Preparing for Future Disasters, 2015
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Civil Wars & Global Disorder
on the horizon: Dædalus Ending Civil Wars: Constraints & Possibilities edited by Karl Eikenberry & Stephen D. Krasner Francis Fukuyama, Tanisha M. Fazal, Stathis N. Kalyvas, Steven Heydemann, Chuck Call & Susanna P. Campbell, Sumit Ganguly, Clare Lockhart, Thomas Risse & Eric Stollenwerk, Tanja A. Börzel & Sonja Grimm, Seyoum Mesfi n & Abdeta Beyene, Lyse Doucet, Nancy Lindborg & Joseph Hewitt, Richard Gowan & Stephen John Stedman, and Jean-Marie Guéhenno & Global Disorder: Threats Opportunities 2017 Civil Wars Fall Dædalus Native Americans & Academia Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences edited by Ned Blackhawk, K. Tsianina Lomawaima, Bryan McKinley Jones Brayboy, Philip J. Deloria, Fall 2017 Loren Ghiglione, Douglas Medin, and Mark Trahant Anti-Corruption: Best Practices edited by Robert I. Rotberg Civil Wars & Global Disorder: Threats & Opportunities Karl Eikenberry & Stephen D. Krasner, guest editors with James D. Fearon Bruce D. Jones & Stephen John Stedman Stewart Patrick · Martha Crenshaw Paul H. Wise & Michele Barry Representing the intellectual community in its breadth Sarah Kenyon Lischer · Vanda Felbab-Brown and diversity, Dædalus explores the frontiers of Hendrik Spruyt · Stephen Biddle · William Reno knowledge and issues of public importance. Aila M. Matanock & Miguel García-Sánchez Barry R. Posen U.S. $15; www.amacad.org; @americanacad Civil War & the Current International System James D. Fearon Abstract: This essay sketches an explanation for the global spread of civil war up to the early 1990s and the partial -
ANNUAL REPORT BUILDING RESILIENCE • EMPOWERING COMMUNITIES Cover Rationale
2016 ANNUAL REPORT BUILDING RESILIENCE • EMPOWERING COMMUNITIES Cover Rationale This year our theme is ‘Resilience’ to give tribute to the various ways in which humans survive and strive through adverse time, such as natural disasters or conict. Surviving and striving through such events however requires a helping hand, that is where MERCY Malaysia plays a signicant role. Through various projects we aim to transfer expert knowledge, skills, provide necessary materials and equipment to enhance communities resilience against the disasters they face. One such project in 2016, which is depicted on the cover, took place in Sierra Leone, West Africa. Sierra Leone was crippled for several months by the Ebola virus, rapidly spreading amongst communities and killing thousands. Although communities showed great strength and courage in ghting the virus, the high level of poverty and lack of sanitation facilities in rural communities made some eorts eeting. Thereby, MERCY Malaysia decided to provide communities with assistance through the activities of building wells, delivering hygiene kits and educating students from 100 schools about hygiene and health, with the objective of increasing the communities’ resilience through the transfer of knowledge and provision of essential sanitation items. It is within our duty to assist communities where they need assistance and ensure communities are prepared for future disasters, all contributing towards making communities resilient. 69 118 100 73 83 CONTENTS Our Approach: Total Disaster Risk Management (TDRM) -
HD in 2020: Peacemaking in Perspective → Page 10 About HD → Page 6 HD Governance: the Board → Page 30
June 2021 EN About HD in 2020: HD governance: HD → page 6 Peacemaking in perspective → page 10 The Board → page 30 Annual Report 2020 mediation for peace www.hdcentre.org Trusted. Neutral. Independent. Connected. Effective. The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) mediates between governments, non-state armed groups and opposition parties to reduce conflict, limit the human suffering caused by war and develop opportunities for peaceful settlements. As a non-profit based in Switzerland, HD helps to build the path to stability and development for people, communities and countries through more than 50 peacemaking projects around the world. → Table of contents HD in 2020: Peacemaking in perspective → page 10 COVID in conflict zones → page 12 Social media and cyberspace → page 12 Supporting peace and inclusion → page 14 Middle East and North Africa → page 18 Francophone Africa → page 20 The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) is a private diplomacy organisation founded on the principles of humanity, Anglophone and Lusophone Africa → page 22 impartiality, neutrality and independence. Its mission is to help prevent, mitigate and resolve armed conflict through dialogue and mediation. Eurasia → page 24 Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) Asia → page 26 114 rue de Lausanne, 1202 – Geneva, Switzerland Tel: +41 (0)22 908 11 30 Email: [email protected] Latin America → page 28 Website: www.hdcentre.org Follow HD on Twitter and Linkedin: https://twitter.com/hdcentre https://www.linkedin.com/company/centreforhumanitariandialogue Design and layout: Hafenkrone © 2021 – Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue About HD governance: Investing Reproduction of all or part of this publication may be authorised only with written consent or acknowledgement of the source. -
