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Introduction Introduction Karl Eikenberry & Stephen D. Krasner The essays that make up this and the previous issue of Dædalus are the culmination of an eighteen-month American Academy of Arts and Sciences project on Civil Wars, Violence, and International Respons- es. Project participants have examined in depth the KARL EIKENBERRY, a Fellow of the intellectual and policy disagreements over both the American Academy since 2012, is risks posed by intrastate violence and how best to the Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow and Director of the U.S.-Asia Security treat it. Initiative at Stanford University’s The Fall 2017 issue, “Civil Wars & Global Disorder: Asia-Pacific Research Center. He Threats & Opportunities,” examines the nature and served as the U.S. Ambassador to causative factors of civil wars in the modern era, the Afghanistan and had a thirty-five- security risks posed by high levels of intrastate vio- year career in the United States lence, and the challenges confronting external actors Army, retiring with the rank of lieutenant general. He codirects intervening to end the fighting and seek a political set- the Academy’s project on Civil tlement. It also explains the project’s aims, method- Wars, Violence, and International ologies, and international outreach program.1 Responses. This issue, “Ending Civil Wars: Constraints & Pos- STEPHEN D. KRASNER, a Fellow of sibilities,” consists of two parts: “Norms & Domes- the American Academy since 1991, tic Factors” and “Policy Prescriptions.” The essays in is Senior Fellow at the Freeman the first section consider the impediments to ending Spogli Institute for International wars of internal disorder when norms such as nation- Studies, the Graham H. Stuart Pro- al identity or commitment to the rule of law are not fessor of International Relations, shared by contending elites, or when rebels are fight- and Senior Fellow at the Hoover ing for a transnational, divine cause and not simply Institution at Stanford University. He is the author of Power, the State, the seizure of state power. The remaining essays focus and Sovereignty: Essays on Internation- on the “what to do” and offer a variety of recommen- al Relations (2009), Sovereignty: Orga- dations to policy-makers. The issue concludes with nized Hypocrisy (1999), and Asymme- the project’s codirectors’ own reflections informed tries in Japanese-American Trade: The by their colleagues’ writings. Case for Specific Reciprocity (1987). He codirects the Academy’s project on Civil Wars, Violence, and Interna- The section devoted to the impact of norms and do- tional Responses. mestic factors on the character of civil wars opens © 2018 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences doi:10.1162/DAED_e_00469 8 with Francis Fukuyama’s historical ac- els coexist alongside the Westphalian state Karl count of England’s tumultuous history system.” Neither option is necessarily ap- Eikenberry & Stephen D. following the Norman Conquest, during pealing. However, Fazal points out that Krasner which the country faced violence and civ- historically these groups have “bumped up il war roughly every fifty years until the against natural limits, precisely because . Glorious Revolution of 1688–1689 es- the claims they make and practices they tablished parliamentary supremacy and engage in during the wars they fight” can- brought long-lasting stability to England. not be sustained.3 Fukuyama uses the English case to illus- Stathis Kalyvas, in his essay, decouples trate that elite bargains will not necessari- violent jihadism from religion and terror- ly result in a stable state or liberal democra- ism, positing that, although both are rele- cy, arguing that stability after 1689 was in- vant characteristics of jihadi groups, it may stead predicated upon increasing respect be beneficial to view such elements first and for the rule of law, and the emergence of foremost as revolutionary insurgents in a strong English state and national identi- civil wars. Kalyvas draws comparisons be- ty. He emphasizes that these developments tween contemporary jihadi groups and rev- took shape over the course of six centuries. olutionary insurgents of the past, specifical- What does this mean for current con- ly Marxist rebels of the Cold War, noting flicts? Fukuyama’s analysis suggests that that both groups’ revolutionary identities “many contemporary conflicts will there- and transnational natures have common at- fore continue until greater normative tributes. A key difference, however, is the commitment to state, law, and democra- absence of significant external state spon- cy come about,” and while U.S. assistance sorship for jihadi rebels, which Kalyvas might help raise the visibility of certain says may well be their greatest weakness. government institutions in the short term, Ultimately, he suggests that “jihadi rebels “the burden of sustainable institution- might, in the end, represent less of a threat building necessarily will fall on the local to their opponents in civil war contexts elites themselves.”2 than their older, Marxist counterparts,” In her