Introduction

Karl Eikenberry & Stephen D. Krasner

The essays that make up this and the previous issue of Dædalus are the culmination of an eighteen-month American Academy of Arts and Sciences project on Civil Wars, Violence, and International Respons- es. Project participants have examined in depth the KARL EIKENBERRY, a Fellow of the intellectual and policy disagreements over both the American Academy since 2012, is risks posed by intrastate violence and how best to the Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow and Director of the U.S.-Asia Security treat it. Initiative at Stanford University’s The Fall 2017 issue, “Civil Wars & Global Disorder: Asia-Pacific Research Center. He Threats & Opportunities,” examines the nature and served as the U.S. Ambassador to causative factors of civil wars in the modern era, the Afghanistan and had a thirty-five- security risks posed by high levels of intrastate vio- year career in the United States lence, and the challenges confronting external actors Army, retiring with the rank of lieutenant general. He codirects intervening to end the fighting and seek a political set- the Academy’s project on Civil tlement. It also explains the project’s aims, method- Wars, Violence, and International ologies, and international outreach program.1 Responses. This issue, “Ending Civil Wars: Constraints & Pos- STEPHEN D. KRASNER, a Fellow of sibilities,” consists of two parts: “Norms & Domes- the American Academy since 1991, tic Factors” and “Policy Prescriptions.” The essays in is Senior Fellow at the Freeman the first section consider the impediments to ending Spogli Institute for International wars of internal disorder when norms such as nation- Studies, the Graham H. Stuart Pro- al identity or commitment to the rule of law are not fessor of International Relations, shared by contending elites, or when rebels are fight- and Senior Fellow at the Hoover ing for a transnational, divine cause and not simply Institution at Stanford University. He is the author of Power, the State, the seizure of state power. The remaining essays focus and Sovereignty: Essays on Internation- on the “what to do” and offer a variety of recommen- al Relations (2009), Sovereignty: Orga- dations to policy-makers. The issue concludes with nized Hypocrisy (1999), and Asymme- the project’s codirectors’ own reflections informed tries in Japanese-American Trade: The by their colleagues’ writings. Case for Specific Reciprocity (1987). He codirects the Academy’s project on Civil Wars, Violence, and Interna- The section devoted to the impact of norms and do- tional Responses. mestic factors on the character of civil wars opens

8 with Francis Fukuyama’s historical ac- els coexist alongside the Westphalian state Karl count of England’s tumultuous history system.” Neither option is necessarily ap- Eikenberry & Stephen D. following the Norman Conquest, during pealing. However, Fazal points out that Krasner which the country faced violence and civ- historically these groups have “bumped up il war roughly every fifty years until the against natural limits, precisely because . . . Glorious Revolution of 1688–1689 es- the claims they make and practices they tablished parliamentary supremacy and engage in during the wars they fight” can- brought long-lasting stability to England. not be sustained.3 Fukuyama uses the English case to illus- Stathis Kalyvas, in his essay, decouples trate that elite bargains will not necessari- violent jihadism from religion and terror- ly result in a stable state or liberal democra- ism, positing that, although both are rele- cy, arguing that stability after 1689 was in- vant characteristics of jihadi groups, it may stead predicated upon increasing respect be beneficial to view such elements first and for the rule of law, and the emergence of foremost as revolutionary insurgents in a strong English state and national identi- civil wars. Kalyvas draws comparisons be- ty. He emphasizes that these developments tween contemporary jihadi groups and rev- took shape over the course of six centuries. olutionary insurgents of the past, specifical- What does this mean for current con- ly Marxist rebels of the Cold War, noting flicts? Fukuyama’s analysis suggests that that both groups’ revolutionary identities “many contemporary conflicts will there- and transnational natures have common at- fore continue until greater normative tributes. A key difference, however, is the commitment to state, law, and democra- absence of significant external state spon- cy come about,” and while U.S. assistance sorship for jihadi rebels, which Kalyvas might help raise the visibility of certain says may well be their greatest weakness. government institutions in the short term, Ultimately, he suggests that “jihadi rebels “the burden of sustainable institution- might, in the end, represent less of a threat building necessarily will fall on the local to their opponents in civil war contexts elites themselves.”2 than their older, Marxist counterparts,” In her essay, Tanisha Fazal argues for the but cautions against blocking peaceful po- recognition of an additional class of reb- litical mobilization for Islamists, as this may els, namely religionist rebels, for whom encourage the future emergence of new, vi- sovereignty comes from the divine: they olent jihadi movements.4 do not seek international recognition or Drawing from the ongoing conflicts in statehood by conventional means. This is Syria, Libya, and Yemen, Steven Heyde- important for two reasons: first, many of mann concludes the section on norms and the common strategies employed in war domestic factors by examining the per- and war termination are likely to be inef- sistence of prewar governance practices fective against insurgents who reject the under conditions of violent conflict. He very legitimacy of the modern state sys- argues that civil war might, in fact, be the tem; and second, religionist rebels often continuation of governance not by different conduct war differently from other rebels means, but by the same means. This asser- given that their justification and motiva- tion has particular policy relevance in that tion come from beyond the realm of states it “challenges understandings of civil war and shared international norms. as marking a rupture in governance: violent Fazal offers two options for conflict res- conflict may disrupt prewar practices less olution: fighting to the end, or establishing than is often assumed.” It also calls atten- a “hybrid system in which religionist reb- tion to the limits and shortcomings of ex-