Our Core Values
URÀW RUJDQLVDWLRQ IRFXVLQJ RQ QDEOH KHDOWKUHODWHG GHYHORSPHQW YXOQHUDEOH FRPPXQLWLHV LQ ERWK OUR CORE VALUES • We focus on rapid medical response for the assistance of communities affected by disasters • :HKROGRXUVHOYHVDFFRXQWDEOHWRRXUGRQRUVDQGEHQHÀFLDULHV • We recognise the value of working with partners and volunteers • We provide an opportunity for individuals to serve with professionalism, upholding the Code of Conduct for International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief NEWNNEW LOGOOGOGOGOGO RATIONALERRAATTIOTOONNAALLEE MERCY Malaysia’s UHIUHVKHGORJRHPERGLHVHIÀFLHQF\DQGHIIHFWLYHQHVV DPLGVWKXPLOLW\7KHORJRSHUVRQLÀHVFRXUDJHDQGGHWHUPLQDWLRQDPPLGVWKXP 7KH ORJRSHHUVRQQLÀH FRXUDJHD GHWHUPPLQD LRQWWKURXJKLWVJKLWV clear-cut and minimalist design. The lower case alphabets denotesd humility DVDYDOXHZHHPEUDFHLQRXUDSSURDFKWRRXUZRUNZLWKEHQHÀFLDDV DYDOXHHZHHPE DFH QR U SSURDFKKWR RXU NZLWK EHQHÀFFLDULHULHVDQGHVD G SDUWQHUV\HWWKHEROGIRQWVLJQLÀHVRXUDELOLW\WRIDFHFKDOOSDUWQHUV \HW H OG IRQW VLJQLÀÀHV RX DEL LW\ WR HFKDOOHQHQJHVDQGWREHQJHV DQG WR H HIIHFWLYHLQRXUZRUN7KH5R\DO%OXHVLJQLÀHVFDOPLQWLPHVRIHIIHFWLY LQ ZRUN 7KHH5R\DO%%OXHV JQLÀH FD P WLPHVRIFFULVLV7KH%ULJKWL V %ULJKW RedRed showsshows ourr commitmentcommmitment andan passionsion in workingwworkking withw h disasterdisaster affectedfected DQGLPSRYHULVKHGFRPPXQLWLHV7KHÁRZHURQWKHORJRLVWKHҊ%XQDQGLPPSRYHULVKHG RPP QL H 7KHÁRZZHU RQW RJRLV WKH%XQJDJD5D\Dҋ5D\ KLELVFXV K ELVFXV VLQHQVLV VVLQHQVL ZKLFKZKLFKK LV WKH QDWLRQDOQDW R DO ÁRZHUÁRZHU RI 0DOD\VLD7K0DOD\\VLD 7KLV -
Final Report
FINAL REPORT Consultancy Project on the Development of a Public Private Partnership Framework and Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) in East Asia Hong Kong, 17 April 2009 This report was prepared by: Helen Roeth c/o CSR Asia, Office A, 15/F Wing Cheong Commercial Building 19-25 Jervois Street Sheung Wan, Hong Kong Tel: (852) 3579 8079 Fax: (852) 3579 8080 Email: [email protected] Table of contents 1. Scope of the review and summary of key findings............................................... 1 2. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 3 3. Private sector involvement in DRR ...................................................................... 5 3.1. The current discussion on PPPs ...................................................................... 5 3.2. The business case for corporate sector involvement in DRR .......................... 7 3.3. The role of the private sector in DRR ............................................................... 8 3.3.1. Finance and insurance services ................................................................. 10 3.3.2. Engineering and constructions ................................................................... 15 3.3.3. ICT and telecom ......................................................................................... 15 3.3.4. Utilities and transportation .......................................................................... 16 3.3.5. Pharmaceuticals and health ...................................................................... -
Lessons-Encountered.Pdf
conflict, and unity of effort and command. essons Encountered: Learning from They stand alongside the lessons of other wars the Long War began as two questions and remind future senior officers that those from General Martin E. Dempsey, 18th who fail to learn from past mistakes are bound Excerpts from LChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: What to repeat them. were the costs and benefits of the campaigns LESSONS ENCOUNTERED in Iraq and Afghanistan, and what were the LESSONS strategic lessons of these campaigns? The R Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University was tasked to answer these questions. The editors com- The Institute for National Strategic Studies posed a volume that assesses the war and (INSS) conducts research in support of the Henry Kissinger has reminded us that “the study of history offers no manual the Long Learning War from LESSONS ENCOUNTERED ENCOUNTERED analyzes the costs, using the Institute’s con- academic and leader development programs of instruction that can be applied automatically; history teaches by analogy, siderable in-house talent and the dedication at the National Defense University (NDU) in shedding light on the likely consequences of comparable situations.” At the of the NDU Press team. The audience for Washington, DC. It provides strategic sup- strategic level, there are no cookie-cutter lessons that can be pressed onto ev- Learning from the Long War this volume is senior officers, their staffs, and port to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman ery batch of future situational dough. The only safe posture is to know many the students in joint professional military of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and unified com- historical cases and to be constantly reexamining the strategic context, ques- education courses—the future leaders of the batant commands. -
PR20150320 ECRF PC Statement FINAL