essay, Tanisha Fazal argues for the but cautions against blocking peaceful po- recognition of an additional class of reb- litical mobilization for Islamists, as this may els, namely religionist rebels, for whom encourage the future emergence of new, vi- sovereignty comes from the divine: they olent jihadi movements.4 do not seek international recognition or Drawing from the ongoing conflicts in statehood by conventional means. This is Syria, Libya, and Yemen, Steven Heyde- important for two reasons: first, many of mann concludes the section on norms and the common strategies employed in war domestic factors by examining the per- and war termination are likely to be inef- sistence of prewar governance practices fective against insurgents who reject the under conditions of violent conflict. He very legitimacy of the modern state sys- argues that civil war might, in fact, be the tem; and second, religionist rebels often continuation of governance not by different conduct war differently from other rebels means, but by the same means. This asser- given that their justification and motiva- tion has particular policy relevance in that tion come from beyond the realm of states it “challenges understandings of civil war and shared international norms. as marking a rupture in governance: violent Fazal offers two options for conflict res- conflict may disrupt prewar practices less olution: fighting to the end, or establishing than is often assumed.” It also calls atten- a “hybrid system in which religionist reb- tion to the limits and shortcomings of ex- 147 (1) Winter 2018 9 Introduction isting frameworks intended to lessen state overlooked is that although war is a great fragility, highlighting the link between sov- evil, it does have a great virtue: it can re- ereignty and governance and the “weapon- solve political conflicts and lead to peace.”7 ization of sovereignty” for political or eco- Though “complete and unequivocal” mili- nomic gain. Heydemann notes that viable tary victory brought an end to almost three solutions to such conflicts are difficult to decades of violent conflict in Sri Lanka, the find, and are “likely to require diplomatic, country still lacks a unified national identi- financial, and military strategies that create ty due to the deep ethnic and cultural divi- incentives for embattled regimes and insur- sions among the Sinhala majority and gov- gent challengers to end violence and accept ernment and the Tamil minority.8 The Sri meaningful compromises in the interest of Lankan government and some civil society securing their minimal requirements,” of- representatives assert that progress is being ten without transitional justice or account- made, but the postwar reconciliation and ability for perpetrators.5 accountability processes are slow-going. Whether the existing peace will hold over Charles Call and Susanna Campbell begin the long term remains in question. the section on policy options by exploring According to Clare Lockhart, over the the logic of prevention, explaining the un- course of the last two decades, the inter- derlying assumptions and associated tools. national community has largely respond- They offer three categories of preventive ac- ed to internal conflict and state breakdown tions–operational, structural, and systemic with either military forces and large-scale –that manifest the rationale for preven- civilian assistance (Afghanistan and Iraq), tion in different ways. They then exam- minimal involvement and calculated dis- ine various political, institutional, bureau- tance (Syria), or the misplaced hope that cratic, and decision-making obstacles that removing a dictator or negotiating a short- have plagued earlier waves of conflict-pre- term peace deal without long-term plan- vention initiatives. The problems are sig- ning and institution-building will lead to nificant and many: namely, the challenges sustainable peace (Libya). Lockhart advo- faced by a state or international organiza- cates an approach between these extremes, tion asked to take action on something that what she terms a “sovereignty strategy.”9 its constituency might not deem important; Such an approach is informed by the prin- the lack of clear rules surrounding preven- ciple of helping internal actors establish tion; and the poor level of understanding or restore a core set of governance sys- about what exactly leads to an effective out- tems or institutions that can win the trust side intervention. Call and Campbell reach and meet the needs of their people, re- a modest yet hopeful conclusion: “although duce the reliance of the country on exter- we should not expect conflict prevention to nal support, and contribute to resolving work in many cases, the few cases in which conflicts before they become violent. She it may prevent escalating violence justify an argues that by carefully sequencing the es- investment, in spite of the odds.”6 tablishment of key state functions over an Sumit Ganguly writes about the Sri Lan- extended time period, public trust can be kan Civil War, an example of civil war ter- gained and international obligations met.
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