147 (1) Winter 2018 9 Introduction isting frameworks intended to lessen state overlooked is that although war is a great fragility, highlighting the link between sov- evil, it does have a great virtue: it can re- ereignty and governance and the “weapon- solve political conflicts and lead to peace.”7 ization of sovereignty” for political or eco- Though “complete and unequivocal” mili- nomic gain. Heydemann notes that viable tary victory brought an end to almost three solutions to such conflicts are difficult to decades of violent conflict in Sri Lanka, the find, and are “likely to require diplomatic, country still lacks a unified national identi- financial, and military strategies that create ty due to the deep ethnic and cultural divi- incentives for embattled regimes and insur- sions among the Sinhala majority and gov- gent challengers to end violence and accept ernment and the Tamil minority.8 The Sri meaningful compromises in the interest of Lankan government and some civil society securing their minimal requirements,” of- representatives assert that progress is being ten without transitional justice or account- made, but the postwar reconciliation and ability for perpetrators.5 accountability processes are slow-going. Whether the existing peace will hold over Charles Call and Susanna Campbell begin the long term remains in question. the section on policy options by exploring According to Clare Lockhart, over the the logic of prevention, explaining the un- course of the last two decades, the inter- derlying assumptions and associated tools. national community has largely respond- They offer three categories of preventive ac- ed to internal conflict and state breakdown tions–operational, structural, and systemic with either military forces and large-scale –that manifest the rationale for preven- civilian assistance (Afghanistan and Iraq), tion in different ways. They then exam- minimal involvement and calculated dis- ine various political, institutional, bureau- tance (Syria), or the misplaced hope that cratic, and decision-making obstacles that removing a dictator or negotiating a short- have plagued earlier waves of conflict-pre- term peace deal without long-term plan- vention initiatives. The problems are sig- ning and institution-building will lead to nificant and many: namely, the challenges sustainable peace (Libya). Lockhart advo- faced by a state or international organiza- cates an approach between these extremes, tion asked to take action on something that what she terms a “sovereignty strategy.”9 its constituency might not deem important; Such an approach is informed by the prin- the lack of clear rules surrounding preven- ciple of helping internal actors establish tion; and the poor level of understanding or restore a core set of governance sys- about what exactly leads to an effective out- tems or institutions that can win the trust side intervention. Call and Campbell reach and meet the needs of their people, re- a modest yet hopeful conclusion: “although duce the reliance of the country on exter- we should not expect conflict prevention to nal support, and contribute to resolving work in many cases, the few cases in which conflicts before they become violent. She it may prevent escalating violence justify an argues that by carefully sequencing the es- investment, in spite of the odds.”6 tablishment of key state functions over an Sumit Ganguly writes about the Sri Lan- extended time period, public trust can be kan Civil War, an example of civil war ter- gained and international obligations met. mination by means of outright military vic- In their essay, Thomas Risse and Eric tory. The Sri Lankan case is one example of Stollenwerk contend that the relationship the “give war a chance” argument put forth between limited statehood and civil war, by political scientist Edward Luttwak, who and therefore the importance placed on has asserted that “an unpleasant truth often state-building efforts for preventing civil