Press Release AirAsia helps East Coast schools and clinics rebuild and prepare better to face future challenges with Mercy Malaysia KOTA BHARU, 20 Mar 2015 – AirAsia Foundation today announced it raised a total of MYR902,447 in support of MERCY Malaysia from its ‘East Coast Relief Fund’ campaign. The donation, which comprise public and AirAsia staff contributions collected onboard all AirAsia and AirAsia X flights between Jan 1-18, 2015, will fund two of the disaster relief organisation’s core recovery programmes. “The success of this campaign shows again the generosity of AirAsia guests in helping those in need. We would like to express our heartfelt thanks to donors who trusted us with their contributions. We will ensure that the funds go into helping communities that are most in need build their resilience to face future challenges,” said AirAsia Berhad Chairman and AirAsia X Group CEO Datuk Kamarudin Meranun. Datuk Kamarudin, who is also a Trustee of AirAsia Foundation, presented the donation cheque to MERCY Malaysia President and Executive Council Member Dato’ Dr Ahmad Faizal Mohd Perdaus at the Sultan Ismail Petra Airport in Kota Bharu today. AirAsia Foundation will be the main funder of MERCY Malaysia’s School Preparedness Programme to increase the capacity of schools and students to respond to future disasters. The programme, designed by MERCY Malaysia to promote a culture of preparedness and awareness of emergency procedures, will be carried out in 30 primary schools in disaster- prone areas in Kelantan, Terengganu, Pahang and Sarawak. “Many were severely affected by the monsoon flood that hit our country last December, making it crucial to be well prepared to which MERCY Malaysia will be focusing on children as they are often the ones most vulnerable to dangers and risks that might occur. -
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs March 1, 2010 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL30588 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Summary During 2009, the Obama Administration addressed a deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan. Despite an increase in U.S. forces there during 2006-2008, insurgents were expanding their area and intensity of operations, resulting in higher levels of overall violence. There was substantial Afghan and international disillusionment with corruption in the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and militants enjoyed a safe haven in parts of Pakistan. Building on assessments completed in the latter days of the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration conducted two “strategy reviews,” the results of which were announced on March 27, 2009, and on December 1, 2009, respectively. Each review included a decision to add combat troops, with the intent of creating the conditions to expand Afghan governance and economic development, rather than on hunting and defeating insurgents in successive operations. The new strategy has been propounded by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who was appointed top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan in May 2009. In his August 30, 2009, initial assessment of the situation, Gen. McChrystal recommended a fully resourced, comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy that could require about 40,000 additional forces (beyond 21,000 additional U.S. forces authorized in February 2009). On December 1, 2009, following the second high level policy review, President Obama announced the following: • The provision of 30,000 additional U.S. -
Consumed by Corruption More Stories
THE AFGHANISTAN PAPERS Part 4: Consumed by corruption More stories THE AFGHANISTAN PAPERS A secret history of the war CONSUMED BY CORRUPTION The U.S. flooded the country with money — then turned a blind eye to the graft it fueled By Craig Whitlock Dec. 9, 2019 bout halfway into the 18-year war, Afghans stopped hiding how corrupt their country had become. THE AFGHANISTAN PAPERS Part 4: Consumed by corruption More stories A Dark money sloshed all around. Afghanistan’s largest bank liquefied into a cesspool of fraud. Travelers lugged suitcases loaded with $1 million, or THE AFGHANISTAN PAPERS Part 4: Consumed by corruptionmore, on flights leaving Kabul. More stories KABUL, 20122006 (Yuri(Gary Kozyrev/Noor) Knight/VII/Redux) Mansions known as “poppy palaces” rose from the rubble to house opium kingpins. THE AFGHANISTAN PAPERS Part 4: Consumed by corruptionPresident Hamid Karzai won reelection after cronies stuffed thousands of More stories ballot boxes. He later admitted the CIA had delivered bags of cash to his office for years, calling it “nothing unusual.” In public, as President Barack Obama escalated the war and Congress approved billions of additional dollars in support, the commander in chief and lawmakers promised to crack down on corruption and hold crooked Afghans accountable. In reality, U.S. officials backed off, looked away and let the thievery become more entrenched than ever, according to a trove of confidential government interviews obtained by The Washington Post. In the interviews, key figures in the war said Washington tolerated the worst offenders — warlords, drug traffickers, defense contractors — because they were allies of the United States. -
