (2) What kind of violence emerges when a movement turns violent?” The kind of violence that emerges when a movement turns violent, in all probability, differs over space and time. In

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case of the Revolution of Dignity, individual actors, of whom the majority were radical rightwing activists, attacked riot police forces and mercenaries by throwing rocks, Molotov cocktails, and flash and smoke bombs as well as using pyrotechnics. The kind of violence that emerges will probably depend on the instruments that are available to demonstrators and protesters when a nonviolent resistance movement turns violent. (3) “Why does violence emerge?” With reference to the Revolution of Dignity, violence emerged when group-based anger prevailed over group identification. An essential part of the nonviolent resistance movement felt alienated from the political opposition leaders, as these leaders were either unwilling or unable to nominate a single leader which would challenge President Yanukovych. The part of the nonviolent resistance movement who felt alienated and experienced a lack of unity decided to overturn the plan that the political opposition leaders had represented on Independence Square by matching towards the Verkhovna Rada. Thus, the Revolution of Dignity turned violent due to a lack of leadership and a lack of unity within the nonviolent resistance movement.

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§ 7.1 Media Coverage Revolution of Dignity Forina, A., Gorchinskyaya, K., Grytsenko, O., Miller, C.J., Rachkevych, M. and Rudenko, O. (November 2013 – February 2014). “EuroMaidan rallies in Ukraine – Daily Coverage”, KyivPost, Ukraine’s Global Voice. Retrieved June 22, 2018.

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 https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/euromaidan/euromaidan-rallies-in-ukraine- nov-26-coverage-332571.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/euromaidan-rallies-in- ukraine-nov-27-coverage-332643.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/euromaidan/euromaidan-rallies-in-ukraine- nov-28-coverage-332728.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/euromaidan/euromaidan-rallies-in-ukraine- nov-29-coverage-332729.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/euromaidan-rallies-on-dec- 1-12-am-to-2-pm-euromaidan-rallies-in-ukraine-332752.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/euromaidan-rallies-on-dec- 1-a-rowdy-afternoon-332780.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/euromaidan-rallies-and- updates-on-dec-2-332898.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/euromaidan-rallies-and- updates-on-dec-3-332985.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/euromaidan-rallies-in- ukraine-dec-4-333067.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/euromaidan-rallies-in- ukraine-dec-5-333124.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/euromaidan-rallies-in- ukrane-dec-6-coverage-333208.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/euromaidan-rallies-in- ukraine-dec-7-333236.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/euromaidan-rallies-in- ukraine-dec-8-333297.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/euromaidan/euromaidan-rallies-in-ukraine- live-updates-332341.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/euromaidan/euromaidan-rallies-in-ukraine- dec10-333425.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/euromaidan-rallies-in- ukraine-dec-11-coverage-333500.html.

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 https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/euromaidan/euromaidan-rallies-in-ukraine- dec12-333595.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/euromaidan-rallies-in- ukraine-live-updates-333360.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/euromaidan/euromaidan-rallies-in-ukraine- saturday-dec14-live-updates-333634.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/euromaidan/euromaidan-rallies-in-ukraine- sunday-dec15-live-updates-333639.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/euromaidan-rallies-in- ukraine-monday-dec16-live-updates-333739.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/euromaidan/euromaidan-rallies-in-ukraine- tuesday-dec17-live-updates-333787.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/euromaidan/euromaidan-rallies-in-ukraine- wednesday-dec18-live-updates-333857.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/euromaidan/euromaidan-rallies-in-ukraine- live-updates-333965.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/euromaidan/euromaidan-rallies-in-ukraine- dec-29-live-updates-334391.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/euromaidan-rallies-in- ukraine-jan-19-coverage-335241.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/euromaidan/euromaidan-rallies-in-ukraine- jan-19-live-updates-335218.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/euromaidan/euromaidan-rallies-in-ukraine- jan-23-live-updates-335389.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/euromaidan/euromaidan-rallies-in-ukraine- jan-24-live-updates-335518.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/euromaidan/euromaidan-rallies-in-ukraine- jan-26-27-live-updates-335614.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/euromaidan/euromaidan-rallies-in-ukraine- jan-28-live-updates-335735.html.  https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/euromaidan/euromaidan-rallies-in-ukraine- feb-1-2-live-updates-336083.html.

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