10 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences war and violent conflict, is often overstated South Sudan, explore the use of buffer zones Karl and misinformed. They point out that lim- as a strategy for responding to the security Eikenberry & Stephen D. ited statehood is the global default, not the challenges posed by failed states in the Horn Krasner exception, and only a small portion of areas of Africa region. Buffer zones are neutral ar- of limited statehood is affected by civil war. eas designed to prevent acts of aggression Weak state capacity may enable civil war, between hostile nations, and can be estab- but it is neither a sufficient nor necessary lished jointly in a shared territory, or uni- condition for civil conflict. External actors, laterally through force. For example, in the Risse and Stollenwerk suggest, should seek Horn of Africa, Ethiopia and Kenya main- to foster societal and political resilience in tain buffer zones inside Somalia to man- areas of limited statehood and to prevent age the threat posed by militant extremist governance breakdowns. They write: “gov- groups such as Al Shabaab. Uganda also em- ernance-building with a focus on particular ploys a similar strategy in South Sudan. In- state and nonstate institutions, as well as terstate tensions often arise, however, be- on service provision, is likely to be not only cause buffer zones usually represent a vio- more efficient, but also more effective.”10 lation of the weaker state’s sovereignty by Tanja Börzel and Sonja Grimm also ex- the stronger state seeking to maintain sta- amine approaches to governance-building, bility and order in the broader region. Buf- analyzing the European Union’s role in fer zones, Mesfin and Beyene persuasively creating stable peace in the Western Bal- argue, can be essential for both fighting ter- kans following the breakup of the former rorism and returning refugees to their plac- Republic of Yugoslavia. The expansion of es of origin in regions plagued by states in- the eu to include ten Central and Eastern capable or unwilling to impose order. European states has seen varying success Drawing upon her vast experience in re- in terms of democratization and stability; porting from the front lines of the most vi- Croatia and Serbia appear to have success- olent and consequential civil wars of our fully locked in these changes, while other times, bbc Chief International Correspon- states seem stuck in transition. Structural dent Lyse Doucet explores the impact of postconflict conditions, conflicting policy the media on the Syrian conflict policies objectives, complex relationships between of U.S. Presidents Barack Obama and Don- eu and Western Balkan governments, and ald Trump. She provides a nuanced analy- the involvement of domestic third-party ac- sis of the so-called cnn Effect: a term that tors in the reform processes explain much entered the lexicon nearly three decades of this variation. To enhance eu efforts to ago and described the power of twenty- improve governance, Börzel and Grimm four-hour American news networks to emphasize the importance of understand- dictate policy and which later was largely ing domestic actors’ interests and aligning dismissed. Doucet argues that media can them with the interests of external actors, play an important role in thrusting issues as well as using governance-building instru- to the top of policy-makers’ agendas, but ments consistently and credibly, while ac- that context matters greatly and influence knowledging conflicting objectives. is often ephemeral. Seyoum Mesfin, who served as Ethiopia’s Attempts by belligerent parties to ma- minister of foreign affairs for nearly twen- nipulate the media and messaging to help ty years, and Abdeta Beyene, who recently achieve their war aims, of course, have served as chief of staff of the Joint Monitor- been a constant in the long history of hu- ing and Evaluation Commission pursuant man conflict, well preceding the cnn Ef- to the Agreement to Resolve the Conflict in fect. What is truly new and novel, how-