The U.S. Surge and Afghan Local Governance
UNITeD StateS INSTITUTe of Peace www.usip.org SPeCIAL RePoRT 2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063 ABOUT THE REPORT Frances Z. Brown This report focuses on both the U.S. military’s localized governance, reconstruction, and development projects and U.S. civilian stabilization programming in Afghanistan from 2009 through 2012. Based on interviews with nearly sixty Afghan and international respondents in Kabul, Kandahar, Nangarhar, The U.S. Surge and and Washington, this report finds that the surge has not met its transformative objectives due to three U.S. assumptions that proved unrealistic. It also examines lessons from the U.S. surge’s impacts on local governance that can be applied toward Afghan Local Governance Afghanistan’s upcoming transition. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Lessons for Transition Frances Z. Brown is a 2011–12 International Affairs Fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations and an Afghanistan Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace. She has worked in and on Summary Afghanistan since 2004, and her previous jobs included roles with the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit and the • The U.S. military and civilian surge into Afghanistan starting in late 2009 aimed to stabilize United States Agency for International Development. She holds the country through interconnected security, governance, and development initiatives. an MA from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International • Despite policymakers’ claims that their goals for Afghan governance were “modest,” the Studies and a BA from Yale University. The views in this report surge’s stated objectives amounted to a transformation of the subnational governance are solely her own and do not reflect the views of the U.S. -
Thoughts on Unconventional Threats and Terrorism
A GRAND STRATEGY ESSAY Thoughts on Unconventional Threats and Terrorism by Karl W. Eikenberry Working Group on Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy www.hoover.org/taskforces/foreign-policy Effective formulation of a state’s security strategy begins with an articulation of national interests and the threats to those interests. During the past twenty-five years, as the dangers posed by potential nation-state actors have shrunk significantly from those experienced throughout most of the twentieth century, America’s national security strategy has given great prominence to unconventional threats in general and to international terrorism in particular. Indeed, since 9/11, terrorism is regarded by the US national security community as the most severe of the many existing unconventional threats. But is the absolute priority currently placed on combating terrorism strategically justified? This paper explores this issue, foreign policy and grand strategy foreign first by examining the meaning of the term unconventional threat and then by examining the implications of using unconventional threats in developing America’s security policy. Unconventional is typically defined as” being out of the ordinary” or “not bound by or in accordance with convention.”1 For something to be classified unconventional implies its occurrence is infrequent or not widespread and that it is in contravention to dominant societal rules and norms. Unconventional, however, can become conventional when framework conditions change. For example, some in the United States categorized unrestricted submarine warfare as acts of terror in the buildup to on working group and during the First World War. It was defined in this manner both because only the Germans employed U-boats on a large scale and because the Germans used this force asymmetrically against American shipping and that of our wartime allies, neither of whom had greatly invested in that capability or in any appropriate countermeasures. -
Nomination Hearing Committee on Foreign Relations
S. HRG. 111–930 NOMINATION HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION MARCH 26, 2009 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gpo.gov U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 65–249 PDF WASHINGTON : 2011 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate Nov 24 2008 11:17 Apr 12, 2011 Jkt 062931 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 S:\HEARING FILES\111TH CONGRESS\NOMINATION HEARINGS THAT WE WILL PRINT\6 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin Republican Leader designee BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania JIM DEMINT, South Carolina JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DAVID MCKEAN, Staff Director KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director (II) VerDate Nov 24 2008 11:17 Apr 12, 2011 Jkt 062931 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 S:\HEARING FILES\111TH CONGRESS\NOMINATION HEARINGS THAT WE WILL PRINT\6 CONTENTS Page Eikenberry, LTG Karl W., to be Ambassador to Afghanistan ............................. 10 Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12 Inouye, Hon.