147 (1) Winter 2018 11 Introduction ever, is the emergence of social media, portant, noting: “meaningful progress will “real-time” fake news, and the empow- require a concerted effort to transform the erment of any individual with a connect- business model of government, making it ed device anywhere in the world to trans- more proactive, adaptive, and integrated.”12 mit images and information that can elic- Lindborg and Hewitt, however, find it deep emotional popular reactions and some room for optimism and make a values- can, in turn, put pressure on policy-makers based argument for positive action. They to act. Doucet explores the consequences assert that, in recent years, the development of this still-recent phenomenon, describ- community has experienced a paradigm ing how, in Syria, the “ferocious battle shift that has bolstered the internation- over ‘fake news’ was waged across a myr- al community’s “collective wisdom” with iad of social media platforms.” Her discus- regard to reducing state fragility and miti- sion of the rival combatants’ explanation gating state failure. While significant orga- of the arresting photograph of five-year- nizational and doctrinal reform is necessary old Omran Daqneesh, sitting alone and to improve the U.S. government’s ability to bloodied on an orange plastic chair in an address effectively the significant challeng- ambulance, makes clear the complexity of es posed by failing and failed states, a selec- the media landscape in which there are no tive approach that prioritizes areas in which agreed upon “facts on the ground.” Dou- external interventions can achieve decisive cet concludes that, in the contemporary results is feasible. world, multifaceted media is “a major in- Richard Gowan and Stephen Stedman re- fluence, but not a major power.”11 count what they refer to as the internation- Nancy Lindborg and Joseph Hewitt an- al regime for treating civil war, developed alyze current U.S. efforts to address state beginning in the late 1980s. In describing fragility, a contributing factor to intrastate the evolution of norms and practices, they warfare, which, as is argued elsewhere in highlight: “1) a belief in the efficacy of me- this volume and in the previous issue of diation in ending intrastate conflicts; 2) in- Dædalus, can threaten regional and inter- vestments in multinational peacekeeping national security. Why do we struggle to operations to secure the resulting deals; implement effectively policies that transi- 3) an overarching focus on the humanitari- tion countries away from fragility and pre- an obligations to minimize civilian fatalities vent civil wars? Lindborg and Hewitt ad- and suffering in war zones; and 4) the ongo- vance three main reasons: First, U.S. poli- ing controversy about the limits and princi- cy is largely crisis-driven, and thus the focus ples of humanitarian intervention.”13 They remains on the most urgent developing cri- assert that the international standard treat- ses, rather than on prevention. Second, bu- ment regime’s future viability depends on reaucratic impediments, such as the place- several factors, including U.S. leadership, ment of government bureaucracies into relations between great powers, and the distinct security, development, and politi- willingness of the international commu- cal silos, render a system without cohesive nity to learn from the lessons of the previ- frameworks or joint plans of action. Third, ous twenty-five years. Gowan and Stedman the lack of a “shared consciousness,” exac- convincingly argue that, though imperfect, erbated by lack of communication and co- the approach has been sufficient and adap- ordination among different government tive in many ways, and for these reasons, is agencies and teams, prevents effective im- worth preserving. plementation of such policies. The authors Jean-Marie Guéhenno, in the final essay identify this last challenge as the most im- on policy prescriptions, addresses the Unit-

12 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences ed Nations’ role in civil wars. He writes that, can both undermine liberal states’ commit- Karl since the end of the Cold War, the un has be- ment to humanitarian norms with signifi- Eikenberry & Stephen D. come increasingly multidimensional, add- cant domestic political consequences, and Krasner ing political, military, development, and hu- complicate efforts to find lasting peace set- manitarian components to its postconflict tlements. The continuing diffusion of glob- stabilization toolbox. However, twenty-six al power may lead to a growing number of years after the end of the Cold War, it is clear regional conflicts due to the unwillingness that the un must revisit its strategy for en- and inability of major stakeholders to facil- gagement in civil wars. Despite increasing itate mediation, enable peacekeeping oper- interconnectedness, global government is ations, and provide a modicum of develop- not a realistic response, and neither is a re- ment assistance. At the same time, there is turn to fully autonomous states. Guéhenno an increasing risk of great-power conflict endorses a less state-centric approach at the stemming from proxy-war engagements strategic level, and urges the un to lower ex- or even direct confrontations in civil wars. pectations, but deploy stronger capacities to While transnational criminality compli- strengthen the effectiveness of the blue hel- cates efforts to end civil wars and weakens mets in conflict and postconflict settings at the ability of states to create a stable poli- the operational level. He highlights the im- ty, it rarely poses a direct threat to interna- portance of setting the appropriate level of tional order and is most easily dealt with ambition and emphasizes the relevance of through domestic and multinational law four discrete sectors: governance, security, enforcement. legal frameworks, and revenue collection. Krasner and Eikenberry identify four Ultimately, as Guéhenno reasons, the abil- policy considerations relevant to states and ity to adapt to an ever-changing, complex, regional and international organizations, and multifaceted world will prove essential contemplating external interventions to for the success of the un and the mainte- resolve a civil war. First, external actors nance of global stability. and local elites rarely share a common future vision. The obstacles to putting a war- Drawing from their colleagues’ essays in torn country on the path to Denmark are this issue and in the previous issue of Dæda- many, and ambitions should be tempered lus, Stephen Krasner and Karl Eikenberry of- accordingly; establishing adequate or good fer insights on security challenges posed by enough governance is a realistic and rea- civil wars and on the implications for policy- sonable goal. Second, the presence of irrec- makers. They assess the six threats that oncilables fighting for outcomes that tran- might directly impact the wealthy and more scend or reject existing and internationally powerful polities of the world, or the nature accepted borders can frustrate efforts to of the postwar liberal international order: reach negotiated settlements. The termi- pandemic diseases, transnational terror- nation of conflicts involving rebels of the ism, refugee flows, regional destabilization, divine, insurgents inspired by an uncom- great-power conflict, and criminality. Their promising transnational ideology or sep- conclusion is that the first two–pandem- aratists who reject association with their ics and international terrorism–are poten- opponents, often requires a bloody mili- tially the most consequential, although nei- tary victory or partition. Third, efforts by a ther poses the kind of existential threat pre- major world or regional power to resolve a sented by war among nuclear-armed states. war of internal disorder can often be hope- Large-scale cross-border or internal move- lessly undermined by an opposing state or ments of people fleeing intrastate violence coalition of states. Small investments by

147 (1) Winter 2018 13 Introduction spoilers can deny success to the interven- international treatment regime, developed ing power. since the early 1990s, combining mediat- Fourth, the ways and means available to ed peace agreements with un or regional the United States and its partners, other organization peacekeepers and develop- major powers, and the international com- ment assistance, has proven more success- munity vary greatly in costs and appropri- ful than is widely understood. However, ateness. Direct military interventions are the regime is ineffective when the protag- hugely expensive and usually require pro- onists do not believe they are in a hurting tracted campaigns; thus, they are difficult stalemate, when the presence of irrecon- to sustain domestically and lead to prob- cilable insurgents is significant, and when lematic attempts to make credible com- relevant regional and great powers have mitments. More modest approaches, in- substantial conflicting interests. cluding employment of tailored military Krasner and Eikenberry conclude that forces such as special forces and combat civil wars may become more prominent on enablers, increased reliance on security as- the international landscape and their con- sistance programs, and provision of limit- sequences for the security of the United ed foreign aid programs, are less costly and States and global order are serious, but do easier to maintain, but are often akin to the not rival the existential threat of nuclear- application of life support. The standard armed and near peer-state competitors.

endnotes 1 Information on the civil wars project may be found at American Academy of Arts and Sci- ences, “Civil Wars, Violence, and International Responses: 2015–Present,” https://www .amacad.org/content/Research/researchproject.aspx?d=22262. 2 Francis Fukuyama, “The Last English Civil War,” Dædalus 147 (1) (Winter 2018). 3 Tanisha M. Fazal, “Religionist Rebels & the Sovereignty of the Divine,” Dædalus 147 (1) (Win- ter 2018). 4 Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Jihadi Rebels in Civil War,” Dædalus 147 (1) (Winter 2018). 5 Steven Heydemann, “Civil War, Economic Governance & State Reconstruction in the Arab Middle East,” Dædalus 147 (1) (Winter 2018). 6 Charles T. Call and Susanna P. Campbell, “Is Prevention the Answer?” Dædalus 147 (1) (Win- ter 2018). 7 Edward N. Luttwak, “Give War a Chance,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 1999, https://www .foreignaffairs.com/articles/1999-07-01/give-war-chance. 8 Sumit Ganguly, “Ending the Sri Lankan Civil War,” Dædalus 147 (1) (Winter 2018). 9 Clare Lockhart, “Sovereignty Strategies: Enhancing Core Governance Functions as a Post- conflict and Conflict-Prevention Measure,” Dædalus 147 (1) (Winter 2018). 10 Thomas Risse and Eric Stollenwerk, “Limited Statehood Does Not Equal Civil War,” Dædalus 147 (1) (Winter 2018). 11 Lyse Doucet, “Syria & the cnn Effect: What Roles Does the Media Play in Policy-Making?” Dædalus 147 (1) (Winter 2018). 12 Nancy E. Lindborg and J. Joseph Hewitt, “In Defense of Ambition: Building Peaceful & In- clusive Societies in a World on Fire,” Dædalus 147 (1) (Winter 2018). 13 Richard Gowan & Stephen John Stedman, “The International Regime for Treating Civil War, 1988–2017,” Dædalus 147 (1) (Winter 2018).

14 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences